governance reforms and failed states: challenges and implications

Governance reforms and failed states: challenges andimplications

Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff

AbstractThis article investigates the multifaceted nature of governance reforms in failed states,and the complex interplay of technical and political factors. It examines threequestions: (1) What do the theory and practice of international assistance in publicadministration tell us about building and/or repairing governance systems? (2) Whatare the challenges to applying these lessons and models to failed/failing states? and (3)What are the corresponding implications for promoting sustainable governancestrategies? The discussion shows how the synoptic efforts to grapple with the ‘bigpicture’ are often undermined by the operational nitty-gritty of donor agencyprocedures and aid delivery mechanisms on the ground. Attention to the complexity ofshifting foreign assistance agendas, the application and refinement of analytic andprocess tools, appropriate incorporation of sometimes conflicting values and agendasand democratic processes to maximize effectiveness can contribute to bringing theconceptual and the practical aspects of promoting governance reforms in failed statescloser together.

The events of 11 September highlighted the dangers of failed states, not simplyfor the unfortunate citizens living in those countries, but for the rest of the worldas well. This article focuses on the challenges of rebuilding viable governancesystems and the implications for international assistance in public administrationand governance. When governance systems break down or are destroyed, thedoor is opened to instability, oppression, conflict and unchecked political andeconomic opportunism. A vicious cycle ensues in which the institutional fabricthat supports societal agreement on basic rules of conduct in all spheres is weak-ened and torn, leading to further decay and conflict. Post 11 September eventshave focused attention on Afghanistan but it is only one case among many; a partial list of others includes Kosovo, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwandaand East Timor. In all of these cases, governance and administrative systems areboth part of the problem — due to their absence, insufficiency, or capture — andpart of the solution — in their centrality to the viability of the state.

Derick W. Brinkerhoff is a principal social scientist with Abt Associates Inc., Bethesda,Maryland, and an adjunct lecturer at Johns Hopkins University’s School of AdvancedInternational Studies. Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff is an assistant professor in the PublicAdministration Department, George Washington University. CDU: 35.047

International Review of Administrative Sciences [0020–8523(200212)68:4]Copyright © 2002 IIAS. SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and NewDelhi), Vol. 68 (2002), 511–531; 030121

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Dealing with failed or failing states is a key element in combating terrorismand in mitigating or avoiding conflict.1 Effective governance, which encompassesboth governments and citizens, is critical to rebuilding conflict-torn societies andravaged economies and to preventing these destructive dynamics from gaining afoothold in the first place. This article examines three questions:2

1. What do the theory and practice of international assistance in public admin-istration tell us about building and/or repairing governance systems?

2. What are the challenges to applying these lessons and models to failed/fail-ing states?

3. What are the corresponding implications for promoting sustainable gover-nance strategies?

Lessons from models and practiceOver the past several decades, the hegemonic forces of economic liberalization,global capitalism and democratization have shaped the context within whichnation-states enact governance (see, for example, Panitch, 1996). These forceshave led to a worldwide governance reform movement whose concepts and pre-scriptions converge into a common model with economic, administrative andpolitical dimensions.3 In the interest of brevity, the dimensions of the model canbe summarized as follows. In terms of economics, the model confirms the marketas the primary organizing principle of societies. Government’s role is to assuresound macroeconomic policy, maintain the rule of law and enforcement of property rights, develop a market-supporting regulatory framework and promoteprivate sector investment. Administratively, the model envisions a downsizedgovernment that provides basic services and infrastructure efficiently and effect-ively, through a combination of direct provision, contracting out and partnershipwith civil society organizations. Public administration is decentralized, respon-sive, flexible and participatory so as to bring government and citizens closertogether. These features increase efficiency and effectiveness, as well as offeringcitizens a stronger voice in governance.

The political dimension of the model focuses on democratic governance mechanisms, including selection of political leadership through elections,accountability and integrity systems, conflict resolution, and consensus-buildinginstitutions and procedures. Democratic governance addresses social equity andinclusiveness, management of diversity, broad-based legitimacy and protectionof vulnerable groups. In furtherance of these governance aims, it seeks to openthe policy and resource allocation processes beyond closed circles of élites anddevolve meaningful authority to local bodies that are accessible to citizens. Theseelements take as their foundation an implicit social contract, whereby citizenscede their natural right of self-governance to the state in exchange for the societalbenefits derived from state sovereignty.

The international donor community’s assistance in public sector capacity-building and, more broadly, in good governance has focused on the three dimen-

512 International Review of Administrative Sciences 68(4)


sions briefly sketched. Through economic stabilization and structural adjustment,the International Monetary Fund, in cooperation with the World Bank, has serveda primary role in economic and market governance reforms (e.g. Haggard andWebb, 1994; Frischtak and Ayitas, 1996). The World Bank and various agenciesof the United Nations have concentrated on the administrative aspects of govern-ance addressing civil service reform, public-sector downsizing, service deliveryand contracting-out, capacity-building and institutional strengthening (see, forexample, World Bank, 1997). The bilateral development agencies, for example,the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Britain’s Depart-ment for International Development (DFID), have taken a lead role in promotingdemocratic governance reforms, including elections and electoral systems, civilsociety and legislative strengthening, judicial reform, anti-corruption, and so on(see, for example, Goudie, 1998; Carothers, 1999).

There is a substantial body of experience on public management and govern-ance reform, addressing all three dimensions of the model, documenting suc-cesses and failures, identifying the core elements of institutional strengthening,capacity-building, and necessary policy changes.4 Overall, the key lessons are:

1. building and maintaining capable states and governance systems are long-term, multifaceted endeavors requiring commitment, country ownership, skill-building and technical assistance;

2. public sector capacity to perform core functions emerges more quickly andis more sustainable when complemented by strengthening of citizen demand-making; and

3. successful governance reforms depend strongly upon existing levels of statecapacity. If states are weak, incompetent, corrupt and/or semi-authoritarian,reforms often do not take or are unsustainable; or, in extreme cases, they lead topartial or total collapse of governance functions and institutions.

In combination with geopolitical and/or ethnopolitical forces, and economicdecline, poor governance emerges as both a symptom of, and a contributor to,failed or failing states, with their all too familiar combination of civil war, ethnicconflict, waves of refugees, food shortages or famine and/or cessation of normaleconomic activity. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), for example, provide moredetails on the downward spiral toward state failure. They analyze the politicaleconomy of humanitarian emergencies and find that factors such as economicstagnation and declining incomes, extensive rent-seeking by dominant élites,inability of the governance system to fulfill its functions, and competition overnatural resources contribute to failed states and humanitarian crises.

In failed and failing states, international assistance targets emergency andhumanitarian relief, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction (see, forexample, Lake, 1990; Kumar, 1997; Pieterse, 1998; Manwaring and Joes, 2000).The economic and administrative dimensions of the governance model outlinedhere have, until recently, been largely silent on what to do in failed and failingstates,5 since by their very nature these states are incapable of fiscal and monetary

Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff: Governance reforms and failed states 513


policy-making, managing the economy and delivering services. However, initiat-ing economic recovery and rebuilding basic service delivery are high on recon-struction strategy agendas and governance departments in international agenciesare actively looking for new approaches (see, for example, UNDP, 2000).6 It isthe political dimension of the governance model that has the most to say inaddressing failed/failing states. Here, approaches include promoting conflictresolution so as to move toward sociopolitical reconciliation, strengthening ofcivil society and associational linkages, rebuilding or creating institutions to foster legitimacy, re-establishing security, reinstalling and strengthening the ruleof law and/or insulating administrative structures from political or ethnic groupinterference/domination.

Table 1 summarizes illustrative governance interventions in functional andfailed/failing states. These exemplify current thinking and best practices, basedon the model we have overviewed here. The interventions on the right- and left-hand sides of the table are not entirely mutually exclusive, for example civil society strengthening activities appear on both sides. The appropriate sequencingwithin and between these categories can also be quite subtle. While reconciliationmechanisms target countries emerging from state failure, the most successfultruth commissions are those created after the establishment of a legitimategovernment (UNDP, 1999). Also, introducing civil service reform during thepeace process can complicate the establishment of credible representation ofvarious groups within the civil service. The two sides reflect relative emphases.Table 1 reveals that the focus of interventions in functional states emphasizesinstitutionalizing systemic change in the formal governance system, whereasinterventions in failed/failing states target rebuilding trust and cooperation amongcitizens and laying the groundwork for reconstituting basic governance functions.The model is the subject of rethinking and refinement as nation-building has re-entered the lexicon of the international community (see, for example, Brock,2001). In response to dealing with failed/failing states, which has brought to-gether scholars and practitioners from a variety of fields, this rethinking is moreclosely integrating political science, international relations, military and securitystudies, humanitarian relief and emergency management, and development specialists, with public administration and policy experts.7

The challenges of applicationIn practice, intervening in failed and failing states has proven to be highly com-plex. As noted, governance specialists in academia, policy think-tanks, interna-tional assistance agencies, government security agencies and ngos are activelyexploring how to cope with this complexity. Key questions emerge aroundsequencing to get from immediate post-conflict to ‘normal’ socioeconomic gover-nance tasks, the composition of appropriate governance ‘packages’ of interven-tions and the impacts of context.

Sequencing issues arise in terms of (a) immediate governance requirements forthe right sequence to get from the complex emergency/immediate post-crisis



phase to reconstruction; and (b) long-term governance needs once a functionalstate has been reconstructed and government can resume some measure of ‘busi-ness as usual’.8 The relationship between these two is another thorny question:how to address the immediate governance needs of the failed state (the right-handside of Table 1), while laying the groundwork for, or at least not jeopardizing,future progress on good governance when the state is functional (the left-handside of Table 1). Earlier notions of a ‘relief to development continuum’, implyingdiscernible stages and steps, have given way to a recognition that post-conflictsituations call for simultaneously addressing root causes, relief and reconstruc-tion, and development (see, for example, Maxwell, 2000). Concerning govern-ance reforms in failed states, this recognition leads to multi-track sequencing (andsome simultaneity), for example promoting democratization, transparency andaccountability while, in some instances, building state institutions, proceduresand legal frameworks from scratch (see Carothers, 2002). In this sense, the ques-tion of sequencing begins to merge with decisions about appropriate sets of inter-ventions.

The search for simple, implementable intervention sets has been frustrated bythe interconnections among the economic, social, political and ethnic componentsof states in crisis (e.g. Zartman, 1996). The World Bank, for example, seeks toadvise on the economic development dimensions of peace accord options, notingexperience in Cambodia, where peace accords inhibited and delayed economicreconstruction and recovery (Kreimer et al., 1998). These interlocking factors


TABLE 1Illustrative governance interventions in functional and failed/failing states

Functional state Failed/failing state

• Structural adjustment/macroeconomic management

• Regulatory framework and legal reform• Democratization and electoral reform• Decentralization• Legislative strengthening• Administrative reform• Budget systems• Public sector management training• Privatization• Infrastructure development• Sectoral service delivery capacity

building (e.g. health, agriculture, socialservices)

• Community development• Civil society strengthening/social capital

formation• ngo watchdogs (human rights,

anti-corruption)

• Constitutional reform, legal frameworks and rule of law

• Demilitarization/demobilization of ex-combatants

• Reconciliation mechanisms (e.g. truthand reconciliation commissions)

• Conflict resolution/mitigation• Security/peacekeeping• Professionalization of military and police• Reconstituting representative institutions• Rebuilding central government core

agencies• Reconstructing legitimacy (e.g. elections)• Limited service delivery/basic

infrastructure• Rebuilding community organizations• Civil society trust-building

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point to new areas where intervention is needed, leading to greater and greatercomplexity and associated intervention costs (Ottaway and Lieven, 2002).9 An-other contributing factor is lack of policy coherence on the part of the countriesproviding international assistance. Finance, trade and defense policies of the USAand OECD countries are, in some cases, inconsistent with their international aidpolicies (see Uvin, 1999). The effects of these policies can influence the prospectsfor success of efforts to end conflict and rebuild governance systems.

The composition of interventions cannot be divorced from the level of assist-ance that donors are willing to provide and the strength of their commitment to remain involved. As Afghanistan illustrates, the resources required for fullyfledged nation-building to reconstitute governance throughout the country vastlyexceed what the international community is willing to invest (Ottaway andLieven, 2002). Thus, while we may be able to identify the elements of an idealpackage for rebuilding governance, drawing, for example, from the items listed inTable 1, the likelihood of implementation must be factored in. Woodward (1999:57–8) addresses this gap in terms of three ‘disproportions’ with respect to aid tofailed and failing states:

1. the disparity between the threat of failed states and donor countries’ per-ceived interest;

2. the disproportion between the resources donor countries are willing to commit and what may actually be needed; and

3. the characteristics of the threat and what donors are, in fact, prepared to dealwith (see also Dorff, 2000).

This latter disconnect emerges from imperfect knowledge of how to address gov-ernance in failed states, plus lack of skills and training to address the complexityof governance interventions. As current efforts in Afghanistan demonstrate,donors underestimate the challenges of working in weak institutional environ-ments. Hence, despite generous aid pledges, actual aid flows and support may beslow in coming or retracted all together (see, for example, Glasser, 2002). Con-tinuing and re-emerging challenges elsewhere may divert military, political andeconomic resources (see International Crisis Group, 2002). In the case of theUnited States’ degree of preparedness in addressing such conflicts, McFaul(2002: 171) points to a mismatch, arguing that while the US military services(what he calls ‘the state-destroying arm’) were upgraded throughout the 1990s,the State Department, USAID and the US Information Service (‘the state-constructing arm’) suffered severe budget cuts, brain drain and disparagement.

The challenge of implementing governance reforms in failed/failing states issignificantly impacted by contextual conditions. Primary among these are: (a) thedistinctive socio-historical characteristics of individual situations that provokecrisis and state failure; and (b) the political economy of peacekeeping, humani-tarian and development assistance. One strong line of argument holds that inter-national development in general, and crisis interventions more specifically, havebeen addressed in ahistorical terms and, as a result, have failed to account ade-



quately for what is specific to an individual country. Generalized stage and transi-tion models (e.g. of relief to development or of democratic transitions), accordingto this argument, ignore or downplay the importance of context. For example,Carothers (2002: 8) calls for ‘the end of the transition paradigm’, citing its faultyassumption that underlying conditions ‘will not be major factors in either theonset or the outcomes of the transition process’.10 With respect to economicdevelopment, Gore (2000) writes of the ‘fall of the Washington Consensus para-digm’.11 He argues that the paradigm is collapsing because its standardized policyframeworks and universalist recommendations have failed to produce widespreadeconomic benefits and to reduce poverty. An alternative framework, a purported‘Southern Consensus’, which he claims is under development, rejects blueprintapproaches and seeks to adapt policy measures to initial conditions, the externalenvironment and change dynamics. Similarly, regarding state failure, socio-historical factors such as the inheritance of colonial era borders and administra-tive systems, Cold War era global politics, ethnic group interaction (cooperationor conflict), previous societal experience with democratic processes and naturalresources exploitation patterns all strongly influence the possibilities for success-ful conflict resolution, peacekeeping and governance rebuilding (see, for exam-ple, Brock, 2001; Easterly, 2001; Klare, 2001).

The political economy of external intervention in complex emergencies andfailed states introduces additional sources of contextual complexity into thedesign and implementation of governance reforms. On the side of external actors,their differing objectives, interests and roles clearly have an impact. For example,the military focuses on conflict containment, security and peace-keeping; whilethe bilateral development agencies combine political, relief and developmentobjectives. The international ngo community often has a mix of objectives —relief, human rights, justice and development — and the multilateral lendersfocus mainly on financing reconstruction and a return to economically productiveactivity. In a given crisis situation, which of these objectives prevails or whichcombination is pursued, how the various actors are allied and/or how they compete, and what level of resources they bring will be critical to shaping whichgovernance reforms make sense and are feasible at a particular point in time.12

Donor coordination is a persistent challenge in any intervention. In the case offailed states, lack of coordination can impede the effective use of conditionalitiesneeded to encourage implementation of peace accords and to prevent actors from‘donor shopping’. Not surprisingly, experience suggests that coordination is mostproblematic at the strategic and political levels, where donors may reach beyondthe parameters of agreed-upon common strategies in pursuit of their own interestsand priorities (Uvin, 1999). Because failed-state governments are weak, they canexert very little countervailing pressure on donors to respect what has beenagreed to. Powerful donors can impose their views on governments and otherdonors. For example, in Uganda, the World Bank was accused of employing a‘standard economic model approach’ to donor coordination, ‘focus[ing] thedevelopment community on macroeconomic reform at the expense of poverty



alleviation programs’ (Kreimer et al., 1998: 26). Thus, even if donors are co-ordinated, the result will likely reflect the priorities of those actors leading thecoordination effort.

Internally, within a given failed/failing state, local actors also have their ownobjectives, interests and roles. A key feature of many conflict situations is that notall local actors are equally interested in a cessation of conflict and violence. Theseso-called ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ have a strong interest in prolonging the crisis,for a mix of economic and political reasons.13 The deal-making to end conflictand reestablish security creates incentives that influence subsequent efforts atgovernance reform or nation-building (see Kumar, 2002). Local actors strikedeals precisely to gain an upper hand in the anticipated international support tofollow, hoping for legitimated authority in the process and a role in governance(Woodward, 1999). These deals may exclude or disadvantage other groups whosepositive commitment, capacity and resources will be needed for reconstruction.In failed/failing states, commitment, capacity and resources are often in shortsupply. Local actors may lack: political will to follow through on reforms, andparticularly to share power; leadership and governance skills to move to recon-ciliation and re-establishment of basic institutions; sufficient social capital toovercome hatred and suspicion, or to initiate and maintain cooperation; adminis-trative capacity; and experience in democratic practice (see Maxwell, 2000).

For both external and internal actors, the international community’s injectionof resources and the delivery mechanisms for those resources shape the politicaleconomy of crisis intervention, post-conflict reconstruction and governance re-form. The incentives created hold serious consequences for states’ developmentpotential in the long run. Aid dependency is not a new concern; however, it isworth noting that large aid flows can create disincentives for developing publicrevenue collection efforts and lead to pain, resistance and potential instabilitywhen these begin to supplant external support (see Hill, 2001). The contours ofthe aid industry are familiar to its many recipients. For example, the Citizen’sPeace Coalition, Labour Alliance (a coalition of trade unions, informal sectorassociations and other civil society groups in Pakistan) expressed concern that aidto Afghanistan will be accompanied by conditionalities to hire foreign experts atexorbitant costs and overhead, leading to crippling long-term debt (quoted inGWU and World Bank, 2002). Engaging expatriates has the added price of inten-sifying cost pressures throughout a fledgling economy (Hill, 2001). Especially in crisis situations, though the amount of aid may be inadequate to long-termrecovery and reconstruction, its initial volume and flow are detrimental in theiremphasis on immediate response and results by multiple external actors, andfrequent disregard for issues of absorptive capacity. Among the risks posed by thestructure and delivery of aid is its potential to bypass or thwart local ownership ofreform and reconstruction efforts — ownership that is particularly essential toreconstruction and nation-building efforts, where warring parties and potentialrivals must perceive a stake in a future together.14



Issues and implications for promoting sustainable governance reformBased on this rapid overview and assessment of governance reforms and theirapplication to failed/failing states, what issues and implications emerge for making reforms effective and sustainable? This section offers some answers and poses some additional questions, organized around international assistanceagendas, tools, values and process considerations. Several common threads linkthe discussion. A primary one is the need to integrate history and context into thedesign and implementation of governance interventions and to avoid the tempta-tions of recipe-like solutions. A second thread is the close links between ‘what’and ‘how’; feasible governance interventions match objectives, resources andactors’ commitment and capacity. A third is the influence of culture and values,not in the sense of a potentially apocalyptic ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington,1996) but as an aspect of context that has not yet been sufficiently incorporatedinto governance or socioeconomic development interventions.

Shifting foreign assistance agendasIn today’s world, with the ongoing war on terrorism launched by 11 September2001 and the international community’s renewed commitment to developmentassistance confirmed in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, the salience of goodgovernance has increased in foreign assistance agendas. This renewed visibilityarises, first, as we have discussed, because of its connections to failed/failingstates and the security threats they pose; and second, because good governance isproposed as one of the yardsticks for determining which countries will receiveaid. For example, the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Accountincludes good governance among the criteria for increased assistance. We see,however, some tensions and contradictions in the emerging shifts in foreignassistance agendas related to governance and failed states.

In the USA, the aftermath of 11 September led to calls for ‘foreign aid in ourown defense’ (Sokolsky and McMillan, 2002) and the ‘conscious, intelligent andeven ruthless use of international aid as a political tool’ (Lieven, 2002). Trends inthis direction pose three main dangers. First, is the risk that the geopolitical objec-tives of the war on terrorism will lead the international community to turn a blindeye to states with serious governance problems, rewarding them for joining the anti-terrorist coalition, but ironically increasing the chances of state and gov-ernance failure in the future.15 Second, and related, it risks exposing the commit-ment to use aid as a reward for good governance as empty rhetoric. Third,because of pressures to show results, it raises the potential for quick-fix approach-es to governance reforms in failed states, pro forma and empty implementation,unrealistic expectations for change and cynicism. Ironically, as functioningnation-states are increasingly acknowledged as a crucial component for globalsecurity (see Woodward, 1999; Benhabib, 2002), the cycle of overpromisingresults, underestimating difficulties and disillusioning public opinion couldreverse the current popular support for increased foreign aid. A review of nation-building efforts from 1970 to 1999 found that despite popular assumptions to the



contrary, these have yielded positive results. However, the achievements havebeen relatively modest, particularly in those countries rated highest for conflict,and these positive results took decades to materialize (Goldsmith, 2002). Thus,maintaining progress toward governance reforms and interventions in failed/failing states will be a challenge, requiring realistic objectives and high-levelpolitical will among western governments (see Woodward, 1999; Dorff, 2000).Important for sustaining commitment and political will is the ongoing documen-tation of the relative costs of conflict, failed states, complex emergencies and pre-ventive measures (see Brown and Rosecrance, 1999) and publicizing successes.16

Developing and applying toolsMaxwell (2000: 159) argues that the complexities of dealing with failed states‘defy planning to reach solutions without complex tools’. A number of analyticand process tools are particularly salient for both post-conflict and governanceinterventions in failed states. These include tools adapted from strategic manage-ment; for example, analytic tools such as stakeholder analysis, political mapping,and swot (internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportunities andthreats) analysis can assist both in the reconciliation process as well as in forgingmulti-actor plans and projects to establish infrastructure and basic governancefunctions (see Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). Discovering and assessing whohas what capacities and resources can be critical to developing the elements of areform package and deciding upon sequencing. USAID, for example, hasdeveloped a number of assessment tools for governance, civil society and anti-corruption.17 Simulations are another tool that hold promise both in terms of reconciliation and planning, particularly in addressing the interdependencies ofeconomic, political and social development; and relief and reconciliation, recon-struction and development (for example, see Maxwell, 2000).

Process tools are important for dealing with the ‘how’ of reform. Tools such asmediation and negotiation techniques or problem-solving workshops can supportconflict resolution for reaching agreements on who will have the authority,resources, and mandate to implement public policies and programs. Their appli-cation can facilitate implementation by ensuring that the major relevant stake-holders are considered, consulted, and participate in the development of resultingprojects and plans. It is particularly important that local officials receive trainingin the use of such tools, since they will be on the ‘frontlines’ of re-establishedlocal governments and service delivery.18

Process tools will also be needed to deal with the differences among competingagendas and value positions of the various actors in post-conflict situations andfailed states. Members of the international community tend to focus on instru-mental objectives related to moving as expeditiously as possible toward restora-tion of peace, governance and economic activity. Local actors, however, mayinclude groups whose concerns for social justice, maintenance of cultural identityor retribution are foremost. These differences, sometimes exacerbated by localactors’ unfamiliarity with the donor ‘development-speak’ terminology of projects



and programs, can create a divide that needs to be addressed through the processmethodologies of consultation, mediation and negotiation. Such process method-ologies are also needed to mediate between local leaders and their constituencies.As some local actors learn the aid industry’s language and procedures and adaptto communicate with external actors, a potential distance between these localactors and their own constituents is created.

Another complex of analytic and process tools with the potential to bridge values and power divides is that associated with participatory rural appraisal(pra). These tools have proven effective in linking local people with governmentagencies in ways where information and input into development decisions areshared and bottom-up, rather than unilateral and top-down. For example,Indonesia’s Department of Home Affairs, with UNICEF assistance, used a praprocess for rural development planning in 1995–96 that increased investment inmaternal and child health (Mukerjee, 1998). Scaling up of the use of pra is oneavenue for re-establishing governance patterns that hold the potential for movingin the direction of decentralization and local-level democracy (see Gaventa,1998). In this way pra tools can contribute to governance reconstruction strate-gies such as the area development approach pursued by the United Nations (seeUNDP, 2000).

For both analytic and process tools, information and communications tech-nologies are particularly important in post-conflict contexts, where the reach andlocus of sovereignty are still uncertain, physical infrastructure is lacking andcommunication, negotiation and planning are required among diverse and spatial-ly separated stakeholders. These technologies can be useful in helping to assurecoordination among different agencies, national and local public-sector organiza-tions, ngos, peace-keeping forces, and international donors. Geographic inform-ation systems are an example of other information technologies that can help, forinstance, with conducting scaled-up pras, planning and siting infrastructureinvestments or supporting famine early warning systems.

Incorporating valuesAs noted, values and underlying cultural issues infuse the political economy ofinternational response to failed states and their reconstruction. Value issues ariseat three levels: among local stakeholders, between local and external actors and inthe international community, and within aid agencies. Any intervention neces-sarily entails changes in the status quo that result in winners and losers. In post-conflict and failed states, this reality is one of the greatest challenges to overcomeand one that rebuilt governance systems must address in order to prevent relapseinto conflict. To emerge from state failure and re-establish sustainable govern-ance, stakeholders must be convinced that it is in their interests to negotiate andcreate democratic structures, a collective identity and authority patterns withshared power for the common good. The focus is on constructing national unityand building national pride (see UNDP, 2000). These efforts are predicated onsome sense of shared values and national identity.19 Since trust is problematic, the



success of these efforts depends upon building confidence. Governance thatincorporates these values can help develop confidence through transparency and accountability mechanisms, as well as specification of contracts, roles andresponsibilities, and standard operating procedures (see Luhmann, 1988). How-ever, in situations where identity-based politics have deeply embedded conflictwithin the society, the most that democratic governance may be able to achieve is‘accommodation amongst . . . conflicting interests, hoping that value change willfollow in the long run’ (Crook, 2001: 1).

Values that support self-determination, inclusion, participation and empower-ment in both economic and governance spheres underlie international post-conflict interventions and the governance model reviewed earlier. From bothintrinsic and instrumental perspectives, they inform the objectives of interven-tions and the tools used to help achieve those objectives. However, these values,and their expression in assistance priorities and strategies, resource allocation andresulting programs and projects, may not be shared by local actors in failed states.For example, in Afghanistan, international efforts to include and empowerwomen as part of reconstruction programs are viewed by some local actors asunwelcome western cultural impositions. Similarly, the deeply ingrained patron–client interaction patterns that characterize Afghan politics and warlordism havebeen cited as cultural impediments to civil society development and the establish-ment of democratic governance systems, besides being constraints to ending con-flict and violence (see Nassery et al., 2002).20

Values issues in the international community, apart from any particularcountry intervention or individual aid organization, concern the ultimate goals ofrebuilding failed states and reintegrating them into the ‘community of nations’ asfunctioning societies and economies. Gore (2000: 795) notes a divide betweenthe values of structural transformation (and the vision of liberating people) and those of spatial integration (and liberating economies). He calls for a moreholistic approach, where development is no longer ‘a monopoly of economists’(p. 800). This is consistent with the sustainable human development approach,which advocates that development ‘should be founded on participation and amore equal partnership between developing countries and aid donors’ (p. 795; seealso Stiglitz, 1998b).

Values come face to face with geopolitics and resources when it comes to the international community’s choices of assistance objectives for failed states.Options range from the most ambitious objectives, such as establishing legitimategovernance and restarting economic growth and development, to relatively morelimited aims, such as humanitarian relief and stopping the fighting (see Dorff,2000). Put another way, interventions may choose between dealing with symp-toms (‘harm reduction’) or more long-term problem-solving (see Anderson,1999; GWU and the World Bank, 2002). Fundamentally, the political debatesover how the international community will pursue the war on terrorism andnation-building are values-based (e.g. Wright, 2002). Key here is recognizinginconsistent and conflicting values and priorities. For example, the International



Crisis Group (2002: 1) warns: ‘Unless US political and military goals in Afghan-istan can be reconciled, today’s successes may become tomorrow’s problems.’

Inside individual aid organizations, whether public, private or ngos, values arerelevant. These organizations are change agents and their staff members can havean enormous impact on aid policies and programs, and serve to advance particularsets of values. Public debate on the multilateral agencies, for example, often challenges their very legitimacy and existence based on their critics’ argumentthat they support the ‘wrong’ values. For individual staff in aid organizations, theaftermath of 11 September 2001 has caused many to revisit the ethics of theirroles in international interventions that blend security and development agendasin an uneasy partnership. For some, the issue of how to seek to influence theirorganizations’ agendas, procedures and practices from the inside has been reinforced.21 This issue circles back to the actors in failed states that are rebuild-ing their governance systems: the changes needed are not just new policies, structures and procedures but transformations of individual behaviors, ethics andvalues.

Paying attention to processA point made repeatedly about post-conflict intervention and rebuilding govern-ance systems in failed states is that it matters greatly how assistance is providedand how reforms are designed and implemented. Important process considera-tions relate to reconciliation, participation and inclusion and empowerment.Following participatory conflict mediation and cessation of hostilities, restartingeconomic processes, getting people back to work and giving them a stake inrebuilding are basic steps. Kumar (2002) points out that the best way to assist thedefunct economy of a failed state is to employ as many people as possible, usingthe resources from international aid and reconstruction, which are likely to be thelargest industry and primary investment for some time. Political leadership, atnational and sub-national levels, also needs a stake in the nation-building process.Several scholars and practitioners have argued that how aid is provided will have an impact on political will to reform, and the appropriate targets are at theregional and local levels (Maxwell, 2000; GWU and the World Bank, 2002;Ottaway and Lieven, 2002).

‘How’ issues also concern building in democratization efforts as part of restor-ing good governance, which have been, and continue to be, the topic of substan-tial debate. In the early 1990s, some analysts held that a strong semi-authoritarianstate was best able to promote development and thus saw democratization as secondary (see Leftwich, 1995). The pendulum then swung in favor of democrati-zation as necessary to the developmental state (see Carothers, 1999). However, in failed states, promoting democratic processes is problematic. Some analystscaution that premature or superficial democratization can jeopardize stability andrisk relapse into conflict (see, for example, Thompson, 1996; Gibson, 2001).Others suggest that it is unrealistic; for example, Ottaway and Lieven (2002: 6)argue that the democratic-reconstruction model cannot be implemented in



Afghanistan since the international community is not prepared to provide anappropriate occupying force. They argue instead for ‘a sober evaluation of theminimal tasks a central administration needs to perform to allow a measure ofnormal life, economic activity, and above all trade’.

However, if conflict resolution, consensus-building and creating citizen owner-ship for change are necessary for reconstruction, then the establishment of somedemocratic processes must be considered as first steps in governance reconstruc-tion.22 Ignoring democratization can also undermine stability in the long run bysignaling that socioeconomic or political development is subject to the whims of alimited set of actors, as has been argued in the case of Pakistan (see Shah, 2002).Maxwell (2000) argues for civil society inclusion at the outset of post-conflictrecovery, adding that this inclusion is no more contentious than civil society’srole in a functional state (i.e. as a primary check on state power). Sen (1999)underscores the importance of democratic processes in ensuring that all stake-holders are engaged in the peace process and contribute to the definition of needsas well as solutions. Locking in access to power and resources during peace and reconciliation by a privileged few runs counter to the aims of subsequentdemocratization and can make such efforts to re-establish democratic governancemuch more difficult to achieve (see Carothers, 2002).

ConclusionEfforts to deal with complex emergencies, failed/failing states and socioculturalantipathies need to learn from previous interventions and from ongoing practiceand research. The challenge is to build upon lessons to date to find appropriatemethods (packages and processes) that address the demanding conditions offailed and failing states, and yet fit within the confines of political will and com-mitment (both in terms of time and resources). On the donor side, mismatchbetween humanitarian and other policies, and competition among assistanceagencies have been identified as key challenges. The 11 September and its contin-uing aftermath have called into question the international community’s assistancepolicies and programs of the past (and what constitutes success and failure) andhave thrust international development more prominently onto strategic agendasfor the future. Current events have also raised awareness of deep-seated resent-ments and anger among groups who feel that the forces of globalization, exempli-fied by the United States, have diminished or harmed them, economically andculturally.

The pitfalls of intervention are many. As has been noted, reform measures are‘easy to over-simplify and even easier to completely mess up. The urgency to findsolutions may be real but the search for a “quick fix” by those with little know-ledge, yet great confidence, is dangerous and will do real damage’ (GWU and theWorld Bank, 2002: 5). Intervention processes combining needs assessment andplanning, jointly conducted and agreed upon by both donors and country actors(including ngos and civil society) could assist in more efficiently and effectivelycombining the various actors’ comparative advantages/expertise, priorities and



values (1) to identify the full range of needs; (2) to match priorities, comparativeadvantages, values, and needs to particular actors; and (3) to identify gapsbetween stated interests and the commitments necessary and between these inter-ests and commitments and the actual capacity to effectively address needs. Such acoordination process could also serve to identify, through combined expertise,available tools and processes; and to incorporate and reconcile, where possible,the diversity of values represented. This approach could better ensure effective-ness by developing interventions that fit four generally accepted humanitarianassistance criteria: (1) connectedness, or interdependence between time frames,problems and approaches; (2) coherence of activities in terms of an efficient divi-sion of labor based on respective comparative advantages; (3) coverage based onneed and inclusiveness; and (4) appropriateness with respect to local needs andvalues, ownership and cost-effectiveness (Kreimer et al., 1998: 43–4).23

Such processes have been attempted in the past. For example, in order to pro-mote policy coherence, the UN led a Strategic Framework for Afghanistan,launched in 1997. This particular effort was not considered successful but doesprovide important lessons for further experimentation with similar mechanisms(OECD, 2001a). These include the needs to reach beyond a project focus and tocreate a common funding mechanism. The effort demonstrated the difficulties ofachieving common frameworks and approaches among diverse actors, as well as the importance of coordination to achieve a critical mass when the funds ofindividual donors fall far short of projected needs. More recently, the AsianDevelopment Bank, UNDP and the World Bank joined forces to conduct a pre-liminary needs assessment and identify short- and medium-term priorities forAfghanistan’s recovery and reconstruction (Asian Development Bank et al.,2002). This document was used as a basis for discussions at the MinisterialMeeting in Tokyo (21–22 January 2002). While several donors made correspond-ing commitments, the track record thus far continues to be mired in the challengesnoted in this article.24

Thus while tools and processes can help, by themselves they are insufficientfor effectively addressing the challenges of rebuilding governance systems infailed states. Foreign and domestic policy considerations that shape donor countries’ interests in intervening in failed states and in maintaining engagementfollowing mitigation of the immediate crisis are key. Only when the gaps betweenespoused and real policy intent are recognized and addressed will adequateresources and commitment be forthcoming. This article has investigated the multifaceted nature of governance reforms in failed states and the complex inter-play of technical and political factors on all sides. The discussion has shown howthe synoptic efforts to grapple with the ‘big picture’ are often undermined by theoperational nitty-gritty of donor agency procedures and aid delivery mechanismson the ground. Attention to the complexity of shifting foreign assistance agendas,the application and refinement of analytic and process tools, appropriate incorpo-ration of sometimes conflicting values and agendas and democratic processes tomaximize effectiveness can contribute to bringing the conceptual and the practi-



cal aspects of promoting governance reforms in failed states closer together.While not pretending to have bridged that divide, this article is a step in that direction.

Notes1. The term, ‘failed’ or ‘failing state’, does not have a precise definition but rather

serves as a label for a situation that can be characterized in a variety of ways. First, the labelis usually applied to a situation internal to a particular state, though there are cross-borderspillovers. Second, a failed or failing state is characterized by political failure and a break-down of law and order where state institutions are unable to protect citizens or are used asinstruments to oppress and attack them. Third, the rubric denotes a collapse of basic func-tions, whereby public services disintegrate and normal economic activity is increasinglylimited. Fourth, at the international level, a failed state has no entity that serves as a reliablerepresentative vis-à-vis the outside world. See, for example, Thurer (1999).

2. In looking at these questions, we draw upon our experience, the literature and anInternet-based global dialogue held in November–December 2001 on ‘Pakistan andAfghanistan: Opportunities and Challenges in the Wake of the Current Crisis’ (GWU andthe World Bank, 2002). The dialogue encompassed 465 participants from approximately30 countries, with more intensive participation from the South Asia region (Pakistan andIndia).

3. In shorthand form, this model can be thought of as a combination of the so-called‘Washington consensus’, which reduces government’s role to facilitating private marketsand global investment flows (Gore, 2000), and the New Public Management, which hasbeen variously labeled ‘post-bureaucratic’, ‘entrepreneurial government’ or ‘market-basedpublic administration’ (Lynn, 1998). Early formulations of the model advocated minimal-ist government but in its current configuration, the need for strong and competent govern-ance is well recognized, particularly in developing and transitioning countries (see WorldBank, 1997). Further, the importance of effective governance is central to the model’spolitical dimension because feeble governance structures and procedures cannot assurethat competition for power and resources will avoid élite capture, repression, or corruption(see, for example, Brautigam, 1996).

4. See, for example, Hadenius and Uggla (1996), Grindle (1997), Schachter (2000) andBrinkerhoff and Crosby (2002).

5. Since the mid-1990s, donor agencies have focused more attention on crisis interven-tions, including, in some cases, their governance implications (see, for example, Kreimeret al., 1998; UNDP, 1999; Uvin, 1999; and OECD, 2001b).

6. For example, the International Monetary Fund played a strong role in post-conflict ElSalvador to return the country’s economy to a path that would support investment andgrowth (Del Castillo, 2001).

7. Organizations and programs analyzing conflict and failed/failing states include:USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti), the WorldBank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, the University of Sussex’s Instituteof Development Studies research program on post-conflict rehabilitation (www.id21.org/society/S10arg1g1.html), the Failed States Research Group (www.ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/Govern_Research_Projects.html) and Brown University’s Watson Institute for Inter-national Studies’ Governance in War-Torn Societies Project (www. watsoninstitute.org).

8. The sequencing of governance reforms is debated not simply for failed state situa-tions but in peaceful developing and transitioning countries as well (see Girishankar,2000).

9. This simultaneity may either be helped or hindered by what Duffield (2000) calls the ‘new development-security community’, which links state and non-state actors for



the purpose of both objectives. Non-state actors include not only ngos but also private pro-tection/security companies and mercenaries.

10. Carothers (2002: 17) acknowledges that scholars began to challenge the ‘no precon-ditions’ assumption during the 1990s.

11. Gore (2000: 799) cites Paul Krugman’s (1995) ‘obituary’ and Joseph Stiglitz’(1998a, b) calls for a new paradigm.

12. A recent example of the tensions that can arise among allies comes from Afghan-istan, where US military personnel engaged in infrastructure reconstruction were wearingcivilian clothes. The international humanitarian ngos argued that the civilian attire blurredthe line between military and humanitarian aims, putting their staff at risk, and lobbied to change the policy. The Pentagon, however, maintained that civilian clotheswere necessary for the security of non-combatant military personnel (Walsh, 2002). In itsreview of crisis interventions, OECD (2001b) identifies the need for external militaryforces to avoid engaging in aid delivery as one of its nine key lessons.

13. As part of its Democracy Promotion and Conflict Prevention Roundtable, theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace held a session on ‘Combating ConflictEntrepreneurs’ on 7 February 2002. See www.ceip.org/files/events, accessed 1 April 2002.

14. See Anderson (1999) for more discussion on the impact of aid on post-conflict situations.

15. Countries frequently mentioned as examples of this risk include Pakistan andUzbekistan. Egypt is also cited by some as an at-risk country.

16. For example, recent editorials in The Washington Post and The New York Times, aswell as articles in The Economist have touted the successes of foreign aid and cautionedthat previous failures due to investments in poor governance systems should be consideredin the light of Cold War politics. This reality has been acknowledged in the donor commu-nity for some time (see Uvin, 1999).

17. These tools can be downloaded from the website of USAID’s Office of Democracyand Governance: www.usaid.gov/democracy/pubsindex.html.

18. For a discussion of the pros and cons of leading with local government interven-tions, see UNDP (1999).

19. As one Afghan implored, ‘I beg all sections and groups of Afghans to come together and build the nation that used to be an Afghan nation with pride, culture, unity,sovereignty and self-esteem. . . . It is the Afghans who should solidify themselves underthe umbrella of Afghaniat and give birth to the new Afghanistan’ (GWU and the WorldBank, 2002: 5). The World Bank advocates assistance for the protection and conservationof cultural heritage as a means to ‘inspire hope and remind people of their creativity’(Kreimer et al., 1998: 32).

20. Similar sociocultural dynamics are found in other countries as well. Recall RobertPutnam’s (1993) analysis of social capital formation in Italy and its impact on economicdevelopment and governance, where he contrasts the hub-and-spoke client–patron hier-archies of southern Italy with the more horizontal and egalitarian social structure of thenorth. For a related discussion of how cultural values shape a country’s prospects forsocioeconomic development see Grondona (2000).

21. The recent dialogue on Pakistan and Afghanistan included a discussion of trans-formation within aid agencies. In influencing aid policies and programs from the inside,one contributor posited that ‘the space you get is the space you create’ (GWU and theWorld Bank, 2002: 10). Some characterized such efforts as courageous. For others, it con-cerns ‘the ability to face ourselves, do what is appropriate, so that we continue to havesome respect for ourselves in the future’ (GWU and the World Bank, 2002: 10).

22. This is one of the arguments in favor of rapid timetables for elections (UNDP,2000). For an alternative view see Gibson (2001).

23. These emerged from a Workshop on Best Practice in the Evaluation of Humani-



tarian Assistance, organized by DANIDA and DAC, Copenhagen, 27 January 1998. Thecriteria were originally suggested by Minear (1994).

24. This includes reluctance on the part of the Afghanistan Transitional Administrationto accept donor funding in the form of loans (see Glasser, 2002).

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