graham meikle and guy redden, eds. news online: transformations and continuities

Volume 35 Number 2 February 2014

CONTENTEditorial noteThe roles of the media in Africa

Herman Wasserman 1

Research articlesAdvances in African and Arab science journalism: Capacity building and new newsroom structures through digital peer-to-peer support

Olatu Jan Lublinski, Inka Reichert, Augustin Denis, Jean-Marc Fleury, Olfa Labassi and Christoph Spurk nji Ogunyemi 5

Examining the relationship between the news media and the ANC: A case study of Nkandla coverage

Jeanne Prinsloo 24

Reality effect or media effect? Television’s molding of the environmental sanitation agenda in Ghana

Senyo Ofori-Parko 41

Third-party complaints in the system of press regulation: Inviting the reader to take part in journalistic accountability and securing press freedom

Julie Reid 59

Use of information communication technologies and mobilisation in the age of parallel media, an emerging Fifth Estate? Case study of Nafeer’s Flood Campaign in the Sudan

Maha Basri 77

South African young adults’ viewership of television news and implications for democracy

Musa Ndlovu 94

Focus on: Livingstone and the legacy of Empire in the journalistic imagination

Guest editors: Martin Conboy, Jairo Lugo-Ocando, Scott Eldridge

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Book reviewsJoseph Ngu, Lai Oso and Oluseyi Soremekun, eds. Journalism, gender and democratic governance in Nigeria

Reviewed by Ayo Oyeleye 111

Anne Geniets. The global news challenge: Market strategies of international broadcasting organisations in developing countries

Reviewed by Stewart Purvis 114

Ola Ogunyemi. What newspapers, fi lms and television do Africans living in Britain see and read? The media of the African Diaspora

Reviewed by Mercy Nyawanza 117

Keith Somerville. Radio propaganda and the broadcasting of hatred: Historical development and defi nitions

Reviewed by Tanja Bosch 120

Graham Meikle and Guy Redden, eds. News online: Transformations and continuities

Reviewed by Everette Ndlovu 123

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Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies Volume 35 (1) 2014ISSN Print 0256-0054/Online 1942-0773 © 2014 iMasaDOI: 10.1080/02560054.2014.????????? pp 1–3

The roles of the media in Africa

This edition of Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies includes perspectives on journalism on various parts of the continent, with topics ranging from science and the environment to political contestations and the relationship between media and democracy.

The fi rst article, by Jan Lublinski, Inka Reichert, Augustin Denis, Jean-Marc Fleury, Olfa Labassi and Christoph Spurk, takes a comparative look at science journalism in several African and Arab countries. This comparative approach is in keeping with ENAJS’s objective of locating African journalism within broader global trends and issues, especially pertaining to contexts in the Global South. The authors argue that science journalism is important in developing countries, as it helps societies derive benefi ts from advances in science and technology. Science journalism is a specialised practice that needs support and development – which are unfortunately often lacking in newsrooms in developing countries. Drawing on data derived from the evaluation of the world’s largest support programme for science journalism, the Science Journalism Cooperation Project (or SjCOOP mentoring project), the authors evaluate the ability of support programmes such as this one to develop much-needed capacity in African and Arab newsrooms to cover science. They identify major structural problems for specialised journalists in these regions, which include lack of support from their organisations to cover beats outside politics and sports, as well as a reluctance on the part of local experts to collaborate with journalists to communicate science to the broader public. To meet these challenges, the authors suggest three elements: capacity building based on peer-to-peer support; the use of digital technologies that could combine distance communication with face-to-face encounters; and a fl exible approach that could meet the needs of individual journalists.

The next two articles in the issue examine the increasingly tense relationship between the South African media and government. In the fi rst, Jeanne Prinsloo uses a single media scandal – the one surrounding security upgrades to South African president Jacob Zuma’s residence, Nkandla – to examine what politicians and journalists do and say to each other when involved in a political contestation. Using a close reading of media discourses about this scandal, Prinsloo investigates the criticisms of the media expressed by the ANC on the one hand, and the fears and concerns expressed by

EDITORIAL NOTE

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Herman Wasserman Editiorial note

Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 35(2): 1–3 © 2014 Institute for Media Analysis in South Africa

journalists on the other. She asks: Are the media hostile to the ANC? Did the media attack the dignity of ANC politicians? Do the media act to the detriment of the public interest? Prinsloo concludes that the media were not unjustifi ably hostile to the politicians concerned, and rightly called for information to be made public – information that the citizenry has a right to. The ANC, however, displayed hostility towards the media and their democratic intentions, to the extent that their conduct constituted disrespect not only for journalists, but also for the citizenry who have the right to information and freedom of expression.

The question of freedom of expression in South Africa – which has been a topic of much debate in recent years as a result of the ruling party’s demand for a statutory Media Appeals Tribunal as well as the passing of a Protection of State Information Bill (see the special issue on Press Freedom in Africa, ENAJS 32(2) 2011) – is also a central theme in Julie Reid’s article on press regulation. The Press Council of South Africa revised its code and regulatory procedures in response to processes of review in recent years. One of the changes to the system of self-regulation, which can now more accurately be described as one of independent co-regulation with greater representation from the public, was the introduction of a third-party complaints mechanism. Reid argues that the introduction of third-party complaints makes it possible to raise public awareness about the Press Council and its relationship to the defense of press freedom. Reid provides an overview of the changes to the Press Council in response to the various criticisms it received and the political pressures it faces, and estimates the likelihood of the revised system ensuring greater participation by the public.

The next article in the issue links with the fi rst, in that it also focuses on an aspect of what can broadly be classifi ed as science journalism. Senyo Ofori-Parko examines the role of television in Ghana in molding the environmental sanitation agenda. The author confi rms the assumption expressed in the fi rst article in the issue, by Lublinski et al., that the media in developing countries such as those in Africa have a responsibility to make social and developmental issues – which often include scientifi c and environmental aspects – accessible to the broader public. Drawing on a content analysis and a survey, Ofori-Parko investigates the way in which the media in Ghana set the agenda for environmental issues and how they also ‘mold’ that agenda by projecting particular worldviews that impact on the audience’s attitudes towards these issues. The author concludes that the media in Ghana – television news in particular – has the potential to act as a valuable source of information about environmental issues, but that it operates within a network of social relations and should therefore not be considered the sole determinant of public attitudes and agendas.

Questions of media access, and assessments of how access can be broadened by new media technologies, remain important topics on the research agenda in the fi eld of African journalism. Maha Basri’s article on the use of information and communication technologies in the Sudan locates the use of these technologies and their potential for broadening citizens’ access to media platforms within the broader context of freedom of speech, as already touched upon by Prinsloo and Reid’s articles in this issue. Basri examines the use of ICTs in a civil society campaign in August 2013, that was aimed at assisting fl ood victims in the Sudan. In the light of a government blackout of


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Herman WassermanEditiorial note


information in the aftermath of the fl ash fl oods, and against the historic backdrop of censorship and economic pressures on the press, Basri uses this case study to examine how ICTs – in her case referring to the Internet, telecommunications and social media – can build audiences in Africa and bring crises to the attention of both the international media and the public. Basri identifi es a signifi cant difference in the use of ICTs in African contexts, as opposed to the individualised Western usage. Not only did the ICT campaign in the Sudan manage to bypass state control, it also illustrated how the oral tradition in African societies, along with the many-to-many, communitarian approaches to communication, can be assisted by new media technologies. She concludes that the various factors at play in the Sudanese contexts led to an expansive horizontal network of citizens free of government censorship.

In the last article in the issue, the focus returns to South Africa. Musa Ndlovu investigated television news viewing trends among youth audiences (in the categories 16–24 and 25–34). His fi ndings draw a parallel between South African youth news media consumption and Western contexts, where a similar decline in viewer interest has been noted. Ndlovu attributes the decline in news viewership among South African youth to the cultural environment they inhabit. Young adults are being socialised in a postapartheid social and political environment where news and politics may occupy less prominent positions than they did for older generations. Because of changing lifestyles, parents are no longer able to play the same cultural roles as previous generations, when it comes to developing an awareness of news among youth. Traditional media platforms fail to resonate with the interests of young viewers, who increasingly source news from other sources such as online sites and social media. Whatever the reasons, the decline in news viewership among youth, Ndlovu concludes, does not bode well for political knowledge and civic engagement in a young democracy.

This issue of Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies concludes with a book reviews section, as usual compiled by our books review editor, Hayes Mabweazara.

Herman WassermanEditor


Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies Volume 35 (2) 2014ISSN Print 0256-0054/Online 1942-0773 © 2014 iMasaDOI: 10.1080/02560054.2014.919945 pp 5–2.3

Advances in African and Arab science journalism: Capacity building and new newsroom structures through digital peer-to-peer support

Jan Lublinski, Inka Reichert, Augustin Denis, Jean-Marc Fleury, Olfa Labassi and Christoph Spurk

AbstractJournalists who regularly cover science, health, environment and technology in Africa and the Arab world face a number of difficulties: Lack of elementary resources for journalistic research, and newsroom environments that are not always supportive of specialised reporting. Also a need for capacity to cover science is often bemoaned as well as difficulties in interactions between journalists and scientists. The evaluation of the world’s largest support initiative for science journalism in developing countries, the SjCOOP-mentoring programme, shows that some of these problems can be mitigated through a variety of support programmes, especially ‘distance mentoring’. The article analyses ways of building capacity and offering general support with the help of ICTs. Organisational structures for specialised reporting in 40 newsrooms are compared. Cases of structural advancement and innovation for science journalism are discussed.

Keywords: distance mentoring, science journalism, SjCOOP mentoring programme

IntroductionScience journalism is considered of great importance to developing countries (see Bauer et al. 2013; Claassen 2011; Fleury 2008; Mbarga et al. 2012). If societies are to benefi t from the efforts of their scientifi c communities as well as advances in technology, environment and health systems, they need specialised journalists to report on these issues. To further develop science journalism it is important to take a closer look at its practice in the newsrooms and the changes it is currently undergoing.

Science journalists, just like all journalists world-wide, are currently participating in a globalisation and transformation of their occupation through digital media. Mobile

RESEARCH ARTICLES


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Jan Lublinski and other


Advances in African and Arab science journalism

phones and the Internet bring new opportunities for investigation and dissemination in various channels. News sourcing routines are changing and news cycles are being sped up (see , Avilés et al. 2009; Jordan 2013; Mabweazara 2013; Weiss and Higgins Joyce 2009).

In this situation, ‘science reporting risks being compromised, many fear, when the necessary time, commitment and resources are in such short supply in so many newsrooms’ (Allan 2011, 773). In a world-wide survey among science journalists, Bauer et al. (2013, 2) compare the situation between the Global North and South: Science journalists from Europe and North America are more satisfi ed with the specifi cs of their job, such as safety and access to information and people, but are less happy in their job overall and more pessimistic about the future. In Africa and the Arab world the opposite seems to be the case, namely ‘there is happiness on the job, but dissatisfaction with the specifi cs of the operation’ (ibid, 2). Fortunately, digitalisation has brought new opportunities for professional capacity building: Thanks to the Internet and mobile communication, journalists interested in learning and further specialisation can access information on their profession, participate in capacity-building projects and network with colleagues at a distance (Zhang 2009).

With this article the aim is to explore the professional world of African and Arab science journalists. To do so, data will be used from the evaluation of the world’s largest support programme for science journalism, the SjCOOP mentoring-project1 (‘science journalism cooperation’) which works in three language regions – the Arab world, Francophone Africa and Anglophone Africa.2 This programme offers science journalists support that cannot be given in classrooms and training workshops alone (see Claassen 2001; Mbarga et al. 2012; Schiffrin 2010): A blend of distance mentoring using information and communication technologies (ICTs), individual face-to-face work, travel opportunities for meetings and journalistic investigations, online forums, and support for national associations of science journalists (see also Nakkazi 2012). Most importantly, the capacity building occurs while these science journalists are ‘on the job’ and carrying out their regular duties in newsrooms. This concept was developed during a fi rst phase of SjCOOP, between 2006 and 2009, with 60 science journalists supported by 15 mentors who were themselves experienced science journalists from developing and developed countries (for a description of the concept and its development see El-Awady and Lublinski 2008; Mbarga et al. 2012). In the second phase of SjCOOP, 78 science journalists from 38 countries took part in the project, which ran between 2010 and 2012 and is the focus of this article.

The aim here is to use this project as a case study and extract from it insights into the professionalisation of African and Arab science journalism that are of general relevance – especially concerning the ability of support programmes to build the capacity of journalists to cover science, the importance of establishing newsroom structures for science, and the chances of support programmes helping to overcome the fi nancial diffi culties of journalists.

In doing so it is important to admit to several limitations: First, the sample is certainly more selective than representative. Journalists were chosen to participate in the programme based on their curriculum vitae and the articles they had published.


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On average they were 34 years of age, with seven years of professional experience as journalists. Overall, the sample consisted of qualifi ed journalists who were reasonably advanced in their craft.

To better understand the working conditions of these journalists information was also collected from their editors-in-chief and the scientists with whom they had been interacting. The insights refl ected here are mostly based on interviews and questionnaires, not direct observations of the work structures in the newsrooms. In addition, one part of the SjCOOP evaluation was excluded: In the course of the project the content quality of the articles produced by these journalists and the impact of their reporting in cases of investigative reporting were assessed. The fi ndings related to those areas will be published later.

Another challenge is the fact that this article had to employ as a basis mainly literature dealing with the organisational and professional problems science journalists in Western countries face. An attempt was made to avoid applying established Western criteria and models without refl ection, therefore an explorative approach was followed here. At the same time this article is based on the assumption that certain fundamental structures in newsrooms are universal, and therefore allow for differentiation and comparison (see also Skjerdal 2009; Ward 2005; Wasserman 2010).

Professionalisation in news organisationsThe process of professionalisation is classically described based on a number of criteria, such as academic education, auto-control through professional associations, the development of a professional ethics code and a functional monopoly. This approach has already been used to discuss certain aspects of science journalism in Africa (Mbarga et al. 2012).

For this article the structural approach to professional action could yield additional perspectives: It focuses on the self-control of an occupation and the insight that professionals usually work autonomously yet strongly depend on the support of their peers. Members of the same profession cooperate, are involved in status competition, and work hard for their reputation among their colleagues. At the same time they seek to defi ne how they differ from other professions and to identify common ground for cooperation (Lazega 2005; Schmeiser 2006). So, for the advancement of science journalism as a profession, the building of relationships, associations and networks among peers is vital, as is the journalists’ relationships to the scientists, doctors and other experts they use as sources.

In addition, organisational theory needs to be considered when studying processes of professionalisation. In his dynamic theory of organisational structure, Mintzberg (1979) describes a structural type of professional burocracy – an idealised organisation in which professionals support and develop structures that allow them to work as independently as possible. Professionals in such an organisation have to deal with the contingent demands of the organisation’s environment. Their work consists of solving complex problems within the structures of the organisation, and to do this they often


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attempt to change the structure and routines of the organisation according to their needs (see also Hinnings et al. 1999).

For science journalists in media organisations this means that they try to work to create structures that will enable specialised reporting. In many cases they seek to estabish or enlarge specialised desks, pages or programmes that allow for a better coverage of science, health or the environment. It can therefore be regarded as a process of professionalisation if science journalists work towards such changes in their newsroom (Lublinski 2011, 2012). But in doing so science journalists may face various diffi culties. As professionals in the organisation they have to work within the general routines and hierarchies of their newsroom; and it is not always easy to pursue new ideas and ambitions within a media organisation.

The problems facing science journalism in Africa and the Arab worldTo identify the fundamental problems pacing science journalism in Africa and the Arab world, an initial questionnaire was developed and the journalists in this sample were asked to list the main work-related problems facing science journalism. In addition, their editors-in-chief/bosses were interviewed and were posed the same question. At fi rst glance it appears that both groups mentioned similar problems (see Table 1).3

Table 1: The most important problems for science journalists

Problems mentioned bySjCOOP participants(science journalists)

Problems mentioned by theireditors-in-chief

1. Lack of financial and organisational resources in the newsroom (63)

2. Lack of encouragement, support for science journalism in the newsroom (40)

3. Getting hold of information, accessing scientists, experts, government officials (35)

4. Need for education and training (13)

1. Getting hold of information, accessing scientists, experts, government officials (40)

2. Lack of science journalists, problems with the skills of the journalists reporting on science (25)

3. Lack of financial resources in the newsroom (22)

Note: Respondents: 67 participants of SjCOOP, 40 editors-in-chief. (In brackets are the number of times a problem was mentioned by the respondents. Several mentions were possible.)

In truth, they placed emphasis on different aspects: The science journalists reported that they were not encouraged suffi ciently by their colleagues in executing their work. Both parties stressed a lack of fi nancial support for their investigations and a lack of dedicated space for science, as well as a lack of interested editors. Select quotes illustrate this:

It is hard to get my editor to publish a science story.

We have an apathy with regard to science stories. They are seen as fi llers, unless a story is a current affairs piece, too.

Specialisation in our newsroom is no guarantee to be assigned to science stories.

The absence of a science page means less dedication to science.


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On the other hand, the editors-in-chief saw greater diffi culties in respect of fi nancial and human resources: Without the fi nancial means to support their reporters, they also bemoaned the lack of qualifi ed, specialised journalists. They expressed a need for journalists who can fi nd, investigate, verify and present science news that is relevant to their respective audiences:

When journalists write down science stories their reports sometimes turn out to be boring, too scientifi c, not appealing.

International media see Africa just as one big block. Our journalists should know how to report on regional problems in our country like availability of drugs, sewage treatments, urban planning etc.

The problem is we do not have enough journalists who are interested in reporting on science.

We need journalists to specialise.

On top of this, both groups in the sample emphasised the diffi culties of fi nding competent local experts, scientists and government offi cials who were willing to talk to them. This problem was particularly pertinent for science journalism in developing countries.4

Thus, from the initial interviews the following problems were identifi ed, as assessed by science journalists and editors-in-chief:

– Financial problems: monetary or organisational resources; – Organisational problems: hindrances in structures, beats, routines in the

newsroom; – Educational problems: lack of schooling, higher education, vocational

training; – - Professional problems: lack of support among colleagues; lack of

professional skills; diffi culties with journalistic investigations; problems accessing sources and interacting with scientists, government offi cials or administrative representatives.

Each of the interviewed groups had a unique emphasis: For the science journalists, fi nancial, organisational and professional problems were the most pressing, while the editors-in-chief emphasised professional diffi culties.

Research questionsThe SjCOOP project attempted to mitigate the diffi culties identifi ed above with a range of activities aimed at supporting science journalists as they continued their work in the newsrooms. From the data generated following an evaluation of the project, answers were sought to the following research questions:

Q1: What kind of capacity-building elements and networking activities with digital tools were used by science journalists in Africa and the Middle East?

Q2: What kind of problems occur in the interactions between scientists and


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journalists in Africa and the Arab world – and how can they be overcome?Q3: What structural differences and advancements can be found in African and

Arab science beats?Q4: Did the SjCOOP project bring about any innovations or new business models

that could ease the fi nancial problems of science journalists?

MethodsFor the SjCOOP project a dedicated monitoring and evaluation framework was developed (Fleury et al. 2010). The basic idea was to use a combination of surveys with different actors and methods to better understand the situation of the journalists and their newsrooms, and also to document the change processes taking place. Three different actors were chosen as main sources: Editors-in-chief, science journalists (i.e. SjCOOP participants and their mentors) and scientists/experts. In addition, reports by mentors and other project documentation were used. All interviews were conducted by telephone or via Skype.

The editors-in-chief interviewed were not involved in the SjCOOP project but were aware of the participation of one of their staff members. Initial interviews were conducted with 40 individuals between July and November 2010, and second interviews between September and October 2011 with 33 of these individuals. The others could either not be reached, or they or the participant had left the newsroom. In October 2012 the information on the status of the newsrooms was verifi ed and updated though interviews with the participants.

The interviewed scientists (or experts) were identifi ed through a special mechanism: 28 participants were asked to supply articles they had published. Scientists who had been mentioned in the article were identifi ed and contacted. The pertinent articles were sent to them and an evaluator asked them to comment on the article, their interaction with the relevant journalist, as well as their general experiences with/thoughts on science journalism and communication.

The 78 science journalists participating in SjCOOP between 2010 and 2012 were asked to fi ll out various forms during fi ve face-to-face meetings; questions related to their professional environment, problems at work and progress in their careers. They were contacted by email and interviewed individually if they had made special progress in their careers or in their reporting.

For a network analysis, all participants and mentors were asked to complete a special questionnaire twice: In June 2011, and again in October 2012, they were asked to name their most important contacts in their work as journalists. To assess the importance of digital tools in their professional network they were asked how often they used different tools to communicate with their professional contacts.5

Distance mentoring, networking with digital tools and the impor-tance of Skype


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In the course of the SjCOOP project, mentors worked on different levels with the participants:

Distance training: In a fi rst stage they went through the content of the ‘Online Course in Science Journalism’ which had been developed in the fi rst phase of SjCOOP.6 The content was discussed online via Skype. Mentors and mentees used the course as a common basic reference.

Reporter mentoring: Mentors supported the participants in their daily work as science journalists: They discussed story ideas, accompanied investigations, edited manuscripts, critiqued the digital editing of audio and fi lm material, and gave feedback on published reports. This peer-to-peer work was also done at a distance with digital communication tools. In most cases this was the most important and time-consuming work in the SjCOOP project. It took considerable and continuous commitment from both sides to build good, intense working relationships.

Career mentoring: Mentors also suggested new outlets for freelancing, encouraged mentees to apply for journalism awards and gave advice on career planning.

‘Virtual newsroom’: Several international teams of reporters came together, exchanged information and material, and then planned joint investigations into topics of general interest. Some of the fi nal results were published in international news outlets and also, in adapted form, in the participants’ own media. One example is a report comparing science funding in fi ve African countries.7

All these project activities seemed to have strengthened the relationships among the participants and encouraged them to work in transnational teams: Our network analysis showed that within a year SjCOOP had become a very important factor in the professional network of all these journalists. When they were asked in 2011 to indicate their fi rst six most important professional contacts, about half of the contacts listed were SjCOOP participants or people working for the project: 174 of a total of 392 contacts mentioned. In 2012, the results were similar, which demonstrates the consistency of the network and its ongoing importance for the participants.

New digital forms of communication played a key role, since the participating journalists were mainly mentored at a distance. Digital tools such as email, Facebook or Skype were used daily/several times a week by almost all SjCOOP journalists, to keep in touch with their respective professional contacts. Other services such as Twitter and blogs were used by very few participants.

The SjCOOP organisers made several attempts to establish a special online platform for exchanges on a dedicated social media website. In 2006 this turned out to be diffi cult: The speed of Internet connection was too slow in many places to connect to or load data from the sharepoint-system. In the second phase, starting in 2010, a new Ning platform was established. Many (but not all) participants visited this forum several times a month and posted around 500 messages in total. The platform therefore worked, to some extent, but in the end only represented a small portion of the communication within this network of journalists. The participants clearly preferred other forms of digital peer-to-peer communication.

One instrument – Skype – proved vital for regular exchanges between mentors and participants. Large audio and video fi les could be transferred and, importantly, people


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could speak to each other and interact directly, at little cost. Group discussions and even press conferences with invited scientists could be held across countries and continents. In the case of bad Internet connections, people could at least keep in touch via the chat function.

According to a survey not all Sjcoop activities were equally attractive to the participants. At the end of the programme participants were asked to name the most important activities undertaken with their mentor, from a set of options. ‘Finding, discussing, planning and doing science stories’ was important to 86 per cent of them, followed by ‘working face-to-face with mentor’ (64%) and ‘editing and improving manuscripts’ (59%). Less important were ‘discussing general journalism’ (36%), ‘career planning and coaching’ (27%), ‘discussing the online course’ (25%) and the ‘private relationship / friendship with the mentor’ (13%). These different elements of capacity building arose in addition to local networks and organisational structures in and around the participants’ own newsrooms.8 Thus, through SjCOOP they received what they had been missing, namely additional support and encouragement by peers on the job.

Interaction between scientists and journalistsThe scientists and experts interviewed showed a differentiated knowledge of the situation around science reporters and science communication in their respective countries. They emphasised educational and professional problems (lack of education and training, lack of preparation for interviews, lack of professional ethics), but also organisational problems (lack of specialisation in the media, lack of support for science reporters in newsrooms). This confi rms overall the fi ndings of Kaye et al. (2011) as regards scientist–journalist relationships in Uganda.9 To gain more insight into the working relationships between science journalists and scientists, 28 cases of interaction were studied in detail. In 21 functioning relationships were identifi ed: Either the scientists were highly satisfi ed with both the interaction and the article (12 cases) or they criticised the journalist on some aspect of his/her work, but generally showed respect for the journalist. In four cases the scientists were very dissatisfi ed with the journalist’s behaviour and with the manuscript produced: According to them, the journalists had not approached them professionally, had not really grasped the subject and/or had written something incorrect or had exaggerated fi ndings in the report.10

This overall positive result seems to be linked to the basic professional skills of the journalists. Many scientists explicitly expressed the view that there was a major difference between the SjCOOP journalists and other journalists who had interviewed them.

To gain the scientists’ cooperation, elementary things were of importance: The way the journalist fi rst approached them, spellt out their wishes, and fi xed and confi rmed meetings. Also, how well the journalist was prepared for the interview, and whether s/he showed some basic understanding of the subject and a willingness to listen and learn. If these basic criteria were met, the scientists were generally willing to accept


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that the journalist, from their perspective, might ask bold questions or contradict them. The following quotations, taken from interviews with scientists, illustrate the fi ndings:

He phoned me at the clinic where I work and talked about why he wanted to interview me and his interest in the subject. He gave me some background information on his work and gave me some time before the interview to do my literature review.

We did not agree on the dangers of GMOs from the beginning, but I took time to answer her questions.

I do not see the real understanding by the journalist himself. He gets pieces of data together, not selling a strong, sound argument.

She is very systematic, coherent and follows scientifi c progress. And she goes to the sources of information to verify them.

We meet journalists mostly at random. But it takes time to get to know each other.

Very helpful for both sides were relationships that extended beyond a single meeting. Many scientists were pleased that the journalists had come back to them with further questions – even if they did not think too highly of the journalists’ reports in the end.

It is therefore possible to conclude that cooperation between scientists and journalists who display basic professional skills is, in fact, possible in Africa and in the Arab world. This, despite only looking at a relatively small cross-section of advanced science journalists and a selection of their interactions with scientists that led to publications. The authors of this article do not call into question the problems journalists face in trying to get access to local sources of expertise, but the fi ndings showed that these problems could, in many cases, be mitigated with a little extra effort from both sides.

Differences between science beatsTo differentiate between and compare structures for science journalism in newsrooms, it helps to take two very basic factors into consideration: First, the dedicated space allocated to science and related fi elds, and, second, the number of science journalists working in the newsroom. Science journalists are defi ned here in a broad sense, thus including environmental, health and technology reporters; ‘full-time’ science journalists may be doing other things as well, but demonstrably more than 50 per cent of a full week’s workload is devoted to science journalism.

In the total sample of 40 editors-in-chief interviewed, there was a large variance in terms of newsroom structure (see Table 2). Overall, the situation for science journalism could be differentiated as follows:

1. Structurally well-equipped newsrooms (High level), here defi ned as newsrooms that have a team of at least two full-time science journalists who produce several print pages/web-pages or radio/TV programmes of at least ten minutes in duration per week, covering at least two different areas of science journalism;

2. Fairly well-equipped newsrooms (Medium level), here defi ned as newsrooms


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that have one full-time science journalist OR one or more science sections/programmes of at least ten minutes in duration per week, covering at least two areas of science journalism (e.g., two weekly pages covering health and environment);

3. Poorly equipped newsrooms (Low level), here defi ned as newsrooms with no or very little dedicated structure for science journalism in terms of specialised staff journalists or spaces.

At the onset of the project a majority of 24 editors-in-chief expressed an interest in increasing the space for science journalism, the number of specialised staff, the skills of their staff, as well as the quality of their products. The remaining 16 editors-in-chief seemed to have no concrete plan and/or no ambition to improve their science journalism in the future.

Table 2: News outlets represented in this survey and initial rating in 2010 on their structure for science journalism

Anglophone group

East African, Kenya, HEthiopian Herald, Ethiopia, LMonitor Publications Ltd, Uganda, LThe New Vision, daily, Uganda, HThe Standard, weekly, Zimbabwe, LThisday Newspaper, Nigeria, MZambia Daily Mail, Zambia, LGhana News Agency, Ghana, MK24 TV, Kenya, HKBC TV, Kenya, MMalawi Boadcasting Corporation, MRadio Isango Star, Rwanda, HSpectrum Broadcasting, Nigeria, MLusophoneJournal Noticias, Mozambique, L

Arab group

Aladala, Iraq, MAl-Dostor, Egypt, MAlraed, Sudan, MAl Ghad, Jordan, HAl Sabil, Jordan, MAlwasat News, Barhaim, HLe Tunisien, Tunisia, **L’Orient Le Jour, Lebanon, MAl-Akhbar Alyawmiyah, Mauretania(Sahara Media: newspaper,Website and TV), LTanja News, electronic newspaper,Morocco, LOn Islam, Media International, Website,Egypt, **Haya Tech TV on Al-Majd TV Channel,Saudia Arabia, **Arab Agency for Science Newswww. Arabsn.net, Yemen, **

Francophone group

Quotidien Mutation, Cameroon, MJournal Walfadjri, Senegal, MLa Nouvelle Gazette, Bénin, LFraternité Matin, Cote d’Ivoire, MInfo-Environment, RDC, **Le Scientifique, monthly paper, Niger, **ACP Agence Congolaise de Presse (also newspaper), DRC, MMetropolys 97.1 FM, Togo, MRadio Burundi, LRadio Golfe FM, Bénin, LRadio Klédu, Mali, HCRTV, radio+TV, Extreme-North,Cameroon, LThe Time of Madagascar, website, L

Note: L (LOW): poorly equipped newsroom for science journalism; M (MEDIUM): fairly well-equipped; H (HIGH): structurally well-equipped; **: specialised science newsroom

Advancements of science beatsIn 2012, two years after their initial assessment of the situation regarding science journalism in newsrooms, the authors were able to identify certain structural changes: In francophone and anglophone Africa, fi ve of the newsrooms in the sample could be


15




rated as having advanced from Low to Medium level. They had established a new, more dedicated organisational structure for science journalism. This progress can be attributed to the special commitment of individual science journalists who began to set up basic structures for specialised reporting in their newsrooms. In doing so, most of them managed to involve other journalists from their newsroom and persuaded them to contribute reports on a regular basis.

Table 3: Advance in science beats by 2012

NewsroomsArab

L’Orient/leJour, Lebanon

Francophone

Radio Golf FM, BeninNouvelle Gazette, BeninFraternité Matin, Cote d’IvoireLe scientifique**, Niger

Anglophone

Ethiopian Herald, EthiopiaZambia Daily Mail, ZambiaThe Standard, weekly, ZimbabweMonitor Publications Ltd, UgandaThisday Newspaper, NigeriaGhana News Agency, GhanaSpectrum Broadcasting, Nigeria

Lusophone

Journal Noticias, Mozambique

New structures

Weekly page covering ICTs, new bilingual environmental magazine Oxygène

Weekly science programmeWeekly science pageNew science editor in the web-departmentThree new science editors

Two journalists who regularly report on scienceNew weekly column on health, in addition to column on environmentNew weekly column on environment, in addition to column on healthNew pull-outs covering health, technology, farming etc.more reporting on special pages: health, development, city and environmentTwo additional reporters who regularly cover scienceNew science desk

New daily science page, three journalists contributing to it

Changein rating

M->H

L->ML->MM->H–

L->ML->ML->ML->HM->H––

L->H

Note: New ratings given in 2012: M (MEDIUM): fairly well-equipped newsroom for science journalism; H (HIGH): structurally well-equipped; **: specialised science newsroom. For newsrooms from the sample that do not appear in this table, no major structural changes in respect to science reporting could be identified.

In addition, fi ve newsrooms had advanced to a High level in the 2012 rating:

– The Ugandan newspaper Daily Monitor has a large number of pull-outs covering different areas of science (among them: health, technology, farming) every day. Three journalists here began to specialise in reporting on these areas. This development was encouraged by an editor-in-chief with a clear


16




interest in specialised feature reporting. And according to several interviewees, there is considerable competition in Uganda between this private newspaper and the state-owned New Vision, which has also increased the number of its special pages;

– In Nigeria, at Thisday Newspaper there has been a general move towards more specialised reporting on additional daily pages (health, ICTs, development, city and environment). In this country, competition with other newspapers for readers plays an important role, which seems to advance the specialisation occurring within the news media;

– The single lusophone newsroom in the sample also came up with an innovation: A new daily science page to which three journalists contribute;

– An interesting case for a dynamic beat structure and crossmedia work in an African newsroom is Fraternité Matin in Cote d’Ivoire: The newspaper has, in addition to its classic beats (which include science and agriculture), a ‘service special’ desk and a daily special page, sélection du jour where larger science features can be printed. In tandem, the online newsroom of Fraternité Matin fi lls its webpage without any beats or departments. Nevertheless, many reporters here pursue special interests. One web-reporter, who participed in SjCOOP, was offi cially nominated as ‘online science reporter’ in 2011. Like several of her colleagues, she contributes regularly to the newspaper. Therefore, the fl exible work of specialised reporters writing for both media is becoming more important in this organisation;

– At l’Orient/le Jour in Lebanon, in 2010 only two journalists fi lled weekly special pages or covered environment and health issues along with their work for other beats. In 2011, a third colleague who produces a computer page joined the team, and in 2012, the journalist specialising in the environment started (besides her newspaper work) a new bilingual environmental magazine, Oxygène, which appears every six months. She used the advice from experienced colleagues in the SjCOOP network and involved other participants as reporters for this special offering.

In all other Arab newsrooms little has changed for science journalism – at least according to the criteria of the authors of this article. This can be explained by recent major political changes: In those countries that witnessed the Spring Revolution in 2011, many traditional media saw their infl uence decline, while new media gained ground. As politics dominated public debates, little space was given to science journalism. Also, many reporters and editors lost or changed their jobs. In more stable countries in the Arab world and the Gulf region (represented in this sample), very limited change was evident.

In the cases of the fi ve newsrooms rated High, clearly positive developments cannot be ascribed to the SjCOOP project alone – many positive infl uences and organisational dynamics unfolded well before the project kicked off. Especially in anglophone Africa, there seems to be a general trend towards more specialised reporting.


17




What is somewhat surprising is that the newsroom managers in most cases were not leading the change processes observed. Of the 24 newsrooms where, at the onset of the project, the editors-in-chief had seen the possibility for structural advancements only two carried out their plans. In the other nine cases the editors-in-chief had not envisaged the possibility of or the need for change in 2010, but by 2012 the science journalists had somewhow implemented changes. The innovations were, in most cases, initiated and carried out by individual science journalists who received external support.

Also, in most cases such advancements were not linked to any major investment on the part of news outlet management. Reporters still receive very little money to pay for trips or phone calls. There are limited indications of new jobs being created in newsrooms for specialised output.

New sources of revenue for science journalistsNeedless to say, the fi nancial problems science journalists faced were not solved through the SjCOOP project. But in a few cases the monetary situation began to improve between 2010 and 2012:

– At least 28 science journalists in Africa and the Arab world have discovered new, international freelancing opportunities with the help of their mentors. They now regularly write for Scidev.net, Nature, Science Africa, Al Hayat newspaper or the environmental magazines Al Bia Wal Tanmia and Oxygène. These additional activities have become an important source of revenue, at least for the best amongst these journalists;

– The abovementioned new Arab environmental magazine, Oxygène, attracted numerous advertisers and became profi table with its fi rst issue. That said, it must be added that the salary of its editor did not need to be paid for: She established the magazine in her spare time, alongside her job at the daily newspaper. But the freelance reporters who contributed articles were paid for their work;

– A former SjCOOP coordinator from Nigeria started the science news service AfricaSTI.com and attracted reporters from the network as well as advertisers to the website;

– A former SjCOOP mentor from Kenya started the science magazine Science Africa. He involved many journalists from the SjCOOP network as reporters, and also found advertisers and sponsors.

These cases show that African and Arab science journalists can fi nd new markets for their reporting, having built their capacities through international collegial networks, specialising in their reporting and offering unique content for very specifi c audiences.


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Summary and discussion

Q1: Capacity building and networking with digital tools

The various digital tools available today made it possible to develop a new approach in journalism capacity building that focuses on collegial distance support ‘on the job’. Direct, oral interaction via Skype seems to suit both African and Arab cultures of communication, while exchanges on online platforms were not really used regularly.

The whole virtual network of colleagues from different countries and continents was kept alive by an array of capacity-building activities. Reporters were offered opportunites to shape their professional identities and advance their careers through individual peer-to-peer mentoring and networking with colleagues. This allows for an extension of the meaning of ‘virtual newsroom’: Through international networking and collaboration with digital tools it is possible to build international, collegial structures that support African and Arab journalists in their professionalisation.

Q2: Relationships between scientists and journalists

In Africa and the Arab world journalists have diffi culty accessing good local experts to interview. In addition, many journalists lack professional skills. But there are ways out of this dilemma. The data show that once journalists master basic elements of their craft, they can win a scientist’s confi dence and support. Many scientists are patient with the journalists because they acknowledge the numerous diffi culties which science journalism in their countries faces. If both sides are aware of their sometimes very different roles in society, productive cooperation should be possible in many instances. Overall, developing countries should benefi t from these exchanges.

Q3: Newsroom structures, differences and advancements for science journalism

The research revealed a large variety of organisational structures for science journalism in African and Arab newsrooms, from news organisations that care little for systematic science reporting to well-established specialised teams that produce dedicated products for their audiences and support investigations. The most common scenario for Arab and African science journalism is a newsroom with a small number of reporters (staff and freelance) who – in addition to their main tasks – cover health or environmental issues occasionally, in smaller segments.

Between 2010 and 2012 considerable advancement was evident in the structures around science journalism in 11 media houses, among them new, attractive forms of daily pull-outs in Uganda, crossmedia teamwork in Cote d’Ivore, and a new environmental magazine produced by a newspaper team in Lebanon. These cases can be regarded as innovation models for science journalism in developing countries. However, the latter two seem to be exceptional cases, as overall comparatively little advancement was evident in the Arab and francophone newsrooms. Meanwhile, in anglophone Africa media markets have become more competitive and media managers now invest at least some resources in specialised reporting.


19




Overall, media managers were not particularly active in advancing their newsrooms towards more specialised reporting. In most cases, innovations brought in by specialised journalists came at little cost to managers. It was probably not too diffi cult a decision for them to let their science journalists do new things with limited means.

Q4: Innovations and new business models in science journalismIn addition to innovations in the established newsrooms mentioned above, several

new products were identifi ed, such as magazines and websites focusing solely on science or the environment, which have the potential to become sustainable. Some of the best African and Arab science reporters successfully began freelancing for international media, while continuing to work for their local news outlets.

These fi ndings show a new direction for journalism but also for capacity building and support programmes in the future: African and Arab journalists can come up with new ideas, formats and products for specifi c audiences. In future, more careful thinking and other resources need to be invested in support of journalistic innovations.

ConclusionsThe authors of this article identifi ed several of the major structural problems faced by specialised journalists and their beats in African and Arab newsrooms. Often, they are not fully supported by their organisations in investigating and publishing stories beyond politics and sports. Also, it is diffi cult for reporters lacking basic professional skills to fi nd good local experts and scientists willing to inform them.

At the same time it is possible to conclude that some, but not all, problems which African and Arab science journalists face in their professionalisation can be mitigated: They can fi nd ways to access local experts and win their confi dence and respect. And they can, even with limited resources, build new beat structures in their newsrooms, engage in crossmedia reporting and develop new specialised products for their audiences.

For the solutions outlined here, three elements were important: First, capacity-building activities based on peer-to-peer support, in the form of different types of mentoring, networking and joint reporting projects in a ‘virtual newsroom’; second, the use of various digital tools for distance communication in combination with face-to-face encounters; and third, the blending and fl exible application of the above to the needs of individual journalists. As media landscapes, newsrooms, and individual capacities and personal interests differ, it is benefi cial to tailor the support to each journalist, and let him/her participate in that process from the outset.

Many other media development cooperation programmes invest more in working with the organisations and hierarchies of the news media, and sometimes risk supporting dysfunctional structures and corrupt managers. The case study refl ected here shows that a fruitful approach may consist of supporting the capacity of individual reporters, while taking their newsroom environments into account. Such an approach has the advantage of tapping into the rich resource of professional collegiality.

With a view to the future, the authors suggest that an enlarged strategy might achieve even more: A combination of digital distance-mentoring of individuals, along with direct support for the newsrooms on the ground. Maybe that might help


20




to ensure greater commitment, on the part of management, to goals agreed upon with their staff. If such an approach is taken, capacity building should not only focus on well-established organisations with their often very traditional structures – it may also be worthwhile giving small, innovative teams that develop new products some initial support. In addition, more research into newsrooms is needed, to guide journalists in developing their future.

AknowledgementsThe authors thank Mohammed Allal, Carole Berbari, Abdelfattah Berrad, Benoît Lacroix, Marie Lou Nicolas, Michael Schanne and Izabela Vono for their contribuitions in preparing and conducting interviews, and also Jackie Wilson for comments.

Notes1 An initiative by the World Federation of Science Journalists (WFSJ) the SjCOOP project is

managed from its headquarters in Canada in close cooperation with regional coordinators in Africa and the Arab World. It has been funded by the British Department for International Development (DfID), the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC), Swedish SIDA and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.wfsj.org/sjcoop/

2 SjCOOP also integrated one lusophone participant from Mozambique.3 The initial data show only a few signifi cant differences between the language regions: In

francophone Africa the resource problems facing newsrooms were emphasised. The Arab editors-in-chief and participants, as well as the francophone participants most often mentioned problems with sources amongst scientists and in government (11, 14, 13 mentions respectively).

4 See Kaye et al. (2011) and for anecdotal evidence Nakkazi (2012), El-Awady (2009), Joubert (2007). Anecdotal evidence on diffi culties in scientist–journalist interactions existed in industrial countries, until Peters et al. (2008) challenged the many negative impressions of science–media interactions. They showed, using a large study in fi ve countries, that interactions between journalists and scientists were more frequent and more harmonious than was previously thought. Whether this is also the case in developing countries is not clear.

5 As SjCOOP is structured into three regional groups – Arab World, francophone Africa and anglophone Africa – all questionnaires were translated and interviews were carried out in the respective languages. One participant came from Mozambique, so his editor-in-chief was interviewed in Portuguese.

6 Clayton and Lublinski 2008; http://www.wfsj.org/course7 Vivienne Irikefe, Gayathri Vaidyanathan, Linda Nordling, Aimable Twahira, Esther Nakkazi,

and Richard Monastersky: ‘The view from the front line’, Nature, 30.06.11. Vol. 474, 556–559.8 This usage pattern was evenly distributed between the three regional groups in the second

phase of SjCOOP. One can speak of a globalisation of ICT-uses here: In the fi rst phase of SjCOOP this was not the case at all. In 2006, many francophone African journalists still had diffi culty accessing the Internet, their anglophone colleagues had at least occasional access in Internet cafés, while many Arab journalists were already provided with the technology in their newsrooms.

9 They identifi ed several elements that journalists and scientists perceive as barriers: Inadequate or inappropriate skills, negative attitudes and the lack of a supportive environment on the part of


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employers and peers. To solve these problems the scientists here stressed the need for capacity building, while journalists suggested ‘implementing strategies on how journalists and scientists might work together more effectively’.

10 In the three other cases the scientists did not remember meeting the journalists.

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Biographical notesJan Lublinski is a journalism trainer and research consultant based in Bonn, Germany. His work focuses on newsrooms, science journalism, and monitoring and evaluation in media development. He works as an associate expert for SjCOOP, a long-term mentoring programme for science journalists. As a reporter he works for German Public Radio and magazines. After submitting this


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article he became project manager in the new research and development team at DW Akademie, the media development branch of Deutsche Welle. Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Reichert works as a freelance science journalist and consultant based in Germany and Spain. She publishes in various media outlets like the German national magazine Die Zeit and the public broadcasting station Westdeutscher Rundfunk. In the past she worked in the evaluation team of the World Federation of Science Journalists. Her research interests include newsrooms in Africa, professional networks and journalism quality.Augustin Denis is a consultant in web technologies and a specialist in building online applications. He worked seven years for the World Federation of Science Journalists as a web specialist in charge of building online tools to help project participants communicate. For SjCOOP he ran numerous training sessions overseas, and was involved in monitoring activities. He is very passionate about travel and Asian cultures, and is struggling to learn Japanese.Jean-Marc Fleury holds the Bell Globemedia Chair in Science Journalism at Laval University, Québec City. He is a past Executive Director of the World Federation of Science Journalists, based in Gatineau (Québec), Canada. Before that he was Director of Communications at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa (Canada). He worked as a science journalist at Le Soleil newspaper in Québec City and the monthly magazine Québec Science.Olfa Labassi was project manager for the World Federation of Science Journalists from 2006 to 2013 in Gatineau, Canada. She now works at Ottawa University as coordinator of a research partnership dedicated to understanding conditions needed for the development of legal systems to manage collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal cultures. Before that, she worked as a fi nance manager in Tunisia. She holds a Master’s degree in project management.Christoph Spurk teaches media and development at the Institute of Applied Media Studies at the Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW), Switzerland. As head of the research unit Media in International Cooperation (MIC) he conducts studies on the infl uence mass media have on the democratisation process in developing countries, as well as on journalism, confl ict and peacebuilding in post-confl ict societies. He is mostly interested in advancing methods of evaluation and in measuring results obtained through mass media.


Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies Volume 35 (2) 2014ISSN Print 0256-0054/Online 1942-0773 © 2014 iMasaDOI: 10.1080/02560054.2014.919946 pp 24–00

Examining the relationship between the news media and the ANC: A case study of Nkandla coverage1

Jeanne Prinsloo

AbstractThe ANC’s 2010 document, intended to inform the party’s position on media policy, identifies key print media challenges and criticises the news media. Journalists, in turn, have voiced concerns about attempts to curtail freedom of expression and access to information. This article examines what the press and politicians do and say in relation to each other when engaged in a contestation. Using ANC criticisms of news content, it considers the coverage of the scandal surrounding expenditure on President Zuma’s Nkandla homestead, in the City Press and the Mail & Guardian, from September 2012 to January 2013. A close critical reading examines the arguments made and how they are variously legitimated, concluding that the ANC’s attitude to the media works against democratic principles and media diversity. In effect, it is guilty of the misdemeanours it accuses the news media of and which it seeks to legislate against.

Keywords: African National Congress (ANC), democracy, investigative journalism, mediatised scandal, Nkandla, textual analysis

IntroductionThe tendency of dismissing any criticism of the media as an attack on press freedom results in the media behaving as a protection racket and leaves no space for introspection … we have a responsibility to assist the media need to shape up [sic]. (ANC 2010, item 61)

The ANC’s discussion document, entitled ‘Media transformation ownership and diversity’ (2010), states its position on the news media and is intended to inform the kind of media transformation the ANC envisages. The position evident in the opening quotation is often repeated by ANC public offi cials and followers, while journalists voice concerns about what they perceive as highhanded attempts on the part of ANC


25

Jeanne Prinsloo


Examining the relationship between the news media and the ANC

offi cials to curtail freedom of expression and access to information (e.g., as evident in their opposition to the proposed ‘secrecy’ or Protection of Information Bill). These confl icting positions might be deeply held, but their conclusions are drawn in the absence of focused research. The article picks up on this stand-off to examine the relationship between the press and ANC politicians, by looking at actual news coverage.

Using the points of critique in the ANC document relating to news content in order to focus the study, it examines the coverage of a single media scandal, namely the expenditure on President Zuma’s Nkandla homestead, to interrogate the relevance of these criticisms. The period of analysis is confi ned to coverage spanning four months, arguably an adequate sample for investigating this relationship. The analysis analyses sustained investigations by two newspapers, City Press and the Mail and Guardian (M&G), as both played a central role in bringing the issue of the expenditure to public attention and in maintaining their investigative focus over a sustained period.

The research examines the way the ANC and news media interact, by considering news coverage of the expenditure on Zuma’s Nkandla homestead. Signifi cant points made in the ANC 2010 document, pertaining to editorial content, are identifi ed in order to focus the study. Then, as reporting on the Nkandla homestead is investigative rather than routine, the theoretical framework addresses investigative journalism and media scandals. The qualitative analysis of the coverage focuses on the positions articulated by ANC public offi cials, as well as those contesting them. Essentially, it boils down to ‘the battle for ideas’ which the ANC identifi es in the closing of its document, which the party is determined to ‘dominate’ (2010, item 152). This, then, is a struggle for ‘symbolic power’ in order ‘to cultivate and sustain belief in their legitimacy’ (Thompson 2000, 98).

The ANC 2010 documentThe ANC’s critique of the news media has to be understood in terms of the party’s agenda and the role it would ideally ascribe to the media. In the 2010 document, the ANC is constituted as seeking to promote a ‘developmental state, collective rights, values of caring and sharing community, solidarity, ubuntu, non sexism, working together’ (ANC 2010). If the party envisages a developmental media to serve these purposes, it notes that that the news media do not fulfi l this function. Rather, the ‘current mainstream media’s ideological outlook’ is described as ‘neo-liberalism, a weak and passive state, and overemphasis on individual rights, market fundamentalism, etc.’ (item 50).

While much of the document considers political economy aspects of ownership and transformation, two criticisms of the print media relate directly to news content, the focus here. First, what is described as the highly commercial and sensational nature of print media is considered detrimental to the public interest. The press is deemed to be prejudiced – a ‘contested terrain and therefore not neutral’ and engaged in ‘ideological battles and power relations based on race, class and gender in our society. It cannot claim that its role is merely to refl ect’ (item 53). Thus the press is viewed as ideologically biased against and hostile to the party – a refrain many ANC politicians voice, particularly when the conduct of individual members is criticised on various


26

Jeanne Prinsloo



grounds.2 These statements assume that the news media do not presently (but potentially could in fact) serve as a mirror to accurately refl ect the world of politics – an issue dealt with later.

Second, the protection and promotion of media freedom stand accused of being treated as more important than responsible and ethical reporting. What is being invoked here relates to a tension between two sets of constitutional clauses, namely those that protect media freedom, access to information and free speech on the one hand (sections 16 and 32) and those that promote the right to dignity and to participate in the cultural life of choice (sections 10 and 30). These clauses have been invoked, particularly, when individual political fi gures are the focus of scandals. The ANC document accuses the press of tending to dismiss ‘criticism of the media as an attack on press freedom’, as noted in the opening quote. The party therefore claims ‘a responsibility to assist the media need to shape up’ (sic) (item 61).

The document stipulates how any critique of ANC policy or its implementation on the part of the media should be conducted, namely ‘in a manner that adds value to the national endeavour and [the media should] refl ect on the broader questions about how our souls are being poisoned by the spirit of conspicuous consumption in a socio-economic formation that encourages greed’ (item 83). Thus the ANC espouses a nationalistic approach that distances itself from personal greed, enrichment and conspicuous (capitalist) consumption. This study is mindful of these criticisms and its recommendations.

Theoretical framework – discourse, democracy, journalismThe study is located within the fi elds of Cultural Studies and Journalism Studies. It is informed by Foucauldian understandings of discourse (Foucault 1977, 1981). Accordingly, a discourse is conceptualised as not offering neutral descriptions of the world, but as presenting a position, as being underpinned by assumptions of ‘truth’, and as always in contestation with other discourses. Where one discourse has come to be considered common-sense or normal, there is always another that could take its place. Importantly, discourse operates by proposing a particular ‘truth’, and the struggle between two sets of discourses can be understood as a struggle to defi ne what counts as ‘truth’ (e.g., contesting discourses constitute the West as civilisation versus the West as imperialistic domination).

Democracy, too, is a discursive construct which remains contested. Consequently, no broad consensus exists on the precise role the news media should play in a democracy. However, despite some lack of consensus, the media are accepted as central players, and pluralism and media diversity are considered fundamental to the democratic role the news media might play (Cammaerts and Carpentier 2007). It is also accepted that citizens should be able to participate actively in their society and therefore they need access to information and a diversity of ideas. While different contexts give rise to different sets of practices, it is argued that ‘certain minimum democratic and media professional values have come to command universal respect’ (Tehranian 2002, 72),


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including ‘freedoms and responsibilities to exercise professional duties, including the responsibility to promote democratic values’ (George 2013, 491).

That different kinds of journalism are possible is fl agged in the ANC document when they criticise practices of the mainstream press, in contrast to journalism that ‘add[s] value to the national endeavour’ (<ref>). Similarly, Zuma lamented the dearth of ‘patriotic reporting’ which ‘fails to tell the story of how the government has turned the country around from the illegal apartheid system to a vibrant democracy’.3 The approach which Zuma validates, constitutes what Christians et al. (2009) term a collaborative approach, whereby the press support the government’s agenda and stand in contrast to the broader self-conception that informs the journalistic profession ‘as public watchdog and provider of information and resources of public opinion formation’ (Cottle 2006, 3).

The relationship between politicians and the news media is complex. On the one hand politicians can draw on their symbolic power (Bourdieu 2002), acquired as a consequence of their social and political position. They can leverage this power to articulate their discursive position as truth (Foucault 1980). Yet the news media are necessary to circulate such statements. At the same time they serve as a space to contest that ‘truth’ and to participate in the contestations, proposing different ‘truths’ to the offi cial line.4 These contesting positions or discourses between political actors and the media tend to be articulated most explicitly around contentious issues. Cottle (2006) coined the term ‘mediatized confl ict’ to describe this phenomenon; where ‘mediatised’ emphasises how the interests and identities that contend for political legitimacy and social transformation do so largely through the media. This concept makes explicit the fact that the media cannot be mere refl ective surfaces or mirrors on the world (as the ANC document suggests). Rather, the media ‘are capable of enacting and performing confl icts as well as reporting and representing them’ (ibid, 9) – the media become a stage for the performance of confl icts. If ‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’, as Foucault (1997) suggested,5 the news media here too engage in political struggle.

It is unsurprising, then, that discursive contestation should arise between politicians and journalists when attention is drawn to the inappropriate conduct of public fi gures, or to the failures of government/government departments. The signifi cance of such contestations goes beyond the immediate event to reverberate throughout society. Cottle (2006, 54) insists that mediatised events ‘demand serious investigation’. One such mediatised confl ict, the Nkandla coverage, became the focus of the investigative journalism of both the City Press and the M&G. In turn, it is the focus of this study.

Investigative journalism presumes a particular understanding of democracy (George 2013) that is consistent with Habermas’ ‘deliberative democracy’, which presumes reasoned and inclusive debate and is marked by a willingness to engage with challenges to democratic institutions and processes of democracy or social justice. Its purpose is to reveal important aspects of the state of democracy in society and to evaluate them, for it engages with accounts of victimhood, villainy and non-accountable social institutions, and serves as a call to public moral indignation (Ettema and Glasser 1998; Thompson 2000). In this way it represents what is in terms of what could ideally be. Two central themes of investigative journalism as moral discourse recur, namely the innocence of


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citizens who become victims as a consequence of some systemic problem, and the guilt of the perpetrators of civic vice, who are responsible for the problem. Concerned about the illicit use of political power while they report offi cial press releases, they are viewed as political constructs <and probe further> <are further probed?>(Ettema and Glasser 1998, 10). Moreover, because their intention is to be convincing rather than to be considered partisan, criticisms and accounts of events, while fi ltered by the news producer, strive to use a neutral tone so as to appear rational and convincing.

There is an important point to be made about how guilt is determined within this discursive terrain. The people exposed are typically judged against their expressed values. The moral claims investigative exposés make, draw on accepted standards of conduct which include those legislated by law, formal regulations, codes of ethics and socially accepted fair and common practice (Ettema and Glasser 1998). Public fi gures are evaluated against their oaths of public offi ce or their articulated moral visions.

The invocation of moral indignation invites the reader to participate in that moral order. The term ‘scandal’ signifi es a breach in moral conduct and authority, and for it to result in a scandal, requires that it be met with public disapproval. Thompson (2000, 245) describes media scandals as ‘struggles over power in which reputation and trust are at stake’. It is a distinctive kind of event that unfolds over time and is sequential in structure. The four sequential phases begin with a pre-scandal phase, when the transgression or breach occurs before it becomes the focus of the scandal. Phase two, the scandal proper, is dependent on a disclosure that triggers responses. It is characterised by a ‘distinctive pattern of revelations, allegations and denunciations’ (ibid, 74). The revelations are followed by denials and various tactics are employed by those who stand accused, including threats of litigation to suppress further coverage. The third phase is the culmination, where events come to a head possibly as a result of an investigation. The fi nal phase, the aftermath, consists of refl ection and might result in certain actions or enquiries.

Clearly, such reporting does discursive work. It is neither neutral in relation to the perceived villainy nor does it act as an impartial arbiter. Little wonder, then, that the responses of those who are the objects of such scrutiny are frequently defensive and hostile!

Research questionBearing in mind the points raised by the ANC document to guide the process, this qualitative study asks: How do the ANC and the news media interact in relation to the contested expenditure on Zuma’s Nkandla homestead? It probes whether, in this controversy, the coverage of the sampled news media was hostile towards the ANC, and attacked the dignity of ANC politicians; whether it endorsed the ANC’s claim that the media operate to the detriment of the public interest and that their concern with media freedom results in irresponsible and unethical reporting.

As these broad questions scrutinise the news media, it is appropriate to also redirect them in terms of the discourses articulated by the ANC, to ask whether the ANC is hostile to the media, etc. The study of the Nkandla homestead controversy serves as a platform for analysing the various contesting positions.


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MethodologyThis qualitative study of the investigative reporting of the City Press and the M&G into expenditure on the Nkandla homestead has a sample period spanning four months, from 29 September 2012 (when the scandal broke) to 30 January 2013 (the announcement of the completion of the Public Works report). Although the events did not come to a conclusion during this period,6 the time frame provides an adequate sample for identifying patterns and trends in the coverage, in relation to the interaction between the news media and public ANC offi cials.

The City Press and M&G were selected for analysis because they played a central role in bringing the question of the expenditure to public attention, and maintained this investigative focus over a sustained period.7 Both weekly titles are signifi cant in the South African media landscape. City Press, started in 1982, has a large readership of 1 704 000, and is primarily read by a black audience (http://www.saarf.co.za/amps-readership/2012/). The M&G began life as the Weekly Mail in 1982, and was known for its critical attitude towards the then apartheid government and its policies. Its present readership, which stands at 459 000, is described as a ‘niche market, interested in a critical approach to politics, arts and current affairs. Large numbers of readers among professionals, academics, diplomats, lobbyists, non-governmental groups’ (http://mg.co.za/page/about-us/). The broad sample of texts on which this analysis draws, includes reports, editorials and commentary in the two titles sourced online: of the approximately 170 contributions in the M&G (82) and City Press (88), 16 are purposively sampled for close reading to include those that economically enable a broad sense of the contesting positions. Rather than comparing the separate titles, the coverage is analysed as one sustained saga and the focus is on investigative journalism around the Nkandla homestead, simultaneously avoiding endless repetition.

The close critical reading draws on insights from critical discourse analysis (CDA), which looks for structural and textual patterns and identifi es sets of discourses, as inscribed in the body of texts (Fairclough 1995; Janks 1997; Richardson 2007). The approach here is eclectic, informed by media studies, rhetoric and critical linguistics. As investigative reporting incorporates dimensions of narrative and argumentation, this analysis considers both. The analysis pays attention to narrative (Prinsloo 2009), transitivity8 and lexicalisation (word choice) (Janks 1997). This article confi nes itself to identifying the broad patterns of meanings relative to the topic.

Analysis of City Press and M&G’s coverage of Zuma’s Nkandla homestead expenditure

The Nkandla saga – an overview: 30 September 2011 to 30 January 2012The pre-scandal stage of the Nkandla saga involves inquiries on the part of the M&G into state expenditure on President Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla. On 29 September 2012, City Press breaks the scandal proper with the report, ‘R200m splurge on Zuma homestead’. This fi rst revelation identifi es the ‘breach’ that impels a sustained investigation into the expenditure, allegedly funded from the public purse.


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The opposition party responds immediately and critically. Thereafter, a pattern of denials, responses and further revelations occurs, constituting stage two of the saga. In response to City Press’s account of its unsuccessful attempts to access information, Public Works Minister, Thulas Nxesi, defers to the National Key Points Act (NKPA) to defend the refusals and justify the level of expenditure with reference to the Ministerial handbook. The Public Works Department’s use of legislation enacted to ensure apartheid secrecy receives sharp criticism from a range of social actors who query the legality of improvements at Nkandla, situated on communal land belonging to the Ingonyama Trust. Further questions are raised about the propriety of First National Bank granting Zuma a bond on leased land, in contradiction of their own regulations. As the major expenditure was enabled by the Public Works Department, contentious points arise relating to contract procedures. It is established that due process was not followed; certain preferred contractors were granted large and infl ated contracts. While the denials on the part of the ANC come primarily from Public Works Minister Nxesi and Mac Maharaj, spokesperson for the Presidency, Zuma does make two ad hoc statements whereby he presents himself as a victim of the media.

Defending arguments by ANC public offi cials are greeted with moral outrage by opposition parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA) attempts various interventions to access information, including requesting the Public Protector to investigate the expenditure and a failed attempt by DA leader, Helen Zille, to inspect the homestead. Similarly, indignation is expressed by civil society, labour representatives and in editorials. All attempts to gain access to information from ANC public offi cials about the expenditure are denied during this period, on the grounds that the Public Works Department has begun its own investigation into the matter. Despite repeated assurances of public access to the report on its completion, it is subsequently withheld for ‘security’ reasons. Although this form of offi cial investigation generally serves as the culmination of a media scandal (Thompson’s stage 3), in this case the scandal continues with further revelations and investigations,9 rather than attaining the fi nal stages of aftermath and refl ection (Thompson’s stage 4).

This analysis focuses on how the ANC representatives and the press relate to each other. To reveal the patterns of engagement, the close reading attends the opening of the scandal (the breach), three immediate responses (one of moral outrage, two defensive ANC responses), further investigative accounts on the regulations used to refuse information, ANC responses, two editorials, Zuma’s defence, and fi nally the announcements of the withholding of the reports.

The breach‘R200m splurge on Zuma homestead’ (City Press, 29.10.2012) is the article that initiated this scandal. Structured as a four-stage argument, it fi rst establishes the issue of excessive, secretive expenditure, thereby introducing the funding as a matter of public concern. The opening paragraph makes three points: the work being undertaken on Zuma’s homestead is cloaked in secrecy as a ‘very hush-hush revamp’; this work is both ‘extensive’ and very costly at R203 million; and it is to be funded by the taxpayers,


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not Zuma. From the outset the grounds for moral outrage driving this investigation are established.

Second, City Press is concerned with duplicity and ‘can reveal’ misinformation on the part of the Public Works Department. If Zuma was meant to ‘foot the majority of the bill’, the memorandum the newspaper has accessed ‘tells another story’, for Public Works approved a budget 18 months earlier, requiring Zuma to pay only fi ve per cent of the costs. A memorandum ‘sent to former Public Works minister Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde on March 28 last year’ identifi es that the work includes ‘installation of security measures’, including a helipad, underground bunkers and fencing. This misinformation is thus held against a consensual standard within democracies – public fi gures are required to be accountable to the public, and access to information in relation to public expenditure is presumed. City Press emphasises the extent of the expenditure: Zuma is responsible for R10.6 million; the state’s portion is estimated at R203 079 677.18.

Third, the report details unsuccessful attempts to access information from Public Works regional manager (author of the memorandum), the presidency spokesperson and Public Works’ acting director-general. The latter justifi es this secrecy by declaring that the residence is a national key point, using NKPA legislation and the 1982 Protection of Information Act to do so.

Finally, a more detailed background of the work on the Nkandla homestead links back to Schabir Shaik’s corruption trial, in which Zuma was implicated. While City Press is positioned in opposition to the ‘whopping’ expenditure and concerned about bringing it to public attention, the tone of the article is detached. Rather, the paper plants the seed for moral indignation. As Thompson (2002, 20)notes, ‘no responses, no scandal’.

Three responses: DA, Public Works, the Office of the Presidency

Unsurprisingly, an immediate response from the DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, is covered in both newspapers. ‘Nkandla: Zuma, cancel ‘lavish personal enrichment’ – Mazibuko’ (City Press 1.10.2012) and ‘DA won’t let Zuma’s R203m homestead revamp “go unanswered”’ (M&G 30.09.2012) report how Mazibuko criticises Zuma for the expenditure. Her response plays an important role in moving the breach to a scandal, and here the main points of her argument are summarised briefl y.

The M&G reports on two aspects of Mazibuko’s criticism: she identifi es the Public Works Department as inadequate and confused as to ‘what the pressing priorities of South Africans are’. Moreover, this expenditure is for a private home, not a state asset. City Press focuses on the argument Mazibuko deploys to discredit Zuma. His excessive spending for personal gain (‘lavish personal enrichment’) is discordant with ‘what his high offi ce demands’. The use of taxpayers’ money for this project is described as a ‘social injustice’ considering the need for ‘clinics, hospitals and “decent” classrooms’ across the country. Mazibuko’s morally indignant argument relates to concern for the public good and serves to expurgate Zuma, and to defi ne ‘what is’ the case, what should be, and what Zuma might do. It is this response that provokes the fi rst ANC riposte.


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The presidential defence responds to the exposé, but addresses Mazibuko’s criticisms too. ‘Zuma’s Nkandla upgrade needed – Maharaj’ (City Press 02.10.2012) reports on Maharaj’s justifi cation. He defl ects attention from Zuma by arguing the necessity of the expenditure on behalf of the president’s staff and guests, and the need to house foreign dignitaries. He poses rhetorical questions about where other signifi cant leaders (‘President Obama or another African heads of state’) should be accommodated, and where ‘Prime Minister Cameron’s security staff’ should stay: for ‘you can’t put them in the same house as the family’. He thereby presupposes that the level of luxury granted to leaders of wealthy industrialised countries is an appropriate yardstick for South Africa. He omits to mention the presidents’ other three offi cial residences in urban areas with adequate provision for hosting such dignitaries. The tone of his response (articulated as rhetorical questions, not information) is defensive and dismissive.

Further defence of the spending on the homestead comes from Nxesi. In ‘Nkandla: Minister calls for City Press probe’ (City Press 02.10.2012) and ‘Department to probe Nkandla documents leak’ (M&G 02.10.2012) he objects not to the amount of money spent, but to the fact that the details have been made public. He describes City Press’s access to ‘top secret’ documents as illegal, on the grounds that the homestead is a national key point. Nxesi threatens an investigation into the paper’s acquisition as the information, which is ‘protected from disclosure’. The Public Works department is thus rendered unaccountable: it ‘will not be in a position to divulge details of security improvements carried out at the president’s private residence’. Nxesi simply excludes the possibility that access to this information should be considered. On 05.10.2012, the M&G report, ‘Nkandla’s costs: Trapping the mole in the bunker’ recounts Nxesi’s construction of the media as devious and conspiratorial, seeking to negatively infl uence Zuma’s chances of re-election as ANC party president. His determination to ferret out the ‘moles’ in his department stands in contrast to his reluctance to provide the information requested by the media. He does not refuse it, but delays it until the 2011/2012 annual reports are presented to parliament. He disclaims knowledge of the amounts referred to by City Press, thus ignorance serves as his defence.

Second, Nxesi defends the expenditure as consistent with ‘the Ministerial Handbook on the grounds that it relates to security arrangements for private residences of the President’. He describes it as ‘normal practice for the former presidents of South Africa’ – a justifi cation that is challenged a few days later. He claims the expenditure is informed by ‘scientifi c security analysis’, thereby rendering it authoritative and unquestionable. Thus begins a pattern of obfuscating information on the part of ANC public offi cials taking recourse to apartheid legislation such as the NKPA and the Ministerial Handbook.

City Press and M&G on using the Ministerial Handbook and NKPA to prevent disclosure

The M&G’s detailed investigative journalism into the issue produces two lengthy responses to Nxesi’s claims. ‘Nxesi contradicts handbook on Nkandla upgrade’ presents a rebuttal to Nxesi’s reasons for withholding information about the expenditure in a detailed deductive argument supported by evidence and reasoning (Richardson 2007,


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161). It proposes that the Ministerial Handbook is being invoked to prevent access to information, to ‘veil’ the spending of state offi cials on ‘private luxuries’, notably Zuma’s Nkandla homestead. It details Nxesi’s refusals which indicate his defensiveness. He ‘states categorically’, he ‘defended’ the plans, ‘criticised’ City Press, ‘warned’ about the possession of documents, and ‘called for an investigation’.10

City Press argues that the Ministerial Handbook allows for expenditure relating to security measures for privately-owned residences up to R100 000. The article recounts high levels of expenditure on Zuma’s homes other than Nkandla for R200 million, namely R13.9 million, R1.9 million and R50 million for his three other offi cial residences, so providing further grounds for moral indignation on the part of the public. The argument avoids direct accusations of the person and his actions, thereby evading any explicit moral outrage to the reader.

‘Nkandla upgrade: Last-minute bid to hide costs’ (M&G 05.10.2012) more explicitly criticises the expedient use of the apartheid legislation of the NKPA to deny access to information. Government has created a ‘blanket’ of secrecy to evade answering questions about the expenditure, it has ‘ratcheted up attempts … to suppress the information’; Nxesi has ‘defended the enormous expenditure’. Additionally, ‘the department misled the M&G’ and made ‘glaring omissions’. Government’s blocking of information renders it as the anti-hero who has misled journalists and the public. Nxesi’s ‘claims’ that the information obtained by City Press is top secret ‘could be a recent construct designed to prevent embarrassment for Zuma’, since Fatyela-Lindie’s briefi ng to Parliament’s National Council of Provinces made the information accessible online. The paper queries the timing of declaring the Nkandla homestead a key point, raising ‘the disturbing possibility’ that its designation was a “conscious attempt to hide information” after the huge expenditure was questioned’. The article thus accuses the government of subterfuge – in effect it throws down the gauntlet, one reluctantly picked up by Nxesi as his defence below details.

Public Works investigation

Nxesi seeks to defi ne the Nkandla scandal as a ‘controversy’ which he insists is based on ‘misperceptions’ (‘Nkandla controversy based on misperceptions – Nxesi’, City Press 05.10.2012). He reluctantly concedes the need for public access to more information – without compromising security – because ‘certain parties will continue to make allegations about this project’. He constructs himself as ‘refut[ing] misperceptions’ with ‘facts’. He commits to making the report public on its completion – a commitment subsequently not honoured.

Editorial commentIf the investigative reports are circumspect and tend to factual argument, the editorials undertake different work and articulate explicit outrage. ‘How to use your moral suasion’ (City Press 06.10.2012) sets up a forensic argument that looks to the past of African post-colonial countries.11 It argues by contrasting the past and the present.


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Over half of the editorial presents the ANC’s past as a robust, moral movement concerned with justice. The modest beginnings ‘in a tiny Free State church’ (later contrasted with the immodest Nkandla homestead) were the work of committed activists: it ‘was built’ by them and its moral stance is expressed as ‘on the side of light’. The leaders are validated as at war against evil, in that they ‘mustered the forces of right’ and ‘fought for justice’. Sustaining the war metaphor, the ethnic, tribal and racial divisions are deemed ‘moats’ they organised across, while their foes wielded the ‘might of the colonial and apartheid forces’. The ANC actors in the past are recognised as ‘the lead intellectual force’ and ‘ahead of their time’, as is evident their drafting of the progressive South African constitution. Underpinning this portrayal is the insistence that their struggle was informed by ‘democratic and just opinion’, its attraction being its ‘moral capital’ and ‘lofty vision’. This glowing retrospective of the ANC is halted by the brief imperative: ‘But look at the party now.’

The details of the present portray the ANC’s defence of the excessive spending (‘splurge of R200 million’) as its ‘fi nal loss of moral authority’. The current ANC is described as ‘succumbing’ to ‘life lived large’, defended by reference to the Ministerial Handbook. It argues that the spending is unjustifi able; Nxesi’s defence that the expenditure on previous presidents’ residences is similarly large, is ‘simply not true’; and recourse to apartheid legislation to obscure information is symptomatic of its moral fall. In contrast to its morally driven rise over a century and its ability to attract people into its ranks through ‘lever[ing] off moral suasion’, the ANC ‘is fumbling’ now and ‘has lost its edge to serve society from the bottom up’. The editorial is explicit in its support and concern for the ANC. Ironically, the same immoral actions mentioned in the ANC 2010 document are censured, notably those of personal greed, enrichment and conspicuous consumption: the press is acting precisely ‘in a manner that adds value to the national endeavour and refl ect on the broader questions about how our souls are being poisoned by the spirit of conspicuous consumption in a socio-economic formation that encourages greed’ (ANC 2010, item 83).

The question of morality is revisited in ‘Echoes of DRC’ (City Press 13.10.2010), again using a forensic argument that looks back further in history across the African continent to draw an analogy between the looters of then and now. Mobutu’s excessive expenditure on his home was paid for by the ‘sweat and blood’ of the Zairian people. It shifts to 2012, to the village of Nkandla and its ‘colossal’ expenditure. The victims again are the people: the ‘taxpayers’ have to ‘fork out’ for the excesses. Both editorials are explicitly not hostile to the ANC per se, but expurgate corrupt leaders who act undemocratically and with scant regard for the public good.

Zuma’s defence

Zuma made two ad hoc responses relating to the Nkandla expenditure. His fi rst direct response occurs at a business breakfast at Midrand hosted by the New Age (owned by the Gupta family). ‘Nkandlagate: Zuma claims ignorance’ (City Press 11.10.2013) recounts how Zuma presents himself as ignorant. He is quoted as saying: ‘I don’t know how much it costs’, but defers to Nxesi who would know the cost: ‘I don’t question when


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government decides to put in security measures for MECs, ministers’, thereby presenting this as something other functionaries attend to. When questioned as to whether greater transparency is needed, he again ‘couldn’t judge’ but defers to the offi cials responsible. He partially defends the expense by describing the costs of security measures as higher in rural areas. He protests his portrayal in the media: ‘People think when they see my home on television that government does that for me, but a lot of things done to the homestead was my family.’ He is reported as laughing and declaring: ‘Well, I’m blamed for everything every day’, self-identifying as the reluctant, albeit jovial, victim here. Importantly, Zuma acts outside of the role of democratic leader that investigative journalism presumes is inscribed in the constitution. He exhibits no concern about the possibility of improper spending. His state of ignorance does not impel him, it appears, to remedy matters or to provide access to the information required, which the public are entitled to. In effect, the public do not receive the respect for their rights, presumed in the president’s oath of offi ce or his public statements, for example the ANC slogan of ‘a better life for all’. Subsequently, Zuma states in parliament that he is paying off the Nkandla homestead building costs (for the fi ve family buildings) and has a bond on his home, a revelation that triggers further investigations. In ‘Zuma defends his Nkandla “family home”’ (M&G 15.11.2012) he reportedly accuses his questioners of arrogance when he says ‘you believe people like me can’t build a home’. ‘Zuma: I take exception to being called fi rst-class corruption man’ (City Press 15.11.2012) focuses on how Zuma responds as ‘aggrieved’. He presents himself as mistreated and emphasises that his family shares the humiliation and pain he is being subjected to. ‘I have been convicted, painted black, called the fi rst-class corruption man on facts that are not tested’; ‘people are speaking without knowing. It is unfair’; ‘I have never asked government to build a home for me.’

Withholding the Public Works investigative report

‘Wait for the report … This will help you to ask more intelligent questions,’ is Zuma’s comment when he criticised opposition members of parliament (MPs) for ‘continually hammering on about Nkandla’ (‘Nkandla tender man a state favourite,’ City Press 24.03.2013). Similarly, Nxesi and other ANC fi gures defl ect questions about the Nkandla expenditure on the grounds that the internal investigation into the decisions and expenditure is in process and will be shared, once completed.

On 27 January 2013 Nxesi makes an announcement relating to the investigation (‘No evidence public money spent on Nkandla – Nxesi,’ City Press 27.01.2013). The report is, contrary to all previous statements by ANC offi cials, not to be ‘shared’ and this withholding of information is justifi ed again on security grounds. The article presents Nxesi’s statement: the investigation set out to ‘absolve the president of any wrong-doing’ and there is ‘no evidence that public money was spent to build the private residence of the president’. He does, however, recognise that certain tender and procurement regulations were ‘fl outed’ and presents a rough breakdown of the spending: R71 million on security upgrades, of which R20 million was on consultancy fees, and R135 million to ‘state departments’ operational needs’.


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‘No evidence … ’ then presents contrasting responses by the ANC and the opposition. The ANC welcome it and argue that Zuma has been ‘incorrectly attacked’ and deem him to be hereby ‘vindicate[d]’. City Press record Mazibuko’s response to the withholding of the report, describing the investigation as a ‘whitewash’, ‘a poor attempt’ to protect the president from being held accountable ‘for this exorbitant waste of public money’. Such withholding ‘brings into question its independence and casts a further shadow on the entire scandal’. By this point in the saga, Nxesi has still not presented any concrete details, Zuma continues to deny any knowledge of the expenditure, and insists it is inappropriate for him to comment.

Conclusion: Reflecting on the ANC’s criticism of the news mediaThis mediatised confl ict relates to the expenditure of public money on Zuma’s private homestead in a remote area of the country where state business is rarely carried out. The ANC offi cial and public statements recounted in the news media articulate their position, namely that the amount of money spent is justifi ed in terms of ensuring Zuma’s security; to question it is impertinent; and the motivation for asking these questions of these authorities is highly dubious. A contesting position is assumed by the press via investigative reporting, editorials and by providing a platform for a range of stakeholders. It holds that the amount of money spent on Nkandla is scandalous; access to information about, which would see public fi gures being held accountable, has been denied; the expenditure was non-procedural; and the money should have been used to benefi t the public, not a single powerful fi gure.

These two discursive positions are not isolated from, but form part of, the undercurrent of South Africa’s complex social and political life. This mediatised event provides a moment where the nature of the struggle for political legitimacy and social transformation can be made more visible, for the media are the stage on which this contestation is performed. To consider the relationship between the two parties and the discourses informing it, the questions that directed the study are revisited. Are the media hostile to the ANC? Do they attack the dignity of ANC politicians? Do they operate to the detriment of the public interest?

What constitutes non-hostile media, for the ANC, can be deduced from its discussion document, namely developmental media consistent with the party’s particular interpretation of nation-building and patriotism. If ‘friendly’ media ideally play a collaborative role in relation to the government’s agenda, ‘hostile’ media hold government accountable. Deference to, rather than questioning of, authority is validated and this extends to critiquing impropriety on the part of ANC politicians. Hostile and unpatriotic media are those that cover events critically in order to hold structures and people to account and act as Ettema and Glasser’s (1998) ‘custodians of conscience’.

A frequent slippage occurs within this discourse. Rendering criticism of a politician as an act of hostility merges into describing it as an attack on the dignity of the person or offi ce-bearer. The emphasis on dignity is a common refrain in Africanist or customary discourse, through which respect for the wisdom of those in authority is presumed. However, the emphasis on dignity and respect can inhibit a probing of the conduct of those deemed authoritative, and can expediently serve as a smokescreen to preclude a


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position other than one of deference. As Friedman (1999, 829) argues: ‘Where African tradition is invoked to dilute or deny pluralism, the outcome is tyranny, however ornate its cultural form.’

The analysis has shown how the investigation takes a clear moral position and sows the seeds for moral outrage about the expenditure and the way information is obscured. While coverage is critical of these actions, they do not attack the offi ce of the president, but his conduct is held to the letter and moral imperative of his oath of offi ce. The editorials expurgate Zuma and those who enable this spending through analogies with cruel and selfi sh dictators. While they are not deferential, this cannot be confl ated with hostility towards the ANC per se. Some editorials are at pains to acknowledge and laud the heroes of the struggle and those leaders dedicated to the public good. Rather than evidence of undue hostility, the reporting is detailed, analytic and calls for access to information in order to hold offi cials accountable.

To argue that in this instance the media attacked the dignity of ANC politicians would require the politicians to have been wrongfully accused. However, ANC public offi cials merely present this as a statement of fact, while obscuring any evidence to substantiate their argument.

The question of the news media operating to the detriment of the public good similarly does not hold here. The news media called for access to information on the inappropriate spending of public money. The public are constitutionally entitled to this information. The reporting frequently draws attention to the extent of expenditure on the homestead, contrasting it with other pressing needs such as housing, education and health. Analogies are deployed to highlight what this cost to the public purse might have rendered in services for the citizenry, for example between 3 000 and 4 000 low-income houses, rather than only one (Parker 2012). If the security for an entire prison cost R45 000, the sum ostensibly spent on security at Nkandla is fi ve times that amount.

This introduces reverse questions. In this mediatised scandal, were the ANC spokespersons hostile to the media, did they disrespect the dignity of the journalists or the public, and act against the public good? The analysis indicates that both Maharaj and Nxesi’s responses to requests were reluctant, impatient and righteous in tone. They felt no obligation to provide the information requested. In the face of increasing moral outrage, they held their ground. Zuma at no stage saw fi t to address the issue or to reassure the South African public. His defence remained one of ignorance. Why, it must be asked, did he not address his ignorance in order to make a public statement consistent with the responsibilities of his offi ce? Zuma’s other defence was to present himself as aggrieved, and to blame the media for this. It is the case here that ANC representatives were hostile to the media and their democratic intentions.

Reversing the question about dignity and respect similarly brings different conclusions to assumptions made in the ANC document. Zuma, Nxesi and Maharaj in particular adopt a ‘shoot-the-messenger’ approach. Nxesi was angry when the extent of the expenditure became public, and for this he threatened legal action. The ANC offi cials’ impatience with requests for information, their reluctance to divulge information, and their frequently hectoring tone reveal their attitudes towards both the media and (indirectly) the public. The media were guaranteed access to the Public


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Works investigative report on several occasions. The subsequent highhanded refusal is indicative of the offi cials’ attitude. After all, Public Works undertook the investigation and needed to ensure that the details were written up in ways that did not compromise Zuma’s security. Their conduct constitutes disrespect not only for journalists but also for South African citizens, who have the right of access to information and freedom of expression.

On the point of public good, the ANC document argues that the media foster greed. Ironically, the ANC endorses the Nkandla expenditure, while stipulating that the media report ‘in a manner that adds value to the national endeavour’ and refl ect on how ‘our souls are being poisoned by the spirit of conspicuous consumption in a socio-economic formation that encourages greed’ (83). The ANC’s responses to the excessive expenditure on Zuma’s homestead give the lie to the moral high ground they seek to claim. The point about the news media not working to effect nation-building similarly can be reversed, as the investigation seeks to hold politicians accountable and expose corruption, thereby bolstering due democratic process – a patriotic act.

Another question arises from criticism of the ANC: Is responsible and ethical reporting treated as less important than the protection and promotion of media freedom? Clearly, the Nkandla scandal saw the M&G and City Press acting in the interests of the press’s right to freedom of expression. The controversy centres on the rights of access to information. Nxesi expressed anger over City Press’s publication of information that broke the scandal. His position would be that this exposure is irresponsible and unethical, and outside a code of practice marked by deference to rules and authority.

In contrast, investigative journalists have historically been bound by a different set of ethics. If they are concerned about the illicit use of political power and are intent on fi nding out the truth in relation to it, they do not rely on offi cial press releases (Ettema and Glasser 1998, 10). Investigative journalism has its underpinnings in the notion of the liberal and rights-based democracy inscribed in the South African constitution. Deference to authority would presume solidarity with the powerful, and would counter the right to media freedom and public access to information when public offi cials are determined to prevent it.

This analysis must however not be construed as a whitewash of the news media. It has focused on an area that the investigative teams in City Press and the M&G do well, while the same critical acumen is not always evident around corporate collusion and improper conduct. However, what has become explicit is that the ANC discussion document proposes developmental media consistent with its particular interpretation of nation-building and patriotism. Yet the constitution is enabling of the genre of investigative journalism, it validates pluralism and freedom of expression. It does not presume that all citizens should be deferential to authority. If the ANC government rejects investigative journalism of this kind, one would need to ask whether they are committed to the form of government encoded in our constitution.

Notes1. This study was undertaken under the auspices of the Media Policy and Democracy Project,

a joint collaborative research project between the Department of Communication Science at


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Unisa and the Department of Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University, and funded by the Open Society Foundation of South Africa.

2. These include Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (then Minister of Health), Jackie Selebi (then Police Commissioner) and Jacob Zuma, both as dismissed deputy president and then as president of South Africa, in relation to the rape case in 2006, the Spear debacle in 2012, and then the Nkandla homestead expenditure.

3. http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-10-zuma-condemns-opposite-of-the-positive-sa-media4. Importantly, the news media are not monolithic and their output does not merely endorse a

single point of view but are highly complex (Cottle 2006, 3).5. This is his corrective of Clausewitz’s position that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other

means’ (Foucault 1997: 48).6. The study this article draws from covers a more extensive period (see Prinsloo 2014).7. Initially it was intended to draw on the Sunday Times as well. It was excluded as it lacks a

dedicated online presence, forming part of the TimesLIVE presence.8. Transitivity examines the relationship between participants and the roles they play in a process

(Richardson 2007).9. The M&G was eventually granted access to many Nkandla fi les as a consequence of a

Protection of Access to Information Application; the offi ce of the Public Protector is continuing her investigation.

10. These are all verbal acts, as a transitivity analysis (Janks 1997) reveals, by someone deemed authoritative.

11. Forensic arguments refer to past actions of particular social actors in terms of justice or injustice, and seek to either accuse or defend such actions (Richardson 2007, 156).

ReferencesAndersen, B. 1983. Imagined communities. London: Verso.Bourdieu, P. 2002. The forms of capital. In Readings in economic sociology, ed. N. Biggart, 280–291.

Oxford: Blackwell.Caemmerts, B. and N. Carpentier. 2007. Introduction. In Reclaiming the media: Communication

rights and expanding democratic media role, ed. B. Caemmerts and N. Carpentier, xi–xviii. Bristol: Intellect.

Christians, C., T. Glasser, D. McQuail and R. White. 2009. Normative theories of the media: Journalism in democratic societies. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Cottle, S. 2006. Mediatized confl ict. Maidenhead: Open University Press.Ettema, J.S and T.L. Glasser. 1998. Custodians of culture: Investigative journalism and public virtue.

<details?>Fairclough, N. 1995. Media discourse. London: Arnold.Fiske, J. 1987. Television culture. London: Routledge.Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Harmondsworth: Peregrine.Foucault, M. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Ed. C.

Gordon. Brighton: The Harvester Press.Foucault, M. 1981. The order of discourse. In Untying the text – a poststructuralist reader, ed. R.

Young, 48–78. London: Routledge.


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Friedman, S. 1999. Agreeing to differ: African democracy, its obstacles and proposals. Social Research 66(3): <pages>.

George, C. 2013. Diversity around a democratic core: The universal and the particular in journalism. Journalism 14(4): 490–503. DOI: 10.1177/1464884912464169.

Janks, H. 1997. Critical discourse analysis as a research tool. Discourse Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 18(3): 329–341.

Parker, F. 2012. Madonsela: The thin blue line of government. Mail & Guardian. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-09-madonsela-the-thin-blue-line (accessed < >).

Prinsloo, J. 2009. Textual analysis: Narrative and argument. In Media studies, ed. P.J Fourie, 204–253. Pretoria: Juta.

Prinsloo, J. 2014. Nkandlagate: A critical textual analysis of the press coverage. http://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/mpdp_nkandla_research_report_21jan_2014.pdf (accessed < >).

Richardson, J.E. 2007. Analysing newspapers: An approach from critical discourse analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tehranian, M. 2002. Peace journalism: Negotiating global media ethics. Paper presented at the Peace Culture and Communications Commission, IPRA General Conference in Korea, July.

Thompson, J.B. 2000. Political scandal: Power and visibility in the media age. Cambridge: Polity.News articles obtained online: http://www.citypress.co.za, http://www.mg.co.zaCity Press. 2012. R200m splurge on Zuma homestead, 29 September.City Press. 2012. Nkandla: Zuma, cancel lavish personal enrichment – Mazibuko, 1 October.City Press. 2012. Zuma’s Nkandla upgrade needed – Maharaj, 2 October.City Press. 2012. Nkandla: Minister calls for City Press probe, 2 October.City Press. 2012. Nkandla controversy based on misperceptions – Nxesi, 5 October.City Press 2012. Nkandla: Zuma claims ignorance, 11 October.City Press 2012. How to use your moral suasion, 6 October.City Press 2012. Echoes of DRC’s Mobutu in KZN, 10 October.City Press 2012. Nkandlagate: Zuma claims ignorance, 11 October.City Press 2013. Nkandla tender man a state favourite, 24 March.City Press 2013. No evidence public money spent on Nkandla – Nxesi, 27 January.M&G. 2012. DA won’t let Zuma’s R203m homestead revamp ‘go unanswered’, 30 September.M&G. 2012. Department to probe Nkandla documents leak, 2 October.M&G. 2012. Nxesi contradicts handbook on Nkandla upgrade, 3 October.M&G. 2012. Nkandla’s costs: Trapping the mole in the bunker, 5 October.M&G. 2012. Nkandla upgrade: Last-minute bid to hide costs, 5 October.

Biographical noteJeanne Prinsloo is an independent researcher/teacher affi liated to Rhodes University, Grahamstown as a professor in Journalism and Media Studies, where she teaches and supervises graduate students. Her work is strongly infl uenced by Foucauldian understandings while her current research interests relate to South African media in particular, popular culture, issues of identity, and power. Email: [email protected]


Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies Volume 35 () 2014ISSN Print 0256-0054/Online 1942-0773 © 2014 iMasaDOI: 10.1080/02560054.2014.919943 pp 41–58

Third-party complaints in the system of press regulation: Inviting the reader to take part in journalistic accountability and securing press freedom1

Julie Reid

AbstractThe system of self-regulation for the press was subject to contentious debates in South Africa from 2010 to 2012. The Press Council of South Africa and the accountability mechanism for the press (self-regulation) underwent two separate processes of review during this period, subsequently altering the procedures of the press complaints body to some degree, and replacing the self-regulatory system with one of independent co-regulation. A significant change to the system, in January 2013, was the introduction of the allowance of third party complaints. In an environment of increasing perceived threats to press freedom from government, and acknowledging the low public profile of the press accountability body, the introduction of third party complaints enables the raising of public awareness about the purpose of the Press Council of South Africa and its relationship to the defence of press freedom, in a format which was not previously possible.

Keywords: accountability, ethics, journalism, press council, press freedom, self-regulation, South Africa, third party complaints

Introduction: The South African system of press accountability under review, 2010–2012While the system of press self-regulation, as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the printed media, was heavily contested in apartheid South Africa, the fi rst 12 years of democracy (1994–2007) saw a relative quietening of the debate (Berger 2010, 289). The ruling African National Congress (ANC) reintroduced the debate in mid-2007, and again with even more vigour in mid-2010 (African National Congress 2007 and 2010). The Press Council of South Africa (PCSA) (hereafter the Press Council) and its procedural functioning as a self-regulatory system for the print media (magazines


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Third-party complaints in the system of press regulation

and newspapers) became the object of scrutiny of two separate processes of review, as various stakeholders debated the most suitable system of press regulation for South Africa.

Partly in response to the ANC’s call for a parliamentary enquiry into the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) to which the Press Council would be subservient, and amid rising fears in the academic, civil society and media spheres that an MAT would impede the freedom of the press, the Press Council conducted a review of its own processes from late-2010 to mid-2011 (PCSA 2011). Following this process a revised press code, constitution and complaints procedure were adopted. Subsequent to this internal review, the two media representative bodies, Print and Digital Media South Africa, or PDMSA (formerly PMSA) and the South African National Editors Forum (Sanef) established the Press Freedom Commission (PFC) in July 2011. This body of nine independent commissioners from outside the media industry, chaired by former Chief Justice, Pius Langa, performed an assessment of the system of press regulation until April 2012, when the PFC released its fi nal report detailing its recommendations for the revision of the press regulatory system. In October 2012 the Press Council released another report in which it detailed the new press code, complaints procedure and constitution, after incorporating selected recommendations of the PFC (PCSA 2012).

A signifi cant alteration to the system was that after the reviews, the press accountability mechanism moved from being classifi ed as self-regulatory, to what the PFC called a system of independent co-regulation, involving both public and press participation but with greater emphasis on public membership and no participation from government (PFC 2012, 7). This amounted to a critical shift in thinking about the core nature of the Press Council.

Politically it seemed at the time to have served the purpose of staving off the ANC’s calls for an investigation into the establishment of an MAT (Hlongwane 2012). That was temporary, since in early 2013 the ANC published the conference resolutions from its national conference held in December 2012: These resolutions make mention of the work done by the PFC and acknowledge the changes to the press regulatory system, but nonetheless stipulate the intention of requesting a parliamentary investigation into the desirability of an MAT (ANC 2013, 62–63). However, apart from these conference resolutions, no other offi cial call to this effect was made by the ANC between January and September 2013, and parliamentary deliberations on an MAT had yet to be initiated at the time of writing.

Another signifi cant change, which will have a small degree of practical implication for the procedural functioning of the Press Council, but enormous implications for public participation in the body, is that for the fi rst time the Ombudsman made provision for third party complaints. Prior to both reviews third party complaints were not permitted, which meant that if a publication breached the code of ethics only persons directly involved in the alleged wayward report could lay a complaint with the Press Council. Third parties, or persons who may have been concerned about the content of a newspaper report but were not directly affected by the report themselves, were not permitted to complain. More detail on why this practice is problematic, its implications,


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its resolution and its potential impact in South Africa in the future, is provided later in this article.

The balancing act of holding the press to account while ensuring its freedom: Should governments play a role?The ANC’s resolution to initiate a parliamentary investigation into an MAT as an appeals body to which the Press Council would be subservient, initiated debates within South Africa on the appropriateness of statutory regulation of <the content of the press> <media content?>. One internationally prevailing view is that state interference in press accountability is a negative indicator of press freedom. This, regardless of whether such involvement is inspired by goodwill or by genuine concerns about raising the standard or quality of journalism. Undue limitations on the press and unnecessary legal barriers are often initiated with the intent to enhance journalistic quality, but have the consequent effect of limiting freedom of expression (Haraszti 2008, 14). Amongst many media representative bodies and much of civil society, the theoretical normative global view has emerged within journalism and media studies that neither lawmakers, nor the state or political elites should play a role in regulating press content. A general feeling persists amongst such stakeholders that attempts to impose ethical standards on journalists by law will impose arbitrary limitations on their freedoms, and will restrict the free fl ow of information within society (ibid, 15). A complementary view is that high-quality journalism should not be a precondition for governments to grant full freedom to the press. Instead, ethical journalism is only able to develop within an environment of guaranteed freedom, while journalists’ adherence to codes of ethics must be preceded by government’s self-restraint in reacting to the media (Haraszti 2008, 15; Reid 2012c).

This view is supported by various international declarations, including the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, which states that ‘[e]ffective self-regulation is the best system for promoting high standards in the media’, and ‘[a]ny print media published by a public authority should be protected adequately against undue political interference’ (African Union [AU] 2002, 3). The concept of the right to freedom of expression, which is not subject to government repression or interference, is also encapsulated in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (AU 1981), the Washington Declaration (which emphasises freedom of expression on the Internet) (Unesco 2011), the Windhoek Declaration (Unesco 1991) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations [UN] 1948, Article 19). Such sentiments are echoed by the International Federation of Journalists (IJF) (1999) which states that ‘[m]edia ethics are a matter for the media professionals. Governments and parliaments must refrain from regulating media content’.

As such, ruling authorities or political elites are often automatically regarded with suspicion when enacting attempts to intervene in press regulation, regardless of their motivation or intention. The irony is that when intervening in the <accountability system> of the press with the self-proclaimed purpose of securing the credibility of the media and the press complaints body, political powers stand to diminish their own


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credibility in the eyes of the public. <This has already taken place amongst sections of the South African public> <supply an example>. What is not mentioned in the fi nal report (PFC 2012), is that numerous submissions delivered to the PFC displayed a remarkable level of distrust in the ANC-led government. A substantial number of submissions remarked that the recent behaviour of the ANC toward the press and the Press Council refl ected the belief that the ruling party is attempting to institute the system in a manner which would help it to hide corrupt practices, and limit the ability of the press to expose government failings or mismanagement. This view is echoed by various journalists and commentators within the country.

As will be explained in more detail later, the public profi le of the Press Council in South Africa is low, and in order to secure wider public support for the Press Council and for a system of press accountability which is independent from government, a great deal of work needs to be done to raise public awareness on the matter.

A key component of any messaging aimed at raising public awareness about the Press Council is that it must help the public gain an understanding of the relationship between the regulation of the press through an accountability body, and press freedom. According to the IFJ (1999), ‘[s]ystems of self-regulation must be linked to principles of media freedom. Where media freedom does not exist or is under threat the promotion of professional standards must be linked to the defence of press freedom.’ In many democracies, including South Africa, journalists are protected by rights and privileges that are encapsulated in law, which ensure the freedom of speech and the right to disseminate news. Journalists invariably test the limits of these freedoms from time to time, but if they are encouraged to operate within a specifi ed code of ethics and, more importantly, if they are held accountable to that code, the institution of the press is more likely to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Journalists are also less likely to fall foul of the law, and governments would have greater diffi culty justifying state intervention in the regulation of the press. It is for this reason that Baydar (2008, 22) maintains that ‘codes of ethics ensure that press freedom prevails’. But can such codes of ethics hold value if no one – neither journalists nor readers – knows anything about them? Berger (2010, 291–292) asserts that ‘[i]t is the extent to which the broader public cherishes press freedom, and self-regulation as integral to this, that provides the ultimate guarantee against political control. In turn ... a system of self-regulation needs broad public awareness and support as a condition of its success.’

Increasing public awareness and raising popular support for the sys-tem of press self-regulation in the interest of press freedomKey to the success of any press council is a public perception of legitimacy which must be preceded by the effective establishment of a strong public profi le (Krüger 2011, 108 and 114). In South Africa the Press Council is positioned at the nucleus of the debate on whether a statutory body ought to be instituted to regulate the press. An important aspect in the ongoing campaign to prevent additional regulation, is attempts to secure popular support from the public not only for the idea of a press which is permitted to operate outside of the regulatory jurisdiction of the state (or parliament), but also for the


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institution of the Press Council as an effective accountability mechanism. The logical equation here is simple: If the Press Council is widely perceived as an effective and reliable system of press accountability amongst the public, then the notion of statutory intervention will seem unnecessary, and in the face of ardent popular/public support for the Press Council, the ruling party would face signifi cant opposition in its attempts to impose any form of additional statutory regulation. But this means that popular public support for the Press Council may be crucial to maintaining an environment in which journalists’ freedoms are not limited by statutory means. In the South African case, the low public profi le of the Press Council is inherently problematic.

Increasing public awareness of the system (including popular education on readers’ rights, the duties of the press regulatory body and how to lodge complaints) is deemed a crucial factor in a proposed summary of best practice in terms of self-regulation (see Breit 2005, 6). In criticising the Australian self-regulatory system, Breit (2005) argues that it treats <is this still valid and therefore present tense, or has it since changed and therefore we must use the past tense?> the public as mere passive recipients of journalistic content, instead of incorporating them into the system as an integral part of the process. According to Breit (ibid, 10) the Australian system is a predominantly complaints-driven process, rather than one which actively engages the public on media ethics, performs the function of raising popular media literacy levels, and educates the public on how to more constructively react to news content, especially with regard to breaches of ethics.

Much the same criticisms have rightly been made of the South African system. Among the various disparagements levelled at the Press Council during the two review processes, were complaints that it was too low-profi le, and reactive rather than proactive in initiating complaints (Berger 2011a, 36). In its review report the Press Council (2012, 33) admits to having received a number of submissions which suggested it needed to ‘market’ itself a great deal better, in order to increase public awareness about its purpose. Directly after the discussion of the Press Council’s low public profi le in its review report, it offers a solution to the problem: It proposes creating a new position within the regulatory body for a Public Advocate (PCSA 2011, 34). However, on closer inspection this new position is described more as a mediator of complaints, than as one charged with initiating a public awareness campaign or with educating the public. The Press Council’s review report (released in 2011) and the newly published press code, procedures and constitution (released in 2012) describe the Public Advocate as someone whose primary task will be to assist members of the public in formulating complaints, and to represent complainants in the case of hearings. This would go some way towards assisting those who lay complaints with the Press Council, but it is questionable whether this activity would raise public awareness of the system more generally. Nothing is mentioned in the description of the Public Advocate’s mandate or responsibilities with regard to raising public awareness, strategising and developing a popular education and marketing campaign, or working to raise levels of public media literacy especially with regard to ethics (PCSA 2012, 33–36, 46).2

Another new position created at the PCSA was that of Director. Former Ombudsman, Joe Thloloe, was appointed to this position in February 2013. The new constitution of


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the PCSA states that ‘[t]he Director shall lead the PCSA on a full-time, professional basis and will concentrate on public engagement regarding issues of ethical journalism and media freedom’ (ibid, 45). The new position of Director, which entails dedicating efforts towards activities aimed at public engagement, certainly has the potential to raise the public profi le of the PCSA. However, at the time of writing nine months had passed since the creation of this new position, and the PCSA had yet to launch a public awareness campaign around its role and purpose, or to initiate a broad popular education drive to inform the print audience and citizens at large of the importance of its work with regard to ethics, and of its position in a democracy when it comes to media freedom.

Apart from suffering from a low public profi le, the Press Council received criticism from the ANC and others for its overly complaints-driven processes and for not behaving proactively in curbing unethical breaches of the press code prior to publication. In the United Kingdom, Lord Justice Leveson (2012, 34) suggests that a new press regulatory board should be mandated to initiate its own investigations into press behaviour, and have suffi cient power to carry out investigations. Publications would be expected cooperate with such investigations. This highlights the sentiment that press accountability bodies could adopt a more proactive approach to ensuring higher standards of journalism.

Representatives from the ANC have criticised the Press Council and the self-regulatory system for not doing more than administering complaints – rather, the aim should be to proactively identify and prosecute problematic journalism. In response, representatives of the Press Council, including retired Ombudsman, Ed Linington, and Council Chairperson, Raymond Louw (and later current Ombudsman Joe Thloloe and Deputy Ombudsman Johan Retief), retorted that it is not appropriate for the Press Council to operate as a policeman, prosecutor and judge, since it is not a policing body (Berger 2010, 298; Kumwenda 2011, 131).

In January 2012, a team of academics from the Department of Communication Science at the University of South Africa (Unisa) prepared a research report which was submitted to the PFC (Reid 2011d). The report (ibid, 9) offers third party complaints as a potential solution to the dilemma of the complaints-driven nature of the Press Council:

The Press Council has been criticised because it operates in a reactive manner and only acts on the receipt of a complaint, instead of operating pro-actively and monitoring the press for cases of shoddy journalism. Of course, one cannot practically expect an institution the size of the Press Council to monitor hundreds of publications on a daily basis in an effective manner. However, why should the Press Council monitor the print media when thousands of readers are already doing so? Should readers be allowed to complain about instances of reporting which concern them, and should they be aware of their right to do so, then the Press Council would literally have an army of ‘monitors’ at its disposal. (ibid.)

One could argue that this tactic would entrench an already overly complaints-driven process, because the number of complaints received is likely to increase exponentially. That may be the case, but it is a short-sighted view. Allowing third parties to lay


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complaints would certainly increase the number of complaints the Press Council receives (if preceded by an effective public awareness campaign), but if such complaints came from members of the public, it would help to decrease breaches of journalistic ethics in the long run. Where third party complaints are permitted, journalists and editors automatically become directly accountable to the public in concrete terms, not merely as a philosophical ideal. Without the allowance of third party complaints, journalists are directly accountable (in regulatory terms) only to those who are directly affected or reported on in the stories they publish. In practical terms, this means journalists are mostly accountable only to a select group of public fi gures. The Unisa report (ibid.) adds

that journalists for their part, may be less likely to knowingly err under these circumstances. If a journalist is aware that not only can an individual directly linked to a particular story lay a complaint, but indeed any member of the public, diligence in journalistic responsibilities such as fact-checking are likely to be heightened. Thus, the journalistic profession would become more accountable to readers and to the public, inevitably raising the standards of journalism in South Africa.

The allowance for third party complaints, if effectively publicised and administered correctly, then serves to address four separate though intertwined diffi culties: First, it indicates a shift in an institutional paradigm which regards the reader as a passive recipient of press content rather than an active participant who is able to react to journalistic products, especially in cases of a breach of ethics. Second, although the allowance of third party complaints appears to make the system even more complaints-driven than it currently is, the long-term effect would see publications, by necessity, becoming more cognisant of their accountability to the public in general, not only to those fi gures reported on. Third, an increased systemic accountability toward the public via the Press Council is, in the interest of sustaining a free press environment, a far more acceptable compromise than being held accountable to government by law. Fourth, the allowance of third party complaints unlocks the system of press accountability to the public, thus making possible, for the fi rst time ever, the crucially important factor of raising public awareness of the system.

It is neither reasonable nor fair to ask the public to be interested in, or to defend, a system that purposefully disallows public contributions. To continue to reject third party complaints would mean that any public awareness campaigning done by the Press Council would be likely to fail, since the public could legitimately question why it should lend its support to an institution that does not permit public contributions in the form of complaints. By allowing for third party complaints the Press Council is in a far better position to approach the public and seek its support.

As regards the matter of raising public awareness of the press regulatory system, and thus securing public support, Hadland (2007) identifi es three key factors to securing the success and sustainability of a non-statutory self-regulatory body. The third of Hadland’s (ibid.) key factors is the most pertinent here, namely that the system must have good public awareness practices, including public knowledge of how to use the


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system, and that the public should be aware of the outcomes of the system’s procedures (newspapers ought to publish rulings).

In his summary of how the press self-regulation debate unfolded in South Africa between 2007 and 2009, Guy Berger (2010, 305) laments that by the end of 2009 very little work had been done by either the Press Council or the media industry with regard to promoting public literacy around press freedom and press regulation, and the concept of the press regulatory body playing a decisive role in developing media literacy with respect to ethics, remained unrealised. At the time of writing (September 2013) this is still the case. The two processes of review pertaining to the press regulatory system, conducted between 2010 and 2012, somewhat raised the profi le of the Press Council, but mainly in terms of its perceived defi ciencies and only amongst a limited audience mainly comprising persons with a specifi c interest in media regulation (media academics, industry professionals, civil society organisations). By September 2013, a general and far-reaching educational campaign to explain the purpose of the Press Council, and a public awareness drive around media literacy with regard to ethics, had not yet been initiated by the media or the Press Council.

Third party complaints: The reader is invited into the systemThere is, however, potential for the situation to change, due to a small yet fundamentally signifi cant amendment to the Press Council’s (2012, 32) complaints procedure, in respect of the defi nition of a ‘complainant’. According to the new complaints procedure, the Press Council will now receive complaints not only from persons who are directly affected by an alleged breach of the press code, but also from ‘anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; and as association acting in the interest of its members’ (ibid.).

It is worth noting that the Press Council did not accept the allowance of third party complaints after its own initial internal review conducted from late-2010 to 2011, despite receiving submissions requesting that it do so (PCSA 2011, 56–57) and criticism for not having done so (Reid 2011a and b). Among the submissions made to the subsequent PFC review, which included a request for third party complaints to be accepted by the Press Council, the most intensive lobbying on this issue was carried out by the team of researchers from Unisa. Their report (Reid 2011d, 5–15), prepared for the PFC, outlined a number of reasons for making allowances for third party complaints in the system and also presented an inventory of press accountability mechanisms from a selection of 50 countries which, amongst other things, revealed that a number of foreign nations with particularly high press freedom ratings allowed for third party complaints with the press accountability body.

For example, the complaints procedure of the Finnish press code states that ‘[a] complaint may be fi led by any individual requesting the investigation of a matter concerning breach of good professional practice or the freedom of speech and publication. The matter does not have to directly concern the person issuing the complaint’ (Julkisen sanan neuvosto 2008). Other countries with signifi cantly high press freedom ratings (like Finland), which accept third party complaints in their press


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accountability systems, include Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, Lithuania and Luxembourg (ibid, 44–47).

On the release of its report in April 2012, the PFC recommended that the Press Council change its position on third party complaints, and suggested that allowances be made for complaints within the complaints procedure (PFC 2012, 43 and 87). Furthermore, the PFC recommended that the defi nition of ‘complainant’ be aligned to Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) – a provision which outlines the circumstances in which an applicant may approach a court for relief, should an infringement of the Bill of Rights occur. If such a formulation were included in the defi nition of ‘complainant’ within the Press Council’s complaints procedure, third party complaints would effectively be permitted (PFC 2012, 43). In the face of continued lobbying on the matter (including by the author of this article) and following the recommendations by the PFC, the Press Council adopted the practice of accepting third party complaints in October 2012 (to be instituted from January 2013), while the formulation of the defi nition of ‘complainant’ was similar to that suggested by the PFC (PCSA 2012, 32).

The problematics of the non-allowance of third party complaintsThe Unisa report (Reid 2011d, 5–15) listed a number of factors which made the non-allowance for third party complaints seem illogical, and even unethical. First, this practice by the Press Council was inconsistent with other South African complaints bodies which facilitate the accountability of other forms of media. With regard to broadcast media (television and radio), the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) accepts third party complaints, and, in addition, runs a fairly effective public awareness campaign via the broadcast media. The BCCSA is consistently publicised widely by broadcasters on their media platforms, to inform the public of their right to complain when they feel a broadcaster has contravened the BCCSA’s code of conduct. With regard to advertising, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) accepts third party complaints from anyone who is concerned about the content of an advertisement/advertising campaign. The complaints procedure of the ASA states that ‘[a]ny person can lodge a complaint with the ASA regarding the content of an advertisement’ (ASA 2011; Reid 2011d, 10). Herein lie the inconsistencies among the accountability systems regulating the content of the various media platforms within South Africa: First, until the PFC-inspired change, the public could lodge a complaint (as a third party) with a regulatory body about anything they saw on television, heard on the radio or which was represented in an advertisement, but not about anything they read in a newspaper (Reid 2011a, 2011d, 10 and 2012a). Under these circumstances the press found themselves in an arguably unreasonably privileged position, because despite the high ideals commonly attributed to the profession of journalism, i.e., working to serve the public, newspapers enjoyed more freedom than other media because they were subject to less stringent levels of accountability toward the public than, for instance, the producers of billboard advertisements.


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Second, although third party complaints were not offi cially allowed according to the Press Council’s complaints procedure, the Ombudsman had nonetheless made an occasional concession and accepted such complaints prior to the offi cial adoption of the practice in January 2013, from organisations such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) and civil society groups (PFC 2012, 43). But the circumstances under which this could (or could not) take place were vague and unclearly defi ned by the Press Council (ibid.). In accepting third party complaints on an ad hoc basis the Ombudsman was, on occasion, contravening the regulations of the Press Council (Reid 2011d, 10).

Third, the various publications’ task of raising awareness about the Press Council is typically limited to a brief paragraph, sometimes appearing below the logo of the Press Council and usually on the second page of a newspaper (although not all newspapers adhere to this requirement). This paragraph explains that, should readers be concerned that the newspaper has contravened the press code, they are urged to contact the Press Ombudsman. For example, this paragraph appeared below the Press Council’s logo in The Times of 23 November 2011:

The Times subscribes to the South African Press Code that prescribes news that is truthful, accurate, fair and balanced. If we don’t live up to the code please contact the Press Ombudsman at 011-484 3618.

It may seem insignifi cant, but this type of advertising is, in fact, misleading. For some years now, similar or identical paragraphs (such as the one above) have been printed in many of South Africa’s mainstream newspapers, including the Sunday Times and the Mail & Guardian. But the content of this messaging is suggestive in that it implies that anyone with concerns about the content of a publication may lay a complaint with the Press Ombudsman, which at the time (pre-January 2013) was in fact not the case.

Fourth, it remains extraordinary that in all of its criticism of the Press Council the ANC has, to date, not voiced concerns about the non-allowance of third party complaints, since such a point may have done a great deal for its purported political purpose. An argument which is emotive in character, yet nonetheless weighty, could easily be made that by not allowing for third party complaints, the Press Council has revealed itself as an institution divorced from the ‘(wo)man-in-the-street’, that it is unwilling to listen to the voices of ‘the people’, is elitist in its nature, and therefore undeserving of popular support. The simple point is that the non-allowance for third party complaints within an accountability mechanism is not ethically defensible within the context of a participatory democracy.

Making allowances for third party complaints within the procedures of the press regulatory body has even been debated outside the borders of South Africa. Writing in a publication commissioned by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, William Gore (2008, 43–44) reiterates the importance of public awareness, and mentions that the media should play an active role in activating public awareness by regularly reporting on the regulator’s activities. However, Gore (ibid, 44) dismisses the notion of allowing for third party complaints, stating that it may be dangerous to investigate a possible breach of ethics if those at the centre of the news report have


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not laid a complaint themselves. Gore (ibid.) argues that people have the right not to complain, and that it would be impossible for the regulatory body to know whether the allegedly offensive content was published, for whatever reason, with the consent of the person involved, as this may in fact have been the case.

Gore fails to notice the unfairness of this position: It is not logical to attempt to raise awareness of a press regulatory body, in the interest of securing widespread public support for such a body, while excluding the public from its processes by not allowing for third party complaints. Gore’s argument does not take into account instances where news reports may have portrayed communities/groups in a derogatory manner, or where they perpetuated negative stereotypes. In such cases, a specifi c individual mentioned in the report may not even be relevant to the content of the complaint, or the story may not mention a particular individual. The only format in which such complaints would ever reach an Ombudsman, would be as third party complaints laid by concerned members of the public, who fi nd the negative media representation of specifi c communities or groups reprehensible.

Other international actors disagree with Gore. In his fi nal report after an enquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press in the United Kingdom, Leveson (2012, 33) recommends that a new UK press regulatory body should accept complaints from all persons, whether personally or directly affected by the alleged breach of ethics, or a representative of a particular group of persons, or from a third party concerned with the accuracy of reporting. As previously pointed out, the Unisa report (Reid 2011d, 44–47) lists a number of foreign press accountability bodies from countries with remarkably high press freedom ratings, which have allowed third party complaints for some time.

Bad bed-fellows: The waiver and third party complaintsOne of the ANC’s main complaints about the self-regulatory system was that the Press Council insisted complainants sign a waiver document, whereby the complainant would commit not to proceed with legal action against a publication, upon any dispute arising from the case being submitted to the Ombudsman. According to the ANC this denied the complainant their constitutional right to take the matter to court, if they were unsatisfi ed with the outcome of the Ombudsman’s ruling (Kumwenda 2011, 130). The Press Council responded by stating that the waiver was designed to prevent a complainant from ‘tribunal hopping’, i.e., testing which forum would best suit their aims, and would prevent a publication from having to answer to the same complaint <more twice> <twice? More than once?> (PCSA 2011, 49–51).

But the Unisa report (Reid 2011d, 16–17) points out that the continuing institution of the waiver in the complaints procedure had the negative effect of preventing third party complaints. If such complaints were allowed, it would nullify the procedural functioning of the waiver, because not all aspects of the case could then be protected by the waiver. While a third party may submit a complaint with the Press Council, a fi rst party complainant may approach the courts with the same complaint. In this instance, both the courts and the Press Council would be administering the same complaint (ibid,


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16). Evidently, it is procedurally diffi cult for a waiver and third party complaints to coexist within the same complaints procedure.

The Unisa report (Reid 2011d, 18–19, 44–55) notes that of the 16 countries to achieve an entirely free press rating and score the highest press freedom ratings in the world according to two separate indices, 14 did not make allowances for a waiver. Furthermore, in all 50 countries assessed, only six imposed a waiver in the complaints procedure of the press accountability system. This means that in 2011, in the world’s top 50 countries in terms of free press ratings, only 12 per cent imposed a waiver on complainants – South Africa being one of them (ibid.).

In a recent review of the UK press accountability system, Leveson (2012, 15) stated: ‘I encourage the new body to be open to being able to deal with complaints even where legal action is a possibility .... ’ This would not necessarily endanger publications by forcing them to face an increase of litigation. If, for example, a wealthy complainant were to force a newspaper into litigation in the hopes that the fi nancial risk would compel the publication to admit wrongdoing in the form of a settlement, the publication could argue that the complainant, even if successful, should be deprived of costs because a different cheap and effective route could have been followed (ibid, 17).

In the October 2012 release of its new complaints procedure, the PCSA relented somewhat and agreed to discontinue <revoke?> the waiver for a test period of one year. It remains to be seen, however, should the Press Council decide to reintroduce the waiver in 2014 after the initial test period, whether it will be reinstituted in such a way as to accommodate third party complaints, or whether, at that time, third party complaints will again be disallowed in favour of the waiver.

ConclusionIt is improbable that the issues of press accountability and its consequences for press freedom in South Africa have fi nally been put to bed. Although there may currently be a respite in the intensity of the debate, this is likely to be temporary, and the ANC may re-initiate the matter again when it is politically convenient to do so, as it has done in the past. For example, prior to the 2007 Polokwane ANC elective conference, both the pro-Mbeki and pro-Zuma factions within the ruling party had particular feelings of <discord> <animosity> toward the press, and clearly lacked any confi dence in the capabilities of the Press Council as an accountability system that would address their concerns (Berger 2010, 289). Among the most characteristic challenges facing the creation and sustenance of press councils in new and emerging democracies is persistent political pressure on the media to show loyalty to those in power and avoid critical journalism which could refl ect negatively on government (Zlatev 2008, 64).

In South Africa this challenge became increasingly evident between 2010 and 2012: 2012 saw a number of clashes between government and the press, with the press publishing stories that were obviously embarrassing to the government and the ruling ANC, whose ensuing reaction was decidedly antagonistic. Such cases included the investigation of the seemingly exorbitant amount of state funds channelled into refurbishing the president’s private residence at Nkandla, most notably by City Press


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and the Mail & Guardian. The media attention on Zuma’s Nkandla home sparked furious reaction from government and the ANC, who accused the media of deliberate maliciousness. The public broadcaster (SABC) was reportedly instructed to refrain from using any terminology which had been spawned by the scandal, including ‘Zumaville’, ‘Nkandlagate’ or ‘Nkandla compound’. This suggested a worrying lack of editorial independence on the part of the public service broadcaster (Mail & Guardian online 2012d; Mokone and Kgosana 2012).

In another case, presidential spokesperson, Mac Maharaj, laid criminal charges against Mail & Guardian editor, Nic Dawes, and investigative journalists, Stefaans Brümmer and Sam Sole, for investigating the content of Maharaj’s testimony to the Scorpions during a 2003 enquiry. The three journalists were summoned to warning interviews with the police in July 2012 (Mail & Guardian online 2012a). The Right2Know Campaign3 came to the Mail & Guardian’s defence by publishing a statement calling for the criminal charges to be dropped. Maharaj retaliated by criticising both the newspaper and the Right2Know Campaign – the latter pointed out that the newspaper had not broken the law (Mail & Guardian online 2012b and c). While the matter is yet to be resolved, in 2013 Dawes, Brümmer and Sole were still facing the possibility of serving 15-year jail terms, if found guilty of the charges laid against them by Maharaj.

In 2009 South Africa achieved a ‘free press’ rating by Freedom House (2009), but by 2012 the country’s press freedom rating on this global index had fallen considerably. The ANC reiterated its intention to pursue a parliamentary investigation of an MAT in January 2013, in the resolutions of its national conference in Mangaung, while Lumko Mtimde, CEO of the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) and outspoken ANC supporter of an MAT, delivered a paper at Rhodes University’s annual ‘Highway Africa’ conference in September 2012, which outlined an argument for the institution of statutory regulations to govern the press (ANC 2013, 62–63). In his paper, Mtimde (2012) makes a case for the press to be regulated in a similar fashion to the broadcast media, and describes circumstances under which statutory regulation would not necessarily impede the freedom of the press, which include guarantees of the independence of a statutory body. A similar argument was delivered by Leveson (2012), when he recommended that a new press regulatory board in the UK should be recognised and instituted by law.

The fi ndings of the Leveson enquiry have the distinct potential to impact debates on press accountability outside the UK: In the South African case, portions of Leveson’s report may directly be employed by the ANC to substantiate Mtimde’s views on the introduction of a statutory element to the regulation of the press.

This furore is bound to erupt again. A substantial part of the defence of press freedom in South Africa, in inevitable future debates and a possible parliamentary investigation, is likely to be reduced to arguments defending the Press Council (Reid 2012c). The Press Council would place itself in a far better position to stave off its critics, protect its own independence and argue against statutory regulation, if it could secure widespread public support. But this requires intensive work on the part of the Press Council, media representative bodies (PDMSA and Sanef) and the media industry. In the absence of a


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public educational forum on press regulation, its relationship to press freedom and the importance of this to the health of a democracy, it is unlikely that an enduring social understanding of the value of non-statutory regulation of the press will be developed. Often, the most successful press councils are those that engage in defi nite action to draw attention to themselves (Krüger 2011, 114). This work should rightly be performed by the Press Council, as well as the press, and for greatest effect, through a collaborative effort on the part of them both.

To date the Press Council has been slow to adopt measures aimed at obtaining public support and has engaged with the ‘public’ on limited platforms only, yet not with regard to raising media literacy on ethics. Its defence of its structure and subsequent arguments for its continued independence have been largely inward-focused, involving microscopic analyses of its step-by-step procedures. But the Press Council could adopt a more outward-focused view, and begin to address the dearth of knowledge regarding its purpose within the minds of the public, before beginning the arduous yet critical task of building strong public support. This begins with engaging the reader; since January 2013 this conversation has been enabled – for the fi rst time, an exchange can begin thus: Did you know that if you read something in a newspaper that upsets you, you are welcome to tell us about it?

Notes1 The author extends thanks and appreciation to Guy Berger, Director for Freedom of Expression

and Media Development at Unesco, for providing comment on this article. The research for this article was conducted as part of the Media Policy and Democracy Project, which is supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) and the Women in Research Grant provided by UNISA (see www.mediaanddemocracy.com).

2 Confusingly, in another part of the Press Council’s (2011, 36) review report, the need to initiate a marketing campaign to draw attention to the role of the PCSA is discussed, but this section of the report does not mention the role of the Public Advocate.

3 The Right2Know Campaign (R2K) is a coalition of diverse organisations, mostly civil society groups, academics, activists and media representatives, which campaigns for the free fl ow of information, and freedom of expression in South Africa. The campaign was launched in August 2010 in response to the Protection of State Information Bill. This draft legislation, according to R2K, has the potential to be abused by those in power, for the purposes of limiting access to government information. Since its launch R2K has garnered wide support, and has broadened its mandate to include campaigning for more open access to information for communities, the promotion of a more diverse and less monopolistic media, freedom of expression (including, but not limited to, freedom of the press), and solidarity for whistle-blowers.

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commission on communications and the battle of ideas. 30 June, Gallagher Estate. http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2404 (accessed 16 January 2013).


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Baydar, Y. 2008. Setting up a journalistic code of ethics. In The media self-regulation guidebook: all questions and answers. Representative on freedom of the media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vienna: OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fom/31497 (accessed 20 October 2011).

Berger, G. 2010. The struggle for press self-regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry charade and a government doormat. Communicatio 36(3): 289-308.

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Gore, W. 2008. Self-regulatory bodies: ensuring respect for a code of ethics. In The media self-regulation guidebook: all questions and answers. Representative on freedom of the media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vienna: OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fom/31497 (accessed 20 October 2011).


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Hadland, A. 2007. The South African print media, 1994 – 2004: an application and critique of comparative media systems theory. PhD thesis, Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town.

Haraszti, M. 2008. The merits of media self-regulation: balancing rights and responsibilities. In The media self-regulation guidebook: all questions and answers. Representative on freedom of the media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vienna: OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fom/31497 (accessed 20 October 2011).

Hlongwane, S. 2012. Analysis: whatever happened to the media appeals tribunal? Daily Maverick. http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-07-03-analysis-whatever-happened-to-the-media-appeals-tribunal (accessed 16 January 2013).

Hyde-Clarke, N., ed. 2011. Communications and media ethics in South Africa. Cape Town: Juta.International Federation of Journalists (IJF). 1999. Media ethics and self-regulation. Conclusions of

the conference, Tirana, 25-27 September. http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/media-ethics-and-self-regulation-conclusions-of-the-conference-tirana-september-1999 (accessed 16 January 2013).

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Krüger, F. 2011. Southern African press councils: accountability in practice. In, Communications and media ethics in South Africa. Edited by N Hyde-Clarke. Cape Town: Juta: 99-116.

Kumwenda, O. 2011. Press councils and the democratic political landscape in South Africa. In, Communications and media ethics in South Africa. Edited by N Hyde-Clarke. Cape Town: Juta: 117-135.

Leveson, B.H. 2012. An enquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press. http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/the-report/ (accessed 16 January 2013).

Mail & Guardian online. 2012a. M&G faces charges over Mac Maharaj. 21 July. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-26-mg-faces-charges-over-mac-maharaj (accessed 17 January 2013).

Mail & Guardian online. 2012b. Mac Maharaj: this is why M&G must be charged. 03 August. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-03-00-mac-maharaj-this-is-why-mg-must-be-charged (accessed 17 January 2013).

Mail & Guardian online. 2012c. Mac attack smacks of self-interest, says Right2Know. 10 August. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-mac-attack-smacks-of-self-interest-says-right2know (accessed 17 January 2013).

Mail & Guardian online. 2012d. ANC: media ‘deliberately misleading’ on Nkandla reports. 21 November. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-21-anc-media-deliberately-misleading-on-nkandla-reports (accessed 17 January 2013).

Mtimde, L. 2012. Concepts for media regulation: a case for statutory media regulation. Paper presented to the Highway Africa Conference, Rhodes University, 09-10 September. Unpublished document.

Mokone, T. and C. Kgosana. 2012. SABC lock on Nkandlagate. 07 November. The Times Online. http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2012/11/07/sabc-lock-on-nkandlagate

(accessed 17 January 2013).Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 2008. The media self-regulation

guidebook: all questions and answers. Representative on freedom of the media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vienna: OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fom/31497 (accessed 20 October 2011).

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Press Council of South Africa. 2012. The South African press code, procedures and constitution. Press Council of South Africa: Johannesburg.

Press Freedom Commission (PFC). 2012. Report on press regulation in South Africa. Print Media South Africa, South African National Editors Forum: Johannesburg.

Reid, J. 2011a. For a better Press Council–don’t leave out the little guy. Daily Maverick. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-02-25-for-a-better-press-council-dont-leave-out-the-little-guy (accessed 03 November 2011).

Reid, J. 2011b. Written submission to the South African Press Council, for the process of review of the Press Council, Press Code and Constitution of the Press Council of South Africa. Submission made to the Press Council. http://www.presscouncil.org.za/pages/review.php (accessed 19 October 2011).

Reid, J. 2011c. The SA press council: a brave voice for media freedom. http://www.journalism.co.za/the-sa-press-council-a-brave-voice-for-media-freedom.html (accessed 13 October 2011). (fi rst published as an op-ed for the Star newspaper, 26 August 2011).

Reid, J., ed. 2011d. Submission to the Press Freedom Commission on media self-regulation in South Africa. Department of Communication Science, UNISA: Pretoria. https://docs.google.com/fi le/d/0B-s7Nn73PfZENTA0NmE3ZjItMGYwZS00MmJiLWE4NjMtODIxY2I3ZTc5ZGVl/edit (accessed 15 December 2011).

Reid, J. 2012a. Press Freedom Commission, ANC and the little guy. The Daily Maverick. http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-05-02-press-freedom-commission-anc-and-the-little-guy (accessed 15 December 2012).

Reid, J. 2012b. The Press Freedom Commission: its implications. The Rhodes Journalism Review. School of Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University: Grahamstown.

Reid, J. 2012c. The battle for freedom of speech and an ethical press goes beyond the question of strengthening press regulation. Paper presented to the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) annual conference. University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban. 15-19 July. Unpublished document. Available: https://docs.google.com/fi le/d/0B-s7Nn73PfZEbnhsS1dneERxeGs/edit (accessed 16 January 2013).

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Windhoek. Declarations on promoting independent and pluralistic media. http://www.unesco.org/webworld/fed/temp/communication_democracy/windhoek.htm (accessed 18 January 2013).

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Zlatev, O. 2008. The press council: the archetype of a self-regulatory body. In The media self-regulation guidebook: all questions and answers. Representative on freedom of the media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vienna: OSCE. http://www.osce.org/fom/31497 (accessed 20 October 2011).


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Biographical noteJulie Reid is a senior lecturer at the Department of Communication Science, at the University of South Africa. Her research interests include media policy and regulation, media ethics, and freedom of expression and the press. She is the current President of the South African Communication Association (SACOMM) and a project leader for the Media Policy and Democracy Project. Email: [email protected]



Reality effect or media effect? Television’s molding of the environmental sanitation agenda in Ghana

S. Senyo Ofori-Parku

AbstractMass media have a responsibility to popularise social and developmental issues. This is a central thesis of the normative view of mass media and development. Giving the precarious nature of environmental sanitation in the West African country, Ghana, what is the nature of media coverage of environmental sanitation? And how does media coverage relate to people’s perceptions of and attitudes toward the problem? While it may be counterintuitive for people to rely on media as sources of information on an obtrusive problem such as environmental sanitation, using content/frame analysis and a survey, this article suggests the potential of mass media (television news) in Ghana to project particular worldviews relating to issues that audiences encounter in their daily lives – a mechanism this article refers to as agenda molding. Thus, even for obtrusive social and development issues such as environmental sanitation, the nature and level of media coverage matters.

Keywords: agenda molding, agenda setting, development journalism, environmental sanitation, Ghana, media and environment, obtrusive issues

IntroductionAbout 2.6 billion of the world’s people lack access to safe sanitation and the numbers are rising (United Nations Summit 2010). Environmental sanitation, which refers to proper waste disposal, is a particularly pressing problem associated with the developing world. The spatial specifi city of the problem is evident in the fact that the greatest proportions of people without adequate environmental sanitation are concentrated in the most economically impoverished countries in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. One such country is Ghana.

Twelve years after Ghana’s Environmental Sanitation Policy was developed, the country is still regarded as having one of the worst sanitation situations in Africa.


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S. Senyo Ofori-Parku Reality effect or media effect?


Environmental sanitation remains a serious threat to the country’s development, as fi lth seems to engulf many city centres and local communities. The UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Platform ranked Ghana’s sanitation condition 48th out of the 52 countries in Africa, and 14th out of the 15 countries in West Africa with the worst sanitation conditions (Boyefi o 2008).

City authorities and waste management companies often collect piles of solid waste only to deposit them at landfi ll sites, many of which are in poor condition. These sites are often wetlands, dry waterbeds or deserted stone quarries. Toxic liquid called leachate, which is produced from these landfi ll sites, inadvertently fi nds its way into the water table, thereby polluting the source of potable drinking water. Environmental sanitation is not an isolated development challenge – it is connected to other human and economic development issues such as health and general poverty levels.

Global interventions on environmental issues (such as the Stockholm Conference), as well as local interventions, past and present, have identifi ed public education and information dissemination as key strategies in awareness creation, attitude formation or change, and possibly behavioral change, which points to the role of communication in popularising issues. As Riffe (2006, 48) explicitly articulates, mass media ‘collectively serve a surveillance function, observing and reporting on threats in the environment’.

Given the media’s touted role as a tool for advocating social problems, this research examines the extent to which mass media in general (and television in particular) are constructing this innocuous problem in the West African country, Ghana.

The article examines the ability of television news to set the public agenda on an obtrusive social problem (i.e., environmental sanitation) in Ghana. The analysis here aligns with the public agenda-setting proposition, i.e., that the media agenda infl uences the public. It builds on Kwansah-Aidoo’s (1999, 2003) position that the obtrusive nature of environmental problems does not necessarily diminish the media’s perceived ability to infl uence people’s attitudes towards and views on those issues. But, it runs contrary to the proposition that the obtrusiveness of an issue reduces the ability of the mass media to set the public agenda on that issue (see Drori and Yutchman-Yarr 2002; Mueller 2006; Zucker 1978).

Theory and literature reviewThe article is underpinned by a convergence of agenda-setting theory and media systems dependency theory. As regards the agenda-setting theory, this study draws on both the fi rst-level agenda-setting proposition, which emphasises salience transfer (Cohen 1963) and the second-level (namely attribute agenda setting), which proposes issues transfer (McCombs 1991). Attribute agenda setting goes beyond the original salience transfer notion of agenda setting and argues that the mass media not only provide audiences with cues about the salience of issues, but also provide them with frames within which to view the world (Carroll and McCombs 2003). Thus, the media do not merely refl ect reality, but select which aspects of reality need to be seen by the public, and through which frames, even determining how the selected aspects of reality should be seen.


61

S. Senyo Ofori-Parku


Reality effect or media effect?

Although framing may constitute a different media theorisation (Entman 1993), in trying to make a distinction between the fi rst and second levels of agenda setting, researchers have long called the attributes ‘frames’ (Iyengar and Simon 1993). ‘Frames’ and ‘attributes’ are often used interchangeably in referring to the second level of agenda setting. One of the pioneer names in framing research is Robert Entman, who defi nes framing as

[the selection of] some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem defi nition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (1993, 52)

According to Entman, frames perform either one or all of three functions: They diagnose the existence of a problem, evaluate the causes, and prescribe solutions. Another defi nition which offers a valuable perspective to this article, is that by De Vreese (2005, 54), who sees a frame as a ‘story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them’.

Researchers such as McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas (2000) and Kwansah-Aidoo (2005) have long underscored the complementarity of the agenda-setting theory and other communication and media theories. Together, agenda setting, framing and media systems dependency theories inform this article because of their complementarity. The most important and original idea of the media systems dependency theory is that ‘individuals increasingly depend on mass media information for knowledge of, and orientation to what is happening in their society’ (Windahl and McQuail 1993, 112). This idea has value for the agenda-setting theory because it provides useful insights into the category of persons or societies likely to be infl uenced by media conditions, and the conditions under which such infl uences are more likely, namely <those who depend on the media some more>. According to the media systems dependency theory, therefore, the centrality of media as sources of information is an imperative for people’s greater or increased dependence on the media (see Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976).

Although the fi eld of agenda setting is well researched, numerous studies have looked at how the media set the political agenda and infl uence people’s voting behaviours. However, not much attention has been paid to environmental issues, particularly in the developing world.

Emphasising the role of media in forcing attention to environmental issues, Lester and Hutchins (2009) note that without print or television news coverage, environmental actions and values lose both legitimacy and effect. Researchers have demonstrated the link between the media framing of issues and the public agenda-setting function of the mass media on those issues. Lester and Hutchins (ibid.) argue that when the media do not cover environmental issues, those issues fail to appear on either the public or the political agenda.

McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas (2000) compared the attribute agenda of their medium of interest and a competitor medium with the public agenda of the focal medium’s primary audience. They found a signifi cantly different correlation between their medium of interest and the public agenda of the primary audience on the one


62



hand, and the correlation of the public agenda with the agenda of the medium’s primary competitors on the other hand.

Although a split is evident in agenda-setting literature on the effects agenda-setting has on obtrusive issues, there is a strong view that the mass media are unable to set the agenda on this score (see Drori and Yutchman-Yarr 2002; Mueller 2006; Zucker 1978). In their study on environmental problems in Tel Aviv and Haifa, Drori and Yutchman-Yarr found that the actual <hazard levels of the local environment> confound the media’s ability to set the agenda on environmental problems <meaning unclear>. Thus, when an issue is very obvious and intrudes on people’s daily lives they are less likely to rely on the media for information, and, for that matter, the media are less likely to set the public agenda on those issues. Mueller (2006) found an inverse relationship between the actual/objective level of environmental conditions and the reliance on media as information sources. This, in turn, limited the agenda-setting effects of six major newspapers in Ohio. The agenda-setting mechanism found in the aforementioned two studies, as regards the obtrusiveness of the phenomenon, corresponds with Rogers and Dearing’s (2007, 90) argument that ‘real-world indicators are possible confounders of the media agenda moving toward public agenda relationships’, resulting in what Kosicki (1993) calls the agenda-refl ection function of the media.

As mentioned earlier, despite evidence being provided in support of the media’s inability to set the agenda on obtrusive issues, some researchers suggest otherwise (e.g., Demers, Craff, Choi and Pessin 2012; Kwansah-Aidoo 1999, 2003). This research focuses on the fi ndings of Kwansah-Aidoo’s research, which was based on environmental issues in an African context. Kwansah-Aidoo’s studies are among the few environmental agenda-setting investigations conducted in Ghana within the past two decades. In his 1999 study, for example, the researcher made a case for the media’s environmental agenda-setting effects, despite the obtrusive nature of the issue. Most people interviewed in that study believed the mass media were instrumental in forming their attitudes toward the environmental problems plaguing the country. In a series of focus group and individual interviews, more than 95 per cent and 85 per cent of respondents respectively said media coverage on environmental issues had infl uenced their views and their attitudes. To clarify this phenomenon, Kwansah-Aidoo (2003) suggested that, for instance, the cultural relevance of events relating to the environment, that are covered by Ghanaian media, offered consumers ready-made patterns of cognition and understanding, thus enhancing the agenda-setting effects.

Two important conditions which are often used as criticism of agenda-setting research, are: How do we determine the direction of infl uence (from media agenda to public agenda or vice versa) and how do we tell whether the effects observed are attributable to mass media or to real-life indicators such as the pervasiveness of the issues of concern? (see Kosicki [1993] for a detailed discussion on the preconditions of agenda setting). On the fi rst concern, Kosicki (2008) and Kosicki (2003) explain that this is a critical question in agenda-setting research: Do the media indeed set the agenda on issues, or does the public set the agenda for the media? Agenda-setting studies have typically answered this question about the fl ow of infl uence in a linear fashion by measuring the media agenda at a specifi c time, and correlating it with the public agenda


63

S. Senyo Ofori-ParkuReality effect or media effect?


at another time, based on self-reports or experiments (see Kwansah-Aidoo 2001; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Mueller 2006; Riffe 2006). On the debate regarding reality effect versus media effect, Kosicki (1993) asserts that one of the problems of agenda-setting research is how to differentiate the agenda-setting ability of the media from the effect of real-world indicators. For an obtrusive issue such as environmental sanitation, which is the subject of interest in this article, the possibility of reality effects is even higher. Thus, there is a tendency for people to cite those problems that surround them as the most pressing ones (Kwansah-Aidoo 1999). The current study takes a series of steps to address these issues (see the methods and fi ndings for more details).

As observed earlier, there is a split within agenda-setting literature regarding the media’s agenda-setting effects on issues that people frequently encounter in their daily lives – obtrusive issues. However, examining media frames and comparing them with the public’s mental frames, instead of merely studying salience transfer from media to the public, brings a new dimension to agenda-setting research (Griffi n 2003). This, Griffi n observes, reopens the possibility of a powerful media effects model, which holds some promise for agenda setting research on obtrusive issues in particular. Young and Brulle (2006) and Kosicki (2008) concur that frame analysis is a useful technique for studying how television sets the environmental agenda, arguing that merely obtaining visibility in television programming is no guarantee that an issue will be comprehended. Although other variables (source, receiver and context) play a role in audience comprehension, how stories are told is equally important. Thus, an analysis of the narrative used in selling ideas about the environment is important in determining agenda-setting effects.

Therefore, using frame analysis and survey, this study investigated the relationship between media coverage of environmental sanitation (an issue that intrudes on the daily lives of people in urban Ghana) and what people think about the problem. This article addresses the following research questions:

1. Does the television news agenda correspond to the public environmental sanitation agenda?

2. What is the perceived direction of infl uence?3. Is the obtrusiveness of environmental sanitation in the study area infl uencing

the news medium’s ability to set the public agenda on the issue?

MethodAlthough this article’s method involves some innovations, it does not deviate signifi cantly from the traditional content analysis-survey research methods of agenda-settings research (McCombs 1976; McCombs and Shaw 1972).

SurveyThe researcher personally administered face-to-face questionnaires to 100 residents of Ashaiman Lebanon (55% females, 45% = males; Mage = 29). As a refl ection of the urban


64



nature of the population, 70 per cent of the sample had had some post-high school (i.e., tertiary) education, 22 per cent had had some high school education, and eight per cent had had some basic (i.e., elementary) education. Most of the respondents were formally employed (58%), followed by students (28%), and six and eight per cent were artisans/traders and unemployed respectively.

The study area, Ashaiman Lebanon, is located about four kilometres North of Tema and about 30 kilometres from Accra. It was chosen for the study because of the researcher’s familiarity with the place, as well as the pervasiveness of poor environmental sanitation conditions in the area, which makes the issue an obtrusive one.

The questionnaire included questions about respondents’ media preferences, habits and attitudes toward environmental sanitation, and self-reported media infl uence. It also included fi ve themes (used for the frame analysis) on environmental sanitation, and respondents were asked to identify which ones they thought were the most important (see later). The survey was the basis for selection of a news medium and a particular channel for the content analysis, which in this case was television (TV3) — arguably the most popular television station in Ghana.

The study used a multi-stage, cluster sampling technique to probabilistically sample 100 respondents. The multi-stage, cluster sampling approach is a proven, robust way (used by Pew Global Attitudes, Global Media Monitoring Project, Annenberg Center for Global Communication Studies, etc.) of generating representative samples in regions of the world where sample frames are non-existent. For this study, the procedure entailed selecting fi ve zones, sampling a street, houses, and qualifi ed individuals. Twenty respondents were selected from each of the fi ve zones in Ashaiman Lebanon. The following steps were followed: 1) The major street in each zone was identifi ed; 2) one major street was randomly selected in each zone; 3) The number three was chosen at random from a table of random numbers; 4) Moving from East to West of the major road sampled in each zone, the third house, representing the nth number chosen at random was selected, subsequently, every third house was sampled; 5) the fi rst person in each sampled house that met the sampling criterion was interviewed, males and females were interviewed interchangeably from one house to another; 6) the process was repeated for each zone, moving from West to East of the main roads. Thus, ten people were selected moving from West to East (of the main roads sampled) and ten from East to West (of main roads) in each of the fi ve zones.

Content and frame analysis

All environmental sanitation news stories on TV3 within a six-month period were content analysed. While it may be argued that six months is not a long enough period to generate adequate media reports on the subject, and subsequently set the public agenda – which is the aim of this paper – many studies have found between two and six months (Mueller 2006; Stone and McCombs 1981 in Kwansah-Aidoo 1999) to be a suffi cient period for agenda setting to occur. Others have even suggested a period of between four and six weeks (e.g., Roberts, Wanta and Dzwo 2002). Besides, in the


65



current study, due to the sporadic nature of environmental news coverage (Mueller 2006), the six-month period was considered optimal. Also, during the period under study, the television station used for the content analysis (i.e., TV3) was airing a news feature programme called Mission, which examined issues relating to the millennium development goals (MDGs), including environmental sanitation. The researcher found and content analysed 15 news stories on environmental sanitation, aired on TV3 between December 2009 and May 2010. The average number of words per story was 275.

Due to poor archiving and the non-availability of news recordings for the content analysis, this study relied on television news scripts to determine TV3’s environmental sanitation agenda. Although this method has resulted in the loss of <essential qualities of images>, it represents an alternative approach to media research in environments where access to data on television news is problematic.

The researcher determined the dominant frames through a close reading of the news scripts. The assignment of stories to frames was based on what Listerman (2010) calls structure frame at article level, rather than frames at argument level. At the article or story level, structure frames refer to the general theme or interpretative patterns in the entire news story. Frames at the argument level refer to the different arguments or positions put forward by a news story. This means there may be more than one frame at the argument level, but at the article or story level, it is possible to identify a single dominant frame. There is little consensus on how to assign a story to a particular frame, but most studies use tentative operational defi nitions of frames designed specifi cally for those individual studies (De Vreese 2005). This inductive approach is, however, criticised for not lending itself to replication and generalisations. The current study therefore uses a combination of issue-specifi c and generic frame categories.

The fi rst level of frame analysis (which is issue-specifi c) comprised fi ve themes identifi ed (through media monitoring two months prior to the study) to be dominant in environmental sanitation news coverage. The a priori theme agendas were ‘waste disposal and management’, ‘choked and fi lthy drains’, ‘plastic pastes’, ‘water pollution’ and ‘air pollution’. Although some overlaps could be observed in these categories, especially between categories one, two and three, for the purpose of this study the categories were treated as themes that highlight different levels of the environmental sanitation challenge. The distinction between ‘waste disposal and management’ and categories two and three were mainly in terms of responsibility. ‘Waste disposal and management’ was defi ned in terms of city offi cials and waste management companies’ inability to collect waste on time, leading to refuse pilling up and spilling over at community refuse dumps, and their ineffectiveness in managing landfi ll sites where garbage is fi nally disposed of. The second category (‘choked and fi lthy drains’) was defi ned in terms of individual attitudes and behaviours – more related to individual responsibility. For example, a story that says something about choked drains but focused mainly on city authorities’ incompetence in ensuring the drains are cleaned frequently, was treated as ‘waste disposal and management’ rather than ‘choked and fi lthy drains’. When such stories focused on individual actions/inactions, they were coded as ‘choked and fi lthy drains’. The third category, ‘plastic wastes’, was treated separately, since


66



it was often covered as an attitudinal problem (i.e., individual level) and such wastes were not always about choked gutters. To avoid overlaps between this and the second category, any story that discussed choked gutters but focused particularly on plastic wastes was placed in the ‘plastic wastes’ category.

How were the stories assigned to one of fi ve themes? According to Tankard (2001) there are 11 mechanisms for identifying the frames in any given news story, namely: headlines, subheads, photos, photo captions, leads, source selection, quotes selection, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs. This article employs relevant elements in Tankard’s list of mechanisms (headlines, leads, quotes selection, and concluding statements and paragraphs) to identify the dominant theme for each of the 15 stories.

The second level of frame analysis was a generic one, which categorised stories in terms of ‘magnitude’ (seriousness of the problem) and ‘scope’ (how widespread the problem is). The generic frame categories emerged from the audience research, when respondents were asked to use phrases or adjectives to describe sanitation.

After personally coding the 15 stories, a second person re-coded them. The categories were found to be reliable (Scott’s π = .84).

Analysis and resultsBesides showing how public opinion corresponds with media coverage, the task of all public agenda-setting research has been to provide some evidence to suggest that the media’s coverage of an issue/aggregate of issues causes the public to perceive those issues as important or prominent. The current article achieves this through a nexus of criteria such as correlation, self- reports of effects, and exposure to media content and attention. The use of self-reports to determine the direction of infl uence is foundational to agenda-setting research. This method was fi rst used by McCombs and Shaw (1972) in their seminal paper on the agenda-setting function of the mass media, and has since been used in most agenda-setting studies. Although this technique is not without criticism, it at least points to the ‘perceived’ direction of infl uence – from media to public or from public to media – from the point of view of the media consumers studied.

Preliminary results

Before any piece of research can make a claim of agenda-setting, one of the preconditions is that the respondents should have been exposed to the media or medium being studied for the effect (Kosicki 1993; Kwansah-Aidoo 1999). The current study found that together, mass media (radio, television and newspapers) accounted for more than nine out of every ten responses (94%) of participants’ information sources. Only six per cent of respondents relied on informal sources such as family or friends.

Also, based on responses to two questions (‘Where do you get most of your news about environmental sanitation in the country?’ and ‘Where do you get most of your news about environmental sanitation in your locality and its environs?’), the study also found mass media to be the most reported source of information on environmental


67



sanitation. It was not surprising that mass media provided respondents with more information on environmental sanitation problems nationwide than locally, given that local environmental conditions are encountered daily. Overall, television provided respondents with the most information on environmental sanitation, nationally (50%). The fi nding about television as the major source of environmental sanitation news was not expected, given that radio was reported to be the major source of general information. TV3 was reported as the television channel that gave the most information on environmental sanitation (75% of respondents). As shown in Table 1, non-mass media forms of communication were used as a source of information on local environmental sanitation conditions, rather than conditions nationally.

Table 1: Major sources of information on environmental sanitation in respondents’ locality and environs, and nationwide

Information sources Environmental sanitation in locality

Environmental sanitation nationwide

(%) (f) (%) (f)

Radio 18.0 18 26.0 26

Television 19.0 19 50.0 50

Newspaper 4.0 4 10.0 10

Family and friends 10 10 0 0

Community/opinion leaders 10 10 2.0 2

Personal experience 35.0 35 10.0 10

Information van 4.0 4 0 0

No response 0 0 2.0 2

Total 100 100 100 100

A further cross-tabulation of responses on ‘major television station sources of environmental sanitation’ by ‘frequency of attention to stories on environmental sanitation’ showed that more than nine in ten (93.2%) of the 76 respondents who said they often paid attention to news stories on environmental sanitation, watched TV3. Out of the 76 respondents who said TV3 was the television medium that gave them the most information on environmental sanitation, more than seven out of ten (72.4%) said they often paid attention to the stories. Only two of those who said they do not often pay attention to environmental sanitation stories, were TV3 viewers. This suggests that TV3’s stories on environmental sanitation are watched and paid attention to by a signifi cant majority of the sample.

The environmental sanitation pictures in people’s headsDetermining which environmental sanitation issues the public considered most threatening or deserving of attention, was done in two ways: 1) through an open-ended question asking respondents what they thought was the single most threatening environmental sanitation issue in Ghana. ‘Waste disposal and management’ was


68



the most cited, while ‘water pollution’ was least cited; 2) respondents were given fi ve environmental sanitation issues selected by the researcher as the main themes in environmental sanitation news coverage, based on media monitoring on different channels prior to this study. The respondents were asked to rank the fi ve main themes on a fi ve-point Likert scale (‘Very serious’ to ‘Not serious at all’). Respondents’ rating of the themes was found to correspond to what they identifi ed as the most threatening environmental sanitation issues (see Table 2). That is, from two separate questions – one open-ended question and a close-ended Likert scale question – the following were identifi ed as constituting the public environmental sanitation agenda, in order of importance:

1. Waste disposal and management2. Choked and fi lthy drains3. Plastic waste4. Water pollution5. Air pollution.

Table 2: Most threatening environmental sanitation problem in Ghana

Sanitation issues Frequency Percentage

Waste disposal and managementChoked and filthy drainsPlastic wasteWater pollutionNo responseTotal

40241612

8100

40.024.016.012.0

8.0100

The study found that television-viewing habits were related to the environmental sanitation issues that were cited as threatening. For all the environmental sanitation problems found to have constituted the public agenda in this study, respondents who said they watched television daily were the ones who cited those problems in proportions that were in sync with the ordering of the issues above. For daily television viewers, refuse disposal and management was the most life-threatening environmental sanitation problem in the country (44.6%), followed by choked and fi lthy drains (18.5%), plastic waste (15.4%) and water pollution (12.3%). Those who watched television two to four times a week, or not often, did not cite these environmental sanitation problems in the same proportions as did daily viewers.

Media environmental sanitation agendaFrom the analyses of TV3’s news content on sanitation, the following three main issues emerged as constituting the media’s theme agenda (Kosicki 1999) on environmental sanitation, in the order in which they were covered:


69



1. Waste disposal and management2. Choked and fi lthy drains3. Water pollution.

About three-quarters (73.3%) of the total television news content analysed highlighted ‘waste disposal and management’. ‘Choked and fi lthy drains’ was covered in 20 per cent of the media content analysed, and only one out of 15 (6.7%) highlighted water pollution. The news reports examined for this research seldom highlighted a single environmental sanitation issue, but the researcher considered for analysis the main theme or issue highlighted in each news story.

A Pearson correlation coeffi cient was calculated for the relationship between the environmental sanitation issues respondents identifi ed as most troubling (public agenda) and the themes found in the news stories (media agenda). A strong positive correlation was found (r = .90, p < .05). Table 3 shows the corresponding percentages for media coverage and <public rations> of the various themes. Thus, with a few exceptions, the issues that were salient on television news were also more likely to be perceived by the public as important.

Table 3: Most threatening environmental sanitation problem in Ghana

Sanitation issues Public agenda

(%)

Media agenda

(%)

Waste disposal and managementChoked and filthy drains

Plastic waste

Water pollution

No response

Total

40.0

24.0

16.0

12.0

8.0

100

73.3

20.0

.0

6.7

.0

100

Note: We explain what could account for the absence of plastic wastes on the media agenda within the six-month period used for the content analysis in the discussion section.

Regarding the generic frames, the study also found that three out of every fi ve news stories (60%) framed the issues to refl ect their seriousness or threat levels, while two out of fi ve (40%) framed the problem in terms of scope. This corresponded with respondents’ descriptions of the environment.

Direction of influenceTo address what Kosicki (1993) refers to as the critical question in agenda-setting research, the researcher asked respondents a series of questions aimed at ascertaining a possible direction of infl uence. In addition to the correlation of the media and the public agenda, and the relationship between media habits, attention to news stories and attitude towards environmental sanitation, the majority of respondents reported that the media infl uenced the environmental sanitation ‘pictures in their heads’. Over


70



all, responses supported the perceived mass media agenda-setting thesis. More people agreed on the media’s third-party infl uence than its ability to infl uence their own attitudes. Also, more people said the media could infl uence their attitudes towards environmental sanitation than those who said the media had actually infl uenced them.

Table 4: Responses on media’s infl uence on attitudes toward environmental sanitation

ResponseInfluence on other

peopleAbility to influence

respondentPerceived influence on

respondent

YesNoNot sureTotal

86.04.0

10.0100

86.04.0

10.0100

72.014.014.0100

Beyond the self-reports of media infl uence, this study also found that for those who said the media had infl uenced them, the proportion of respondents who cited each environmental issue as important were in sync with the rankings of those issues on the media agenda. In other words, the proportion of respondents who said ‘waste disposal and management’ was the most pressing issue exceeded those who cited ‘choked and fi lthy drains’, which exceeded those who cited ‘water pollution’. As would be expected, not all respondents said the media had infl uenced them. Even so, many who said the media had not infl uenced them, agreed that it was a useful source of information – a fi nding that is consistent with earlier research by Kwansah-Aidoo (2003) and Pratt, Ha and Pratt (2002).

Also, TV3 was airing a news feature programme called Mission, from which journalists deliberately sourced issues relating to the MDGs, including environmental sanitation. This suggests that TV3, through selection, consciously seeks to set the environmental sanitation agenda – and the public believe they do. The television station also set a theme for each month, investigating issues in line with such themes. January 2010, for example, was water and sanitation month, and accordingly, environmental sanitation issues were given more media coverage. All of this makes the claim of the mass media setting the public agenda on environmental sanitation even more plausible, at least from the perspective of the media as well as media consumers. But the reciprocal relationship between media coverage and public concern obviously cannot be denied.

Reality effect or media effect?To delineate the agenda-setting ability of the media from the effect of real-world indicators such as the pervasiveness of the problem, this article contrasted responses on the most prevalent conditions in local communities with views about general environmental sanitation conditions. The study did not fi nd that the obtrusiveness of conditions in respondents’ communities permeated their responses on the most threatening sanitation issues in the country. The fi ndings suggest that although more people said ‘choked drains’ were more prevalent in their vicinities (42%) than did


71



‘waste disposal and management’ (30%), most people perceived ‘waste disposal and management’ (40%) to be the most threatening problem facing the country. Thus, community-level problems were not cited as the most important environmental sanitation concerns in the country as a whole (see discussion section).

Discussion and conclusionThis study sought to examine the media’s agenda-setting effect on environmental sanitation – an issue that pervades the daily lives of many Ghanaians. The study satisfi ed the proposition of media systems dependency theory, namely that the centrality of media as sources of information is an imperative for people’s greater or increased dependence on the media (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976), which makes infl uence more likely (Kosicki 1993). It also satisfi ed one of Kosicki’s preconditions for agenda setting, which argues that people ought to be exposed to and cognitively engaged with media content for an agenda-setting effect to occur. In this respect, those who reported that they watched and paid attention to TV3 news items on environmental sanitation were more likely to have ranked environmental sanitation issues in a manner that corresponded with TV3’s news content analysed within a six-month period. Overall support for mass media agenda setting, from the respondents’ point of view, is congruent with McQuail’s (2007) assertion that changes brought about by the media, that affect individuals, are relatively easy to demonstrate and could be easily attributed to a media source – as is the case in this study.

Contrary to the proposition that the obtrusiveness of an issue reduces the ability of mass media to set the public agenda on that issue (Drori and Yutchman-Yarr 2002; Mueller 2006), the current study found a correspondence between the media and the public’s frames of environmental sanitation. As seen in Table 3, although ‘plastic wastes’ appeared on the public agenda, it was not found on the media agenda during the time this study was conducted. This could be explained by the fact that news reports on ‘waste disposal and management’ as well as ‘choked and fi lthy gutters’ frequently feature images of plastic water sachets. But since the content analysis was based on news scripts, there was no way of accounting for the type of images shown in the news items content analysed.

As regards the correspondence between the media and the public agenda in this study, the most obtrusive issues (local sanitation problems) were not the ones respondents identifi ed as the most threatening or widespread. This, coupled with the correspondence between the media and the public agenda, suggests the possibility of some media infl uence. The results extend Kwansah-Aidoo’s (1999, 2003) assertion that the obtrusiveness of environmental challenges does not necessarily eliminate the media’s infl uence (perceived or real) on public attitudes and perceptions. The fact that local sanitation problems were not the ones the public identifi ed as the most threatening, suggests that it is unlikely the respondents were simply identifying particular environmental sanitation themes as important because of the obtrusive nature of those concerns. Although this does not completely eliminate the possibility of a reality effect, it suggests that news coverage of obtrusive issues can be instrumental in


72



molding people’s worldviews: reinforcing, shaping, affi rming and redirecting public attitudes and perceptions. It may be mere coincidence that the issues highlighted by the media are those identifi ed by the public as important, but when the frames used in media coverage are refl ected in the public’s responses, which is not likely to be a mere coincidence. Due to the obtrusive nature of environmental sanitation, frame transfer analysis (which implies second-level agenda setting), and not just salience transfer analysis (fi rst-level agenda setting), is a more useful technique for studying how television sets the public agenda.

Having said this, agenda setting is not the linear, unidirectional process it is often characterised to be. It is a holistic process involving information exchanges between different spheres (Kwansah-Aidoo 2003; Rogers and Dearing 2007). Therefore, 1) the results refl ected here should not be interpreted to mean the mass media are the sole drivers of public attitudes on environmental sanitation. Rather, as explained later on, with obtrusive issues such as the one explored here, both mass media and real-world indicators interact to infl uence attitudes; 2) the argument put forward here does not rule out a mutually reinforcing relationship between the mass media agenda and the public agenda (Sheafer and Weimann 2005): it only focuses on one side of the equation, whereas subsequent studies could explore the other side.

Even if TV3 as a news medium were not the driver of public perceptions, the self-reported infl uence of the news medium on attitudes toward environmental sanitation gives the television station some legitimacy – if harnessed, it could have positive implications for mediated communication for social change. Thus, if the media in Ghana and the developing world committed themselves to development issues (such as environmental sanitation), they would be able to complement other sources of infl uence so as to engineer the desired social change, given that even with little coverage, people think the news medium shapes their views on issues (e.g., environmental sanitation).

LimitationsAlthough six months is generally regarded as long enough for agenda-setting effects to be observed, one limitation of this study is the number of stories found within the stipulated six months. Air pollution, which respondents cited the least, was also absent from the media agenda over the study period. This perhaps suggests a mutual infl uence. But since agenda-setting occurs through a process of accumulation (Kwansah-Aidoo 1999), collecting data over an extended period could be useful in this regard.

This study’s use of television news scripts for the content/frame analysis to determine TV3’s environmental sanitation agenda, due to the non-availability of news recordings, represents an alternative approach to media research in environments where access to data on television news is problematic. However, it also represents an implicit weakness of the content analysis. Analysing news scripts in lieu of news videos means that the essential qualities of images are lost.

The fi ndings of this study are far from conclusive, and the link between television news content and people’s attitudes, suggested in this study, is only by association. Although the article argues for the plausibility of the agenda-setting effect, care should


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be taken not to interpret the association between media content and public views as indicating cause and effect. Subsequent studies could benefi t from more robust research techniques and statistical analyses.

ConclusionThis article has argued that the mass media in Ghana, as demonstrated by television news, are valuable sources of information on environmental issues. This increases their potential to infl uence opinions, attitudes and behaviours. The study reported here suggests that there is a high possibility of the media agenda on environmental sanitation molding the public agenda on these issues. This conclusion was based on fi ve main reasons: 1) the frames used by the media corresponded with the environmental sanitation pictures in respondents’ heads, the two agendas were also highly correlated; 2) the ranking of environmental sanitation issues (public agenda) by non-daily television viewers and those who paid relatively little attention to environmental sanitation news stories on television did not correspond to the media agenda; 3) if the actual level of environmental sanitation issues was solely responsible for placing those issues high on the public agenda (Drori and Yutchman-Yarr 2002; Kosicki 1993; Mueller 2006; Zucker 1978), one would expect that the problems pertaining to respondents’ environments would be cited as the most serious, but this was not the case; 4) the majority of respondents acknowledged that the news media might infl uence their opinions and even behaviours, which implies, at the very least, a perceived media infl uence; 5) the television news channel studied here was deliberately seeking out, selecting and giving coverage to development-related issues, including environmental sanitation.

However, since mass media do not operate in a vacuum but in a web of social networks and relationships, this study does not make a claim of the mass media being the sole infl uencer of the public agenda – in fact, it would be hard to imagine a single theory or study that could do so. According to Rogers and Dearing (2007, 90), ‘real-world indicators are possible confounders of the media agenda moving toward public agenda relationships’. While this is true, as Kosicki (1993) concurs, even where real-world indicators (i.e., the obtrusiveness of an issue) drive both the media and the public agendas, the effect of mass media on the public agenda cannot be ruled out.

Finally, similar to Kosicki’s concept of the ‘agenda-infl uencing function of mass media’, this article proposes the concept of an ‘agenda molding’ function on the part of the mass media, as regards obtrusive issues. The concept refers to the media’s ability to project, affi rm, shape and reinforce particular worldviews relating to issues that audiences encounter in their daily lives – obtrusive issues. As the defi nition suggests, the agenda-molding concept is similar to Kosicki’s agenda-infl uencing idea, except that it pertains to obtrusive issues. The concept is also similar to agenda building, in that both acknowledge the effects of real-world indicators on the media’s and the public’s agenda. But, unlike the agenda-building concept, agenda molding is not only concerned with how real-world indicators (including public expectations and attitudes) infl uence the media agenda (see Funkhouser 1973; Sheafer and Weimann 2005). Agenda molding, like McCombs and Shaw’s original agenda-setting study, focuses


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on the media agenda and real-world indicators as the independent variables, and the public agenda as the dependent variable. It proposes that although an issue may be obtrusive, and therefore self-evident, media coverage and framing do have signal value for the general public. It implies that when an issue is obtrusive, real-world indicators become important infl uences on public attitudes, but these are not suffi cient. Due to the media’s perceived power, credibility, etc., their coverage of such issues has the potential to interact with real-world indicators and to valence public perceptions and attitudes. Thus, the concept addresses the question: Even though a social issue may intrude on the daily lives of the public, how do the media help shape the public’s overall outlook on those issues? To rephrase Rogers and Dearing (2007), media agendas are possible moderators of the infl uence real-world indicators have on public perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Second-level agenda setting (i.e., issues transfer, not just salience transfer) or frame analysis is a useful method for establishing agenda-molding effects. In the study reported here, the agenda-molding effect was ascertained through the use of magnitude and scope frames, and through the fi ve different themes identifi ed in television news coverage on environmental sanitation. Subsequent studies should further explore this concept.

Other researchers could also examine different media together (i.e., the most informative newspaper, radio <station> and television <channel>), since all media interact to form attitudes. A bigger sample size will also enhance the external validity of subsequent studies.

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Kwansah-Aidoo, K. 2005. Prospects for agenda-setting research in the 21st century. In Topical issues in communications and media research, ed. K. Kwansah-Aidoo, 35–59. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Lester, L. and B. Hutchins. 2009. Power games: Environmental protest, news media and the Internet. Media Culture Society 31(4): 579–595. http://www.mcs.sagepub.com. DOI: 10.1177/0163443709335201

Listerman, T. 2010. Framing of science issues in opinion-leading news: International comparison of biotechnology issue coverage. Public Understanding of Science 19(1): 5–15.

McCombs, M., E. Lopez-Escobar and J.P. Llamas. 2000. Setting the agenda for issues in the 1996 Spanish general elections. Journal of Communication 50(2): 77–92.

McCombs, M.E. 1976. Agenda-setting research: A bibliographic essay. Political Communication Review 1: 1–7.

McCombs, M.E. and D.L. Shaw. 1972. The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36: 176–185. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747787 (accessed < >).

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McQuail, D. and S. Windahl. 1993. Communication models, 2nd ed. New York: Longman.Mueller, J.F. 2006. An analysis of environmental coverage in Ohio’s six major metropolitan

newspapers to citizen perception of environmental problems. Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Ohio University College of Communication, USA. http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi/Mueller%20John%20F.pdf?ohiou1145420206 DOI: ohiou1145420206

Pratt, C., L. Ha and C.A. Pratt. 2002. Setting the public health agenda on major diseases in sub- Saharan Africa: African popular magazines and medical journals (1981–1997). Journal of Communication 52(4): 889–904.

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Rogers, E.M. and W.J. Dearing. 2007. Agenda-setting research: Where has it been, where is it going? In Media power in politics, ed. D.A. Graber, 80–97. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Sheafer, T. and G. Weimann. 2005. Agenda building, agenda setting, priming, individual voting intentions and the aggregate results: An analysis of four Israeli elections. Journal of Communication 55(2): 347–365.

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Biographical noteS. Senyo Ofori-Parku is a PhD candidate and a graduate teaching fellow in the School of Journalism and Communication, University of Oregon. His research, writing and teaching revolve around mediated communication, social change and development. He holds a Master of Philosophy from the School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana, and a BA in Sociology and Geography from the University of Cape Coast. Email: [email protected]



The use of ICTs and mobilisation in the age of parallel media, an emerging fifth estate? A case study of Nafeer’s flood campaign in the Sudan

Maha Basri

AbstractThe fourth estate’s power, in many African countries, has been restricted and its role as a catalyst of change in civil society curtailed. The ensuing information gap provided fertile ground for alternative forms of communications to take centre stage. A parallel market of information has been facilitated by new technologies that circumvent government censorship. On 1 August 2013, heavy rains in the Sudan triggered flash floods that affected more than 530 000 citizens. The government failed to aid those affected and created a media blackout. More than 12 000 Sudanese volunteers created a horizontal network of citizens participating in a community-led initiative. The Nafeer campaign united the fragmented discourse, demonstrating that using ICTs to mobilise citizens is not contingent on the number of people with access, but on how access is channeled.

Keywords: alternate public spheres, information communication technologies (ICTs), mobilisation, parallel media, Nafeer’s campaign, the Sudan

IntroductionMass media in general and the press in particular have enabled the creation of an independent institution, the fourth estate, central to a pluralist democracy (Dutton 2009). When the Irish statesman Edmund Burke fi rst coined the term in 1787, he identifi ed the press as a force whose power is not to be undermined in a democracy. In many modern-day democracies, the fourth estate assumes the role of watchdog over other government branches.

The fourth estate and journalists have had a tumultuous existence in Africa. Journalists have been persecuted, prevented from reporting, detained, and even killed in


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The use of ICTs and mobilisation in the age of parallel media

many African countries. This has, in many cases, curtailed the power of the fourth estate and the role it can play in advancing civil society in Africa. The vanguards of change have, for the most part, been unable to report and mobilise citizens in environments with a restrictive communicative sphere. Modern technologies, on the other hand, have provided citizens with alternate outlets for receiving and producing information.

The new millennium, spurred by the rise of new information communication technologies (ICTs), has ushered in a new age of citizen journalists, along with ways to mobilise the man in the street. Citizen journalists are ordinary citizens who report the news as they see it happening. New communication technologies provide ordinary citizens and their networks with the ability to bypass traditional media outlets, and to share unfi ltered information without being hindered by political or editorial constraints. In the African context this unbridled fl ow of information is of particular importance due to the dominance of state-controlled media outlets.

Many scholars refer to this phenomenon as the fi fth estate (Dutton 2009). The fi fth estate shares many characteristics with the fourth estate, yet it is built on the growing use of the Internet and related ICTs. Networked users within the fi fth estate are ‘reconfi guring access to alternative sources of information, people and other resources’ (Dutton 2009, 2). These networked users form what Castells (2011) refers to as the network society. Individuals within this society move across, question and undermine the boundaries of existing institutions and loci of power. This, in turn, this creates ‘parallel markets of information’ (Moyo 2009) where the networked individual becomes both a consumer and producer of information, thus surpassing content disseminated by offi cial channels.

The ability of a networked society to surpass established institutions and traditional media when it comes to mobilising different publics was apparent in the community-based Nafeer initiative in the Sudan, in August 2013. The event is of great signifi cance in a country where the power of the fourth estate is heavily regulated. Despite having one of the oldest established press systems in modern Africa (dating back to 1889, when the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian government launched an offi cial Arabic–English gazette), press censorship is also part of this extended history (Sharkey 1999). Since Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’s 1989 coup d’état the country’s communicative space has been even more severely restricted. Print and broadcast are in most cases state controlled and heavily censored. The country split into two separate states on 9 July 2011 to form the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan (commonly known as South Sudan). After the southern part of the country seceded in 2011, economic problems rendered the media business even more unviable and further eroded the existence of an independent press. The press in the Sudan has become nothing but ‘an old toothless lion’ according to Al-Taher Sati <check spelling throughout>, a prominent North Sudanese journalist.1

The focus of this study is the community-based initiative, Nafeer, in the Sudan. On 1 August 2013, heavy rains fell in the Sudan, triggering fl ash fl oods that affected as many as 530 000 people. The Sudanese government failed to lead and coordinate a systematic response to the ensuing humanitarian crisis. Moreover, there was a lack of reporting on the fl ooding through traditional media vehicles that are, for the most part,


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government owned. An intentional media blackout hid the severity of the humanitarian crisis. Consequently, community-based volunteers rushed to fi ll the void and aid those affected by the fl oods, with Nafeer being the most prominent and forceful volunteer group. Its membership, which surpassed 12 000 volunteers, mostly comprised of young people from an amalgam of professional backgrounds. The members launched an online campaign to help those affected, and to mobilise Sudanese within and outside the country.

There are three parts to this article. The fi rst examines the role of ICTs in facilitating discourse and forming alternative media outlets that allow citizens to engage in public spheres, free of government regulations. It is particularly important to analyse this from an African context. The second part addresses the Sudanese press and the current situation, which led to the rise of parallel media to circumvent the heavy government censorship. The third part examines Nafeer’s successful use of ICTs to engage and mobilise audiences, citizen journalists, activists and civil society groups in the Sudan, after the fl ooding crisis. In this article, ICTs are defi ned as the Internet, telecoms and social media outlets. It is hoped that this case study will offer insight into how ICTs facilitated an ‘audience-building capacity’ (Bennett 2003, 162) that aided Nafeer’s initiative, in addition to helping to garner local and global attention for the campaign.

The case study method (Thomas 2011) is appropriate here because it allows for a comparative analysis of events, policies and people, over both time and distance, without applying the type of statistical rigor required of a laboratory experiment or survey design. Despite the success of Nafeer’s campaign in the Sudan it is not possible to extrapolate conclusions that are generalisable across all African countries, or even in another initiative in the Sudan. However, the case study approach may help lay the groundwork for a schema which is relevant to the African context, because it naturally affords comparisons across different cultures and countries.

ICTs and the African contextScholars have long argued over the positive or negative effects of new technologies such as the Internet – a utopian or dystopian approach – especially when examining the digital divide between the industrialised countries of the North and the poor countries of the South (Akpan 2000; Press 2000; Rodriguez and Wilson 2000). On the other hand, researchers such as Hacker and Van Dijk (2000) argue that related studies have been too technologically deterministic. Ott and Smith (2001) stress that the focus should be on the effects and implications new information technologies have for political and economic development, rather than on the digital divide – particularly in African countries. The study of ICTs should also be cognizant of different settings, and should examine specifi c socio-cultural characteristics, as well as possible political ramifi cations in these settings (Castells 2000, 5; Mudhai 2000).

Globally, new media technologies have ‘facilitated formal political participation’ (Wasserman 2005, 178) and have also afforded social movement activists and special interest groups an opportunity to engage audiences and disseminate information both on the local and global levels (Mudhai 2004; Struwig and Conradie 2003; Wasserman


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2005). Many scholars argue that the interactivity provided by new media has the potential to ‘create alternative public spheres’ (Wasserman 2005, 181). Consequently, these groups and movements are able to widen connections and forge support on not only on the local but also on the global level (Dahlberg 2001; Edelman 2001).

The question, as posed by Wasserman (2005), is whether this holds true in African contexts, given the lag in access and penetration of these new technologies when comparing the continent to other global regions. The World Bank (2012) reports that Africa’s mobile phone market comprises of 650 million subscribers, which is bigger than that of either the United States or the European Union. New ICTs (defi ned as software, computers and telecoms by the World Bank) have facilitated communication and in turn helped spread messages among a vast African audience, not necessarily only those within the geographic confi nes of the continent, but also those in the diaspora.

The success of the Internet as the engine of the new information economy depends on affordable, near-universal access (Rao 1999). Public access has been hailed as the driving force behind the expanded public sphere, thanks to ‘electronic democracy’ (Kahin and Keller 1995; Norris 2001; Ott and Rosser 2000). Access can be made available in many shapes and forms, such as Internet cafés and multipurpose community telecentres which are popping up in developing nations (Minges, Brown, Kelly and Gray 2001; Rao 1999; Rogers and Shukla 2001). These are often deemed to be ‘the harbingers of universal access in countries where there are still too many barriers to Internet access from the comforts of home or the workplace’ (Mwesige 2004, 84).

More importantly, it is vital to examine the use of ICTs in Africa based on the particularities of the region (Mercer 2004; Moyo 2009). Access to computers and literacy are barriers to using the Internet in many parts of the continent, but as Bernal (2006, 177) contends, ‘it is important to remember that it does not exist in a vacuum but in a larger fi eld of communication fl ows via word of mouth, telephone, and other means, so that the reach and infl uence of the Internet extends to those who may not go online themselves’.

African societies continue to revolve around oral tradition, with their strong emphasis on word-of-mouth dissemination of information. Therefore, what occurs in the African context is, in many cases, a two-step process whereby information fl ows from those with access to those without. Consequently, information then spreads through horizontal networks via word of mouth. The Internet and other ICTs have created decentralised, participatory and unregulated parallel media in the African context, compared to traditional mass media such as newspapers, radio and television where media consumers are merely receivers of information, not producers of content (Bernal 2006).

Nyamnjoh (2004) describes the single-owner-multi-user phenomenon manifesting in West Africa: one person owns a mobile phone yet shares it with other individuals in the same community when they wish to make calls or send messages inside or outside of the country. The same pattern applies to Internet access across the continent via Internet cafés. Citizens who do not have access to computers use such cafés to access the Internet.


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ICTs have led to the development of horizontal citizen networks that transcend governmental scrutiny and editorial guidelines, leading to a form of liberated journalism (Moyo 2009). This is of particular importance in the developing world, because it shifts the balance of power between states and citizens (Cleaver 1998; Ferdinand 2000; Ott and Smith 2001). Traditionally, with state-controlled old media there was a vertical fl ow of information, and consequently the voices of only a few were heard (McQuail 2000). Despite continued government control of the media, ICTs offer the opportunity for a freer public sphere, where there are more participants and voices. ICTs have led to the rise of a parallel market of information and media that transcends mainstream, state-controlled media. In the case of the Sudan, these parallel media outlets have gained a signifi cant following amongst citizens inside and outside the country, because they are deemed to be more credible than government sources.

Furthermore, these new media technologies have ‘created opportunities for social movements’ (Wasserman 2005, 180) in which a new sphere has become available for them to publicise and draw attention to their cause(s). Activists are able to coordinate protests, raise awareness, mobilise different publics, and even get the attention and coverage of traditional media, thanks to new technologies. Bennett (2003) contends that one such technology, the Internet, has the ability to build audiences and, more importantly, move past the circles of elites and activists. New media technologies allow for many-to-many communication (Burnett and Marshall 2003). In an African context, this truly widens horizontal networks, making them even more inclusive.

The Sudan and its sociopolitical terrainICTs are contesting censorship and the fl ow of information in many countries operating under authoritarian regimes. The Sudan is one such country where the press, along with press freedom, is heavily curtailed under the 1985 Press and Publication Act (Galander and Starosta 1997). Censorship laws have tightened since Al-Bashir’s 1989 coup.

The Sudan (prior to secession in 2011) had, at various times in its history, been seen as a possible model for a successful African democracy, an example of interethnic cooperation in the African context, and a potential breadbasket for the continent. It possessed land and water resources appropriate for agricultural development as well as oil reserves. It had a cosmopolitan, educated class, well-established political organisations, and civil society groups that successfully ‘bridged the gap between the more “traditional” elements and “modern” groups in society’ (Voll 1990, 575), long before many of its African and Arab counterparts. A strong tradition of literacy and public discourse was nurtured and encouraged in the years before and after independence from Great Britain in 1956. The old adage was that Cairo wrote, Beirut published and Khartoum read.

Specifi c events and developments demonstrated the Sudan’s political potential. The state had its 1964 October Revolution – one of the few instances when unarmed civilians were able to overthrow a military regime and replace it with a democratically elected parliament (Voll 1990) long before the advent of social media and the Facebook revolutions of the Arab world. This experience was repeated in the April 1985 revolution.


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Yet, despite such promise and potential it is currently a country in crisis. South Sudan seceded after a bitter civil war and a failed peace agreement. Violent confl icts in various parts of the country, along with a genocide in the western region, point to secessions in the near future, unless a resolution can be found. The Sudan’s economy was hit hard after South Sudan’s secession in July 2011, with the new state taking with it about 75 per cent of the country’s oil output. Sudanese professionals continue to leave the country in large numbers, in search of higher paying jobs and a better life (UNDP 2012).

Furthermore, the country’s previously well-established press system is heavily censored and regulated by government. The pendulum of press freedom in the Sudan has swung signifi cantly during the course of 57 years since the country gained independence from Great Britain. Censorship has always existed in some shape or form, but the current government has muzzled press freedom to unprecedented levels.

On paper, the Sudanese constitution guarantees press freedom, however, the current legal environment, as far as the media are concerned, is largely unfavourable (Human Rights Watch 2012). The Interim National Constitution, adopted after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), gave some freedom to the press and citizens the right to expression. However, media freedom organisations have criticised the new law for falling short of international standards. It allows for restrictions on the press, in the interests of national security and public order, and contains loosely defi ned provisions related to the encouragement of ethnic and religious disturbances and the incitement of violence. The law also gives the National Council for Press and Publications (NCPP) the authority to shut down newspapers for three days without a court order. Several other laws were used against the press in 2011, including elements of the 1991 penal code, the 2010 National Security Forces Act, and emergency law imposed in the western region of Darfur. This law remained in effect even after the secession of South Sudan.

Defamation is a criminal offense, and there is no freedom of information law, which makes access to public information diffi cult if not impossible. The Ministry of Information manages broadcast licensing in a highly politicised manner, allowing pro-government stations to acquire licences more easily than independent outlets (Human Rights Watch 2012). The NCPP regulates the journalistic profession, along with entry into the fi eld. Journalists are required to pass a test prior to receiving accreditation and a licence.

Direct prepublication censorship was offi cially lifted in 2009, but it is imposed on a regular basis. Newspaper editors often receive orders from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) stipulating what they are allowed to report on and what news stories to avoid. Publications are instructed not to carry any information about rebel groups and their activities, or any information deemed a threat to national security. Furthermore, a media blackout on stories from the restive states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan was instituted in 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2012).

Journalists are regularly harassed, attacked, arrested, detained and reportedly tortured throughout the year, despite President Al-Bashir’s announcement in August 2011


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that he would free all imprisoned journalists in the country. Following the president’s announcement, six journalists with the opposition newspaper, Al-Midan, were arrested in January 2012. Their detention followed their coverage of street protests in the capital Khartoum, against declining living standards and a rise in commodity prices. Journalists who covered the arrest, torture, and gang rape of human rights activist, Safi ya Ishag, by members of the NISS in February, were especially targeted. Three were jailed or fi ned for covering the attack, and another seven faced investigations. The repressive press freedom environment has consequently led many journalists to actively self-censor, abandon the occupation, or leave the country altogether.

This information gap has provided fertile ground for various alternative forms of communications to take centre stage. Consequently, a parallel market of information (Moyo 2009), spurred by the availability of ICTs, has sprung to life.

New media technologies: Fragmented messages and a cacophony of voices?Despite the censorship, technological changes sweeping the world have given rise to active parallel media outlets in the Sudan. Internet penetration in the country has increased signifi cantly in the past seven years (ITU 2012). In 2005, only one per cent of Sudanese had access to and were using the Internet. This fi gure jumped to 21 per cent in 2013 and is rapidly growing (ibid.). While certainly low by global standards, the numbers still translate into a signifi cant portion of Sudanese society, and are relatively high for sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, Sudanese culture remains one with a strong oral tradition, where word of mouth is still a prominent way of receiving information. Therefore, it is safe to say those who have access to the Internet will share information with those who do not.

Mobile phones have become the new talking drums of everyday Africa (De Brujin, Nymanjoh and Brinkman 2009). The Economist (2008) hailed the cellular phone as ‘the device that has become the potent force for economic development in the world’s poorest countries’. The proliferation of mobile phones and SMS facilitates the free fl ow of information. Mobiles not only help economic development in African countries, they give voice and provide a public sphere to those marginalised by lack of access to other ICTs (Arsenault and Castells 2006; Gordon 2007; Mudhai 2006; Obadare 2005). Currently, 22 million people out of a total Sudanese population of 30 million are mobile phone subscribers.

Platforms such as Twitter and Facebook may render users in the Sudan vulnerable to state surveillance, but they also offer access to alternative public spheres. The government monitors and at times blocks websites and proxy servers, but for the most part these parallel networks have been able to function. Consequently, a vast and robust yet fragmented parallel media landscape has sprung to life. The Internet, social media sites, mobile phones and other ICTs have created a vibrant public sphere where civil society organisations, activists and citizen journalists have been able to disseminate messages through parallel information networks. For the most part, these networks are freer than their traditional media counterparts. Moreover, the anonymity of users


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guarantees protection for those speaking out against the government or discussing contentious issues.

Sudanese parallel information networks range from alternate new outlets, to individual activist pages on social media, to discussion forums on websites as well as Twitter feeds. Pages such as Youmiyat Al-Beshir (Al-Beshir Diaries) on Facebook or news websites such as Al-Rakoba.net (The News Lean To), Sudanile.com and 500 Words Magazine, an online Sudanese magazine featuring different bloggers (with content in both Arabic and English) have a large number of followers and readers. Youmiyat Al-Beshir, for example, has over 100 000 likes on Facebook, whereas Girfi na Media (We Are Fed Up Media) has over 83 000 likes on Facebook and 10 000 followers on Twitter.2

One the largest Sudanese forums in cyberspace is SudaneseOnline.com. Founded by Bakri Abubakr, a member of the Sudanese Diaspora in the United States (US), it is the largest forum and news disseminator accessed by Sudanese inside and outside of the country. Interestingly, 58 per cent of the forum’s traffi c comes from within Sudan (Alexa.com). SudaneseOnline provides a transnational public sphere where Sudanese politics, democracy, history, culture and identity are discussed without restrictions. The site has opened up space for new discursive communities that build on ‘existing social networks on the ground’ (Bernal 2006, 163) and in turn extend their membership. It has been cited as a source of credible information for news outlets such as the Los Angeles Times and has also been mentioned in several US government reports.

The government has hacked into these alternative outlets and has cut off access to them on several occasions. However, for the most part they are left in peace, despite their vehement criticism of the government. Sudanese activists believe several reasons prevent the government from completely shutting down access to these technologies.3 Primarily, the government believes the majority of Sudanese do not have access to the Internet and other ICTs, therefore few citizens are likely to know of the content disseminated. Moreover, many technical diffi culties arise when access is cut off: new webpages or social media content would simply appear. Security entities believe it is easier for them to monitor civil society organisations, activists, citizen journalists and public opinion trends, and on occasion they use these platforms to disseminate news and counter-information on these outlets. Some activists argue that the government fears that shutting off access will invite more unwanted international pressure – something best avoided, given its fair share of international scrutiny and existing problems. The personal interest of those working in what activists call the government’s ‘electronic jihad brigade’ (<ref>) ensures the continued existence of parallel media outlets, which keep them employed.

The Nafeer initiativeWhen heavy rains fell in the Sudan on 1 August 2013, the United Nations (UN) estimated damage to more than 14 000 homes, housing 72 500 people, as a result of the fl ooding. At least 950 homes were completely destroyed while 759 homes suffered partial collapse.


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The Sudanese government’s failure to coordinate and lead a systematic response to the humanitarian crisis led a group of young Sudanese professionals to spearhead a mobilisation campaign. Nafeer’s members launched an online campaign to help those affected and to mobilise Sudanese within and outside the country. The campaign was successful in drawing global media attention to this natural disaster. ‘Nafeer’ was chosen because in Arabic it means to ‘call’ or ‘mobilise’. Since its inception, the group stressed its apolitical stance and emphasised its role as a vehicle for disseminating information and carrying out humanitarian work to aid those affected by the fl oods.

MethodologyICTs and social media have become indispensable tools, especially in times of crisis and disaster. They have the advantages of freedom from censorship, low costs, rapid dissemination across a wide community, and user interaction (Paul 2001). Critics argue that the disadvantages include blind authorship, a lack of source citation, and the presentation of opinion as fact. However, ICTs’ importance is of greater signifi cance in countries where they assume the role of the fourth estate. Mobilisation messages constructed on social media sites explain problems and offer solutions in a manner that insinuates the responsibility of individuals or society as a whole (An and Gower 2009). Positive framing (ibid.) has the ability to shape a cause as a high public priority and to stimulate the recruitment efforts of both organisations and individuals.

The purpose of this study is to examine how the use of ICTs facilitated the dissemination of information and the mobilisation of audiences in Nafeer’s community-based initiative. A case study approach was employed. The researcher interviewed three people who were part of the Nafeer initiative, along with four Sudanese activists who chose to remain anonymous. The researcher chose these particular four activists because they had different political leanings (which paints a more realistic and diverse picture of those pushing for political change in the Sudan), and because they were actively involved in disseminating content via the alternative media outlets examined in this research.

Social networking sites and relationship cultivation have been well established in literature which examines user participation and user-generated content in nonprofi t organisations (Kelleher 2006; Tredinnick 2006; Waters et al. 2009). Nonprofi ts use these sites to establish a virtual presence, to help them educate stakeholders about their programmes and services, and to interact with their publics. By extension, community-based initiatives and activist groups assume the role of a nonprofi t organisation. They, in turn, cultivate the same type of relationships with their audiences and stakeholders through alternative media outlets.

The offi cial social media presence for the Nafeer initiative was examined for its content. This included Nafeer’s website, Facebook page and Twitter account. The research also examined the offi cial social media presence of alternative media outlets, which included a social media presence set up by prominent Sudanese journalists as well as activist groups. The research only examined content on these alternative outlets that pertained to the Nafeer initiative, the rationale being that these outlets were set


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up by their owners to allow for the dissemination of information, to raise awareness around pertinent issues relating to public discourse, and to push for action or social change in relation to these issues. Hence, it is safe to say that these outlets assumed the role of the failed fourth estate in the Sudan. Furthermore, the argument for the authenticity and integrity of the content is corroborated by the Sudanese government’s censorship of these outlets at certain points in time.

The rise of a fifth estate?The campaign launched both English and Arabic Facebook pages (to date there are 58 409 likes for the Arabic page and 3 844 likes for the English page and counting, despite the folding of the campaign) to disseminate information. Nafeer also had a very active Twitter, YouTube and Flickr presence. Hundreds of Sudanese in the Diaspora joined the initiative. Free instant messaging applications (not controlled by government carriers) such as WhatsApp were used to disseminate information on the initiative, both inside and outside Sudan. Hotlines were set up to receive donations from Sudanese in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Britain, the US, Canada, Australia, Norway, Sweden, and other countries. All these media tools circumvented traditional government media channels, forming a parallel market of information.

The UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA <ref>) highly commended the group for ‘its impressive results’. In a three-day period in mid-August, Nafeer volunteers distributed more than 3 000 ready-made meals, 3 000 plastic sheets, and 200 mosquito nets. Mark Cutts, head of UNOCHA, said that he was ‘very impressed with the work Nafeer is doing in Sudan’.4 Furthermore, he was excited to see so many young volunteers joining the effort to help those affected and using social media to mobilise support.

Nafeer’s initiative provided many services apart from the distribution of food to those affected. Doctors were mobilised to participate, and a primary healthcare clinic was set up to make medical services available to those in fl ood-stricken areas. Environmental engineering teams cleaned up the debris, and treated fl oodwaters to control for diseases. Nafeer volunteers fi lled and stacked burlap sacks to create barriers against further fl ooding. Training sessions were held for volunteers in order to streamline projects undertaken by the group. Nafeer’s Facebook pages and Twitter account were used to publicise the efforts of other volunteers, e.g., Education Without Borders’ efforts to collect school supplies and rehabilitate affected schools was prominently advertised on Nafeer’s Arabic and English Facebook pages.

The use of ICTs was highly organised, centralised, and built on a number of disparate systems. A website was constructed to raise awareness for the initiative. Web applications were used to record and aggregate incident reports (notifi cations), mobilise volunteers, provide the necessary reports for immediate response, as well as for high-level decision-making. Web applications were primarily used to assist in internal communications within the group, to streamline internal operations and processes. Furthermore, a crowd-mapping application using the Ushahidi platform was designed to report incidents and show geographical locations. It is interesting that


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Nafeer’s website always lagged behind its social media outlets (especially its Facebook pages) in terms of traction and audience-building. The public followed the Facebook pages, turning to them for information rather than seeking updates on the website.

The web application on Nafeer’s website allowed volunteers to self-register. Showing up at Nafeer’s centre was an alternative way of registering as a volunteer, especially for those without access to ICTs, who wanted to participate. The managing team used the database to call available volunteers and place them (based on their skill sets) within Nafeer operations such as fi eldwork, transportation, medical services, engineering services and IT work.

The use of social media, in particular Facebook, led to high visibility for the initiative on both a national and a global level. Nafeer was very active and successful in its efforts to engage and inform alternative outlets about its humanitarian efforts. This led to a horizontal expansion and dissemination of information regarding Nafeer’s community-based efforts. Furthermore, it joined many different people across the political spectrum as well as those who had no political affi liation.

The availability of a huge number of volunteers (more than 12 000 registered) dwarfed that of well-established non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and could never have been solidifi ed through the use of traditional media vehicles. In addition, Sudanese within the country and in the diaspora made donations via a streamlined system. The sheer volume of donations and Nafeer’s smooth logistical operations attracted international media attention at a time when the Sudanese government was blacking out fl ood-related news and information. It is highly unlikely that Nafeer or the fl oods would have registered on the radars of the international media or received as much coverage as they did without the use of ICTs to publicise and promote the issue.

The use of ICTs in this instance certainly helped with audience mobilisation and capacity-building, which transcended traditional activist circles, civil society groups and political entities. A wide horizontal network engaged the common man and woman in the street. While a large number of Sudanese youth have access to Facebook and other social media outlets, only a few had ever been exposed to, or participated in, voluntary work.

Muhammad Alkarouri, the brain behind Nafeer’s IT setup, believes the initiative has increased ‘the pool of volunteers by an order of magnitude’ (interview with Alkarouri, <date>). In his assessment it is highly likely that many fi rst-time participants will be available for future volunteer work. Perhaps more importantly, for a large number of young volunteers, the concept of voluntary work has been established as a ‘normal and “cool” thing’ to engage in.5 Volunteerism is not a well-established phenomenon in Sudanese society, therefore the success of this mobilisation set a precedent and laid the groundwork for future engagement and audience-building capacity.

Nafeer’s initiative, which folded on 12 September 2013, gave rise to a number of benefi ts that will fi nd their way to other Sudanese NGOs and civil society groups: on the IT side, software developed for the initiative will be released as open source so that future campaigns in the Sudan (or anywhere, for that matter) will have access to well-established IT applications and programmes.


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The dissemination of information about Nafeer, shortly after its inception, employed a two-stage process. Nafeer strongly pushed to raise awareness of its activities, by engaging many well-known Sudanese activists on Facebook. Efforts included engaging NGOs, civil society groups, as well as well-known Sudanese bloggers (who already had extensive networks of followers) to help Nafeer appeal and build credibility with different Sudanese publics.

Moreover, the initiative appealed to a critical Sudanese mass because it was apolitical and not related in any way to a government which many deem corrupt. By its nature, the matter of supporting aid operations to those affected by fl ooding raises no confl ict between parties from both sides of the digital divide. Nafeer’s apolitical stance and transparency made it easier to collect money from donors worldwide. Financial reports detailing donations received and expenditures were regularly made available on the group’s website and Facebook pages, which further enhanced Nafeer’s credibility in a country infamous for its lack of transparency, and for its humanitarian aid/funding being channelled into the pockets of corrupt politicians.

DiscussionThe implications of the Nafeer initiative are signifi cant within the African context. Social networks such as Nafeer may perhaps create an alternative sphere of information to assume the role of a heavily censored and weakened African fourth estate. The success of networked movements ‘is based on the capability of associating around a concrete problem, in order to fi ght in unison for some rights’ (Laskowska 2014). For repressive African regimes, such a unanimous and determined voice seems dangerous and more diffi cult to subdue, not to mention manipulate – something that is apparent in the case of the fourth estate.

However, as Castells (2000, 218) points out, networked movements ‘are not necessarily trying to take power over, either by revolution or a march through the state institutions’. Rather, their strength (and perhaps weakness) lies in the ability to ‘concentrat[e] their networking resources on a few and very concrete problems’ (ibid.).

As is evident in the Nafeer example, a repressive Sudanese regime was not overthrown, but a pressing humanitarian issue was publicised and resolved. This might lead some to argue that the networked society may have a myopic perspective that focuses on a limited set of issues within the public sphere. Nonetheless, there is no denying networked citizens can and are able to successfully establish a fi fth estate that transcends and questions existing African governments and established institutions.

Much of the scholarship on the Internet and other ICTs ‘emphasises connectivity and assumes a Western individual cybersubjectivity’ (Bernal 2006, 178). The signifi cance of the Nafeer campaign lies in the fact that it bypassed state-controlled traditional media vehicles to reach and mobilise different publics across the Sudanese spectrum. More importantly, it mobilised people across the digital divide. Many might argue that access to new technologies (used in this initiative) is in the hands of a few elites in the Sudan, but the counter-argument is the trickle-down effect of information from those with access to those without. Given the importance of the oral tradition in


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Africa, one must understand that the model is distinctly different from a Western one. This initiative demonstrates the use of many-to-many and one-to-many approaches that were facilitated (at times) by the single-owner-multi-user phenomenon. Not everyone has access to a home computer/laptop, but everyone can and does access the Internet via Internet cafés, at work, or even via their phone. All these factors led to an expansive horizontal network of citizens free from government censorship.

Nafeer’s campaign makes it evident that it is not only the percentage of access to ICTs that matters in the developing world, but what is done with the available access. Perhaps penetration rates and ownership of new ICTs are not as high as in fi rst-world countries, yet the impact of campaigns and initiatives established by citizens in the developing world can and does bypass the capabilities of well-established organisations such as the UN.

The campaign not only succeeded in mobilising the populace, it garnered a great deal of media attention on both a regional (e.g., Al-Jazeera and Alarabiya) and a global scale. Many Western outlets (the New York Times, the BBC and Fox News) covered the initiative, although it is understandable that the BBC would have an interest in news from a former African colony. American media coverage of Nafeer’s initiative was noteworthy, given the general lack of attention for news from the Sudan in these outlets – especially if an issue has no direct bearing on American foreign policy (Bashri 2012).

Nafeer’s campaign defi nitely holds promise for future citizen-to-citizen mobilisation that bypasses a centralised government and its traditional media channels. The initiative was not only commended for its transparency in the use of donations made to fl ood victims, but also for its documentation and dissemination of information regarding its efforts in fl ood-ravaged areas. What we can take from this initiative is that ICTs do provide access to an alternative public sphere – one which community-based campaigns, civil society groups and activists can use to enhance their role as harbingers of change, in order to mobilise audiences.

Furthermore, the new technologies offered a medium which effectively helped the Sudanese overcome geographic distance so as to participate in a local campaign. A virtual community was constructed via ICTs, and this translated into objectives and goals that were achieved on the ground – quite a feat for volunteers with nonexistent advocacy and campaign experience.

Becker and Wehner (2001) argue that ICTs generally (and the Internet specifi cally) promote fragmented information and partial public spheres which, in turn, lead to a lack of tangible effects in the real world. Despite the cacophony of voices and alternative media outlets using ICTs in the Sudan, this campaign was able to overcome the fragmentation of messages and existing partial public spheres. Consequently a successful humanitarian effort took place. Perhaps Nafeer’s success is directly related to its apolitical stance.

Obviously the Sudanese government underestimated the role ICTs can play in citizen mobilisation. With Nafeer’s campaign, a shift of power occurred whereby citizens had more power and leverage than the government in disseminating information and mobilising recovery efforts. However, the expectation that campaigns like these will always succeed in the Sudan or in other African context, has its limitations since state


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and state-controlled media establishments are still too dominant. Despite the promise that ICTs can enable citizens to circumvent authority and censorship, access can be shut off at any time. At the end of the day, it is well to remember that governments control access to ICTs and have the ability to shut them off at any point, if they feel threatened. The Sudanese government has ultimate control over ICTs and will prevent access if power continues to shift in favour of the ordinary citizen.

NotesPlease note Nafeer’s Twitter feed, Facebook pages, Flickr pictures, and YouTube Videos were accessed for this article.

1. See Al-Taher Sati’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/TaherSati2. Alternative media outlets are accessible via different social media platforms.3. Rawa Gafar Bakhit, a prominent Sudanese activist, and Tagreed Abdein, a Sudanese blogger,

were interviewed for this article. Their responses provided insight into reasons behind the lack of censorship in alternative news networks.

4. For Mark Cutts quote and UNOCHA statistics see: http://unocha.org/sudan/top-stories/sudan-hundreds-thousands-affected-heavy-rains-and-fl oods

5. Muhmmad Al Karouri, who holds a PhD in Systems Engineering from the University of Sheffi eld, UK, is brain behind Nafeer’s IT setup. Dr. Karouri was interviewed for this article.

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Biographical noteMaha Bashri is associate professor of Communication at Bradley University (Illinois, US). Her research focuses on the global South, agenda setting, and use of ICTs. Currently she is researching Africa’s emerging markets and their communicative sphere. She is a member of the International Communication Association (ICA) and Association for Education in Journalism and Communication Research (AEJMC). Email: [email protected]; [email protected]



South African young adults’ viewership of television news and implications for democracy

Musawenkosi W. Ndlovu

AbstractInconclusive findings regarding South African young adults’ interest in (television) news prompted this article’s exploration of viewership trends (2006–2012). The focus is on the viewership of newscasts produced by the SABC and e.tv. Specific attention is paid to young adult viewers, who are then compared with older adults. It appears that in South Africa, newscast viewership has been declining across age categories. From a socialisation theory perspective, youth subsists in a cultural/social environment where news consumption is waning; hence youths’ declining news consumption levels. The decline is sharper in the younger generation. Although viewership decline is universal, there is an increase in viewership of newscasts that incorporate elements of tabloid journalism and are trusted. Overall, viewership decline reflects Western trends and can be associated with citizens’ withdrawal from the political public sphere.

Keywords: e.tv, newscasts, public sphere, SABC, South Africa, viewership, young adults

Background and rationaleScholarly research on the relationship between South African young adults and news media, although already focused on social media, is inconclusive regarding the former’s interest in (television) news. Tracking young adults’ newscast consumption trends over time is non-existent. Comparisons of young adults’ viewership trends over time with those of older adults are equally non-existent. Consequently, the conclusions reached create an impression of young adults in South Africa having a peculiar relationship with newscasts, compared to other groups. This article fi lls the gap by exploring whether 1) young adults are losing interest in newscasts and in news media in general; 2) trends over time in newscasts viewership by young adults differ from those of older adult groups; 3) trends over time in newscasts viewership differ among channels; 4) there are differences in newscast viewership by age group and channel; and 5) there are differences in news viewership between morning and evening.


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South African young adults’ viewership of television news

Several interrelated motivations undergird this article. Contextually, South Africa celebrated 20 years of freedom from apartheid on 27 April 2014. Refl ecting on the country’s years of democracy is fundamental. Central to this refl ection is examining the manner in which the relationship between two universal pillars of democracy, citizenship and news media, has unfolded. The youth will inherit the future, and young adults (specifi cally those aged 16–24 and 25–34)1 constitute the majority of the population. For young adults, television, after radio, remains the main news source (Duncan et al. 2013). Television has been chosen here because in South Africa it is the ‘mean’ between two extremes: the fast-declining mainstream newspapers and the most popular radio news, particularly among youth. Studying the relationship between newscasts and youth citizens gives a sense of where news consumption trends are going. Will they follow radio, grow slowly as new/social media, or decline like newspapers? Despite its documented shortcomings as political affairs educator, from a social psychology point of view television still contributes valuable information about matters relating to the public sphere (Buckingham 1997a; Robinson 1996). On the side of audiences and citizens, the more young adults are motivated to consume newscasts (and other news media), the better the chances that the political public sphere and democracy will survive (David 2009).

Two other motivations led to this study: research from advanced democracies (the United States, Western Europe and Australia) consistently concludes that young adults in these societies are losing interest in mainstream news media/television news (Wattenberg 2012). In South Africa, there are certain ‘ambiguities’ and ‘defi cits’ (see below) in research regarding the relationship between youth and newscasts. Broadly, a cumulative body of research indicates a gradual historical decline in the share of young adults who regularly consume news (cf. Barnhurst and Wartella 1998; Evans and Sternberg 1998; Patterson 2007). The defi nitive decline in young adults’ news consumption, the failure of younger youth cohorts to take up news consumption habits, and their general early adoption of new media technologies has created the hope that they will appropriate new media for political communication and news consumption (Loader 2012). As much as young adults increasingly source news online and on social media (Patterson 2007), levels of news consumption are unsatisfactory (Mindich 2005).

News is implicated in the creation of an informed citizenry. So, young adults’ declining news interest is cause for concern in democracies (Loader 2012). Apprehension stems from recurring associations of news consumption with knowledge of current affairs – a crucial measure of an informed citizenry (David 2009). Young adults’ declining levels of television news consumption could create an unenlightened citizenry. Furthermore, political knowledge determines political attitudes and political participation, to a great extent (Conway et al. 1981). Therefore, young adults’ disinterest in news could create indifference towards civic responsibilities, such as being a member of a political party or trade union movement and/or voting. To this extent, youths’ behaviour threatens the survival of public democratic institutions (Barnhurst and Wartella 1998).

To the degree, then, that South Africa’s democracy is maturing in a manner that follows the trends of an advanced liberal democracy, will local youth gradually become disinterested in newscasts? A related question: How generalisable are conclusions


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reached in the advanced industrialised societies to modernising/developing societies/economies like South Africa, despite the globalisation of youth cultures regarding media consumption patterns? The need to appreciate these issues is another rationale for this article; the other regards ‘ambiguities’ and ‘defi cits’ in local research.

First, there is a paucity of scholarly, public surveys and media-industry-based research exploring the relationship between youth and news in South Africa (Ndlovu 2008). Second, there are few works constitutive of a local-centric literature on the subject. Whereas it is plausible to observe that Western ‘analysts agree on one thing: today’s young people pay less attention to daily news than their counterparts of two or three decades ago’ (Patterson 2007, 5), it is impossible to argue the same with respect to local analysts on the relationship between youth and news. Lacking are historical/longitudinal, empirical evidence-based conclusions with respect to one of the foremost questions in the study of youth and news: Are young South Africans defi nitely losing interest in mainstream news media/television news? Third, without fi rst establishing youths’ interest in the means of political communication/news, it is hard to establish the degree to which they are interested or disinterested in the democratic process.

Local scholarship on youth and news has, on the one hand, a limited set of studies that strongly indicates that the youth are losing their interest in news. For example, Du Plooy-Cilliers and Bezuidenhout (2003, 18) conclude that young adults are interested in political news and current affairs, but are in fact ‘not interested in the content and presentation of current news programmes’. What this study notes, in essence, is that local youth do not watch newscasts, because newscasts are not presented in the way youth would prefer. Pepler (2003, 1) confi rms the low consumption of (political) news on the part of South African youth, observing that ‘while the average mark for current news item questions came to 35%, the section on popular culture returned an average mark of 85%’. From these studies, one could reasonably infer negative implications for South Africa’s democracy, as youth become uninformed. Other studies contradict these fi ndings. One of these is Strelitz (2002, 25) who observes:

The relatively high readership of newspapers and the continuing salience for youth of news contradicts the claims that made by Katz (1992: 33) and Buckingham (1997: 348) that young people are no longer interested in conventional news media.

News salience among youth (observed above) is noted in the survey by Duncan et al. (2013). In this study, almost 70 per cent of young adults nationwide claimed to consume news from television. The impression given by Strelitz’s (2002) and Duncan et al.’s (2013) studies is supported by changes in the local media industry. The local broadcasting industry continues to launch new news platforms, despite conclusions in Western literature that television is a dying news source, particularly among young adults (Wattenberg 2010). e.tv’s owners recently launched three news channels: e.News Channel Africa (ENCA), Zulu News and e.Nuus. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) launched SABC News. ANN7 has also just been established. The aforementioned developments signify both the country’s appetite for political information and the willingness of ‘risk-conscious’ private capital to invest in these ventures. The aforementioned growth, however, has occurred alongside an accelerating


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decline in circulation fi gures and readership of long-established English and Afrikaans-language ‘quality’ newspapers. These divergent conclusions and contradictions in the local media markets is what necessitated this study, along with the following methodological and contextual limitations.

Apart from the survey by Duncan et al. (2013), for example, fi ndings on youth and news are a product of focus-group and other research methods from which generalisations are improbable. Focus-group discussants, though appropriately sampled, tend to be drawn from a particular cultural and social environment within South Africa’s higher education system: suburban, white, middle/upper class, English and Afrikaans language-dominated universities such Monash, University of Free State, Rhodes and University of Cape Town. Indeed, Pepler’s (2003), Ndlovu’s (2011) and Strelitz’s (2005) works accommodate students from diverse backgrounds, particularly in terms of class.

Starkly lacking in local scholarship on youth and news, in a country where lived experiences are shaped by class and race, is research conducted from the so-called former black universities of Zululand, Venda, Limpopo and North West (Mafi keng Campus), for example. Though these universities themselves would hardly yield a generalisable sample, in terms of social class they tend to draw their students from working-class communities.

Disproportionate use of students in the local study of youth and news presents two problems: the student population at local universities does not necessarily refl ect the youth population in the country, nor even that of the universities from which they are drawn. In this context there is a need for this study, and for its exploration of newscast viewership over time, using a national sample. The foregoing methodological specifi cities are dealt with in the context of the broader South African political discourse, both within and outside of scholarship.

Political discourse on youthIn South Africa, as in the West, there is growing social anxiety about youths’ disaffection not only with news, but also with politics. Political actors from various ideological persuasions in the country are becoming increasingly concerned (Ndebele 2013; Zille 2013). Popular mainstream news media writings equally point to these concerns: ‘Where is the youth of today, gone partying?’ (City Press, Anon. 2001); ‘From young lions to young yawners’ (Mail & Guardian, Mataboge and Mawson 2004); ‘SA’s youth care little, know less about apartheid’ (Seattle Times, Mulegeta 2002) and ‘The politics of self’ (Mail & Guardian, Deane 2003).

In local scholarship, of late the relationship between youth, news and politics (hereafter: YNP) is progressively becoming a foremost area of academic inquiry (Ndlovu 2008). Characteristic of this inquiry is growing anxiety about the rupturing link between youth and the political public sphere. In brief, local scholarship on YNP can be loosely divided into three categories (for the convenience of this article). Certain research studies focus exclusively on the relationship between youth and traditional means of political communication such as print, radio and television (Booysen 1991;


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Claassen 2001; Du Plooy-Cilliers and Bezuidenhout 2003; Ndlovu 2008; Pepler 2003; Strelitz 2002). These studies are located between 1987 and 2003 (Ndlovu 2008). These scholars, as noted above, provide no defi nitive answers with respect to whether the youth, however defi ned, are losing interest in news media/newscasts.

The second category of studies on YNP is propelled by transformative social change and new/social media development in South Africa. The central focus is the relationship between youth, political content and social networking sites (cf. Journal of African Media Studies 5(2) 2013). Equally, there are no generalisations among these studies with respect to young adults’ use of social media for political communication.

The third category is represented by national surveys, with a ‘baseline study of youth identity, the media and the public sphere in South Africa’ (2013) being the fi rst in the country. This ‘comprehensive’ national survey explores young adults’ uses of all media platforms and types for political communication.

Furthermore, the seriousness of and the increasing attention being paid to the relationship in question is marked by at least two other happenings: 1) for the fi rst time in the history of South African media studies, of a full-blown panel titled Talking politics: Young South Africans and political participation in mobile and social media (2012) was organised at the International Association for Media and Communication Research’s (IAMCR) Communication Policy and Technology Section; 2) the latest issue of Rhodes Journalism Review (2013, No. 33) pays unprecedented attention to the relationship between YNP.

Noteworthy, though, is the fact that growing concern about youth and politics is less about youth and news. Be that as it may, this is a serious shift in the discourse about YNP in this country. Twenty years ago, there were no concerns about local youth being disaffected with politics. If anything, the concern would have been that local youths were too political. Today, one of the defi ning features of public discourse on the topic is whether the youth will register to vote and then actually vote during the 2014 national elections. But why are local and international researchers into YNP so anxious about the quality of youths’ citizenship? What has shaped this anxiety?

The legacy of the EnlightenmentApprehension arises from the presupposition of a civic-republican young citizen whose news consumption is not an end in itself, but a means to an end; the end being the act and the process of being politically aware and active in the public sphere(s). This is a political citizen who actively participates in deliberations around public affairs; who exercises his/her civic duty, in part, by holding those in political power accountable; and who contributes to the nurturing of democracy by exercising his/her right to vote. This is a ‘good citizen’ (Pattie et al. 2004). It is specifi cally from this perspective that the present article relates South African young adults’ news consumption trends to implications for the country’s democracy.

Ideas about and practices of the liberal-individualist and civic-republican types of citizenship, which the study of youth and news promotes and are now taken for granted as part of (late)modern democratic liberal societies, have their roots in the


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Enlightenment era of the 17th and 18th centuries (cf. Zafi rovski 2011). The Enlightenment necessarily bequeathed modern democratic societies with the language of ‘democracy’, ‘active citizenship’, ‘informed citizen’, ‘legitimacy of public institutions and political accountability’, ‘political participation’ and the ‘public sphere’, amongst others (cf. Keane 1995). This language is intrinsic to the study of youth and news.

Modern democratic societies – with which post-apartheid South Africa amalgamated after its fi rst democratic elections in 1994 – have historically naturally presupposed one major social development in relation to the transition of children into young adulthood. They presumed not only the cultural progression of children into young adults through rituals such as completing school, getting a job, leaving home, getting married and setting up individual family units; but also assumed that once children have grown to be (and have reached a certain institutionally determined stage of being) young adults, they would naturally take up more political responsibilities, and graduate to become full citizens of a geographically defi ned nation-state.

Primary amongst these cumulative political responsibilities, which are concomitant with age, racialised and gender-based social exclusions notwithstanding, are voting in periodical national elections; civic engagement; holding those who hold political and economic power accountable; and participating actively in the nation-state’s discourses in the public sphere(s). Involvement in these processes of citizenship requires being informed about the nation-state’s current affairs through news media institutions, including television news (Meijer 2006). As mentioned earlier, news consumption and civic engagement are mutually reinforcing variables (Conway et al. 1981). To establish South African young adults’ newscast viewing trends, for the purposes of inferring possible implications for democracy in this country, the following methodology was followed.

MethodologyData were requested from the South African Advertising and Research Foundation (SAARF),2 a media research institutions to which almost all local media organisations subscribe for regular updates on consumption patterns related to their products and services. The SAARF employs Area Stratifi ed Probability Sampling, which divides the country into nine provinces and subsequently four areas, i.e., metropolitan, large city/town, urban and rural. The gender split in South Africa is 49.5 per cent male and 50.5 per cent female, therefore the country is proportionally split accordingly. The same applies to the four SAARF age bands, i.e., 16–24, 25–34, 35–49 and 50+. The ‘geo-frame’ method is then used to select respondents, making use of the telephone book. Suburbs are then categorised alphabetically, as are streets within the various suburbs. The interviewer is then instructed to go, for example, to no 54 in a specifi c suburb and interview people who fall within a specifi c demographic profi le, e.g., a male aged 16–24. Four attempts are made to track down the individual, if this fails then a neighbour is used as a substitute.

The SAARF data were analysed at Harvard University’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science, under the mentorship of Steven Worthington, a postdoctoral fellow


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at the Institute.3 Having imported the SAARF’s data from Excel, loaded it into R and tested various regression models, we fi tted the model which would best explain the viewership trends of 7 065 newscast/programmes by both old and young adults over the seven-year period (see fi gures below).

Q1: Do trends over time in television news viewership differ among age groups?The answer, in view of Figure 1 below, is yes. There are differences in viewership of South African television newscasts among different age categories. ‘Differences’ in this context means variations in percentages of, say, a decline between age categories and in the rate of that decline (‘differences’ does not necessarily mean a difference between incline and decline). Two age categories are represented by the slopes in Figure 1: one for young adults and the other for old adults. The young adult slope <below the old adult slope> <check> represents a combination of those viewers between age categories 16–24 and 25–34. The old adult slope above the young adult slope represents a combination of those viewers who are between age-categories 35–49 and 50+. Although both slopes demonstrate a downward secular trend, as parallel regression lines slope negatively and do not interact, they demonstrate that trends over time in television news viewership differ among age groups; as much as they both decline, they decline differently. Both slopes differ from zero. The slope for young adults shows a b = -0.034 and p = <0.001 from zero. The slope for old adults shows a b = -0.054, p = <0.001from zero. Both slopes show downward secular negative decline in viewership between the age categories. For older adults, despite viewing more news by comparison, the slope shows an accelerated rate of decline by comparison. In short, young adult South Africans are losing interest in television news, but they are NOT the only ones – so are older adults. If young adults are losing interest in television news, as they are, and if we apply socialisation theory (see below), we could argue the following: young adults exist in a social and cultural environment where there is a growing disinterest in television news.

Furthermore, if we distill the age categories (young adults and older adults) into four age-based subcategories, i.e., 16–24, 25–34, 35–49 and 50 +, the same trend as in Figure 1 emerges in Figure 2. The only difference, importantly, is that the slope for age category 25–34, if we had non-linear curve, will be showing a fl at line; that is, no difference from zero. In other words, age category 25–34, unlike other age categories that show clear decline, viewed neither more nor less television news during the 2006–2012 period.


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Figure 1: Trends in television news viewership among different age groups

Figure 2: Television news viewership of four age-based subcategories


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Q2: Do trends over time in television news viewership differ among television channels?

SABC1

Within the universal framework and ethos of a Public Service Broadcaster (PSB), SABC1 is a typical PSB channel that, in practice, provides a variety of cultural, educational and entertainment shows, some South African and others international (mainly American). The channel, which is mandated to cater for the youth interest, broadcasts mainly in English, isiZulu and isiXhosa. It is home to the most watched soapie in the country, Generations. Despite, to a degree, SABC1’s youthful orientation, not all its language-based newscasts are meant exclusively for young adults, but rather for the entire family. Compared to other channels within the SABC empire, SABC1 is characterised by having quantitatively fewer newscasts. Every evening, SABC1 provides newscasts at 17:30 (alternated between siSwati and isiNdebele) and 19:30 (main news alternated between isiXhosa and isiZulu).

SABC1 still attracts more viewers (including youth) than any other channel in the country. Its slope (see Figure 3), however, shows a relatively sharp negative decline in news viewership compared to other declining slopes, representing other channels. The channel’s rate of decline is across age categories. It could be that youth decline is pulling down all other age groups, or that youth, as expressed above, exist in an environment where news consumption is generally in decline.

Figure 3: Television news viewership of different television channels


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SABC2SABC2 is a family-oriented channel broadcasting mainly in English, SeSotho and Afrikaans. Although it is among the least watched of the SABC channels, viewership of its newscasts neither increased nor declined during 2006–2012. SABC2 provides the majority of the SABC’s daily and nightly newscasts, and broadcasts weekday news bulletins in both Tshivenda and Xitsonga at 17:30. On weekdays and weekends, the channel provides news bulletins in Afrikaans at 19:00 and in SeSotho at 20:30. It is the only channel within the SABC that provides a fl agship variety news and current affairs breakfast show, Morning Live. It is not clear why SABC2 news viewership has remained stable in the period under study, while other SABC channels have been losing viewers.

SABC3SABC3 typically provides news, current affairs and entertainment programming solely in English. SABC3 is a cosmopolitan channel targeted at an upwardly mobile multiracial audience. Notably, on 7 April 2003, the channel shifted its 30-minute fl agship news bulletin from 20:00 to 19:00, bringing it in direct competition with the newscast of its main competitor, e.tv (see below). As Figure 3 indicates, SABC3’s news viewership is in crisis; the slope shows that it is the least viewed of the four channels, and that it is in decline. SABC3’s fl agship newscast is rivalled by e.tv news.

e.tve.tv is a privately-owned commercial broadcaster that provides a variety of mainly entertainment programmes. Unlike the multi-channel SABC, e.tv, until recently, comprised a single channel. News-wise, e.tv is the only channel showing an upward <secular> trend in viewership over time. Its style of news presentation is thought to be responsible for this. As Bird (1999: 16) observes:

Instead of the traditional medium close-up of the news-reader seated at a desk, as on SABC news, e-tv has gone for a more informal style of news reading. The reader is perched on the edge of a desk with a handful of papers in his/her hands while slightly dimmed newsroom and a neon-blue ‘E’ make up the background. In addition to this the readers themselves are informally dressed when compared to their SABC counterparts.

e.tv’s fi rst news broadcast, on 17 January 1999, introduced South African television viewers to a different form of news presentation and tone. Both this style and the supposed independence from government are paying off for the channel’s newscasts.

Q3: Are there differences in television news viewership by age group and television channel?Figure 4 shows the differences between age groups in terms of the manner in which they view each different channel. For example, on SABC1 the gap between young adults and old adults is very narrow, in the comparison to SABC2 or SABC3. More young adults watch news on SABC1 than on SABC2, SABC3 and e.tv. Both young and


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old adults on SABC1 consume almost the same amount of news, compared to other channels. This difference is marked, when compared to e.tv.

Figure 4: Television news viewership by age group and television channel

The differences in television news viewership by age group and channel, as regards young adults and old adults, are observable when these categories are distilled into four age groups: 16–24, 25–34, 35–49 and 50+ (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Television news viewership by age group and channel


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Q4: Are there differences in television news viewership between morn-ing and evening times?This question was prompted by the assumption that young adults could be watching morning newscasts because they differ from evening newscasts. Morning newscasts tend to be different in terms of codes of form (mode of address, scope and variety, brief vs. in-depth news reports) and codes of content (newsreader and the studio’s visual appeal). What Figures 6 and 7 show is that young adults watch more news in the evenings than older adults do; also, younger adults watch fewer newscasts in the morning than older adults do.

Figure 6: Morning and evening news viewership of younger and older adults

Discussion and conclusionThe above evidence regarding viewership of South African television newscasts, based on 7 065 newscasts viewed during 2006–2012, distinctly demonstrates a clear general decline in television news consumption across age groups, over time. Against the backdrop of the rationale for this study, it perhaps puts to rest for now the question of whether or not South African youth is losing interest in television news. Like older adults, younger adults are generally losing interest in television news. Though not presented by this study’s data, the decline could reasonably be associated with the accelerated decreased rate of circulation and readership of South African mainstream newspapers (Myburgh 2013). Some analysts have even pointed out that certain


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Figure 7: Morning and evening news viewership of four age categories

historical local newspapers may close down within the next fi ve years (Moodie 2013). For Glenn and Mattes (2011), the newspapers’ decline began just after 1994, and they never recovered. Newspaper reading among South African young adults is equally low (Duncan et al. 2013). Both the culture of decline in news consumption and the practice of staying away from particular kinds of traditional news media by all age groups can be explained through socialisation theory.

In short, studies grounded in socialisation theory clearly indicate that children, teenagers and young adults emulate their parents’ media consumption patterns (Gunter and McLeer 1990, 36). ‘This certainly seems to be the case in relation to the development of news consumption practices for young adults’ (Guntlett and Hill 1999, 86). If it is, then young adults tend to emulate their parents’ news consumption habits, and the decline in news media consumption among South African youth could be strongly associated with the cultural environment they inhabit.

This point about young adults’ cultural socialisation can be taken further and linked to the evidence presented above. The gap, for example, between older and younger SABC1 viewers, as a cultural and social type, is smaller, as much as older viewers watch more news. In other words, reasonably, the drop in news consumption trends on SABC1 among older adults tends to be found, almost at the same rate, among younger adults. Equally, a signifi cant drop in the consumption of SABC3 newscasts among both older and younger adults, as a cultural and social type, is evident. Also, e.tv’s newscast


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viewership increases among all age groups, yet the rate of younger adults viewership increase has been slower. Lastly, young adults watch newscast as many times as adults do, either in the mornings or in the evenings. There is no behaviour difference in trends in this regard. In short, younger adults are anchored in more or less the same social and cultural relations which shape trends in television (news) consumption in the country.

However, even if young adults who do watch news watch more or less the same number of newscasts as those older adults who do, another element infl uences why fewer young adults than older adults watch news, and why the decline is far more pronounced among them. First, young adults – particularly those in the age category 16–24 – are being socialised in a different, post-apartheid South African cultural/media, socioeconomic and political environment, compared to other age groups. They are growing up in an environment where they have more limited exposure to news and politics than older generations did, i.e., exposure to news media competes with other media, culture and lifestyle activities that were not necessarily available to the older generation, but now form part and parcel of young people’s lives. Second, parents whose news consumption behaviour is to be emulated by youth are no longer able to perform this cultural task, because of changes in their lifestyle and work habits. The life of average South Africans is busier than before, and they work longer hours than before (South Africans at work longer 2014).

Third, if e.tv is rising, it is because of its attention to both human interest stories and its perceived ideological independence in dealing with political stories. The dominance of political stories on SABC and perceptions of ideological bias are affecting its viewership. SABC newscasts have so far lacked the combination of aesthetic appeal or the ‘visual extravaganza’ that differentially characterises e.tv and tabloids, leading one analyst to say that ‘the main issue for me is that SABC news is so damn boring’ (Moodie 2012).

Fourth, the decline in news consumption in general (and mostly on SABC) could be caused by a number of factors: young adults, particularly those at universities, are not necessarily sourcing news from television and newspapers; traditional news media are showing a decline among young adults, <but from digital-only media and social media> (Duncan et al. 2013; cf. Moodie 2014). Both the increase in the number of new news providers mentioned in this study and their novelty value could be splitting news audiences and causing a decline in others – particularly SABC news. Fifth, research shows that viewers are moving from terrestrial (analog) channels such SABC and e.tv to satellite. The dominant satellite broadcaster in South Africa, Multichoice’s DStv, is the main benefi ciary of this migration, particular through its cheaper packages such as DStv Compacts, which is aimed at viewers in the middle- and lower-class income brackets (Ferreira 2014). This might reasonably explain the decline of SABC in general. Increasingly popular are channels such Mzansi Magic and Mzansi Wethu, which directly compete with SABC1, particularly in their use of local indigenous languages which is where the SABC had a distinct advantage. Again, in a religious and sports-mad country such as South Africa, DStv’s offering of niche channels targeting these communities is also wrestling viewers from the PSB, hence the general decline of the SABC. Unlike e.tv, the SABC airs old programmes while DStv airs new and topical shows, which


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impacts the SABC negatively. By the time, say, SABC3 is on season four of Desperate Housewives, DStv could be on season 12 (and students in rich local universities with good broadband would have downloaded and shared all the seasons that any SABC channel would have wanted to show anyway). The postmodern, fragmented and niche-oriented ways in which South Africans are consuming television, particular young adults, mirror those of the advanced industrial democracies cited above. The outcome is mostly likely to be the decline in (television) news interest (as we are seeing) and politics (Glenn and Mattes 2011), leading to the crisis of citizenship: a decrease in political knowledge and civic engagement. These are serious implications for South Africa’s young democracy.

Notes1. The study of youth, news and politics is notorious for lack of standardisation when comes to

terms such as ‘youth’, ‘Generation X’, ‘Gen Y’, etc. (Zerba 2009).2. It is noted in this work that The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has been

unhappy with the quality of research from the SA Audience Research Foundation (Saarf) and subsequently withdrew its participation in it. Also, SAARF’s name has changed (Hauser 2014). This work depends on SAARF’s already calculated averages, not the scope of the samples which NAB had issues with.

3. The institute is meant, among other things, to mentor Harvard University-affi liated researchers like myself. At the time of writing and taking classes with the institute, I was a Mandela Mellow Fellow at the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research at Harvard University.

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December 2013).Ndlovu, M. 2008. South African journalism and mass communication research on youth and news

media: A refl ection. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 29(1): 64–78.


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Ndlovu, M. 2010. Reading young adult South Africans’ reading of national television news. Communicare 29(2): 26–47.

Ndlovu, M. 2011. The meaning of post-apartheid isiZulu media. Communicatio 37(2): 269–292.Patterson, T. 2007. Young people and news: A report from the Shorenstein Center on the press,

politics and public policy. Boston: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.Pattie, C., P. Seyd and P. Whiteley. 2004. Citizenship in Britain: Values, participation and democracy.

Cambridge: Cambridge University PressPepler, E. 2003. Traditional news values vs. popular culture: Media preferen ces of the younger

generations. Paper read at the Conference on Media in Africa: Current Issues and Future Challenges, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, 11–12 September.

Robinson, J.P. and R. Levy. 1996. News media use the informed public: A 1990s update. Journal of Communication 46(2): 129–135.

South Africans at work longer – survey. 2014. News 24, 3 May.http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/South-Africans-at-work-longer-survey-20101020-2

(accessed 3 May 2014).Strelitz, L. 2002. Where the global meets the local: South African youth and their experience of global

media. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.Zafi rovski, M. 2011 The Enlightenment and its effects on modern society. New York: Springer.Zerba, A. 2005. Reaching young adults begin with change. In Women, men and news: Divided and

disconnected in the news media landscape, ed. P. Poindexter, S. Meraz and A. Weiss, 170–191. London: Routledge.

Zille, H. 2013. Youth disillusioned with politics. City Press, 22 November. http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/youth-disillusioned-with-politics-da/ (accessed 22 November 2013).

Biographical noteMusawenkosi W. Ndlovu is a senior lecturer in Media Studies in the Centre for Film and Media Studies, UCT and a Mandela Mellon Fellow in the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute at Harvard University. He holds a PhD from the University of Natal-Durban. He publishes in the areas of youth, news media technologies and politics in the South African public sphere. Email: [email protected]



Journalism, gender and democratic governance in NigeriaJoseph Ngu, Lai Oso and Oluseyi Soremekun, eds.UNESCO: Abuja, Nigeria. 2013 pp. 200ISBN: 978-978-932-422-4 (paperback)

Reviewed by Ayo Oyeleye

On the front cover, this UNESCO-sponsored book project lists the three aforementioned scholars as the editors, although there is very little evidence of editing in the volume – but more on this later. In the context of the long-established objective and aspiration to develop a thriving book publishing culture and industry in Nigeria, as well as across sub-Saharan Africa, the arrival of every new book written by African scholars for African students/readers represents another notch in the fulfi lment of that objective. So it is with this volume, albeit with mixed results. The book comes across more as a hotchpotch of randomly selected papers than an edited project culminating in a thematically conceptualised and structured volume. This much is acknowledged in the foreword, where it was noted that the composite chapters in the book were papers presented at two previous World Press Freedom Day conferences held under the auspices of UNESCO Nigeria. Twelve papers from these proceedings have been cobbled together to form the chapters in the book. One gathers from the foreword that the papers selected for inclusion in this book were presented under the two themes of ‘21st century media: New frontiers, new barriers’ and ‘New voices: Media freedom helping to transform societies’, from the WPFD conferences of 2011 and 2012 respectively.

Be that as it may, the various chapters cover a good range of the usual topics that have formed the mainstay of journalism and media studies/research, such as press freedom, the media and democracy, freedom of expression, the public sphere, media ethics and media regulations, most of which are explored around the subject of the new media and their transformative potentials for active citizenship, participatory politics and democracy. The lead chapter is a long piece by two of the contributing authors, Lai Oso and Semiu Bello, titled ‘New media, new voices and the democratization process’, which is essentially a discussion about the continued relevance and utility of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere for understanding the pivotal role of the media in the process of democratisation in Nigeria and the transformative potential of new

BOOK REVIEWS


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media in this nexus. This is followed by a chapter offering an empirical analysis of the 2012 ‘Occupy Nigeria’ fuel subsidy protest, again, drawing on the concept of the public sphere. Another chapter engages with the ethical underpinnings of the ideal of free speech and their ramifi cations for democracy in Nigeria in the era of new media. Other chapters in the book cover subjects on media regulation; the interconnections between the growth of print media and sustainable democracy in North-Eastern Nigeria; an exploration of Nigeria’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); how the FOIA can be sustained through media literacy; the interconnections between the FOIA, the media and the empowerment of citizens; and two further chapters on the interlinks between the press, governance and democracy; and an exploration of the opportunities and barriers that lie in the new media of the 21st century. The fi nal two chapters are offered up as token gestures to the word ‘gender’ in the book’s title. I use the expression ‘token gestures’ here because despite the prominence accorded the term ‘gender’ in the title, there is actually little substantive engagement with how the gender factor plays out in many of the issues and topics that the various chapters in the book seek to explore.

In all, then, the book covers a reasonably diverse range of topics and issues that engage with the aforementioned themes and that might provide a useful introduction to these core topics around the media’s enabling and facilitating roles in civic life and in democratic culture. As current commentaries and expositions on the two themes identifi ed above, and with regard to the wider context of developing a thriving book publishing culture in Africa that offers a platform for African perspectives on media practices and theories, alas, the value of this book project is somewhat limited, vitiated by a number of weaknesses.

Key among these weaknesses, for the sake of brevity, is a lack of critical engagement with the core concepts and theories that constitute the subject matter of pretty much all the constituent chapters in the book. The contributors have all mainly proffered a received understanding of concepts such as the public sphere, freedom of expression, media ethics, new media, or ideas about the role of the media in a democracy. Going through each of the chapters in this book I desperately anticipated some credible effort at critical interrogation on the part of any of the contributors of these concepts and theories, in a way that might offer insights on an African perspective, or at least shows an understanding of how cross-national settings complicate the assumptions inherent in these concepts. The general approach seems to have been to accept these ideas as gospel truths and to simply apply them un-problematically to the Nigerian context of media and journalism practice. Also, as noted briefl y above, the appearance of the word ‘gender’ in the title is somewhat disingenuous, as it suggests that the reader can expect to fi nd a more sustained exploration of this subject as a key variable in the analysis of the various issues covered in the book’s chapters. Not so. What you get instead are two discrete chapters, positioned at the end of the book almost as an afterthought, on the issues of gender and equitable politics in Nigeria, and another one on mainstreaming gender in journalism training and practice in Nigeria.

A second major fl aw is the glaringly poor editing that was involved in its production: 1) there is a copious amount of errors – typographical, grammatical, bibliographical – littered all over the constituent chapters of the book; 2) it is curious that the book offers


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no over-arching introductory chapter to help map out the topics or themes covered, or to pull together any common threads of concerns, insights or interests that the various papers in the volume may offer the reader; nor is there a concluding chapter to offer an overarching summary or refl ections on key fi ndings, or perhaps pointers to the research and media training/education implications of the fi ndings presented in the book.

Ultimately, this book covers a range of topical subjects on media practice and culture in Nigeria and helps to highlight ongoing concerns or issues relating to core concepts on press freedom, the potential and challenges of new media for facilitating civic culture and active citizenship, and the issue of gender parity and justice in both the Nigerian media and society that may prove useful to its target readers. Unfortunately, it falls short on providing an interventionist critique of these topics, and in many instances, giving an up-to-date exposition on the concepts and theories that contextualise the issues explored in the constituent chapters.

Biographical noteDr Ayo Oyeleye is a senior lecturer in Media Studies and Director of the Media Postgraduate Awards Suite at the Birmingham School of Media, Birmingham City University. His current teaching and research interests are in the areas of communication for social justice, global and social justice journalism, critical pedagogy, and communication for social change and for sustainable development. Email: [email protected]



The global news challenge: Market strategies of international broad-casting organisations in developing countriesAnne GenietsNew York: Routledge. 2013. pp. 188ISBN: 978-0-415-64066-4 (hardback)

Reviewed by Stewart Purvis

In July 2013, Lord Howell, Chairman of the British House of Lords Committee on the UK’s ‘soft power’, observed that ‘suddenly it is getting a bit crowded’. He was referring to the growing number of nations which had opted to use satellite television news channels as a way of spreading their infl uence around the world. The second half of the 20th century saw radio stations from both the East and West battling to win the hearts and minds of the people of Central and Eastern Europe. The West won. The fi rst half of the 21st century has seen not just the old Cold War powers, but all sorts of new players, joining a truly global battle for infl uence. Much of the focus is now on the developing world, with Africa being seen as a particularly important battleground by broadcasters.

This time the technology is not so much short-wave radio as a whole panoply of digital media, of which international television news channels are the most prominent. Some of these new players seem to have very deep pockets indeed. So who will win this time?

Anne Geniets’ analysis of the global news challenge is a very welcome study of what she calls the ‘market strategies of international broadcasting organisations in developing countries’. The strategies employed by organisations as different as the Voice of America and CNN inevitably vary, because this is not a normal ‘market’. Geniets attempts to divide one table between ‘commercial and non-commercial’ broadcasters and between ‘state-controlled’ and ‘editorially independent’ ones. Yet, for instance, two of the channels she lists as ‘state-controlled’, namely China’s CCTV and Russia’s ‘RT’, are licensed across Europe by the British telecommunications regulator, Ofcon, which requires broadcasters to be ‘editorially independent’ and ‘impartial’.

It is similarly diffi cult to defi ne the criteria for a ‘commercial broadcaster’ when none of them, be they publicly or privately owned, report their full costs and


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revenues. The author has assembled possibly the most complete set of available data, but inevitably data alone cannot explain exactly why and how so many countries are spending so much money on these services. The short answer seems to be ‘soft power’ – Joseph Nye’s term for the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce.

The main manifestation of ‘soft power’, which has raised not only interest but also concern amongst Western channels, has been the growth of China’s international broadcasters. The biggest of them, CCTV News, now transmits in Chinese, English, Spanish, Russian and Arabic. Although this is still a long way short of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC’s) total of more than 30 languages, in one of BBC World Service Radio’s heartlands, Africa, CCTV has not only set up what it calls its ‘fi rst African news hub’ in Nairobi for its ‘Africa Live’ broadcasts, but it is also syndicating its news content to broadcasters across the continent free of charge. The BBC has accused China of using ‘its fi nancial muscle to pay for access to airwaves’. China argues that syndicated content is a way of offering ‘aid to developing countries’. CCTV openly admits that part of its mission is to ‘break the western voice’s monopoly on the news’.

As the author explains, China’s fi nancial investment in Africa goes well beyond the continent’s portion of the billions of dollars China is investing in global news content. She records how, until recently, there was only one television distribution system in Kenya – a state-owned one – but now a Chinese corporation has won the second licence to disseminate digital broadcasts, giving the company what she calls ‘essential control of key strategic infrastructure’. This has led some to predict ‘a new era of imperialism in Africa, but this time with Asian and predominantly Chinese characteristics’.

Combining investment in local infrastructure with spending on news content appears to give the Chinese the competitive advantage over their Western (and, for that matter, Russian) channel competitors, who see broadcasting as their primary and sometimes sole activity. They leave the foreign aid budgets to the appropriate foreign affairs ministry.

The global news challenge is an important resource for all those interested not only in news, but also in the role it plays in ‘soft power’ struggles. So, diplomats as well as journalists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as broadcasters, transnational players as well as national targets will fi nd something of interest in this text. Chronicling the ever-changing and constantly expanding armies of state-owned broadcasts, websites and other digital media is diffi cult, but the author has provided the best guide I have come across. She also looks ahead to strategic options for international broadcasters, which include partnerships with more localised operators.

Especially welcome in the research sections are the studies into what viewers and listeners in developing countries think of the broadcasts aimed at them. The conclusions are more reassuring for traditional national players than for new internationalists. As one respondent states: ‘There is one thing I hate with these international broadcasters. If they want to report a story on African countries, they try and portray poverty.’ But there is also some encouraging feedback, such as the respondent who, when asked what the difference was between local and international news channels, replied: ‘For me international broadcasters generally say the truth.’


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Biographical noteStewart Purvis is professor of Television Journalism at City University London. He is a former Chief Executive and Editor-in-Chief of the British news organisation, ITN, and former President of the European news channel, Euronews, based in Lyon, France. He is the co-author of When reporters cross the line, a series of case studies of media ethics. Email: [email protected]



What newspapers, films and television do Africans living in Britain see and read? The media of the African Diaspora

Ola OgunyemiLampeter: Edwin Mellen Press. 2012. pp. 335ISBN: 13: 978-0-7734-2920-8 (paperback)ISBN: 10 7734-2920-4 (hardcover)

Reviewed by Mercy Nyawanza

This is a well-written piece of work in which the author addresses the scarcity of research on media use by African diaspora communities in the United Kingdom (UK). The book focuses on two key themes: 1) it attempts to examine the professional practices of the African Diaspora using dominant approaches such as objectivity, agenda setting, gatekeeping, news values and ethics; and 2) it demonstrates how African diasporas are made up of active audiences with tastes that similar to mainstream audiences, yet who are distinctive in their demand for certain programmes with cultural and religious undertones. The author uses a multi-method approach to investigate different aspects of the media, ranging from radio to television and online news sites. The methods employed include in situ observation of media organisations, interviews, as well as conversational, discursive and documentary analysis.

Ogunyemi conducts an intensive literature review of the production and consumption of media, to explore the relevance media theory has for the media of the African diasporas. In exploring the role of ethics, he argues that it is appropriate that the ethical orientations of practitioners in Africa be analysed. He draws on the work of Musa and Domatob (2007), who argue that development journalism impacts on ethical orientations because its central philosophy is that journalism and national leaders are citizens who share the common goal of building a progressive and peaceful society. Ogunyemi contends that African journalists adopted this development journalism before coming to the UK, where they combine it with libertarian journalism principles. This, he insists, means that they balance commercial interests with racial, cultural and religious sensitivities.


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Using ethnographic methods, the author examines the news values of the African diasporas’ media, by discussing the news values of the mainstream media and then comparing these to his fi ndings. Based on research on the African Voice newspaper and VOAR (Voice of Africa Radio), his fi ndings suggest that there are key news values behind news selection: the objective to serve the interests of black Africans by standing up for their rights, to highlight issues of African concern, and to promote knowledge of African cultures and histories. Ogunyemi notes that these values mean that the ethnic media shun mainstream media news values, such as bad news and celebrity gossip. He posits that, instead, the ethnic media prefer ‘good news’ stories that allow them to showcase the achievements of Africans and the African continent. This, he observes, is a deliberate effort to counter negative representations of black people in the mainstream media. As regards celebrity gossip, Ogunyemi’s fi ndings suggest that the media of the African diasporas tend to avoid publishing titillating details about black celebrities, and are more likely to portray them as role models instead.

The book combines an analysis of the use of media by diaspora communities with refl ections on their experiences as migrants in a foreign country. It examines how migrants in the diaspora cope as foreigners, by forming organisations such the Central Association of Nigerians in the UK to preserve their culture and identity.

Ogunyemi also highlights the role the media play in linking new arrivals with other members of communities, and with creating conglomerated identities. The work is well evidenced by a comprehensive bibliography and interview transcripts in some places. However, it must be mentioned that while the book broadly represents the media experiences of black Africans in the UK, the study relates more specifi cally to the experiences of people from West Africa. While other African nationalities participated in the research, the study is biased towards Nigerians and Ghanaians. This, of course does not necessarily diminish the contribution that the book makes to the body of knowledge on the subject.

The book also investigates where the media of the African diasporas fi t in, in terms of mainstream and alternative media. Ogunyemi does this by examining the attributes of alternative media, and then measuring the media of the diasporas against these. In doing so, he highlights how on the one hand diasporic media embody characteristics of alternative media (such as the use of staff with little or no journalism experience and alternative distribution chains such as African grocery stores), while on the other hand not really accessing alternative news sources and are not being radical (neither politically nor socially). He concludes that these media can be called hybrids of mainstream and alternative media, since they encompass traits from both.

Without doubt, this work fi lls a gap in the extant knowledge on media practitioners’ perspectives on the values of the journalistic profession. By employing an ethnographic approach, Ogunyemi showcases the challenges faced by the media of the diaspora (e.g., BenTV, African Voice, Ghanaweb), which include dwindling advertising, circulation and sales, as well as limited technological resources. He notes that these problems are compounded by the fact that for many in the diaspora, the ethnic media supplement rather than replace the mainstream media, therefore their programmes attract very little sponsorship. Financial constraints also mean that the media organisations reprocess


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news that is already in the mainstream media. More positively, Ogunyemi contends that the media of the diaspora are useful in that they utilise black experts when seeking sources, thus giving an African perspective to news. He also notes that online news forums allow Africans in the diaspora to engage in a form of citizen journalism, letting them air their opinions on local issues and at home, from abroad.

This book is a must-read for media students and researchers, as it not only interrogates key issues in the production, consumption and content of media in general, but also explores issues such as race, migration and alternative media. It makes a signifi cant contribution to scholarship, as it lays bare the practices of media use among members of the African Diaspora living in the UK, and also investigates how these media organisations are run, compared to mainstream media organisations. The book hones in on the way migrants from Africa use the media, and brings to the fore the challenges faced by those running media organisations aimed at African diaspora communities. Ogunyemi provides a context from which further research into ethnic media can be launched. A highly recommended read.

Biographical noteMercy Nyawanza holds a PhD in Politics and Communication from the University of Liverpool. She is a lecturer at Worcester University where she teaches Media Studies. Her research interests are in the areas of crime and the representation of gender in the media. Email: [email protected]



Radio propaganda and the broadcasting of hatred: Historical development and definitionsKeith SomervilleLondon: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. pp. 288ISBN: 9780230278295 (hardback)

Reviewed by Tanja Bosch

Given the fairly limited range of literature on radio and propaganda, this book is a welcome contribution to the fi eld. Via an exploration of the historical roots and development of propaganda in the media (broadcasting specifi cally), as well as a series of case studies, Somerville attempts a defi nition of hate radio as an extension of what is normally understood as propaganda. He shows how ‘radio has provided an effective tool for the dissemination of ideas, for political and social debate, for national development but also or the development of agendas of hate, discourses of dehumanization has the ability to elicit strong responses’ (p. 241). His central argument is that hate radio goes beyond the mere propagation of a discourse of fear and hatred, to encompass a call to actual violence or other collective actions based on media framing and representation.

The fi rst chapter, ‘Propaganda: Origins, development and utilization’, provides a thorough overview of the origins and development of propaganda and the use of electronic media to promote causes or propagate ideologies. In particular, Somerville explores the development of propaganda, studying its content to explore how it develops into ‘the incitement of extreme forms of hatred and violence’ (p. 1). In the opening chapter he also reviews the literature on propaganda and explains that his use of the term is limited to ‘that aimed by governments, movements and parties at their own populations to develop and maintain support for a regime or set of policies, elicit active support … and … promote hatred and incite violence toward the objects of that hatred’ (p. 2). He shows how the term ‘propaganda’ is frequently misunderstood as something repressive, whereas it is pervasive in social, cultural and political life as a form of social manipulation and control. This chapter shows how propaganda has been an essential part of human social communication, but that the technological revolution ‘led to more effi cient and widespread use of propaganda and incitement’


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(p. 13). Somerville explores a wide range of examples of the use of propaganda by political forces, as well as how the various forms developed as access to different types of media became more widespread.

Chapter 1, ‘The advent of radio: Creating a mass audience for propaganda and incitement, 1911–1945’, explores the specifi c role of radio in propagating hate. The chapter outlines the history of radio and describes the fi rst uses of radio broadcasts for disseminating hate propaganda in the United States in the early 1920s, then later in the Spanish Civil War; as well as the use of radio as a tool for ideological education and indoctrination in Italy, Germany and the USSR in the 1930s.

Chapter 3 explores the Cold War as well as radio propaganda’s role in the break-up of Yugoslavia. To this point, the book is primarily historical, with extensive descriptions of these political confl icts and some refl ection on the role radio played in these. The second half of the book, titled Case Studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) provides extensive discussion of Nazi radio propaganda, hate radio in Rwanda, and fi nally the role of vernacular radio stations in political violence in Kenya.

While the phrase ‘hate radio’ is usually associated with the genocide in Rwanda, Somerville goes back in history to demonstrate its historical evolution with Hitler and the Nazi Party in German domestic radio. The Nazi party directly controlled or owned over 400 newspapers, and the government instituted state regulation of broadcasting through the Reich Radio Company.

The discussion of Rwandan ‘hate radio’ draws on the available (but limited) radio transcripts, the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and accounts of those involved or studying them. This chapter explores the well-known case of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), whose broadcasts over the nine months prior to the genocide ‘consistently set an agenda of suspicion and hatred of the Tutsi’ (p. 186). Somerville highlights the large number of scholars who argue against a causal link between RTML’s broadcasts and the genocide as ‘it is impossible to disentangle the complex web of radio propaganda, exhortations at public meetings and the effects of a strongly ordered and controlled society under the hegemony of fi rst a government and then a Hutu supremacist movement that had the manpower, means and will to enforce its word’ (p. 201).

The fi nal case study chapter, titled ‘Kenya: Political violence, the media and the role of vernacular radio stations’, provides some insight into a recent upsurge in violence in Kenya, in protest against the results of the 2007 elections. This chapter explores the socio-political environment that gave rise to the violence, the language of political discourse in Kenyan politics, and the behaviour of the Kenyan media (vernacular radio in particular) with regard to the dissemination of fear and hatred, and the incitement to murder. Somerville uses agenda-setting, framing and the representation of subjects within the limited broadcasts available, but without a full dataset can only conclude that there is some evidence of these stations ‘having a partisan agenda and of using language capable of inciting hatred and even violence’ (p. 236).

This book will be of particular interest to media historians and radio scholars interested in history. The depth of background and historical context is signifi cant, but radio somehow seems incidental to the overall accounts of political propaganda.


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Radio certainly had a role to play in each of the cases explored, but the overall picture of media use for propaganda in those locations certainly goes far beyond the role of hate radio. The absence of qualitative data is perhaps another limitation to the book – access to actual broadcasts are in most cases largely impossible to obtain, but this might have been supplemented with qualitative interviews interspersed throughout the text, in order for the participants in each of the locations studied, to have a voice. Despite these limitations, the book provides an interesting historical insight into the role that radio can play in transitional societies and during periods of socio-political confl ict.

Biographical noteDr Tanja Bosch is a senior lecturer in the Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, where she teaches radio studies, new media and qualitative research. Email: [email protected]



News online: Transformations and continuitiesGraham Meikle and Guy Redden, eds.Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. pp. 224ISBN: 9780230233454 (paperback)ISBN: 9780230233447 (hardback)

Reviewed by Everette Ndlovu

A lot has been written about media convergence and cyberculture (see, for example, Hamilton 2000; Jenkins 2006; Siapera 2012; Smith and Kollock 1999). These publications have illuminated the impact which new digital technologies in the hands of citizens have on traditional media content. To complement these publications, Meikle and Redden have gone a step further in compiling a book comprised of 12 articles from renowned international authors such as Stuart Allan, Einar Thorsen, Brian McNair, Robert McChesney and Gerald Goggin. These authors place news-gathering in a practical context, revealing how new technologies impact on contemporary journalism practice globally. This makes online presence not a choice but a norm that has to be embraced if organisations want to reach the ever-growing digital audience.

The volume comes at an opportune moment, when the line between newsmakers and consumers is increasingly becoming blurred, with the latter also becoming active producers of media content, thanks to the rapid proliferation of digital technologies. The tone of the book is summed up in the statement that ‘[t]he news environment of the 21st century is being shaped by both emerging transformations and contested continuities’ (p. 1). The book clearly articulates the way citizens have used new technological developments to erode the power of established institutions, forcing them to rely extensively on user-generated content and eye-witness reports in order to remain relevant (see Goggin, chapter 6). New media technologies such as mobile phones and Twitter are therefore seen as playing a critical role within the modern news ecology, e.g. breaking news which is disseminated via Twitter (p. 117). As Deuze and Fortunati write in Chapter 10 , the power has shifted from journalists to employers and audiences.

The book examines worldwide journalism practices in detail, giving contemporary examples that resonate well with the experiences of practitioners and academics.


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The chapters collectively show how global citizens use mobile and Internet-enabled technologies to capture and propagate eye-witness reports of events happening around them. Chapter 12 gives as examples the killing of Neda Agha-Soltan by the Iranian army in 2009, the hanging of Saddam Hussein in 2006, the 2008 London bombings, and national disasters which were captured by amateurs well ahead of professionals (see also p. 195). The book thus illustrates citizens’ relevance in the process of news gathering and dissemination – they are no longer merely consumers, but have also become principal media content producers (see Chapter 8). This is clearly illustrated by the manner in which millions of citizens all over the world now collaborate with established media organisations to break stories as they happen, thereby forcing established news organisations to embrace new digital cultures, without necessarily making professionals redundant.

Collaboration between non-professionals and professionals has equally resulted in both technological and content convergence: content previously not considered compatible (e.g., news and video games) not only converges but is being produced and streamed across multiple platforms (see chapter 5). The book further shows that when ‘new’ and ‘old’ practices are brought together by modern technologies which tend to deprofessionalise, deinstitutionalise and decapitalise news gathering (see Hamilton 2000), new forms of news-making emerge, giving citizens platforms to strip traditional media institutions of their monopoly in setting agendas, and telling people what to think and talk about. In this sense, the authors of the text under review show that there is an ongoing shift from traditional to new media – a development that has enabled media practitioners to reach a wider online audience. The emphasis is on how important it is for media organisations to have an online presence, if they are to accommodate the consumption culture propelled by those Internet-enabled mobile technologies which generate and disseminate content instantaneously, and which facilitate interactivity across multiple platforms (see McNair’s Managing the online news revolution: the UK experience).

A particular strength of this book is its establishment of a symbiotic relationship between citizen journalists and mainstream media organisations. Millions of citizens have created links with established institutions, with a view to getting their stories told. To these established, capital-intensive institutions they send video, audio and text data, which is simultaneously propagated across various platforms in real time. Such media content is then relayed all over the world as people witness events unfolding around them – especially in times of crisis. This development means many established media institutions have had to embrace digital technologies, in order to ensure that they remain relevant in the 21st century.

This book is without doubt a treasure to those researchers and practitioners with an interest in understanding how digital technologies have revolutionised journalism practice, in line with the ‘consumption culture’ associated with ever-increasing interactivity. In general, the book illuminates the challenges modern practitioners face as they attempt to come to grips with novel news production values and business models emerging within changing cultures. Likewise, it provides insights into professional cultures associated with consumers who have themselves become active and infl uential


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producers of content. All these emerging professional developments are illustrated by examples which collectively situate emerging online news cultures into a clear context throughout the various chapters.

ReferencesHamilton, J. 2000. Alternative media: Conceptual diffi culties, critical possibilities. Journal of

Communication Inquiry 24(4): 357–378.

Jenkins, H. 2006. Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide. New York and London: University Press.

Sapporo, E. 2012. Understanding new media. London: Sage.

Smith, M. and P. Kollock. 1998. Communities in cyberspace. New York: Routledge.

Biographical noteDr Everette Ndlovu is a lecturer in the Department of Media and Communications at Salford University, Manchester. He teaches alternative media, media texts and audiences and new media digital culture. Before joining the university, he worked as a television producer/ director at Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) for ten years. His interest is in the emancipatory role of digital technologies in restricted political environments. Email: [email protected]


USER

Sticky Note

Alternative Media,Media Texts and Audiences and New Media Digital Culture