improving third-party decisions at choice points: a cyprus case study

Benjamin J. Broome is professor of communication at the Hugh Downs School of Human Commu-nication, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 871205, Tempe, Ariz. 85287. Email: [email protected] S. Murray is associate director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts(PARC) and professor of practice in international relations at the Maxwell School, Syracuse Univer-sity, Syracuse, N.Y. 13244. Email: [email protected].

0748-4526/02/0100-0075/0 © 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation Negotiation Journal January 2002 75

Case Analysis

Improving Third-Party Decisions at Choice Points: A Cyprus Case Study

Benjamin J. Broome and John S. Murray

Third parties are often required to make process decisions under consider-able psychological pressure, within the stressful view of interested parties,often with high stakes and inadequate information, on very short notice,and without an opportunity for extended research or even much reflection.Therefore, a valuable goal in preparing for intervention is to develop theability to spot patterns or cues in the context of the dispute that can imme-diately suggest techniques or process options that could be successful. Thisessay focuses on conditions at important choice points in an interventionand the third-party decisions made in response. It discusses how third par-ties make decisions on process issues and suggests ways to learn how tomake better decisions. Next, it applies this decision framework to an actualintervention, using an effort by a co-author to build interaction betweenthe Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus during the mid-1990s.Finally, the authors jointly evaluate the Cyprus experience to capturelessons learned for improving third-party conflict resolution practice.

Third-party decisions can often make the difference between agreementand no agreement, between a sound agreement and a temporary settlement,or between a satisfying negotiation process and a tension-filled confronta-tion. These decisions can strongly influence the progress that disputing

76 Broome and Murray Improving Third-Party Decisions

parties make toward resolving their problems, the quality of a resulting solu-tion, the success of eventual implementation, and the warmth of anycontinuing relationships.

As third-party professionals, we search for better ways to help dis-putants establish a negotiation process that is fair, efficient, satisfying, andeffective. Improving our decisions is a key to achieving this objective. We donot make decisions randomly, but as calculated responses to what we per-ceive as relevant conditions at the point of choice. Recognizing the closerelationship between these conditions and our responses to them may be astep toward improving third-party decision making.

Much has been written that describes negotiation and mediationprocesses, records third-party actions and their successful or sometimes notso successful consequences, highlights characteristics that influence out-comes, and designs useful prescriptive tools to help third parties make gooddecisions (see, e.g., Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Kolb and Williams 2000;Kriesberg 1998; Fisher 1997; Moore 1996; Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider1994). Less attention has been given to identifying important choice pointsthat third parties face and defining what conditions at that point call forwhich third-party decision. In the course of an intervention, third partiesinvariably face critical times or events where their decision to initiate or omitcertain activities, or to interject (or not) a new line of thinking, has leveragewith the parties and a significant influence on the eventual outcome. Thesecritical times or events are “choice points,” and the conditions that existamong the parties and in the context at those points are what inform third-party decisions.

The often pivotal link between the conditions at the choice points andthe decisions that third parties make in response is our focus in this essay.First, we discuss how third parties make decisions on process issues and sug-gest ways that will help us learn to make better decisions. Next, we applythis decision framework to an actual intervention, an effort to build interac-tion between citizen activists in the Greek and Turkish communities inCyprus during the mid-1990s. Third-party professionals frequently assistunofficial participants in conducting activities that are intended to bridgebetween communities or groups that are enmeshed in protracted, deep-rooted and often violent conflict. In selecting as our case application anexample of unofficial interaction in Cyprus, we have benefited from morethan two decades of scholarship and practice in the field of unofficial con-flict resolution (Kelman 1995, 1973; Fisher 1988, 1983; Burton 1969). Weconclude with a joint evaluation of the Cyprus experience to capture lessonslearned for improving third-party conflict resolution practice.

A Decision FrameworkKey choice points in an intervention are windows for understanding howconflict resolution professionals make good decisions. Practitioners facemany choice points during a typical intervention. For example, who should

Negotiation Journal January 2002 77

we interview to design an effective process? What information is essential tothis design? Should the parties meet initially together or separately? What is agood agenda for the first gathering? How can we turn expressions of anger,fear and frustration into constructive steps for resolving differences? Whenare the parties ready to consider options for solving their problems? Would abrainstorming format be useful at this time? Will a single-text process helpthe parties at this point move toward agreement? What follow-up steps cansupport smooth implementation of an agreement by the parties?

These and other process questions are typically faced by third-partyprofessionals under conditions of serious time pressure, often with highstakes and inadequate information, and with extra stress added by conflict-ing parties who watch closely, anxiously awaiting a favorable response.

A recent study in cognitive psychology focuses on decision making byprofessionals under conditions calling for quick assessments of situationsthat require immediate action.1 Under these conditions, the study suggests, aprofessional makes decisions by identifying recognizable patterns or cueswithin a dynamic situation, comparing these patterns to what he or sheexpects to find, evaluating them in relation to feasible goals or objectives ofthe task, and then applying the first best option that comes to mind.2

Facilitators and mediators, when making process decisions, fall neatlywithin the professional group that this study discusses. We observe disputingbehavior, identify familiar and meaningful patterns or cues, compare thesepatterns with what we expect to find with parties at this stage of the con-flict, review the cues against the goal of achieving a good outcome, andselect the first best response that comes to mind based on our mental simu-lation of how it would play out if we actually selected it.3 In other words, wemake decisions based on intuition and experience.

If we use intuition and experience to make process decisions, the bestway to improve those decisions, or to continue to make good ones consis-tently, is to accumulate more experience and invest time in learning from it.We already look to experience as a leading teacher in the field. Trainers inconflict resolution use role plays and simulation exercises as a primary learn-ing mode. Many state mediation programs now require an apprenticeshipbefore a newly trained person can assume the role of mediator. Professionaljournals in conflict studies welcome contributions from practitioners whohave examples — stories — of what has worked in the field. These programsand writings typically provide a general description of the situation, theactions of the third party, and the normally beneficial consequences of third-party action. They rarely focus on critical choice points or the patterns orcues that direct us toward more effective decisions.

Stories — or case histories — are packaged experiences. The power ofstories lies in describing experience that offers information about the mean-ingful patterns or cues to look for in a disputing situation and how differentthird-party decisions at these choice points contributed, or posed obstacles,


to a good outcome. Stories can be an important road to improved practice ifused as a “best practices” learning tool.

A first step is being aware of the dynamics of a disputing situation andidentifying the patterns or cues that indicate the need to make a processdecision. Not even the most experienced mediator can have first-hand expe-rience with all decision points in every disputing situation. Thus, stories ofthe experiences of others as they face difficult process issues are useful sub-stitutes. They bring experience into our lives, allow us to identify thepatterns that make a difference in the decisions we need to make, and offerexamples of appropriate, or perhaps inappropriate, responses to guide us inour work. We use the stories of a co-author’s intervention in Cyprus to evalu-ate how this decision framework can be applied to help improve third-partydecisions in the future.

The Cyprus ExperienceBenjamin Broome, an experienced third-party practitioner, worked inCyprus from 1994 to 1996 as a Fulbright Scholar, offering seminars, training,and workshops in conflict resolution and interactive design processes tomono-communal and bi-communal groups of Greek Cypriots and TurkishCypriots. At the time he arrived in Cyprus in August 1994, contact betweenTurkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot residents was very limited, with the“Green Line” separating the two communities, running through the centerof the capital, Nicosia, creating a virtually impenetrable boundary of barbedwire and military checkpoints.4 Conflict resolution activities, which hadtaken place on a periodic but infrequent basis over the years, were just start-ing to grow (Broome 1997a). At the beginning of his stay, Broomeconcentrated on working with a small group of individuals who had alreadyreceived conflict resolution training from groups such the U.S.-based CyprusConsortium,5 and who were committed to the expansion of citizen-basedpeace-building activities on the island. This group worked together to createa collective vision statement and a collaborative action agenda, and duringthe latter stages of his fellowship, Broome spent his time assisting variousgroups in implementation of the activities from this agenda (Broome 1997b).

By the time Broome completed the third term of his Fulbright fellow-ship and returned to his academic position in the United States, thepeace-building group had expanded significantly. Other Fulbright scholarsand third parties continued the conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus, andeventually over 2000 Cypriots from the two communities became involvedin bi-communal activities. The Green Line still stands as a dividing line, butindividuals from all walks of life have bridged the line of separation throughtheir tireless efforts to promote peace and reconciliation between ordinarycitizens of this troubled isle.

Although the success of conflict resolution work in Cyprus is due pri-marily to the dedication and ceaseless efforts of the Cypriots themselves,Broome’s work in Cyprus came at a key time in the growth of a citizen-based


peace movement. His presence helped stimulate both depth and breath ofits development during a critical period of its expansion. We want to capturesome of Broome’s experience and identify the cues that helped him makeprocess decisions that had a positive impact. The format we have chosen is adialogue between the two of us, as Murray asks questions that focus on keychoice points during the intervention, and Broome responds with storiesthat allow us to participate in his experience.

1. What were some of the initial challenges you faced in Cyprus?In most cases, a person entering a situation such as the one in Cyprus wouldneed a significant amount of time to learn about the situation, meet peoplewho want to be involved in the work, and build enough trust to get startedwith workshops and other activities. I was very fortunate to have a “headstart” in my work, made possible by an invitation from the Cyprus Consor-tium to serve as faculty in a series of workshops they offered in Cyprusduring spring and summer of 1994. I participated in three week-long work-shops, involving more than 50 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, duringwhich I became acquainted with the individuals with whom I would soonbe working.

These factors helped create a set of positive conditions that made itpossible to get started with problem-solving and design workshops soonafter I moved to Cyprus. First, the group of peace-builders with whom Iwould be working was already in place — it was not necessary for me tospend time identifying individuals with interest in the work. Second, I haddeveloped a certain level of trust with this core group of interested people— they knew me personally and held positive impressions of my compe-tency. Third, the group was ready to proceed — there was no need topersuade people of the need to work together or of the urgency and impor-tance of what was at stake.

At the same time, based on my experience in working with them in theearlier training workshops, and reinforced by my conversations with individ-uals during the beginning of my stay, it became clear to me that the groupwas characterized by diverse motivations, goals, and interpretations of howto move forward. Other than their participation in the recently held conflictresolution workshops, they had little experience working together in mono-communal settings and almost no experience in a bi-communal setting.6

They were already under attack from the media in both communities, partlybecause they had taken part in training offered by “the Americans.” Mostimportantly, their conversations with me reflected unawareness about whatthey faced or how to overcome these obstacles.

Because of the diversity of perceptions that was evident in each com-munity and between communities, I concluded that the group could benefitfrom a series of planning and design sessions that would help them identifyhow to move forward with a common vision. However, such work requires alot of time over a long period. The group was motivated to take immediateaction, yet it did not understand adequately what to do or how to go about


it. Thus, one of the first challenges I faced was how to introduce to thegroup the need for prolonged and sustained design work. I was afraid if Itold them it might take six months or longer to get to the point where aviable plan was in place, they might be hesitant to engage in the requiredtasks. Everyone had job and family obligations, making it difficult to meet ona regular basis, and my experiences with other situations had shown me thatfew groups could easily accept the need for a problem-definition stagebefore moving to action.

It was necessary to approach this situation with great care. Although Iwas confident in my own assessment, I remained open to other ways of get-ting started. Pushing individuals or groups too hard at this initial stage wouldbe counterproductive. As a first step, I spent nearly one month meeting withindividuals and small groups, asking them to tell me how they thought weshould proceed. Fortunately, the common theme that participants stressedin these meetings was the need to move carefully and purposefully, confirm-ing my own earlier conclusions. I proposed a systematic three-phase processthat would begin with identification of the situation they were facing aspeace builders, move to the creation of a collective vision, and finallydevelop a collaborative action agenda. Our intention was to meet as a bi-communal group to work on these three tasks. I did not propose a specifictime frame for completing our work, because there were so many unknownvariables that might affect our progress. However, we agreed that we wouldreassess our progress at the end of each phase.

This approach allowed us to assemble a core group of fifteen self-selected individuals in each community who were willing to begin work ondesigning the future of citizen peace-building activities in Cyprus. All partici-pants had taken part in the earlier summer workshops, so they had receivedsome training in conflict resolution, and they were familiar with each other,both within community groups and across community lines.

2. As you started these planning and design sessions, were thereany crucial choice points you faced? What were youresponding to, and what were your decisions?

The first major choice was made necessary by external circumstances, and itwas not something that I had foreseen. Our intention had been to meettogether as a bi-communal group to work though all three phases of thedesign process. However, all bi-communal meetings in Cyprus requireapproval of the authorities on both sides, and we were not able to obtainpermissions for meeting together. The need to obtain permissions for meet-ing together is made necessary by the existence of the buffer zone inCyprus, which is monitored by United Nations peacekeeping troops, as wellas by military forces on both sides. The buffer zone serves for the GreekCypriots as a temporary cease-fire line and for the Turkish Cypriots as a “bor-der” for their self-declared state. There is a single official crossing, located inNicosia, where diplomats and others with special permission are able totravel between the two sides. In the buffer zone between the checkpoints


on either side is located a former luxury hotel, the “Ledra Palace,” whereU.N. troops are housed. Although the building was in poor condition andoffered nothing more than a sparsely furnished set of meeting rooms, it wasthe only place where bi-communal meetings could be held, if proper permis-sions could be obtained from Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, and UnitedNations authorities. For the United Nations, the approval process consistsprimarily of scheduling a room in which to meet. For the Greek Cypriotauthorities, the approval process consists primarily of providing a list of indi-viduals who will be attending.

For the Turkish Cypriot authorities, however, the approval processrequires obtaining permissions from their foreign affairs office, since thosecrossing beyond the checkpoint are considered as leaving what they con-sider to be their territory. The Turkish military, which is charged withguaranteeing the security of the “border,” takes this same position. Bi-com-munal meetings are not looked upon favorably by the Turkish Cypriotauthorities or by the Turkish military, because they believe such meetingsonly serve to reinforce the Greek Cypriot position that Cyprus must bereunified. Therefore, permissions are difficult to obtain, and once obtained,are often withdrawn at the last minute. Permissions are sometimes deniedfor long periods during heightened political tensions, and the TurkishCypriot authorities often withhold permissions to express their displeasureat actions by Americans or others who promote bi-communal activities.

Without approval to meet in the buffer zone, we had to decide whetherto wait until permissions were granted, or to go ahead with our work in sep-arate groups until the time came when we could meet together. Personally, Iwas torn between the need to move forward together, and the need to getstarted while the motivation was strong. I was afraid that meeting in differ-ent communal groups would only accentuate the separation, and at the sametime I was afraid that if we delayed until permissions were granted, momen-tum could be lost. I was also aware that my own time in Cyprus was limited— my initial funding was for a nine-month period, and the first month wasalready behind me.

After much discussion with my Cypriot colleagues, I began to reframethe situation, concluding that we might actually benefit from meeting sepa-rately. I realized that in the problem-definition stage of design work, the twocommunities, following the same agenda, would probably see the situationquite differently, and they could each learn a lot by seeing how the otherside perceived the obstacles to peace building. It was not until after westarted our work that I understood an equally important benefit of workingin mono-communal groups — the need to resolve intra-group differences.

As we began meeting in mono-communal groups, there emergedwithin each community several internal issues — differences in political ori-entations, various views about the meaning of “peace” with the other side,insufficient level of trust, competition for leadership of the group, and otherpotentially divisive matters. If we had started in a bi-communal setting, these


issues may have remained below the surface, perhaps negatively affectingthe group work in a variety of ways. By dealing with these concerns first in amono-communal setting, it was much easier to focus on issues of substanceonce we were in the bi-communal group. Although it is difficult to knowhow it might have played out had we been able to stay with our original planof bi-communal meetings, it is likely that it would have been necessary tomeet separately in order to work through these issues. In fact, based on ourlearning from this experience, with several later groups we followed the pat-tern of first scheduling mono-communal meetings prior to bringing themtogether in a bi-communal setting.

3. When and why did you decide to have the two groups meettogether at the time that you did? How did you develop theagenda for this first joint session? Did it go as planned?

The three-phase process we employed in our work started with problem def-inition.7 This phase engaged each group in identifying the obstacles theywould encounter in their peace-building activities, and then developing astructural map of how they perceived the relationship among these issues.This resulted in a graphical representation of each group’s view of the sys-tem of problems confronting them in their work. The discussion that led tothis product was thorough and meaningful, providing insight into eachgroup’s view of the current situation. The opportunity to exchange theseproducts would allow each community group to learn much about how theother perceives the situation. Thus, I believed that the end of Phase Onework was an appropriate time to hold a joint session.

Fortunately, we were able to obtain permission to meet together toexchange the group products. The agenda for this joint meeting flowed natu-rally from the work of the separate groups and consisted primarily ofpresentations by each group of their product, with time for questions, obser-vations, and comments. Of course, it was also a time for people to see eachother again after several months without contact, so we allocated a gooddeal of time for people to socialize.

The outcome of the joint session was a surprise to me. Until the meet-ing actually took place, neither group knew anything about the other’swork, although I was constantly under pressure from each group to shareinformation about the other group’s views. Each group knew that the otherwas working with the same topic and using the same methodology, but Idid not share information about one group with the other. I did not wantthe thinking of one group to influence that of the other, and I decided thatit was best for the groups themselves to present their own views to theother rather than have it filtered through the eyes of a third party. However,there was an assumption in each group that the other was developing a sim-ilar product, since both groups were composed of individuals dedicated tobuilding peace in Cyprus, and since everyone had been involved previouslyin similar conflict resolution workshops. I knew the two products were dif-


ferent, but had not focused on the implications this might have when pre-sented in joint session.

When the groups met and exchanged products, it was quite a shock forthem to see the differences in each other’s structural maps. The TurkishCypriots were pleasantly surprised to see how different the two structureswere, while the Greek Cypriots were extremely disappointed that they werenot more similar. For the Turkish Cypriots, there already existed an aware-ness that each community lived in a different world, but the Greek Cypriotswere not aware of how much the Turkish Cypriot worldview differed fromtheir own. The Turkish Cypriots felt that for the first time the Greek Cypriotswere confronted with the reality of the differences between the two com-munities. However, the Greek Cypriots were discouraged by the results, andmany came away with the feeling: “If peace builders see the situation so dif-ferently, then how is it possible for the two communities to have any hope ofliving together?”

The Greek Cypriots’ response was unexpected, and for the first time Irealized how little most Greek Cypriots, even those who had been throughconflict resolution workshops, knew about the deeper reality of the otherside. This outcome reinforced for me the value of what we were doing, espe-cially the need for in-depth discussion that helped participants get below thesurface of issues. However, it also made me wonder if I should have donemore to prepare the groups for the differences that were emerging duringthe workshops. Although I had thought it would be better for each group topresent their problem definition charts themselves (rather than me present-ing it for them), and while I did not want the results from one group toinfluence those of the other, it was naïve of me to expect the groups to dealwith the differences from a purely academic point of view. I had not realizedthe extent to which such differences called into question (for the GreekCypriots) the very rationale for their work, nor had I realized the extent towhich they would reinforce for the Turkish Cypriots their side’s politicalposition. It took quite a number of one-to-one consultations with membersfrom both sides before the effects of the problem definition exchange wereworked out. The experience taught me that it might be better to take spe-cific steps to lessen the “shock” prior to such product exchange.

4. How did you address challenges presented by language andculture?

Before the two communities were separated in 1963 and 1974, many Turk-ish Cypriots spoke Greek, and some Greek Cypriots spoke Turkish, buttoday only those of the older generation can speak the language of the othercommunity. However, Cyprus is a former British colony, and English is usedas a second language by a large percentage of the population in both com-munities. This allows most bi-communal meetings to use English as themedium of communication. This is convenient for the third party whocomes from an English-speaking country, but except for those participantswhose education has been in English, its use as the primary language for dis-


cussions created many possibilities for miscommunication, limited the abilityof many individuals to express themselves, and left out many people whowould have liked to be involved but whose English was too limited.

Cultural differences were more subtle but perhaps more complicated,and they occurred on two levels. On one level, cultural differences betweenthe two communities were always present in our meetings. Greek Cypriots,in general, are more expressive than Turkish Cypriots, especially when thetwo groups are together, and this meant that Greek Cypriots tended to talkmore and longer. As facilitator, I had to monitor this very carefully, makingsure that Greek Cypriots did not dominate the conversations. Greek Cypriotsalso tend to react more emotionally to events and to statements of others.The more experienced Turkish Cypriots usually expected emotionalresponses from the Greek Cypriots and understood how to interpret them,but in many cases I found myself in conversations with Turkish Cypriotsreminding them that the behavior of the Greek Cypriots may not have beenmeant as strongly as it appeared to them. Similarly, many times I had toremind the Greek Cypriots that the lack of an enthusiastic response from theTurkish Cypriots might not mean they are not interested in an idea. TurkishCypriots tend to be much less impulsive and more cautious in consideringproposals, thinking through consequences more carefully before takingaction. This often created a “disconnect” in the timing of when the twogroups were ready to move forward on an idea — one group was eager toget started and the other was inclined to wait. Finally, I found that GreekCypriots were more proactive and future-directed in their thinking, with theTurkish Cypriots more focused on the past. This was endlessly frustrating forthe Greek Cypriots, who tired of being constantly reminded of what hadhappened in the past. And for the Turkish Cypriots, it was equally frustratingthat the Greek Cypriots could not seem to acknowledge (to their satisfac-tion) the importance of past events.

On a second level, I was constantly concerned about cultural differencesbetween my own western orientation and the eastern Mediterranean cul-ture of the Cypriots. For example, I had to modify my expectations regardingapproach to managing time. We rarely started our meetings earlier than 45minutes past the scheduled time for assembly, we always had difficulty bring-ing participants back from a break before at least 30 minutes had passed, andyet we usually needed to stop by our scheduled ending time because peoplehad other commitments. Consequently, it took more meetings to workthrough a particular methodology than I had expected. I soon realized thatthis was not a matter of interest or commitment — it was simply a way ofworking to which I needed to adjust. And I also learned that there were manybenefits to this way of working. For example, the social time at the beginningof sessions while everyone was slowly arriving, as well as during the longbreaks, was an important means of building both group harmony and consen-sus on difficult issues


More importantly, I tried to be very careful that the methodologies andthe suggestions I put forward to the group were not incompatible with thecultural context in which I was working. For example, in the beginning Ihad questions about the appropriateness of the problem-definition, vision,and action sequence of activities that I was proposing. Was it possible to sep-arate these phases of group work so clearly in a culture where multi-taskingis the norm? Would it be necessary to sequence the phases differently? Werethere other phases I should be using? I have seen too many trainers andmediators simply bring in the programs they had developed for use in theirown cultural context and try to implement these without modification withlocal groups. This not only results in approaches that do not work well, butalso can do damage that may not show up until well after the outsiders aresafely back in their own environment.

I was also concerned about the methodologies. For example, I usuallyuse Nominal Group Technique (NGT) for idea generation at the beginning ofboth the problem-definition phase and the vision phase (Delbeq, Van DeVen, and Gustafson 1975). Would such an orderly turn-taking process beacceptable in a culture where people are used to a more free-flow of conver-sation? As work progressed, I made many small modifications. For example, Iwas accustomed to using with NGT the term “triggering question,” which isdesigned to stimulate the generation of ideas. However, in a culture with ahistory of war, “triggering” was hardly the best term to encourage creativethinking! Similarly, I normally call the product of Interpretive Structural Mod-eling (ISM) a “structural map,” since it graphically displays the group’sconsensus about how a set of ideas relate to one another (Warfield and Car-denas 1994). In this case, I learned that each community’s authorities arevery sensitive about “maps,” since territorial issues are one of the concernsof the Cyprus conflict, and a group working on such a product would beseen as taking on a task that was not their business. Needless to say, I revisedthe terminology accordingly.

At the same time, I tried to keep in mind that one of the advantages of athird party is the ability to introduce new ideas that help break destructivecultural patterns that may be keeping the participants from moving forward.There is a fine line between cultural imperialism and the introduction ofappropriate methodology, and it is not always easy to make the best deci-sions about how far to go in adapting one’s process to the local culture.Partly for this reason, other than the types of modifications I just described, Imaintained the planned sequence of activities as well as the basic form ofmost methodologies. However, I did so only after carefully evaluating theentire process at each step of the way and asking the participants manyquestions about appropriateness.


5. What decisions, if any, did you make in handling internaldynamics within the groups? Did you deal with the groupsfrom the two communities differently?

The participants in each group represented a wide range of ages, profes-sions, personalities, and political affiliations. This diversity was one of thestrengths of our work but, at the same time, it made internal harmony andconsensus difficult to achieve. There were several ways in which these dif-ferences manifested themselves in the group. Communication style differedamong individuals in each group, and those who tended to be more concisein their expressions of ideas became frustrated with those who talked longerand were less clear in the points they were making. Some came across toother group members as overly “academic” in their contributions, while oth-ers were perceived as too emotional. A few were impatient to take action,while others were more oriented toward discussion and analysis. Some weremore eager to spend time socializing, while others thought we needed toaccomplish more work.

Differences such as these did not cause significant problems, but it wasnecessary to be constantly vigilant in order to ensure an appropriate balanceof participation. For example, in the Greek-Cypriot group one participantwas older than the other group members, while one was much younger. Theolder person often took on the role of “lecturing” to the group, mostly aboutbehavioral issues (such as not coming at the scheduled time). The youngerperson, on the other hand, many times felt unappreciated and not taken seri-ously. I had to find ways to allow the older person to make his point, eventhough the other group members were not eager to hear it again and again,and at the same time encourage the younger person to keep putting forthhis ideas, even when he thought no one was listening.

More serious problems revolved around personal jealousies and rival-ries. In general, group members were very supportive of one another, butinterpersonal competition was always operating below the surface. Thisoccurred within each group and between the two community groups. Therewere occasions when individuals believed that a specific person in thegroup was trying to sabotage their project or create difficulties in order tokeep them from succeeding. Sometimes there were concerns about whoshould receive credit for an accomplishment. In some instances individualscomplained that they were doing all the work, with no help from othergroup members. Certain persons were constantly complaining about howsome were only interested in peace-building work in order to further theirown professional lives. As the group expanded, a few members of the coregroup resisted the involvement of new people who had not “sacrificed suffi-ciently” in the past and were now joining only because it was “the popularthing to do.” And then there were the eternal pessimists who were con-stantly telling the group why something would not work. These problemswere not easy for me to deal with and provided a constant source of frustra-tion. Most difficult of all was the attempt by many to elicit my support for


their position, effectively “taking sides” in the disputes. Fortunately, therewere also a number of very positive, optimistic, forward-thinking individualswho helped me keep these problems in perspective.

In the Turkish-Cypriot group, political differences were sometimes aproblem. Because Turkish-Cypriot authorities did not look favorably towardbi-communal activities, few participants belonged to the ruling party ormaintained close contact with elected officials. However, there were two orthree members of the group who belonged to the inner circles of Turkish-Cypriot leadership. The other group members generally viewed theseindividuals with suspicion, which often had a dampening effect on groupinteraction — many people were afraid that what they said in the groupwould be reported to the authorities, with the possibility of this negativelyaffecting their career or business.

There were several steps I took in order to help manage issues relatedto internal dynamics. At the end of most meetings, we took time for whatwe called a “check-out,” and often we started our meetings with a “check-in,”both of which allowed individuals an opportunity to share feelings about anumber of issues, including group dynamics. This gave us a way to gaugewhether we needed to schedule a special time to discuss the progress of thegroup, which we did from time to time.

Additionally, I spent time talking individually with group participantsabout how the group was doing and how it might be improved. I found thatI was able to bring up such issues with the Greek Cypriots in a group set-ting, and they were able to be open and self-critical. The Turkish Cypriotstended to avoid this topic when the group was together, preferring to talkwith me about internal dynamics when meeting one-on-one or in smallgroups of two or three. In both community settings, I made an effort to pro-vide a “listening ear” on these matters rather than give a lot of advice. Ibelieve this is an important role of the third-party facilitator in such situa-tions.

6. How did your actions or decisions on internal dynamics affectleadership within the two community groups? Within the jointgroup?

One of the most delicate and challenging tasks I faced was dealing with con-trol issues and power struggles within each group. By reading about thehistory of the island prior to beginning my work there, I had learned thatCypriot society has long been characterized by internal infighting and strug-gles for influence and control. Similar to what I had learned from the time Ispent in Greece earlier, I found that no one wants to work “under” anotherperson, and nearly everyone believes they can do a better job than the per-son in charge. As in many Middle Eastern and Balkan countries, leadershiproles are not viewed as “service” positions, and often the person doing thebest job is criticized most severely. This often leads to a destructive patterninvolving attempts to pull down whoever takes on a leadership role. Thispattern carries over into the peace-building groups, making it difficult for


any meaningful form of organizational structure to be sustained over longperiods.

Awareness of the possible cultural patterns in Cyprus related to controlissues is one of the reasons I decided during the first year of my residency touse methodologies that equalized participation and did not require any for-mal leadership roles within the group. This allowed the core group to avoidmany of the potential pitfalls associated with leadership issues. Our eventualproduct, a collaborative action agenda, required for its implementation thateveryone take a leadership role with specific projects. Thus, although therewere problems with personal jealousies and political differences, the workof the core group stayed on track without destructive power struggles.

We were also able to contain, as the work expanded, this cultural ten-dency to work against whomever is in charge. I give partial credit for thissuccess to a lesson I gained when I first arrived in Cyprus. There existed atthat time a “Bi-communal Steering Committee” (BSC) that had been set upafter a successful workshop in Oxford, England in 1993 (Diamond andFisher, 1995). The BSC functioned quite effectively for a period of time, butby the end of my first year in Cyprus it had ceased to operate, primarilybecause of internal power struggles and political differences. I learned fromwatching this group slowly disintegrate that I would need to be very carefulabout promoting a similar form of leadership. During my second year inCyprus, as the number of groups and activities started growing, there was aneed for more cooperation among the groups, suggesting a structure thathelped link the various efforts. However, instead of forming a general steer-ing group, we formed temporary coordinating groups for specific events.This allowed those interested in leadership roles to step forward and worktoward the accomplishment of a specific task and then step back into thelarger group, avoiding the need to formalize positions that would last overtime. This worked well and prevented energy wasted toward “pulling down”those in charge, and still permitted individuals to provide effective leader-ship for specific events.

7. Your initial appointment as Fulbright Scholar was for a nine-month period. Why did you decide to extend your stay inCyprus?

It become clear to me from the initial pace of the work that I would be leav-ing about the time the group was ready to implement the agenda we wereworking so hard to develop. At that point, it would be crucial to have aknowledgeable and trusted third party to assist with the projects, especiallysome of them in which new groups were being started. These concerns ledme to feel quite strongly that it would be the wrong time to leave. At thattime, there were no plans by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission to continuethe conflict resolution position.

Therefore, my colleagues and I spent a lot of time and effort to renewthe grant for another term. The slow pace of bureaucracy and competinginterests for funds created many difficulties, but thanks to the efforts of my


colleagues and the vision of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and the U.S.Embassy in Cyprus,8 a second and eventually a third term were added to mygrant, keeping me in Cyprus two and one-half years. During that time, sev-eral new groups were formed and many bi-communal events were held,building a momentum that carried through during the year following mydeparture and led to the involvement of more than 2000 individuals in vari-ous projects.9

I am not sure how the work would have progressed in the absence of athird party, but some of the more challenging groups, such as the youngbusiness leaders and the young political leaders, may not have formed. Inaddition, there occurred several external events that nearly stopped thework, and it was very important to have someone who could provide abroader perspective on the situation during these times of crisis, and whocould offer encouragement to continue. I cannot take much credit for thegrowth of the peace-building work in Cyprus, because it was my Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot colleagues who made it happen, but I knowthat the continuous presence of a third-party during an important period ofits growth and development played a key role in helping shape the directionof the work and in overcoming several key hurdles.

8. Looking back, do you now recognize certain key leveragepoints, i.e., points of choice where your decisions shaped thecourse of the intervention?

Although it is easy, in retrospect, to view certain choice points as isolatedevents, it is probably more accurate to think of them as “apex” points alonga continuum of choices that led to them and followed from them. Evenwhen one is faced with the need to made a quick decision that will havemomentous consequences, it is likely that a number of other choices havebeen made that suggest a certain course of action, or at least narrow thechoices that are available. When viewed in this manner, it is difficult to talkabout key decisions made by a single individual acting alone. However, I alsorealize that choices at critical times can shape the course of events. Duringthe time I have been involved with the Cyprus conflict, I can identify severalof these “forks in the road” where particular choices led us along a path thatwe otherwise might not have taken.

One of the first crossroads I faced concerned how to get the workstarted after permissions to meet in a bi-communal setting were withdrawn,a situation that I described earlier. As I look back on our choice to go aheadwith mono-communal meetings, I can see that it affected not only the courseof events for the core group, greatly strengthening its work, but it influencedhow we chose to work with other groups down the road.

For example, when we were organizing the first workshop for theyoung business leaders, which was one of the first activities to be imple-mented from the agenda of the core group, we made a decision to holdseparate weekend retreats for each community group prior to the first bi-communal meeting. This proved to be crucial to their success, because in


both groups we were bringing together a diverse set of individuals who hadnot worked together before, and most of them were leery of meeting withmembers of the other community.

These weekend retreats allowed each community group to establish acertain level of rapport with one another before taking on the anxiety-pro-ducing task of meeting with the other side. It also allowed them to producea product, a problem structure showing their view of obstacles to coopera-tion with the other side, which they could present to the other group. Theirpresentation of this product provided the focus for the first bi-communalmeeting, and it allowed us to discuss similarities and differences in how eachcommunity viewed the current situation. This discussion helped each grouplearn from the other, and it set the stage for further work together.

We used this same pattern, scheduling mono-communal meetings fol-lowed by a bi-communal meeting, with other groups — the young politicalleaders, women’s group, and university students — all with positive conse-quences. Not only did the mono-communal meetings help prepare thegroups for the bi-communal meetings, but they also helped during periodswhen permissions were not granted for bi-communal meetings. By establish-ing a precedent of meeting as mono-communal groups when it was notpossible to meet jointly, we kept the groups going during times when theymight otherwise have simply stop meeting. Thus, my experience with thecore group taught me a lot when dealing with the other groups that formedlater.

Another defining moment of my involvement with the work in Cyprusoccurred after the core group had completed its work on the problem-defini-tion phase and moved into the vision phase of its work. After thebi-communal meeting in which each group exchanged problematiques, wehad to continue working in mono-communal groups until we could receivepermission again to meet together. Although this was not ideal, we knewthat we had to keep the work going. After our experience with theexchange of problem structures, where the differences in products were sosurprising to the group, we were all expecting to see even greater differ-ences in each group’s attempt to define the future. If the two groups did notsee the current situation in a similar manner, then how could they possiblydefine a common future? As each group completed the work on its ownvision statement, I could see that, contrary to our expectations, there wassignificant overlap in the two structures, which I presumed would be a posi-tive development that would encourage each group.

To facilitate the exchange of products, I prepared a graphic thatdepicted the similarities and differences, showing items that were generatedby each group and structured in a similar manner, items each structure heldin common but were located at different places in the vision statement, anditems each group generated that were not included in the other’s structure.In the bi-communal meeting, after the groups had exchanged their vision


statements, I presented this graphic, emphasizing the degree to which eachstructure had so much in common.

Following this presentation, I detected a look of satisfaction on thefaces of the Greek Cypriots, but the Turkish Cypriots appeared concernedabout the results. As we pursued our discussion, the enthusiastic responsefrom the Greek Cypriots, eager now to work together to produce a collec-tive vision statement, was contrasted by the lukewarm response from theTurkish Cypriots, hesitant to move to the next step.

After the meeting, in consultation with the Turkish Cypriots, I learnedthat the surprising degree of overlap in each community’s focus on thefuture was a direct threat to the worldview prevalent within the Turkish-Cypriot community, which emphasized the vastly different views of thefuture held by each community, and on which was built the political argu-ment that separate political entities and geographical zones were necessary.Even those Turkish Cypriots in the group who were pleased by the degree ofcommonality were concerned that such a product would be used againstthem. Unlike the problematique, which had emphasized the differences, thisproduct might backfire, causing a negative reaction on the part of the Turk-ish-Cypriot authorities and further complicating our efforts to meet together.

Now I faced a serious dilemma. The Greek Cypriots, who had beenready to give up after the earlier exchange of problem structures, were eagerto proceed, and the Turkish Cypriots, who had gained great satisfaction fromthe results of the first phase, were now ready to withdraw, or at least tomove in a different direction. The very action that would galvanize theGreek Cypriots might push away the Turkish Cypriots. I knew that movingto the third phase, where we would concentrate on building an agenda forjoint projects, would not progress smoothly unless the group was clearabout where it wanted to go. I was convinced that it was important to makean attempt to finish the vision statement together. At the same time, I recog-nized that several joint Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot groups had attemptedto create a common vision statement in the past, and all of them had failed.Indeed, this seemed to be the great problem of Cyprus — the lack of ashared view of the future.

I decided that it would be better to move forward by working on thecollective vision statement as planned, rather than discuss whether or notwe should continue in this direction. Fortunately, the Turkish Cypriotsagreed to meet with the Greek Cypriots in order to start our work. I realizedthere were risks involved — we might fail in our task, as other groups haddone, or the Turkish Cypriots might resist the work. But I believed that itwould be counterproductive to discuss the issue in the full group at thistime. Only a few individuals in the Turkish-Cypriot group seemed to feelstrongly about the matter, and it would be easy in the context of a discussioncentered on this specific issue for them to persuade the remainder of thegroup to view it more seriously, thus jeopardizing the chance to makeprogress. It would be better, I thought, simply to start working and let the


issue arise in the context of our task rather than make it a task itself. My deci-sion to take the group in this direction came from my previous experiencewith the methodology and its ability to help groups with diverse perspec-tives build a common view of the future.

As I thought might happen, we got off to a rocky start. A lot of discus-sion took place between members of the Turkish-Cypriot group, pittingthose who wanted to emphasize the differences against those who wantedto emphasize their commonality with the Greek Cypriots. I rememberclearly the moment the confrontation came to a breaking point. Two mem-bers of the Turkish-Cypriot group, both of whom were closely tied to thepolitical leadership structure, decided they could no longer take part in anexercise that would result in a collective vision statement. They pressuredpublicly, in the joint session, the other Turkish Cypriots to join them in leav-ing the workshop. To my great relief, no one joined them and even otherswho were also close to the authorities stayed to continue the work. This wasa bold move on the part of those Turkish Cypriots who remained in the jointgroup, and it was recognized as such by the Greek Cypriots.

From that moment, the atmosphere in the group changed dramatically.There was no longer an underlying tension present in the bi-communal set-ting, the group no longer thought of itself as two separate communitygroups but as a single entity working toward a common set of goals, and aconfidence developed among the group members, who had survived one ofthe strongest threats yet to its existence. The work then progressed insmooth fashion, at least until it hit the next “bump in the road.”10 After thevision statement was completed, there was clear positive energy in thegroup, and our work in Phase Three went both quickly and without inci-dent, resulting in a collaborative action agenda that continues to serve as theunderlying basis for bi-communal work in Cyprus.

Lessons LearnedIn his role as third-party facilitator in the Cyprus conflict, Benjamin Broomefaced several key decision points in his work with peace-building groups onthe island. He had to make choices about issues such as: how to getacquainted and accepted in the beginning stages of his residency; whatsteps to take in order to build credibility among colleagues and workshopparticipants; whether or not to maintain the essential structure of hisplanned intervention in the face of unanticipated obstacles; what strategyto use in managing the sometimes difficult internal dynamics within thegroup; how to proceed when he encountered reluctance from TurkishCypriots to work on a collective vision statement that he viewed as essen-tial to progress of the group; and how to develop support (from criticalplayers outside the group) for investing in the continuing presence of athird-party facilitator on the island.

The choices he made offer several lessons for negotiators, mediators,facilitators and others who work with similar groups. These lessons rein-


force much of what we already know about third-party intervention but thatwe all too often overlook or neglect in our training programs and otherforms of preparation. Especially viewed within the framework of choice-points, we believe the following lessons can offer valuable suggestions andreminders for those engaged in the fine art of working with opposing sidesin protracted conflict situations.

Lesson One: To be effective, third parties must have extensiveand accurate substantive knowledge of the context within whichthey will be working.

Supporting data: Before coming to Cyprus, Broome had lived andworked in the Eastern Mediterranean on two different occasions, and he wasfamiliar with the issues and emotions tied up in the Greek-Turkish contro-versy over Cyprus. He also had participated in three conflict resolutiontraining workshops held on the island several months prior to taking up resi-dency in Cyprus. As he approached the task of building credibility withpotential participants and of deciding how to begin the intervention, heused this knowledge of the local context and culture to help him identifykey choices and make successful decisions.

But it is not only pre-intervention preparation that is vital. An outsidercan never know everything about a culture, even with much study and resi-dency, as Broome’s experience shows. The third party can learn aboutrelevant cultural attributes and appreciate their importance in building rap-port and initiating an intervention agenda. Sensitivity and openness toadapting to context are key skills. Broome remained open and sensitive tothe varying ways the two communities responded differently as he workedthrough Phase One of his intervention plan. Several responses surprisedhim, and he adjusted rapidly to accommodate these unforeseen cultural fac-tors.

Implications: Current training programs for mediators, facilitators andother third parties typically stress the importance of gaining facilitative skillsuseful in a mediating situation. If Broome’s experience is accurate, however,a third party also needs to be familiar with the substantive context of the dis-pute to offer the parties the best assistance. A mediator who has very goodfacilitative skills but insufficient substantive knowledge of the disputing con-text, may miss important cues or make inappropriate process decisions.Therefore, a mediation training program should commit significant time andmaterials to the substantive context or contexts in which the participantswill be acting. Recreating a realistic cultural context is difficult in a simula-tion where all participants belong to the same group. Nevertheless,differences in thought and speech patterns, and differing worldviews, can bebuilt into simulations in ways that those playing the roles, if properlycoached, can offer meaningful experiences to the participants.

Lesson Two: A third party should have process knowledge in aform that is both usable and quickly accessible, based in a cleartheoretical framework that has been tested in similar situations.


The frames, techniques, and process options need to be linked tospecific contextual conditions.

Supporting data: Based on similarities between his past experiencesand what he envisioned the Cyprus situation to be like, Broome selected athree-phase procedure he believed was most likely to be useful in the situa-tion. The interactive design process he used was based on more than twentyyears of applications and firmly rooted in theories of effective group plan-ning models. As he became acquainted with Cypriots from bothcommunities, he identified patterns that supported his choice and those thatcould serve as obstacles to its success. As he introduced the three-phase taskplan, he kept alert for cues that its implementation was consistent with howhe mentally pictured it. His continual comparison of reality with generalprocess goals allowed Broome to respond immediately and confidently topotential trouble spots with appropriate explanations or adjustments.

Implications: Experience provides the mental images and stories thatare essential in evaluating a procedural option. In most cases, the context ofthird-party activity features significant time and psychological pressuresimposed by the pace of the conflict, the parties’ presence, and other exter-nal conditions. As a result, a third party cannot use purely rational analysisand quiet reflection to select and test the best among multiple options. Athird party must:

• select in a timely manner an applicable frame, technique or processoption from a previously defined set of methodologies that have beentested and proven to be useful in similar situations;

• simulate mentally how that frame, technique or process option wouldwork in the current situation — how its elements would assist the partiesin their negotiation, plus what obstacles might be faced; and

• apply the frame, technique, or process option confidently, while beingaware of the risks inherent in the way it was selected, and thus alert topossible needs to clarify, adapt or change direction entirely.

Training for mediators and other third parties should include simula-tions, role-plays, case studies and other activities that allow the participantsto generate experiences that closely match what they may meet in practice.Attention can be placed on what conditions and behaviors will call forwhich frames, techniques or other process options.

Lesson Three: Intervention in conflicts, especially in protractedsituations, must be viewed as long-term commitments, oftenrequiring a continuous physical presence from the third party.

Supporting data: Before accepting the Cyprus project, Broome hadalready adopted a posture that the short-term mentality prevalent amongAmerican conflict resolution practitioners doing work abroad was inappro-priate in most cases and often counter productive. He was concerned thatthe nine-month Fulbright term would be vulnerable to some of the same crit-


icisms, but he was unsuccessful at the outset in persuading Fulbright toextend his stay. He discussed his concerns with Cypriots from both commu-nities during the initial contacts and received confirming responses. Hisintense feeling for this position, and his persistence over many months, ledeventually to two extensions of the Fulbright grant, which provided anadded message of international support for local efforts. It is difficult toknow how the work would have progressed without the continuous pres-ence of a third party, but by remaining in Cyprus over a long period, heplayed a role in expanding the work and in helping those involved workthrough several difficult situations that could have significantly hampered oreven stopped the work for long periods of time. Broome continues to visitCyprus regularly to work with an expanding group of peace builders ontheir joint projects, and he maintains regular contact with colleaguesthrough telephone and e-mail.

Implications: All too often, and for many understandable reasons, con-flict resolution interventions occur in what might be called a “parachute-in”fashion. The third party drops in, frequently without extensive knowledge ofthe local situation or culture, offers a packaged training module, and thendeparts with little or no follow-up. Reasons for this pattern are logical,although not entirely persuasive. Specialists in conflict resolution who arecapable of delivering good training and intervention services are usuallyfound in western countries, and the demand for these services is highestamong the many developing countries. Few specialists have background inevery cultural context needing their services. In addition, funding normallycomes from sources outside the country receiving the assistance, primarilybecause most receiving countries and peoples do not have the resources tocommit to anything that is not basic education. These funding sources areoften committed to excellent objectives that may not include that particularcountry as a main focus.

Moreover, many of these external funding organizations support short-term interventions as a normal operating procedure (e.g., the FulbrightFellowships of four and nine months in length). Longer project timelines, saythree to five years, do not fit easily with organizational reporting periods andboard oversight. This lack of continued funding is typically how third partiesexplain why they are unable to offer extended support to the participants ofthe initial training. Yet, the professionals and residents of countries receivingassistance need continuous support over a long period in order to buildcapacity in handling their own conflicts.

There are ways to overcome the barriers to extended support. Thirdparties can look for ways to continue their involvement, whether by con-vincing funding organizations to expand their time horizon, as Broome didwith Fulbright in Cyprus, or by using up-to-date communication techniques,such as e-mail, fax, and telephone, or by helping parties attract new fundingsources with long-term ties to the issues at stake. What it takes is a commit-ment by an intervening third party to a long-term involvement, plus a


willingness to accept the risk that this continued involvement will not beadequately funded.

Lesson Four: External events and decisions can influence thedirection and momentum of the third-party process. Success inhandling these pressures rests on the ability of the third party toidentify possible external obstacles early and have the flexibilityto adapt a chosen process constructively.

Supporting evidence: Broome faced delays in getting permission tosponsor a bi-community group, plus the deadline of a short, nine-monthgrant period. His initial contacts on Cyprus were with members of eachcommunity separately, and of necessity he built his working relationships onan individual basis. He initially planned for the first meetings to be joint ses-sions held in the buffer zone, but the external constraints were imposingindefinite delays. Broome responded by changing his plans and beginningthe consensus-building process separately in the two communities.

Implications: Mediator training should include practice in identifyingexternal conditions that may cause difficulty in the intervention process andbuilding experience in adjusting to meet possible outside constraints. Theseconditions can be included in simulation exercises in ways that force partici-pants to adjust to external pressure under realistic time constraints.

Concluding ThoughtsPreparation is a key component to effective third-party decision making. Thecomplexities of intractable conflict situations are not easily deciphered, andwhen one is placed in the position of working with parties that have beenlong at odds with one another, it is difficult to make the “right” choicesabout how to proceed. Third parties are often required to make decisions onimportant process issues on very short notice and without an opportunityfor extended research or even much reflection. Therefore, a valuable goal forpreparation is to develop the ability to spot patterns or cues in the contextof the dispute that can immediately suggest techniques or process optionsthat might be successful.

This ability can sometimes come from long and varied experience as athird-party practitioner, but usually it is critical to develop well-designedtraining programs to help potential interveners. Hopefully, the questionsposed and the responses provided in this essay will be helpful to thosedesigning such training programs, as well as to the individual who is seekingto better understand and-or perform the facilitator role. Rather than offerconclusions, our intention is to promote dialogue about important issues sur-rounding intervention choice-points of the type described here. If the ideaspresented are helpful to anyone, we will be pleased, and if better choices aremade as a result of our discussion, we will be more than gratified. We lookforward to an exchange of ideas and the chance to learn from the experi-ences of others.


NOTES

1. Features that define those decision-making settings are experienced decision makers, timepressure, high stakes, inadequate information or ambiguity, unstructured procedures, a stressfulcontext, and dynamic conditions (Klein 1998: 4). See also Zsambok and Klein (1997) and Klein etal. (1993) for a more extensive discussion of naturalistic decision making.

2. Klein (1998: 24) describes a “recognition-primed decision” (RPD) model, which “fuses twoprocesses: the way decision makers size up the situation to recognize which course of actionmakes sense, and the way they evaluate that course of action by imagining it.”

3. Third parties are also involved in helping make decisions on such substantive issues as dis-covering interests, inventing options, generating objective criteria, identifying alternatives, andevaluating possible solutions. We use a rational-choice model, rather than experience-based meth-ods, to address those issues and help the parties make the resulting decisions.

4. For a history of the Cyprus conflict, see Attalides (1979); Hitchens (1984); Koumoulides(1986); Markides (1977); Stearns (1992).

5. The Cyprus Consortium, which included the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD)and the Conflict Management Group (CMG), offered a series of conflict resolution training work-shops during the spring and summer of 1994. Broome participated in these workshops as part ofthe facilitation team.

6. Some Greek Cypriots belonged to the Peace Center, which had been established a fewyears earlier, and some Turkish Cypriots had a coalition for peace that primarily involved mem-bers of the political left. In addition, a small bi-communal committee had been formed after anearlier IMTD workshop in Oxford, England.

7. The interactive design methodologies Broome used with various groups in Cyprus arebased on the work of John Warfield and his “Interactive Management” (IM) process. See Warfield(1994); Broome and Keever (1995).

8. Daniel Hadjitoffi, executive director of the Cyprus Commission, played a leading role inefforts to continue the conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus. Ambassador Richard Boucher, whowas completing his term at the end of Broome’s first year in Cyprus, and Ambassador KennethBrill, who was appointed to replace Boucher, were both supportive of continuing the FulbrightScholar position. Their efforts, along with those of their public affairs officers, Marcelle Wabbaand Judy Baroody, were instrumental in making possible Broome’s second and third terms inCyprus.

9. At the end of Broome’s residency in Cyprus, the Fulbright Commission authorized the con-tinuation of the conflict resolution fellowship, and the work was carried on in following years byother scholars. Fulbright scholars Philip Snyder, John Ungerleighter, and Marko Turk were particu-larly instrumental in the growth of the bi-communal peace movement in Cyprus during the period1997-1998, when the activities and numbers of participants increased dramatically.

10. An intricate struggle, dealing with wording of an item, occurred near the end of thegroup’s work on their vision statement, but this time instead of threatening the existence of thegroup, it simply delayed further progress until the conflict could be resolved. Although it was notpossible to move forward until a solution could be found to the problem, no one questioned theability of the group to complete the work, and a creative solution was found to resolve the dis-pute.

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improving third-party decisions at choice points: a cyprus case study

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