japan: occupation & a post-colonial context

Japan: Occupation & a Post-Colonial Context1945 to present

preface .

September 2, 1945, the second World War in the Pacific Theatre closes with the signing of the Japanese

Instrument of Surrender aboard the USS Missouri at anchor in Tokyo Bay. Signatories of the Empire of

Japan sign alongside the United States of America, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain & Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of Australia, the

Dominion of Canada, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, & the Dominion of New Zealand enacting the terms of Japan’s official surrender & the formal

passage of Japan from sovereign nation into the custody of Allied Occupational forces. By this time, the

ceremony aboard the USS Missouri was largely a formality. Emperor Hirohito had accepted the terms of

the Potsdam Declaration1 in the Gyokuon-hōsō (Imperial Rescript of Surrender) he issued during an

unprecedented radio address to the people of Japan on August 15th, 1945, noon Japanese Standard

Time. The Occupation of Japan had effectively begun two weeks later when, uncontested, General

MacArthur first set foot upon Japanese Soil at the Atsugi Naval Air Base on the thirtieth of August.

By the time that Mamoru Shigemitsu & Yoshijirō Umezu signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on

behalf of the Emperor & Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, respectively, Japan had already been

occupied for three days & would remain so until 11:00 a.m. on the twenty-eighth of April 1952; six years

four months to the day since American Troops had first set foot upon Japan.

Whitney Starbuck Boykin" Gwendolyn WrightGSAPP: Columbia University" Colonial/Post-Colonial Urbanismwsb2119" May 10, 2013

Japan: Occupation & a Post-Colonial Context" 1

1 Issued July 26, 1945 by the authority of “ United States President Harry S. Truman, United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, & Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China Chiang Kai-shek... which outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference.” (Potsdam Declaration)

In the intervening years, the United States would act unilaterally to reform & reconstruct Japan to forge a

lasting peace in Western Asia & the broader Pacific region. Pivotal to the history of the Occupation is the

broader context of the Cold War, which will effect the priorities, responsibilities & goals spelled out in the

Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4/A) to the degree that those initial priorities were at

times abandoned in favor of responding to the immediate demands of the Cold War.

intent .

This paper will attempt to trace the post war agenda for the Occupation of Japan from its origins in

punishing Japan thru disarmament of its military, the dismantling of its industry & scheduled reparations

into the growing concerns about Communist expansion, the emergence of containment as the preeminent

foreign policy position of the United States & the consequent effect of this policy on the subsequent

political & urban development of Japan as part of a multi-layered, multivalent network of defense

constructed by the United States in the wake of the war & the emergence of political warfare. In this

narrative, a series of American political decisions will be characterized as leading directly to a pattern of

development most apparent in the reconstruction of Hiroshima that managed the two primary goals of the

United States occupation of Japan: to construct a robust political bulwark against the expansion of

communism & the dissuasion of Japan from future acts of aggression. Specifically, this narrative will

arrive at the point of Tange Kenzo’s Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park as the object of American Cold War

policies & in its design as the narrative that has since predisposed Japan toward peace.

Looking beyond the end of the occupation & relationships that have emerged from it, a brief foray will be

made into the post-occupation relationship between Japan & the United States to facilitate an observation

of the post-colonial context by which the two nations prosper but maintain an eerily dominating

association.



A considerable amount of this paper will belong to the political backstory that precedes the reconstruction

of Japan. Without this I fear that the eventual passage of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City

Construction Law & Tange Kenzo’s masterpiece of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park & Museum will

seem unremarkable, autonomous & innocuous within the broader context of the American Occupation &

the Cold War. Consider then, the rebuilding of Hiroshima, the Park & the Museum as the object of an

American Cold War policy & the typology of the museum itself as the curator of a narrative encouraged by

the United States.

context .

In order to appreciate the profundity of the policy shifts that would occur with respect to Japan over the

course of the occupation, it is important to acknowledge the initial sentiments of the American people,

public & political. Prior to the detonation of Little Boy & Fat Man above Hiroshima & Nagasaki or even the

viability of such nuclear weapons, the wound of Pearl Harbor & the bloody legacy of subsequent war in

the Pacific Theatre was raw in the American psyche. A 1944 Gallup Poll showed that 13-percent of the

American public were inclined toward the total annihilation of Japan; another poll the following year

indicated the slightly moderated position of 33-percent of the public who favored the summary execution

of Emperor Hirohito upon Japan’s defeat. The bloodlust was not limited to the public sphere. 2

Sen. Lister (D-Alabama) urged the armed forces to “gut the heart of Japan with fire”; Sen. Ernest McFarland (D-Arizona) insisted that “the Japs... pay dearly through their blood & the ashes of their cities”... & Sen. Theodore G. Biblo (D-Mississippi), a notorious racist,... urge[d] the sterilization of all Japanese.3

The President’s son had advocated the continued bombing of Japan until her civilian population was

reduced by one-half. The President himself entertained that the Japanese people might posses racial



2 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 3.

3 ibid.

traits of “primitive” brains & “barbarism” that might be ameliorated through a eugenic program of

compulsory crossbreeding with “docile Pacific islanders.”4

Military strategists & planners were at the same time increasingly nervous about the destabilizing effect

on postwar Asia of having requested the Soviet Union’s aide in prosecuting the routing of Japanese

forces from mainland Asia & the invasion of Japan at Yalta in February of 1945. To permit Russia to

advance further into Asia under the auspices of war threatened the expansion of Communism into China,

Japanese territory & colonies that would be under Soviet occupation following the war. Before the atomic

bomb was anything more than a theory, these elements were desperately searching for options to affect

Japan’s surrender & the end of conflict in Asia with all possible haste.5 When Franklin Delano Roosevelt

was informed of the The Gadget’s successful test on July 16, 1945, it seemed that the United States

arsenal was then in possessionof the means to affect Japanese surrender on the schedule necessary to

deny Russia the opportunity to continue their advance into China & lay claim to territory of Japan. So, as

the Enola Gay took to the skies of Japan6 on the fateful morning of August sixth, the American imperative

to bring a sudden end to the war & Soviet expansion7 was seemingly realized. “Fat Man” would descend

on Nagasaki before the United States acknowledged Japan’s intent to surrender; Russia would continue

its war with Japan until September eighth.8



4 ibid, 4.

5 There can be little doubt that the extraordinarily high estimates for American casualties anticipated for any landing action was also a factor in this concern.

6 The selection of the two targets, Hiroshima & Nagasaki, appears to have been the product of substantial debate in Washington. Not wanting to prejudice the potential to align Japan’s future with the interests of the United States, military planners omitted Kyoto & Tokyo from the prospective list of atomic targets early on. The fear was that the enormous cultural destruction that would result from using the weapons on these cities would inspire generations of hate in the Japanese people, which might prejudice them toward the Soviet cause. (Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb & the Cold War, 1945-50, 20.)

7 Aware of the latter context of the Cold War, I feel it is important to note that Soviet expansion at this time appears to be legitimate under the context of the war.

8 The history of these decisions is variegated & unclear to my mind & will not be commented on here.

General Douglas MacArthur was assigned as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the

Pacific & given provisional authority over the reform & reconstruction of Japan during its occupation.

Insisting upon the vital strategic value of Japan & the mandate islands to America’s national security, the

United States moved quickly to exclude exclude the involvement of the Soviets & its allies from anything

more substantive than advisory roles in the occupation of Japan. With unilateral authority General

MacArthur executed the “Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan” (SWNCC 150/4/A) when he assumed the

position of SCAP in Tokyo. The agenda of SWNCC 150/4/A was to “‘first destroy military power,’ then

build representative government, enfranchise women, free political prisoners, liberate farmers, establish

free labor unions, destroy monopolies, abolish police repression, liberate the press, liberalize education &

decentralize political power.”9 The cumulative effect of these objectives was to strip Japan of the political

will to war & the industrial capacity militarize. Poignantly, “to insure that Japan will not again become a

menace to the peace & security of the world.”10

economic reconstruction in occupied areas program .

The United States had emerged from the second World War as the preeminent industrial, capitalistic

economy; however, the network of global production & trade upon which this status was predicated had

been utterly eradicated by fifteen years of war. Faced with global dollar shortages that negated the

viability of its burgeoning export industry,11 the American economy though insularly robust was situated at

the precipice of a future world with which its economy was incongruent. Previous attempts had been

made to bolster the industries of the allied nations while maintaining conditions for reparations to be made




10 United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4/A)

11 The scarcity of liquid assets around the globe meant that America’s trading partners could not pay the entirety of their balance for trade, the dollar shortage in 1947 was estimated at $11 billion ($96.8 billion adjusted). As a result, private investors in the United States had to carry balance. The industry of nations importing these products were not viable since they faced rapid inflation as a result of the relatively high cost of raw material for their production. This inflation rendered the products of these industries too expensive to be valuable in an impoverished post war world.

by the defeated axis powers. The combined effects of the Eurasian economic depression following the

war & the mandated freezing of Germany & Japan’s considerable industrial power rendered these plans

impotent. Faced with the permanent dissolution of the prewar global trade networks (atop which the

United States was now positioned), the subsequent regional trade networks that would likely take their

place & the popular opinion that such small scale economies were a fertile condition for communist

sentiments, the imperative to punish Germany & Japan while dismantling the industries that gave their

militaries such potency gave way to economic concerns of ensuring a robust network of vivacious

capitalistic democracies. Ergo, 1947 saw a drastic shift in the American postwar foreign policy.

The Economic Reconstruction in Occupied Areas program (EROA-prog) was the Asiacentric12 parallel of

the Eurocentric Marshall Plan,13 as well as the global Government & Relief in Occupied Areas aid

(GARIOA-aid) package with which the United States distributed considerable dollar & raw material aide to

allies & occupied areas.14 The broad strategy, of which the two plans were indispensable components,

marked a discrete tac in the postwar policy that shifted priority from reparations & disarmament & toward

reinvigorating networks of global trade.

The plans were a product of the containment doctrine & had their origins in a 1947 report on Russia’s

behavior in Europe that was dispatched by George Kennan, then serving as an American Diplomat to the

Soviet Union. In this report Kennan made general gestures at what would later become the doctrine of

containment as the bolstering of global democratic capitalism’s capacity. Kennan’s report brought the




13 Begun April 1948 (Lapansky, United States History: Modern America, 402.)

14 As noted by Michael Schaller, China was conspicuously absent from the recipients of this aide. He explains that China “possessed no industrial base or offensive military strength...” (P.88). However, it is important to note that an initial stipulation of SCAP (Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, i.e. MacArthur) in the occupation of Japan was the surrender of all Japanese industry in China to the sovereign control of China as ill-gotten gains. Coincident with the enactment of the two plans, we can observe gathering momentum of Communist elements in China & the potential collapse of the Nationalists. Consequently, Washington begins to backpedal on the surrender of Japanese industries to China & we are left with Schaller’s observation that China lacked the industrial base that was prerequisite to receiving aide. **Subsequent research has revealed that this is a well tread statement that is supported by records of Kennan himself.

young diplomat to the awareness of Navy Secretary James Forestall. It was Forestall’s sponsorship of

Kennan to lecture at the National War College that brought Kennan into orbit with George C. Marshall

who was then organizing the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) that would inform what would eventually

become the Marshall Plan. Marshall appointed Kennan as head of the PPS, from which position Kennan

immediately developed the argument for the preeminent threat to America’s continued prosperity as

Russia’s political power & not the orthodox military power of its Red Army. Consequently, what would

emerge as the doctrine of containment was, though not uniquely the province of Kennan’s mind, best

articulated through his argument for economic & political strategies rather than militaristic ones, which

would make the global economy inhospitable to Communism. His work on the doctrine that would

embody this argument earned him the epitaph of “the father of containment.”15

Before an audience at the National War College in September of 1948, Kennan cemented “containment”

in the political conscience of America & her policy makers when describing that at present the Soviet

Union had neither the will nor the resources to constitute a credible threat to the United States & that

“only five centers of industrial & military power in the world” possessed the capacity necessary to alter this

balance. Apart from the obvious centers of the United Sates & the Soviet Union, the PPS had identified

Great Britain, Central Europe, Germany, & Japan.16 Ergo, in April of 1948 the twin plans, the Marshall

Plan & the program of Japanese Recovery were initiated to construct of Great Britain, Central Europe,

Germany, Japan & the United States a robust global network of trade & capitalistic democracy.

The brief history of containment is important because it establishes the impetus for the later passage of

the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law on August 6th, 1949. Prior to discussing that

however, it also introduces George Kennan to our awareness.



15 “George F. Kennan”

16 Kennan, “Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy”

george kennan & william draper .

The American Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of

Defense & granted the Department of State more robust powers with which the two could begin to reign

in the flamboyant & increasingly unresponsive SPAC, General MacArthur. Newly appointed Department of

Defense Secretary, James Forestall, tapped William H. Draper, vice president of the investment bank

Dillon Read & Co., as under secretary.17 Draper had previously been involved in Occupied Germany,

where he was responsible for relaxing the punitive economic restrictions that had hamstrung German

business early in the occupation.18

The “father of containment” & the investment banker were brought together by their respective superiors

in wake of the National Security Act. Both men were advocates of containment, of the perspective that the

greatest bulwark against Communist expansion was a robust network of Capitalistic Democracies & that

the latent business interests of Japan & Germany were the elements most capable of ensuring that

eventuality. Together they resisted SCAP’s efforts to bring the occupation of Japan to a close late in 1947.

The two men “considered it vital to delay peace settlements until after the German & Japanese business

classes (& their political allies) were securely returned to power.”19



17 “William Henry Draper, Jr.”

18 ibid


hiroshima .

“”

Not a single living tree remained in Hiroshima. The wasteland extended as far as the eye could

see, its flat surface crisscrossed by intersecting roads & waterways... Yet in this scorched

wilderness, there were always wandering souls haunting the landscape like shadows: disoriented

men in national uniforms with faces covered with dirt; children whose scarred faces twitched with

spasms of pain; hairless women walking under the sun like frightened animals, their faces

covered with a furoshiki.20 Hospitals in the suburbs sufficiently far from the center of explosion to

have escaped destruction were still packed with patients suffering from continuous high fever,

swollen gums, & wounds oozing pus. Only two months ago, they had been citizens of Hiroshima,

& now they were the survivors.

The city of Hiroshima had been there until the morning of August 6, 1945, a castle town still

untouched by the bombings... That morning, in an instant, the whole city vanished... Survivors

tried to escape to the suburbs amidst the black smoke covering the sky & the flames scorching

the earth, but some collapsed on the way & others died just as they had made their way to safety.

Those who survived the ordeal & thought they had narrowly escaped the jaws of death were

celebrating their good fortune with relatives in the countryside, but within a mere three or four

weeks their hair began to fall out & their noses & mouths began to bleed. Soon they developed a

high fever & died before any medical attention could be administered. Two months later those

who did manage to survive were numb from the shock of losing their close family members, &

they themselves became fearful of the effects of radiation from the atomic explosion. Like

unwanted animals, they wandered aimlessly in the scorched wilderness. These former citizens of

Hiroshima were no longer the same human beings; their former identities had vanished as though

they had never existed.

Those who had gone through such an experience were reluctant to talk about it. The only thing

they were prepared to say was, “We got nuked, that's what we call it here. We just feel more dead

than alive.”

“”

" -Shuichi Kato, recalling November 1945



20 A wrapping cloth commonly used in Japan to transport goods.

hiroshima peace memorial city construction law .

Early reconstruction legislation was hamstrung by chronic tax shortfalls stemming from the massive loss

of taxpayers & taxable assets in Japan. The War Damage Reconstruction Plan, passed into law in the fall

of 1946, was no exception. Even with the legislation the City Restoration Bureau, which was charge with

distributing funds & resources equitably for the reconstruction of war damaged areas, had estimated the

cost of restoring Hiroshima at over ¥2.25 billion (¥64.2 billion adjusted)21& they could not in good

conscience dedicate such significant resources to one city when so many others were in need of this

assistance. The personal efforts of Mayor Kihara to secure to necessary commitments included appeals

directly to the national government & SPAC, which don’t appear to have been immediately successful.22

Three years later, however... The Japanese economy had begun to cautiously withdraw from the brink of

collapse, which it had teetered upon since inflation ran rampant at the end of the war, with the enactment

of the Dodge Plan following the visit of the eponymous Joseph Dodge, an American banker, at the behest

of President Truman in July of 1949.23 The Dodge Plan operated on four objectives:

“1) balancing the consolidated national budget; 2) establishing the U.S. Aid Counterpart Fund in place of the lending operations of the RFB; 3) establishing a single foreign exchange rate; & 4) decreasing government intervention into the economy, especially through subsidies & price controls.”24

The subsequent financial reform & austerity measures enlisted by the Dodge Plan facilitated the desired

stimulant effect of the EROA-prog & GARIOA-aid to take hold, which was so important within the context

of the containment doctrine.

Shortly after the adoption of the Dodge Plan, the Diet , still under the provisional occupational authority of

SCAP, passed the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law on August sixth, 1949.25 By that



21 “The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law.”

22 ibid.

23 “Joseph Dodge.”

24 Thorsten & Sugita, “Joseph Dodge & the geometry of power in US-Japan relations,” 1999.

25 Noteworthy that this date is the fourth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

time, Hiroshima’s four year struggle to recover from the devastating toll of Little Boy had been to little

effect. Were Hiroshima to continue to languish in the post-atomic depression facilitated by chronic food

shortages, political opposition26 27 & the inadequacy of industry & finance to affect recovery, the instability

could threaten not only the broader economic future of Japan but the attitude of the Japanese narrative

toward the second world war & the atomic bomb. Japan’s economy as well as the sympathy of its national

narrative toward America & former colonies of Japan were vital to the United States’ Asian strategy of

containment. Either a failed economy or a hostile national narrative would, in the eyes of American

planners, have presented opportunities for ingress of Communist sentiments & sympathies into Japan.

Unlike previous legislation, The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law was national legislation

intended specifically to facilitate the restoration of Hiroshima, thus averting the legitimate concerns of the

City Restoration Bureau. In pursuit of establishing a, “peace memorial city to symbolize the human ideal

figure 1: Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Plan, 1952. courtesy: http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/



26 According to the history of the War Damage Reconstruction Plan.

27 Ohta, Essays by Yoko Ohta A city and it's people with evening calm.

http://www.city.hiroshima.jp


of sincere pursuit of genuine & lasting peace”28 the affected the transfer of land that was previously

military or government property to the city of Hiroshima (Article IV) & the allocation of resources from

Japan’s aide packages29 to fund & support the necessary planning & reconstruction of Hiroshima. The law

30 states...

Article I

It shall be the object of the present law to provide for the construction of the city of Hiroshima as a peace memorial city to symbolize the human ideal of sincere pursuit of genuine & lasting peace.

Article II

Special town planning for the construction of Hiroshima Peace Memorial City (hereinafter referred to as the Peace Memorial City Construction Plan) shall include, in addition to the planning provided for by Article 4 of the Town Planning Law, planning of facilities to inspire the pursuit of lasting peace and such other cultural facilities as would befit a peace memorial city.

2) The special town planning endeavors to construct the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City (hereinafter referred to as the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors) shall be developed for the purpose of implementing the Peace Memorial City Construction Plan.

Article III

Relevant agencies of the national and local governments shall, in light of the significance of the purpose described in Article 1, render every possible assistance to the expedition and completion of the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors.

Article IV

As deemed necessary for the execution of the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors, the national government may, Article 28 of the National Property Law notwithstanding, transfer ordinary assets to those local public entities mandated to bear the expenses required by construction endeavors.

Article V

Those engaged in executing the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors shall strive to complete said endeavors promptly and shall submit progress reports to the Minister of Construction at least once every six months.

2 The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet once each year the status of the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors.



28 Article 219 of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Plan, Article I.

29 EROA-prog, GARIOA-aid & later that of the Marshall Plan when it was expanded to Asia. All aid packages were later replaced by the Mutual Security Plan in 1951, active as as 1952.

30 http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/.



Article VI

The Mayor of Hiroshima shall, with the cooperation of residents and support from relevant organizations, establish a program of continuous activity toward completion of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City.

Article VII

Unless otherwise stipulated by this law, the Special Town Planning Law and the Town Planning Law shall apply to the Peace Memorial City Construction Plan and the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors.

Upon its enactment, the immediate effect of this law (beyond the distribution of land & resources) was the

obligation of prefectural, municipal, & the national government to the proactive support of redeveloping

Hiroshima as a peace city & to do so with all due haste, according to the provisions of Articles III & V.

Essentially, this positioned Hiroshima at the hearth of Japan’s consolidating national identity, by virtue of

that proximity wed that

identity to the consequences

of war & the atomic age, &

obligated the resources of

the nation to the support of

that identity. Article VI looked

toward the future addressing

concerns of permanence by

ensuring the preservation of

the emerging narratives

iconography.31

Nakajima, formerly the city’s

primary business center, was

not redeveloped for business



31 This was fifty-years before the Genbaku Dome’s 1999 inscription to the UNESCO World Heritage List in on the basis of cultural criteria. (UNESCO, “Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome).”)

figure: 3. Map of facilities related to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law, courtesy: http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/



(as might be expected given the economic imperative) but instead set aside by the Hiroshima Peace

Memorial City Construction Law as Nakajima Park, later known as Peace Memorial Park in the Hiroshima

Memorial City Construction Plan. 32 The law also initiated the competition for the design of the Peace

Memorial Park, which solicited 145 proposals; the shortlist from which were the projects proposed by

Tange Kenzo, Yamashita Toshiro, & Arai Ryuzo; awarded first through third respectively.33

Unique to Tange’s proposal & apparent in the diagrams above was Tange’s inclusion of the Genbaku

Dome as the terminus of the primary axis of the project.

Of all of the land in Hiroshima that could have been set aside for the Peace Memorial Park, there was

special significance to Nakajima that was symbolized by the presence of the Genbaku Dome. The dome

remains well known to the present day as one of the few structures to remain standing after August sixth;

however, prior to that day Genbaku Dome had been conceived as Hiroshima Prefectural Commercial

Exhibition Hall by its Czech architect34 at its completion in 1915. The name would change twice in the

next two decades: 1921, Hiroshima Prefectural Products Exhibition Hall; 1933, Hiroshima Prefectural

figure: 4. courtesy: http://www.arch-hiroshima.net



32 Planning and Coordination Department, Planning and General Affairs Bureau, the City of Hiroshima, “The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law and Commentary: To accomplish our goal of constructing Hiroshima as a symbol of eternal peace.”

33 Arch-Hiroshima, “Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum & Park.”

34 Jan Letzel

http://www.arch-hiroshima.net

http://www.arch-hiroshima.net

Industrial Promotion Hall.35 As of the sixth

of August, the building housed interests

responsible for promoting trade with

Japan’s colonies, the accumulated

territory of its foreign aggression up to

that time. This is the irony that predicated

axial alignment of Kenzo Tange’s

proposal for the Hiroshima Peace

Memorial Park & Museum.36 By aligning the entire proposal on axis with this ruin, Tange engraved an

indelible mark from the redevelopment of Hiroshima, the governing Hiroshima Memorial City Construction

Plan (which would become the governing document for all subsequent urban development in the

country), the atomic bombing of Hiroshima & that event as the consequence of nationalistic excesses of

militaristic aggression & colonization. Construction of the museum & park would begin in 1949 & with their

completion in 1955, this predicate narrative was firmly established.

The development of the Hiroshima Memorial park included the Peace Boulevard, spanning 100 meters in

width and stretching to a length of 3,750 meters. The Peace Bridge, the railings & bastions of which were

designed by the Japanese-American Sculptor, Isamu Noguchi, connect the island on which the museum

is located to the delta on either side.

Anti-nuclear demonstrations37 & the continued defense of a conservative reading of Article IX of the

National Constitution of Japan by the political left, demonstrates the immutability of this narrative in the



35 Logan, Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with 'Difficult Heritage.'

36 Tange Kenzo, “Hiroshima heiwa kinen tōshi ni kankei shite (The Making of Hiroshima into a factory for Peace).”

37 That were reinvigorated by the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi resulting from the earthquake & tsunami of March 11, 2011.

figure 2

body politic of Japan. As of 2003, the redevelopment of Hiroshima had reached ¥1.7 trillion according to

the accounting of the Peace Memorial City Construction Endeavors.38

the end of occupation .

The 1949 general election saw the newly established Liberal Party sweep into power with 13,583,289

votes, more than 44% of all of the votes cast, assuming 269 of the 466 seats on the Diet.39 The Liberal

Party was novel in name only: Yoshida Shigeru had previously served as Foreign Secretary under the

Seiyuki party in 194540 before assuming the position of Prime Minister for the Liberal Party, the rebranded

Seiyuki party, in the 1949 election. The 1949 election also saw the emerging Socialist & Communist

parties loose ground after their strong performance in the 1947 election. Seemingly, with the political

imperatives of Draper & Kennan satisfied, the end of the American Occupation moves to being imminent

that same year as SCAP began to relinquish considerable ranges of its authority to the newly elected

Yoshida Diet.

On September eighth, 1951, at the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Conference, the San

Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by all signatories present except for the Soviet Union & People’s

Republic of China. At the same time, the Security Treaty Between the United Sates Japan was also

signed, granting the United States indefinite, exclusive military access to the sovereign l&s of Japan. Both

treaties became effective on April 28, 1952, ensuring the United State’s desired Pacific security network.

This same year, the Liberal Party together with the Reform Party, the rebranded mantle of the Progressive

Party, gained control of 331 of the 446 seats in the Diet, while the Japanese Communist Party was left



38 http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/.

39 “Japanese General Election, 1949”

40 Pivotal to efforts to thwart SPAC mandate to dismantle the Zaibatsu.



without representation with the loss of its remaining 35 seats.41 The historical power structure had been

largely restored, sans the military element & the with the emperor now largely a figurehead. The Zaibatsu,

the monopolistic, mega-industrial, family entities, that were generally believed to have profited from

Japan’s militarization & to have actively stoked the furnaces of war were a primary concern of the

American Policy in the early years of occupation and were to have been entirely disassembled before a

peace settlement was to be considered. At the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Zaibatsu

had been only superficially disassembled; their primary power & political structures kept in place

throughout the occupation. Their survival and subsequent veracity is credited by many contemporary

observers as the impetus for Japan’s rapid industrial recovery in the years that followed the return to

sovereignty.

With the escalation of the Korean conflict, the 24th Infantry Division, which had been stationed in Japan,

was redeployed to Korea. Consequently, Japan was encouraged by SCAP to begin remilitarization for the

purposes of its own defense. In July 1950, the Japanese Government, under the Prime Ministership of

Yoshida Shigeru & still under the Occupational authority of SCAP, authorized the armament of a 75,000

man National Police Reserve for the nations defense. Yoshida Shigeru’s position as Prime Minister did

not end until December 1954, before which time the Prime Minister of the then sovereign nation of Japan

made gestures to the United States of willingness “to accept whatever practical arrangements the United

States might consider necessary”42 with regard to continued American military presence within Japan for

the purposes of the two nations security.

Tensions between the two nations escalated as the United States exerted increased pressure on Japan to

equivocate on the terms of Article IX in the National Constitution of Japan to allow for the rearmament of



41 “Japanese General Election, 1952”

42 Kort, Trans-Pacific Racisms & the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 43.

Japan for purposes of defense. Tensions peaked in 1960 with discussion of the pending Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation & Security Between the United States & Japan. In response to the rearmament of Japan at

the behest of the United States, the treaty would expand responsibilities for joint military involvement

while permitting the United States to maintain 31,000 troops in Japan. The treaty inspired massive

protest, cost the sitting Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, his seat & passed solely by virtue of a technicality

when the House of Councilors refused to vote on the measure within the limited period of time required

from when it had been approved by the lower house.43 The treaty was consistent with continuing pressure

from the United States on Japan toward additional rearmament & weaponization under Sato as Prime

Minister.44

Following the April 1, 1979 American disaster at Three Mile Island in which a coolant system failed

leading to the uncontrolled release of radioactive krypton gas & iodine, domestic approval for nuclear

power waned drastically. Coincident with this, then president Jimmy Carter virtually incapacitated the

American nuclear research field thru a series of legislation on the topic of non-proliferation, culminating in

the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act. The timing of this ended development of what American nuclear scientists

had believed was the “holy grail” of nuclear technology, breeder reactors that could exploit the plutonium

fuel cycle producing minimal waste & meeting foreseeable energy demands with known reserves of fissile

material for more than five-billion years (effectively the predicted life of the sun).

Under pressure from domestic nuclear interests & the Japanese government, the Reagan administration

subverted Carter’s policies to transfer the body of American nuclear breeder reactor research & an

unknown mass of plutonium fuel to the sovereign control of Japan. Estimates are that Japan had

accumulated 70-metric tons of plutonium up until the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi. This includes

shipments of foreign-origin fissile material as well as plutonium domestically enriched. This research was



43 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security between the United States & Japan”

44 “Sato Visit”, 1964

pioneered by Joseph Trento at the National Security News Service and was published by the organization

in greater detail on April 9, 2012.45

As the narrative presented by Mr. Trento pertains to the topic of the post-colonial context of Japan, one

might consider the timing of the export of nuclear research & material during the tensions of the Cold War,

as an expansion of American military potency. In that scenario the Japanese government, whose

obligations to America during the occupation were not so distant memories & who had already shown

continued tolerance of an American military presence in their territory, may have been sensitive to

American overtures, or at the very least the otherwise unlikely willingness of the Americans to share this

technology. If not for the occupation, its general success & the national incorporation of peace & anti-

nuclear positions, it is unlikely that Japan would have served not only as a political bulwark against

Communist expansion, but potentially a sovereignly military one as well.



45 Trento, “United States Circumvented Laws To Help Japan Accumulate Tons of Plutonium.”

japan: occupation & a post-colonial context

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