KEMALISM AND POST-KEMALISM: TURKISH STATE in SEARCH of PALATABLE CITIZEN

FOREVER

SEVGİ KURU AÇIKGÖZ

Homo-LASTus was the constructed palatable citizen model of Kemalist tutelaryregime. It did not include all the segments in the society. Identities exclusion wasimplemented in several ways. The exclusion of Turkey’s identities from Turkey’spolitical system has been an obstacle on Turkish democratic consolidation. AKP’semergence to power flourished the expectation of Turkey becoming moredemocratic and embracing all its citizens equally. However, after a decade of AKPrule, Turkey seemed to enter a post-Kemalist tutelary era which has its owncriteria for the palatable citizen and which, just like Kemalism, tries to excludeand oppress some parts of the society. Either Kemalist or post-Kemalist Islamist,it seems that the state’s reflex to shape the citizen identity does not alter forTurkey.

Keywords: Kemalism, post-Kemalism, Identity, AKP, Homo-LASTus.

INTRODUCTION

Each nation-state came up with certain values that constructed

its identity. The identity of Turkish republic was defined through

Kemalism, Turkish nationalism and Lausannian Islam which gave birth

to the palatable citizen, Homo-LASTus. It is important to define the

building blocks of this identity since some ethnic and religious

groups in the country were excluded from Homo-LASTus. The first part

of the paper will give a definition of Homo-LASTus and seek to

explain the history of this identity and how it was constructed

through judicial, social, political instruments.

The modern Turkey inherited the territories of the Ottoman

Empire, the Anatolia and eastern Thrace. These territories were

hosting divergent ethnic and religious identities. Beside the Sunni

Turks, there were Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Alevites and Kurds in the

region. The second part of the paper will try to focus on the fate

of these identities during and after the formation of Homo-LASTus.

Another focus will be on practising Muslim population who preferred

to put Islam on the centre of their social life but were constrained

with the establishment of the secular Republic.

With the experience of AKP rule in 2002, Homo- LASTus began to

lose its importance, while the identities which were vilified,

oppressed, ignored throughout the Republican era, started to be more

visible and relatively tolerable. This visibility and tolerance had

firstly been regarded as a step towards democratization. Therefore,

different segments of the society that personally did not share the

way of life of the AKP rulers, gave support to the party for the

sake of more democratization. With a continuous and increasing

support from different segments of the society, AKP managed to

overcome the tutelary regime of Kemalism; some indicative incidents

in this struggle were the 27 April e-memorandum, the Sledgehammer

and Ergenekon trials and the referendum for a new Constitution in

2010. The period from 2002 to 2010 can be marked as an era in which

Kemalism got weakened and the state took some steps to normalize its

relation with the identities that were excluded previously.

In 2011 general elections AKP took 49.9% of the votes in

Turkey. The party which had already been criticized for ‘one man’

authoritative behaviour, began to intense its majoritarian policies

and regulations. The education system was changed in such a way that

the only state secondary school alternative to the regular secondary

school became the imam-hatip schools which aimed to raise imams and

preachers in the country. No other profession, science or language

based secondary schools were promoted in the 4+4+4 system. Erdoğan

repeatedly declared that AKP’s aim was to raise a pious generation.

While some progressive negotiation had seemingly been taking place

with the Kurds, the government could not come to compromise with the

Alevis’ demands in the country. Polarization and ideational-

political exclusion intensified with the Gezi incidents of June

2013, the regulation of prep-schools closure and lastly the

corruption probes of December 2013. Each of these topics could be a

paper on their own. This paper is just a brief comparison of two

identity imposition periods of Turkish republic; the Kemalist

tutelary, the transition, the post –Kemalist tutelary.

I. THE FIRST STEPS OF A NEW NATION IN THE LATE OTTOMAN TIMES

The building blocks of Homo-LASTus can be rooted back to the

late Ottoman period. The first interaction of the empire with

nationalism was through uprises in Balkan territories. The

populations demanded autonomy and insurrection mainly due to the

abuses of local Muslim landowners and the janissaries.1 Nationalism

has flourished in the nineteenth century throughout the Empire

(including the Asiatic provinces) and proved to be the most

important factor for destruction of the Empire (Zürcher 2007: 26).

Competing ideological debates were brought up by the Ottoman elites

in order to cope with this destruction. Some people favored

Ottomanism, which supported that different communities could unite

around the Ottoman throne. Pan Islamists argued, on the other hand,

that the empire could regenerate on the basis of Islamic practises

and solidarity could be maintained within the Islamic Ümmet

1 The uprises began in Serbia in 1808. ‘It was not a coincidence that themovements leader was a rich pig exporter called Kara George.’ (see detailsin Zürcher, 2007: 26. )

(Community), whereas pan Turks sought to the union of Turkic people

under the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher 2007: 127) .

I.A. Turkish Nationalism before the Republic

Turkish had already become the state’s official language in

1876 Constitution. But it was after the Second Constitutional Period

in 1908 that Turkish nationalism became publicly more visible under

the rule of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ülker 2005: 617).

Actually the official ideology of 1908 was Ottomanism. The new

constitutional state was expected to promote equal rights to all

loyal citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious differences.

However in 1912, the Balkan War took place upon which the Empire

lost its richest and most developed provinces (Macedonia, Albania,

Thrace) which it used to hold for 500 years. Numerically the loss

was 60 000 square miles with about 4 million inhabitants. After this

event, first time in Ottoman history, Turks became the majority

ethnic group in the remaining country (Zürcher 2007: 109).

Especially the loss of Albania made the CUP (the Young Turks)

conclude that Ottomanism would not be capable to unite the empire

(Ibid.: 130). Under these circumstances, the Young Turks turned their

face more towards Turkification.

Turkification has been implemented in several areas. One of the

most important issues was the nationalization of the economy. The

national economy was to be led by the Muslim- Turk bourgeoisie. This

bourgeoisie, in the end, should supplant the dominance of Armenian

and Greek commercial classes. The Language Reform of 1915 prohibited

the use of foreign languages in economic transactions. Non- Muslim

traders were boycotted. The locals’ non- Turkish names were replaced

by Turkish names (Ülker 2005: 622-624).

Another important implementation of Turkification was the

settlement and forced migration policies. The aim of this policy was

to purify the demographic structure of Anatolia in favour of the

Muslim Turks. A population exchange was formulated in the treaty

signed after the second Balkan War. Upon this formulation, in 1913

and 1914, more than 45 000 Muslims from Bulgaria came to the Empire

and more than 45 000 Bulgarians migrated from the Empire to

Bulgaria. The CUP suggested a similar agreement also to Greece. In

order to force the Greek government to consent population exchange,

the CUP immediately started to drive forcefully the Greek population

of Thrace and Aegean coast to interior parts of Anatolia. Shortly

after, the Greek government announced that population exchange could

take place voluntarily and simultaneously, but the Ottoman Empire

entered WWI and the negotiations were suspended. Before and during

WWI, about 435 000 Muslim immigrants entered the Ottoman territory.

These were mainly settled to the villages of non- Muslim

populations, especially of the Greeks (Ibid.: 625). In May 1915 the

CUP passed a law regulating the relocation of the groups which were

seen as potential traitors. Many Armenians died during these

deportations due to disease, starvation, plunder of bandit.2 As a

result of this policy, about at least 700,000 Armenians and 500,000

Greeks were forced to leave their homes and hometowns.

The deportation policy was implemented in another way to the

Muslim non- Turk immigrants. The immigrants from Bosnia and Albania,

were not allowed to settle near the Balkans, also not to those

cities where the overall population of the Muslim Turks would fell

below 90 percent. They were rather scattered to Anatolian towns

where they would not make more than 10 percent of the population.

2 Famine was a regular situation in those years, especially in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine. In Autumn 1916, only due to famine, 60 thousand people were reported to have died in Lebanon. In the winter of 1916, a total of 150 thousand people were reported to have died. (see details Lewy, 2011: 95-105).

The government’s major concern in this policy was to assimilate this

population into the Turkish culture (Ibid.:627). The Arab and

Kurdish refugees were settled to places where they would not make

the majority. The already settled refugees of Diyarbakır, Erzurum,

Elazığ and Sivas were also sent to inner Anatolia.

In almost ten years, the CUP policies together with war

conditionalities, altered the demographic structure of Anatolia

drastically.3 The policies were only implemented in Anatolia and

seeked to create a lebensraum for the Turkish ‘nation’ which was

challenged by the Greeks in the west, and the Armenians in the east.

The Sevres Treaty in 1920, which was regarded as born death due

to several reasons including disagreements within the Entente and

the Ottoman government’s lack of legitimacy in eyes of its people,

foresaw an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia, whereas left

Aegean coastal region to Greece. This treaty has partly been

attempted to realize and could not succeed, but it has become a

source for threat perception throughout the Republican history until

recently. Serves Treaty has been made reference in the history books

within the educational system to remember the growing generation on

the ambitious intentions of the outside world on Turkey’s

territorial integrity.

I.B. Citizen Constructing Instruments in the late Ottoman

Period

In 1910, in the Ottoman Assembly Grand Vizier İbrahim Hakkı

expressed that:

3 The territories of Turkey lost about 90 percent of both its Greek and Armenian population between 1913 and 1923. Muslim percentage before the wars was 80 percent and by 1923 it has reached 98 percent due to the immigrations and deportations. (Zürcher 2007: 170-172).

Coming to the point of citizen, learning Turkish has greatestimportance in that case too. Since, a person who does not knowTurkish will be deprived of some rights [hukuk]. For example, hewill not be able to be deputy. But there is one more importantthing. What is it? Citizens should be of the same opinion on thematters that are connected to the life of the state. Namely, theyshould interpret and view the future of the state in the samemanner and they should possess the same sentiment. This isabsolutely the objective that the Government and Kanun-i Esasi arelooking for. The homogeneity of education and culture (terbiye) isdesired. (Ülker 2005: 619)

In the late Ottoman period, there was an effort to define the

rights and duties of the citizens who were previously seen as mere

tax giving subjects of the Sultan. Citizenship was tried to be

standardized by law in order to build a collective identity and a

qualified united public sphere. Secular celebration days (The Day of

Constitutional Declaration, The Day of Assembly) were invented after

the declaration of the Second Constitution to lessen the level of

distinction between religions (and religious feast days). (Üstel

2004: 28)

There were two important institutions in modern central state

building process (‘the community of citizens’); the military and

education (Ibid. : 29). A law has passed which made military duty

obligatory also for the non-Muslim males. In case they wanted to get

exemption, they had to pay money. After the Second Constitutional

period, school courses were formulated to give collective

consciousness through Ottoman Geography, Ottoman History and

Turkish.

II. BUILDING THE KEMALIST NATION STATE AND CONSTRUCTING ITS

CITIZENS: THE IDENTITY OF TURKISH REPUBLIC

After the War of Independence in which Mustafa Kemal made

emphasis on Islamic brotherhood to mobilize all Muslim entities in

Anatolia, the Turkish Republic was established in 1923 with the

treaty of Laussanne which defined not only the territorial but also

the ideational borders of the new Republic. The population exchanges

which started in the CUP period have been rewritten and shaped in

the treaty of Laussanne. A few hundred thousand immigrants entered

Turkey from the Balkans within a decade. Not all were Turkish

speaking. But they were Muslim and the state considered that they

had the potential to ‘cope’ with Turkish identity. (Ülker 2007: 10-

12)

A national enclosure defines also the cultural- national

boundaries of a particular citizenship identity. The more a nation-

state could built an integrated homogenous national political

identity, the more a genuine basis it would have for legitimacy

(İçduygu and Kaygusuz 2004: 34). Turkish nation- state building was

a process of constructing Kemalism through social practices, norms

and institutions.

Mustafa Kemal and his comrades were from the Young Turk

tradition. The early periods of the Turkish Republic was

economically, politically and ideologically much more a continuation

of the Young Turk era4. However, despite this continuation, the

Kemalists did not want the Empire to be regarded as the ancestor of

the Republic. The aim was a Western type rapid modernization which

would decrease the differences between Turkey and the West and avoid

the Western orientalist mind set and imperialist ambitions.5 The

process of modernization was also the process of identity building

4 Zürcher points to the similarity between the Young Turk II. Constitutional Era andthe first years of the Turkish republic. He points that in each phase the governments began with a pluralistic and rather free environment (1908- 1913 and 1922-1925 respectively) but finally get engaged establishing a hegemony (1913-1918 and 1925-1945) (Zürcher 2007: 163- 172).

5 ‘Identity differences increased otherness, where as similarities diminished this otherness and become a means of survival.’ See details in Bilgin, 2008; 39; pp. 593-613.

for Turkey, and Kemalism was to construct the path and the citizens

of the Turkish Republic.

II.A. Instruments of Kemalism and Turkification

The path for construction was multi-dimensional. There were

economic, political, cultural and geographical means which served

the construction of Kemalist state and citizenship. By these means,

different identities and subjectivities were articulated into a

common project, and a new social order was brought by, out of a

variety of dislocated elements. So both the political practises and

the outcomes had hegemonic characters (Çelik 2009: 224-225).

Kemalism was a top- down project in which the ruling elite aimed to

shape people accordingly.

The 1924 Constitution defined all people of Turkey as ‘Turks’

regardless of their racial or religious basis (Şeker 2005: 64). This

definition goes parallel with the above formulation and gives the

first idea on the ‘common’ element of Kemalism. Turkish has already

been declared as the official language in the Ottoman Empire. In

1928, a campaign has been mobilized: ‘Citizen! Speak Turkish’. With

this campaign, the usage of other languages in public was banned.

In the Ottoman Empire, the economic facilities were mainly

concentrated in the hands of non-Muslim minorities, the Greeks, the

Armenians, the Jews. Starting with the CUP era, the economy was

tried to be ‘nationalized’ (Turkified) and this continued during the

Republican era. Due to the population exchanges and deportations,

the country has lost much of its economically qualified class and

the replacement of this class by a Muslim Turkish one was both seen

necessary and desired in the Kemalist regime. In 1923, non-Muslim

traders were excluded from Istanbul Trade Chamber. In 1926, a law

has passed which made the use of Turkish language in the trade-

business transactions obligatory. The same year, with informal

notifications, the foreign companies were dictated to employ at

least 75% Muslim Turk employee in their companies. The Surname Law

of 1934 banns the usage of surnames which make reference to other

ethnicities (Aktoprak 2010). Indeed, it is still the case in Turkey,

that by taking Turkish citizenship, a person has to take a Turkish

name.

The geographical reconstruction of the country continued after

Lausanne since the Turkish government agreed on population exchange

with Greece. These exchanges were made on the basis of religion.

Christians were exchanged with Muslims regardless of the language

they spoke natively. A Turk was presupposed to be Muslim and a

Muslim was foreseen to become a Turk. The immigrant Muslim non-

Turkish populations were settled as such proportions that they could

be assimilated within the majority Turkish speaking inhabitants.

Especially the Settlement Law of 1934 was a very detailed process of

assimilation in which all ethnic groups were classified and

redefined and decided to be settled accordingly.6

The educational system was one of the crucial chains of the

identity construction process. The aim was to build a duty- based

citizen consciousness. The Malumat-ı Medeniye (Acknowledgment of Civilization)

lectures in schools were renamed as Malumat-ı Vataniye (Acknowledgment of

Homeland). Although the books of these lectures were teaching a rather

constitutional civic citizen model between 1924 and 1926, after the

Sheih Said rebellion in 1925 the citizenship expression has changed

to a more authoritative one. The new lecture books made more

emphasis on the duties of the citizens. The accession of the citizen

into the political system was only through vote, tax and military6For a clear prescription of the Law in 1934, see Ülker, 2008.

duty (for the male). Acknowledgement on Homeland books did not

include direct vilification of other ethnic groups, instead they

ignored and made the others invisible (Altınörs 2010: 44-45).

Moreover, a lot of emphasis has been made on Turks moral virtues.

These definitions were formulated and institutionalized in the

Turkish History Thesis which made the Turks the descendants of all

important civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Aegean and Anatolia.

Additionally, the Sun Language Theory was formulated which claimed

that most major languages in the world originated from Turkish

(Şeker 2005: 65). The elementary school education was seen as

particularly important and Turkification elements in teaching

history and identity consciousness were given carefully and

constantly. National consciousness was tried to be strengthened and

supported through the celebration of national feast days.

Institutions like the Public Houses (Halkevleri) and Village Institutes (Köy

Enstitüleri) aimed to mobilize people as modern, loyal and productive7

citizens. In 1928, the Latin alphabet was adopted which caused a

clear cut break with the previous tradition (the Ottoman Empire).

This break was also one of the steps towards Laicism.

II.B. Laicism (Secularism) and Kemalism

Religion was the most centrifugal determinant of the social and

political life in the 1920s’ Turkey. This centrality of religion was

regarded as an obstacle for the economic and social transformation

of the Republic. The founders’ of the Republic wanted to diminish

the role of religion in political sphere and convert it into a

solely private life issue (Gülalp 2005: 356). Laicism aimed to

distance the state from religion and serve as a means for modern

civilization. The social, cultural, economic and educational

7 Productive in the sense that he/ she becomes useful to state. It was not an individualist productiveness.

programs had to be introduced without the influence of religion.

This was believed to be the ideal path which could serve the

Republic catch up the ‘civilized’ world. Religion had to be

controlled, so that it did not burden the transformation (Bilgin,

2008).

Laicism was a process which began with the abolishment of the

Caliphate in 1924. In 1925, the Western Style Dress Code was passed

as a constitutional code which brought the hat as headgear to social

life. The message of this law was to show the ‘civilized world’ that

the Turks were not different, but similar to them. Although it was

argued that it would help to unify society since it banned religious

symbols as markers of difference (Bilgin 2008: 602), the perception

in the society had become that laicism was something against

religion since it banned the religious symbols (Saygın- Önal 2008:

39). In 1926, the new Civil Code was introduced from Switzerland

together with the Gregorian Calendar. Two years later, Islam was

written out of Constitution and the Latin alphabet was adopted. In

the beginning of 1930s the Western metric system and Sunday as

holiday was recognized. Finally in 1937, Laicism was introduced in

the Constitution as one of the key elements of the Republic. It was

a constructed and controlled project which aimed to fulfill the goal

of modernization and westernization of the country (Kadıoğlu 2010:

492).

The acceptance of Laicism was tried to be fortified by

vilification of the other, Islam. Incidents such as Menemen Vakası8 were

told over and over to make people threatened of Islam and of

practicing Muslim people, so that they would refer to shelter under

Laicism. Domestic threat was constructed in order to make masses8 It is a unique case in the early years of Republic where a hodja was claimed to have killed brutally an army officer. Many speculative scenarioshave been drawn about the incident.

define the Kemalist elite as the safe guardians. Vilifications were

supported by the high censored press.

It is also argued that Laicism has been adopted in order to

position the state equally distant to all belief systems and avoid

the Western powers interference into domestic issues for Christian

minorities (Bilgin 2008). However, it is a question whether this

point was in favour of the non-Muslims. For example, with the

adoption of Civil Code, non-Muslims’ marriages in their churches and

synagogues would not be legitimate without the stately defined

marriage.

II.C. Sunni Identity or the Lausannian Islam

‘Our real citizens are Muslims, belong to Hanefi denomination and speak Turkish’.

Celal Nuri Bey, National Assembly (TBMM), 1924 Constitution Discussions.

(Bayır 2010: 141)

Although melted distinctively, it was impossible to completely

exterminate religion from social life. Therefore it was crucial to

control, shape and teach the religion, Islam, so that ‘the poor

folk’ would be informed on how much and what kind of religiosity to

be ‘proper’. Islam was to be formulated in such a ‘modern’ way that

it would serve the establishment of Kemalist regime. This ‘modern’

version was found to be within the Sunni tradition and named as the

Lausannian Islam which makes emphasis on its unique character shaped

by the Kemalist rhetoric(Yılmaz 2005: 389). So the state based a

religion in order not to become a religion- based state (Altan 2010:

92). It is a contradiction within itself since laicism means the

separation of state from religious affairs, and then the state does

conduct in religious affairs in favour of a certain type.

Actually in 1920, Turkey’s founder and first president Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk defined the basis of nation over religion, since the

War of Independence was fought with the Muslim Kurds of Anatolia.

But after the Lausanne Treaty and the formation of the Turkish

Republic, the emphasis for national identity shifted to secularism

and Turkish nationalism.

The Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was established

in order to formulate Islam in such a way that it would become a

servant of the Kemalist ideology. Diyanet9 became an instrument of

the Regime to implement state politics (Kadıoğlu 2010: 493). At an

environment where all other religious orders and lodges were

formally prohibited, Diyanet was the only alternative possible for

the moderate Muslim population of Turkish Republic. Islam which was

not controlled by the state began to be perceived as a symbol of

backwardness (Ibıd.: 497) and as a path which was not equally

legitimate as the stately palatable Lausannian Islam. Thus an entity

which couldn’t be equally legitimate, would likely be suspected as a

potential ‘threat’ in the country. Therefore, the formally

prohibited, but informally existing religious orders and lodges of

Turkey were to be accused as being a source of reactionarism and a

domestic security threat for the Turkish Republic whenever the state

tended to be more oppressive, which was very often the case since

Turkey faced military interventions of several types almost within

each ten years of time.10 The content of the Friday sermons were (and

still are) centrally delivered by the Diyanet to all the mosques in

Turkey, even to the mosques in Europe which are operating under

9 For the year 2013, Diyanet had a budget more than 2.5 billion USD with emplyees exceding 115 thousand and mosques 85 thousand. See details Yılmaz 2013, 116.10 The 1960 Coup, the 1971 Memorandum, the 1980 Coup, the February 28 1997 intervention, the April 2007 E-Memorandum. One should also note that several extra-ordinary and unsolved violant incidents took place in between each intervention which became a justification for the state to remain oppressive continuesly.

Diyanet. The state, be it civil or military, has been determining

the contents of these sermons.11

Turkification has been an important characteristic of

Lausannian Islam, especially in the one party era, when the (prayer

call) ezan was made in Turkish. Just as referring to a Turk meant that

he/she was Muslim, calling a person Muslim would automatically

recall that he/she was Sunni. So Lausannian Muslims would make up

the preferred palatable subject citizen model in the Kemalist

Republic of Turkey. They would satisfy their religious affiliations

as much as the state allowed. They would pray in private, but would

refrain to do so in public, for example in their official work

places. The most favoured Sunni Muslims were those ones who would

call themselves Muslims but were not practising at all.12 The women

were expected to be unveiled in order to exist in the public as

educated and professional citizens. So the citizens would call

themselves Sunni Muslims however would not carry any visible

characteristics about this identity. The identity would refer more

to secular, cultural and socio –political basis, than piety (Yılmaz

2013: 110).

II.4.The Homo-LASTus

After all, Kemalism managed to establish its own middle class,

the good citizen, the Homo-LASTus, laic, Ataturkist, Sunni, Turk

citizen (Yılmaz 2013: 108). Each element of Homo-LASTus is a self in

relation to another ideational element. Laicism aimed to serve the

11 After February 28 1997, the military not only determined the content of the sermons, but also illegally monitored religous communities and individuals by usingDiyanet bureaucracy and facilities. Accessed November 5, 2014. http://haber.stargazete.com/guncel/buda-28-subatin-balyozu/haber-711592. 12 If they would feel free to consume alcoholic beverages under certain occasions and celebrities, this could well be regarded as a further positive characteristics for the image of the citizens in the eyes of the Kemalist state.

citizen’s modernization which was identical with westernization. It

would make the Muslims as modern as the non-Muslims. Since it has

been impossible to eliminate religion totally, it should serve

Kemalism and should have an urban structure. This was established

with the Laussanian type Sunni Islam.

Although they are often used synonymously, Kemalism and

Ataturkism refer to different identities. A Kemalist has more

hostile affiliations towards Islam and supports an elitist top down

construction of the society. An Ataturkist, on the other hand, can

also be a practising Muslim. He/she doesn’t have to be, but this is

a possibility. Ataturkism stands for the respect to Ataturk and what

he has done for the independence and reconstruction of Turkey.13

Turkishness, as an identity, aimed to homogenize the society’s

divergent ethnicity. All other ethnic identities were aimed to get

assimilated or at least invisible through Turkification. In the

Laussanne Treaty, minorities were defined on religious basis. So

non-Muslims were minorities, but Muslims that had immigrated from

different lands like, Caucasus, Crimea, Balkans were all regarded as

Turks, even if they hadn’t an ethnic root for Turkishness.14 Some of

these populations kept their mother language, but most of them were

totally assimilated. It is a usual case that these non-ethnic Turks

advocating Turkishness in a very enthusiastic manner. This can be

regarded as a success of the Kemalist nation-building policies

(Yılmaz 2013: 110).

13 Yılmaz, 2013: 110. Kemalist and Ataturkist are generally used interchangebly. However a Kemalist has a more assertive secularist characteristic, while an Ataturkist can have a deep respect not only to Ataturk but also to Islam. 14 Ülker, 2007. Thus as the non-Muslims were minorities and the aim was a homogenoussociety, having less minority was a preferred condition. Therefore Christians who were linguistically speaking Turkish were exchanged with Greece, while Muslims who spoke no Turkish were welcomed.

Overall, the Homo-LASTus people can be defined as the

successful outcome of the hegemonic imposition of the Kemalist

regime. They believed sincerely and enthusiastically to what they

have been told. According to Homo-LASTus people, Turkey has had many

outside and inside enemies15 and protecting the country from these

enemies needed and needs a lot qualification. This qualification was

only seen present in their identity as being western, enlightened,

modern, civilized and loyally bound to Turkish nationality. So,

together with the assistance of the army16, the Homo-LASTus elites

were the masters and the guardians of the country, the Republic of

Turkey.17

There are threat perceptions based on past, like what the others

did to Turks. There are also threat perceptions of present, that

each identity that does not fit to Homo-LASTus is a potential danger

for the Republic. Combining the past and the present, an average

Homo-LASTus is likely to construct a threat perception of the

future. These threat perceptions, in the end, formulate the

attitudes and actions of the identity. The education of the identity

started in elementary with the daily oath18, continues in middle

school with Vatandaşlık Dersi (Citizenship Course) and İnkilap Tarihi (History of

Revolution), finally ends up in university with the rereading of İnkilap

Tarihi (History of Revolution) regardless of the faculty the student attends.

III. THE OTHERS OF TURKEY: THE IDENTITIES OF TURKISH SOCIETY15 An anonymous saying: ‘A Turk has no other friend than another Turk’ (‘Türk’ün Türkten başka dostu yoktur.’). Also Ataturk in his ‘Address to Youth’ speech states that Turkey would always have enemies abroad and inside.16 Turkey has had 2 direct (1960, 1980) military intervention to its parliamentary system alongside with an ultimatom in 1971. Thereafter the military was on the scene in 1997 with a post modern intervention and in 2007 with a post modern cyber ultimatom.17 A much refered sentence within the elite: ‘My Ata! We are the loyal watchmen of the Republic that you commended us’ (‘Atam! Emanetin olan Cumhuriyetin sadık bekçileriyiz’)18 The daily oath ceremony was lifted recently; it started with the words ‘I am a Turk, I am hard working…’ ended up saying ‘…how happy the one who calls himself a Turk!’

The Homo-LASTus, the white Turks of the country, had to govern

the country inside and represent it respectfully outside. There were

also the Negro Turks and the mountain Turks in Turkey19, and also those

‘unfortunates’ who could not be put to any category of Turks at all.

All of these have to be focused on, in order to understand

contemporary Turkish society and politics.

III.A. The non- Muslims

‘On the one hand, we say citizens of [the state]…are completely Turk. On theother hand, the government is struggling to make sure foreign companieswill dismiss Greek and Armenian workers. When we attempt that….[and] ifwe are told that ‘No, in line with the law passed by your parliament they areTurks’ what would your answer be? The word citizenship would not beenough to abate a desire which is in the mind and heart… there is onereality, they cannot be Turk… there is no possibility’

(Hamdullah Suphi Bey, TBMM, 1924 Constitution Discussions)

(Bayır 2010: 142)

Based on this assumption, Turkish parliament passed a law in

1926, which stated that only ‘Turks’ can become state officers. The

law was under practise until 1965, when the precondition was changed

to ‘Turkish citizenship’.

The non- Muslims, Armenians, Greeks, Jews were citizens but did

not belong to the ‘national community’. They were seen as the

potential collaborators of foreign states who were seen as not

giving up their ambitions on Turkey. So the real national community

should always be alert against the collaborators.

Until recently, the Land Registry Law referred to non- Muslims

as ‘the foreigners whose existence has been recognized by the

19 See Akyol, 2011. Akyol roughly classified the Muslim citizens of Turkey as White Turks (the elitist Seculars), Negro Turks (the practising Muslim periphery) and Mountain Turks (the Kurds).

Turkish Republic’ (Ibid.: 142). Although they were ‘foreigners’,

they were forced to pay the highest taxes between 1942 and 1944. The

Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) aimed to deal with the war profiteers. But it was

not applied properly and resulted in the discrimination of the non-

Muslim community. The 55 percent of the total tax revenue has been

taken from the non-Muslim business people in Istanbul and Izmir. If

they could not pay, they were deported or sentenced to forced labour

in countryside. Most of them sold their properties and businesses to

Muslim businessmen in order to pay. This period caused an

irreparable damage on the confidence of non-Muslims to the Turkish

state (Zürcher 2007: 208).

III.A.1.The Armenians

The Armenian population has declined dramatically due to the

1915 deportations. Among the discursive Armenian inhabitant numbers,

the Armenian population in Ottoman Empire, before 1915, can

concluded to be more or less 1,5 million (Lewy 2011: 366-367). In

1923, the Turkish Republic had about 65 thousand Armenians left. The

properties (houses) of the deported Armenians were given to the new

immigrant Turks (Muslims) with the Settlement regulations of the

Republican era. The Armenians who left their homes by deportation

and survived the bad conditions, did not return. They instead

settled to western countries and formulated the Armenian Diaspora.

The Armenian Diaspora constructed its identity on 1915 events.

Beginning with 1965, the Diaspora tried to make the international

community recognize the deportations as genocide. In the 1970s, the

armed reactionary Armenian group, ASALA, attacked and killed several

Turkish diplomats all over the world. ASALA also attacked civilian

international targets like the Orly Airport in 1983. Thereafter it

ceased fire and concentrated more on the recognition of genocide in

the international arena (Lewy 2011: 397-398). Today 20 countries

some of whom are Turkey’s significant trade partners (such as

Germany, Netherlands, Italy) are recognizing the 1915 events as

genocide. Most of the US federal states (42 out of 50) have also

recognized the 1915 events as the Armenian genocide. This situation

puts much burden on Turkish foreign policy and is likely to

intensify as 2015 marks the 100th anniversary of the deportations.

The remaining Armenians in Turkey avoided confrontation with

the Turkish state. They rather preferred to be invisible until

recent, when issues like minority rights have begun to be discussed

in public. They have most of the time tried to differentiate

themselves from the Diaspora. But still they could not avoid to

become target of Turkish nationalism. Hrant Dink, a leading

journalist of Turkish Armenian community, was trialled on the law of

‘Insulting Turkishness’.20 During the trials he was harshly accused

by the mainstream media as being a betrayer. In January 2007, he was

killed by a Turkish ultra nationalist boy who was afterwards

sentenced with lifelong imprisonment. By October 2014, the Case have

not concluded yet, since the investigations showed that the boy was

not alone.

In 2012, the Armenian elementary school students visited the

Education minister and requested the removal of humiliating

expressions about Armenians from the school text books.21 But in the

20 ‘Insulting’ is very interpretive in Turkey, especially if the issue inconcern is Turkishness or Atatürk. For the ‘insulting’ articles of HrantDink see, ---------- “Hrant Dink’i ‘yakan’ yazılar”, Radikal, October 10,2005. Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=16648521 See detail Todayszaman, January 5, 2012. Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-267705-dincer-listens-to-armenian-students-claim-of-misrepresentation-in-textbooks.html

school text books of 2014 there were still problematic expressions

and descriptions about the Armenian identity.22

III.A.2. The Greeks

The Greek population of Anatolia was about 2 million in the

late Ottoman era. The population shrunk to 120 thousand due to

immigrations and population exchanges (Zürcher 2007: 172). As

mentioned above, they were mostly seen as the collaborators of

Greece. Although their rights were defined in Laussanne, these were

easily suspended whenever relations deteriorated with Greece

(Aktoprak 2010: 37-38).

One of the most traumatic events which the community

experienced took place in September 6-7, 1955. The Cyprus issue was

an unsolved problematic between Turkey and Greece which put tension

on the relations on those days. The press had a significant role in

increasing the tension and preparing the conditions for September 6-

7 (Lengerli 2006: 103). The events were based on an information

that a bomb has exploded near the Turkish consulate in Salonika and

that the house in which Atatürk was born had been burned. This news

have ignited a serious of uncontrolled demonstrations in Istanbul

and Izmir in which thousands of buildings of Greek citizens were

damaged. Several Greeks lost their life and 35 were injured. After

this event, another wave of immigration took place.

Turkey was left with even a smaller Greek community, which was

still regarded as a potential threat. As the Cyprus crisis peaked in

the first half of 1970s with armed confrontations, the Turkish

government closed the Clergy School of Greek community which was

seen crucial for the Greek community to continue their religious

22 See Taraf, September 2014. http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/taner-akcam/kasitla-nefret-sucu-islenmektedir/30841/ . Accessed November 3, 2014.

traditions. The education in the Clergy School of Heybeliada,

actually, was formulated and permitted under the Treaty of

Laussanne. However, in time, Turkish public has developed a

perception that held the reopening of the Clergy School equivalent

to loosing national sovereignty and promoting missionary activity.

Whereas for the Greek community of Turkey, the reopening of the

Clergy School is one of the most important elements of cultural

continuation.

III.A.3.The Jews

The population of the Jews were not as much as the Armenians or

the Greeks. They were settled in Istanbul as well as in Thrace,

Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, Edirne and Kırklareli. They were traders and

economically well off. They were keeping their cultural diversity

which meant that they could not have been ‘successfully Turkified’

until 1930s. It is important to note that 1930s were the years when

Europe was experiencing the Hitler rule and anti-semitism.

In 1933, Nihal Atsız who became one of the leading names of

radical nationalism in Turkey later on, was appointed as Turkish

literature teacher from Malatya to Edirne. After he arrived in

Edirne, he started to write provocative articles in local journals

and held meetings within the Turkish community saying that they “had

to get rid of the Jews who were exploiting the Turkish people”. This

was one side of the coin. The other side was that Turkey wanted to

establish a military brigade in Thrace. The Turkish government did

not want to have the Jews in the region who were trade partners of

American companies. The Turkish government did not trust the Jews

because they were not Turkified. The propaganda of Atsız was

successful. The Jewish people were first economically boycotted.

Then the businesses of the Jews were plundered and they were

threatened to be killed if they don’t leave. Several Jews became

victims of brutal physical violence between June 28 and July 4,

1934. Thereafter, all Jews left Thrace. Most of them settled to

Istanbul, where as some immigrated to Greece (Bali 1999).

In 1942 they became subjects of the Wealth tax, upon which they

lost their confidence to Turkish state. Thousands of Jews immigrated

to Israel after 1950.23

III.B.The Practising Muslims

They were the Negro Turks of the system (Akyol 2011). The

Kemalist regime’s secular identity put hegemonic restrictions on the

visibility and practibility of Islam in daily life. An officer of

state, be it military or public, should not be a practising Muslim.

This would be regarded as a challenge to Laicism. Until recent, the

army officers who were daily practising Muslims and who had veiled

wife could have been dismissed from duty without any indemnity or

retirement salary. It was the case, even if they had a CV full with

honour rolls. The army officers’ head scarfed family members, be it

mother or wife, were not allowed to enter any building within the

army by headscarf. Especially after February 28 199724, they were

even not allowed to military hospitals if they had not covered their

head in a ‘traditional’ way.25

In the 1925 the educations in Medrese and Tekke were banned saying

that these were serving reactionary activities and hindering

23 See Gündem, 2012. Valuable information about the experiences of Turkey’s Jews can be find in the biographical book of a well known successful Jewishbusinessman of Turkey, Ishak Alaton. 24 The post modern coup of Turkey.25 Interesting terminologies have been developed for the so-called traditional way: rabbit-ear, granny style etc. The state in this way tried to decompose its ‘proper’ citizens from ‘improper’ ones: the beneath message aimed was: ‘the state is not against religion. But the religion should exist the way the state defines it; all others are source of threat.’

Turkey’s path to modern civilization. Many religious leading figures

were trialled and jailed during the Republic. The first ones were

those who opposed to wear the hat and insisted on their headgear

sarık. Many people were sentenced to death in the Independence Courts

of 1920s. Thus sarık and veil has been perceived as a major challenge

to Kemalist modernization since they were visibly differentiating

Turkey from Europe.

According to Homo-LASTus, the practising Muslims were regarded

as primitive and periphery. As long as they stayed at the periphery,

there was no problem. The conflicts began when the periphery

challenged the core socially, economically and politically. In the

1980s, with the changing economic and political structure of Turkey,

the practising Muslims became more visible at the border of the

core, in the big cities of the country. They were taking higher

education and began taking office in important state institutions.

This has been regarded as a threat to Laicism.

More threatening was the issue of the practising Muslim women.

Their ‘unmodernity’, their contradiction with laicism, the

headscarf, was so much visible, that it was impossible for the state

to have them in the public sphere. The only way practising Muslim

women to be in public sphere could be either as subordinate and

uneducated but veiled, or educated but unveiled. After the coup 28

February 1997, some universities established ‘convince rooms’ for

the head scarfed women who were to apply to the universities. In

these rooms, the university teachers tried to ‘convince’ the

headscarf women that their appearance were improper. They further

claimed that it could not be the women’s own preference, but their

families’ oppression on them that make them cover their head. It has

been only a few years that women can attend to universities with

headscarf in Turkey. Now they have become also more visible in

public duties.

Even at the top of Turkish state hierarchy, the headscarf faced

embargo from the guardians of the regime. When in 2002 the AKP came to

power with its leading figures’ wifes wearing headscarf, they were

looked upon in suspicion and were invited to official receptions of

President Ahmet Necdet Sezer without wife, which was contrary to the

usual practises. Also a silent civic embargo exists on the identity

in certain non-state areas. In 2011, a top company, Borusan,

cancelled the sponsorship of the woman rally champion, Burcu

Çetinkaya after her appearance on the news while giving an interview

to a head scarfed journalist.26

III.C.The Alevis

Some of them define themselves as a sect of Islam, while some

of them define themselves as a separate religious practise. They

make up about 10 percent of current Turkey’s population. They took

their share from laicism with the closure of Bektaşi dervish lodge

in 1920s. The establishment of the Directorate of the Religious

Affairs, Diyanet, continues to be a further obstacle for the Alevis

since it is based on Sunni belief and ignores any other belief.

The Alevis are not one homogenous entity. There are Alevi

Kurds, Alevi Zazas and Alevi Turks. But the way they have been

perceived by the Sunnis did not differ much according to the

different ethnicities because they were mostly defined over their

religious identity. However, in respect to the official perception,

26 See detail, Todayszaman. 2011.“Borusan cancels sponsorship allegedly overcompany image concerns”, December 28. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-267001-borusan-cancels-sponsorship-allegedly-over-company-image-concerns.html

Zaza and Kurd Alevis were more disadvantageous than the Turks

(Koçan- Öncü 2004).

Alevis faced several violent confrontation and discrimination

both by state and by public throughout the Republican era. The first

to mention would be the Dersim events of 1937. The cultural

heterogeneity and resistance of Dersim to the state was supressed

harshly by the government in 1937- 1938. Turkish war planes bombed

the region for days. Villages were evacuated. Thousands of people

were lost in the events. Many families were forcefully send and

settled to different places of Turkey where they would be all alone

with their identity within the Sunni majority. Girls were taken away

from their families and were given to army officers’ as home

servants where they were believed to be brought up in a proper

manner. Recently a documentary has been made on the lifes of these

girls in the aim of trying to find them.27

On the eve of the last military coup in 1980, the Alevis faced

two destructive confrontation with the Sunni population in two

middle range cities of Turkey, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum. In both

cases the events lasted for days and the government was unable to

settle them down. After the events, the populations in the respected

regions immigrated to more cosmopolitan cities where they would not

be visible and known through their identity.

The religious education in schools of Turkey are still Sunni

based. The cemevis of the Alevis are not recognised as worship places.

Since cemevis aren’t recognized by Diyanet as worship places, they

are not able to get financial aid from the state. Each year the

government specifies a significant amount to the Diyanet from the

annual budget. The Diyanet budget has been criticized for serving in27 For detail see the documentary http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=295tyDGsDYI

favour of just one part of the society (the Sunni Muslims), although

the budget is a result of the taxes collected from all Turkey’s

citizens including the Alevis.

III.D.The Kurds

They were initially, the Muslim brothers who fought the

Independence War together with the Turks against the non-Muslims.

After the establishment of the Republic, they became the second

biggest population. Their differentiation began with the abolishment

of the caliphate in 1924 which alienated their common identity

(Muslimhood) inside Turkey. Immediately after this, the Constitution

changed the definition of people living in Turkey. In 1921

Constitution it was stated as the ‘peoples of Turkey’ which was an

inclusive statement that also covered the Kurdish identity. In 1924

the sentence was changed as ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of

religion and race, are Turks as regard to citizenship’. The Sheihk

Said Kurdish rebellion erupted upon this change.28 This event marked

the end of brotherhood between the Kurds and the Turks. The Dersim

events fortified the polarization. Beginning with Dersim they were

defined as the men (the bandit) in the mountains; they were regarded

as the uncivilized mountain Turks which the state needed to oppress

for the sake of integrity.

Kurds were not and are still not allowed to learn their mother

tongue in state schools. Recently there has been a new regulation to

allow private schools teaching Kurdish which doesn’t seem very

realistic. Because most of the population is not in the condition to

effort private education. Indeed, in 2014, a few private school

declared that said they would start Kurdish courses. The majority

of the children of Kurdish citizens still have unequal educational

28 Esayan, 2010.

conditions when they start school since they have no language that

they can speak.29 The denial of Kurdish identity has been so strong

throughout the Republican period, that the Turkish state and society

would regard any reference to Kurdishness as a threat to sovereignty

and integrity. So when a protest singer, Ahmet Kaya, at a music

dinner in 1999 stated that he would like to sing Kurdish songs, he

was lynched immediately. Thereafter he was accused for being a

betrayer in the mainstream media and the court opened a trial on the

issue. He went to exile where he died a year later.

The major problematic attached to the Kurdish identity emerged

after the 1980 coup. The 1980 military coup was a brutally traumatic

experience to many people in Turkey, and especially to Kurds (Matur

2011). All kinds of torture and insult were practised on the

imprisoned people which included also insult on identity. After they

were released from prisons, they went to mountains and PKK was

formed. An armed confrontation between PKK and the Turkish army has

been going on for three decades which took the lifes of more than 30

thousand people.

Many unknown murder cases took place in 1990s in the Southeast

region of Turkey which decreased the people’s confidence to state.

Many Kurds immigrated to western cities or to the cities in the

region when their villages were burned or evacuated.

IV. THE RECURRENCE OF HISTORY: FROM PLURALISM TO HEGEMONY AGAIN

Eric Zürcher claims that Turkish politics had gone through

similar phases under Young Turks and under the rule of Mustafa Kemal

and his comrades. In both cases, the political movements initially

29 For detail see, “İki Dil Bir Bavul”: a documentary film on a Turkish teacher from western Anatolia attending a Kurdish village school in eastern Anatolia. http://www.perisanfilm.com/school/trailer.php

started to govern with a pluralistic stance and ended up with

oppressive hegemonic politics which were based on exclusion of some

parts of the society. In each oppressive era, the state had a threat

perception which served as a justification for the authoritarian

policies. The threat perception was fortified through vilification

in written, oral and visual communication instruments (i.e. books,

newspapers, magazines and movies). Rules were regulated according to

this constructed perception. The same path can also be observed

today with the AKP rule which has been governing the country for

twelve years. AKP, in early years of its rule, seemed to have a

pluralistic structure. After it felt sure that the military would

not make a coup and the Constitutional Court could not close the

party, AKP began to give an increasingly majoritarian hegemonic

outlook.

IV.A.The Challenge of the Core and Expectations for Equal

Citizenship

The first four years (from 2003 to 2007) of AKP rule can be

characterized having a willingness towards more democratization and

for more inclusion of the others in the society. Coming from an

Islamist background whose representative parties were closed down by

the Constitutional Court for several times, AKP in this era, tried

to convince the public as well as the ‘guardians’ of the Republic

that it had no intention of challenging the basic elements of the

Republic. The party gave a determinant image for more

democratization. In this era, Turkey seemed enthusiastically trying

to make progress in democratization and EU membership. Therefore it

gained the support of different segments in the country which would

normally not vote for an Islamic rooted party. In the absence of

productive opposition parties, AKP became a catchall party which

promised relative improvement conditions for all the disadvantageous

ethnic and religious identities that were excluded from Homo-LASTus.

In this era, the party’s policies were pretty much constrained by

the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as well as by a threat of closure

on the party. AKP was seen as the supporter of the peripheral

identities and its rule was regarded as a challenge to the core. The

2007 Presidential election was one of the most important

confrontations of the core statist elites and the peripheral AKP.

The government faced an e-memorandum from the military after

nominating Abdullah Gül for presidency. However AKP showed a

determinant stance against the e-memorandum, which in return,

increased its public support.

In the second era, from 2007 to 2011, most of the aggrieved

identities in Turkey continued supporting AKP with an expectation of

more democratization and equal citizenship for all. This support was

significant when high military officers had begun to be trialled in

Sledgehammer and Ergenekon probes that accused them for coup

attempts and constructing terror organization against the

government. Support for AKP continued in 2010 Referandum for

Constitutional Change which was perceived as a hope for Turkey’s

democratization. With this referendum, closure of political parties

became harder in Turkey. From 2007 to 2011, Turkey experienced the

weakening of Kemalist tutelary regime. While the weakening of

tutelary was expected to be replaced by a more democratic system, it

turned out that the elitist tutelary was being replaced by a

majoritarian tutelary, the post-Kemalist Erdoğanist regime, and this

new tutelary regime had its own definition for the palatable

citizen.

IV.B. 2011-2014: The New Palatable Identity of post-Kemalist

Turkey

Regulations in education and judiciary systems and the

discourses of Erdoğan, show what the palatable citizen for the AKP

has become. Erdoğan repeatedly declared that they were aiming to

raise a pious generation. He condemned the university students who

were living in boys and girls together apartment flats and said that

as a conservative democrat government they were determinant to bring

a new legal regulation about the issue.30 He said he was

‘tolerating’ those who had improper dressing.

Today, any social resistance or critique to any of the

decisions of the government is being regarded as a threat to peace

and stability in the country. Erdoğan repeatedly claims that those

who criticized or resisted AKP’s politics were not willing the

country develop and prosper. People, especially journalists are

losing their jobs, being targeted31 or even are being imprisoned.32

Businessmen who criticized the government politics were facing

additional financial checks on their business and obliged to some

extra payment. The discourse of Erdoğan has become increasingly

externalizing especially after 2010; vilification has become an

instrument used against almost all segments of the society.

In 2012, the AKP government came up with a new structural

change in the education system, the 4+4+4 System. The system was

30 Hürriyet Dailynews November 7, 2013. Accessed November 5, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/regulation-on-mixed-student-houses-would-be-unconstitutional.aspx?PageID=238&NID=57504&NewsCatID=341 31 There are many cases where journalists (and academicians) have been targeted personally in the speeches of Erdoğan. Two latest examples are thecases of Amberin Zaman and Ihsan Yılmaz. See details in http://www.todayszaman.com/blog/turkish-media-watch/journalists-react-to-erdogans-targeting-of-zaman_355020.html and http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/ihsan-yilmaz/erdogan-made-me-a-target-of-fanatics_363638.html , accessed November 6, 2014.32 Turkey, in the last years scored as one of the top countries for imprisoned journalists on the world. Together with the closure of twitter and youtube in the beginning of 2014, Freedom House Report of 2014 described Turkish press as ‘not Free’ and internet as ‘partly free’.

bringing back the secondary school in the aim of promoting the Imam-

Hatip schools which had initially been opened to raise Sunni

preachers and Imams in the 1950s. Then in decades the Imam-Hatip

schools had become an alternative for the pious conservative

citizens who wanted their students to take Islamic knowledge

together with social and physical sciences. But not all of the Imam-

Hatip high school graduates became imams and preachers. Instead, in

the university, they began to enter departments other than Islamic

sciences. In the 1990s they have been accused for being the backyard

of the political Islam in Turkey. They were seen as a threat for the

secular state. Upon this accusation the Imam-Hatip schools’

secondary parts were shut down during February 28 Coup of 1997. This

regulation did not only affected the Imam-Hatip schools, but all

secondary schools. So, the secondary schools for physical or social

sciences were also closed down in 1997, in the intention to close

down the secondary schools of Imam Hatip schools. This change in the

education system was criticised then for delaying the students’

specialization in physical or social sciences education to the high

school years. In 2012 AKP changed the education system so that the

secondary schools were reopened. But instead of opening all the

closed schools, the government promoted only the Imam-Hatip

secondary education. Thus a student attending to a state secondary

school had two alternatives: the vocational or the Imam-Hatip.

Especially in the metropolitan cities, the government converted the

primary schools of the previous system to Imam-Hatip secondary

schools without taking the opinions of the parents or the residents

in that region.

If a student wants to attend a state school, she is registered

to the nearest school to his/her home. Recently, in increasing

number of cases, the student’s only school nearby has become an

Imam-Hatip school which has often not been the preferred choice of

the majority families in that region. So there were several cases in

which the parents protested the conversions of their schools and

their children’s nearest option becoming an Imam-Hatip school.33

The education system has become more a mass after 2014 high

school entrance examinations. The state automatically emplaced

thousands of students who didn’t make a school preference to an

Imam-Hatip high school. It has been declared that about 40 thousand

students were placed involuntarily to Imam-Hatip high schools.34 Not

all were Sunni teenagers; there were Alevis, Armenian, Jewish

Turkish citizens who were automatically enrolled to Imam-Hatip high

schools. Some students didn’t make a state high school choice

because they had already decided for a private school. In this case,

the system again automatically placed them to some state, mostly

Imam-Hatip schools. Ludicrous incidents took place at this stage;

the grandchild of a Jewish Rabbi, Ishak Haleva, was placed in an

Imam-Hatip High school. A famous secular journalist, Fatih Altaylı’s

daughter was also placed to Imam-Hatip High school. Moreover, the

schools to which the students were automatically placed were not

close to their home district; instead, in several cases they were as

far as 90 km away from their home.35 Of course neither the grandchild

of Ishak Haleva, nor the daughter of Fatih Altaylı went to Imam-

Hatip high school, since they had previously decided on private33Protests didn’t take place in a few discrete places, but in several schools of themetropolitan cities. See, Milliyet, August 26, 2014. Accessed November 4 2014 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kadikoy-de-imam-hatip-protestosu-gundem-1930899/. Also see different protest cases under http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/ogrenci-ve-velilerden-imam-hatip-protestosu-v-42066 , http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/velilerden-imam-hatip-protestosu-v-21834, http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/bursa-da-imam-hatip-protestosu-v-39920 34 Todayszaman August 26, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.todayszaman.com/national_automatic-imam-hatip-enrollments-reach-40000_356823.html 35 See Al-Monitor September 5, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-education-system-non-muslims-islamic-schools.html#

schools of their world view. However, they were symbolic examples

for how chaotic and pro-Imam Hatip the education system had become.

The Federation of Alevi-Bektaşi Associations called on parents

to resist the Imam-Hatip emplacements. The Alevis were already very

dissatisfied with the way the education system had transformed after

2012. In the pre-2010 era, some Alevis hoped that AKP might respond

to the demands of the Alevi community. The AKP then gave a more

democratic outlook. The government held several workshops with the

Alevi community between 2009 and 2010 but no concrete step in favour

of Alevi demands has been taken afterwards. On the contrary, the new

education system brought further courses on Sunni dialect. The 2012

regulation on education system put Quran and Prophet Muhammed’s Life

as elective courses to secondary schools. One has to keep in mind

that elective courses are not many in Turkish schools and if the

majority of a class decides on something, the others have to go with

that decision occasionally.

All the politics showed that AKP didn’t really intent an equal

recognition to the Alevi citizens of Turkey. The Alevis weren’t

accepted in the way they defined themselves, but were tried to be

convinced to the definition of AKP. If a state does have respect for

individual liberties, then it is expected that it accepts its

citizen the way the citizen wants to define his/ herself. Turkey’s

domestic threat perceptions and hegemonic impositions for palatable

citizen hinder the respect for individual liberties. Thus one of

Alevi’s main demands, having Cemevis recognized as worship places

was not accepted by the government. Moreover, it became likely the

case that Alevi people being physically and orally discriminated.36

36 In several public election speeches Prime Minister Erdoğan referred to the Alevi identity of the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu and permitted the crowds’ booing Kılıçdaroğlu afterwards. Suspicously, in Gezi Events and in the street demonstrations thereafter, the proportion of killed or arrested Alevi citizens were more than the others.

The Gezi Events, which started as a demonstration to protect a

public park but turned into an uncontrollable violent protestation,

has become an incident where the Alevi population was harmed at

most. The confrontation between the Gezi people and the government

increased the tension in the society. Interestingly, many of the

dead casualties of the Gezi protests had an Alevi background.

While vilifying all who supported the Gezi protests, the

rhetoric of Erdoğan became extremely polarizing. He abused Islam to

strengthen his supporters’ attachment to AKP. Religion, Islam, was

instrumentalised. He claimed that the protesters had entered a

mosque with their shoes and had drunk alcohol in there. He insisted

that there were videos about the incident. The reality was that the

people got into the mosque, because they were injured and affected

by massive tear gas. In the released videos about the incident, the

mosque looked like a hospital’s emergency department. Another claim

of Erdoğan was that a veiled woman was abused and assaulted by the

Gezi protesters brutally and that there were again, videos about the

issue. Even an interview with the subject woman was published in one

of the pro-government newspapers. But the videos about the incident

couldn’t approve that such an event took place. The aim of Erdoğan

in both cases was to justify his harsh Gezi politics in the eyes of

his pious conservative voters; indeed, he partly succeeded.

Issues concerning the non-Muslim populations have not been

solved, either in the AKP decade. The Halki Seminary has not been

opened. Only a small amount of the properties of non-Muslim

Foundations were given back; and that after long and exhausting

trials. This process has been criticized by the non-Muslim,37 as well

37 See Radikal July 29, 2013. Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/yetvart_danzikyan/onde_25_milyar_dolar_arkada_uzun_koridorlar-1143793 . Also See Agos October 11, 2013. Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.agos.com.tr/rober-koptas-yazdi-basbakan-

as Muslim journalists. The murder cases against the non- Muslim

citizens38 which happened during the AKP rule were not perceived as

justly trialled, either. Although the murderers were caught and

imprisoned, they were released after a recent change in law. On the

other hand, Erdoğan’s statement at an interview, “…excuse me saying,

they have said even uglier things -- they have called me Armenian,”

was very much criticized by the democratic circles, as well as by

the Armenians in Turkey.39

Meanwhile, after all the dialogs and seemingly continuing

Kurdish democratic process, the government by November 2014,

appeared to be stuck and unable to reach a societal compromise;

neither with the Kurds, nor with the rest of the country concerning

the Kurdish issue. Actually the so-called democratic process took

place without the acknowledgment of main political opposition

parties, even without giving information to the military, let alone

the public. While tension increases in the southeast Anatolia once

more, a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue looks very much

unlikely.

Although AKP seemed to be promoting ‘Islamic’ lifestyle and

thereby recruiting the living standard of the practising Muslims,

with the recent events before and after December 17 2013, AKP and

Erdoğan began to target also some of the practising Muslims in

Turkey, the Hizmet movemet. Erdoğan began to defame the Movement and

its spiritual leader Fethullah Gülen because they have opposed the

azinliklar-konusunda-iyi-niyetli-mi-5905.html . 38 The Case of Hrant Dink, the Case of Priest Santaro, the Case of Zirve Publishing house.39 Todayszaman August 6, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_pm-uses-offensive-racist-language-targeting-armenians_354746.html . For a comment together with Erdoğan’s video on the issue see Washingtonpost August 6, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/06/is-armenian-an-insult-turkeys-prime-minister-seems-to-think-so/

closure of backup study rooms and they gave support to the

investigation of corruption probes of December 17 and December 25.

After December 25, the Hizmet movement has become the biggest enemy

and traitor for Erdoğan. Each single day a dozen of TV channels gave

Erdoğan’s speeches live. Additionally, the government financed 7-8

newspapers which are published with similar headlines.40 Not just

through press, but also economically, businessmen who were known to

sympathize or support the Hizmet movement have been facing

additional sanctions and controls. The government altered legal

procedures specifically to violate and discriminate the functions

and operations of the private schools attached to Hizmet movement,

as well as the institutions like Bankasya and KimseYokmu.

The AKP didn’t just targeted the practising Muslims of Hizmet

movement, but many others. With a recent news published, it came out

that civil servants were labelled according to their ethnic and

religious preferences also during the AKP rule, just as it has been

the case before the AKP rule. The civil servants’ religious

community preferences were given in details in these labels.

Meanwhile, dozens of publishing houses which previously published

the books of Said Nursi, a popular Islamic scholar of the last

century, were banned from doing so since eight months.

AKP’s regulations give the impression that it tries to

homogenize and monopolize even civil religious movements in the

country. The criteria for religious communities not becoming

targeted by the state, is to declare support to the government under

each circumstance. Questioning or criticizing any policy is not a

preferred and expected behaviour from the citizen. Although having

an Imam-Hatip background is an important criteria, it is not40 A new terminology developed for the pro-AKP media; it was called the poolmedia, because of the claims that it was backed up by a financial pool constructed for them.

absolutely determinant. The determinant element of AKP’s palatable

citizen is its praise for Erdoğan and his politics; be it Armenian,

secular or Islamist.

CONCLUSION

Identity is the way a person defines him-herself and wants to

be defined by others. There is a conditionality in relation to the

past, the present and the environment in the definition of identity.

Identities demand recognition, respect, preservation of culture and

belongingness (Ergil 2010). Turkey is a country which is the

motherland of several divergent identities. Citizen is the way the

state defines and accepts the people living within a country. Both

the Kemalist and the post-Kemalist Erdoğanist state had palatable

citizens and these had narrow definitions which excluded, oppressed

and vilified some identities in the country. Aiming a palatable

citizen on an identity or some ideology basis is likely to be

problematic also in the future and is likely to increase the rate of

discontent in Turkey. However, it seems also likely that governments

having authoritative tendencies will have intentions to shape the

people according to their world views. A government is likely to be

more authoritarian if the country has an illiberal democracy with

immature institutions inclined to grafts, and a majoritarian rule

which lacks a political culture for compromise. Unfortunately, this

has been the case in Turkey in the last years. But to what extend an

authoritarian state can manage to rule when the citizens become

furious and polarized is a question mark the Turkish state has

tested in Gezi protests of June 2013 and in the Kurdish street

demonstrations of October 2014. The path for social peace and

democratization in Turkey is related to how the state and governors

perceive the people living in the country and how this perception

reflects the individual’s reality and his/her demands from the state

as a citizen. If the perceptions can meet at a common ground

reflecting the reality and if the state as well as the people

abandon using the term ‘traitor’ so easily, political life might

normalize. Besides, people require a need to trust the state and to

be confident that there is justice in the country. Because in a just

environment, a state is unlikely to classify its citizens according

to some criteria of palatability. If there ought to be any criteria

of palatability, then this should take universal human rights

criteria as the basic common ground.

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