Is the EU democratic?

Moana Genevey

The EU and democracy are closely related. Indeed, Article 2 of the Treaty of European

Union defines democracy as a founding value of the Union and Article 7 provides sanctions

against Member States which do not respect this value. Furthermore, in order to acquire

membership, the Copenhagen criteria require the future Member State to be built upon

democratic governance. Regarding its foreign policy, the Union makes the promotion of

democracy towards third countries a central objective. Finally, the EU rests on an

institutional and political framework in which the vocabulary employed can remind some

basic aspects of a democratic state: while it has a Parliament and an elected President, the

Union is also endowed with a Court of Justice and a Charter of Fundamental Rights and its

inhabitants are considered, since the Treaty of Maastricht, as citizens. However, the

discussion here is not about the link between the EU and democracy but whether or not the

EU is democratic. The complex task of asserting EU’s democratic aspect lies on its unique

nature and the challenging analysis of its integration process. According to Giandomenico

Majone, the Union is a ‘regulatory state’ only aiming to correct market failures in a purely

economic goal. As the political considerations must be separated from the economic ones,

applying classic democratic standards to the EU is not relevant (Majone, 1998). In his

analysis, Majone can be considered as both right and wrong. As a matter of fact, the idea of

the inadequacy of classic democratic standards to qualify the Union seems accurate. The

principle of ‘democracy’ cannot be strictly transcribed to the sui generis organisation.

Nevertheless, where Majone can be considered as misleading is in his idea of separated

political and economic consideration for the European Union. This opinion can be overcome

by the major ‘spillover’ operated by the EU. While the European Union cannot be considered

as an integrated political system, it has extended its competences in an increasing number of

policy fields, from environmental to foreign policies through to agricultural and social

policies. Its various competencies and impacts imply a real reflection over the democratic

aspect of its polity.

This question refers to the issue of the ‘democratic deficit’, popularised in 1979 by David

Marquand in his book Parliament for Europe. The term has then been developed,

challenged, discussed or even denied, so much so that it now encompasses a wide range of

issues and apply differently to different parts of the EU. In this essay, it will be referred to

the issue of democratic accountability and, mostly, to the issue of legitimacy as it appears to

be a central problem that the EU is currently facing (notably with the rise of euro-

skepticism). This issue will be studied at two levels, echoing two approaches of the

democratic deficit and concerning two sides of a system of government. First, the

democratic deficit must be studied at the institutional level, or the ‘governing side’. The

effect of the EU on the Member States will be issued through the problematic of the raise of

the national executive power over the national legislative power. A second issue will be

more ‘horizontal’, regarding the legitimacy of the EU institutions and focusing on the

Parliament, as it is a key institution in the democratic debate. Then, the democratic deficit

will be studied through the socio-psychological perspective , or the ‘governed side’. Lying on

the theory that, to be democratic, the EU citizens needs to first have a common European

awareness and then possess the tools to impact on the EU, these two problems will be

addressed and put into perspective.

Regarding the institutional democratic aspect in the EU, two perspectives of the

Union will be discussed: the respect of national parliamentary democracies (that is to say, a

fair system of checks and balances between national executive and legislative instances

regarding their impact on EU decision-making) and the legitimacy and powers of the

European Parliament.

In the first perspective, there is a clear intergovernmental prism, stating that, to be

democratic, the EU must strictly respect the democratic institutional framework of its

Member States. The latter are considered as central actors of the EU, and their national

models of democracy, forming part of their national sovereignty, must not be infringed. One

of the key aspects of this approach is to consider the widespread model of democratic

parliamentary as a central standard to respect. This model lies on the accountability of

national executive powers based on the legislative powers approval. But, for Daniel Wincott,

‘The EU perverts democracy’ regarding ’the loosing of the domestic constraints on national

governments’ (Wincott, 1998 : 412, 427). This general critic of the lack of accountability of

national executive powers due to the EU can be illustrated by the practice of the Council of

the EU. As its meetings were, for a long time, held in secrecy and its official documents were

not accessible to public, national governments could escape legislative control on their

decisions (Héritier, 2003 : 823). Whereas Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties have increased the

Council’s transparency, its full accessibility is still a debated issue (Böstrom, 2009).

Moreover, the central role of the COREPER in the work of this institution can be seen as a

complete detachment of the national parliaments regarding the Council (Jolly, 2007: 48)

while the Commission has been depicted by spending ‘much time and energy in recent years

trying to bypass national governments’ (Christiansen, 1997 : 85). One clear critic of this

approach on the democratic deficit in the EU has been formulated by formulated by Andrew

Moravcsik and then developed by Simon Hix. The author states that, in Europe, the ‘most

directly accountable politicians’ are ‘national governments, not national parliaments’ (Hix,

2008 : 72). The scholar pictures European governments as key-players in national and

political processes, especially regarding the elections system where the main goal is to elect

a party and a leader through the constitution of a parliament. Whereas this vision can be

contested, because of its global scope eluding some national specificities, his vision of

national governments as accountable policy-makers at the EU level must be taken into

account, especially since the EU has its own legislative institution: the European Parliament.

This statement leads to examine the legitimacy and powers of the European

Parliament. First, it seems relevant to underline that Moravcik has highlighted the important

role of this institution as a tool of ‘direct accountability’ for the EU to the Member States and

their citizens (Moravcik, 2002 : 611). However, while he emphasizes the central and

indispensable function of national accountability for the democratic aspect of the EU, he is

not identifying the Parliament as a source of direct legitimacy for the Union. It can be

explained by its Liberal Intergovernmental prism and, consequently, its specific perception of

the European Union. Nevertheless, the question of the Parliament’s legitimacy must be

addressed. In the EU framework, other institutions have been accused of having a

consistent lack of legitimacy. For instance, the Commission can be seen as fundamentally

lacking legitimacy as it has a great role in the EU while being composed of executively

nominated European commissioners (Peters, 1999 : 92). Regarding the Council with an

intergovernmental perspective, the implementation of the Qualify Majority Voting can be

seen as a lack of democratic legitimacy for the institution as some Member States’ interests

could be ignored during the bargaining process (Menon and Peet, 2010 : 2). Another

example of institution which legitimacy is contested is the European Court of Justice, which

was ‘attacked for its teleological pro-integrationist bias’ (Chryssochoou, 2010 : 380). The role

of the court in the extensive interpretation of the Treaties can be criticized as it has

considerably extended the field of EU law while having no democratic legitimacy. However,

the debate surrounding the Court is more a theoretical question about the essence of law

and the ‘government of judges’ that impact on every legal order, than a debate

fundamentally linked to the democratic deficit in the EU. Nevertheless, concerning the

European Parliament, its democratic legitimacy seems clearly recognised, especially since

1979 and the implementation of direct election of European deputies by the citizens. But,

looking at the powers of the Parliament, it can be argued that this legitimacy is limited. It is

unquestionable that, since the 1980’s, the European Parliament has acquired larger weight

on the functioning of the EU. While its new powers concerning Commission’s composition

has led to change José Manuel Barroso’s team in 2004 (Scully, 2010 : 166), the

implementation of the co-decision procedure by the Maastricht Treaty –strongly reinforced

by the Lisbon Treaty– led Andrew Duff to the conclusion that the Parliament ‘has now come

of age as a law-making body (Duff, 1994 : 31). Nevertheless, this statement needs to be

discussed, as the European Parliament does not have a full parliamentary power. The

institution is only sharing its legislative competencies with the Commission through the

Framework Agreement (in terms of drafting) and with the Council (in terms of decision).

Furthermore, the Parliament’s legislative competence does not cover all the EU policy field.

Regarding the Common Foreign and Security, for example, the institution only has

consultative and informative competences, this policy field being only intergovernmental.

Moreover, the questionable legitimacy of the European Parliament depends on other criteria

than only institutional ones, and its political and popular impact needs to be put in a broader

perspective.

Thus, solely supporting the analysis of the EU’s democratic deficit on institutional

arguments may lead to an incomplete understanding of the issue. As the notion of

‘democratic’ implies a form of relation between the government and the governed, it seems

accurate to continue this discussion on the European citizens’ perspective. In this manner,

two questions must be examined : the contested European political community and the

possibilities of “bridges” between EU citizens and the Union.

First and foremost, it seems necessary to assess that the ‘spillover’ process from a

strictly economic Union guaranteeing basic rights to its workers, to a multi-level policies

Union guaranteeing fundamental rights to its citizens, did not lead to the replacement of

national identities by an European one (Fligstein, Polyakova and Santholtz, 2012 : 106). With

no European supranational identity, it seems difficult to picture the existence of an

European people and thus, the EU cannot be considered as a democracy since ‘if there is no

collective self, there can be no collective self-determination’ (Jolly, 2007 : 52). However,

according to Dimitris N. Crhyssochoou, it is possible for a polity to be democratic and to rely

on ‘no demo but many demoi’ (Chryssochoou, 2001). As a matter of fact, the motto of the

EU, ‘united in diversity’, illustrates this plurality of European identities reunited under the

same system of government. But, can the EU be considered as a democratic polity reuniting

diverse peoples? To Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, this idea implies two necessities : the

governed must ‘see themselves as part of a democratic whole’ and they must be given ‘the

means to mark their impact in EU governance’ (Chryssochoou, 2010 : 382). Concerning the

first statement, the issue is complex and relies, first, on the erosion of the ‘permissive

consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). Indeed, from 1990 to 2002, the EU population

seeing EU membership as a ‘good thing’ decreased from 70% to 53% (Down and Wilson,

2008 : 28). Furthermore, the Euro-crisis increased popular dissatisfaction with the EU, as the

austerity measures imposed by Brussels to the Member States are felt as unjust and

illegitimate by the most affected populations, especially in Greece. Nevertheless, before the

economic crisis had hit the EU, Yves Mény already theorised this lack of legitimacy’s feeling

by explaining that ‘Democratic citizens have the feeling that their votes matter less and less,

that parties in power do not deliver what they promised while in opposition, that policies do

not fit their needs and aspirations.’ (Mény, 2003 : 4). Even if, according to Simon Hix, this

feeling is not necessarily justified and is exploited by conservative parties to win some

popular support (Hix, 2008 : 75), the lack of popular legitimacy towards the EU must be

taken into account. This feeling is also nurtured by a general absence of an European public

sphere. Thus, Thomas Risse explained, using Junger Gerhars study on the subject, that,

concerning the media coverage of ‘Europe’, ‘European Institutions’ and ‘European Affairs’,

the main result is that those issues received the lowest ‘media attention in comparison to all

other (…) issues areas’ (Risse, 2003 : 2). Furthermore, a 2009 report of European Research

Area on the national media coverage of the EU showed that ‘today, the EU is perceived as

‘cold’, technical and too complex’ (European Research Area, 2009 : 3). And even if,

nowadays, the media coverage of the EU has been increasing, it is mainly linked to the crisis,

amplifying the negative perception of the Union. Those two criteria combined are clearly

challenging the idea that EU citizens could have a sense of belonging to the Union. Besides,

these psychological criteria are undermined by political ones. Indeed, in term of political

representation, the system of Euro parties is particularly complex and, during elections for

the European Parliament, Anand Menon and John Peet underlined the fact that different

national parties, while belonging to the same European political groups, ‘often stand on

different values and campaign on different platforms’ (Menon and Peet (2010) : 3). This

statement rests on the shared idea that European elections, ran nationally, have, in practice,

little to do with European issues. Candidates and parties focus most of the time on national

questions and elude what should be the core of their concern. It can be explained by the fact

that national political parties and leaders use the electoral opportunity of European

elections to shape their national political popularity and agenda (Franklin, 2006 : 228).

Therefore, with the context of popular legitimacy’s erosion towards the EU, the lack of

positive representation of the Union by the media and the national focus made by parties on

the only direct electoral process between the EU and the citizens, it seems highly difficult to

approve the existence of a European sense of belonging to a democratic whole.

However, if the European feeling of belonging can be challenged by several

statements, it seems accurate to argue that EU citizens may possess tools to impact on EU

governance. The first obvious tool is the representative instrument provided by the direct

election of EU parliamentarians. Whereas the legislative powers of the Parliament may seem

limited, the growing importance of this institution shall not be neglected. In this view, having

a direct impact on its composition can be seen as a clear asset for EU citizens, in a

democratic perspective. Nevertheless, if this form of citizen influence towards the EU can

seem theoretically appealing, the facts remain disappointing. From 1979 to 2009, the

participation rate to European elections has been systematically decreasing starting from

67% to 43% (Menon and Peet, 2010 : 3). This apparent lack of interest for EU elections can

contribute to reinforce the idea that the European Parliament’s legitimacy is questionable.

Another interesting tool contributing to build a bridge between the EU and its citizens is the

use of lobbies and interests groups. These two types of groups are considered as the

composition of the European civil society. By their close cooperation with the EU

institutions, and particularly with the Commission, they fully contribute to the Union policy-

making process in providing precise expertise which helps improving the efficiency of EU

policies. As Brussels is the city concentrating the most important number of civil society

representatives in the world – more than Washington – (Stares, 2011), the Commission is

using this profusion of actors as a way to enhance democracy, which can be illustrated by

the 2001 White Paper on European Governance (Eising and Lehringer, 2010 : 194). Indeed,

the democratic effect of interest groups has been highlighted by many scholars. According to

Justin Greenwood, civil society representatives ‘help the EU to acquire more policy

competencies by bringing irresistible demands to member state doorsteps, and assist in the

popular identification with the European Union’ (Greenwood, 2004: 146). Imogen Sudbery,

in the same approach, sees the development of the cooperation between EU institutions

and interest groups as a way to reduce ‘the structural barriers to citizen involvement in the

EU’ by stimulating debate between citizens and the EU, by intensifying the influence of those

citizens on policy-making, and, finally, by achieving their identification to the EU policies

(Sudbery, 2003: 77). Here, the relation between civil society and the EU is seen as a tool to

impact on the Union as well as a way to increase citizen’s interest towards it, and thus, as a

mean to meliorate the legitimacy of the EU. While some have criticized this system for its

lack of transparency (Kallas, 2005 : 6), it is the European Parliament’s critical comment that

seems more stimulating to put this issue into perspective. In its resolution on the

Commission white paper on European Governance, the Parliament stated that, on the basis

that civil society was ‘inevitably sectoral’, it could not be legitimate, arguing that ‘the

European and national parliaments’ were ‘the basis for a European system with democratic

legitimacy’ (European Parliament, 2001 : points 8, 11a). Here, the Parliament has a clear

view on how democratic principles should apply to the EU, in relation to its vision of the

institutional structure and nature of the Union. However, the legitimacy of interest groups

and lobbies can be justified if the EU is analysed as a form of multi-level governance. Civil

society representatives can be seen as subnational actors legitimately impacting on the EU

institutions, a form of transnational network advocated and supported by an autonomous

Commission.

To Conclude, in an institutional point of view, the classic argument criticizing the shift

of national power implied by the EU has been rejected while the limited legitimacy of the

Parliament has been highlighted. Regarding the citizen’s point of view, it has been argued

that the EU suffers a clear lack of popular legitimacy whereas the citizens progressively turn

their back to the ‘traditional’ tool of representation and have the opportunity to enter

another dimension of democracy.

Regarding the sui generis nature of the EU, two solutions seem to be at stake to democratize

the EU. The first one is to go into further integration, while accepting the fact that the EU

lies on ‘no demo and many demoi’, through the enhancement of the representative

institution (the European Parliament), while developing the European public sphere and

monitoring a refund of the Europarties in order to create a real European political life. This

task seems gigantic and supposes to lead a tough battle against the rise of euroscepticism.

The other solution is to manage the democratic issue through the prism of Multi-Level

Governance, which implies handling the link between EU and citizens in terms of civil

society. Then, the practice of interest groups must be centralized and developed and the

conception of a ‘democratic’ Europe, completely extracted from its traditional frame.

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multiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1),

pp 73-90.

Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (2010), ‘Europe’s Contested Democracy’ in Cini Michelle and

Pérez-Solorzano Borragan Nieve (eds), European Union Politics, 3rd edn, Oxford : OUP, pp

377-389.

Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (2001), ‘The Nature of Democracy in the European Union and the

Limits of Treaty Reform’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 10(3): pp 245–64.

Down, Ian and Wilson, Carole J. (2008) : ‘From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘ Permissive

Dissensus’, Acta Politica, 43, pp 26-49.

Duff, Andrew (1994) : ‘Building a Parliamentary Europe’, Government and Opposition, 29 (2):

pp 147-65.

Eising, Rainer and Lehringer, Sonja (2010) : ‘Interest Groups and the European Union’ in Cini

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(ed.), European Union : Power and Policy-Making, 3rd ed, Oxon : Routledge. pp 227-246.

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Nationalism and European Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, pp 106-122.

Greenwood, Justin (2004). ‘The search for input legitimacy through organised civil society in

the EU’, Transnational Associations, 2, pp 145-156

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access to information’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (5), pp. 814-833

Hix, Simon (2008) : What’s Wrong With The European Union and How to Fix It, Cambridge :

Polity Press.

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Change in the European Community. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Majone, Giandomenico (1998) : ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’ : the Question of Standards’,

European Law Journal, 4 (1), 5-28.

Mény, Yves (2003) : ‘De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges’, Journal

of Common Market Studies, 41(1), pp 1-13.

Menon Anand and Peet John (2010), Beyond the European Parliament : Rethinking the EU’s

democratic legitimacy, London : Center for European Reform.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2002) 'In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the

European Union', Journal of Common Market Studies, pp 603-624.

Peters, Guy B. (1992), ‘Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Union’, in

Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-politics. Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European

Community. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Risse, Thomas (2003) : ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and

Empirical Indicators’, (paper presentend to the Annual Meeting of the European Union

Studies Association (EUSA), Nashville TN, March 27-30).

Scully, Roger (2010) : ‘The European Parliament’ in Cini Michelle and Pérez-Solorzano

Borragan Nieve (eds), European Union Politics, 3rd edn, Oxford : OUP, pp 162-175.

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accessed on the 7th of January 2013 :

<http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1156/brussels-a-corporate-lobbying-

paradise>

Sudbery, Imogen (2003) : ‘Bridging the Legitimity Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to

Bring the Union Closer to its Citizens.’, Collegium Spring, 26, pp 75-95.

Wincott, Daniel (1998) : ‘Does the European Union Pervert Democracy? Questions of

Democracy in New Constitutionalist Thought of the Future of Europe’, European Law

Journal, 4(4), pp 411-428.

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Böstrom, Charlotte (2009) : ‘Lisbon Treaty Creates Uncertain Future for EU Transparency’,

Europe in the World, accessed on the 4th of January 2013 :

<http://www.schoolvoorjournalistiek.com/europe/?p=2071>

Charrad, Kristina (2006) : Lobbying the European Union, Westphälische Wilhems-Universität

Münster : Nachwuchsgruppe Europäische Zivilgesellschaft.

Christiansen, Thomas (1997): ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and

multiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1),

pp 73-90.

Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (2010), ‘Europe’s Contested Democracy’ in Cini Michelle and

Pérez-Solorzano Borragan Nieve (eds), European Union Politics, 3rd edn, Oxford : OUP, pp

377-389.

Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (2001), ‘The Nature of Democracy in the European Union and the

Limits of Treaty Reform’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 10(3): pp 245–64.

Down, Ian and Wilson, Carole J. (2008) : ‘From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘ Permissive

Dissensus’, Acta Politica, 43, pp 26-49.

Duff, Andrew (1994) : ‘Building a Parliamentary Europe’, Government and Opposition, 29 (2):

pp 147-65.

Eising, Rainer and Lehringer, Sonja (2010) : ‘Interest Groups and the European Union’ in Cini

Michelle and Pérez-Solorzano Borragan Nieve (eds), European Union Politics, 3rd edn, Oxford

: OUP, pp 189-206.

European Parliament (2001) : EP Resolution on the Commission White Paper on European

Governance, A-5-03-99/2001

European Research Area (2009) : ‘ Policy Brief, Communication in Crisis : Europe and the

Media’, accessed on the 6th of January 2013 :

<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ssh/docs/emediate-bursi_en.pdf>

Franklin, Mark (2006) : ‘European Elections and the European Voter’ in Richardson, Jeremy

(ed.), European Union : Power and Policy-Making, 3rd ed, Oxon : Routledge. pp 227-246.

Fligstein, Neil, Polyakova, Alina and Sandholtz, Wayne (2012) : ‘European Integration,

Nationalism and European Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, pp 106-122.

Greenwood, Justin (2004). ‘The search for input legitimacy through organised civil society in

the EU’, Transnational Associations, 2, pp 145-156

Héritier, Adrienne (2003) : ‘Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and

access to information’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (5), pp. 814-833

Hix, Simon (2008) : What’s Wrong With The European Union and How to Fix It, Cambridge :

Polity Press.

Jolly, Mette E. (2007) : The European Union and the People, Oxford : OUP.

Kallas, Siim (2005) : The Need for a European Transparency Initiative, SPEECH/05/130, the

European Foundation for Management, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham, 3 March.

Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart A. (1970). Europe's Would-be Polity. Patterns of

Change in the European Community. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Majone, Giandomenico (1998) : ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’ : the Question of Standards’,

European Law Journal, 4 (1), 5-28

Mancini, Giusepe F. (1998) : ‘Europe : the case for Statehood’, European Law Journal, 4(1),

pp 29-42.

Mény, Yves (2003) : ‘De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges’, Journal

of Common Market Studies, 41(1), pp 1-13.

Menon Anand and Peet John (2010), Beyond the European Parliament : Rethinking the EU’s

democratic legitimacy, London : Center for European Reform.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2002) 'In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the

European Union', Journal of Common Market Studies, pp 603-624.

Peters, Guy B. (1992), ‘Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Union’, in

Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-politics. Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European

Community. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Risse, Thomas (2003) : ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and

Empirical Indicators’, (paper presentend to the Annual Meeting of the European Union

Studies Association (EUSA), Nashville TN, March 27-30).

Scully, Roger (2010) : ‘The European Parliament’ in Cini Michelle and Pérez-Solorzano

Borragan Nieve (eds), European Union Politics, 3rd edn, Oxford : OUP, pp 162-175.

Stares, Justin (2011) : ‘Brussels : a ‘corporate lobbying paradise’’, Public Service Europe,

accessed on the 7th of January 2013 :

<http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1156/brussels-a-corporate-lobbying-

paradise>

Sudbery, Imogen (2003) : ‘Bridging the Legitimity Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to

Bring the Union Closer to its Citizens.’, Collegium Spring, 26, pp 75-95.

Wincott, Daniel (1998) : ‘Does the European Union Pervert Democracy? Questions of

Democracy in New Constitutionalist Thought of the Future of Europe’, European Law

Journal, 4(4), pp 411-428.