inequality in late-classical democratic athens. evidence and models. 2017

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Ober. Inequality. Evidence & models. December 2016. 1 Inequality in late-classical democratic Athens. Evidence and models Josiah Ober. Stanford University. Pp. 125-146 in G.C. Bitros and N.C. Kyriazis, eds. Democracy and Open-Economy World Order. Cham, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing. Abstract: This paper contributes to the question of the relationship between democracy and economic inequality in ancient Greece by developing a realistic population and income model for late classical Athens. The model is evidence-based, although hypothetical in many particulars. It aligns with other evidence suggesting that economic inequality in late classical Athens was low by historical standards. While no causal argument is made here, the model is consistent with the hypothesis that democracy tended to lower economic inequality over time, in part through progressive taxation. The model also helps to explain Athenian social stability: poorer Athenians, including many slaves, were beneficiaries of a system that enabled most Athenians to live well above the level of bare subsistence. Some slaves had some chance of earning their way out of slavery by, in effect, purchasing themselves. While taxation could be disruptively heavy for some estates, the overall tax burden on wealthy Athenians, as a class, was not high enough to trigger elite- level revolutionary cooperation against the democratic regime. Introduction Ancient Athens is a well-documented example of a premodern democratic society. Athens was not a liberal democracy: there was a large (see below) population of chattel slaves; political participation was limited to adult males; and relatively long-term non-native residents were only rarely granted full citizenship, with its concomitant political participation rights. But Athens was, by premodern standards, strikingly politically egalitarian in that virtually all native adult males held full participation rights. There was no property qualification for citizenship. Non-elite citizens participated actively in Athenian legislative institutions, served as jurors on law courts, and held administrative offices. Equal access to institutions for all citizens was ensured by pay for public service and the frequent use of lotteries for service on the council, on juries, and for various offices. Athenian public discourse emphasized equality of voice (isegoria), of vote (isopsephia), and before the law (isonomia). Along with liberty, a commitment to political equality was held

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Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.1

Inequalityinlate-classicaldemocraticAthens.Evidenceand

modelsJosiahOber.StanfordUniversity. Pp. 125-146 in G.C. Bitros and N.C. Kyriazis, eds. Democracy and Open-Economy World Order. Cham, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing. Abstract:ThispapercontributestothequestionoftherelationshipbetweendemocracyandeconomicinequalityinancientGreecebydevelopingarealisticpopulationandincomemodelforlateclassicalAthens.Themodelisevidence-based,althoughhypotheticalinmanyparticulars.ItalignswithotherevidencesuggestingthateconomicinequalityinlateclassicalAthenswaslowbyhistoricalstandards.Whilenocausalargumentismadehere,themodelisconsistentwiththehypothesisthatdemocracytendedtolowereconomicinequalityovertime,inpartthroughprogressivetaxation.ThemodelalsohelpstoexplainAtheniansocialstability:poorerAthenians,includingmanyslaves,werebeneficiariesofasystemthatenabledmostAthenianstolivewellabovethelevelofbaresubsistence.Someslaveshadsomechanceofearningtheirwayoutofslaveryby,ineffect,purchasingthemselves.Whiletaxationcouldbedisruptivelyheavyforsomeestates,theoveralltaxburdenonwealthyAthenians,asaclass,wasnothighenoughtotriggerelite-levelrevolutionarycooperationagainstthedemocraticregime. Introduction

AncientAthensisawell-documentedexampleofapremoderndemocraticsociety.Athenswasnotaliberaldemocracy:therewasalarge(seebelow)populationofchattelslaves;politicalparticipationwaslimitedtoadultmales;andrelativelylong-termnon-nativeresidentswereonlyrarelygrantedfullcitizenship,withitsconcomitantpoliticalparticipationrights.ButAthenswas,bypremodernstandards,strikinglypoliticallyegalitarianinthatvirtuallyallnativeadultmalesheldfullparticipationrights.Therewasnopropertyqualificationforcitizenship.Non-elitecitizensparticipatedactivelyinAthenianlegislativeinstitutions,servedasjurorsonlawcourts,andheldadministrativeoffices.Equalaccesstoinstitutionsforallcitizenswasensuredbypayforpublicserviceandthefrequentuseoflotteriesforserviceonthecouncil,onjuries,andforvariousoffices.Athenianpublicdiscourseemphasizedequalityofvoice(isegoria),ofvote(isopsephia),andbeforethelaw(isonomia).Alongwithliberty,acommitmenttopoliticalequalitywasheld

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.2

tobecharacteristicofthedemocraticregime,byancientdemocratsandtheirelitecriticsalike.1

TheAthenianswerenot,however,practicingegalitariansinrespecttothedistributionofmaterialgoods.Wealthandincomeweredistributedunequallyacrosstheresidentpopulation;someAthenianswererich,somepoor,manyotherssomewhereinthemiddle.Sothegeneralquestionisthis:DidAtheniandemocracy,withitsfocusonpoliticalequality,haveanymeasurableimpactonAthenian(or,morebroadly,ancientGreek)economicinequality?Putinotherterms:IstherereasonforcontemporarystudentsofeconomichistorytobesurprisedatthelevelofAthenianeconomicinequality,whenitiscomparedtootherpremodernsocieties?Ifso,isthesurpriseoccasionedbyhigherorlowerthanexpectedlevelsofinequality?WasAthenslessunequalthanother,lessdemocratic,premodernstates?Ifso,candemocracyplausiblybepostulatedasacauseofthedifference?2

Inotherrecentwork(Ober2008,2015a)Ihavearguedthat(1)thereisreasontobelievethatlateclassicalAthensexperiencedrelativelylowlevelsofeconomicinequalityalongwithhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth;(2)althoughAthenswasespeciallyprosperous,AthensisinnotanoutlierintheworldoftheGreekcitystates:manyGreekpoleis,andtheclassicalGreekworldgenerally,wereremarkablyprosperous;(3)prosperityandrelativelylowlevelsofeconomicinequalitywererelatedandbothwerefosteredbyhistoricallydistinctiveGreekcitizen-centeredpoliticalandlegalinstitutions;(4)democracyisanespeciallystrongversionofthegeneralGreekphenomenonofthecitizen-centeredregime,andthusdemocracymaybeexpectedtohavehadaparticularlystrongeffectonprosperityandinequality.Iftheseclaimsarecorrect,theancientAthenian(andgenerallytheancientGreek)casehasconsiderablebearingonquestionsthatlieatthecenterofdebatesamongsocialscientists(e.g.AcemogluandRobinson2012;Boix2015),concerningpoliticaleconomyanddevelopment.

Politicaldevelopmentisoftenassociatedwithchangesinthelevelofeconomicinequality.CarlesBoix(2015)argues,followingabroadconsensusamonghistoricalanthropologists,thatverysmall“stateless”societiesofforagersaretypicallyveryequal,inbothpoliticalandmaterialterms.Thedevelopmentofagriculture,radicalincreasesinsocialscaleandcomplexity,andthebeginningofurbanizationsubsequentlyledtoprofoundlevelsofpoliticalandeconomicinequality,whichpersisted,Boixargues,inmostoftheworlduntiltheIndustrialRevolution.Boix’stheoryisthateconomicdevelopment(agriculture,muchlaterindustrialization)drivespoliticaldevelopment(centralizedmonarchies,muchlaterdemocracy),ratherthantheotherwayaround.Henotes,however,thatthecultureoftheancientGreekcity-stateswasinsomewaysexceptionalinfeaturingstrongformsofpoliticalrepublicanismandrelativelyrobustgrowthlongbeforetheIndustrialRevolution(Boix2015:134-139,204-205).Boixultimatelydismissesthe

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.3

Greekcaseasameaningfulalternativepathtopoliticalandeconomicdevelopment,claiming(Boix2015:88),“perhapsmostdecisively,theshortduration[italicsadded]ofmostrepublicsmeantthatanyeconomicadvantagetheymighthavehadcouldnotbeconsolidatedandthatitdisappearedwiththeirconquestatthehandsofamonarchicalpower–HellenisticGreeceatthehandsofRome,latemedievalItalyatthehandsofFranceandSpain.”Ontheothersideofthedemocracyanddevelopmentdebate,DaronAcemogluandJamesRobinson(2015)havepointedtotheancientGreekcitystatesasanexampleofeffective“bottomup”politicaldevelopmentleadingtorobustcivilsocietyandthuspavingthewayforeconomicgrowth.

EconomicgrowthintheancientGreekworldwasstrongandsustained,bypremodernstandards.3From800BCE(theendofthe“dark”periodoftheEarlyIronAge,thusdiscountingthe“postcollapserecoveryera”of1000-800)to200BCE(theRomantakeover)theGreekworldexperienced600yearsofimpressiveeconomicperformance.WithintheworldoftheGreekcity-states,therewascertainlyconsiderableregionalvariationingrowthrates.Overallgrowthduringthe600-yearperiodundoubtedlymasksperiodsofsharpdownturn.Moreover,itiscertainlytruethatancientGreekgrowthwasmuchlowerthanmoderngrowth(byseveralordersofmagnitude)andthatitdidnotlastindefinitely.But,ontheotherhand,itremainsthecasethattheIndustrialAgeisnotmuchmorethan250yearsold.Soitseemswrong,oratleastpremature,tosaythattheGreekeconomicefflorescencewasof“shortduration”comparedtoindustrialeramodernity.

Theevidenceforrelativelyhighlevelsofpoliticalequalityamongnativemalesinmany(althoughnotall)Greekcity-statesiswellenoughknownthatIneednotrehearseithere.PoliticalequalityamongnativemaleswasespeciallystronglyassociatedwithGreekdemocracy,anddemocracyisbyfarbestdocumentedforclassicalAthens.AsIhavearguedindetail(Ober2008)Athenswasinsomewaysexceptionalasacity-state(verybig,veryhighperforming,withinstitutionsthatprovedrobusttoexogenousshock).ButinotherwaysAthensisexemplaryofthe“citizencentered”andprosperousclassicalGreekcity-states.Thisisimportant,insofarasourevidenceforthedistributionofwealthandincomeisheavilyconcentratedinAthens. AmodelofAthenianpopulationandincome,330BCE. Economiststypicallyassessmaterialinequalitybymeasuringincome.WecannothopetobepreciseinourmeasureofincomeacrossthepopulationofeventhebestdocumentedoftheGreekcity-states.ButIbelievethatthereiscurrentlyenoughinformationavailabletoallowforplausibleguessesofincomedistributionforAthensinthelateclassicalera.Thepostulateddateofthemodelis330BCE,intheso-called“Lycurgan”eraduringwhichAthenianstateincomeandgeneral

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.4

prosperitywasatahighpoint.ThisdatehastheadvantageofbeingaftertheendoftheAthenianEmpire(anerainwhichAthenianeconomywasveryunusualbyGreekstandards),aftertheeconomyhadrecoveredfromthePeloponnesianWar,andbeforetheconquestsofAlexanderfundamentallyremadetheGreekworld. ThemodelofAthenianpopulationandincomeisbasedon34groups,eachwithahypotheticalsizeandlevelofincome.ThemodelislaidoutindetailintheAppendixTable.ThismodelisavariantofaconsiderablysimplermodelIproposedinearlierwork(Ober2015a:Table4.4).Whilethegeneralconclusionsinrespecttolevelsofincomeinequalityofthetwomodelsaresimilar,thenewmodelassumesasomewhatsmallertotalpopulationofsub-adultcitizensandasubstantiallylargerpopulationofliturgicalclass(verywealthy)Athenians.Thenewmodelattemptstoaddsomemorenuancebut,liketheolderone,itnecessarilysimplifiesamuchmorecomplexsocialreality,interaliabyassumingthatwithin-grouphouseholdincomesareequal. Thepopulationandincomemodelproposedheremakesanumberofassumptionsthataremoreorlesswellsupportedbyavailableempiricalevidence.Otherhistoriansofclassicalantiquity,usingthesameevidence,mightmakesomewhatdifferentassumptionsaboutthepopulationofAthens,itsdistributionacrossgroupsofpersons,householdsize,andtheestimatedincomeperhouseholdineachgroup.IhaveattemptedtokeepmyassumptionsaboutpopulationandincomewellinsidewhatItaketobethegeneralrangewithinwhichmostestimatesbyprofessionalGreekhistoriansarelikelytofall.Inanyevent,theattemptatmodelingallowsothersinterestedinthequestionsraisedheretopointoutwheretheirassumptionsalignwithordifferfrommine,andtobuildtheirownpopulationandincomemodelsaccordingly.4Population:226,703totalin123,170households. Thepopulationmodeledisthetotaloflong-termresidentslivinginAthens’hometerritoryofAtticain330BCE.Thethreeprimarycategoriesoflong-termresidentsareslaves,freeforeigners(metics),andcitizens.5Someresidentsareassumedtoliveinfamilyhouseholds,normalizedas4.5individuals(husband,wife,2.5otherdependentkin:childrenunderage18orotherfamily-members,e.g.unmarriedorwidowedadultwomen).Othersareassumedtoliveinone-personhouseholds;i.e.notmarried,nochildren,nootherdependents.“Household”isusedhereinastylizedway,forpurposesofdemographiccounts,ratherthanasadescriptionofactuallivingconditions.Thus,allslavesarecountedasindividual(one-person)households,ratherthanbeingincludedinthehouseholdsoftheirmasters.Inreality,someslavescertainlylivedinthehousesoftheirmasters;otherslavesdidliveindependently,apartfromtheirmasters,andsomeofthesecertainlydidhavefamilies.Yetothersmayhavelivedinbarracksofsomekind,butno

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.5

archaeologicalevidenceofsucharrangementshavebeenidentified.6 Slaves.80,000totalin80,000households:35%ofAthenianpopulation.Thecategoryofslavesisthemostuncertainintermsofnumbers;estimatesofAthens’slavepopulationhaverangedfromalowofabout20,000toahighofseveralhundredsofthousands.AmongtheproblemsinestimatingslavenumbersisthelikelihoodthatnoAthenianeverknewhowmanyslaveswereresidentinAttica.Therewasnoreasonforthestatetocollectthatinformation,andnowayforanyprivateindividualtoknowit.Thetotalfigureofca.80,000(ofallagesandbothsexes)hasbeenusedforagenerationinpopulationestimates,althoughitrestsonnoancientauthority.Intermsofdistribution,Iartificiallyassumethatnoslaves(eventhoselivingapartfromtheirmasters)livewiththeirownfamilies.Iassumethatmostslavesareadults(i.e.therearefew“house-born”slaves).Idonotmakeanyassumptionaboutthedistributionbygender.Addinganumberofsub-adultslavesinslavehouseholdswouldincreasethetotalestimatedpopulation,butitwouldnotmuchaffectthegeneralmodel.7 Metics.31,633totalin12,835households:14%ofAthenianpopulation.Meticsincludedbothmigrants(Greekandnon-Greek)whochosetoliveinAttica,presumablyoftenforeconomicreasons,andmanumittedslaves.Unlikeslaves,theAthenianstatedidkeeparecordoflong-termresidentfreenon-citizens,eachofwhom(maleandfemaleadults)wasrequiredtopayanannualpolltaxtothestate.Oneancientpassage(Athenaeus272c:seeaboven.3)claimsthattherewere10,000(presumablyadult)meticsinAthensin317BCE,duringtheoligarchyestablishedbyDemetriusofPhaleronunderMacedonianauspices.Ihaveassumedthatin.330BCEthereweremoreadultmeticsthanthat.TheAthenianeconomyin330BCEwasstrongerthanitwaslater,andthedemocraticregimemorewelcomingtoforeignresidents.Moreover,Iassumethatinadditionthe“officialmetics”whopaidthatpolltax(andthuswereavailabletobecountedininanofficiallist)thereweresome“undocumented”meticswhodidnotpaythetaxandsocouldnotbeofficiallycounted.Iassumethatsomemeticslivedalone(i.e.inhouseholdsof1,slavesaside).Otherswillhavelivedinfamilyhouseholdswithchildrenandperhapssomeadultfamily-memberdependents.8 Citizens.115,070totalin30,337households:51%ofAthenianpopulation.Thecitizenpopulationhasreceivedthemostattentionfromancienthistorians.MogensHansen(1986,1988,2006)hasdoneespeciallyimpressiveworkonthenumberofAtheniancitizensinthefourthcenturyBCE;myassumptionsmakeonlyminoralterationsinhismodel,whichispredicatedontheassumptionthattherewereatleast30,000adultmalecitizensandonstandardlifetablesdevelopedby

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.6

demographersforpremodernsocieties.LikeHansen,Iassumearoughlyequalnumberofcitizenmalesandfemales.Thequestionofthedistributionofindividualsacrossagecategoriesiscomplex.Hansen’s“mortalitylevel4growthrate0.5%”modelwasbasedonacomparisonwithdemographicestimatesofthepopulationstructureofthehighRomanempire;thebasicworkwasdoneagenerationagobytheRomanhistorian,KeithHopkins,andsimilarassumptionsarestillbeingmadebysubsequentRomandemographers(Akrigg2011).RomandemographersinturnborrowedfromassumptionsaboutEuropeanpopulationsbefore1800.Hansen’schoiceofdemographicmodelseemscertainlytobewithintherightgeneralrange,buttheAthenianpopulationmayhavevariedfromthemodelincertainways.

Akeyquestionistheratioofadults(age18andover)tochildren,whichinturndependsoflifeexpectancyandaveragenumberoflivebirthsperwoman.Therateofinfant/youngchildmortalityhasanespeciallystrongeffectonthestructureoftheoverallpopulation.Hansen’smodelresultsinmalesaged18-80being57.4%ofthetotalmalecitizenpopulation.Myearlier(Ober2015)modelleftadultmalesasonly44.4%ofthetotalmalepopulation,implyingthattherewouldhavebeenmanymorechildrenincitizenhouseholds.ThatfigureresultedfromwhatInowregardasanoverly-strongsimplifyingassumptioni.e.thateachadultcitizenheadedofafamilyof4.5persons.Thatobviouslymisrepresentsthereality,inthatamalecitizenof,say,18-20,wasunlikelytobemarriedwith2.5childrenorotherfamily-memberdependents.Likewise,someoldermalecitizenswouldnolongerbeheadsofhouseholdssupportingchildrenunder18.InthenewmodelIhaveattemptedtocorrectforthisbypostulatingthattherewere6125unmarriedcitizenmenoverage18(group11:“citizen2”).

Forcitizenswithfamilies,IthinkwemayallowmarginallylowerchildhoodmortalitythaninHansen’smodel,ontheassumptionthatthelifetablesheusedaverageacrosssubpopulations,atleastsomeofwhichmaybeassumedtooutperformandotherstounderperformthemedian.So,insofarasthemodelisbasedonthedemographyoftheRomanempire,wemayreasonablyassumethatsomepartsoftheempire(i.e.certainancientpopulations)divergedsomewhatfromthenorm.MymodelassumesadateinthethirdquarterofthefourthcenturyBCE,whichappearstobenearthepeakoftheclassicalGreekefflorescence.Aswewillsee,AnnaLagia(2015,below)hasofferednewevidencethatsuggeststhatclassicalGreek(andspecificallyAthenian)nutritionwasoverallbetterthanitwasduringtheRomanera.Insum,IamassumingeconomicconditionsthatappeartobemorefavorablethanatanypointinGreekhistorybeforethe20thcentury.

Theupshotisanassumptionthattherewerejustover30,000adultmalecitizens,andthatthisrepresented52.7%ofallcitizenmales(comparedwithHansen57.4%).Thetotalnumberofcitizensofbothgendersandallagescomestojustover115,000.

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Income.7,179.6Talentstotalperannum. Thebasicunitsofincomearethedrachma(dr:asilvercoinwithstandardweightof4.3grams)andtheTalent(T:6000drachmas).Allincomefiguresarepre-tax.Perabove,meticspaidapolltax(attherateof12drperannumforamale,6drperannumforafemale).Therewasnostandardtaxonincome,buteliteAthenianspaidperiodicpropertytaxes(eisphora)andothertaxesintheformofmandatoryliturgiesanddonations(epidoseis)tostateprojects.9 Becauseweknowenoughaboutthecostofgrain,incomeintheformofdrachmasperdaycanbeconvertedtostandardperdiem“wheatwages,”andthenintomultiplesofbaresubsistence(Scheidel2010).Estimatesofincomearebasedonthefollowingbasicassumptions(discussedinmoredetailinOber201591-97):Tosurviveeachindividualmustconsumeatorabovethelevelofbaresubsistence(S).Whenincomeisintheformofdailywages,Iassume300workingdaysperyear.Adultmale“headofhousehold”istheprimarysourceofincomeforfamilyhouseholds,butadultwomenandotherfamilymembersareassumedtobringinsomeincome. Wageearners(includingslaves).Groups1-14.IassumethatthegreatmajorityofAtheniansmadetheirlivingfromincomethatwasintheformof,orcanbeimaginedas,wages.OfcoursenotallAtheniansactuallyreceivedwages:manyreceivedsomeoralloftheirincomefromworkingprivately-heldorleasedagriculturalland.WherewehavetheevidenceofactualwagesinlaterfourthcenturyAthens,thesewererelativelyhighwhencomparedtothenormalwagepaidtounskilledlaborersinotherpremodernsocieties.Documentaryevidencesuggeststhat,inthelaterfourthcenturyBCE,unskilledlaborbyadultmaleswaspaidattherateof1.5drperday;socialstatus(slave,metic,citizen)doesnotappeartoaffectpayrates.Skilledlaborerswerepaidathigherlevels,upto2.5drperday.Whenconvertedintowheatwageequivalents,andcombinedwiththeassumptionofatleastminimalincomebyotherfamilymembersthisyieldsahighfamilyincome:3.7to4.6timesabovethelevelofbaresubsistence(i.e.3.7-4.6S).TheseAthenianpayratesarecomparabletopayratesinearlymodernHollandandmuchhigherthanotherknownancientandmedievalsocieties,whichaveragearound1.6S.10Theincomemodelassumesthatsomeadultmaleresidentswerepaidbelowtheunskilledlaborrateof1.5drnotedabove,andthatothers,assumedtobeskilledlaborers,werepaidabovethoserates. Theincomeofslavesismodeledintheformofwages.Thewagesofslavesinthemodelareassumedtobetheportionofpaythatislefttotheslave,tosupporthis/herconsumptionandsavings,afterthemasterhasextractedthebulkoftheslave’swages.Iassumethatsomeslaveswereleftwithverylittlebeyondbare

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.8

subsistence(group1),thatotherswereleftwithsomewhatmore(groups2and3),andthatsomeskilledslaveswereleftwith“takehome”incomecomparabletothatofanunskilledlaborer(group8).Wedonotactuallyknowwhatpartofaslave’sincomewastypicallyretainedbytheslave,butwedoknowthatAthenianslaveswerefrequentlymanumittedandthatmanumissionatleastsometimesinvolvedafinancialtransferofwhatcanbeimaginedasslavesavingstothemasterinasortof“balloonpayment,”wherebytheslaveineffectpurchasedhimself.Slavetomastermanumission-timewealthtransferisatleastisonereasonthatAthenianincomeinequalityislikelytobesubstantiallylowerthanwealthinequality.11 Elites.Groups15-34.Thehighendoftheincomedistributionmodelconsistsof5,265peoplein1170households;835ofthesehouseholdsarecitizens,335aremetic.Thesehigh-incomegroupsconstitute2.32%ofAthenianpopulation.Iassumethathouseholdincomeinthesehigh-endgroupsincludesvariousnon-wagesources,suchthatanestimateofdailywagesisnolongertherelevantunitofincome;ratherincomeoughttobethoughtofintermsofareturnoninvestedwealth.WeknowthatinAthenshouseholdswithsubstantialwealth,generallyestimatedintherangeof3-4talents,weresubjecttopayingdirecttaxesonwealth(eisphoraandoccasionalliturgies,triarchicandfestival).InthismodelIhaveacceptedtheargumentthattheliturgicalclassincludedapproximately1200households(meticandcitizen),ratherthantheestimateof400householdsthatIusedinmyearliermodel.12 Assumingareturnonwealth(whetherintheformofrealestateorotherassets)intherangeof5-8%perannum,ahouseholdinthebottomrankofthehigh-incometier(groups15,25),withanestimatedincomeof1000drperannum,mightpossesstotalwealthintherangeof2-3.5T.Householdsinhigher-incomegroups(16-24,26-34)wouldhavecomparablygreaterwealth.Iassumethatthelowerofthehigh-incomegroupscontainedrelativelymorehouseholds.Thereareonlyahandfulofmeticandcitizenhouseholdsintheverywealthiestgroups(24,34),withestimatedannualincomesof40,000dr.Eachoftheseultra-high-incomehouseholdsmighthavepossessedtotalwealthintherangeof100T.Estimatesoftheincomeofthehighest-incomegroupscan,however,belittlemorethanguesses,inpartbecauseoftheissueofhiddenwealth.Iassumethatmanyelitefamiliessoughttohide(i.e.render“invisible”andthusuntaxable)asubstantialpartoftheirwealthandthatsomeweresuccessfulindoingso. Discussion.Basedonthehypotheticalmodelofpopulationandincomesketchedabove,anddetailedintheAppendixTable,wecancalculatevariousfiguresrelevanttothequestionoftheextentofincomeinequalityinlateclassicalAthens.Thesefiguresare,ofcourse,hypothetical,inthattheyarebasedontheassumptionsbuilt

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intothemodel.Onceagain,otherhistoriansmightmakedifferentassumptions,andthusendupwithdifferentfigures.

GiniCoefficientofInequalityandInequalityExtractionRatio.The(pretax)incomeGinicoefficientforthewholeofAtheniansociety(includingslavesandresidentforeigners)comesto38.13Thisismarginallyhigherthanthe“RomanEmpirein14CE”Giniof36.4,asestimatedbyMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliams(2011;seeTable1,below),butitislowerthantheRomanempireGiniof42–44,asestimatedbytheancienteconomichistorians,WalterScheidelandStevenFriesen(2009).TheLorenzcurveforAthensisillustratedinFigure1.ItisquitedifferentinshapefromthecurveillustratedbyScheidelandFriesenforRome.ThedifferencearisesfromthesubstantiallylargerAthenianpopulationofpersonswhofallinthemiddlerange,betweentherichestandpoorest.TheestimatedAthenianincomeGiniissubstantiallylowerthanthatestimatedbyMilianovic,Lindert,andWilliiamsonforrelativelyhighpreformingearlymodernEuropeaneconomies.14

[Figure1abouthere]

MeanAthenianincomepercapita(roughlyGPDpercapita)comesto0.032T

(192dr).Movingfromthispercapitameantothemeanincomeofafamilyhouseholdallowsustocalculateaccordingtomultiplesofthesubsistenceminimum.Meanhouseholdincomecomestoapproximately4.5S.ThatestimateinturnallowsustomeasureinequalityinAthensaccordingtotheInequalityExtractionRatio,amethodthatisinsomerespectsmoreusefulforassessinginequalityinpre-industrialsocietiesthanisthesimpleGinicoefficientbecauseitfactorsinconsumptionasamultipleofsubsistence.

Milanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson(2011)developedtheInequalityExtractionRatio(IER)asametricforpremoderninequality.TheIERfocusesonthedifferencebetweenincomenecessarytoachievethesubsistenceminimumandtheactualincomeofnon-elites.Itdoessobymeasuringthepercentageofactualinequalitywithinagivensociety,asmeasuredbytheGinicoefficient,asapercentageofmaximumfeasibleinequality.ThemaximumfeasibleGiniforthesocietyinquestionsetsitsInequalityPossibilityFrontier:thepointatwhich,iftheirincomewerelower,non-eliteswouldfallbelowthesubsistenceminimum.AsMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson(2011)demonstrated,premodernsocietiesoftenapproachtheInequalityPossibilityFrontier(IPF).Ifelitesextractbeyondthelevelthatwouldleaveothersintheirsocietyatbelowa1Slevel,thepoorestwilldiefromdeprivation.Thepointhereisthatevenaveryrapaciouselitemustordinarilyleavethenon-elitewithasubsistenceminimuminordertoavoiddestroyingelitesourcesofincome.ComparingtheactualGiniwiththemaximumfeasibleGiniyieldsthe

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InequalityExtractionRatio(IER).AnIERof100%isindicatesthatthesocietyhasarrivedattheIPF,thepointatwhichmoreinequalityimpliesdeathofsomebydeprivation.ThemedianoftheMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamsonstudygroupisanIERofabout75%.Basedonmyincome/populationmodel,theIERforAthensin330BCEis48.9%.ThismakesAthensalowoutlieramongpremodernsocieties,evenlowerthanEnglandandWalesin1688,andverymuchlowerthanmostothersocietiesmeasuredinMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson’scollectionofcasestudies(seeTable1).

[Table1abouthere]

Middle,low,andelitepopulationsegments.Athenianmedianpercapitaincomeisestimatedat0.023T(138dr)peryear.MeanAthenianincomepercapita(0.032)isthus39%abovemedianincome.Coincidentally,thisisalmostexactlytheratioofmeantomedianforhouseholdincomeinthecontemporaryUSA.15Conversely,Athenianmedianincomeis71%ofmeanincome.Whenmedianincomeistranslated(perabove)intoamultipleofbaresubsistence,weseethatamedianfamilyconsumedatabout3.5timessubsistence(3.5S).Ifwecalculatethe“middleclass”bytheordinarymethod(Milanovic2011:171-72)ofincludingallthosewhoseincomefallswithin25%ofthemedian,some55%ofAtheniansweremiddleclass;23%fellbelowthemiddleclassstandard,while22%areabovethatstandard.Bywayofcomparison,accordingtothefigurescitedbyMilanovic(2011),incontemporaryLatinAmericathemedianincomeis60%ofthemean,and20%meetthemiddleclassstandard.Intheaveragemoderndevelopedcountry,themedianincomeisabout85%ofmeanincome,andabout40%ofthepopulationmeetsthemiddleclassstandard. Calculatedanotherway,bymultiplesofsubsistence,76%ofAthenianhouseholdsfallwithinwhatScheidelandFriesen(2009)considerthe“decentmiddling”rangeof2.4-10timessubsistence;22.5%ofhouseholdsfallbelowthedecentmiddlingrange;1.3%ofhouseholdsareinthe“elite”rangeofover10timessubsistence. Thepre-taxincomeshare(comparedtothetotalincomeofallAthenians)ofthetop1%ofAthenians(2228persons:halfofgroup17,groups18-25,28-34)isabout13%;thisfallsroughlymidwaybetweenthetop1%incomeshareinanumberofcontemporarywesternEuropeancountriesandthetop1%shareinthecontemporaryUSA.16TheaveragepercapitaincomeofanAthenianinthetop1%ofincomeearnerswasabout18timestheincomeofamedianAthenian(inthecontemporaryUSAitisabout12times),andabout13timesthemeanpercapitaincome.Theincomeshareoftheliturgicalclass(groups15-34:2.3%ofthepopulation,perabove)is16.3%.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.11

Taxation.Asnotedabove,themodeldevelopedisofpre-taxincomeandthetaxationpolicyoftheAthenianstatelevieddirecttaxes(otherthanonmetics)uniquelyonthewealthiest(indirecttaxesonimportsandexportswouldhaveaffectedallincomeclasses).ThusAtheniantaxationpolicywouldhaveservedtofurtherequalizeAthenianincomes.Inthelongrun,byreducingelitehouseholdincomeovertime(andthustheamountofincomethatcouldbeprivatelysaved),itwouldalsotendtolowerwealthinequality.TheestimateofthetaxburdenonwealthyAtheniansasaclassmustbeveryapproximate,evenwhenweassumethattheburdenisbeingcalculatedonactual(hiddenandthusuntaxed,aswellasvisibleandthustaxed)income.But,againassumingthatthefiguresinthemodelarewithinrange,wecanmakesomeinformedguesses.ThebiggesttaxonwealthyAthenianswasintheformoftrierarchicliturgies.An“active”trierarchicliturgy,accordingtowhichtheliturgistwasrequiredtooutfitawarshipforasailingseason,variedaccordingtocircumstances,butmayhaveaveragedabout4000dr(0.66T).If,hypothetically,100triremesweredeployedinagivenyear,thenthetotaltrierarchicliturgyburdenwouldhavebeenca.67Tperyear.Trierarchicliturgiesaregenerallythoughttoberestrictedtocitizens,althoughthekeytext(Demosthenes20.20)onlyimpliesthatthisisthecaseanddoesnotsaythisexplicitly.Assumingthatitwasacitizen-onlytax,thetrierarchysystemalonemightproduceataxrateontheliturgicalclassofcitizensofabout8-9%-andmoreifmoreshipsneededtobemannedinagivenyear.17

Inadditiontothetrierarchy,therewereabout100festivalliturgies,whichmayhaveaveragedabout1500dr,foratotalofca.25T.Annualpropertytaxonwealthyestates,inordinaryyears,totaledabout10T(eisphora).Therewerealsoperiodicspecialleviesontheveryrich(epidoseis,proeisphora).Thesetaxeswerepaidbywealthymeticsaswellascitizens,meaningthatthetaxburdenwasspreadout.Theca.300wealthiestcitizenhouseholds(correspondingtogroups28-34,minimumestimatedincomeof1Tperyear)weresubjecttothespecialassessmentsnotedabove.Ifweestimatethattheseother(non-trierarchic)taxesaddeduptoatotalofabout45Tperyear,wemayassumethatthenormalannualtaxonwealthyAtheniansasaclass(citizensandmeticsalike)wasintherangeof112T,orroughly10%ofgrossannualliturgical-classhouseholdincome.Taxesonindividualestatesandontheliturgicalclassasawholevariedsubstantiallyfromyeartoyear.Inyearswhenfewershipsneededtobeatsea,thetotaltaxburdenonthewealthyasaclasswouldbelighter;intimesofmilitaryemergency,taxeswillhavebeenhigher.18

Themodelyieldsanaverageliturgical-classhouseholdincomeofabout1Tperyear,acrossthegroups(15-34)ofhigh-incomecitizenandmetichouseholds.Theimpactofatrierarchicliturgyof4000dronanaverageestatewouldbeverysubstantial–amountingtosomethingliketwo-thirdsofgrossannualhousehold

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.12

income.Theimpactwouldbeevengreater,ofcourse,onthelowertiersoftheliturgicalclass,potentiallyamountingtofourtimesannualhouseholdincomeforahouseholdingroup15or25.AsMarkPyzyk(inprogress)suggests,therewasverygoodreasonforAtheniansinthelowerendoftheliturgicalclasstoseektoavoidtaxesbyhidingincomeorfoistingtheburdenontosomeoneelse’sestateviaalegalmaneuver.19Aseriesoftaxreformsinthecourseofthefourthcentury(Gabrielsen1994:ch.8;Christ2007)soughttosmoothoutthetaxburdenacrossthewealthyclass,inwaysthatseemtohaveaimedatlesseningtheimpactofagivenyear’staxonthelessprosperousliturgical-classcitizenhouseholds.

Preliminaryconclusions:incomeinequality.Theprecedingdiscussionofthe

populationandincomemodelsuggeststhatAthenianincomeinequalityin330BCEwaslowbycomparisonwithotherdocumentedhistoricalpre-industrialsocietiesandisinsomewayscomparabletoratesofinequalityinsomecontemporarydevelopedstates.TheGinicoefficientand,evenmoresaliently,theInequalityExtractionRatio(IER)arebothrelativelylowwhencomparedtoimperialRomanortothemosthighlydevelopedsocietiesofwesternEuropebeforetheIndustrialRevolution.

Themodelallowsonlyveryroughestimates,butitalsoshowshowfarwewouldhavetopushthevariousassumptionsonwhichitisbasedinordertobringAthensintolinewiththehighIERofotherhistoricalsocieties.Suppose,forexample,weweretolowermeanAthenianincomefrommyestimated4.5Sto(animplausiblylow)3S,andraisetheGinicoefficientfrom38to(animplausiblyhigh)45.TheAthenianIERwould,undertheserevisedassumptions,cometo67.5(ratherthan,asestimatedabove,48.9).Evenundertheseextremelypessimisticassumptions,AthenswouldbewellbelowthemedianIER(75)ofhistoricalsocietiesstudiedbyMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson.ThosesortsofrevisionstothemodelseemimplausiblebecausetheywouldrequireeitherthatourancientevidenceforAthenianwagesisverymisleading,orthatforsomereasontheevidenceisrelevantonlytoasmallpartoftheAthenianpopulation,orthattheliturgicalclassofwealthyAthenianswasmuchlargerthattheevidencesuggests,orthattherichestweremuchwealthier.

Pushingany,orevenall,oftheseunderlyingassumptionsfarenoughtoimperiltheresultofsurprisingly(incomparativeperspective)lowAthenianincomeinequalitywouldrequiredismissingmuchofourdocumentary,textual,andarchaeologicalevidenceforlateclassicalAtheniansociety.Thus,whiletheactualfiguresderivedfromthemodelremainheavilystylizedfacts,thegeneralconclusionthatAthenianincomeinequalitywascomparativelylowinhistoricalperspectiveseemsagreatdealmorelikelythananyalternativedescriptionthatcharacterizedAthenianinequalityaseitherhistoricallyunexceptionalorunusuallyhigh.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.13

Othermeasuresofinequality.

IfthepopulationandincomemodeldevelopedaboveisanywhereclosetoareasonablereflectionoflivedAthenianreality,wemightexpecttoseeasomewhatsimilarpatterninothermeasuresofinequality.WemaytestthehypothesisthatAthenianincomeinequalitywasrelativelylowincomparisonwithotherpre-industrialsocietiesbyreferencetoapredictionthatinequalitywouldberelativelylowinotherareas.Whilethistestcannotprove,definitively,thatAthenianincomeinequalitywaslow,itdoesprovideanindirectfalsificationcondition:Ifotherindicatorsshownotendencytolower-than-expectedinequality,wewouldhavereasontobemoresuspiciousabouttheincomeresultslaidoutabove.

Wealthandland

GeoffreyKronhasmeasuredwealthdistributionamongcitizensinlatefourthcenturyAthensbycalculatingtheGinicoefficientbasedonancienttextevidence.Kroncalculatesthatinlatefourth-centuryAthenstherichest1percentofthecitizenpopulationownedabout30percentofallprivatewealth;whilethetop10%ownedabout60percentofthewealth.ThisyieldsaGinicoefficientof70.8.KronthencomparesthisfiguretotheGiniwealthcoefficientsforseveralmodernsocieties.Thelate-classicalAthenianleveloftotal-wealthinequalityisroughlycomparabletothatoftheUSAin1953-54(71).ItislessequalthanCanadain1998(69),butamoreequalthanFlorencein1427(78.8)ortheUSAin1998(79.4).ItismuchmoreequalthantheUSAorEnglandintheearly20thcentury(93and95respectively).20

Kron’sconclusiononthecomparatively(inhistoricalterms)equitabledistributionofprivatewealthamongcitizensinlateclassicalAthensisconsistentwithestimatesoflandholdinginAthens:Twoindependentstudiesbyclassicalscholarsintheearly1990sconcludedthatabout7.5-9%ofcitizensownedabout30-35%ofthelandofAttica;some20%ownedlittleornoland.Excludingthoseatthetopandbottomofthedistribution,weareleftwithroughly60-65%ofthelandbeingownedbyabout70-75%ofthecitizenpopulation.21IanMorrispointsoutthattheresultingGinicoefficient,whichIcalculateasabout48,islowincomparisontoestimateddistributionsofland-holdingforotherancientandmedievalsocieties.JuliánGallego(2016)hasrecentlycalculatedlandholdinginequalityinlateclassicalAthens(usingeightratherthanthreewealthclasses)at44.1AlthoughthebaselineAthenianfiguresdonottellusanythingaboutsomerelevantfactorsaffectingthevalueofland,e.g.distributionofespeciallyproductivelandorfinancialencumbrancesonlandholdings,Morrisiscertainlyrighttoconcludethat,“thebasicpointisclear:landholdingamongcitizenswasunusuallyegalitarianinClassicalAthens.”22

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.14

NutritionInanimportantstudyofasampleofisotopicanalysisof52humanskeletons

fromthreedifferentcemeteriesinAttica,AnnaLagiahasshednewlightonpatternsofancientAtheniannutrition.Thesamples,whicharesortedintotheclassical,Hellenistic,andRomanperiods,yieldseveralimportantresults.First,nutrition(basedonisotopicevidenceforproteinintake)wasoverallverygoodintheclassicalperiod.NutritionlevelsworsenedintheHellenisticperiodburials,anddeclinedfurtherintheRomanera.ThispatternofdeclinebetweentheclassicaltotheRomanerasisconsistentwithisotopicstudiesofnutritioninseveralotherGreeksites.Lagia(2015:140)concludes“ThehomogenouspictureofanelevatedproteinintheClassicalperiodinsitesasdiverseasMakriyalos,Thebes,andAthensvis-à-visearlierperiods,inadditiontoacorrespondingdecreaseintheHellenisticperiodinAthensandThebes,suggestthatthecausesofthesechangesweretransformationsinthelivingstandardsratherthanrandomfactorsrelatedtoindividualphysiologyoreconomicstrategy.”Thispatternofhighclassicaleraproteinintakeisconsistentwiththeevidenceforrelativelyhighclassicalerawagesacrossasubstantialpartofthepopulation.

Equallyimportant,forourpurposes,isthelackofsubstantialdifferentiationamongthenutritionlevelsoftheindividualsburiedinthethreecemeteries.Lagia(2015:121-212)arguespersuasivelythatthefirstcemetery,Kerameikos,hostedgenerallyeliteburials;thesecondcemetery,PlateiaKotziaseemstohavebeenusedbyordinarypeoplelivinginorneartheurbancenter.Thefourburialsinthestudysetfromthethirdcemetery,locatedatthedemeofThorikosintheLaurionregionofsouthAttica,arebelievedtobethoseofslavesworkingintheminingdistrict.Notably,therewerenosignificantdifferencesintheobservedlevelsofnutritionacrossthethreecemeteries(Lagia2015:127).Thislackofdifferentiationbetweeneliteandnon-elitenutritionintheclassicaleracontrastssharplywiththeverysignificantdifferencesinnutritionobserved(inotherisotopicbonestudies)betweeneliteandnon-eliteindividualsinGreekburialsfromtheBronzeandMedievealperiod(Knipperetal.2015;Buikstra&Lagia2009:18).Lagia’sconclusionsaboutthestrikingsimilarityinnutritionlevelsamongpresumedeliteandnon-eliteAtheniansoftheclassicalera,basedonherstudyofremainsfromthethreeAtheniancemeteries,isconsistentwithamodelofrelativelylowlevelofincomeinequalityinthelateclassicalmodel.Houses

Housesizescanbeemployedasanindirectproxyofbothconsumptionandinequality.IanMorris(2004)hasdemonstratedthat,basedonthearchaeologicalevidence,archaic/classicaleraGreeksettlementswerenevercharacterizedbyafewmansionsandmanyhuts.Theaveragesizeofhousesgrewdramaticallyacrossthis

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.15

period;intheEarlyIronAgemostGreekslivedinsmallandpoorlyconstructedhouses.BythelateclassicalperiodtheaverageGreekfamilylivedinamuchlarger,andmuchbetter-builthouse.Butacrosstheentirehalf-millenniumfrom800-300BCE,thedistributionofGreekhousestendedtoclusteraroundthemedianhousesize.Asthebiggesthousesinthesamplesizegrewovertime,sotoodidthesmallerhouses.Thesizeofhousesinthetopquartile(basedonfloorplanarea)neverdivergedmarkedlyfromthatofthebottomquartile.Thesizeoflargerandsmallerhousesgrewmoreorlessinlockstepacrosstheperiod:by300BCEhousesinthe75thpercentileofthedistributionwereonlyaboutone-fifthagain(roughly50m2)aslargeasthoseatthe25thpercentile(Morris2004:722-23).

AcomparativesurveyofclassicalerahousesizesatOlynthosandotherwellpreservedGreekurbanareasbyGeoffreyKron(2011)confirmsthisgeneralpicture.Unlike(e.g.)nineteenthcenturyEngland,thedistributionofhousesizesatmid-fourthcenturyBCEOlynthosdescribesabellcurve:mosthousesfallinthemiddle,ratherthanonthefarleft(tinyhouse)side,ofthedistribution.OverallinequalityamonghousesizesatOlynthoswasverylow,KroncalculatestheGinicoefficientas14.Inlaterperiodsofantiquity,fromtheHellenisticthroughRomanera,housesizesdiverged(i.e.theGinicoefficientincreased);bythelateRomanperiodthedifferenceinaveragesizebetweengreatvillasandordinaryhouseswasimmense.23

Inthecaseofhouses,thesamplesarenotdrawnjustfromAthens,butfromacrosstheGreekworld.Nonetheless,thereisnoreasontobelieve,basedonwhatisknownofclassicaleraAthenianhouses,thathouse-sizeatAthenswasmoreunequalthantheclassicaleraGreeknorm.ThecomparisonofrelativelyequalhousesizeintheGreekclassicalperiod,andforveryconsiderablegrowthofinequalityinpost-classicalGreece,fitswiththegeneralconclusionofrelativelyloweconomicinequalityinlateclassicalAthens.Indeed,itsuggeststhattheworldoftheclassicalGreekcity-statesoverallmayhavebeencharacterizedbyhistoricallylowlevelsofeconomicinequality.Conclusions

TheevidenceforrelativelylowlevelsofinequalityinclassicaleraAthenianwealthandlandholding,Athenianclassicaleranutrition,andarchaictoclassicaleraGreekhousesizeisconsistentwiththepreliminaryconclusion,basedonthepopulationandincomemodeldevelopedhere,ofrelativelylowincomeinequalityinlateclassicalAthens.24Theoverallpictureistolerablyclear:Thehistoricallyhighlevelofpoliticalequality(amongasubstantialportionofadultnativemales)thatcharacterizedmanyGreekcity-states,andthatwasespeciallycharacteristicofdemocraticAthens,ismatchedbyhistoricallylowlevelsofeconomicinequality.Here,Iwillnotattempttodevelopacausalargumentconnectingdemocraticpoliticalequalityandeconomicequality.Buttheprogressivetaxationemployedby

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.16

theAthenianstateinthedemocraticera,whichmeantthatdirecttaxeswereuniquelyleviedontherichestresidents,offersanobviousmechanismforacausalargumentinwhichhighlevelsofpoliticalequalityexplainlowlevelsofeconomicinequality.

RelativelylowAthenianinequality,inacontextofrelativelyhighlevelsofoverallprosperity,providesapotential(ifnecessarilypartial)explanationfortheAthens’recordofoverallsocialstabilityduringthedemocraticera(theobviousexceptionisthecrisisofthelatefifthcenturyBCE).Despitewhatappeartobehistoricallyhighlevelsofchattelslavery,thereisnoevidenceofslaverevoltsatAthens(or,forthatmatter,exceptatSparta,elsewhereinclassicalGreece).Thelackofslaverevoltsmightbeexplained,inpart,bytheevidenceforgoodnutritionamongslaves.Athenianslavesseemnottohavebeenkeptattheedgeofstarvation.Perhapsevenmoreimportantinreducingslaves’incentivetorevoltwasthehopeofmanumission.25Aristotle,whonotoriouslyarguedthatslaverycouldbethenatural(andtherebybest)conditionforsomehumans,alsopromisedinbook7ofthePoliticstoofferadviceonhowslavesoughttobetreated,andsuggestedthatinhisidealpolis“itisbettertoholdout[thechanceof]freedomasarewardforallslaves”(Politics1330a33).Aristotledidnot(inthepreservedcorpus)fulfillthepromisetoexplainexactlyhowslavesshouldbetreatedandwhyitwasbetterforthemtohavethehopeofmanumission.Butwemayguessthatpropertreatmentincludedthechanceforaslaveto“buyhimself”throughsavingsurplusincome,andthatthelessenedthreatofslaveresistance(throughrevoltorinferiorwork)wasamongthereasonsthatAristotlecommendedthepracticeofholdingoutthehopeofmanumissiontoslaves.

Movingupthesocialscale,meticswouldhavemorereasontomigratetoAthens(andtosettlethere)ifwagesweregoodandiftherulesallowedforeconomicadvancement.Likewise,poorercitizenswillhavehadlessreasontoseekpropertyredistributioniftheirwageswerehighenoughtoenablethemtolivereasonablycomfortably,andiftheybelievedthattheirwealthierfellowcitizensweredoingtheirfairshareinpayingtaxesfortheprovisionofimportantpublicgoods.Ifthepoorercitizenshadusedtheirmajorityvotingpowertosettaxratesatanextortionatelevel,thewealthywouldhavemorereasontoseekregimechange.26

SurelysomeAthenianelitesmusthavehopedforadifferentgovernment,oneinwhichtheordinarycitizensdidnotsettherateofelitetaxes.ButrevolutionaryactiontochangethedemocraticgovernmentwouldrequirecoordinatedactionacrosstheranksofeliteAthenians.AsPs-Xenophon(2.20,3.13)hadnotedinthelaterfifthcenturyBCE,manyeliteAthenianschosetocooperateactivelywiththedemocraticregime.ThesameseemstobethecaseinthefourthcenturyBCE.TaxratesarehardlytheonlyfactorthatcameintoplayinregulatingrelationsbetweenthemassofcitizensandtheclassicaleraAthenianelite(Ober1989).Butitappears

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.17

likelythatthetaxrateswere,inthelaterclassicalperiod,overalllowenoughtodiscourageelitesfromcoordinatingonrevolutionaryplanstooverthrowthedemocraticgovernment.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.18

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Zelnick-Abramovitz,Rachel.2005.Notwhollyfree:TheconceptofmanumissionandthestatusofmanumittedslavesintheancientGreekworld.Leiden;Boston:Brill.

------.2009.“Freedslaves,theirstatusandstatecontrolinAncientGreec.”EuropeanReviewofHistory.16(3):303-318.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.22

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.23

Table1.Historicalcomparisonsofincomeinequality

Societyanddate

GiniCoefficient

MeanIncome(inS)

MaximumFeasibleGini

InequalityExtractionRatio(%)

Athens,330BCE 38.0 4.5 77.8 48.9RomanEmpire,14 36.4 2.1 52.6 75England&Wales,1290 35.3 2.1 53 69.2Holland,1561 56.0 3.8 73.4 76.3England&Wales,1688 44.9 4.7 78.8 57.1Holland,1732 61.0 6.8 85.2 71.7Notes:S=subsistenceminimum.Alldata,otherthanAthens,fromMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson2011.NotethatScheidelandFriesen2009estimateahigherGinicoefficientfortheRomanempire,andalowerMeanIncome,whichwouldyieldanIERsohigh(over100)astoimplysomeimperialresidentswerelivingbelowsubsistence,andthusdyingduetodeprivation.GiniCoefficient=Gini1exceptforHolland,forwhichGini1isnotreported,andsoGini2issubstituted.Figure1.Athenianincomeinequality(basedonAppendix).Lorenzcurve.Gini=0.38.

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.24

AppendixTable.Athens,330BCE.Modelofpopulationandincome.group# description estates size grouppop dr/day days dr/yr T/yr T/Yr/group

1 slave1 24000 1 24000 0.25 300 75 0.013 300.002 slave2 24000 1 24000 0.5 300 150 0.025 600.003 slave3 24000 1 24000 0.75 300 225 0.038 900.004 metic1 2000 1 2000 0.5 300 150 0.025 50.005 metic2 2000 1 2000 0.75 300 225 0.038 75.006 metic3 1000 4.5 4500 1 300 300 0.050 50.007 citizen1 5000 4.5 22500 1 300 300 0.050 250.008 slave4 8000 1 8000 1.5 300 450 0.075 600.009 metic4 3750 1 4750 1.5 300 450 0.075 356.2510 metic5 3750 4.5 16875 2 300 600 0.100 375.0011 citizen2 6125 1 6125 1.6 300 480 0.080 490.0012 citizen3 6125 4.5 27563 1.8 300 540 0.090 551.2513 citizen4 6125 4.5 27563 2.2 300 660 0.110 673.7514 citizen5 6125 4.5 27563 2.4 300 720 0.120 735.0015 metic6 65 4.5 293 1000 0.167 10.8316 meitc7 60 4.5 270 2000 0.333 20.0017 metic8 50 4.5 225 4000 0.667 33.3318 metic9 40 4.5 180 6000 1.000 40.0019 metic10 30 4.5 135 8000 1.333 40.0020 metic11 25 4.5 113 10000 1.667 41.6721 metic12 25 4.5 113 15000 2.500 62.5022 metic13 25 4.5 113 20000 3.333 83.3323 metic14 10 4.5 45 30000 5.000 50.0024 metic15 5 4.5 23 40000 6.667 33.3325 citizen6 200 4.5 900 1000 0.167 33.3326 citizen7 175 4.5 788 2000 0.333 58.3327 citizen8 150 4.5 675 4000 0.667 100.0028 citizen9 100 4.5 450 6000 1.000 100.0029 citizen10 75 4.5 338 8000 1.333 100.0030 citizen11 50 4.5 225 10000 1.667 83.3331 citizen12 40 4.5 180 15000 2.500 100.0032 citizen13 30 4.5 135 20000 3.333 100.0033 citizen14 10 4.5 45 30000 5.000 50.0034 citizen15 5 4.5 23 40000 6.667 33.33

Total

226703

7180Notes:dr=drachmas.T=Talent(6000drachmas).

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.25

Ober.Athenianinequality.EvidenceandModels.Notes1Atheniandemocracy:Hansen1999;democracyvaluesanddemocracy’scritics:Ober1998.AnabbreviatedversionofsomepartsofthispaperappearsinOber2016,section2.MythankstoWalterScheidel,ClaireTaylor,MarkPyzyk,andNikolaosKyriazisfordiscussionoftheissuesinthispaper.

2Forrecent,contrastingviewsofandapproachestoeconomicinequalityinclassicalGreece,seeRoubineau2015,arguingthateveryGreekpoliswasgroundedindeepsocialstatusinequalities,resultingintheimpoverishmentofmany;Patriquin2015,arguingforminimalinequalityamongcitizensatAthens,becausedemocracycouldonlyariseinasocietywithonlyasmallgapbetweenrichandpoor.Neitherattemptsthesortofmodelingofferedhere.

3InadditiontoOber2015b,recentandimportantbooksaddressingGreekeconomicgrowthintheclassicaleraincludeActon2014;Bresson2015;Harris,Lewis,andWoolmer2015.Taylor(forthcoming)addressesthequestionofeconomicinequalityinclassicalAthens.

4VanWees2011discussesawell-knownpassageinAthenaeus272c,thatrecordsthefollowingfiguresforAthens’population,sometimeafter317BCE:Athenaioi:21,000;metoikoi10,000;oiketai:400,000.VanWees’interpretationofthepassageisatoddswithallpreviousscholarship.VanWeesclaimsthatthatthepassage(asithascomedowninthemanuscripttradition)accuratelyrecordsacarefulcensusofresidentsofAthens,putativelyconductedbyDemetriusofPhaleron.HeproposesthatthemetoikoiincludemanydisenfranchisedAthenians(seebelow).Healsoproposesthatthefigureforoiketaiincludesabout100,000nativewomenandchildren,therestbeingslaves.Noneofthisseemsplausible:interalia,atotalpopulationof431,000wouldyieldapersquarekmdensityofover170persons,whichismuchtoohighforAttica,inanerawhenAthenswasnolongeranimperialcapitalorthecenterofAegeantrade.SinceAthenianagriculturalproductivitywaslimited,inordertofeedsuchapopulation(ca.10slavestoeveryfreehousehold),thenon-agriculturalsectoroftheeconomyofAthenswouldhavetobeconsiderablymoreproductivethananyhistorianantiquityhaseverdaredsuggest.ExtrapolatingthesefigurestootherregionsofGreece(giventhatthereisnoreasontoassumethatAthenspost317BCEwasvastlymoredenselypopulated)wouldyieldpopulationfiguresfarhigherthanthehighestestimatesproposedbyancienthistorians.Atleastforoiketai,theAthenaeusfiguremustberegardedaswrong,asmostpreviousscholarshiponthepassageassumed.Theotherfiguresinthepassage,eveniftheywereaccurateforpost-317BCE,needhavelittlebearingonthefiguresin330BCE,giventhedramaticchangesinAthens’fortunesafter322BCE.

5Theseareverygeneralcategories;forfiner-graineddistinctionsamongAtheniancategoriesofpersons(inlawandsocialrelations)seeKamen2013.

6Ancientdemography:Scheidel2007;HolleranandPudsey2011.OntheinvisibilityofAthenianslavesinthearchaeologicalrecord,seeMorris1998b.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.26

7Cartledge1985:35,seemsreasonable:60,000-100,000“accordingtothemostcautiousestimates.”Kameninprogress:ch.1n..37surveysadozenrespectedclassicalscholars’estimatesofslavenumbersinclassicalAthens.Estimatesareforvariousdatesinthelatefifthtolatefourthcentury,andaresometimesstatedintermsofmaximaorminima.Forwhatitisworth,themeanoftheestimatescomesto84,400;themedianis78,000.Forthelowcount:Jones1964.Highcount:Taylor2001;vanWees2011.ForthebackgroundconditionsthatmadeGreekandRomanslaveryprofitable,seeScheidel2005,2008;Silver2006.

8MeticsinAthenswithdiscussionofpossiblenumbers:Whitehead1977;Kamen2013;Akrigg2015.VanWees2011:104,arguesthateven10,000meticsis“implausiblyhigh,”basedonanover-readingofThucydides2.31.2.VanWeesusestheThucydidespassagetoproduceacitizen-to-meticratioof5:1.ThatratioisinturnimaginedtobeconstantfromthefifththroughthelatefourthcenturyBCE.Theargumentfortheratioisstrained,anditsassumedinvarianceovertime,isimplausible.MetoikiaasaninstitutionoutsideAthens:Whitehead1984.

9OnAtheniantaxation,seeLyttkens2012;Ober2015b;Fawcett2016.10SeefurtherScheidel2010,Allen2009.11Manumission:Zelnick-Abramson2005,2009;Akrigg2015.12Thelowerfigureofca.400liturgicalestates:Davies1971;thehigherfigureofca.1200liturgicalestates:Hansen1999:110-115.Duetothesimplifyingassumptionofequalwithin-groupincome,thecutoffbetweengroups14(citizen5:annualhouseholdincome720dr)and25(citizen6:annualhouseholdincome1000dr)isartificial.Ancientsourcesreferringto1200citizensintheliturgicalclass(onwhichseeHansen,above)canbeaccommodatedbyassumingthatafewhundredofthewealthiestgroup14householdsweresubjecttopayingliturgicaltaxes.

13ThederivedGiniis“Gini1,”whichestimatesbetween-groupinequality,assumingwithin-groupinequalitytobezero.SeeMilanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson2011:260forthedistinctionbetweenGini1andGini2;astheynote,thedifferenceisverysmallformostofthehistoricalsocietiesintheirstudygroup.

The“optimistic”modelinOber2015b:Table4.4yieldedanincomeGiniof40.14ScheidelandFriesen2009:84–85.Bywayofearlymoderncomparisons,Milanovic,Lindert,andWilliamson2011(Table2)reporttheincomeGiniforTuscanyin1427=46;Hollandin1561=56;EnglandandWalesin1688=45;Francein1788=56.

15USCensusBureau,IncomeDistributionto$250,000orMoreforHouseholds2013.Accessed02/02/2016.

16SeeAlvaredoetal.2013andthedatacollectedinFacundoAlvaredo,AnthonyB.Atkinson,ThomasPiketty,EmmanuelSaez,andGabrielZucman,TheWorldWealthandIncomeDatabase,http://www.wid.world,02/02/2016

17Trierarchicliturgyamount:Davies1971:xxi-xxiv;Pritchard2012n.71.Gabrielsen1994discussestheevidenceforfinancingwarshipsindetail.Hisfinalestimateforthenumberofactiveservicetrierarchiesperyear,60,islowerthanmyestimate,buthisestimateforthecostoftrierarchyishigherthanmyestimate,at6000-7000dr(1994:216).Thetotaltrierarchictaxburdencomestoroughlythesameamount:60-70T.

Ober.Inequality.Evidence&models.December2016.27

18See,furtherHansen1999:110-115.Iestimatefestivalliturgiesat25T;annualnormaleisphoraat10T;andextraordinarytaxesat10T.

19See,furtherGabrielsen1986;Christ1990;Cohen1992;Kaiser2007.20Kronforthcoming.ItisimportanttokeepinmindthattheoverallGiniwealthindexforAtheniansocietyasawhole,includingslavesandmetics,wouldsurelybesubstantiallyhigher—IcannotsayhowmuchhigherbecauseIknownowaytocalculatethewealthofmeticsorslaves.Wealthinequality,asmeasuredbytheGinicoefficient,istypicallymuchhigherthanincomeinequality.

21Foxhall1992,2002;Osborne1992.22Morris1998a:235-36.Quote,ibid.p.36.AsClaireTaylorpointedouttome,MorrismisreportedtheGinicoefficientas38.2-38.6;butMorris’generalpointremainsvalid.

23Kron2014,forthcoming.ForOlynthoshouses,Kron2014:129table2calculatestheGinicoefficientat14,considerablylowerthanlaterHellenisticandRomaneraGreekcities.Cf.Bintliff2012,ch.13.

24Athens,andtheclassicalGreekworldgenerally,appearbeoutliersinthelong-termglobalhistoricalpatternofhighinequality(exceptintheaftermathofmajorwar,naturalcatastrophe,plague,orstatecollapse):Scheidel2017.

25SeeRoubineau2015,ch.10.26Fortheassociationbetweenlevelsoftaxationindemocraticsocietiesandsocialassumptionsaboutfairness,seenowScheveandStasavage2016.