joannes senftleben on the possibles, essences and eternal truths

V. Capitulum BOHEMIA JESUITICA 1556–2006 Pag. 573–587

DANIEL HEIDER

Joannes Senftleben on the Possibles, Essences and Eternal Truths.

The Reception of Suárez’s Metaphysics in Senftleben’s

Philosophia Aristotelica universa

The intellectual influence of the Uncommon Doctor upon the Bohemian or in the

Bohemian land’s living Jesuit intelligentsia is a well-known historical fact. In my paper

I would like to illustrate that fact with the example of Polish-Czech thinker Joannes

Senftleben SJ (1648–1693). However, my presentation shall extend beyond merely being

a demonstration of the historical influence of Suárezian metaphysics upon the work of the

Polish Jesuit, who lived in the Bohemian lands during the era of the Counter-Reformation.

I aspire to show more, namely that Senftleben’s interpretation of Suárez’s metaphysics of ratioentis represents one of the possible interpretations of Doctor Eximius’ concept of possibles and

eternal truths.

The paper is divided into several sections. The first gives a short bibliography of the

Polish-Bohemian thinker. The second provides the reader with an outline of the general

divisions in his Philosophia Aristotelica universa, from which I will draw. In the third, I will

focus on Senftleben’s first two propositions from his Metaphysics, which are connected with

the issue of the content of ratio entis. In the concrete, I will concentrate on the issue of

possible beings and their “existence” before the divine production and on the guestion of the

nature of distinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae. After stating two of Senftleben’s

eight metaphysical theses, I will show how closely and faithfully the Polish-Bohemian Jesuit

follows Suárez’s opinions and arguments. Finally, I will highlight Senftleben’s criticism of two

conceptions, which have been ascribed to Francisco Suárez SJ (1548–1617) himself by some

recent scholars. In conclusion, I will state that Senftleben’s exposition, which is at least in the

subject matter of possibles and eternal truths led by the intention to follow the ideas of the

Uncommon Doctor, represents a certain conservative “reading” of Suárez’s theory of possibles.1

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1 The intensive scholarly debate about the problem of real essence, which is the object of Suárez’s metaphysics, ispredominantly connected with the question of to what degree Suárez’s metaphysics “makes its entrance into themodern period” and in what way it prepares the modern “logization” of metaphysics, in which “what is really realis what is non-contradictory”. For that question, v. Francisco SUÁREZ: On the Essence of Finite Being As Such,On the Existence of That Essence and Their Distinction, translated from Latin with an Introduction by NormanJ. Wells, Milwaukee 1983, p. 27; John P. DOYLE: Suárez on the Reality of Possibles, in: The Modern Schoolman44 (1967), p. 29–48; further: IDEM: Suárez on the Analogy of Being, in: ibidem 46 (1969), p. 219–249 (firstpart), p. 323–341 (second part); Bernardo J. CANTENS: The Relationship between God and Essences and the

05Cemus_BohemiaJesuitica 24.3.2010 14:50 Stránka 573

Joannes Senftleben2 was born at the end of the Thirty-Year War (1648) in Glogau/

Glogów/Hlohov (today Poland). He died in Glatz/K∏odsko/Kladsko comparatively young

when he was 45 (in the year 1693). In the year 1665 he entered the Society of Jesus in the

oldest Czech Jesuit College of Saint Clement in the Old Town City in Prague. In the years

1667–1669 he studied at the Philosophical Faculty in Breslau/Wroc∏aw/Vratislav. Four years

later he commenced his studies at the Faculty of Theology in the College of Our Lady in the

Snow in Olomouc (while that College was founded in the year 1556, Olomouc’s University

was founded seven years later). In the years 1677/1678 he worked as the professor of poetics

and rhetoric in the College of Saint Clement in Prague. At the same time he became the local

preacher. The last thirteen years of his life were filled with fervent pedagogical and literary

activities. In 1680 he was appointed professor at the Philosophical faculty at the Charles-

Ferdinand University and from 1681 to 1683 he became the faculty’s full-time professor of

philosophy. Afterwards he was awarded a professorship of moral theology and speculative

theology at the Faculty of Theology. In the last year of his life he was even elected the Dean

of the Faculty of Theology. In addition to those academic functions and posts, he also worked

as an academic exhorter at Saint Ursula / Sv. Vor‰ila, and simultaneously acted as the internal

examiner within the Society of Jesus.

As for Senftleben’s literary activity, it falls mainly between the years 1680–1687. His most

popular treatises include his ethico-political works Conversatio politico-christiana ad legesethico-politico-morales (1680) and Philosophia Moralis ad politico-christianae conversandum(1683). In this paper I am not interested in Senftleben’s practical philosophy but in his three-

volume Philosophia Aristotelica universa3, which was published in the year 1685. The first

volume dealing with Logic contains twenty theses, with each proposition being defended by

at least five arguments and supported by the examination of at least ten objections. The

second volume contains Philosophy of Nature and includes forty-five propositions, making

it the most extensive volume (the most significant part of this volume is the critique of the

Cartesian philosophia naturalis). The third volume, unlike the first two, encompasses various

philosophical disciplines, namely Cosmology (called Ex libris de Mundo et Coelo), Philosophy

of Nature (called Ex libris de Ortu et Interitu), the propositions from Psychology (entitled Exlibris de Anima), and finally, eight propositions in short Ex Metaphysica.

The metaphysical part of the third volume is primarily comprised of three metaphysical

themes. The first theme, included in the first four theses and in the eighth and last thesis,

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Notion of Eternal Truths According to Francisco Suárez, in: ibidem LXXVII (January 2000), p. 127–143; IDEM:Suárez and Meinong on Beings of Reason and Non-existent Objects (unpublished Dissertation on the Universityof Miami), Miami 1999; and many other works.

2 The bibliographical data are taken from: Ivana âORNEJOVÁ / Anna FECHTNEROVÁ: Îivotopisn˘ slovníkpraÏské univerzity. Filozofická a Teologická fakulta 1654–1773, Praha 1986, p. 417–419; Hugo HURTER:Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae theologie exhibens IV, Innsbruck 1910, p. 336; A[…] VACANT/ E[…] MANGENOT / E[…] AMANN: L’Expose des Doctrine de la Théologie Catholique. TomeQuatorziéme, deuxiéme partie, [s.l.] 1839, p. 1860; Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus. I: Bibliographie parles Pères Augustin et Aloys de BACKER. II: Histoire par le Père Auguste CARAYON. Nouvelle édition parCarlos SOMMERVOGEL, S.J. Strasbourgois, publiée par la Province de Belgique, tom. VII, Bruxelles/Paris1896, col. 1122sq.

3 The full baroque title is as following: Joannes SENFTLEBEN SJ: Philosophia Aristotelica universa, commentariisDoctorum Societatis Jesu illustrata selectis Thesibus proposita expositque per P. Joannem Senftleben e Societate Jesu inUniversitate Carolo-Ferdinandea Pragensi, nuper Philosophiae Profesorem ordinarium ac publicum, Pragae 1685.


covers the concept of being. While the second theme, included in the fifth and the sixth

proposition, is devoted to transcendental unity, the third topic, which is the topic of the last

proposition, relates to “the crown of metaphysics”, which is the proof of God’s existence

and its singleness (called Deum esse et unum esse, ratione demonstrator). In this paper I am

primarily concerned with the aspects of the first theme.

I will focus on three propositions that are immediately connected with the problem of

ratio of being. Senftleben’s first proposition is called Ens possibile, antequam actu producatur,nihil est in se intrinsece, ac realiter, atque adeo passiva possibilitas creaturae, aeterna, ac necessaria,est denominatio pure extrinseca, intentionalis; proveniens ab Idea, ac Omnipotentia Dei, utproductiva creaturae4. As indicated by its title, it is concerned with the issue of the ontological

status of possible being, i.e. with the essence of finite beings before the divine production.

The second proposition, titled Essentia extra causas posita non distinguitur realiter abexistentia5, deals with the famous metaphysical problem concerning the nature of the

distinction between essence and existence,6 or better, between esse essentiae and esse existentiaeof finite beings. The last proposition Subsistentia est terminus positivus, naturae realitersuperadditus7 will be only marginally considered. The other two propositions concerning the

formal or “relational” aspect of the doctrine of the concept of beings (the bearing of the

concept of being to its inferiora) affirming the analogicity of being (Ens non est univocum, sedest tantum analogum, respectu Dei, et creatura; substantia, et accidentis); and denying the

possibility of the formally perfect precision of real being as such from its contractive differences

(Nec ens a differentiis, nec differentiae ab ente, praecisione perfecta, abstrahi possunt) will be

neglected.

Senftleben’s first thesis can be understood in connection with Suárez’s three questions

which are presented at the end of the seventh paragraph in the Second Disputation of his

Metaphysical Disputations, which deals with the concept of being (In quo consistat ratio entisin quantum ens, et quomodo inferioribus entibus conveniat)8. After having explained what he

understands by “essence” and mainly what he understands by realis in the phrase “essentia

realis” (constituting the adequate object of Suárez’s metaphysics), Suárez poses three questions,

which are to be answered if the concept of being is to be duly elucidated. These questions

are: (1) What is the entity of real essence when it does not actually exist?; (2) What is actual

existence and for what is it necessary in things?; (3) How is existence distinguished from

essence?9 Senftleben’s first two theses and partly also the thesis about subsistence are the

answers to those questions.

Which arguments does Senftleben use in support of his solution to the problem of

possibles, i.e. for their intrinsic nothingness and the mere extrinsic denomination from the

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4 Ibidem, p. 320.5 Ibidem, p. 332.6 The question to what degree Senftleben’s critique is also valid against Aquinas’ distinction between the essence and

the act of being will be laid aside in this paper. It is a well-known fact that although Aquinas held the real distinctionbetween those two extremes, he did not agree (contra Senftleben and Suárez) with their mutual separability.

7 Ibidem, p. 400.8 Francisco SUÁREZ: Metaphysical Disputations, Hildesheim 1965 (quoted in the following way: x, y, z, p. (x = the

number of a disputation, y = the number of a section, z = the number of a paragraph, p. = the number of a page)9 “Prima est, qualis sit entitas essentiae realis, quando actu non existit. Secunda, quid sit existentia actualis, et ad

quid necessaria sit in rebus. Tertia, quomodo existentia distinguatur ab essentia.” In: ibidem, 2, 4, 7, p. 90.


divine intellect? Senftleben’s first argument is the argument that, as Suárez also says,10 should

be common to all Catholic Doctors: The only being that is intrinsically eternal and

simpliciter necessary is the pure summum Bonum. However the pure and the highest Being is

God. Thus, the possibility and essence that would be eternal and necessary in being is God

and nothing else.11 One may note that the argument expresses a radical “No” to the Platonic

metaphysics of essences, which serve as the external models or “samples” for the activity of

the demiurge.

Senftleben’s third argument is the following: According to the opinion of adversaries12 it

must be consequently admitted that being is neither produced ex puro nihilo, nor it can be

from God reduced to pure nothingness. It is so because possibility, as something that is

somehow real and distinct from God, is always remaining. Provided that creation is the

production of a whole being according to its whole reality from nothing via the given

existence, it must be said that God can neither create nor annihilate anything. However that

consequence is obviously false. That is why it must be said the essences before the divine

production are nothing.13

One of Confirmatur having the form of reductio ad absurdum is almost literally taken

from Suárez14: The possibility of creatures is either something outside nothingness, or not.

If it is not, Senftleben gets what he intends. He can thus state that they are, crudely spoken,

somehow identified with God. If it is something outside nothing, either God produces it, or

it is not. If God produces it, it is produced by means of the existence given from God (perexistentiam a Deo datam). Consequently it will have to be said that creatures exist necessarily

ab aeterno because essences of things and possibles are necessary. However that is just what

the Polish-Bohemian Jesuit denies.15

Senftleben’s answer to Suárez’s question regarding the reality of possibles seems to also

imply the answer to the third question concerning the nature of the distinction between

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10 “Nec potuit in mentem alicujus Doctor’s Catholici venire, quod essentia creaturae ex se, et absque efficientia liberaDei, sit aliqua vera res, aliquod verum esse reale habens distinctum ab esse Dei…”, in: ibidem, 31, 2, 3, p. 230.

11 “Probatur primo. Ens in se intrinsece aeternum, ac simpliciter necessarium, ex conceptu suo, est purum,summumque bonum. Atqui ens pure, ac summe bonum, est DEUS; ergo, &c. ergo possibilitas, ac essentia abaeterno, quae esset ens aeternum ac necessarium, esset DEUS.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 320sq.

12 Suárez mentions John Wicleff for whom “… creaturas habere ab aeterno aliquod esse reale distinctum ab esseDei.” Vide SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 2, 1, p. 229.

13 “In Sententia Adversariorum, nullum ens produceretur ex puro nihilo; nec posset in purum nihilum reducia DEO; quia presupponeretur, & remaneret possibilitas, quae esset aliquid reale, contradistinctum a DEO. ErgoDEUS nihil posset creare, aut annhilare; si quidem juxta SS.PP. creatio est potius entis, secundum totam omninoejus realitatem, ex nihilo, per datam existentiam, produci. Atqui Sequela est falsa; ergo, &c.” In: SENFTLEBEN(n. 3) p. 322; “Et confirmatur, quia alias non posset Deus rem aliquam in nihilum redigere, quia semper manerealiquid rei, scilicet, essentia. Et similiter non creasset Deus omnia ex nihilo, sed ex uno esse transmutasset illa adalium esse.” In: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 2, 3, p. 230.

14 “... relinquitur frivolam et vanam esse distinctionem de nihilo essentiae et existentiae, quia quod est simpliciteret omnino nihil, non potest vere et realiter esse aliquid in aliqua ratione veri entis.” In: ibidem, 31, 2, 4, p. 230.

15 “Confirmatur secundo. Illa possibilitas creaturarum, vel est aliquid, vel non est aliquid ultra nihil. Si non estaliquid ultra nihil? habetur intentum. Si est aliquid ultra nihil vel est factum a DEO per existentiam a DEOdatam factum est, atque ex nihilo extractum; ergo creatura aliqua fuit ab aeterno, & quidem necessario: quiaessentiae rerum, & possibilitates sunt necessariae. Si autem factum non est? Ergo DEUS est; quidquid enim est,& factum non est, DEUS est.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 323; “Est autem de fide certum, Deum non fecisseessentias creatas ab aeterno, quia neque ex necessitate […] cum de fide sit, Deum nihil agere necessariosimpliciter; neque ex libera voluntate; sic enim de fide est, in tempore coepisse operari.” In: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31,2, 3, p. 230.


essence and existence, and consequently also to the second question dealing with the

nature of actual existence. Senftleben’s second thesis claims that the essence, which is

posited outside its own causes is not distinguished really (realiter) from its existence. It

can be said that Senftleben’s arguments for that thesis and his answers to the objections

largely copy Suárez’s first, fourth, sixth and also twelfth and thirteenth section of his

31st Disputation.

Senftleben, in the same way as Suárez, denies any kind of real distinction between essence

and existence in a finite being posited outside its causes. The Polish-Czech professor presents

seven arguments, which comes out of the interpretation of real distinction whether as the

distinction of two things or a thing and a mode.16 The first argument leans against the

authority of Aristotle: Being, which is joined to things does not add anything to them. Being

thus signifies only things themselves, which means essences outside nothingness and outside

the state of pure possibility. However, being is the same as an existent. Thus, it can be stated

that the expression existens does not signify something really distinct from a thing itself, that

is, from the essence that is produced outside nothing.17

From that first argument one can already anticipate Senftleben’s answer to Suárez’s second

question mentioned above, “What is the actual existence in things and for what is it

necessary?” The complete answer is presented in the fifth argument labeled as ratio PatrisSuárez. It says that the actuality of existence is nothing else than the real actuality, through

which some entity formally, intrinsically and immediately is constituted outside its causes.

That definition of actual existence is he says evident from the common conception and

from the immediate and formal opposition between ens actu and ens in potentia (nothing

middle is possible to excogitate). It is just through the real actuality, by which a created thing

is constituted formally, intrinsically and immediately outside its causes. Thus it loses “its own”

being nothing and begins to really be. The confirmation seems to be literally taken from

Suárez: The actuality of essences suffices for the truth of the proposition “Essence is”. So that

the actuality of essence is equal to the existence. The consequence is clear because according

to common opinion the expression is signifies actu esse in rerum natura, which is generally

called existence.18 We can sum up the answer to Suárez’s second question in the following way:

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16 SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 332–337 (it is the first part of Thesis II: Essentia extra causas posita non distinguaturrealiter ab existentia in which he argues against the real distinction).

17 “Primo. Aristoteles loco jam citato ait: ENS & UNUM, adjuncta rebus, nihil amplius significare, quam res ipsas;hoc est: quam essentias; extra nihilum, & statum purae possibilitates, productas. Atqui idem est ens, quod existens;ergo ly EXISTENS non significat aliquid realiter diversum a re ipsa; seu ab essentia, extra nihilum, statumquepurae possibilitatis, producta.” In: ibidem, p. 332; “Probari igitur potest conclusio exposita ex Aristotele, quiubique ait ens adjunctum rebus nihil eis addere; nam idem est ens homo, quod homo; hoc autem, cum eademproportione, verum est de re in potentia et in actu; ens ergo actu, quod est proprie ens, idemque quod existens,nihil addit rei seu essentiae actuali, ex sententia Aristotelis…”, in: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 6, 1, p. 241sq.

18 “Probatur quinto ratione Patris Suárez. Actualitas existentiae nihil est aliud, quam illa realis actualitas, vi cujusformaliter, intrinsece, ac immediate, entitas aliqua constituitur extra causas; desinit esse nihil, & incipit aliquidesse reale. Patet hoc ex communi acceptione; & ex immediata, ac formali oppositione inter ENS ACTU, & ENSIN POTENTIA: neque est conceptibile medium, inter ens possibile, & existens. Atqui per realem actualitatemessentiae, res creata constituitur formaliter, intrinsece, ac immediate extra causas; & desinit esse nihil, ac incipitesse aliquid reale; ergo, &c. Confirmatur ex Eodem. Esse essentiae seu actualitas essentiae, sufficit ad veritateshujus propositionis de secundo adjacente: ESSENTIA EST. Ergo illa actualitas essentiae, est vere, ac realiterexistentia. Consequentia patet: quia juxta communem acceptionem, ly EST de secundo adjacente, significatACTU ESSE IN RERUM NATURA, quod omnes vocant EXISTENTIAM.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 335;


Existence or esse existentiae is being, by which formally and immediately some entity is

constituted outside its causes and by which it loses its being nothing and gets its being

“something”. Therefore it must be claimed that the existential being cannot be the constituent,

which would compose the actual essence in the genus of intrinsic formal cause. The simple

axiom that stands behind that claim can be formulated in the following way: Nothing exnatura rei distinct can make by its own power some different being a real entity. Existence can

be, for both Senftleben and the Uncommon Doctor, not some formal intrinsic constituent

(form of all forms) but only the efficient cause or necessary condition.19

Senftleben’s interpretation of adversaries’ conceptions of existence, whether seen as

a thing (Thomists) or as a mode (Scotists), together with the nominalist rendering of what

it means to be really distinct bring to the foreground the negative consequences of the

theories advocating the real distinction. Those negative consequences can be seen in the

majority of Senftleben’s arguments against the given presumption. One confutation, having

the form of reductio, holds that essence as the real potency to actual existence can be either

the potency to the essential being or to the accidental being. There are solely those two kinds

of potency. If essence is the real potency to existence as to something essential, then existence

will be necessarily the part of the being’s essence. But that will mean that existence is not

outside the essence and that is “essential”. If it is the potency of some accidental act, then

existence will necessarily be the accident. However, then it will hold that as such it cannot

constitute the substance intrinsically.20

The other argument declaring well-known Suárezian “reification of act and potency” and

consequently essence and existence says that the act of existence constitutes with the essence

either a being which is unum per se, or unum per accidens. However, it cannot constitute

unum per se because, according to Senftleben’s adversaries, there cannot be unum per se that

is constituted from two “actual” entities. That is also why they (Senftleben no doubt has in

mind Thomists) also negate the entitative act of the prime matter. Nevertheless, it cannot

constitute unum per accidens either. The terminus of substantial change, i.e., of generation, is

a whole thing. Thus the substantial generation cannot be terminated in unum per accidens.21

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“Dico tertio: illud esse, quo essentia creaturae formaliter constituitur in actualitate essentiae, est verum esseexistentiae […] Probatur autem haec assertio variis modis. Primo, quia hoc esse praecise sumptum satis est adveritatem hujus locutionis de secundo adjacente, ESSENTIA EST; ergo illud esse est vera existentia.Consequentia est clara: nam, juxta communem significationem et conceptionem hominum, EST, de secundoadjacente, non absolvitur a tempore, sed significat actu esse in rerum natura, quod omnes intelligimus nomineexistentiae, seu per esse existentiae.” In: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 4, 4, p. 236.

19 “Nec refert, si quis dicat, hoc esse actualis essentiae pendere ab alio distincto, quod ab aliis appellatur actualisexistentia, tum quia, licet admittamus hanc dependentiam, illa esse non potest in genere causae vel terminiformalis intrinsece constituentis essentiam in ratione essentiae actualis […] si ergo aliqua est dependentia actualisessentiae a tali existentia, non erit ut ab intrinseco constitutivo formali, sed ut ab alia causa vel conditionenecessaria.” In: ibidem, 31, 5, 7, p. 237.

20 “Probatur secundo. Essentia secundum Adversarios, est realis potentia ad existentiam, velut ultimam actualitatemin linea entis; ergo vel est potentia ad aliquid, enti essentiale: vel ad aliquid, enti accidentale. Aristoteles enim 8.Phys: t.32. &2. de Anima t. 55. solum potentiam essentialem, & accidentalem agnoscit. Si essentia est realispotentia ad existentiam, ut aliquid essentiale enti; ergo existentia est de essentia entis; ergo existentia non est extraessentiam entis; ergo realiter not distinguitur ab essentia entis. Si vero est potentia ad existentiam, velut aliquidaccidentale enti; ergo existentia est accidens; ergo nequit intrinsece substantiam constituere.” In: SENFTLEBEN(n. 3) p. 333.

21 “Probatur tertio. Vel actus existentiae cum actu essentiae constituit ens unum per se: vel tantum ens unum peraccidens. Atqui nequit constituere unum per se; cum juxta Adversarios, ex duobus entibus in actu, non possit


Moreover, if essence and existence were really distinguished, so Senftleben’s fourth argument,

the substantial generation would terminate in two distinct terms. Consequently, the motion

whose numerical unity is given by the term ad quem would not be numerically one.22

In Senftleben’s reasoning one can detect a latent compositional principle essentially

conducting his critique of the real distinction. That principle can be called “the mereological

principle of simple entities”. Accordingly, it holds that if we have two really distinct entities

that compose the whole, then those two entities must be related as parts composing

a certain whole. In application to our case we get the entity of essence and the entity of

existence that compose the actual being. The application of that principle offers the

following reductio-argument: Either we get the first possibility, according to which those two

entities are simple. Then it holds that one cannot intrinsically and formally constitute the

other. Their entities are independently constituted. It is the case of the real distinction

between the prime matter and the substantial form. In spite of the fact that prime matter is

in the ordo naturae directed at the substantial form, which gives it a species, it has in itself its

own entitative act (actus entitativus), thanks to which it can be conserved by God’s absolute

power.23 Or we get the alternative saying that those entities are not simple. Thus it will be

necessary to state that, e.g., the entity of existence will again be composed from the entity of

existence and the entity of essence. Consequently, we will be obliged to say that not only the

existence of, e.g., Peter is really distinguished from the essence of Peter, but also that the

essence of existence is thus distinguished from existence itself. However, what we get is nothing

less than the infinite regress of infinite essences and infinite really distinct existences.24 The

same argument can be also directed against the authors holding the thesis of the so-called

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constitui unum ens per se: quemadmodum arguunt, dum materiae primae actum entitativum negant. Sed necpotest constituere unum per accidens; cum res existens sit terminus generationis substantialis; generatio autemsubstantialis non possit terminari ad unum ens per accidens; ergo, &c.” In: ibidem, p. 333sq.

22 “Si existentia distingueretur realiter ab essentia; sequeretur: quod generatio substantialis terminetur ad duosterminos realiter distinctos; adeoque quod non fit unus numero motus: si quidem unitas numeralis cujuslibetmotus, desumitur ab unitate termini AD QUEM; ergo, &c.” In: ibidem, p. 334.

23 That is Senftleben’s opinion. Vide Daniel HEIDER: F. Suárez a J. Senftleben: Reifikace první látky, in: SlánskéRozhovory: ·panûlsko, Slan˘ 2004, p. 37–42.

24 “Probatur septimo. Ex iisdem fundamentis, quibus probant Adversarii essentiam e.g. Petri, realiter distingui abexistentia: probatur etiam existentiae essentiam distingui realiter ab existentia Petri; prout distincta ab essentiaPetri, habet suam essentiam: quia habet aliquem conceptum essentialem, sibi peculiarem, exclusivum alteriusessentiae; ergo non tantum existentia Petri distinguitur realiter ab essentia Petri: sed etiam ipsa essentia existentiae,realiter distinguitur ab existentia; adeoque in qualibet re existente, continentur infinitae essentiae, & existentiaedistinctae. Nam existentia etiam ut distincta ab essentia existentiae, habet adhuc aliquam essentiam; quae iterumdistinguitur a sua existentia: & haec rursum distincta existentia, habet essentiam ab existentia distinctam; ergo,&c.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 336sq.; “At vero si comparetur actus ad aliam rem vel potentiam cujus est actus, non potest intrinsece et formaliter constituere propriam entitatem ejus, quia illa entitas non est composita,sed simplex; alioqui non esset altera pars componens, sed totum compositum, quod in reali compositione exrebus distinctis prorsus repugnat. Item alioqui constaret illa entitas seu pars quae recipit actum, ex illo actu etaliqua alia re, de qua rursus inquiram an constituatur intrinsece et formaliter per illum actum; nam, si hocaffirmetur, procedemus ulterius in infinitum; si vero negetur, concluditur intentum, nimirum, potentiam propriecomponentem cum actu realiter distincto, non posse intrinsece et formaliter constitui per ipsummet actum cumquo componit. Atque ita, cum fit ultima resolutio ad prima seu simplicissima componentia, necesse est ut illaentitas quae ad alteram comparatur ut potentia, non constituatur intrinsece et formaliter in sua entitate peralteram, quae est actus, licet fortasse illam postulet ut sit, sicut materia postulat formam. Sic ergophilosophandum esset de entitate essentiae et entitate existentiae, si essent distinctae; componerent enim unum,verbi gratia, hoc existens, respectu cujus existentia se haberet ut actus intrinsecus et formalis; tamen respectuentitatis essentiae nullo modo posset intrinsece illam constituere aut componere, quia una ab aliacondistingueretur, ut entitas simplex ab entitate simplici.” In: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 6, 3, p. 242.


modal distinction between essence and existence, i.e., the distinction between res (essence)

and a mode (existence).25

Although Senftleben does not explicitly introduce his own positive conception of which

distinction occurs between essence and existence (at least in a way which would use the form of

a thesis), his solution seems to be Suárezian in nature. How does Suárez specify the nature of the

distinction between essence and existence? Are they distinct only grammatically, i.e., like the verb

and the substantive? Although Suárez considers that explanation as probable26, he suggests that

one has to take into accout a major distinction than merely nominal. That distinction must be

the mental distinction cum fundamento in re. However, the important question is to be answered:

What is that foundation? Suárez is convinced that the foundation can be nothing else than the

ontological fact that created things do not have being de se and thus that they need not have been

and when they already are, they will not be. From their contingency we conceive the essence as

somehow indifferent to esse or non-esse in actu.27

How does Senftleben’s doctrine look like? Although he does not expose it explicitly, it is not

difficult to deduce it from his responses to objections. It is no exaggeration to say that his theory

is in important aspects similar to Suárez’s. The first group of objections against Senftleben’s

critique of real distinction comes out of the ontological fact of the contingency of finite beings.

It examines Senftleben’s refusal of real distinction as the error that precludes its relevant

ontological foundation: How can we, without considering the real distinction between essence

and existence in finite beings, save the fact of the contingency of their existence? Vice-versa,

provided that there is only the mental distinction, how can we distinguish a being that is not

composed at all from any other finite and thus necessarily composite being?28

580

25 “... quia si quid cogeret ad hanc distinctionem modalem, maxime quod essentia creaturae potest existere et nonexistere; sed ille etiam modus, qui dicitur esse existentia distincta, potest actu esse, et in sola potentia objectiva,quod est posse existere et non existere; ergo etiam in illo modo erit distinctio ex natura rei inter ipsum et suumactuale esse, quod est impossibile; alias fiet idem argumentum de esse existentiae illis modi, et sic procederetur ininfinitum.” In: ibidem, 31, 6, 11, p. 245.

26 “Atque eadem ratione consequenter asserendum est esse essentiae et existentiae, si utrumque proprie sumatur provero esse reali, non differre etiam ratione, sed tantum in nomine, quia ita inter se comparantur esse essentiae etexistentiae, sicut essentia et existentia inter se. Et in hunc modum sensisse videtur de his vocibus et conceptibusGabriel, citato loco, ubi ait esse, ens et essentiam non differre secundum rem significatam, sed solum secundummodos grammaticales, sicut verbum, participium et nomen; et similiter esse et existere idem significare, ideoqueetiam essentiam et existentiam idem esse. Et eumdem dicendi modum amplectuntur alii ex citatis auctoribus, etest sane probabilis.” In: ibidem, 31, 6, 20, p. 248sq.

27 “Hujus autem distinctionis fundamentum est, quod res creatae de se non habent esse et possunt interdum nonesse. Ex hoc enim fit ut essentiam creaturae nos concipiamus ut indifferentem ad esse vel non esse actu, quaeindifferentia non est per modum abstractionis negativae, sed praecisivae; et ideo, quamvis ratio essentiae absoluteconcipiatur a nobis etiam in ente in potentia, tamen multo magis intelligimus reperiri in ente in actu, licet in eopraescindamus totum id quod necessario et essentialiter ei convenit, ab ipsa actualitate essendi; et hoc modoconcipimus essentiam sub ratione essentiae ut potentiam; existentiam vero ut actum eius. Hac ergo rationedicimus hanc distinctionem rationis habere in re aliquod fundamentum, quod non est aliqua actualis distinctioquae in re intercedat, sed imperfectio creaturae, quae, hoc ipso quod ex se non habet esse et illud potest ab aliorecipere, occasionem praebet huic nostrae conceptioni.” In: ibidem, 31, 6, 23, p. 250.

28 “Objicies septimo. Implicat, ut creatura sit SUUM esse; hoc enim est Soli DEO proprium unde dicit de Se Ipso: EGOSUM QUI SUM, ergo implicat, ut existentia, seu esse creaturae, sit idem cum essentia ejus.” In: SENFTLEBEN(n. 3) p. 342; “Objicies octavo. Omnis existentia creata, est esse receptum; ut docet Sanctus Thomas, ergo realiterdistinguitur ab essentia: quia receptum distinguitur a recipiente; cum sint relative oposita.” In: ibidem, p. 343;“Objicies nono. Existere per suam essentiam, est perfectio simpliciter simplex; quia reperitur in DEO. Ergoimpossibile est, ut creatura existit per essentiam suam,” in: ibidem, p. 344; “Objicies decimo. Nulla creatura est actuspurus; ergo omnis creatura est composita ex actu, & potentia. Si enim potentiam nullam involveret; esset actus purus:quia ubi nulla est potentia, nulla est imperfectio; ubi nulla imperfectio, ibi mera est perfectio; ubi est mera perfectio,ibi est actus purus. Ergo omnis creatura saltem componitur ex essentia, & existentia.” In: ibidem, p. 345sq.


The answer to that group of objections is based on Suárez’s and Senftleben’s distinction

between the compository and non-compository explanation of participation: While it is

contradictory for a creature to have identically the act of being if a creature is considered as

a metaphysical essence, it is not absurd to say that a creature has identically the act of being if

it is taken as a physical essence. Thus, the created being taken as the metaphysical essence will

not be being that is received in aliquo, but that is caused ab aliquo. As such it will be limited

by its own efficient cause and thus it will not require for its contingency any real composition

at all.29 At most we can speak about the metaphysical composition, which, however, does not

entail any real, but only rational composition cum fundamento in re.30 Moreover, the non-

compository simplicity of creature in regard to essence and existence, which for the opponents

is equal to “the divinization” of creatures, can be compensated by the other compository

principles. Among others it is mainly the real, namely the modal distinction, between

subsistence or supposit and a singular nature, which can be found even in physically simple

separate substances.31 Both Senftleben and Suárez argue against Scotists’ opinion, according to

which a created supposit does not really add anything positive to a singular nature. Both

Senftleben’s and Suárez’s argument are based on the mystery of Incarnation.32

The second group of objections concerns the very possibility of metaphysics: How can

we speak about necessary essences and necessary truths, if essences, on which those truths are

581

29 “Omnis existentia creata, est esse receptum; ut docet Sanctus Thomas, ergo realiter distinguitur ab essentia: quiareceptum distinguitur a recipiente; cum sint relative opposita. Resp.: Explico S. Th. Cum Dist. A. est essereceptum AB ALIQUO, nempe a causa sui effectrice participatum CA. Est esse receptum IN ALIQUO, nempein potentia physica receptiva N.A. […] Urgebis. Omnis existentia creata comparantur ad essentiam, ut actus adpotentiam. Atqui actus & potentia distinguuntur realiter: cum sibi opponantur; ergo omnis existentia creatadistinguitur realiter ab essentia. Resp: Dist: Maj: comparatur ut actus ad potentia physica, ac realis N. Maj. Dist:similiter Min:& N.C. etiam animal est potentia logice, & metaphysice ad rationale; & tamen non distinguiturrealiter ab hoc: quia animal non est potentia realiter, ac physice, rationalis receptiva.” In: ibidem, p. 343.

30 “At vero juxta nostram sententiam dicendum est, compositionem ex esse et essentia analogice tantumcompositionem appellari, quia non est compositio realis, sed rationis; compositio enim realis non est nisi exextremis in re ipsa distinctis; hic autem extrema non sunt in re distincta, ut ostendimus; ergo compositio ex illisnon potest esse realis. Sicut autem ens rationis non est ens nisi analogice ac solo fere nomine, ita compositio haecnon habet univocam convenientiam cum compositione reali materiae et formae, verbi gratia, sed analogamtantum proportionem…”, in: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 13, 7, p. 300; “Aliter vero posset responderi, dupliciter intelligiesse irreceptum: uno modo, quod sit irreceptum, tam in aliquo quam ab aliquo, et hoc modo non sequitur, exnostra sententia, quod esse creaturae sit irreceptum […] Alio vero modo dici potest esse irreceptum in aliquo,quamvis sit receptum ab aliquo, et hoc modo conceditur, esse creatum posse esse irreceptum; nego tamen indesequi, quod sit illimitatum ac infinitum […] Et declaratur hoc ipsum in ipsamet essentia vel substantia creata; estenim essentia, et substantia per participationem, non quia ab alia re vel substantia participetur subjective (ut sicdicam), sed solum quia effective est a divina substantia, cujus est quaedam participatio.” In: ibidem, 31, 13, 17,p. 303; “Metaphysica contractio non requirit distinctionem actualem ex natura rei inter contractum etcontrahens, sed ad illam sufficit distinctio conceptuum cum aliquo fundamentum in re, et hoc modo (si velimuscum multis loqui) admittere possumus, essentiam finiri et limitari in ordine ad esse, et, e converso, ipsum essefiniri ac limitari, quia est actus talis essentiae […] At vero, physice loquendo, si essentia sit simplex, substantialis,et completa, ut est substantia angelica, revera non indiget aliquo formaliter ac intrinsece limitante, praeterseipsam; sed sicut substantia composita limitatur a suis intrinsecis componentibus, seu principiis (a quibus simulsumptis et unitis in re non distinguitur), quod nihil aliud est quam per suammet entitatem intrinsece limitari, itasubstantia simplex creata, physice ac realiter seipsa limitata est.” In: ibidem, 31, 13, 18, p. 303sq.

31 “Nihilominus dicendum est, etiam in Angelis distingui ex natura rei personalitatem a natura singulari etindividua.” In: ibidem, 34, 3, 9, p. 362.

32 “Ex his ergo presentis sectiones resolutio colligitur, nimium, suppositum creatum addere naturae creata aliquodreale positivum, et in re ipsa distinctum ab illa.” In: ibidem, 34, 2, 20, p. 359. For the criticism of Scotus’ theoryaccording to which the “suppositum creaturae nihil rei positive addere naturae singulari, sed solum negationemdependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis ad aliquod suppositum”, vide ibidem, 34, 2, 8–19, p. 355–359. Forarguments to Senftleben’s thesis, “Subsistentia est terminus positivus, naturae realiter superadditus”, videSENFTLEBEN (n. 3), p. 400–405.


ultimately based, cease to exist at the same time when their existence does?33 Or shall we say

that, e.g., mathematical truths or truths like “Man is a rational animal” are not necessary and

eternal? The next important question which must be considered is as follows: Provided that the

essences or possibles before divine production were only in the objective being as objects in

God’s intellect – mere denominations from without – how will they be distinguished from

beings of reason, which also have objective being in God’s mind?34

Senftleben’s answer to the second group of objections, like Suárez’s, is based on “the

conditional theory” of eternal truths. However, irrespective of their mutual agreements it was

Suárez’s theory of possibles and eternal truths, which in recent secondary literature has become

an “apple of discord” for Suárez’s interpreters.35 It must be noted that the same cannot be said

about Senftleben’s doctrine. My claim is that Senftleben offers a rather straightforward

“reading” of Suárez’s doctrine that can be called “non-Avicennian” or cum grano salis“Thomistic”36. The exposition of Senftleben’s account must be nevertheless given after a brief

presentation of the Uncommon Doctor’s doctrine.37

Suárez agrees that the above-mentioned propositions, like “Homo est animal rationale”, are

necessary and eternal. He introduces the so-called hypothetical or conditional usage of the

copula “is”. Thus, he detects a certain ambiguity in the usual usage of the copula, whicg is the

usage presupposing the existential import, and employment without that import. The being of

that copula possesses only the objective being in the mind. The eternal truth, “Homo est animal

rationale”, can be understood as eternal only in the conditional sense; namely, “If a man existed,

he/she would be a rational animal.” The truth of those conditional propositions can be found

not only among possibles but also among impossibles, e.g., chimeras and the like. The

conditional proposition “Si lapis est animal, est sensibilis” or “Chimera est Chimera” will be true

in the same way as “Si homo est animal, est sensibilis”. However, if both possibles and

impossibles occur in God’s objective being, there must be some intrinsic reason, some internal

possibility, why possibles can be actualized (why they are apt to be) and impossibles cannot.

What does it mean that the efficient divine cause can create a man and not create a chimera?

It is sometimes accepted that Suárez’s theory of possibles and eternal truths should be

labeled as “pre-existential” meaning that there is some entitative relict independent of the

divine being. Thanks to it Suárez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae “makes amply evident that the

ghost of Avicenna is still haunting scholastics’ lecture halls”.38 That interpretation seems to

582

33 “Objicies primo. Essentiae rerum fuerunt ab aeterno: existentiae rerum non fuerunt ab aeterno; ergo, &c.”, in:ibidem, p. 337; “Essentiae rerum sunt necessariae; quia alias, ut docet Aristoteles, de ipsis non darenturScientiae; existentia creatura cujuslibet est contingens, & libere a DEO collata; adeoque existentiaecreaturarum non sunt necessariae. Ergo essentiae, & existentiae cujusvis creaturae, conveniunt duocontradictoria; ergo distinguitur realiter.” In: ibidem, p. 339; “Objicies undecimo. Istae sunt propositionesaeternae veritatis: HOMO EST ANIMAL RATIONALE; BRUTUM EST ANIMAL IRRATIONALE; ergoobjectum harum propositionum est ab aeterno. Atqui Objectum harum propositionum non est DEUS;ergo,&c.” In: ibidem, p. 329sq.

34 “Objicies secundo. Debet dari ratio: cur DEUS possit producere hominem; & non possit producere hirco-coervum. Atqui non est alia ratio, quam quod homo sit intrinsece possibilis: hirco-coervus autem sit intrinseceimpossibilis; ergo,&c.” In: ibidem, p. 324.

35 Vide WELLS (n. 1), p. 25.36 However the differences between Thomistic and Senftlebenian conception will not be analyzed in this paper.37 Suárez exhibits his account mainly in the passage entitled Tractatur objectio de enunciationibus perpetuae veritatis.

Vide SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 12, 38–47, p. 294–298.38 Timothy J. CRONIN, S.J.: Objective Being in Descartes and in Suárez, Rome 1966, p. 41.


be, for those “essentialist interpreters”, among them the most well-known is Timothy

Cronin, confirmed by Suárez’s following reasoning: At the end of the above-mentioned

passage Suárez lastly asks what the necessary connection of the non-existent extremes, when

it does not posit anything real in re, de facto, is. Here he admits that it is not satisfactory to

say that the connection gets its necessity from the divine idea because the divine idea has

already possessed its own necessity to represent, e.g., man as a rational animal, and not as,

for instance, an irrational animal. This means that necessity comes not from the divine

example, but from the object itself. However, the question remains: How can the object,

which is in itself nothing, from itself give rise to such a connection of predicates to be able

to found the necessity of that truth, of that science, and of that idea?39

For essentialist interpreters the answer seems to be obviously “Avicennian”. The connection

is the identity of the extremes that occurs in essential propositions. Every propositional truth

is based on the identity or on the unity of the extremes, which is grasped by us in a complex

way. And because unity is the transcendental property of being, it must be found in every

being.40 And thus it can and even must be also found in the possible being, it is in esseessentiae. “The truth, the necessity and eternity are rooted in essences’ self-identity” and “his

object known by the eternal speculative intellect of God is thus within the divine intellect its

own immutable self-identity and is this of itself, prescinding from its future actual existence

in things or from even its being in the divine intellect. It is true of itself.”41 The essence of

a man having its own esse proprium is its self-identical sameness. The state of essence –

whether it is the being which is within divine knowledge as the object known, or whether it

is the same as actual essence – does not affect its proper being. It is essence’s own self-identity,

not as actually existing, not as identical with the essence of God to which the truth of divine

science is confronted.42

583

39 “... nondum est explicatum quid sit ista necessaria connexio extremorum non existentium; nam, cum nihil in reponat, difficile est intellectu quomodo possit fundare necessariam veritatem. Neque enim satisfacit si dicamus,ablata rerum existentia, solum manere hanc connexionem in divino exemplari et ab illo oriri talem necessitatem;hoc (inquam) non satisfacit, nam, licet veritas harum connexionum, ut realis et actualis veritas, non maneat nisiin divino intellectu (quo sensu locutus est D. Thomas citatis locis, praesertim I, q. 16, a. 7, et sumitur etiam exAnselmo, dialog. de Veritat., c. 7 et 8), nihilominus necessitas hujus veritatis et prima radix ac origo talisconnexionis non videtur posse referri in divinum exemplar. Nam ipsummet divinum exemplar habuit hancnecessitatem repraesentandi hominem animal rationale, nec potuit illum alterius essentiae repraesentare, quodnon aliunde provenit nisi quia non potest homo esse alterius essentiae, nam, hoc ipso quod sit res alteriusessentiae, jam non est homo; ergo ex objecto ipso et non ex exemplari divino provenit haec necessitas; semperergo restat difficultas tacta, quomodo, scilicet, si objectum illud in se nihil est, possit ex se habere talemconnexionem praedicatorum ut fundet aliquo modo necessitatem talis scientiae, et talis veritatis, ac talisexemplaris.” In: SUÁREZ (n. 8) 31, 12, 46, p. 298.

40 “Ad hoc dicendum videtur hanc connexionem nihil aliud esse quam identitatem extremorum quae sunt inpropositionibus essentialibus et affirmativis (et idem dicendum est proportionaliter de diversitate extremorum innegativis). Omnis enim veritas propositionis affirmativae fundatur in aliqua extremorum identitatem vel unitate,quae, licet a nobis concipiatur complexo modo, et per modum conjunctionis praedicati cum subjecto, tamen inre nihil est praeter ipsammet rei entitatem. Identitas autem, cum si proprietas entis (nam idem et diversum adunitatem reducuntur, ut supra diximus), in omni ente, seu in omni statu entis cum proportione reperitur.” In:ibidem.

41 CRONIN (n. 38), p. 52.42 “The essence of man or any essence is its identical self-sameness, and the state of the essence – whether it be that

which is nothing actual but is merely that essence which is apart from all existence and is within divine knowledgeas the object known, or whether it be that same essence as actual – does not affect the essence in itself.” Ibidem,p. 54sq. “Essence, considered in its own self-identity and considered simply as such, and not as actually existingor as existing in the divine mind identical with the essence of God, is that to which even the truth of divinescience is confronted.” In: ibidem, p. 55.


Senftleben seems to be convinced that Suárez’s conditional disquisition does not lay

anything in re at all.43 However, the possible is “nothing” only intrinsically, not according to

the extrinsic denomination.44 The possible seems to be formally constituted only by means

of extrinsic being. It cannot be said that to the creative (not non-creative!) active potency

there must correspond some passive potency. By His creative act, unlike Cronin’s opinion,45

God constitutes freely His own terminus, which is the object known. It can be seen that

Senftleben in no way adopts the principle according to which true thought supposes the

reality of the object known, which seems to be typical for the tradition of Avicenna, Henry

of Ghent and John Duns Scotus.46

Beside that delimitation to the “Avicennian” interpretation operating with the intrinsic

being of possible beings, Senftleben also proposes the argument suggesting that one has to

strictly distinguish between esse objectivum and esse essentiae. According to that opinion,

whose representatives are, e.g., John Doyle47 and some other interpreters48, we cannot, as

Cronin does, identify objective being prior to its creation with the being of an essence in

itself. We are not allowed to do that because the esse objectivum is not the intrinsic reality of

that which is known. It is rather, as has already been said, the extrinsic denomination. Thus

we do not have to neglect the distinction regarding the objective concept between that which

is known and the being it has when it is known.

However, we cannot identify the aptitude for existence, which is essential for real beings

or real essences (that create for Suárez and Senftleben the very object of metaphysics) with

the esse objectivum taken as extrinsic denomination. If we did not discriminate between them,

we would not be allowed to discriminate between possibles and beings of reason. The only

criterion we can get is thus the non-repugnance or the non-contradiction of possibles.

Thanks to that possibles can be distinguished from mere beings of reason having no intrinsic

reality at all.49

Provided that Senftleben wants, at least intentionally, to follow Suárez, we can claim that

Senftleben rejects even Doyle’s interpretation using possibile logicum as a sort of pre-

existential relict preceding activating divine science. Thus it can be said that Senftleben,

unlike Doyle, places the extreme source of plurality not to forms existing outside God, but

584

43 “Objicies primo. Essentiae rerum fuerunt ab aeterno: existentiae rerum non fuerunt ab aeterno; ergo, &c. Resp:Dist. A. essentiae rerum fuerunt ab aeterno, in Idea Divina; & conditionate C.A. fuerunt ab aeterno in se; &absolute N.A. & C. sic ab aeterno fuit homo ANIMAL RATIONALE, hoc sensu conditionato: si existeret homo,existeret animal rationale; conditio autem nihil ponit in re.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3), p. 337.

44 “Objicies sexto. Creatura possibilis est nihil; ergo dum dico: CREATURA EST POSSIBILIS; dico: CREATURAEST NIHIL. Resp: Dist. A. Creatura juxta posibilitatem intrinsecam, passivam, est nihil C. A. juxtapossibilitatem extrinsecam, & activam, est nihil N. A. & C. Dum dico: CREATURA POSSIBILIS EST NIHIL;nego &potentiam extrinsecam, seu activam creaturae, esse aliquid, quod falsum est. Si negarem potentiam solumpassivam, & intrinsecam, esse aliquid; verum eset.” In: ibidem, p. 327.

45 CRONIN (n. 38) p. 55sq.46 “DEUS autem, utpote Creator, per actionem Suam constituit Sibi libere terminum; adeoque in actu exercito

producit ipsam potentiam passivam.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 324.47 Vide DOYLE (n. 1).48 Jean-Francois COURTINE: Suárez et le système de la mètaphysique, Paris 1990, p. 293–321.49 DOYLE 1967 (n. 1) p. 43–45; “Objicies secundo. Debet dari ratio: cur DEUS possit producere hominem; &

non possit producere hirco-cervum. Atqui non est alia ratio, quam quod homo sit intrinsece possibilis: hirco-cervus autem sit intrinsece impossibilis; ergo,&c.” In: SENFTLEBEN (n. 3) p. 324.


directly to God. Many of his responses to the objections are, again, led by the presumption

denying any intrinsic reality on the side of possibles creatures.

He denies the fact that God can create a man and not a goat-stag is so because a man is

intrinsically possible and a goat-stag intrinsically impossible. He emphatically states that the

reason must be taken from God Himself. He is the first cause, the first reason, the first truth, the

first idea and the first exemplar of all beings. Therefore it would be the contradiction to

presuppose some “truth-meker” on which He would be, in his production, dependent.50 Possible

beings are only extrinsic denominations – their possibility is denominated from the divine

Omnipotence.51 The objection to Senftleben’s reduction of plurality to God saying that God

does want to produce possible man but not Himself, Senftleben refutes by saying that He wants

to create something from Himself different not in the pressupositive way (praesuppositive), but

in the constitutive way (constitutive). He wants to create a man effectively, i.e., he does not want

to produce a man that is purely possible.52

What precedes what? Can we say that because a stone is possible, God can create it?

Senftleben answers the question affirmatively. However, he distinguishes between two ways

of the given inference: While he does not agree if we accept that inference causally (there is

no ulterior causality than the prime cause), he concurs with the interpretation according to

which the inference is taken in the formal or identical sense (because Peter is a rational

animal, he is a man). He dismisses any accusation of having committed the vicious circle:

A stone is possible because God can produce it, not vice versa.53

Senftleben also denies “the principle of truth-maker”, according to which every eternal

truth has to be made true by some object. Only God is the necessary and eternal truth.

Propositions are true only in the connection of predicates and subjects that exist only in

God’s wisdom in the conditional way.54 However, it seems that Senftleben’s emphasis on the

source of plurality in God must face the objection that every scientific act will necessarily

585

50 “Resp.: Dist. Maj: debet dari ratio desumpta ex Ipso DEO C. Maj. desumpta ab aliquo extra DEUM N. Maj. N. etiamMi. Nihil de homine, qua tali, est actu ab aeterno; ergo non est aliquid homini instrinsecum, ex quo desumitur ratiointrinsece possibilitatis. Ratio profundior est: quia DEUS est Prima Causa, Prima Ratio, Prima Veritas, Prima Idea,Primum Exemplar omnium, quae extra Deum sunt. Ergo implicat, ut detur alia ratio causalis, veritas, idea, & c. a Deodistincta; dependeter a qua DEUS possit producere e.g. Petrum; &non possit producere vulp-anserem, &c. quia sidaretur alia ratio a priori; tunc DEUS esset Prima ratio, Veritas, Idea, &c.&non esset.” In: ibidem, p. 325.

51 “Homo existens per suum esse instrinsecum, seu per existentiam, denominatur EXISTENS: sed perOmnipotentiam extrinseca denominatur possibilis.” In: ibidem, p. 326.

52 “Objicies quinto. Quando DEUS vult hominem possibile producere, vult aliquid a Se distinctum; non enim vultproducere Se Ipsum; ergo, &c. Resp: Dist. A. vult aliquid a Se distinctum CONSTITUTIVE C. A.PRAESUPPOSITIVE N. A. &C. eo ipso quod DEUS velit efficaciter producere hominem possibile, constituitillum realiter ens per existentiam ipsi datam. Ergo non vult producere hominem PURE POSSIBILE.” In: ibidem.

53 “Objicies decimo. Ideo DEUS potest producere lapidem, quia est possibilis; ergo, &c. Resp: Dist. A si ly IDEOaccipiatur in sensu formali, aut identico C. A. (sic etiam dicitur: IDEO PETRUS EST HOMO, quia est animalrationale) si accipiatur in sensu vere causali N. A. &C. Prima Causa non habet aliam sui causam; nec prima ratiohabet aliam rationem ante se; ut patet ex terminis. Urgebis. Ergo dum dicitur: IDEO DEUS POTEST LAPIDEMPRODUCERE, QUIA EST POSSIBILIS; erit iste sensus: IDEO DEUS POTEST PRODUCERE LAPIDEM,QUIA POTEST; atqui haec Causalis committit circulum vitiosum; ergo,&c. Resp: Ideo lapis est possibilis, quiaDEUS potest illum producere: non autem ideo DEUS potest lapidem producere, quia lapis est possibilis. Ergo noncommittitur circulum vitiosum. Dum autem dicitur: IDEO DEUS POTEST, QUIA POTEST; significamus:nullam esse causalitatem ulteriorem possibilitatis, a DEO distinctam.” In: ibidem, p. 329.

54 “Objicies primo. Essentiae rerum fuerunt ab aeterno: existentiae rerum non fuerunt ab aeterno; ergo, &c. Resp:Dist. A. Essentiae rerum fuerunt ab aeterno, in Idea Divina; &conditionate C. A. fuerunt ab aeterno in se;&absolute N.A. &C. sic ab aeterno fuit ANIMAL RATIONALE, hoc sensu conditionato: si existeret homo,existeret animal rationale; conditio autem nihil ponit in re.” In: ibidem, p. 337.


have as its own object God Himself. Every theoretical science will be about God and thus

it will be “theological”. As usual, the Polish-Bohemian Jesuit responds with the help of

distinction: While as for the mediated object one has to concede to the objection, as for the

immediate object one has to admit that that the real objects are predicates that formally

represent. That is why he says that the scientific act affirms only implicitly and virtually the

divine wisdom that is the first truth.55

I do not want to solve certain ambivalences in Suárez’s teaching of possibles and eternal

truths by means of Senftleben’s interpretation. What I want to show is that J. Senftleben, as one

of the faithful Bohemian Suárezians (the other is e.g. Maximilian Wietrowski, 1660–1737)

living in the second half of the 17th century, interpreted Suárez’s doctrine in a rather conservative

way. His motto was not only “Back to Suárez!”, but rather “Back to the conservative Suárez!”.56

I agree with José Pereira that Suárez’s metaphysics could in certain anamorphoses give rise to

many modernist semblances of metaphysics connected with its “logization” and “supertrans-

cendentalization”. However, it must be noted that this was not the only historical ramification

that Suárez’s metaphysics could give and indeed gave rise to. Joannes Senftleben is the historical

proof that at the Jesuit Faculty of Theology of Charles-Ferdinand University in the second half

of the 17th century the conservative tendencies among Jesuits were still present.

I have to admit that, unlike some of Suárez’s allusions, there is no trace of the possibile logicumin Senftleben’s exposition. It is just logically possible that for many “modernist” interpreters

represents the ultimate moment of Suárez’s metaphysics. Provided that Senftleben’s conservative

exposition is the interpretation faithful to Suárez’s doctrine – face to face to Senftleben’s explicit

quotations and many barowed arguments that presumption does not seem to be entirely

willful – one can learn, I dare say, something about Suárez’s own conception.57 It may be

concluded that Senftleben’s explicit and Suárez’s, not so uncompromising, conservativism in the

issue of possibles is to be classifild as relating more to the tradition of Aguinas and his pollowers,

rather than to that of Avicenna and his adherents.58

586

55 “Objicies undecimo. Istae sunt propositiones aeternae veritatis: HOMO EST ANIMAL RATIONALE,BRUTUM EST ANIMAL IRRATIONALE; ergo objectum harum propositionum est ab aeterno. AtquiObjectum harum propositionum non est DEUS; ergo, c. Resp: N. Subsum: Solus DEUS est veritas necessaria,ac aeterna; ut constat ex rationibus Conclusionis. Dicuntur ergo propositiones esse aeternae, ac necessariae, quoadconnexionem praedicati cum subjecto; quia sic in Sapientia, ac Idea Divina existunt; non quod in se, acintrinsece, sint aliquid a DEO distinctum. Urgebis. Ergo omnes actus scientifici (quia affirmant veritatesnecessariam, ac aeternam) habent pro objecto DEUM. Resp: Dist. Illatum. Pro objecto mediato C. pro objectoimmediato N. Illat: Pro objecto immediato habent illa praedicata, quae formaliter, & explicite representant; atquehaec in statu existentiae temporalis sunt terminus realis divinae Omnipotentiae, pro objecto mediato habentconnexionem praedicati cum subjecto, quae non nisi in Idea Divina est aliud; adeoque actus scientifici implicite,virtualiter, in actu exercito, &c. affirmant ipsam Ideam, ac Sapientiam Divinam, quae est Prima Veritas.” In:ibidem, p. 329sq.

56 For this motto that characterizes the stream of Czech Jesuit philosophers and theologians in the second halfof the 17th century I am grateful to professor Stanislav Sousedík.

57 Cf. the similar interpretation of Suárez’s conception in Amy D. KAROFSKY: Suárez’ Doctrine of Eternal Truths,in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (January 2001), p. 23–47, esp. 41–43.

58 By that designation I do not want to say that Suárez’s and Senftleben’s conception are entirely identical both witheach other and also individually with the Thomistic conception presented, e.g., by Joseph Gredt. Despite theabove-mentioned resemblances, Senftleben’s doctrine of the possibles seems to stress “voluntaristic” aspects more than Suárez and Gredt. That is why one could say that it is closer to Ockham’s concept, which was in larlymodern academic philosophy reaffirmed by the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641). However, thecharacteristics presented below assuredly indicate certain basic similarities: The internal possibility depends onGod – the claim that the internal possibility would remain even though God did not exist is absurd; the intrinsic


Joannes Senftleben (1648–1693) o posibiliích, esencích a vûãn˘ch pravdách. Recepce Suárezovy

metafyziky v Senftlebenovû díle Philosophia Aristotelica universa

StaÈ pfiedstavuje Ïivot a dílo polsko-ãeského filosofa a teologa druhé poloviny 17. století Joanne-

se Senftlebena. Soustfiedí se na jeho recepci Suárezovy metafyziky, konkrétnû na recepci tématu moÏ-

n˘ch jsoucen, povahy distinkce mezi esenciálním a existenciálním bytím koneãn˘ch jsoucen a otáz-

ky tzv. vûãn˘ch pravd (napfi. ãlovûk je Ïivoãich rozumov˘). Autor poukazuje na to, Ïe Senftlebenova

koncepce v nikoli nev˘znamn˘ch rysech navazuje na Suárezovu koncepci ontologické nicoty moÏ-

n˘ch jsoucen pfied stvofiením ãi kritiku tomistické doktríny reálné distinkce mezi esencí a existencí.

Stejnû jako Suárez i Senftleben je pfiesvûdãen, Ïe moÏná jsoucna pfied stvofiením mají jen objektivní

bytí v rozumu (jsou jen Bohem poznávány) a Ïádné bytí vnitfiní. Podobnû jako Doctor Eximius zastá-

vá koncepci reálné identity esence a existence u koneãn˘ch jsoucen. Jako Suárez je proto i Senftle-

ben nucen odpovídat na celou fiadu námitek spojen˘ch s metafyzick˘m v˘kladem kontingence tvorÛ

ãi moÏností samotného metafyzického poznání, tedy vûãn˘ch a nutn˘ch pravd. Autor ukazuje, Ïe na

rozdíl od Suáreze, kter˘ v rámci souãasné diskuse b˘vá interpretován „modernisticky“ v tom slova

smyslu, Ïe v jeho metafyzice lze izolovat tzv. logickou posibilii neboli logické moÏné jsoucno, Senft-

leben tyto vûãné pravdy pfiece jen více a explicitnûji zakládá v BoÏí v‰emohoucnosti. Z toho dÛvodu

lze fiíci, Ïe Senftlebenova inspirace Suárezovou metafyzikou není, v rámci daného tématu, zcela bez-

v˘hradná.

587

possibility depends fundamentally on the divine essence; the intrinsic possibility depends formally on the divineintellect. Vide I[oseph] GREDT OSB: Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae II, editio decima tertiorecognita et aucta ab Euchario Zenzen OSB, Barcinone/ Friburgi Brisgoviae /Romae 1961, p. 129–135. WhenSuárez says that conditional propositions would be true even though there were neither any actual nor potentialefficient cause, one must take into account that he does mention only efficient cause but not the divine essenceand His knowledge. “Immo, in hoc eodem sensu non solum non requirunt hae connexiones causam efficientemin actu, verum etiam neque in potentia videntur illam postulare, si formaliter ac praecise sistamus in earumveritate. Quod potest declarari ratione facta de propositione conditionali, cujus veritas non pendet ex causaefficienti vel potente efficere, et ideo aeque reperitur in rebus impossibilibus ac in possibilibus.” In: SUÁREZ(n. 8) 31, 12, 45, p. 297.


joannes senftleben on the possibles, essences and eternal truths

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