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Journal of Risk Research

ISSN: 1366-9877 (Print) 1466-4461 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjrr20

Exploring risk attenuation and crisiscommunication after a plague death in GrandCanyon

Laura N. Rickard , Katherine A. McComas , Christopher E. Clarke , Richard C.Stedman & Daniel J. Decker

To cite this article: Laura N. Rickard , Katherine A. McComas , Christopher E. Clarke , RichardC. Stedman & Daniel J. Decker (2013) Exploring risk attenuation and crisis communicationafter a plague death in Grand Canyon, Journal of Risk Research, 16:2, 145-167, DOI:10.1080/13669877.2012.725673

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2012.725673

Published online: 25 Sep 2012.

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Exploring risk attenuation and crisis communication after aplague death in Grand Canyon

Laura N. Rickarda*, Katherine A. McComasa, Christopher E. Clarkea, Richard C.Stedmanb and Daniel J. Deckerb

aDepartment of Communication, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA; bDepartment ofNatural Resources, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

(Received 17 August 2011; final version received 2 June 2012)

In 2007, a US National Park Service (NPS) biologist working in Grand CanyonNational Park in the state of Arizona died from pneumonic plague contracted froma mountain lion, prompting NPS, in partnership with local and federal agencies, toinform publics about plague risk within park contexts. Overall, the incidentattracted limited media attention and public concern about an increased risk of pla-gue. Drawing on the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), the Crisisand Emergency Risk Communication model (CERC) and the related literature out-lining ‘best practices’ in crisis communication, we explore how characteristics ofthis incident may have attenuated, rather than amplified, plague risk. Results aredrawn from the data collected at a workshop with NPS employees and in-depthinterviews with these and other individuals. Theoretical and practical implicationsof this research, including future directions for pairing CERC and SARF in orga-nizational risk and crisis communication research are discussed.

Keywords: risk communication; crisis communication; amplification of risk;case study

Risk communication scholars have long recognized that some incidents (e.g. deathby dreaded disease) generate more public concern than others (e.g. death by caraccident), even though the latter may produce more societal costs. Understandingresponses to such events is a complex calculus, accounting for media coverage,government responses, characteristics of individuals, and other factors (Kaspersonet al. 1988). The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al.1988) considers these societal and individual-level variables in examining the poten-tial impact of a risk event. Also applicable to risk events, the Crisis and EmergencyRisk Communication (CERC) model (e.g. Reynolds and Seeger 2005; Seeger,Reynolds, and Sellnow 2008) highlights the communication behaviors an organiza-tion should undertake throughout a crisis. CERC and related research in crisiscommunication offer ‘best practices’ to managers, in the hopes that such actionsmay discourage unnecessary public concern and reduce damage to an organization’sreputation. From a practical perspective, both SARF and CERC allow us to explorehow communication in various forms during a crisis may contribute to (or lessen)

*Corresponding author. Email: lrickard@esf.edu

Journal of Risk Research, 2013Vol. 16, No. 2, 145–167, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2012.725673

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public concern. From a theoretical perspective, when considered together withrespect to a single case, CERC and SARF may complement each other. Pairing themodels may also identify key gaps and opportunities to address them with furtherresearch.

This paper investigates the value of combining the two frameworks through acase study of an organizational crisis. Specifically, in 2007, a National Park Service(NPS) wildlife biologist died in his Grand Canyon National Park (GRCA) residencefrom pneumonic plague, which he contracted from contact with an infected moun-tain lion. At over 1.2 million acres, which includes the 277 miles of the ColoradoRiver that slowly formed the geologic masterpiece, GRCA is considered a ‘crownjewel’ of the US national park system and receives over five million visitors annu-ally. While plague is endemic to the Southwest, fatalities are rare. Moreover, manypeople who reside outside of this area and visit the Grand Canyon may be unfamil-iar with plague and still mostly associate it with the ‘Black Death’ that decimatedEurope’s population in the fourteenth century. Despite the arguably extraordinarycircumstances, the case neither received widespread media coverage nor elicited sig-nificant public reaction. Drawing from interviews with key informants, a workshopwith NPS employees, and a review of pertinent news coverage, we examine thiscase through the lenses of SARF and CERC and explore what characteristics of thecase may have influenced public reactions to plague risk. We conclude by offeringfuture directions for the pairing of CERC and SARF to better understand crises orrisk events in organizational settings.

Theoretical frameworks

Social amplification of risk framework

Definition

Combining psychological and sociological approaches to explaining risk perception,SARF entered the risk literature in the late 1980s, described as a ‘comprehensivetheory … capable of integrating the technical analysis of risk and the cultural,social, and individual response structures that shape the public experience of risk’(Kasperson et al. 1988, 178). Informed by cultural theory, SARF considers not justindividual attributes but also social context elements, such as the actions of govern-mental institutions. According to SARF, the ‘risk event’ functions as the startingpoint of the social amplification process and can include ‘actual or hypothesizedaccidents and incidents’ (Kasperson et al. 2003, 15) that produce ‘risk signals’ (i.e.images or symbols that represent the risk). These signals are processed through‘amplification stations’ on both the individual (e.g. citizens) and social (i.e. newsmedia) levels (Kasperson et al. 1988). These stations help attenuate or amplifypublic perception of the risk.

SARF demonstrates how amplification can produce ‘ripple effects’ that haveimpacts far beyond the initial risk event. A risk event may be amplified as a resultof exaggerated media coverage, or in concert with societal stigmatization of a par-ticular issue, such as nuclear energy (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996). Alternatively,individuals may inflate the benefits of other, more familiar or ‘acceptable’ risks,such as driving cars, and downplay their potential deadly outcomes. In some cases,a risk may be deemed more ‘acceptable’ to individuals based on their relationshipwith and proximity to its source (Baxter and Lee 2004; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009;

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Masuda and Garvin 2006). For instance, Baxter and Lee (2004) found low concernamong residents living adjacent to a hazardous waste facility in Alberta, Canada, asource of employment and economic support for the community. Risks associatedwith marginalized people or places or incapable of producing a noteworthy ‘soundbite’ may likewise be attenuated (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996).

Researchers in risk and crisis communication, as well as public health, havesuggested that the news media can amplify or attenuate risk, as well as shorten orprolong risk-related crises (e.g. Bakir 2005; Barnett and Breakwell 2003; Glik 2007;Heberlein and Stedman 2009; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009; Susarla 2003; Veil andOjeda 2010; Wilkins 2005). In a case study examining Greenpeace’s 1995 denounce-ment of Shell’s planned disposal of an oilrig in the ocean, Bakir (2005) found SARFto be an appropriate model for describing Greenpeace’s strategic placement of ‘risksignals’ in the media. Furthermore, when news media coverage converges on a par-ticular source of blame for a risk event, whether a government agency or a privatecorporation, risk amplification may occur (Susarla 2003). Yet the effect of mediacoverage on public risk perception is far from a linear cause-and-effect. In additionto describing how information about risk events circulates through media channels,SARF also showcases institutional structure, functions, and culture as drivers ofamplification or attenuation of risk signals (Kasperson et al. 2003).

SARF in organizational contexts

Given SARF’s attention to individual- and institutional-level variables, as well as‘objective’ (i.e. the quantitative amount of potential harm to humans or the environ-ment) and perceived (i.e. potentially varied interpretations of said harm) risk, schol-ars have suggested that the model may be applied to organizational riskmanagement (Leiss 2003). In this vein, empirical studies (Burns et al. 1993; Rennet al. 1992) have suggested that perceptions of ‘managerial competence’ – that is,how publics perceive the appropriateness or effectiveness of an organization’sresponse to a given risk event – can help predict subsequent public reactions to,and impacts of, the event. Conceptually, managerial competence contributes to anevent’s risk signal and subsequent amplification or attenuation. Defining managerialincompetence as the ‘degree to which the public believes that a hazard implies thatsimilar risks are being managed incompetently,’ Burns et al. (1993, 614), found thatperceived managerial incompetence played a larger role than the number of casual-ties in predicting a hypothetical risk event’s overall societal impact. According toBurns et al. (1993), the risk signal (to which managerial incompetence contributes)stimulates public behavior (e.g. to boycott a company) that, in turn, influences theimpact of the risk event (e.g. loss of profits). Though both Burns et al. (1993) andRenn et al. (1992) describe managerial competence from the perspective of inter-ested publics, neither tells us what ‘competent’ management might actually entail,nor how it might be perceived and measured.

Thus, while SARF provides possible pathways by which risk may be amplifiedor attenuated, its macro-level perspective provides limited guidance for operational-ization for risk managers. Managerial competence remains a vague concept at best,located somewhere in the equally undefined ‘information flow’ stage of SARF (seeFigure 1). Likewise, by starting with the risk event, SARF provides scant attentionto the circumstances preceding the event; consequently, the framework minimizesattention to warning signs, which could help managers to avert the crisis. In sum,

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although SARF offers a valuable model for describing – and even predicting –which events may amplify or attenuate, the framework does not offer specific guid-ance for organizations seeking to influence the trajectory of a given risk event. Forthat, we turn to the literature on crisis communication and one model used to guideorganizational response: the CERC.

Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Framework (CERC)

Developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), CERC hasbeen characterized as a tool allowing managers to plan communication responses toa crisis under the assumption that it will unfold in a (generally) predictable manner(Reynolds and Seeger 2005). CERC provides a blueprint for public health officialsto ‘communicate complex issues quickly, accurately, and credibly in extreme anduncertain situations’ (Courtney, Cole, and Reynolds 2003, 129). Applying empiri-cally tested principles of risk and crisis communication, the model has been imple-mented by the US public health agencies (Courtney et al. 2003).

CERC describes crises as multifaceted progressions that can be collapsed intoprecrisis (i.e. what occurs before the crisis transpires), crisis (i.e. the response to thecrisis), and postcrisis (i.e. actions taken after the crisis is determined over) phases(e.g. Coombs 1999; Fearn-Banks 2002). Most crisis communication researchconverges on three basic premises. First, and distinct from the SARF perspective,crises can comprise more than a single event, and tend to evolve over time throughthe course of distinct stages. Second, rather than requiring a unified response, eachcrisis necessitates different organizational responses throughout each stage. Finally,each stage of a crisis calls for varying types and forms of communication that can

Pre-Crisis

Crisis

Post-Crisis

Build relationshipswith key stakeholders,internal and external toorganization.

Investigate currentawareness andperception of relevantrisks amongstakeholders (e.g.,clients, employees)

Establishcommunicationstructures (e.g., crisiscommunication plan)

Event

Information flow

Interpretation/Behavioral Response

Rippling:Amplification orAttenuation

Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Adapted from Kasperson et al., 1988; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005)

Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Framework (CERC) (Adapted from Reynolds & Seeger, 2005)

candor, and compassion, even in situations of uncertain orincomplete information.

Facilitate inter-agency coordination; provide opportunitiesfor agencies to work towards common goals in a non-competitive environment.

Provide relevant self-efficacy information for those affectedby the risk.

Reinforceorganizational identityand credibility (e.g.,through stakeholderengagement).

Nurture newrelationships foundedduring the crisis.

Publicize new riskavoidance behaviors andresponse procedures,such as throughemployee training andpublic communication.

SocietalImpacts

Event characteristics

Figure 1. SARF and CERF combined model.

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help resolve the crisis and safeguard the organization’s reputation (Coombs 2007;Coombs and Holladay 2002). Though the three-stage model suggests unidirectional-ity, as well as discrete phases, in practice, the stages of a crisis may be more circu-lar or iterative, and less easily defined (e.g. Health 2004; Ulmer, Sellnow, andSeeger 2009).

Like much crisis communication research, CERC implies that competence – ‘thecapability of the organization to perform effectively’ (Veil et al. 2005, 19–20) – ismanifested in the organization’s ability to follow a set of best practices throughouta crisis. According to CERC, this systematic approach to communication and rela-tionship building can lead to the successful resolution of a crisis. Below, we outlineCERC’s recommendations by crisis stage, drawing on the larger crisis communica-tion literature to elaborate.

Best practices by crisis stage

Precrisis

Before a crisis, CERC indicates that organizations should work towards building‘alliances and cooperation’ (Reynolds and Seeger 2005, 52) with key stakeholders,such as journalists who may report on the organization. Many scholars note thatsuch relationships can help the organization scan for emergent crises, with stake-holders enlisted to monitor for, and report on, warning signs (e.g. Coombs 1999;Prue et al. 2003). Similarly, Seeger (2006, 240) advises that organizations establishnetworks of reliable relationships prior to a crisis so that they can ‘collaborate andcoordinate with credible sources’ during a crisis, by providing consistent messagesto public audiences. Such relationships can also engender the organizational trustnecessary to recover from a crisis (e.g. Ritchie 2004; Ulmer 2001).

Managers should also have structures in place to respond to crises (Reynoldsand Seeger 2005). Researchers have described the need for a ‘crisis managementplan,’ which outlines communication protocols to follow in an emergency (e.g.Fearn-Banks 2002). This document might list the organization’s media spokespersonand describe the functioning of a crisis communication control center, therefore,‘[providing] a functioning collective brain’ for the organization and its memberswho ‘may not operate at normal capacity due to the shock or emotions of the crisisevent’ (Fearn-Banks 2002, 11). When in place, these plans can help contribute to amore efficient crisis response (Seeger 2006).1

Crisis

CERC describes managerial responses as actions with direct ramifications for theorganization’s reputation. For instance, according to CERC, an organization shouldcommunicate with its stakeholders even under circumstances of uncertain or incom-plete information, or else risk losing the trust and backing of these importantindividuals (e.g. Holmes et al. 2009; Reynolds 2006; Seeger 2006). Other crisiscommunication research reveals the following best practices:

• Ensuring that internal publics learn of the crisis before external publics withthis information provided by the organization itself, rather than through themedia (e.g. Fearn-Banks 2002).

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• Projecting ‘honesty, candor, and openness’ as well as ‘compassion, concern,and empathy’ (Seeger 2006, 241) in communication with public audiences(Covello 2003; Reynolds and Seeger 2005; Reynolds and Quinn 2008).

• Including messages emphasizing self-efficacy: what individuals can do toprotect themselves against a risk (e.g. Avery and Kim 2009; Glik et al. 2004;Heath 2006; Reynolds and Seeger 2005; Seeger 2006; Wray and Jupka 2004;Wray et al. 2008).

As a crisis unfolds, crisis communication scholars also recommend that organi-zations integrate information from multiple sources, such as public health agencies,private corporations, employees, or even private citizens (e.g. Covello 2003). Bysharing this information with groups cooperating in the crisis response, theorganization ensures that its response ‘speaks with one voice’ – for instance, aboutrecommended actions that the public can take to reduce risk (Coombs 1999; Heath2006; Jackson et al. 2006). Much crisis communication research has highlighted theimportance of a ‘spokesperson’ in projecting the public image of the crisis to mediaoutlets (e.g. Fearn-Banks 2002; Reynolds and Seeger 2005).

Postcrisis: ripple effects and impacts

CERC recognizes that the potential negative impacts of a crisis on the organizationcan expand to influence community concern, create loss of confidence in institu-tions, and spur regulatory actions. According to crisis communication scholars,organizations must make concerted postcrisis efforts to rebuild their credibility andthe trust of stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay 2009; Reynolds and Seeger 2005;Ulmer 2001; Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow 2007). Some scholars point out that crisesprovide opportunities for officials to craft a public image that may not have existedprior to the crisis (e.g. Coombs 1995). Researchers note that organizations shouldalso nurture new relationships established during the response (Coombs 1999).

SARF, CERC, and managerial competence

As we have illustrated, both CERC and SARF share an attention to crises (or riskevents) as progressing through macro-level phases. More importantly to this casestudy, both frameworks speak to ways in which (in)competent organizational behav-iors, such as the communication actions taken by a manager, may influence the lifeof a crisis (see Leiss 2003). Considered on its own, however, each framework haslimitations. As a descriptive framework geared toward managers and arising from apublic relations focus, CERC pays scant attention to how societal or institutionalfactors might impact perceptions of crisis-related risk. As a model integrating psy-chological and sociological concepts to explain a complex phenomenon, SARFlacks specificity in its empirical application of its constructs. In light of these limita-tions, we see advantages of combining SARF and CERC (Figure 1) to better under-stand the stage-based progression organizational response to risk-related crises (seealso Veil et al. 2008).

Considering the CERC and SARF frameworks together could enable a richerunderstanding of how organizational actions may influence attention to crises or riskevents. While SARF allows us to better understand how managerial competencemay influence the life cycle of a risk event, CERC and the broader crisis

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communication literature describe what comprises such proficiency. While not all‘risk events’ are necessarily ‘crises,’ as defined by the crisis communication litera-ture, they nonetheless are instances that call for organized and timely responsesfrom individuals in positions of power.

Research question

To explore the circumstances leading to the outcome of this crisis, we used SARFand CERC to guide our inquiry. We applied each theoretical framework to thecommunication elements in our case, using (a) the hypothesized contributors to riskamplification or attenuation and (b) the recommendations for organizational bestpractices in a health/risk crisis. We framed our inquiry with one broad researchquestion:

• How do SARF and CERC, considered together, explain the influence ofcommunication on public response to a plague death at GRCA?

Case study: Plague at Grand Canyon National Park

On 30 October 2007, Eric York, a 37-year-old NPS wildlife biologist with experi-ence tracking and handling mountain lions, presented with flu-like symptoms at theGRCA health clinic; he had no prior chronic medical conditions. Three days later,two co-workers found him dead in his South Rim residence. Autopsy results fromthe CDC and the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS) confirmed deathfrom pneumonic plague. Later tests conducted by the CDC determined it was thesame strain that had killed the mountain lion he had necropsied in his garage daysearlier. Endemic to high elevation areas in Northern Arizona, and caused by thebacterium Yersinia pestis, pneumonic plague is more rare and virulent than the twoother varieties of plague, bubonic and septicemic. The disease is transmitted primar-ily by direct contact with infected animals or through inhaling airborne bacteria andproduces symptoms including high fever, chills, weakness, headache, and blood-tinged sputum. While plague is treatable with antibiotics upon early detection, with-out treatment, mortality rates reach close to 100% (Wong et al. 2009).

York’s death set into motion an organized response from the NPS to identifyother individuals at GRCA who might be at risk from exposure to plague. As a pre-caution, approximately 40 individuals who had been in recent contact with Yorkreceived prophylactic antibiotics. In addition to initiating an internal investigation,GRCA officials reached out to the NPS Office of Public Health and Division ofRisk Management (both located in Washington, DC) and the Biological ResourceManagement Division (Ft. Collins, Colorado); officials from the Coconino County(Arizona) Health Department, CDC, Occupational Safety and Health Administra-tion, and AHDS also joined the investigation. GRCA officials also communicatedwith park employees, local residents, visitors, and media outlets about the risks ofcontracting plague at GRCA, and described NPS efforts to protect employee,visitor, and wildlife health. Although no other individuals were subsequently diag-nosed with plague, upon recommendations from these investigations, NPS enactedsystem-wide measures to modify employee policies, including those related to thesafe handling of wild animals.

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Risk event

Considering the circumstances of the case – an infamous disease, large carnivores,and an iconic setting – following SARF, one might predict that York’s death wouldhave resulted in risk amplification, including widespread notice and increased publicalarm; however, evidence and reasoning which we outline below suggestsotherwise.

First, because risk perceptions are often based on the perceived familiarity of arisk or the degree to which it is ‘known’ (Slovic 1987), perceptions of plague mayvary depending on individuals’ familiarity with the disease, itself a product ofgeographical location. For many, references to plague conjure macabre images of the‘Black Death’ pandemic that ravaged Europe in the Middle Ages, spurring largepopulation declines, as well as social and economic turmoil (Hays 2005). For resi-dents of the American Southwest, however, plague is less a dreaded scourge of thefourteenth century than a contemporary presence in the high-altitude desert land-scape. Local public health agencies and the news media routinely alert citizens tosemiannual outbreaks of the disease among wildlife populations (e.g. prairie dogs)and human deaths, though uncommon, do occur (Wong et al. 2009). Second,following York’s death, public visitation to GRCA remained at a level comparable tothe previous year (NPS 2011).2 Third, as will be explored further in the Results sec-tion below, the case generated limited news media attention. Finally, while the casemay be interpreted as producing ‘ripple effects’ beyond the death of an individual,such effects were largely beneficial to NPS and its stakeholders. For instance, lessthan a year after York’s death, with new, nationally acclaimed employee safety poli-cies in place, wildlife biologists at GRCA resumed all field activities requiringhuman–wildlife interaction (US Department of the Interior 2008).

Methods

With representatives from Cornell University and NPS serving as co-investigators,this study was designed around a two-day workshop, consisting primarily of groupinterviews with NPS employees who responded to Eric York’s death.

Interviews

Prior to the workshop, we conducted 14 in-depth interviews with individuals whowould be attending the workshop and others who did not attend; these interviewsallowed us to better understand the case such that we could delve more deeply intoquestioning during the workshop. Using a key informants approach (Weiss 1994),we selected interviewees to include GRCA employees, health officials, and regionaljournalists. Following a snowball sampling technique (e.g. Lofland et al. 2006), weprioritized contacting individuals who would be attending the workshop, then askedthese informants for names of additional people involved in the York case. Afterthe workshop, we conducted interviews with these additional individuals (n= 13),for a total of 27 interviews. These individuals included everyone within the NPSwho played a primary part in the crisis response, as well as most of the individualsoutside of the NPS who were highly involved with the case. Interviews wereconducted by telephone or in person and covered individuals’ involvement in theincident, views on how the incident was handled, perceptions of media coverage,and communication with NPS and public audiences. Interviews were audio recordedto ensure accuracy of data collection.

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Review of news coverage

Prior to the workshop, we reviewed news coverage to assess how local and nationalmedia portrayed the crisis. To identify relevant articles, we conducted a Lexis–Nex-is database search. To account for articles from smaller news sources not indexed,we conducted Google searches using the same key words and variants. We catego-rized the articles using a coding scheme including background information (e.g.which sources were quoted) as well as plague-specific information (e.g. mention ofplague epidemiology) and judgments expressed about the attribution of responsibil-ity for York’s death. Due to the small number of articles (n= 46), we did notconduct a formal content analysis involving multiple coders and a measurement ofreliability; instead, two of the authors reviewed all of the articles, with one takingprimary responsibility for the coding. This analysis provides descriptive backgroundfor the case, but does not make claims about statistical significance.

Workshop

We held a workshop at the Horace M. Albright Training Center (located on thepremises of GRCA) on 31 March and 1 April 2010. Those in attendance includedNPS employees from GRCA and the Washington, DC office. Cornell Universityrepresentatives facilitated group conversation. We organized the discussions arounda timeline of communication events that occurred following York’s death and askedparticipants to comment on crisis communication and management, recording thesesessions with our participants’ permission. In the event that individuals might notfeel comfortable speaking frankly about their perceptions of the case in the presenceof a supervisor, we organized the workshop such that GRCA managers and ‘rankand file’ employees attended separate sessions; this format helped to encourage fulldisclosure.

Data analysis

During the first day of the workshop, NPS participants and university researchersbegan by reviewing the timeline of events to identify specific communication-related decisions and events deemed ‘successful’ by those who played key roles inthe case. Using this discussion as a starting point, during the second day of theworkshop participants extrapolated more universal ‘themes’ (e.g. the importance ofinteragency relationships among health and veterinary professionals) that seemed toemerge at one or more stages of the York crisis. Participants were encouraged todiscuss themes that might be specific to the unique circumstances and conditions atGRCA, as well as those potentially more broadly applicable.

To further develop, describe, and refine these themes, university researchersreviewed transcripts of the workshop and the participant interviews for relevantquotations and supporting evidence. Because we conducted interviews both beforeand after the workshop, data analysis followed the ‘constant comparative method’(Glaser and Strauss 1967), with emergent results informing and refining subsequentdata collection. For instance, during the interviews we conducted after the work-shop, we included questions pertaining to the themes we had previously identified.Throughout this process, we solicited input from our participants, such as commentson early drafts of our analysis, in order to increase the validity of our findings(Maxwell 1996).

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Results

We present our results following the template of the three broad stages of a crisisand, within each stage, draw out elements of the communication response, accord-ing to SARF and to CERC, that may have contributed to risk response (Figure 1).We use the term ‘participants’ broadly to refer to individuals who only participatedin an interview as well as those who participated in both an interview and theworkshop.

Precrisis

According to CERC, organizations are best served by cooperating with other groupsand agencies prior to the emergence of a crisis. Moreover, Reynolds and Seeger(2005) advise that organizations develop risk message strategies before an event.While GRCA officials may not have had pre-scripted information on hand aboutthe risk of contracting plague, their attention to fostering relationships and establish-ing emergency communication protocols appeared to align with CERC’s precrisisrecommendations.

Relationships

Participants noted that GRCA officials had established ties with state, federal, andlocal health agencies, such as the US Public Health Service (USPHS) representativeassigned to GRCA. Several participants, especially those working for public healthagencies, echoed crisis communication researchers in extolling the importance ofthese relationships to competent management of public health incidents. As a CDCofficial explained:

… The reality is that a great deal of what is done – or at least done effectively – inpublic health ultimately comes down to those sorts of personal relationships wherepeople either know people directly or they know who to call who would know theright person to get in touch with.

Moreover, as an NPS Office of Public Health official commented, having estab-lished relationships allows for ‘trust [to be] pre-accumulated, so that the two groupscan work together more seamlessly with less squabbling and with less groping inthe dark.’ Participants emphasized that GRCA includes more than tourist attractionsand encompasses, among other entities, a K-12 school, a bank, a medical clinic,two for-profit concessions companies, a chamber of commerce, and an electric com-pany. As several participants noted, prior to York’s death, the GRCA Superintendenthad committed to logging ‘face time’ with many of these stakeholders, fromresidents of the nearby town to Arizona’s representatives to the US Congress.

Structure

GRCA staff have routinely dealt with public health outbreaks (e.g. norovirus amongriver rafting trip participants) as well as visitor injuries. As such, they had structuredsystems in place, and experience utilizing them. Participants suggested thatawareness of these procedures allowed them to ‘know their role’ in a crisis; theycould concentrate on their own duties, assured that others were also fulfilling

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necessary tasks. An interpretive ranger described the implementation of the IncidentCommunication System, an in-park emergency information telephone bank activatedafter York’s discovery:

… Notebooks of information had already been put together with phone numbers, thephone lines and the room that we use were all set up. So it was a very easy transitionfor that group of people to come together and start doing what needed to be done …

At GRCA, communication culture seems to have complemented structure; membersof the Public Information Office were invited to participate in decision-making, andthe park prioritized information sharing with its internal and external stakeholders.

Crisis

After the onset of the crisis, NPS officials designated an agency spokesperson,attempted to reduce uncertainty among interested publics, and worked towardscooperation with multiple public health agencies, all managerial actions in line withCERC’s recommendations (Reynolds and Seeger 2005). Yet, in addition to theseapparent examples of managerial competence, to better understand the reaction toYork’s death, we must examine NPS employees’ risk attention as well as newsmedia coverage of the event. According to SARF, these variables may attenuateperceptions of the risk event.

Managing uncertainty

In uncertain, rapidly developing conditions, NPS officials needed to share criticalinformation with GRCA employees and the greater community. Participantsdescribed the period in which experts must wait for the results of diagnostic tests inpublic health investigations as complicating communication with public audiences.In particular, most plague investigation cases proceed through a stage in whichuncertainty is unavoidable, due to the inherent delays associated with confirmingplague in the victim; while this period may only extend a few days, significantimpacts on public perception of the investigation may nonetheless occur. During theYork case, 10 days transpired between the discovery of the deceased and the diag-nosis of plague as confirmed through the culture recovery of Yersinia pestis frompatient and mountain lion tissue samples. Although many investigating officialssuspected plague as early as several hours after finding York, these individualsdisagreed on when – and with whom – to share this unconfirmed information. Ingeneral, public health officials described needing the highest level of confidencebefore releasing information about the diagnosis to public audiences. The GRCAadministration appeared to follow suit, as the Office of the Superintendent releasedonly fully confirmed information in its talking points, press releases, public meet-ings, and Incident Communication System telephone line – thus waiting to releasethe cause of death.

Not all participants agreed with this strategy to withhold pending information: aNPS law enforcement official felt he should disseminate information to the publicabout the potential plague diagnosis and inform the victim’s family. A journalist fora local newspaper described a commitment to her readership to advise them aboutpotential exposure and appropriate precautions even before receiving fullconfirmation of the diagnosis. She questioned:

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How did [NPS] know that York wasn’t standing at a bus stop with 30 people whowere heading in different directions? … And we felt that the Park Service definitelyknew it was plague and had confirmed that with data and for some reason sat on thosefindings for a couple days for reasons unknown to us.

For her, the NPS’ decision to wait on publicizing the diagnosis information until itwas confirmed constituted a lack of transparency and a ‘trust us’ response that shefound deeply unsatisfying. For their part, GRCA officials tended to perceive thisdrive to uncover information as somewhat misdirected, and targeted towards reveal-ing information not yet confirmed (i.e. conjecture) to general audiences. While thisreporter may represent a minority voice, her comments nonetheless suggest thatofficials might have paid more attention to communicating about the uncertainty ofdiagnosing plague not just with employees and community members, but also withthe press. As crisis communication scholars have noted, treating journalists as ‘part-ners’ rather than ‘roadblocks,’ might allow them to play a constructive rather thancritical role in the crisis response (e.g. Veil and Ojeda 2010).

Key point of contact

Participants were unanimous in recognizing the critical role of one member of theNPS Office of Public Health in integrating information from multiple sources, facili-tating communication, and transforming technical terminology into lay vernacular.This ‘key point of contact’ allowed for the prevention of duplicate actions, andlimited the opportunity for contradictory communication, thus following the crisiscommunication literature’s advice for multiple agencies to ‘speak with one voice.’With his access to the GRCA management team, he served the role of both agency‘insider’ (i.e. due to his affiliation with the NPS Office of Public Health) and ‘out-sider’ (i.e. due to his past tenure at CDC and status as a practicing pediatrician). Ashe explained:

… People from these other agencies that were doing the testing – they could call meand check that I would interpret the information appropriately because I am a healthprofessional myself. It’d be different I think if they were trying to get in touch with aSuperintendent of a park or someone and not know how that would be translated, ormaybe misinterpreted because the language they were using maybe is not clear tosomeone who is not doing this kind of work all the time.

Involving this individual thus encouraged trust emanating from his commitment toNPS, and credibility associated with his being an outside expert from a publichealth agency.

Interagency coordination

NonNPS public health officials concurred that they valued being informed of theYork case, even if they would not be involved in the subsequent investigation. Asthey explained, an awareness of the case allows agencies to manage public andmedia inquiry, as well as facilitate coordination between the agencies. Onceinformed, these officials could communicate with other interested parties in theirrespective agencies. For instance, a CDC official described how the CDC’s Officeof Terrorism Response needed to know the details of the incident (e.g. that it

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occurred in a remote area of a national park) to ensure there was no concern ofplague being used as an instrument of bioterrorism. As with informing internalstakeholders (i.e. within NPS), keeping external stakeholders (i.e. outside of NPS)informed of the developments of the case seemed to play as much of a political asa substantive role in the unfolding investigation; providing these groups informationallowed them to preserve their institutional ‘face’ as well as provide consistent,necessary information to their respective stakeholders.

Several participants suggested that agencies involved in the case were able tocombine their efforts to promote successful coordination rather than unproductiveterritorialism. While there may have been disagreements between agencies, as amember of the NPS Office of Biological Resource Management described, ‘Nobodygot ‘turfy’ or … was looking out for their own interest … [E]veryone was workingas a team.’ The fact that agency representatives appeared to ‘respect each other’sexpertise’ also allowed for all involved to act quickly and reach consensus. In manycases, these relationships also resulted in increased capacity – resources beyondwhat NPS would have been able to provide on its own throughout the investigation.For instance, the Coconino County Health Department provided print brochures tosurrounding communities about prevention, and also reassured individuals of thelow risk of being exposed to plague, given case circumstances, actions that theNPS was unequipped to perform. Participants agreed that the case represented‘successful’ organizational communication, as multiple audiences were informed oftheir risk and subsequently advised about appropriate actions.

While recognizing the importance of partnering with other agencies, participantsstressed the need for such agencies to defer to the individual park as the lead unitin the investigation. Among many of the public health officials interviewed, allnoted that park management officials should retain leadership responsibilities, ratherthan relinquish them to outsiders. In the words of a member of the NPS Office ofPublic Health:

If you’re not respectful that it’s their park and they’re managing it, that’s where youget to squabbling and at odds and dysfunctional. So I try to be very respectful thatI’m not managing that park, I’m here to help them as best I can in the subject area …but the decisions about that park are theirs to make …

Throughout the York case, all public and employee communication efforts were ini-tiated and directed by GRCA; when other agencies issued communication about thecase, they reviewed the materials released by the park. Importantly, the outsideagencies respected the park’s authority to provide the bottom line on managementdecisions, even if park managers relied on these agencies for advice and support.

Risk attention

Following York’s death, increased concern about plague-related risk was isolated tothose most likely to come into contact with the disease during their job, particularlywildlife biologists. NPS and public health veterinarians were well acquainted withthe risk of plague transmission to humans through mountain lions prior to York’sdeath; however, they and other participants suggested that many wildlife profession-als were both ill-informed of this risk and complacent about adopting standardprecautionary measures, such as wearing masks and gloves. Participants speculated

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that, following York’s death, the presence of a network of wildlife biologistsconducting similar fieldwork in the USA (as well as publishing in a limited set ofscientific journals) helped draw greater attention to the case and its implications,and this newfound awareness was not limited to Grand Canyon employees (Boschet al. 2010). As a GRCA wildlife biologist explained:

I think [attention to plague] has changed enormously. This was a wake-up call …Frankly, biologists are a lot more careful now when performing necropsies or handlingcritters in the field … Before this, I mean we all pretty much shot from the hip anddidn’t take a whole lot of precautions. We certainly do now …

Although attention to plague among the general GRCA employee populationincreased during the investigation, many participants suggested that this peak inattention was fleeting. Participants noted that most GRCA employees were unlikelyto perceive increased risk to themselves if the incident did not pertain to their work.While a park ranger who distributed hiking permits and did not routinely handlewildlife perhaps experienced initial concern following the event, his or her elevatedconcern soon receded. As a GRCA interpretive ranger expressed:

… I think for most people, this was something of heightened concern for a very shortperiod of time and for most people, sort of back to business as usual. It didn’t affectthem very directly.

For those who had worked most closely with York, however, plague risk remaineda salient issue. A GRCA biologist in York’s research division described an apparenttension between complacency and concern experienced by some NPS employeeswho encountered – or had the potential to encounter – wildlife during their dailyroutines:

Everyone goes into panic mode at the time, and is aware of [plague risk], but thenyeah, it kind of falls to the wayside or to the back of their minds. I don’t think that isthe case in our department, but that may be because most of the individuals still work-ing here were here and have worked with Eric … [but] … you become very comfort-able, and contracting a zoonotic disease like plague is so rare, so you get like, ‘Oh,what are really the chances [of getting plague if I remove a skunk from a camp-ground]?’ But there’s always a chance …

For such individuals, attention to plague increased not solely because of their simi-lar profession but also because this incident involved a colleague – a member ofthe research community recognized and respected as an accomplished biologist.

News coverage

The attenuation of plague-related risk was also apparent in the way in which mediaoutlets covered the case. Most participants thought that news reports covered thecase ‘fairly’ without ‘slant’ or ‘bias.’ Several participants expressed that this ‘hon-est’ approach was not the norm; they perceived that cases involving GRCA or othernational parks, as well as zoonotic disease, usually attract heightened, unwanted,attention. Other participants noted that news reports about the York case adheredclosely to the park’s official statements. According to an interpretive ranger:

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… Overall, things were pretty balanced … [T]he press releases that were issued werelargely the information that wound up in the paper … there wasn’t a lot of sort ofwild speculation.

To understand the contribution of news coverage associated with the York case,it is useful to note the extent and location of the stories. Of the 46 articles wefound, only four appeared in national newspapers (USA Today and The WashingtonPost); the rest were published in regional or local papers (e.g. The Arizona DailySun), or appeared on websites (e.g. www.discovery.com). Roughly one-quarter ofthe news stories attributed responsibility for York’s death both to York and NPS orother organizational entities. Examples of attributing responsibility to York werearticles referring to his lack of using personal protective equipment (PPE) duringthe necropsy and his decision to perform this procedure in his garage, an unap-proved research location. References to NPS or other organizational entities intro-duced similar issues, such as poor facilities for wildlife biologists (e.g. nolaboratory for performing necropsies). Also mentioned was the perception that Yorkreceived limited job supervision, training on wildlife disease risk, or guidance onhow to use appropriate PPE. As these examples illustrate, the news accounts thatdid reference blame tended not to direct responsibility to particular individuals,such as staff at the GRCA health clinic (for their misdiagnosis of York’s condition).Moreover, the stories did not converge on a source of blame, i.e. York or someother person/entity, perhaps helping to avoid the sort of risk amplification othershave described (Susarla 2003). Had blameworthiness been a more central andconsensual focus of news coverage, attention might have increased.

Postcrisis

In the months following York’s death, NPS officials not only worked towardincreasing awareness of plague but also helped to carry this message beyond theNPS. Following CERC’s suggestions, these individuals drew attention to plague asa ‘new risk’ – one not always associated with biological fieldwork – and outlinedeffective ‘risk avoidance behaviors’; at the same time, their efforts appeared to‘reinforce positive … identity and image’ of the agency (Reynolds and Seeger2005, 53; see also Benoit 2004; Ulmer et al. 2009). Participants also described a‘new normal’ emerging from the crisis, a concept that has been employed by crisiscommunication scholars to explain changes in organizational approaches and beliefsystems inherent in the postcrisis ‘renewal’ process (e.g. Ulmer, Sellnow, andSeeger 2007).

Attention and credibility

Despite the tragic consequences of the York case, participants felt that the incidentushered some positive attention to both GRCA and NPS. From a public affairsperspective, the incident solidified relationships with the local press. Despite theirbest efforts, participants also noted, however, that there are always journalists whowill disagree with the park’s public information strategy, as noted earlier.

Participants suggested that the York case also drew positive attention to the NPSwildlife research program. Following the death, NPS created Reference Manual(RM) 50B, a policy document outlining safe work practices for biologists (US

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2008). The manual has subsequently been disseminated throughout NPS and tononNPS wildlife biologists, allowing for continued wildlife field research at all parkunits. Some participants suggested that RM 50B helped garner increased respectfrom the larger wildlife biology community, as well as build the credibility of NPSwildlife management researchers. Participants noted that numerous states, federalagencies, and NGOs have requested copies of the manual, thus not only contribut-ing to an increased awareness of zoonotic disease risk and prevention, but also pro-moting NPS’ leadership. NPS officials have presented the York case at professionalmeetings, as well as published accounts in the peer-reviewed literature. Such actionshave helped foster learning, in turn supporting the NPS’ commitment to continuingwildlife research.

‘New normal’

For many participants, returning to ‘normal’ life at GRCA was challenging. Mem-bers of the GRCA management most directly involved in the York case described adifficult path to reestablishing ‘normalcy’ in day-to-day operations. One managerdescribed how efforts to help her division heal were thwarted by the ongoing stringof public health investigations. According to this employee, normalcy ensued onlyafter the first-annual commemoration of York’s life at Celebrate Wildlife Day (May2008) and the designation of RM 50B (June 2008). Alternatively, an employee inthe Office of Public Affairs described how, following the release of the Board ofReview report in November 2008, press calls dwindled, and the office resumed itsprecrisis routine.

For GRCA employees less directly involved in wildlife research or the crisisresponse, the return to life-as-usual proceeded more quickly. For instance, onelower-level employee suggested that normalcy was restored following the park’srelease of the cause of death as pneumonic plague, just one week after York’sdeath. Other GRCA employees, struggling to attach a date to these changes,described how the ‘new normal’ of working at the park entailed new behaviors andfollowing new protocols, such as always wearing gloves when potentially exposedto wildlife, and receiving more wildlife safety training. Still others noted that theworkshop itself – for some, a profound and cathartic experience – was evidence ofthe long-term healing process that York’s death has come to represent. As is clearfrom participants’ reactions, no single action or event constituted a clear end to thecrisis, supporting some crisis communication scholars’ contention that the postcrisisstage often lacks a definite end (e.g. Heath 2004; Jaques 2007).

Discussion

Drawing on both SARF and CERC, we examined how aspects of organizationalcommunication may have attenuated rather than amplified plague concern. Beforeturning to practical and theoretical implications, it is important to address our limi-tations. First, because our study took place two years after York’s death, issues withrecall emerged, particularly, related to impressions of news reports. Moreover, someindividuals involved in the case had moved on to other jobs and were difficult tocontact. Our participants also included fewer ‘rank and file’ park employees, includ-ing concessions operations staff (e.g. hotel and restaurant staff, river guides, etc.).We had difficulty including these individuals in the workshop due to their work

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schedules. Interviews gauging this audience’s concern about plague and attitudestowards organizational communication efforts would have complemented the inputgathered from higher-ranking officials. Second, most empirical applications ofSARF involve a discrete measure of risk perception, usually achieved throughsurvey items; however, as explained in our analysis, our participants’ commentsindicated that, for the majority of GRCA employees and community members,plague was neither a large nor a lasting concern.

As with many qualitative case studies, the ‘external generalizability’ (Maxwell1996), or ability to extrapolate findings to settings and populations beyond thosestudied, is limited; however, this generalizability may be less critical than the abilityof the study to suggest new areas for theoretical development (Maxwell 1996).Such analysis can focus attention on areas for future research, and create researchquestions and hypotheses that may be tested more deductively in the future, whichwe demonstrate below.

Practical implications: preparing for risk/crisis events

The findings support the claim that predicting a response to a risk event or crisis ismore than a simple formula; many factors, from media coverage to preestablishedrelationships, contribute to public attention and organizational impacts. Moreover,the findings illustrate the importance of varying communication tactics at differentstages of a crisis/risk event. In this sense, a ‘competent’ organization embarks on afast-changing response, in tune with the dynamic nature of the event. By demon-strating that GRCA’s communication actions in the York case appropriately reflectedthe crisis stage, our analysis broadly supports CERC, with its strategic attention tothe appropriateness of risk communication by the crisis stage.

Our analysis illustrates the value of SARF for describing the unique condi-tions of an organizational setting, the nature of the risk event, including the bio-logical hazards to which members of the public may be exposed, and how suchindividuals might respond to a given risk-related crisis. The US national parks,for instance, vary widely in environmental characteristics such as topography,elevation, and climate, creating a range of potential risks, from plague in theSouthwest, to volcanic eruptions in the Pacific Northwest, to Lyme disease-carry-ing ticks in the Northeast (e.g. Tuler, Golding, and Krueger 2002). Moreover,national parks conjoin networks of employees, tourists, and community members,for whom a given risk event may be more or less salient, and more or lesslikely to be amplified. Some individuals may have never before visited (orworked at) a particular park and may not be aware of the associated risks, suchas rapidly changing weather, endemic zoonotic disease, or the effects of eleva-tion. Recognizing how risk attributes – including both perceived and ‘objective’characteristics – might favor amplification or attenuation would be an advisablecomponent of organizational training.

In the NPS context, park officials should be aware of the possibility for riskamplification/attenuation with respect to both common and relatively rare riskevents, such as zoonotic disease, and understand how messages might be designedto communicate about these risks at all stages of a crisis/risk event (Tuler andGolding 2002). In this way, we see the coupling of SARF and CERC (Figure 1) asproviding a comprehensive planning and response tool for managers of organiza-tions and industries susceptible to health and environmental crises, from national

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parks to food processing plants. While recognizing that no two crises or risk eventsare identical, we nonetheless see the SARF-CERC model as able to help managersunderstand localized (e.g. within an organization) and broader communicationaudiences and concerns that may emerge throughout the life cycle of a crisis/riskevent.

Theoretical implications: exploring managerial competence

Considering the principles of CERC can strengthen the applicability of SARF toorganizational contexts, conferring benefits to both the crisis and risk communica-tion fields. CERC, and crisis communication more generally, has excelled in provid-ing accounts of ‘best practices’ to manage organizational crises; yet, suchscholarship often lacks the type of deeper, explanatory power necessary for under-standing the origin of such events. As Marra (2004, 325) argues:

Although studies that demonstrate how public relations people should practice crisispublic relations are useful, the discipline is now at a point in time where it is impor-tant to understand why events occur.

Our goal in pairing SARF and CERC was not to pose a new, predictive theory;however, inspired by Marra’s (2004) call to action, we demonstrated how these twoperspectives lead us to a more comprehensive understanding of what ‘managerialcompetence’ entails, and how it might affect the amplification or attenuation of risk.

First, in the precrisis stage, CERC showcases how certain organizational charac-teristics, such as the relationships with outside agencies, the structures in place (e.g.crisis communication plans), and the experience with past crisis might influence theemergence of a crisis or risk event. Since crisis prevention is crucial for organiza-tional managers, filling the ‘gap’ apparent in SARF with CERC’s precrisis stageadvice allows for a more obvious connection to the management context.

During the crisis phase, CERC helps us explain more specifically how attributesof ‘information flow’ – an undifferentiated concept in the SARF model – mightinfluence audience interpretations, and/or behaviors, and in which circumstances;for instance, a competent manager would know how to balance the imperative tospeak honestly and candidly with publics with the need to convey uncertainty. Atthe same time, SARF fills apparent ‘gaps’ in CERC (and other crisis communica-tion literature) by explaining how certain characteristics of the risk, or of the event,might contribute to amplification or attenuation of public perceptions of risk.

In the postcrisis stage, the CERC-SARF combination draws attention to both themeso- and macro-level effects of crises or risk events. Whereas CERC focuses morespecifically on how organizational reputation can be affected and/or repaired (meso-level), SARF takes a broader macro view of societal impacts. Though both perspec-tives are necessary to understanding the fallout of a crisis or risk event, envisioningthem simultaneously (without privileging one other the other) may be challenging;a combined model, therefore, helps us begin to do so. By considering CERC along-side SARF, we are also reminded that crises can, in some instances, provide oppor-tunities for positive change, such as increased opportunities for public engagement,a (re)evaluation of a company’s safety strategy, or a (re)commitment to ethicalbehavior. Finally, CERC, and the crisis communication field more broadly, also

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emphasize the cyclical nature of a crisis or risk event, and that each of the ‘stages’may be, in practice, less obviously defined.

Future research

Our interest in pairing SARF and CERC in the context of understandingorganizational crises or risk events also leads us to pose questions for futureresearch. First, more research is necessary to understand how perceptions of mana-gerial competence may differ from this standard in distinct organizational settings,and among risk-affected populations. For instance:

• How do different stakeholders (e.g. lower-ranking employees, managers,paying clientele, etc.) define managerial competence, and how might suchunderstandings vary among audiences and at different stages in a crisis/riskevent?

• What might managerial competence entail in different institutional contexts,such as a for-profit company vs. a school or government agency?

• How does perceived managerial competence vary throughout the stages of acrisis/risk event, according to different stakeholders?

Second, empirical applications of SARF, as well as research in crisis communica-tion, have recognized attribution of responsibility as influencing the nature andextent of crises or risk events (e.g. Coombs 2007, 2010; Coombs and Holladay2006; Susarla 2003). Therefore, we ask:

• How might characteristics of the crisis or risk event (e.g. involving a ‘known’or ‘unknown’ risk, affecting human health or not, etc.) affect attribution oforganizational responsibility or blame?

• How might the nature of media coverage of a crisis or risk event affectattribution of organizational responsibility or blame? (Coombs and Holladay2006)

• What strategies can managers use to address CERC’s advice to facilitatediscussion and resolution of issues of blame and responsibility withouttriggering unwarranted risk amplification or attenuation?

Given the substantive overlap between the crisis and risk communication fields, thetheoretical overlap we have demonstrated between SARF and CERC is perhapsexpected; however, this and future research will help to show how such overlap canalso fill apparent gaps in each of the frameworks, providing a critical opportunitymake theory relevant in applied contexts.

AcknowledgmentsThis manuscript was prepared with funding from the National Park Service under TaskAgreement J2340100021 of the Great Lakes-Northern Forest Cooperative Ecosystem StudiesUnit under Cooperative Agreement H6000082000 between the National Park Service andthe University of Minnesota. Margaret Wild, of the NPS Biological Resource ManagementDivision, as well as Chuck Higgins and David Wong, of the NPS Office of Public Health,were instrumental in helping design and execute this research. We also thank employeesfrom Grand Canyon National Park for their helpful guidance and valuable contributions tothis study.

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Notes1. Importantly, some scholars have noted that crisis communication plans, while important,

do not, on their own, ensure the successful handling of crises. Understanding crisisresponse, instead, requires considering more ‘macro’-level elements, such as the organi-zational culture of the workplace, rather than just the ‘technical elements,’ like responseplans (Marra 1998, 2004).

2. The NPS published the following data on annual visitation at Grand Canyon NationalPark (NPS 2011):

• 2006 (prior to York’s death): 272, 623, and 980 recreational visits.• 2007 (York dies in late October): 275, 581, and 547 recreational visits.• 2008 (after York’s death): 274, 852, and 949 recreational visits.

Monthly visitation for GRCA was reported as the following:

• November 2006 (prior to York’s death): 239 and 306 recreational visits.• November 2007 (immediately following York’s death): 235 and 217 recreational visits(1.71% from 2006).

• November 2008 (1 year after York’s death): 209 and 843 recreational visits (10.79%change).

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