insight, part of a special feature on exploring resilience in social-ecological systems shooting the...

Copyright © 2006 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.Olsson, P., L. H. Gunderson, S. R. Carpenter, P. Ryan, L. Lebel, C. Folke, and C. S. Holling. 2006.Shooting the rapids: navigating transitions to adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. Ecologyand Society 11(1): 18. [online] URL:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art18/

Insight, part of a Special Feature on Exploring Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems

Shooting the Rapids: Navigating Transitions to AdaptiveGovernance of Social-Ecological Systems

Per Olsson1, Lance H. Gunderson2, Steve R. Carpenter3, Paul Ryan4, Louis Lebel5, Carl Folke6, and C. S. Holling7

ABSTRACT. The case studies of Kristianstads Vattenrike, Sweden; the Northern Highlands Lake Districtand the Everglades in the USA; the Mae Nam Ping Basin, Thailand; and the Goulburn-Broken Catchment,Australia, were compared to assess the outcome of different actions for transforming social-ecologicalsystems (SESs). The transformations consisted of two phases, a preparation phase and a transition phase,linked by a window of opportunity. Key leaders and shadow networks can prepare a system for change byexploring alternative system configurations and developing strategies for choosing from among possiblefutures. Key leaders can recognize and use or create windows of opportunity and navigate transitions towardadaptive governance. Leadership functions include the ability to span scales of governance, orchestratenetworks, integrate and communicate understanding, and reconcile different problem domains. Successfultransformations rely on epistemic and shadow networks to provide novel ideas and ways of governingSESs. We conclude by listing some rules of thumb” that can help build leadership and networks forsuccessful transformations toward adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.

Key Words: social-ecological systems; adaptive governance; transformability; shadow networks;leadership; resilience

INTRODUCTION

The experience of traversing the turbulent reachesof a river in a small vessel is not easily forgotten.The shallow and rapidly flowing water can createtreacherous conditions that are characterized bygreat uncertainty and great risks. We use the phrase“shooting the rapids” as an organizing metaphorbecause it is analogous to the periods of abruptchange or turbulence observed in managed social-ecological systems (SESs), in which previous rulesand social mechanisms may no longer apply. Duringthe period of transit through the rapids, severalalternate vessel configurations are possible: one inwhich the keel points down, another in which thekeel points up, and yet another in which the vesselcompletely disintegrates, with one state moredesirable than the others. In this article, we provideinsight into how people in various SESs prepare forand navigate periods of transformation, particularlyin terms of leadership and social networks.

Many ongoing governance and managementapproaches to SESs attempt to control keyecosystem variables in their efforts to deliverefficiency, reliability, and optimality of ecosystemgoods and services (Holling and Meffe 1996).However, approaches that seek to stabilize a set ofdesirable goods and services ultimately increase thevulnerability of the system to unexpected change(Folke et al. 2002, Gunderson and Holling 2002).There is an increasing recognition that alternativesto top-down governmental control for governingSESs are needed (Gunderson et al. 1995, Berkes andFolke 1998, Berkes et al. 2003). The growingnumber of failures among current approaches andthe increasing vulnerability of SESs has led to callsfor more adaptive governance regimes that can dealwith uncertainty and change (Dietz et al. 2003,Folke et al. 2005, Lebel et al. 2006). Governanceregimes of this type, capable of matching theinherent complexity of SESs and dealing withuncertainty and change, require substantial changes

1Stockholm University, 2Emory University, 3University of Wisconsin-Madison, 4CSIRO, 5Chiang Mai University, 6Center for TransdisciplinaryEnvironmental Research, 7University of Florida

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in the way humans currently relate to and governthese systems (Folke et al. 2005).

Adaptive governance relies on polycentricinstitutional arrangements that are nested, quasi-autonomous decision-making units operating atmultiple scales (Ostrom 1996, McGinnis 1999).Spanning from local to higher organizational levels,polycentric institutions provide a balance betweendecentralized and centralized control (Imperial1999). M. Lee (unpublished manuscript) refers tosuch adaptive systems of governance as the “newgovernance” and defines it as a form of socialcoordination in which actions are coordinatedvoluntarily by individuals and organizations withself-organizing and -enforcing capabilities. Adaptivegovernance relies on networks that connectindividuals, organizations, agencies, and institutionsat multiple organizational levels (Folke et al. 2005).This form of governance also provides forcollaborative, flexible, learning-based approachesto managing ecosystems, also referred to as“adaptive co-management” (Folke et al. 2003,Olsson et al. 2004a).

In this paper, we explore how the emergence ofadaptive governance regimes relates to the conceptof transformability. Walker et al. (2004) definetransformability as the capacity to create afundamentally new system when ecological,economic, or social, including political, conditionsmake the existing system untenable. Transformabilitymeans defining and creating novel systemconfigurations by introducing new components andways of governing SESs, thereby changing the statevariables, and often the scales of key cycles, thatdefine the system. Transformations fundamentallychange the structures and processes that alternatefeedback loops in SESs.

The idea of transformation is not new to theliterature on natural resource management.Transformation has been used to describe ecologicalchanges that result in a degraded state (e.g., Turneret al. 1990, Hamilton et al. 2004). Danter et al.(2000) describe the transformations within agovernment agency that are needed to implementecosystem management. Transformative changecan also occur as a result of (1) ecological crises,during which unexpected or unanticipatedecosystem changes occur; (2) shifts in the socialcomponents of the system, such as in social valuesor resources (Scheffer et al. 2003); or (3) economicor political change (Aberbach and Christensen

2001). Allison and Hobbs (2004) describe howadaptive behavior that fails to respond toenvironmental feedback in agricultural systems canresult in a “lock-in” trap in an undesirable regimefrom which transformation is the only escape.

In this article, we address transformations of entiregovernance systems of which government agenciesare a part. Transformations toward alternative formsof governance have been addressed by Bressers andKuks (2004) and Kettl (2000). We investigate howactions have succeeded or failed to transform SESsinto more desired configurations; in particular, westudy why some windows of opportunity generatedramatic change and others do not. We focus ontransformations within the social domain of theSESs that increase our capacity to learn from,respond to, and manage environmental feedbackfrom dynamic ecosystems. Such transformationsinclude shifts in social features such as perceptionand meaning, network configurations, socialcoordination, and associated institutional arrangementsand organizational structures. Transformations alsoinclude redirecting governance into restoring,sustaining, and developing the capacity ofecosystems to generate essential services.

We compare five case studies from the ResilienceAlliance to learn from past attempts to implementstrategies intended to move vulnerable andunsustainable systems into new trajectories ofadaptive governance. The case studies areKristianstads Vattenrike (KV), Sweden; theNorthern Highlands Lake District (NHLD) inWisconsin and the Florida Everglades, USA; theMae Nam Ping Basin (MNPB), Thailand; and theGoulburn-Broken Catchment (GBC), Australia.

These SESs are in different stages of the adaptivecycle in the sense defined by Holling (1986). In KV,a wetland landscape, the management regime hasundergone a full transformation and is in the frontloop of a new adaptive cycle. The social-ecologicaltransformation thwarted an adverse land-use trendresulting from urban sprawl, draining, dredging, andthe abandonment of agriculture practices (Olsson etal. 2004b) with associated loss of ecosystemservices. The management of the Everglades hasundergone several transformations (Gunderson etal. 1995) and is currently in the late K phase of anadaptive cycle. In the 20th century, the fourtransformations in Everglades management weretriggered by changes in both ecological and socialcomponents, and resulted in a fundamentally new



set of management regimes. These four erasrepresent attempts to (1) control unwanted floodwater, (2) sustain the water supply for a growingpopulation, (3) control the nutrients associated withland-use interactions, and (4) bring about ecosystemrestoration (Light et al. 1995, Gunderson et al.2002).

Although the KV and the Everglades represent casestudies in which it was possible to transformgovernance for improved management in responseto crisis, it is clear that other regions have been lesssuccessful at this. Despite the obvious need totransform to a more sustainable trajectory, manySESs either do so too late, in which case significantdegradation and loss of utility from the system havealready occurred, or they fail to seize windows ofopportunity when they arise. In the NHLD, whichis in a backloop, changes are happening rapidly(Peterson et al. 2003a). These changes include agrowing local population as more people move intothe area, mounting conflicts over resources,increasing withdrawals of ecosystem services, andmore species invasions and habitat degradation. Ifthe actors of the SES are not able to step in andtransform it into a new and very different adaptivecycle and trajectory, the system will move furtherdown an unsustainable trajectory toward thedegradation of both terrestrial and aquaticecosystems and the loss of services as aconsequence. In contrast, the GBC represents anexample of an SES that missed a critical opportunityfor transformation and now faces an uncertainfuture. Confronted with a crisis of increasinglysaline groundwater during the mid-1970s, the GBCcommunity put in place many of the building blockswe consider essential to prepare the system fortransformation. However, when more radicaltransformation would have been possible, theyopted instead to invest in adaptability, devisingstrategies to maintain the current production andsocial systems while attempting to minimize theirimpacts on local ecosystems.

Similarly in the MNPB, key opportunities to setregional development upon a more sustainable pathwere missed because problems were repeatedly andincorrectly framed to serve other political anddevelopment agendas (Lebel et al. 2004,Luangaramsri 1999). Earlier responses to changehave moved the SES closer to a critical threshold atwhich small changes in supply or demand can havemajor economic repercussions. With respect towater resources, the system is in a late K phase, with

a high potential for collapse and major social andecological changes in how water and watershedservices are perceived and delivered. This imminentcrisis is arising from the rapidly increasing demandfor water for intensified agriculture (Walker 2003)in the lowland irrigated areas and for the rapidlyexpanding urban settlements and industrial estatesthat have completely altered the lowland forestfloodplains and riparian landscapes (Cohen andPearson 1998, Pearson 1999).

Even though the NHLD, MNPB, and GBC have notundergone major transformations in this sense, theyoffer insights into the very real challenges faced bySESs that are trying to transform. When faced withcrises of similar magnitudes, the KV and theEverglades were able to transform their governancesystems into new SES configurations. Why wastransformation possible in these systems and not inothers?

The aim of this article is to compare these casestudies to deepen our understanding oftransformability and identify critical factors in SEStransformability that can help provide social sourcesof renewal and shape reorganization toward desiredSES configurations. We start the article by goingthrough the different phases of transformation in thesocial domain using nsights from Olsson et al.(2004b) and present our current view of each phaseusing illustrations from the case studies. We alsoinvestigate the role of windows of opportunity,using the work of Kingdon (1995). We then identifyand discuss critical factors for transformation toadaptive governance of SESs. The discussion isinspired by Proposition 14 in Walker et al. (2006),which suggests that the determinants oftransformability include incentives, awareness,experimentation, reserves, and governance. Weconclude by listing a few steps that should beconsidered when taking action to transform towardadaptive governance of SESs.

PHASES OF TRANSFORMATION

Social-ecological transformations toward adaptivegovernance occur in three phases (Olsson et al.2004b). First, systems are generally prepared for thechanges that are about to occur. The second phaseinvolves a transition to a new social context forecosystem management. The third phase is buildingthe resilience of the new direction. In this article,we focus on the two first phases. These two phases



are linked by a window of opportunity thatconstitutes a critical moment in time between thetwo phases. The next sections are structured aroundthese phases, beginning with preparations forchange, followed by a description of windows ofopportunity, and ending with a section on navigatingthe transition phase.

Preparing for change

Some preparation is needed prior to moving a social-ecological system (SES) into a desirable trajectory.Table 1 summarizes the actions taken in each of thecases studied to prepare the system for change.These preparations can be grouped into categoriesof (1) exploring new system configurations andalternative approaches for governance and (2)developing strategies for sorting or annealingalternatives that create conditions for adaptive co-management. Those preparations occur in networksthat integrate and build knowledge for ecosystemmanagement, as described in the next section.However, learning networks alone are not sufficientpreparation, because some form of leadership mustemerge to move the system into the next phase,which is discussed below.

Building knowledge and networking

The transformation in the Kristianstads Vattenrike(KV) was preceded by the emergence of a socialnetwork for managing the lower Helgeå River at thecatchment level. This self-organized process aimedto find integrated landscape-level solutions to theproblems of declining bird populations, decreasingwater quality and nuisance plant growth in lakes,and decreasing use of flooded meadows forhaymaking and grazing. The network includedindividuals from local groups such as environmentalorganizations, the Bird Society of NortheasternScania, and local farmers’ associations. It alsoincluded actors at other organizational levels suchas the Municipality of Kristianstad, the CountyAdministrative Board, WWF Sweden, the NationalMuseum of Natural History, and a national researchcouncil (FRN). These individuals were nodes ofexpertise in the emerging network (Olsson et al.2004b). In addition to connecting people, theprocess involved trust-building and sense-making,which formed a platform for conflict managementand sharing of information between groups. In this

way, the network tied together a number of sourcesof knowledge and experience, which increased theknowledge pool for decision making and helped todevelop practices for ecosystem management.

In the Everglades, each governance transformationwas preceded by the emergence of networks thatrepresented alternative management approacheswith the ultimate goal of bringing about change(Gunderson 1999). The members of these networkswere able to suspend extant beliefs, questionperceptions, and contrast possible futures to allowfor the exploration of new and novel systemconfigurations. These can be viewed as epistemicnetworks composed of technical and scientificpersonnel who provided ecological knowledge atcritical times. The first was the Soil and CropScience Society, whose planning efforts in 1939were a result of documenting ecosystem changescaused by prior drainage efforts. Their workprovided the foundation for land-use, management,and governance changes following the floodingcrisis of 1947 (Blake 1980, Light et al. 1995). Asecond network of ecologists and planners at theUniversity of Miami appeared in the 1970s.Impending eutrophication of Lake Okeechobeeprompted transformations in the social domain ofthe SES that eventually led to the restoration of theKissimmee River and prevented nutrient pollutionin the Everglades (Light et al. 1995). Current effortsto restore the ecosystem are the result of the workof the adaptive management group that began in thelate 1980s. Through a series of modelingworkshops, they concluded that both vegetationtrends and long-standing environmental degradationof key wildlife populations were reversible.Subsequent planning efforts have built on thisunderstanding and have led to current restorationefforts (Gunderson 1994). These networks extendedbeyond the scientific community and into themanagement and political arenas. The ideas forecosystem restoration were in essence a search forecological resilience, that is, an effort to discoverwhether the resources required for restoration evenexisted. Upon concluding that the system still hadenough resilience, the network was extended to thepolitical realm. In 1992, a colloquy was held todiscuss options for ecosystem restoration with keymanagers and decision makers. That meetingprovided the conduit by which scientificinnovations were used to move the system towardadaptive governance. The networking at that



Table 1. Comparing the five case studies regarding key factors for preparing the social-ecological systemfor change.

Key factors

Building knowledge Networking LeadershipSocial-ecologicalsystem

Kristianstads Vattenrike (creationof the KV)

A new perspective onecosystem management andintegrated landscape-levelsolutions guided thedevelopment of knowledge. Itincluded identifyingknowledge gaps for managingthe KV and initiating studies tofill them.

The emergence of the networkin the mid-1980s connectedactors with different interests.This included vertical linksand horizontal links betweengovernment agencies, NGOs,the municipality, andlandowners.

Leadership emerged that wasimportant for connectingpeople, developing andcommunicating a vision ofecosystem management, andbuilding trust and broadsupport for change.

The Everglades(ecosystem restoration)

A few key scientists werefrustrated by continuingecosystem degradation, whichthey tried to address inworkshops. The ecosystemrestoration (resilience)perspective guided modelingworkshops in whichinformation was synthesizedand used to develop compositepolicies.

A network of scientistsemerged in the late 1980s andformed the adaptivemanagement group. In 1992,networking was extended intothe management and politicalarenas to spread the ideas ofthe adaptive managementgroup, link actor groupsoperating at differentorganizational levels, andrepresent different interests.

Leadership emerged thatbrought in a novel perspectiveof ecosystem resilience, builttrust, and connected people.The leaders were weary ofongoing legal actions andwished to pursue alternativeways of management. Theyfocused on ensuring theengagement of all groups, notjust a few special interestgroups.

The NorthernHighlands LakeDistrict (sustainablefutures)

The polarization amongdifferent actor groups hindersthe sharing of new ideas andinnovations. However, a fewbridging efforts aredeveloping, and these couldnucleate to provide thenecessary institutions forbuilding and sharingknowledge.

Networking at a regional scalethat connects different groupsof actors is poorly developed.

Leadership for collective actionand ecosystem management atthe regional level has notemerged. Instead, leadershiphas emerged for pursuingspecific interests.

Mae Nam PingBasin (sustainablewater management)

Knowledge based on theecosystem approach has beenassimilated from a wide rangeof sources, and innovativeecosystems approaches existbut do not guide networking atthe regional level.

Networking at the basin levelis lacking. Instead, networksthat serve and protect specificinterests are developing.

Leadership for collective actionand ecosystem management atthe basin level has notemerged. Instead, leadershiphas emerged for pursuingspecific interests.

Goulburn-BrokenCatchment (sustainable agriculture)

There was a lack of innovationthat made it impossible toexplore new configurations ofthe system, in particular, waysto address ecosystemprocesses. Building knowledgeto support the status quoapproach to ecosystemmanagement was emphasized.

Networks emerged thatconnected people and interestsat different levels. Thesenetworks were later formalizedinto decision-making and -implementing organizations.

Leadership did emerge forcollective action at thecatchment level, but not toprovide a novel approach toecosystem management.



meeting linked actor groups operating at differentorganizational levels and representing differentinterests, and generated the activities that led to thecurrent restoration plans and actions (Gunderson1999).

Deep disagreements and conflicting interests canlead to polarization among actor groups, whichhinders capacity building for ecosystem management.The Goulburn-Broken Catchment (GBC), theNorthern Highland Lake District (NHLD), and theMae Nam Ping Basin (MNPB) case studies areexamples in which social and ecological crises haveexacerbated conflicts among special interests. In theNHLD, there is a central disconnect among NativeAmericans, lakeshore owners, and local nontribalpeople who are highly dependent on exploitationpatterns that a growing number of people believeare no longer tenable in an increasingly crowdedregion. At another scale, there are conflictinginterests between groups such as environmentalistsand “silent sport” users, e.g., hikers, bikers, canoers,kayakers; fishers, in some cases substructured bypreferred practices; hunters; and advocates ofmotorized recreation. Responses to crises such asconflicts of interest or species invasions have led toincreased polarization among these groups.Although there is some agreement on the drivingforces behind the current crisis, the actors cannotagree on what actions should be taken. There are anumber of small innovations in resource use,including resource management by indigenousgroups, local governance by lake associations,research organizations such as the university fieldstation, a long-term ecological research program,and an experimental management unit operated bythe state management agency, the WisconsinDepartment of Natural Resources. However, theregional network that should connect these differentgroups of actors is only poorly developed, whichhinders the sharing of new ideas and innovationsand the ability to draw on various sources ofknowledge at critical times. The individuals in thesegroups often narrowly pursue their own interests,which further reduces trust among actor groups,deepens polarization, and impedes progress. Themost rapid development of focused networks isoccurring among the lake associations, some ofwhose members are running for public office.

In the MNPB, researchers and activists have playeda critical role in generating new knowledge andsynthesizing existing knowledge that challenges thefundamental basis of watershed management and

water allocation policies in northern Thailand. Thestate bureaucracy no longer has a monopoly onknowledge about forest changes or water resources.Indeed, not-for-profit and commercial consultantcompanies often have better data and a more in-depth understanding than line agencies. The mainproblem is that this growing understanding of, e.g.,the impacts of land-cover changes on catchmenthydrology or increasing urban and industrial waterdemand and theft is not being critically used.Instead, under the current polarized circumstances,various nongovernmental groups are making use ofresearch to support particular political agendas,which can undermine the credibility of the originalresearch and hinder the development of a commonunderstanding.

Although both the NHLD and the MNPB sufferfrom the polarization of interest groups, there havebeen peripheral efforts to reconcile the differentclusters of actors for the purposes of identifying acommon ground and staking out a new direction formanagement. In the MNPB, basic ideas aboutecosystem management have been introduced intothe policy agenda at both the regional and nationallevels by researchers with good links to policy (e.g., Mingsarn Kaosa-ard 2000, 2001, Thomas 2005).Other studies of high relevance to water resourcesand irrigation management have also beenconducted (Molle 2001, Molle et al. 2001). Theseand many other key researchers interested indemocratizing governance are connected to eachother through formal collaborations and meetings.Even though they do not necessarily share identicalviews about the best institutional designs or balancebetween conservation and development, theycomprise the nodes of a partly independent shadownetwork that is capable of talking to government atthe provincial and national levels. Other networksand movements use different tactics and challengeor avoid engaging the state. This could also beeffective, but it seems that both styles of networksare important for bringing about change.

In the NHLD, the number of lake associations,which are organizations for the adaptive co-management of individual lakes or chains of lakes,is increasing. The interests of these associations aresomewhat different than those of other actor groupssuch as local tribes, recreational users, the forestproduct and construction industries, NGOs, and thestate management agency. In the NHLD, some ofthe actor groups are beginning to consider regionalissues, such as invasive species, in a more inclusive



way. For example, a group of scientists has initiateda series of meetings and outreach activities toencourage these groups to work in concert in areasin which their interests overlap. Their activitiesinvolve managers and a cross section ofstakeholders in the development of scenarios for thefuture of the NHLD (Peterson et al. 2003a,b, Carpenter 2006; see alsohttp://lakefutures.wisc.edu). These scenarios aredesigned to evoke dialogue among the residents inthe NHLD about alternative futures. They are alsothe starting point for a process of evaluating policiesin terms of how they shape the ability of the NHLDto respond to potential risks and to use possibleopportunities (Peterson 2003b).

Leadership

Leadership is a critical element in preparing thesystem for change, especially with regard tostrategies for exploring new configurations of SESs.In the Everglades, leadership involved integratingthe extant scientific understanding of the ecosystem,summarizing that integration, and communicatingthat understanding to a wider audience. That hasbeen done many times, starting with MarjorieStoneman Douglas, who was a leading advocate forthe Everglades and whose key contributionappeared in the book The Everglades, River of Grass (Douglas 1947). That compelling and beautifullywritten volume was based on conversations andinteractions with leading scientists. In the 1960s and1970s, Arthur R. Marshall provided the sameleadership at a research institute at the Universityof Miami and communicated his understanding with“the zeal and passion of a country preacher” (Lightet al. 1995). Two decades later, scientific leadershipwas provided by the adaptive management groupconsisting of Buzz Holling, Carl Walters, LanceGunderson, Steve Davis, and Steve Light (Davisand Ogden 1995).

In KV, a key individual, Sven-Erik Magnusson(SEM), recognized that the problems arising in thearea were interrelated. He started to connect keyindividuals who were already involved in ongoingprojects to build the knowledge needed to deviseintegrated solutions and match the scale of theproblems. This included actor groups operating atdifferent organizational levels and representingdiverse interests. To frame and give direction to thisprocess, he developed and communicated a visionof ecosystem management for the area. SEMmanaged to mobilize broad support for a new

management approach. Although this includedsupport from key individuals, he also developed arelationship with the local media as a strategy forbuilding public support for the idea. In this way, heprovided leadership functions such as connectingkey individuals, developing and communicating avision, and engaging with others to establishdirection. He aligned, motivated, and inspiredpeople to invest in an alternative approach andthereby built broad support for change.

In the GBC, small community groups emerged todeal with flooding, waterlogging, and drainageissues after the initial water-table crisis in themid-1970s. These groups quickly coalesced intolarger networks as the true scale of the salinity crisisbecame more apparent. Leaders emerged to form aregional committee to represent the concerns of thevarious networks throughout the catchment. Theseleaders and the committee they formed became aconduit for a wider range of issues, includingbroader environmental, social, and economicconcerns. They pooled existing knowledge,identified gaps, and invested in research anddevelopment to address priorities, and theyeffectively lobbied government agencies forsupport and resources. The initial leadership groupwas made up of well known local inhabitants,mostly farmers and business people with a longhistory of community service in the region; thisproved to be a valuable attribute in a smallcommunity in which credibility was critical tosuccess. Importantly, the leadership group recruiteda series of individuals with skills in localgovernment, education, communication, and mediato disseminate information into the community,because the group recognized that knowledgetransfer was a key element of their strategy.Targeting leaders with diverse skills and roles in thecommunity ensured that the concerns and issuesimportant to the leadership committee becameembedded in other processes and forums within andexternal to the GBC.

In addition to their roles in preparing the system fortransformational change, leaders in many caseshelped move the system into the transition phase.However, to do that, a window of opportunity wasrequired. These windows appear to be critical fortransformations to occur, as described in the nextsection.


http://lakefutures.wisc.edu


Windows of opportunity

Kingdon (1995) stresses the importance of timingfor initiating policy changes and opening policywindows. He argues that significant changes aremost likely when three independently operating“streams,” i.e., problems, solutions, and politics,come together at critical times. This type of couplingprovides a window of opportunity for change inwhich “ ... a problem is recognized, a solution isavailable, the political climate makes the time rightfor change, and the constraints do not prohibitactions” (Kingdon 1995). Here we use the threestreams in our comparison of the case studies (Table2) and our analysis of attempts to transformgovernance regimes. We also address the role of keyindividuals, also called “policy entrepreneurs”(Kingdon 1995), in linking these three streams.

Rapid change and ecological crises can providewindows of opportunity that trigger the emergenceof networks and promote new forms of governance(Folke et al. 2005). In both KV and the Everglades,a specific opportunity made it possible to move fromthe preparation phase into the transition phase andcomplete the transformation. In the Everglades, theemergence of the networks that preceded thetransformations was, for example, triggered byalgae blooms in Lake Okeechobee or cattaildominance in the freshwater Everglades. InKristianstad, the emergence of networks forecosystem management was triggered by a declinein natural and cultural values, including diminishingbird populations, decreased water quality andovergrowth of lakes, and a decrease in the use offlooded meadows for haymaking and grazing. Suchnetworks are not always successful in moving theSES into alternative trajectories. The extent towhich the transformation of entire governanceregimes is possible appears to be related to the scaleat which the crisis most clearly manifests itself andhow it is perceived in relation to the scope of changepossible.

Our case studies suggest that each of these streamsoccurs in a different arena (Table 2) and that thecoupling of problems, solutions, and politics inSESs requires cross-scale interactions. Thisinvolves connecting individuals, organizations,agencies, and institutions at multiple organizationallevels. For example, in the Everglades, the problemsof ecosystem restoration and the subsequent set ofsolutions were developed in a series of technicalworkshops (Davis and Ogden 1994, Holling et al.

1994). Those solutions were vetted in two parallelplanning processes; one at the state level by theGovernors Commission on Sustainability and theother at the federal level by the Army Corps ofEngineers Restudy. These planning processes led tofederal and state legislation passed in 2000, whichallocated $8 billion for Everglades restoration

In KV, social change and ecological crises at onescale triggered a transformation of the governanceof the SES at another scale. Two key circumstancesare believed to have placed the management of KVon the municipal political agenda and affected thepolitical will to adopt the new governance approachcurrently in use (Olsson et al. 2004b). First, localpoliticians were keen to find a new profile for themunicipality, which had previously been a centerfor military training. Second, environmentalquestions had received a lot of coverage during thenational Swedish election in September 1988,probably because of reports that red tides and viraldisease were killing a vast number of seals alongthe Swedish coasts. At this time, the ecosystemapproach for integrated landscape-level solutions toenvironmental problems in KV existed within thenetwork that SEM initiated. With support from awide range of actor groups at various organizationallevels, SEM took the opportunity to bring the ideato two municipal politicians and make them awareof the impending problems in KV and the need foraction. SEM managed to change the perceptions ofthose politicians, who now saw the wetlands as aresource rather than a problem. He also linked theproposal to other goals such as regionaldevelopment. The politicians acted as policyentrepreneurs and convinced the MunicipalityExecutive Board to support the idea. The politicalaction that followed was needed to enter thetransition phase. The leadership of SEM wascombined with the political leadership at themunicipal level.

In the Everglades, social activists, politicians, orother groups intent on changing extant policy cancreate a political window of opportunity. Expertpanels and lawsuits by environmentalists are twosuch mechanisms for opening a political window.In these cases, the groups interpret information fromecosystem components, such as data on decliningwater quality, to support an action to “open up” thesystem for the renegotiation of rules, norms, andother institutional relationships. For example, theU.S. federal government sued the State of Floridain 1987 to change existing water management



Table 2. Comparing the five case studies regarding windows of opportunity for change and the attributesof the three streams identified by Kingdon (1995).

Social-ecological system Problem awareness Solutions available Political action

Kristianstads Vattenrike The environmental problems inthe area were identified by afew individuals and networkedacross organizational levelsand key actor groups. Theywere also communicated tokey individuals in themunicipal government.

The network made it possibleto coordinate and linkongoing projects to createintegrated landscape-levelsolutions that were based onthe ecosystem approach.

The municipal politicianswere made aware of theproblems and supported thesolution that had beendeveloped in the emergingnetwork

The Everglades (the latesttransformation)

The problems that emerged inthe area were identified by theadaptive management group.The group communicated theseproblems to managers andpoliticians.

The colloquy developedpolicies that were based onthe ecosystem restoration andresilience approach. Twoparallel processes emergedfrom the colloquy; onefederal (the Corps ofEngineers Restudy) and onestate (the Governor'sCommission). Bothprocesses vetted solutions.

Plans were presented to stateand federal governments.Legislation was passed thatauthorized $8 billion forEverglades restoration.

The Northern HighlandsLake District

There is a general awarenessamong actor groups of theemerging environmentalproblems in the region.

Integrated solutions that arebased on an ecosystem andresilience approach exist in afew nodes but are not wellnetworked across the region

At the time of writing, nucleifor action are emerging, butthe shape of regional action isnot yet clear.

Mae Nam Ping Basin

There are different views ofwhat the problem is anddifferent explanations of thecauses.

There is no consensus and alack of alternatives. Solutionsbased on ecosystemmanagement at the basinlevel exist among some actorgroups but are not wellnetworked

There is a lack of politicalsupport and action.

Goulburn-BrokenCatchment

There was a general awarenessof the problem of salinizationof soils among a wide range ofactor groups at differentorganizational levels.

An engineering solution wasput forward and adopted bylocal leaders and farmers.

Local politicans recognizedthe problem and supportedthe engineering solution.

policies in the Everglades that were damagingfederal resources (John 1994). This lawsuit changedagricultural management practices and forced thedevelopment of technology that uses wetlands toimprove the water quality of runoff fromagricultural areas, but it also increased polarizationamong stakeholders.

In contrast to the Everglades and KV, the GBCcommunity devised strategies to maintain thecurrent production and social system while

attempting to minimize the impacts on nativeecosystems. Local leaders took advantage ofgovernment’s eagerness to invest in regionalcommunities, riding a wave of environmentalconcern and institutional reforms at higher scales.In 1997, a new catchment-wide organization wasset up to coordinate local networks, governmentagencies, and their various strategies. This structure,called the Catchment Management Authority, nowincludes more than 160 community leaders onvarious committees and provides an avenue of input



for thousands of people across the catchment.However, the solution that was put forward was anengineering solution that masks signals ofenvironmental and ecosystem change. The reasonfor this seems to be a combination of things. It hadtaken more than a decade from the initial water-tablecrisis in the mid-1970s before the community hadsufficient organization and resources to make anyreal change in the system. During that time, theclimate had shifted back toward a dry phase, andwater tables began to decrease slightly, which mademany farmers believe that the threat from risingwater tables had diminished. Another reason wasthat there had been some minor local successes incontrolling rising water tables using a combinationof groundwater pumps, surface drainage, landforming to improve irrigation efficiency, and treeplanting that minimized the direct costs to farmersand initially lowered water tables. Some leaderspointed to these successes as the way forward andbelieved that, if they could expand these engineeringworks across the region, the impacts of salinity andwaterlogging could be controlled with minimalsocial and economic impact. Finally, theadaptability approach had enormous financialbenefits for farmers, many of whom were finding ithard to remain economically viable. Theengineering works would dramatically increaseirrigation productivity, with the added bonus thatgovernment would subsidize a large proportion ofthe costs; as a result, there was little real incentivefor farmers to make any radical changes in theirpractices.

In the NHLD, the funding, staffing, and influenceof the state management agency, the WisconsinDepartment of Natural Resources, is waningbecause of declining support from the public andcuts in government funding. This shift in thepolitical landscape creates a leadership vacuum andopportunities for change. New trajectories couldcome from collaboration among the innovativeorganizations in the region, such as the tribes, lakeassociations, and research organizations. Alliancesamong the tribes, the lake associations, and forward-looking business people in the community could beremarkably powerful in effecting change. Althoughchanges seem to be nucleating, the directions ofchange were not clear at the time of this writing.

In the years immediately following a financial crisisin the MNPB, several sweeping administrative,legal, and other reforms were introduced that gavepeople a sense that democratic decentralization

might, at last, become something of a reality. Fornorthern Thailand, this matters a lot, because itcould create opportunities for natural resourcemanagement that better reflects the local contextand resources, which are rather dissimilar fromthose of the rest of the country. The formation of anew ministry with a specific environmental mandatecould also be seen as an opportunity because ofinstitutional changes at larger scales. Unfortunately,the overwhelming political dominance of the ThaiRak Thai party under Thaksin Shinawatra’sleadership has resulted in many reversals of thetrend toward more open and decentralized decisionmaking (Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). Oneof the specific challenges in the MNPB is that theinstitutional innovations that might create windowsof opportunity are often introduced by adding newlayers to the management structure governing theSES, rather than by reforming or replacing outdateddepartments or practices. For example, themanagement of canals in the basin is in a state ofconfusion, with local government authorities,communal systems, and an irrigation departmenteach claiming or disclaiming particular responsibilities.As a result, the system is almost completelyunmanaged in those areas in which farmers,universities, households, and businesses take asmuch water as they want with pumps and wells. Atransformation would include improving theaccountability of existing authorities, especially oflocal government, groups of water users, and basinorganizations. It would also include securingextensive public participation, changing rights towater that are culturally bound, and encouraging thepursuit of livelihoods other than agriculture. A crisisof water conflicts and rationing caused by anunusually dry year in the area could trigger this typeof change, but, given recent politics, this is unlikelyto come out favorably for farmers.

These case studies provide a rich set of examples ofwindows of opportunity. These windows can be aresult of environmental crises, policy failure, fiscalcrises, activist groups, lawsuits, or slowly changinginstitutional structures. Although there are manyways to open a window, the opportunity for changeis often limited to a very short period of time. Totransform the system, a set of activities must bepursed that makes it possible to navigate a transitionto a new system.



Navigating the transition

The transition phase is not well understood becauseit is so unpredictable and turbulent. The transitionto adaptive governance can only be navigated, notplanned. Navigating requires the type of preparationdescribed earlier as well as flexibility and the abilityto improvise and modify the game plan to meetchanging conditions and maintain momentum.During the transition, new social structures andprocesses can be established that link individuals,organizations, agencies, and institutions at multipleorganizational levels and allow adaptive governanceto emerge. The dynamics of cross-scale interactions,a key element of transformations, are described inpanarchy theory (Gunderson and Holling 2002).Another key element during the transition period isthe management of problems in different domains(Westley 2002) and the development of compositepolicies or solutions to these different problems.Leadership, diversity, and timing seem to be keyfactors in this respect. Examples of navigationstrategies are described below.

One strategy used by SEM in KV was to have aportfolio of possible projects that could be launchedwhenever there was an opening and the time wasright. The initial idea for KV, formulated in an earlyproposal, was to make the area a UNESCO “Manand the Biosphere” (MAB) reserve, and theEcomuseum Kristianstads Vattenrike (EKV) wouldbe part of that structure. However, because of thelack of support for the MAB idea at the time, SEMinstead pushed the idea of the Ecomuseum, whichwas more acceptable and appealing to key actorgroups. In June 2005, KV became a MAB area. Theestablishment of the EKV as a bridging organizationcreated opportunities for new interactions betweenactors at different organizational levels (Olsson etal. 2004b, Hahn et al. 2005). The Ecomuseumprovides an arena for trust-building, sense-making,learning, collaboration, and conflict resolution, allof which are key conditions for the emergence ofadaptive governance (Folke et al. 2005). Itcommunicates, translates, and mediates scientificknowledge to make it relevant to policy and actionand also uses its network of stakeholders to mobilizeknowledge in turbulent times, which in turn helpsmanagement deal with uncertainty and shapechange. Financial sponsors within the network werecrucial for navigating the transition. Different partsof the EKV project appealed to different sponsors,and

all the sponsors made their support conditional onbroader participation by other sponsors. Having adiversity of funding opportunities that provideeconomic incentives at critical times seems to makenavigating the backloop smoother.

The transformations among management andgovernance in the Everglades in 1947, 1971, and1983 all resulted in the creation of physicalinfrastructure and new formal institutions. Theinstitutional solutions were the Flood ControlDistrict (1947), the South Florida WaterManagement District (1971), and the EvergladesCoalition (1983). The most recent transformationfor ecosystem restoration resulted in a bridging ormeshing network that involves government andnongovernmental groups as well as other keystakeholders (Gunderson 2003). In these cases,either new institutions or new institutionalarrangements were created during the transformationperiod, largely as a way of solving the problem thatled to the crisis. In all of the transformations, amassive influx of money from higher levels ofgovernment (Gunderson et al. 2002) andtechnological solutions were key ingredients.

As stated above, the GBC failed to transform to anew trajectory following the water table crisis in themid-1970s. A possible reason is because there wasno process for exploring new configurations for theSES. Despite the development of social networks atthe catchment level, the creation of a newinstitutional layer, social and institutional reformsat scales above, and the generation of knowledgeand resources that could provide the foundations forthe emergence of adaptive governance, communityleaders opted to invest in adaptation rather thantransformation. The decision-making body had amajority of farmers and local business owners, thepeople most likely to bear the brunt of the costsassociated with transformation, which meant thatthe decision was probably biased by vested interests.The decision reduced the short-term social andeconomic costs of transforming, but, as a result, theregion now faces even greater challenges. Itshydrology continues to track toward a newequilibrium in which salinity and waterlogging willultimately have a more severe effect on thecommunity and the regional economy than theinitial crisis did (Anderies 2004). The costs ofmaintaining the current system continue to mount,the natural resource base is degrading further, andthe



regional economy is becoming increasingly brittle.The system has become vulnerable to a wider rangeof shocks and disturbances from biophysical,political, social, and/or economic events (Anderieset al. 2006).

In the MNPB, earlier responses to various crisesfailed to deal with social and ecological problemsat the level of the basin, which pushed the SES closerto collapse. It is now on the verge of a transition thatcould easily go in a number of different directions.On the one hand, there is the government-led viewthat water security is best achieved by augmentingsupply through a “Thai water grid,” which in factmeans interbasin transfers from Burma and LaoPDR. On the other, there is a diversity of relatedviews and prospects in which water and watershedmanagement could more closely reflect theecological and social contexts of different basins,both as constraints and comparative advantages.

CRITICAL FACTORS FORTRANSFORMING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICALSYSTEMS

Inspired by the proposition stated in theintroduction, we have investigated in this articlehow the social determinants of transformabilityplayed out in the two phases of the transformationof social-ecological systems (SESs) in five differentregional systems. Through this comparison, wehave identified at least two other critical factors ofSES transformability: the emergence of shadownetworks and the essential role of leadership.Alternative approaches for governing SESs maydevelop and reside in shadow networks. One featureof these networks is a willingness to experiment andgenerate alternative solutions to emergingproblems. Shadow networks can also equipthemselves with the tools and data needed tonavigate the transition and institutionalize the newapproach during windows of opportunity, includingthe identification and mobilization of economicincentives for change. Social transformation towardecosystem management seems to involve shifts inperceptions and awareness as well as “reserves” ofexperience, e.g., social memory (Olick and Robbins1998, McIntosh 2000)) in the existing and emergingsocial networks. This means that networking can beorchestrated during the front loop of the adaptivecycle, and this orchestration may facilitate transitionin the backloop. The comparison also suggests thatsuccessful transformations of governance require

leadership that can provide certain functionsthroughout the preparation and navigation phases.In the following section, we discuss critical factorsfor the emergence of shadow networks andleadership for transformation toward adaptivegovernance of SESs.

Emergence of shadow networks

Successful transformations toward adaptivegovernance seem to be preceded by the emergenceof informal networks that help to facilitateinformation flows, identify knowledge gaps, andcreate nodes of expertise of significance forecosystem management that can be drawn upon atcritical times. As shown in the KV and Evergladescase studies, these networks emphasize politicalindependence outside the fray of regulation andimplementation in places in which formal networksand many planning processes fail (Gunderson1999). Gunderson (1999) also emphasized the roleof these shadow networks as incubators for newapproaches to governing SESs. These informal,outside the fray shadow groups seem to be wherenew ideas arise and flourish. It is these“skunkworks” who explore flexible opportunitiesfor resolving resource issues, devise alternativedesigns and tests of policy, and create ways to fostersocial learning. Because the members of thesenetworks are not always under scrutiny or theobligations of their agencies or constituencies, theyare freer to develop alternative policies, dare to learnfrom each other, and think creatively about how toresolve resource problems. Gunderson (1999) alsopoints out the challenge in developing and fosteringshadow networks for adaptive governance.

Evans (1996) argues that the social capital importantfor economic development is often built in theintermediate organizations and informal policynetworks in the interstices between state andsociety. In the same issue of the journal WorldDevelopment, Ostrom (1996) explores thepossibility of constructing synergies betweengovernments and groups of engaged citizens.Similarly, social networks that link the state andlocal communities can support capacity building forecosystem management (Berkes 2002, Olsson et al.2004a, Folke et al. 2005).

We argue that the emergence of shadow networksfor adaptive governance is a self-organizing processoften triggered by a social or ecological crisis. The



impetus for this is often the recognition of the needfor an alternative approach for governing SESs.Olsson et al. (2004a) observe that self-organizingprocesses toward adaptive co-management ofecosystems usually start with responses to crises byindividual actors that expand to groups of actors andeventually become multiple-actor processes.Knowledge develops as part of this process andbecomes embedded in the emerging organizationaland institutional structures. The shadow networksin the Everglades and KV emerged in this way. Inthe Everglades, the development of a new andeffective integrated understanding of that systemwithin shadow networks preceded the transformationin the late 1980s and helped establish thefoundations for models of the integrativeEverglades system. It also established an entirelynew discussion among warring parties that set thefoundations for the multi-jurisdictional agreementto renovate the Everglades system that involved theSouth West Water Management District, the Stateof Florida, the U.S. government, and variousstakeholders. Similarly, in the MNPB and theNHLD, epistemic communities exist that canprovide new knowledge critical for developing analternative approach and moving toward adaptiveco-management. However, this knowledge is notwell networked across the region, partly because ofinstitutional gaps and the fact that the groups ofactors do not trust each other.

In KV, networking facilitated the generation of newknowledge for finding an integrated solution to theemerging problems in the area. For example, itfacilitated the development of a new way ofconducting inventories and acquiring ecologicalknowledge that in turn led to more efficientmanagement efforts (Olsson et al. 2004b). Theseinventories constituted the basis for actions andhelped target certain areas for management. Linksbetween key individuals in existing organizationsand formal networks in a self-organized shadownetwork generated innovation and new ways ofdoing things that were critical for adaptive co-management.

Linking different networks and creating opportunitiesfor new interactions are important when dealingwith uncertainty and change. They are also criticalfactors for learning and nurturing integratedadaptive responses to change (Stubbs and Lemon2001). Tompkins and Adger (2004) argue that theability to link different networks makes it easier toavoid following the customary response paths and

facilitates flexible learning-based management. Inthe NHLD, the polarization caused by conflicts ofinterest and distrust among actor groups hinderssuch links and could lock the SES into an undesiredtrajectory. Westley (2002) argues that the ability todeal with the interactive dynamics of SESs requiresthat the entire network of interacting individuals andorganizations at different levels create the rightlinks, at the right time, around the right issues. InKV, the different networks and the numerous cross-level linkages that developed during the preparationphase can be activated at critical times, whichcontributes to the flexibility and robustness of theSES and can therefore be viewed as sources ofresilience (Olsson et al. 2004b, Hahn et al. 2006,Folke et al. 2005).

The emergence of shadow networks can take a longtime or happen quickly as pre-existing shadownetworks are mobilized to address an impendingcrisis. In the first instance, it takes time to build trustand a collective view of the system thataccommodates the diverse viewpoints and mentalmodels of the participants (Wondolleck and Yaffe2000, Singleton 1998). Social capital is built up informal organizations and networks of prevailinggovernance structures, and shadow networks canprovide a platform/arena for collaboration in whichthis capital can be reorganized and recombined; thisin turn can generate innovation and nurture renewalin times of reorganization. The nodes of thesenetworks become reservoirs of collectiveknowledge and memory (Folke et al. 2003, Folke etal. 2005), with continual reinforcement and renewalof key ideas or past events through the day-to-dayinteractions of the network participants.

In KV, linking actors from various groups in shadownetworks helped to create an organization andmanagement practices that better matched social-ecological processes and interactions across spatialand temporal scales (Olsson et al. 2004b). Thishelped tighten feedback loops (Levin 1999) andbuild the resilience of the SES, thereby increasingthe network's ability to secure and develop thecapacity of ecosystems to generate services.Similarly, in the GBC, local networks deliberatelycreated a new institutional layer at the scale above,i.e., the Catchment Management Authority,recognizing that hydrological processes operate atcatchment and subcatchment scales well above theinfluence of local networks. However, it stillmaintained structures that contributed to maskingenvironmental feedback (in the sense of Ludwig et



al. 1993, Huitric 2004), eroding resilience, andmoving the SES further down an undesiredtrajectory.

In the MNPB, the deliberative processes introducedwith post-1997 decentralization reforms include theestablishment of a new Ping River BasinOrganization. Such organizations have the potentialto link individuals and networks and provide theleadership necessary to initiate negotiations,collaboration, and partnerships among actor groups.The emergence of the social networks in KV andthe establishment of the EKV as a mid-levelorganization facilitated cross-scale interactions inthe adaptive co-management process of the wetlandlandscape. Mid-level entities of this type have beenreferred to as “bridging organizations” (Hahn et al.2006). Bridging organizations increase the potentialto redirect external forces into opportunities, serveas catalysts and facilitators between different levelsof governance, and bring in resources, knowledge,and other incentives for ecosystem management(Folke et al. 2005). The GBC case study shows,however, that organizations such as the CatchmentManagement Authority do not always facilitatetransformation, but instead become the barriers forsuch change.

Emergence of leadership

Leadership provides key functions for transformationstoward adaptive governance of SESs. This includestrust-building, sense-making, managing conflict,linking key individuals and initiating partnershipsamong actor groups, compiling and generatingknowledge, developing and communicating vision,mobilizing broad support for change, and gainingand maintaining the momentum needed to navigatethe transitions and institutionalize new approaches(Berkes et al. 2003, Olsson 2004b, Folke et al.2005).

Kotter (1995) and Bass (1990) refer totransformational leadership, which Kotter definesas “ ... a process to establish direction, align people,motivate and inspire—with the ultimate goal ofproducing movement or change.” Westley (1995)shows that visionary leaders can appear at times ofcrisis to forge new alliances between knowledge andaction when the paradigms that forged the oldbridges have proven bankrupt as a platform for theeffective management of ecosystems. The crisis inthe GBC triggered processes similar to those in KV

and the Everglades, but transformational leadershipfor moving the SES toward adaptive governance didnot emerge as it did in those two cases. Therefore,the GBC process lacked the vision of a novelapproach that could direct and frame the self-organizing process of emerging shadow networksin the preparation phase. It also lacked theknowledge and understanding of the long-termconsequences of not transforming, which led to themasking of feedback signals and moved the SESfurther down the undesired trajectory. Leadershipemerged in the GBC and was critical in organizingthe system, but these leaders then played a“dampening” role by promoting adaptability ratherthan more radical suggestions for transformation.The vision they developed was in fact a vision forstability, i.e., a continuation of the current trajectory.

The GBC example shows that the emergence ofleadership does not necessarily guarantee thetransformation of SESs toward adaptive governancebut instead can constitute a barrier for such change.In the Everglades and KV, successful SEStransformations occurred because of the ability ofthe leaders to:

● reconceptualize issues;

● generate and integrate a diversity of ideas,viewpoints, and solutions;

● communicate and engage with keyindividuals in different sectors;

● move across levels of governance andpolitics, i.e., span scales;

● promote and steward experimentation atsmaller scales;

● recognize or create windows of opportunity;and

● promote novelty by combining differentnetworks, experiences, and social memories.

Successful leaders such as Sven-Erik Magnusson inKV or Art Marshall in the Everglades are able tounderstand and communicate a wide set oftechnical, social, and political perspectivesregarding the particular resource issues at hand.They play a key role in integrating, understanding,and communicating in multiple arenas. Usually, thatintegration involves networking with key groups,



including shadow or epistemic groups. We also seethat effective leaders are able to span and link keyindividuals operating in multiple arenas ofdiscourse. Key individuals develop and communicatethe visions of ecosystem management that frameself-organizing processes. Visionary leadersfabricate new and vital meanings, overcomecontradictions, create new syntheses, and forge newalliances between knowledge and action (Westley1995). Our case studies also suggest that SEStransformations require linked leadership at variousorganizational levels.

The MNPB is on the verge of a transition or a tippingpoint (Gladwell 2000). There are several notablerepresentatives of various networks outside ofresponsible agencies who speak out regularly onissues of river, water resource, and watershedmanagement. However, they have not yet been ableto mobilize the diverse interests in the basin for thetransition to adaptive governance, nor have theygarnered the broad support at differentorganizational levels needed to pull along a widerconstituency. This is partly because their use ofscience in advocacy is too obviously ideologicallycolored for it to be convincing to other key actors.

Comparing the cases makes it clear that changingthe opinions and values of key individuals in an SESis critical for successful transformation. Scheffer etal. (2003) show that it is harder to bring about anopinion shift if credible authorities are downplayingthe problem or if it has to compete for attention withother problems at the same time. In the MNPBexample, nongovernmental groups are making useof research to support particular political agendas.This tends to undermine the credibility of theoriginal research and knowledge that could becritical for developing an alternative approach.Scheffer et al. (2003) also recognize that keyindividuals such as charismatic leaders maycatalyze opinion shifts, which can reduce the timelag between problem and solution. This wayfundamental change in an SES can occur quickly.Leadership that can engage and change the opinionsand values of a critical mass of people to create an“epidemic” movement toward an idea has also beenreferred to as “tipping-point leadership” (Kim andMauborgne 2003). It seems that the kind ofleadership that could “tip” the SES into a trajectorytoward adaptive governance has not yet emerged inthe MNPB.

In KV, Sven-Erik Magnusson (SEM) identified theareas in which the interests of actor groupscoalesced and found starting points for dialogue andcollaboration. This was a first step toward changingthe perceptions of key individuals and overcomingtheir resistance to transformational change.Transformational leadership therefore includesrecognizing opportunities and identifying andtransforming constraints and barriers such asconflicts of interest, values, and opinions. This iscritical for reducing the resilience of undesiredtrajectories and building up the momentum neededto move into new trajectories.

In the NHLD, the emergence of a dialogue amonginterest groups evokes hope that leadership andnetworks will develop that can help transform theSES toward adaptive governance. In the Everglades,leadership emerged out of the scientific community.Such leadership can also emerge from the localcommunity/public sector, for example, from localentrepreneurs as in KV. In this case, the visionhelped stake out a new trajectory of adaptivegovernance. The transformational leadership thatSEM provided helped broaden the perceptions ofkey actors and empowered them to act. Hisleadership was crucial for navigating the transitiontoward adaptive co-management.

SHOOTING THE RAPIDS

We began this paper with a description of theexperience of shooting the rapids as a metaphor fortransformational change in social-ecologicalsystems (SESs). Navigating white water and gettingthrough turbulent periods on the way to adaptivegovernance share certain other characteristics aswell, such as the role of leadership and the timingof interventions and actions.

In this article, we have analyzed and compared fiveregional cases, with a focus on transformationswithin the social domain of their respective SESs.This focus has been on shifts in the social featuresof governance systems that enable ecosystemmanagement, in particular, the features behind theemergence of adaptive governance. Such featuresinclude perception and meaning, networkconfigurations, social coordination, and associatedinstitutional arrangements and organizationalstructures.



The objective has been to gain insight into criticalfactors of SES transformability that promote shiftsin social features. These factors include leadershipfunctions, which we argue are important for theemergence of shadow networks and for preparingthe system for change, navigating the transition, andcharting a new direction for management. Thesefindings represent a first step in improving ourunderstanding of SES transformations and whysome windows of opportunity generate dramaticchanges of governance and others do not.

The comparison shows how novel ideas and placesto explore new configurations of the SES are crucialfor transforming governance regimes from thosethat mask environmental feedback to those that haveviable social-ecological feedback loops. InKristianstads Vattenrike (KV) and the Everglades,such innovations were developed in shadownetworks during a preparation phase and continuedthrough a navigating phase. Successful ideaspropagated across scales because of linkages thatwere established during the preparation phase. Inthe Mae Nam Ping Basin and the NorthernHighlands Lake District, novel ideas exist but arestill at the periphery and have not been adopted ona regional scale. In the Goulburn-BrokenCatchment, problems were dealt with at the regionalscale, but they failed to explore new configurationsof the SES.

The role of leadership is important, yet highlyvariable and hard to predict. Leadership is criticalto the emergence and effectiveness of shadownetworks. Moreover, our comparison suggests thatthe emergence of leadership does not necessarilylead to improved governance of SESs. Theseuncertainties suggest important research questions,such as: Is leadership random and idiosyncratic?Are there social mechanisms that increase thechances for leadership to emerge? Whatcharacterizes the particular type of leadership thatcan transform an SES toward adaptive governance?

Perhaps one reason that leadership is crucial has todo with the nature of windows of opportunity. If thewindow is driven by resource dynamics, as forexample in the Everglades and KV, then successfulleaders recognize the opening as an opportunity toorchestrate change. As indicated, this is a highlyunpredictable dynamic. However, many leaders cancreate such a window for change, especially if thereis a sense that current approaches are either failingor perceived as failing.

Comparing the regional case studies also shows thatleadership can be concentrated in one or a fewpeople or dispersed in a network of several actorgroups. This is very similar to the idea of a camarilla,suggested by Holling and Chambers (1973). Social-ecological systems that depend on one or a fewindividuals to provide leadership functions can behighly vulnerable. If, for example, Sven-ErikMagnusson in KV had moved or for some otherreason disappeared at a critical time, the directionof management would have been highly uncertainand the transformation might have taken anotherpathway. When might reliance on one or a few keyindividuals make change highly vulnerable toaccidents of history? Are there ways toinstitutionalize, diversify, and secure leadershipfunctions? What is the role of bridgingorganizations for this purpose?

Finally, based on our comparison we suggest someconsiderations and actions for successfultransformations of SESs toward adaptivegovernance:

● Change attitudes among groups to a new,

shared vision; differences are good,polarization is bad.

● Check for and develop persistent, embeddedleadership across scales; one person can do itfor a time, but several are better locally,regionally, and politically.

● Design resilient processes, e.g., discourse andcollaborations, not fixed structures.

● Evaluate and monitor outcomes of pastinterventions and encourage reflectionfollowed by changes in practices.

● Change is both bottom-up and top-down.Otherwise, scale conflicts ultimately compromisethe promise; globalization is good but candestroy adaptive capacity both regionally andlocally.

● Develop and maintain a portfolio of projects,waiting for opportunities to open.

● Always check larger scales in differentsectors for opportunities; this is not science,but politics.



● Know which phase of an adaptive cycle the

system has reached and identify thresholds;talk about it with others.

● Plan backloop actions differently than frontloop ones; efficiency is on the front loop andresilience on the back loop.

● The time horizon for effect and assessment isat least 30–50 yr; restructuring resilience isall about slow dynamics.

● Create cooperation and transform conflict,but always be happy with some rhythm ofconflict and ensure that channels forexpressing dissent and disagreement arealways open.

● Create novel communication face to face,individual to individual, group to group, andsector to sector.

● Encourage small-scale revolts and recoveries,not large-scale collapses.

● Try to facilitate adaptive governance byallowing just enough flexibility in institutionsand politics.

Hopefully, these suggestions will help managers tomore effectively navigate the periods of uncertaintyand turbulence that appear to be an unavoidablecomponent of any transformation of a social-ecological system.

Responses to this article can be read online at:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art18/responses/

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