immigration and european immigration policy: myths and realities
TRANSCRIPT
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Immigration and European Immigration
Policy: Myths and Realities
Giuseppe Sciortino (Università di Trieste, Trieste, Italy)
and
Ferruccio Pastore (CeSPI, Roma, Italy)
Paper prepared for the conference: Extending the area of Freedom, Justice and Security through Enlargment: Challenges for the European Union
Europaische Rechtsakademie Trier, July 2002
Preliminary version – do not quote without permission
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Tampere’s promises are quickly fading away. For a while, it seemed that Western Europe
was on the verge of a deep and long sought change in the process, scope and contents of its
immigration policy.
Cashing upon the spaces opened up by the 1997 Amsterdam treaty, which stated a shy step
in the direction of the “communitarization” of immigration and asylum policies, the 1999 EU
meeting in Tampere called for a full- fledged common EU migration policy. On these basis, a
wave of ambitious communications and proposals have been presented by the Commission. Fairly
soon, however, the climate began to change, as revealed by the same scoreboard that the
Commission – perhaps overconfidently – had set up immediately after Tampere. The scoreboard
reveals that long delays have already accumulated for several key proposals1. Press agencies
inform us of open conflicts about others. Since Laeken, the former incremental approach and the
restrictive orthodoxy have taken again center stage, while the dream of a comprehensive common
immigration policy has receded in the background.
There are many possible ways to explain the pendulum-like movements recorded in such
process. Such explanations, of course, are contingent upon the level of analysis selected. As a
short term account, such changes may be explained looking at the changing political environment.
After all, such environment has changed a lot since Tampere, with a new popularity of center-right
governments, immigration panics again in the top of the political agenda and a new wave of
populist movements gaining success in the media and in the ballots boxes. A more structural
account would look at the difficulties of the specific institution-building, the power networks
germinated in past intergovernmental activities, the resource and constraints for the commission
staff to act as “supranational entrepreneurs” to use Moravcsik (1999) term.
Such analyses are by and large correct. They, however, do seem to us unable to tell the full
story with an adequate detail. This paper will argue that, in order to explain such pendulum
movements, it is necessary to focalize also the conceptual framework which has been embedded in
the – by now – long history of the attempt to construct immigration as a “European” issue. In the
first paragraph, we will reconstruct briefly such attempt, stressing how the tensions between the
“intergovernmental” and the “European” approaches cannot be seen only as an organizational
issue: in the last decades, it will be argued, such tension has produced a whole set of rhetorical
structures and binary oppositions, that have become somewhat “embedded” in the institutional
1. The scoreboard is available at http.//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg/justice_home/pdf/
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tension (par. 1.2). In the next step, we will describe the conceptual framework that has triggered
the construction of European migration as a common policy issue. We will outline how such
conceptual framework is grounded on several mythical assumptions, that we will quickly confront
with some easily available data (par. 3). On the basis of these analyses we will provide a further
key elements for explaining the difficulties of establishing a full-Europeanized immigration
policies: any attempt to create a common immigration policy - the post Tampere events being only
the last of a series – face the need to challenge the mythical assumptions of the European vision of
immigration. The political difficulties of such task, we will argue, are a key – and
unacknowledged - stumbling block in the way of European policy development.
1. “European migration policy” before Tampere: a brief historical background
All over Europe, the immigration debate is plenty of references to “Europe”. In most
public opinions, it is common place to argue that immigration is a “European” problem and to
complain about the shortcomings of the “European” immigration policy. In the Southern European
countries, politicians in charge argue that immigration reforms are necessary to bring them up to
the “European” standard, while opposition parties claim the same reforms are bringing their
countries “out of Europe”. In other European countries, it is a common charge that europhile
politicians are discussing or accepting immigration decisions that are against the national interests.
In other words, that they fail to secure an adequate action for protecting such interests. According
to public opinion data, European citizens are deeply unsatisfied with their immigration policies.
Still the number of them that consider useful some kind of “European” policy is fairly high. In
other words, the fact that “european immigration policy” is a highly conflictual and highly
contested field should not blind us to the fact that the boundaries of such field – the assumption of
its existence, peculiarity and significance – are firmly established as a political object. Nor should
it be forgotten that frequent oppositions to specific European proposals leave intact the idea that a
common European answer to immigration problems is both desiderable and achievable (if only the
other member states would accept our priorities….). Already in 1989, although with sizeable
national variations, 35% of the European respondents to the Eurobarometer survey advocated a
common legislation that would apply directly to all member states and a further 30% advocated a
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strict coordination among national legislation through a reciprocal consultation procedure
(Eurobarometer 1989).
This is, indeed, quite extraordinary. For a long part of post-war European history, the
thirty glorious years of economic recovery and state reconstruction, European countries have
witnessed impressive migratory flows (Bade 2000; Sassen 1999). Such era, however, did not
imply any kind of coordination among receiving countries. While a web of treaties did indeed link
sending and receiving countries, the relationships among governments of the European receiving
countries were absent or openly competitive. When a degree of similarity can be identified, it is
usually linked either to participation to international bodies or to informal copycat strategies
(Sciortino 2000a). The first steps toward the construction of a “European immigration” policy
problem took place only in the early ’80s, when the consequences of the immigration stop of the
mid ‘70s had destroyed both the delusions of the previous era and the hopes for country-based
quick solutions (Pastore 2000). Beside a resolution on the problem of migrant workers and their
families in 1976 – where member states were encouraged to consult the commission about their
policies toward resident immigrant workers (Callovi 1992) - the establishment of a European
policy field on immigration had to wait until mid-80s (Papademetriu 1996).
The historical reconstruction of such genetic moment is still fairly incomplete. The
construction of the “European immigration policy” field – of the idea that the control and
management of migratory flows should be considered a European problem - has been facilitated
by several factors. First of all, the clashes with the embedded liberalism regimes - experienced by
many countries in their post-1973 attempts to restrict immigration with country-based measures –
made appealing the existence of a forum where member states could bypass their internal
constraints in the attempt to regulate the forms of migration their policies defined as unwanted
(Geddes 2001). Second, a certain measure of coordination could easily fit with the technical
problems of the establishment of an intensified common market. Third, the policy response to
some historical events –such as the Turkish asylum seekers upsurge in 1979/80 – had taught that
the control of unwanted migration could require measures (such as the introduction of visa
requirements and agreement with neighboring states) whose effectiveness was strictly contingent
upon coordination with other territorially close receiving states2. There is room, however, to argue
2. The Turkish asylum seekers in Germany are the first warning of the coming “asylum seekers crisis” of the early ‘90s. After the coup d’etat in Turkey, the German Federal Republic received in two years more asylum requests than in the whole previous decade. The “crisis” was brought under control through the introduction of visa requirements for Turkish citizens, an agreement with the GDR for stopping Turkish
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that a basic factor in the establishment of such a field has been the very same adoption of stop
policies in the mid-70s. Although the migratory regimes of the European receiving states were
quite varied – and albeit the immigration stops were introduced independently – the adoption of
very similar decisions had quickly backtracked: from the fact of similar answers could be inferred
the existence of similar problems. At the root of the European immigration policy process, we find
the slow emergence of a common vision of the European immigration system: there is not a
structural demand for unskilled foreign labor any more, their previous large supply has lowered
the adoption of technological and organizational innovation, the actual migration pressure is
largely due to push factors in the sending countries, new waves of arrival would preclude a full
integration of the already present foreigners, would exercise a strain on the welfare state coffers
and could trigger a wave of xenophobic backlashes.
The shared construction of “Europe” in reference to immigration, however, did leave
open the question of which “Europe”, of the institutional framework of the newly constructed
policy field. Since the beginning, there is a structural tension between the attempt, by the
European Commission, to establish immigration policy as a full- fledged field of action and several
states and state structures, interested instead on a dense network of intergovernmental bodies. In
1985, we witness both the establishment of the first kernel of the Schengen system – bound to
become the quintessential symbol of the intergovernmental approach – and the attempt by the
commission to establish a somewhat binding coordination of member states in matters of entry,
residence, working permits, contrast of irregular migration and cooperation with sending countries
(Commission of the European Communities 1985). While the Schengen system was bound to
grow remarkably in subsequent years, the Commission attempt was quickly defeated by a
challenge in the European Court of Justice by several member states. Even the few areas and
procedures allowed by the ECJ ruling were seldom or weakly implemented (Papademetriu 1996).
A similar conflict appeared during the negotiations of the Single European Act of 1986, where the
Commission’s inclusive interpretation of article 8a was defeated by the member states, unwilling
to reduce their discretionality in the treatment of Third Country Nationals. By 1989, with the Free
Movement of Persons Report, (Coordinators' Group on Free Movement of Persons 1989), it was
clear that immigration policies would be dealt within strictly intergovernmental structures. Such
cooperation should include only restrictive and control issues. A year later, a new discrepancy
appeared at the Council meeting in Rome, where the Commission presented the report of a group
citizens from entering the country via Berlin and forbidding asylum seekers from being employed while
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of independent experts – accepting the priority of control over integration, but stressing at the
same time the independent importance of integration measures and advocating an easy access to
naturalizations (Commission of the European Communities 1990) – while the Coordinators’
Group stressed how integration could be achieved only in a context of tight and effective
regulations of new entries, postponing consequently integrative measure far away in the future
(Coordinators' Group on Free Movement of Persons 1990).
Since the beginning, we see a processual pattern that will be encountered again and
again: the slow condensation of organizational energies and rhetorical resources in the hands of
the proponents of an EU immigration policy, a decreasing satisfaction with the achieved level of
coordination on immigration control activities, the attempt by supranational bodies to seize the
opportunities opened up by the general institution-building, the production of apparently
successful proposals and a severe defeat at the end, with a rapid Commission’s retreat and a return
to the perspective of intergovernmental coordination on a restricted set of issues. As a matter of
fact, such pattern may be identified in the early ‘90s, looking at the fate of the two 1991
communications on asylum and immigration, and again in the mid-90s, looking at the fate of the
1994 communication on immigration and asylum policies (Commission of the European
Communities 1991a; Commission of the European Communities 1991b; Commission of the
European Communities 1994).
The existence and strength of such recurring pattern is instructive: the structural tension
between intergovernmental and supranational vision of the searched European immigration policy
creates, in a diachronic perspective, a pendulum-like movement. This, however, appear to be
strongly biased in favor of loose coordination among member states on a limited, and control-
based, list of issues. Such pendulum movements, however, do not imply a return of the identical.
Cycle by cycle, the two institutional and organizational options have become charged with a
variety of symbolic meanings, related both to the overall characteristics of the two options and to
the values and priorities such “European” policy should embrace (table 13). This set of rhetorical
binary oppositions – the aura, so to speak – is often more sharply polarized than the actual policy
measures advocated, that are nearly always much more similar than expected4. The rhetorical
their request was evaluate (Martin 1994) . 3. The table has been constructed starting from a (surely non probabilistic) sample of official documents, scholarly papers and press cut-outs. It should be assumed consequently as a sensitizing device, not as a factual description of the situation. 4 . Some warnings are in order. It may be suspected that, at least in some occasion, the communication of the commission, such as the 1991 ones, were meant to accomodate the general political mood or were
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structure adopted, however, has some consequences also for the actors that adopt it: their agenda
and options becomes – at least partly – constrained by the symbolic attributions they employ to
carve a space for themselves (DiMaggio 1997; Nash 2001). After every downturn, the
Commission structures have found themselves more and more identified with the aim of a a
“global, complementary, comprehensive and realistic” immigration policy (Commission of the
European Communities 1991b).
Tab. 1 The Rhetorical Structure of Institutional Options.
Inter-governmental "supranational" control control and integration
state-centered EU-centered short-term long-term
incremental comprehensive restrictive enlightened
fragmented systemic Lowest-common denominator up-to-the-task
unaccountable accountable Fortress Europe Area of freedom, security and justice rights-reducing rights-enhancing
pragmatic ideological realistic grandiose
common sense elitist 2. Schengen II: the revenge?
From many points of view, the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a strong
difference in the institutional context of “European” immigration policy. The treaty, after all,
provided the institutional resources for a full “communitarization” (contingent upon a unanimity
vote in 2004) of the main structures of the intergovernmental approach. It is important to stress
that such outcome has made been possible by the very same success of intergovernemental
coordination. From one side, Schengen was by then basically covering all the external Southern
frontiers of the Union. Its main engine – the exchange between the willingness to play the role of a
buffer state and the symbolic recognition granted by the Schengen membership (Convey and
Kupiszewski M. 1995; Sciortino 1999; Pastore 1999) – was consequently running out of fuel. On
the other side, “communitarization” appeared, even to supporters of the intergovernmental
approach, as a reasonable way out from the increasing severity of the approach’s shortcomings:
selected in a way as to maximize attention to the areas were its claims could be pushed more successfully (Papademetriu 1996). On the whole, however, most of the communications here reviewed are basically enlightened versions of the restrictive orthodoxy about immigration in Europe.
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the extensive dependency on unanimity decisions (producing painfully slow and weak decisions),
the unequal distribution of financial and control burdens that would derive from a real application
of the Dublin treaty (producing widespread delays and endemic subterfuges) and interest in
presenting accession countries a take-it-or-leave-it package of immigration control measures
(necessary to create an Eastern layer of buffer states). Finally, the restrictive orthodoxy seemed to
be breaking down anyway: the need for foreign labor was starting to be openly recognized in
several European political system, and some Mediterranean countries had already introduced a
basic set of active immigration policies5. Such opportunities were appealing, and it is then not
surprising that plenty of initiatives – from different actors and with different purposes – have been
observed since 1997.
The Tampere’s council of 1999 – with its emphasis on the adoption of an “integrated
approach” (Commission of the European Communities 1999)– seemed to many held the promise
that a “communitarized” immigration policy would be something different from Schengen written
large (Pastore 2000). On the basis of the decisions taken in Tampere, the Commission has issued
several communications and legislative proposals addressing a variety of key issues and, more
importantly launching an integrate and medium term strategy for immigration policy in Europe,
including an outline of the institutional process designed to support it (Commission of the
European Communities 2000a; Commission of the European Communities 2000b; Commission of
the European Communities 2001). Such communications, and several more specific ones, dealt –
albeit quite shyly – with troubled issues such as the rights of third country nationals, family
reunification and the introduction of burden sharing mechanisms for asylum-seekers. In a limited,
but significant, breakaway from the restrictive orthodoxy, the Commission recognized the
existence in Europe of a demand for foreign workers and argued in favor of some kind of active
immigration policy The pendulum seemed to have switched definitely towards the supranational
side and the symbols associated with it.
It did not last long. Already at the end of 2001, the commission – reviewing its
scoreboard – stressed how progresses in the field of immigration had been very slow and uneven.
Looking at the measures, the scoreboard revealed fairly clearly that the measures that basically
expanded or revised the Schengen tradition had fairly good chances of acceptance, while the
5 . All the talk of “zero immigration ” notwithstanding, no EU member state has ever stopped completely labor migration. All member states have actually a variety of programs for the entry of foreign labor (Ecotec ). Still, from 1999 on, a growth has been observed in the proposals for explicit programs for foreign workers even in countries that had never recognize before the enduring existence of a demand for foreign workers.
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chances of the measures targeted to deal with regular immigration – a key dimension of the
Commission’s strategy – were rather gloomy. Immediately after such review exercise, the Laeken
summit brought to light the open resistance of some member states and the existence of significant
amounts of afterthoughts in the others. The same summit operated a fairly strong scaling-down of
the strategy, giving again full priority to control issues and to the standardization of procedures
only in the field of humanitarian acceptance6. This fundamental trend was not only confirmed but
reinforced in Sevilla.
What seems to take place, in short, is the classical putting old wine in new bottles: the
“new” “communitarized” approach assumes more and more the two main structural features of the
former inter-governmental one: it is restricted to few issues managed according to the search for
lowest common denominators, it deals nearly exclusively with control issues and it pursues its
objectives in a fragmented rather than systemic way. At the moment, the choice seems to be
between a communitarized immigration policy that follow rather closely the immigration strategy
and approach of the previous intergovernmental stream – thus basically renouncing the aura
identified in table 1 – and an overarching chance of failure in 2004. If such outcome will prove
true, the significance of the previous explanations centered on the institutional level will need to
be somewhat qualified. Opposition to “communitarization”, in other words, could prove to be less
connected with institutional design and fears for the sovereignty losses than previously assumed.
On the contrary, the systemic, comprehensive, medium-term policy stance, strictly associated to
that project, could turn out to matter more.
Our argument is that – beside the obvious importance of the competing institutional
projects and of the power networks associated with them – an adequate understanding of the
issues involved requires also to pay its dues to the conceptual frame embodied in the very same
construction of an “European immigration policy”, the very taken-for-granted assumptions that
political actors make about the process that aim to regulate. Such assumptions – that have fuelled
the growth of the “European immigration” policy field – have, as we will show in the next
paragraph, largely mythical foundations. Reality notwithstanding, such cognitive frame has
attained a status of orthodoxy that can be challenged – from the political and electoral point of
view - only at great risk. As such foundation would be much more difficult to uphold within the
context of a comprehensive immigration policy, the political pressure to maintain such
foundations– although matched with a growing feeling of unreality among staff and even
6. See point n. 40 of the conclusions, available at http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/
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decision-makers – force the policy process towards incremental, lowest-common denominator,
negotiations centered mainly on reactive control measures.
3. Myths and Realities
From the point of view of its cognitive framework, the European immigration policy
debate shows a fairly strong continuity. Reading longitudinally the available planning document, it
is striking how stable the set of basic assumption is revealed to be. Such set of assumption may
summarized as follow:
1. Western Europe is a single, albeit internally varied, migration system; 2. EU member states have (at least) a set of common migratory problems, that can (and
should) be managed in similar ways; 3. In Western Europe, there is no structural demand for unskilled foreign labor; 4. The main factor behind irregular immigration are inadequate control systems; 5. Irregular migration toward EU countries is mainly push-driven; 6. The integration of immigrants is difficult and it poses several challenges. To be able to
integrate the already present foreigners, a tight control is necessary; 7. To regulate restrictively the mobility of TCN is necessary given their high mobility
potential. Without such restrictions, foreigners would move to the most generous welfare states;
8. European societies are highly homogeneous and most citizens feel culturally threatened by immigration. Consequently, xenophobic backlashes are an ever-present possibility to be constantly monitored and taken into account;
All these assumptions may be questioned and – indeed – are questioned by several
researches. We will restrict ourselves to public-use, easily accessible data, just in order to show
that such premises are not inference from factual knowledge, but rather a kind of moral discourse
- evolved as a reaction from the guestworkers’ era delusions – that is continually reinforced by its
assertion as a “realistic” frame for policy-making7.
Let’s start with the first crucial assumption: that Western Europe is a single, albeit
internally varied, migration system. In the last twenty years there has been a remarkable process of
convergence among the immigration policies of the EU member countries, at least as far as
7. We do not claim at all that cognitive frameworks determine policies (Sciortino 2000b). We claim they contribute to establish the boundaries of policy menus, as well as creating resources both for launching and contrasting policy proposals. In recent years, the restrictive orthodoxy has increasingly played the latter role.
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migratory control is concerned (Brochmann and Hammar 1999).Can we say the same for the
migratory systems such policies are meant to regulate? Unfortunately, comparative data are scarce
and sometimes less reliable than they could be. However, if we have a look at the available data
for the last decade (Council of Europe 2000; Eurostat 2000; Oecd 1999), we easily discover a few
significant facts:
- there are only very few and debatable evidence of convergence among European countries as
far as migrants’ countries of origins, destinations and individual characteristics;
- there is very weak evidence of convergence among migratory trends, with only a few countries
experiencing in the last decade structural changes in the flows’ compositions;
- there is an even scarcer evidence of convergence among migratory stock trends, both in
reference to the stock of resident foreign population and its labor market participation rate and
sectoral employment. Most of the recorded convergence is likely to be derived by the
convergence among the countries’ occupational structures;
- sub-regional homogeneities are very limited and nearly never among contiguous units;
- the attractive capacities of countries, and increasingly of their regions, appear to be highly
disomogeneous;
A point that should be stressed is that such results are not surprising from the point of view of
contemporary migration theory8. Given what we know by now about the history of migratory
flows in many European countries (most of them already in the stage where cumulative causation
factors are mature), about the path-dependent and locally-selected nature of many migratory
systems and about the effectiveness and capabilities of immigration policy, such results are
precisely what a sophisticated theory of migration would lead us to expect. This does not imply
that among the set of migratory systems that include Western Europe there are not similarities and
overlappings. Nor that the convergence among control immigration policies will be void of
consequences for such systems. Keeping in mind the plural and fragmented nature of immigration
in Europe, however, should sensitize us to the fact that such convergence among control policies
is perceived as a reaction but is empirically a construction (Sciortino 2000a).
From the first assumption, in the European policy debate, usually follows that EU member
countries have at least some common migratory problem that could and should be managed in a
coordinated way. At first glance, it may appear obvious. Compared with 30 years ago, all Western
European countries – actually most European countries tout court – have become receiving
8 For an accurate review, see (Massey et al. 1998)
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countries. All public opinions are concerned with a set of apparently similar issues – irregular
migration, security and the migratory consequences of international crises being surely among
them. The policy problem menus seem today much more similar today across European countries
than it used to be 30 years ago. At a closer look, however, such similarities are indeed existing but
far from telling us the full story. Similar flows, in different contexts, may after all still require
different answers as they may produce different answers. The clearest example is the “control
crisis” of the early ‘90s, a main triggering factors in the development of “European immigration
policy” as a policy field (Cornelius W. et al. 1994; Freeman 1994). Most of European coordination
at the time has been targeted to bring under control such crisis, identified mainly with the upsurge
of asylum-seekers and refugees (introduction of visa requirements, externalization of border
controls, sanctions to carriers, involvement of Eastern European countries, the safe heaven
concept, temporary and discretionary protection programs). By and large, such policy – albeit at
the cost of serious strains - has been successful: even if in the rise again, the number of asylum
applications in Europe was in 2001 only slightly more than 50% of the 1992 peak, and the war in
Kossovo has shown that even the flows of displaced persons may be contained quite effectively.
Tab. 2 Asylum Requests in Europe as a % of the total. 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991
France 8,0 16,6 20,7 12,6 9,5 Germany 63,0 47,6 42,8 49,0 52,8 Sweden 7,4 9,3 10,7 7,5 5,6 United Kingdom 5,8 3,5 5,5 6,4 9,2 % of the EU15 total 84,2 77,1 79,7 75,5 77,1
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
France 4,3 5,3 8,4 7,3 7,6 Germany 65,2 62,5 41,3 46,6 51,8 Sweden 12,5 7,3 6,1 3,3 2,6 United Kingdom 4,8 5,4 13,7 20,0 12,4 % of the EU15 total 86,8 80,5 69,5 77,2 74,5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
France 8,3 7,4 8,9 10,6 13,0 Germany 43,3 32,5 27,5 21,6 24,3 Sweden 4,0 4,2 3,2 4,5 6,5 United Kingdom 13,5 19,1 20,6 20,9 19,7 % of the EU15 total 69,1 63,3 60,3 57,6 63,4 Source: Unhcr for 1980-1981, 2001 and for Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg; Icg for 1992-2000.
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In retrospect, however, we can easily discover that such “crisis” was hardly
“European”: it was a German (and partly French, Swedish and British) crisis (table 2). Germany
alone, in the heaviest years from 1990 to 1993, received from 49% to 65% of all the asylum
requests in Europe, and the four countries together absorbed from 75% to 86% of all the requests
filed in those years. In doing so, they were confirming a medium-term pattern already well
established long before the geopolitical transformations of the late ‘80s, as the 1980 and 1985 data
show (table 2). Not surprisingly, the policies enacted in the period have changed the situation.
This, however, not only as far as the volumes of overall asylum seekers (the average number of
application from 1990 to 1993 was 517,000, the average number of application in the period from
1998 to 2001 was 344,000 with a decrease of 33%) but also their regional distribution: in the last
years, Germany receives less than a quarter of all European applications, Sweden between 4% and
7% and the absorption rate of the four major countries of the “crisis period” has lowered to 63%.
The policy circle of the early ’90s has consequently been rather effective. But it may be
questioned if the measures adopted and the policy stances taken have been answering to a
“European-wide” problem: Southern European countries, that in the same years were experiencing
a large influx of foreign labor, would have presumably benefited much more by the development
of an active labor policy, matched if possible by a more liberal visa regime, by programs for
seasonal work and tailored employer sanctions. Such items were in fact on the European table, but
they were always given a low – if existent – priority.
The latter point is closely connected to the fourth myth we have identified in the
European vision of migration: the lack of a structural demand for unskilled – or low skilled –
foreign labor. Such item was born in the years prior to the great immigration stop of the early ‘70s,
and it has fossilized ever since. The historical record, however, does indeed show that such great
immigration stop was linked more to political than economic reasons. In fact, it took place while
employers were still frantically recruiting abroad, recurring in Germany even to charter flights
(Münz R. and Ulrich R. E. 1998). As matter of fact, the immigration stop was a political decision,
aimed at establishing a renewed control over the determination of the composition of the
population, on the basis of a perception that the current migration situation was producing benefits
for the entrepreneurs and costs for the political system9. There is a considerable evidence that the
9. This was openly recognized in the very first SOPEMI report, written in 1979: the immigration stop decision is presented as motivated “strictly by political reasons” and it is argued that the oil shock had been an occasion for pushing forward “restrictive decisions grounded in the political and social situation” rather than in the economic one. For a detailed discussion of such interpretation of the immigration stop, see (Sciortino 2000a)
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immigration stop has not implied the disappearance of the demand for unskilled foreign labor. Of
course, the era of large manufacturing plants hiring thousands of steelworkers at once is ended
and many mature sectors have been loosing large shares of their workforce. But a large demand
for lowly skilled and unskilled work still exists in other sectors, such as construction and small,
tailored-made, production. Actually, it could well be that technological and organizational
innovations do produce in the most innovative firms a deeper segmentation between skilled and
unskilled positions, thus increasing the demand for foreign labor (Bruni 1994). The demand for
elementary occupation in the service sector is also large. Given that European welfare state (with
the exception of the Scandinavian countries) are service-lean and transfer-based, European
households – pressured by a structural increase in women employment - needs to acquire a large
volume of personal services on the market, producing a further demand for lowly skilled jobs.
Agriculture does still need – at least in some points in the circle, often year- long – position
shunned by locals. According to the most recent estimates, more than one agricultural seasonal
worker out of ten is a foreigner, 90% of which arriving from accession countries (table 3). Given
the large proportion of undocumented work in the agricultural sector, such data are very likely to
be heavily underestimated.
Tab. 3 Foreign Seasonal Workers in the Agricultural Sectors (2000).
Germany 250.000 Austria 28.421 Greece 120.000 Finland 2.502 Sweden 2.835 Netherlands 6.328 Italy (data refer to 2001) 80.000 Spain 32.315 Portugal - - France 7.100 Denmark 50 Belgium - - Partial Total 522.685 Source: Coldiretti calculation on GEOPA data (2002).
In the absence of heavy proletarization processes of the native population, such large
demand for unskilled or low skilled work will require the presence of a large number of
foreigners. Not surprisingly, we find across Western Europe immigrants over represented in the
manufacturing, construction and service sectors (Oecd 2001). The same sectors are supposed to
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harbor the most of undocumented migration jobs, with even a larger presence in the personal
services (Oecd 2000).
As matter of fact, hundreds of thousands of the migrants that, along the last two
decades, were said to “migrate into unemployment” appear actually to be by now firmly
employed10. All in all, market participation rate of male foreign workers is frequently above that
of natives in European labor markets, more remarkably in the younger countries of immigration
such as Italy or Spain11. Differences, moreover, tend to disappear with the length of residence, as
foreigners seem to show over time a remarkable occupational assimilation (Oecd 2001). Although
immigrants may face difficulties in entering the labor market in the short term, they seem to have
a beneficial effect in the medium one (Glover et al. 2001).
A final consideration may be made looking at what the EU member states do, rather
than to what they preach: in recent years, a variety of seasonal workers programs have been
opened or strengthened in some European countries. Under a large variety of labels and schemes,
Germany has employed during the 90s an average of 275,000 foreign temporary workers a year,
France an average of 13,000, the United Kingdom of around 86,000 (Oecd 2001). If we look at the
policy proposals on the table of many European government, there is some chances that a new
guestworker era is slowly starting. The new generation of programs, however, seems to be
designed in a way that secures its temporary character or, more precisely, does not imply the
acquisition of residency rights. It is just too early to say if such programs will turn to be effective
or if they will nurture a new historical delusion about their actual temporariness.
The brief summary of the information available about the demand for foreign labor may
allow the conclusion that the difference between the period before the early '70s immigration stop
and today does not concern so much the volume as the origins of such demands: the demand of
foreign labor by the large industrial plants – the reference point of most traditional corporatist
immigration planning – is very limited or not existent. But there is a strong demand originating
from small and medium sized businesses as well as by households. Such change implies a change
in the effectiveness of internal immigration control: policing the boundaries of the labor market is,
10. We are not saying that the employment of foreigners is a paradise. Data shows firmly that foreigners’ earnings are significantly lower than natives’, that immigrants’ occupations are much more sensible to economic downturns and that first-generation, and sometimes second generation, foreigners are much more represented in elementary occupations. We just want to make the point that the demand for their work is, at least for a large part, structural in the medium term. 11. The comparison of aggregate data as in some countries the base (the number of recorded foreigners in the population) is composed by a significant number of asylum seekers, that in most countries are forbidden to work while their application or their appeal is heard.
16
in the contemporary situation, a much more complicated matter. It is not surprising then that at
least sections of the European migratory system have, rather than stopped, turned from regular to
irregular, from documented to undocumented. As irregular migrants are, by definition (in Europe,
at least), excluded from the official labor market, the existence of a sizable irregular migration
system is largely contingent upon the size, structure and strength of the informal economy in the
different economic systems. According to IMF estimates, the contribution of the informal
economy to the official GDP is estimated as ranging from a minimum of 9% (Switzerland) up to
27% and 30% respectively in Italy and Greece (Schneider and Enste 2000) and the experts
surveyed by Mateman and Renooy estimate a large, although far from being exclusive,
contribution of undocumented migrants to the Western European informal economies (Mateman
and Renooy P. H. 2001). Given this context, the assumption that irregular migration is produced
(or made possible) by weak external controls appear to be rather mythical too.
Since the late ‘80s, most of European government’s attention has been devoted to the
reform of external controls. Visa requirements have been introduced for nearly all sending
countries and significant investments have been made on border police authorities (International
Centre for Migration Policy Development 1999). With a remarkable degree of creativity,
“borders” have been expanded and enlarged, buffer-states and buffer areas have been identified
and a growing number of actors has been made subject to control duties (Lahav and Guiraudon
2000). Such efforts have had a remarkable degree of success in the control of the flows of asylum-
seekers and, more generally, in managing the growing demand for admission. Such success is
perhaps best witnessed by the surge of illegal entries recorded in recent years, and in the
development of a specialised transnational smuggling industry (Pastore et al. 1999). Such a large
investment on external controls could be highly effective if the migratory flows were a flood, a
multitude of atomised persons “pushed” out from their countries desperately. The previous points,
however, have shown how such vision is deeply mistaken, at least for the mainstream of the flow.
Most of irregular migrants have both connections and some kind of job prospects in the receiving
countries. And precisely for this reason a number of them can, given the strength of the demand
for foreign labour, circumvent a system focalised nearly only on external control.
Here we find a further sub-myth: that the main channels of irregular migration are those
based on clandestine entry. Such sub-myth, functional to the overemphasis on border controls,
does underplay the complexities of visa regulations in a highly interconnected world. As matter of
fact, even tight visa requirements still allow for overstaying. Given the absence of comparative
17
data, we will use here the result of a recent survey – on a large (N=7692) sample of foreigners – in
Lumbardy. The survey result show that more than a third of the interviewees have entered the
country with a short-term visa, and subsequently overstayed (table 4). This is even more
significant if we take into account that a quarter of the sample has arrived before the introduction
of visa requirements and others have entered as refugees and temporary protected persons, with
no need for visa. Overstaying, rather than clandestine entry, appear then to be the main channel of
irregular migration for many long term undocumented resident.
Table 4 - When they entered, did they have a visa? Frequency %
Regular, long-term visa 2.121 27,6 Tourist visa 2.818 36,6 No visa 2.754 35,8 Total 7.692 100,0 Source: Fondazione Cariplo-Ismu, Lumbardy survey, 2001.
Nor this can be attributed to a lax implementation of visa requirements by Italian
authorities. The number of visa issued by Italian consulates in the sending countries is quite
reasonable, and perhaps lower than international trade and tourism flows would lead to expect.
Table 5 – Visas granted by some Schengen countries (1998-2000). Country 1998 1999 2000 Var. % 1999/2000 Germany 2,498,000 2,264,131 2,607,012 15.1% France 2,053,443 1,940,000 2,113,632 8.9% Italy 741,077 834,776 1,008,999 20.9% Spain 660,359 542,000 670,949 23.8% Greece … 462,748 … … Austria 419,700 433,867 449,035 3.5% Netherlands + Luxemburg
415,420 369,665 320,847 -13.2%
Belgium 147,684 122,761 … … Portugal 111,859 106,565 122,002 14.5% Total 7,047,542 7,076,513 … … Source: Ministero degli affari esteri, 2001, p. 121.
There is also a large body of documentary evidence that, in many sending countries, to
obtain a short-term visa is difficult, even when there are very good reasons for requesting it. Data
show that some sending countries (such as Morocco and Albania) provide only a small number of
overstayers. Irregular migration from other areas - Central and South America, the Philippines,
Russia and Eastern Europe – seem, on the contrary, to take place mainly through overstaying. The
18
first cause of such difference is the sheer size of mobility among the latter countries and Western
Europe. The second is the existence of geopolitical and historical links between some of these
countries and at least a European country, that function as a gateway for the whole Western
Europe; The third – and likely the most important - is the availability, for the overstayers from
these countries, of irregular employment within households. An effective system of immigration
control in Western Europe should be then focalized in reducing the availability of informal,
undocumented jobs, thus dealing indirectly with the main pulling factor. Western European states,
however, do not seem to place the contrast of irregular occupation on the top of the policy
priority, nor we record in recent years significant investments on work-sites inspections and
employers’ sanctions (Robin and Barros 1999). The European coordination on such issues has
appeared since the beginning in the “European immigration policy” planning documents, but it
has never been object of actual decisions.
The existence of a demand for foreign labor does not imply automatically that the
enactment of highly restrictive policies is unwise. A large supply of new immigrants, it is argued,
would put an heavy strain on the integrative capacities of Western European societies, thus
menacing the already present ones. The connection between integration of already present
immigrants and tight control of new entries is the hard core of the “European” vision of
immigration. Actually, sometimes the whole restric tive orthodoxy is grounded on the necessity to
make a large effort in order to manage integration successfully. Such assumption is grounded on a
widespread perception that the contemporary conditions for immigrants’ integration are markedly
different from the previous ones: integration is slower and more painful, immigrants display a
stronger feeling of resistance, transnational links and transnational homeland politics make their
“foreigness” more foreign and lasting. Unfortunately, again, this assumption does not seem to fit
well with the available evidence. Far from being characterized by their active “resistance” to
assimilation, contemporary migratory flows are repeating familiar steps. Socio-economically, it
has been seen how immigrants tend in the long term to acquire a profile similar to natives (Oecd
2001). Socially, the evidence seems to point to a reasonable process of “assimilation”: most of
them learn the language of the new country within their lifetime and very few of their offspring
fail to do so12. In the U.S., data seem to show that “the trend lines [for contemporary immigrants]
look similar to those of the Europeans: increasing spatial dispersion away from enclaves, loss of
12. When and where reality seems to diverge from such pattern, we usually find policies that, keeping immigrants uncertain about their settlement, make such goal more troublesome and less worthy. Such is the case of most of the contemporary European policies for refugees and asylum-seekers.
19
language in later generation, and increasing intermarriage”(Fisher 1999). But the same pattern
may be found – although reliable data are sensibly scarcer – in Western Europe: after a decade of
litanies on the failures of assimilation, the now available research shows quite a different story
(Modood et al. 1994; Tribalat 1996). Politically, immigrants’ mobilizations develop, of course,
collective identities. But such identities, far from being foreign implants, are actually developed
within the moulds of distinctive, receiving country-specific, national political cultures (Koopmans
and Statham 1999; Koopmans and Statham 2001). Culturally, the available evidence show that
cultural practices imported or adapted by settled immigrants are – in absence of external definition
and sanctioning – mostly of a “limited liability” characters, where culture-based scripts are
enacted and exposed according to contextual logics. If any, in Europe difference-based arguments
over immigrants seem to be more popular with - and full of implication for - receiving societies’
élites and public opinions, than they are with the immigrant themselves (Rath 1993; Schain 1999;
Silverman 1992). As matter of fact, most of the current debate on cultural differences and
immigration is just a bonfire of the vanities: assimilationists were used to portray some processes
as inevitably leading to incorporation in a common cultural life. Pluralists described the same
processes as leading to a variety of crosscutting networks characterized by a complex mix of
acquired and preserved traits. Multiculturalists describe the same processes as leading to
distinctive groups with vested interest in the protection of their cultures. It is correct to notice the
fact that the accounts have changed. But it is wise to stay agnostic on the fact that such changes in
the social accounts are caused by changes in the empirical processes (Sciortino, forthcoming).
Would such processes be modified by a flow of new entries? It would surely make a difference
from the point of view of the observer: continuing migration does indeed create a perception of
enduring ethnic visibility13. But most of such processes operate at the micro level over time,
largely independently from the flows of new arrivals. Plus, it should be considered that the ‘90s
have already been a decade of heavy new inflows.
The issues of immigrants integration is somewhat linked to the issue of TCN’s mobility
within the union. The Commission has launched several times, and failed to secure, attempts to
include TNCs among the beneficiaries of free movements. Most states, however, have assumed
that such freedom of movement would be a great risk, with large number of TCNs admitted in a
country but more than willing to move quickly to another. According to this logic, freedom of
13. There is even room to argue that the wider process of “ethnic retention” is actually just mis taken vision. What appear as “resistance” is often be the consequence of migratory patterns and “ethnic” migrant groups may just be immigrants groups continuously revitalized by new arrivals (Gans 1997).
20
movement for TCNs would basically be a renounce to state control over the size and
characteristics of new entries. Now, there is for sure a certain degree of intra-european mobility in
the irregular migratory system. A significant section of the early immigrants in Italy, as example,
was made by foreigners that had tried to stay irregularly in the traditional European receiving
countries and failed to do so. As far as legally resident immigrants are concerned, however, the
matter seems more complicated. Most resident foreigners and denizens – the target of TNC
freedom of movement – are settled by many years. And economic conditions across EU member
countries are by and large similar or varying within a limited range. The only simulation available
for international mobility within a free movements space with such conditions – developed using
Scandinavian data – would lead any analyst to a safe bet that, if such freedom were granted, the
movements would be pretty much frictional (Muus P. 1998). This has large implications also for
the assumption that generous welfare conditions do work as welfare magnet, attiring migrants
were they may enjoy the most liberal conditions. Prima facie, the theory of welfare magnet seems
more than reasonable: studies in Germany, Sweden and Denmark have documented an increase in
the rates of welfare dependency of foreign populations, in absolute terms and relative to the native
population. At the same time, however, such analyses document how such difference disappears
once controlled for observable characteristics14 and taking into account the large number of
asylum seekers who are made ‘welfare dependent’ by design (Brucker et al. 2001). Contrary to
the U.S., moreover, in Western Europe welfare dependency decreases with the length of stay:
foreigners assimilate out of welfare assistance. A strain on the welfare purse does indeed exist: but
it is largely linked to the management of asylum-seekers, to whom in most countries it is
forbidden to work. Given the large differences within the welfare regimes of Western European
countries (Esping-Andersen 1999) and the lack of solid comparative data, it is currently not
possible to say if such results would hold true for all EU countries. But they provide a fertile
ground for questioning both the assumption that ‘generous’ welfare countries will exhibit
increased immigration and that migrants are attracted to generous welfare states (Baldwin-
Edwards 2002).
The last mythical review we identified concerns the risk for xenophobic backlasher in
the European populations worried by the loss of cultural homogeneity. Such kind of problems
make the headlines in may European media, and in the post September 11th such worrisome
attitudes has taken a distinct religion-specific emphasis. Racism and xenophobia do exist. And it
14. Particularly age of the households head, education and number of children.
21
is true that in most Western European countries the national narrative tell a story of similar people
bound by the enactment of similar lifestyles. The enduring, constitutive cultural and social
heterogeneity of most European population is precisely one of the dimension of their identity that
national narrative, to quote Renan, doit avoir oublié. This notwithstanding, it is important to
stress that many opinion polls of the European public opinion do document an attitude, at least at
the declaration level, much more open that public discourse would lead us to predict15. Already in
1989, when the restrictive orthodoxy had already coalesced, 45% of European interviewed by the
Eurobarometer wanted to make naturalization easier (against 35% who were against it) and 55%
were in favour of some kind of hate laws not only for hate-motivated actions but also for hate-
expressing communications (against 28%). The Eurobarometer of 1997 document how a majority
of respondents perceived immigrants as producing unemployment (63%), putting a strain on the
welfare system (59%) and causing insecurity (45%). Less than a third, however, perceived such
presence as threatening the European way of life (29%) (Eurobarometer 1997). A survey carried
on behalf of the Vienna-based EUMC in 2000 shows a fairly negative vision of immigration
among European public opinions. The answers, however, are mainly concerned with
unemployment, welfare intake and personal security rather than with “ethnocultural” issues.
Actually, a majority of respondents display what the analysts label a “multicultural optimism”
Only in three countries – Belgium (50%), Germany (69%) and Greece (45%) – respondents feel
that cultural diversity may weaken the country fabric. The same data document how in every EU
member country a majority of the respondents – ranging from 79% to 54% - disagree with any
strongly assimilationist program (Thalhammer et al. 2000). On the whole, the actual negative
vision of immigration that we detect in European public opinion is much more functional than
ethnocultural-based. Western Europe, of course, appear unfortunately to have a fairly large
number of bigots. But for the majority of its citizens, the trouble lies more in the balance between
costs and benefits, and in their distribution. In this sense, an openly functional argument could
turn out to be much more important than a paternalistic attitude.
15. Opinion polls on matter of racism and xenophobia must always be handled with care. There is a very large gap between what human beings say and what they do, and such gap is usually even larger when sensitive issues are concerned. The gap, however, works both ways. As Lapierre demonstrated already in the ‘1930s, strongly discriminatory attitudes towards a collective may go hand in hand with fairly inclusionary behavior at the face-to-face level (LaPierre 1935). As the American joke says, “I hate Jews. Well, Aaron is not jew, he is Aaron”.
22
4. Conclusions
The previous paragraph has argued that most policy discussion in the “European
immigration policy” field are rooted in largely mythical foundations. Reacting to the delusions of
the guestworker’s era, European élites have progressively codified a cognitive framework that has
grown to become a full- fledged orthodoxy. In the last decade, such cognitive framework has been
severely tested by actual trends, and in many instances we find evidence of a growing disaffection
with it among experts and practitioners. Such orthodoxy, however, has become also embedded in
a variety of political cleavages and it is quite popular among public opinion. From the point of
view of each single decision-maker, such cognitive framework may be found less and less useful.
Still, to challenge it is something that can be done only at at great risk. This produces a spiral of
silence effect: as the holders of contrary opinions prefer to stay silent, they make silence more and
more likely along the process, thus ensuring the reproduction of such vision (Noelle-Neumann
1984). In practical terms, this implies a growing distance between what is preached and what is
done, with a constant search for low-profile solutions to labor market shortages able to bypass the
restrictive orthodoxy without challenging it (Pastore 2001).
If such description of the Western European policy context is correct, it is possible to
argue that such political expediencies are easier to manage within the fragmented and scattered
framework typical of the previous intergovernmental era than in the framework of the organic,
systemic and long-term strategies the Commission identified with. Not by chance, the recent
attempt to design precisely a policy with such features (Commission of the European
Communities 2000a), albeit very cautious on the institutional implication, resulted in a fairly
explicit challenge of some basic tenets of the restrictive orthodoxy (Pastore 2000). The post-
Tampere developments of the field may then be interpreted as an attempt to maintain a
“communitarized” institutional focus while rescuing at the issues level the residual and
fragmented structure necessary for matching cognitive definitions and actual practices. The
stumbling block in the way of a common European policy may well turn out to lie less in the
realm of institutions’ vested interests and more in the chiasm between the actions and their self-
description.
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