ethnopolitical discourse among ordinary malaysians. the discursive constructions of unity and...
TRANSCRIPT
Journal submitted to: Discourse & Society
ETHNOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE AMONG ORDINARY MALAYSIANS:
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF UNITY AND DIFFERENCE
Word count: 10, 687
By
Richard Buttny, Azirah Hashim and Kiranjit Kaur,
Richard Buttny is a Professor of Communication and Rhetorical Studies at Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 13244, USA. Tel: 315-443-5137; email: [email protected] Azirah Hashim is a Professor of English Languages and Linguistics at the University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Tel. 603-7967 3177; email: [email protected] Kiranjit Kaur is an Associate Professor of Communication and Media Studies at Universiti Teknologi MARA, 40450 Shah Alam, Malaysia. Tel. 603-55435936; email: [email protected] An earlier version of this study was presented at the National Communication Association Conference, Chicago, 2009. We gratefully acknowledge the comments or discussion on this project from Ee Lin Lee, Munis Paran, Lim Beng Soon, Moses Samuel, Mahmud Hassan Khan, Alena Sanusi, Cynthia Gordon, and Jodi Cohen. The first author thanks the Fulbright Commission for his Fellowship to Malaysia, 2008-09.
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ETHNOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE AMONG ORDINARY MALAYSIANS:
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF UNITY AND DIFFERENCE
Abstract
A focus group of ethnically diverse Malaysians was assembled to discuss the state of
multiculturalism in Malaysia. Discursive analysis was used to get at the participants’
speech practices and constructions of multiculturalism. Participants’ accounts revealed
an increased social distance between the Malays and non-Malays, but differing
explanations or solutions for such group boundaries. Participants’ accounts drew on
various voices in representing or evaluating the current situation and how it became this
way. Religion, especially Islam, was used as an ethnopolitical discourse and was
articulated in different ways. For instance, the Malays invoked being Muslim as the
primary source of identity and imagined community, while the non-Malays cited the
politicalization of Islam as a primary cause for the increasing boundary between groups.
The discussion pointed to increasing differences between Malays and non-Malays
suggesting that the problem of multiculturalism has been transformed into a bi-modal
ethnopolitical tension. (Key terms: Malaysian multiculturalism, ethnopolitical conflict,
Islamization, accounts, voicing, discursive analysis)
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ETHNOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE AMONG ORDINARY MALAYSIANS:
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF UNITY AND DIFFERENCE
Okay I’m- I’m very glad that you come up with this uhm very relevant what
some people might say sensitive questions because I think uhm that unless we
hear these questions and try to answer and face those questions you get no where
going around in circles: because we have to face (.) uh these questions if we hope
to progress
Malaysia as a multicultural country is widely recognized as a success story in
postcolonial Asia in managing ethnic tensions since independence. At the same time
many Malaysians identify more by their ethnoreligious group rather than as Malaysian.
A continuing issue for Malaysia as a multicultural society remains the relatively weak
sense of shared identity or national unity. While Prime Minister Najib has recently called
for “1 Malaysia,” critics have pondered what this really means or have dismissed it as
mere sloganeering or rhetoric (Chandra, 2011). In recent years there seems to be
heightened awareness of ethnic identities and religious differences which lead to
increasing social boundaries and a growing separation making the integration of the
society all the more difficult.
The epigram—a statement by a focus group participant captures one of the central
issues of our study: How can ordinary Malaysians discuss potentially sensitive or divisive
issues about ethnicity, religion, or identity with a diverse group of citizens. In this paper
we do a discursive analysis of a focus-group discussion on multiculturalism. In particular
we are interested in how various ethnic, racial, or religious notions get used in accounting
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for the current situation in Malaysia. How are various discourses used in explaining
ethnic identity or in imagining community?
Malaysia as Multicultural Society
Due to its favorable location along sea trading routes Malaysia has long been a
cross-roads for commerce, trade, and cultural exchange over the centuries (Hefner, 2001;
Hooker, 2003). The three largest cultural groups in Malaysia today are the Malays,
Chinese, and Indians. The Malays are the indigenous peoples comprising 65% of the
population. The Malays are Muslim, speak the national language, Malay, and largely run
the national government. The next largest group is the Chinese at about 25%. Most
Chinese immigrated during British colonial times in the late 19th Century to work in the
tin mines; they have prospered and have become the dominant economic group. The
Chinese are mostly Taoist or Buddhist and some Christians; they speak their native
language (e.g., Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien, Teochew, Hainanese, and Mandarin).1
Indians, who also arrived in large numbers during the colonial period to work the rubber
plantations, make up about 7% of the populous. They are largely Hindu with some Sikhs
or Christians, speak their native language (e.g., Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, and Punjabi)
and are the most economically disadvantaged of the three main groups. Many of the
Chinese and Indians also speak Malay, the national language, while English often serves
as a lingua franca for all the groups in business or urban contexts (Azirah, 2009). This is
of course a gross simplification of a complex situation in which multilingualism is
prevalent. English tends to be underestimated in official statistics with many urban
Malays, Chinese and Indians using it more domains than their declared ‘mother tongue’.
Each of these three main groups are diverse and are comprised of different ethnic or
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linguistic groups (Baskaran, 2004). In addition, there are many peoples of hybridized
identities, e.g., Eurasian, or recent immigrants, especially from Indonesia. The northern
states of Borneo became part of country in 1963 and added a number of other ethnic
groups to the Malaysian mosaic, e.g., Kadazan, Iban, and Melanau.
In Malaysia there is no one dominant group: the Malays control the political
realm, while Chinese Malaysians are dominant in business and trade (Hooker, 2004;
Mandal, 2004). Multicultural tensions arise, not from a legacy of racism as in the West,
but more from a “question of national belonging” (Goh, 2008). Despite the fact that the
vast majority of Chinese and Indians have lived in Malaysia for generations--“Who is an
immigrant?”--remains a hot-button issue (Mandal, 2004). The State’s intervening in
multicultural politics has had a major influence on the current situation. The racial
formation, bumiputera (literally “sons of the soil”), was created by the government by
combing the Malays along with other indigenous peoples from the Peninsula and Borneo
(Fee, 2006). The bumiputera need to be seen in contrast to the non-indigenous groups,
the Chinese and Indians. To achieve economic equality for the Malay majority group, a
New Economic Policy (NEP) was devised in 1971 to give the bumiputera “special rights
and privileges” which allows for positive discrimination in jobs, scholarships, and other
advantages (Sowell, 2004; Mutalib, 2007). This asymmetry in economic and educational
opportunities has led to a growing dissatisfaction among non- bumiputera (Haque, 2003).
“The expansive role of the state in managing, reinforcing and reengineering ethnic
identities in Malaysia is considered one of the major research interests in the realm of
Asian politics” (Haque, 2003, p. 242).
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These “racial formations” (Omi & Winant, 1994) or “racialization” categories
(Miles, 1989)—bumiputera, Malay, Chinese, and so forth—need to be seen as socio-
historical constructions rather than as essentialized natural categories. As Shamsul
argues about the category, Malay, “‘What it means’ has always been altered, invented,
redefined, reconstituted and boundaries expanded according to socio-historical
circumstances” (1996, p. 480). Today for most Malays, Muslim identity has become
increasingly important—constituting an “ethnoreligious resurgence” (Hefner, 2001;
Haque, 2003; Husin, 2008). According to a recent survey, when Malays were asked to
choose their primary identity between Malay, Muslim, or Malaysian, 72% chose Muslim
(Centre for Public Policy Studies, 2006 as cited in Furlow, 2009, p. 223). Indeed,
‘Malay’ is defined by the 1957 Constitution as one who professes Islam, speaks Malay,
and follows Malay customs. So with the category, Malay, ethnicity is directly tied to
religion (Mutalib, 2007).
This rise in Islamic identity has been explained in various ways.2 Religious
identity is said to be especially distinctive of Asian cultures (Bakar, 2001; Hooker, 2004).
The resurgence of identification with Islam in Malaysia, and throughout the world, has
been called ‘Islamization,’ reemerging in the 1960s and 70s (Houben, 2003; Liow, 2009)
and energized by the 1979 Iranian revolution. As Malays became more prosperous and
middle-class and moved to urban areas they became more religious in reaction to the
seeming unfettered materialism and the excesses of globalization (Sachedina, 2002;
Thompson, 2003; Aziz & Shamsul, 2004). The Islam of the kampong (village) proved
inadequate for the urban context leading to a decline in traditional values, so Malays
searched for other more pious versions of Islam (Houben, 2003; Fealy, 2005). The move
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towards stricter versions of Islam serves to symbolically cleanse Malays from past Hindu
influences and practices (Willford, 2006). This Islamic resurgence can be seen as part of
a Malay “cultural assertiveness” in state funding for Mosque construction, Islamic-style
architecture, in banning the shadow play, or in the fatwa against yoga (Peletz, 1997; Lee,
2000). The identities of Malay and Muslim have become increasingly intertwined
(Haque, 2003).
Malaysia is generally regarded as practicing a “moderate Islam” (Aziz & Shamsul,
2004). Yet the government’s championing of Islam and special privileges for Malays has
been be seen by some as an impediment to ethnic relations and “a threat to national
unity” (Hooker, 2004, p. 160). Mutalib (2007, p. 40) argues that Malaysia is not really a
“plural society” but a “bi-modal society” between Muslims and non-Muslims (also see
Mandal, 2004).
The official racialization categories recognized by the State—Malay, Chinese,
Indian, and Other—are the same categories inherited from British colonial rule
(Hirshman, 1986). A problem with these official categories is that they are socio-
historical constructions that have changed over time and most likely will continue to
change. Also these categories do not recognize the varied languages spoken under the
rubric Chinese (e.g., Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien, Teochew, Hainanese, and Mandarin) or
Indian (e.g., Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, and Punjabi) (Goh & Holden, 2009). These
racialization categories need to be seen in the Malaysian context not only as socio-
historical constructions (Shamsul, 2001), but also as “relational” (Mandal, 2004, p. 62),
or even “dialectical” (Fee, 2006, p. 223). For instance, the discourse of a Malay identity
as Muslim needs to be seen as counterpoised to a Chinese, non-Muslim identity.
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Discursively positioning oneself by certain racialization terms implicitly positions others.
As Mandal assesses the current situation, “Racialisation in Malaysia remains an urgent
matter for careful attention and elucidation of scholars” (2004, p. 65).
From this brief sketch we can see how diverse and multicultural Malaysia really is;
indeed Malaysia is one of the most multicultural states in the world. There are competing
assessments of how Malaysia has fared as a multicultural society. Malaysia is said to be
“among the most successful countries in postcolonial management of ethnic pluralism”
(Goh, 2008, p. 234); for most of the 50-plus years since independence the country has
been at peace and has grown economically such that today Malaysia is no longer
considered a third-world country (Aziz & Shamsul, 2004). Williamson (2002) argues
that “economic growth…is becoming the primary model of Malaysian nationalism” (p.
403) rather than ties of national culture, language or kinship (for a similar view also see
Ibrahim, 2004). On the other hand, Malaysia is said to be deeply divided along ethnic
lines with race/ethnicity influencing how Malaysians conduct themselves at all levels
(Haque, 2003; Hooker, 2004; Fee, 2006; Husin, 2008). A recent survey indicated that
“ethnocentric views, mistrust and misunderstanding (were) quite prevalent” (Merdeka
Centre, 2006 as cited in Taman, 2009). Generally people identify more with their ethnic
or religious affiliation than as Malaysian.
From this review of the literature there seems to be competing views of Malaysia
as multicultural society: on the one hand Malaysia is portrayed as deeply divided by
ethnicity and religion with simmering tensions, while on the other hand, the growing
emphasis on economic development has rendered identity politics increasingly to the
private realm. Another tension involves the public and private spheres: the role of the
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state as a political agent vis-à-vis multiculturalism (e.g., Malay special rights and
privileges). Also, how multicultural relations play out on the personal or interpersonal
level. In our study we examine how a group of ordinary Malaysians make sense of
multiculturalism in their own terms. What kinds of accounts do participants draw on to
interpret or articulate the current situation in Malaysia?
Analytic Perspective and Methods
Our perspective here is discursive constructionism (Buttny, 2004). We are
interested in both participants’ speaking practices and the discursive realities claimed
about multiculturalism. We examine, not only the content of what participants say—their
constructions, but also their speech practices in saying these--their constructing through
discourse. As constructionists we are interested in how the participants discursively
make sense of their social world. For instance, there is a growing consensus that the
notion of race does not have a scientific basis (Miles, 1989), but if people consider and
act toward it as real, then race can be said to have a social reality.
We begin by looking at participants’ accounts that portray events or assess the
current multicultural situation. Accounts are persons’ tellings of past events, present
conditions, or future possibilities which purport to describe, explain or assess that content
(Buttny, 1993). Accounts can take the form of a narrative or of propositions. Accounts
typically contain references to various categories of persons. We are interested in how
these persons and their actions get represented; more specifically, how these actors are
identified, what voice(s), if any, are they given, and how they are positioned by the
speaker. By “identified” we mean the terms or categories used to reference the actors’
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age and the like. How are these terms discursively
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organized in making explicit or implicit claims about these persons? As will be seen,
such discourse often focuses on problematic aspects of multicultural contact. In the
accounts, these persons are given a “voice” in various ways to portray their actions or
positions (Bakhtin, 1986). The teller “ventriloquises” (Cooren, 2008) the voices of
different persons in representing their actions. Through such voicing, persons become
‘positioned’ in the account, which is portrayed or evaluated favorably or unfavorably by
the teller (Harrè & Langenhove, 1999). How participants represent the contact between
groups allows them to portray events and also to comment on them, to evaluate or explain.
Representations of multicultural contact are often heard as complaints or criticisms. Such
accounts work to position self and other, which in turn makes relevant a response from
other group members to defend, explain, or make a counter-assertion. Much inter-ethnic
discourse takes the form of criticism-defense sequences.
Many studies of multiculturalism have a “limited geopolitical perspective” within
North America or Europe (He & Kymlicka, 2005; Goh, 2008, p. 233). There is a need to
look at other multicultural societies such as Malaysia in its postcolonial, South-East
Asian context. Often discussions involving multiculturalism result in complaints or
criticisms about other ethnic groups. Such conflictive discourse invariably involves
political aspects, what has been called “ethnopolitical conflict” (Ellis, 2006). We draw
on an ethnopolitical conflict perspective to examine how various discursive resources get
invoked (e.g., collective memory, narratives, values) in positioning one’s own or other
groups. On this view, ethnicity is not essentialized or fixed, but rather gets activated
through discourse. Boundaries of ethnic identity are flexible and based on fluid symbolic
distinctions. There is a “grammar to developing ethnic identity” through naming, avowals,
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argument or other discursive acts (Ellis, 2006, p. 58). Political leaders mobilize members
through rhetorical appeals, such as by citing ethnic grievances. Ethnicity gets used in
identity politics in accentuating or minimizing identity, group differentiation, or cultural
boundaries. The most potentially contentious condition involves ethnically similar
groups who live side by side but are religiously dissimilar (Henderson, 1997 (cited in
Ellis, 2006, p. 42)). Religion can become intertwined with ethnic identity, hence the
notion of ‘ethnoreligious identity.’
As seen from the above literature review, the special privileges for Malays or the
role of Islam in society are considered to be “sensitive topics” such that public discussion
of them is prohibited by law (Haque, 2003; Ganeson, 2005; Gomez, 2009). Talk about
sensitive topics or complaints about other ethnic groups generally only occur within one’s
own group. Despite these obstacles, we wondered how a discussion of multiculturalism
in Malaysia would unfold. How would a mixed group of articulate Malaysians from
different ethnoreligious backgrounds address one another’s issues and concerns? How do
participants represent or evaluate the contact between groups? How are various
participants’ accounts organized or put together into a discourse to portray identity
through voicing and stake out positions? Given the above-mentioned issues of ethnicity,
religion, identity, and nation we also wondered, what is the vision that participants have
for Malaysia, what is their “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006)? We focus on these
accounts as a snapshot of the state of multicultural Malaysia.
Data
Our data come from an audio recording of a focus group conducted in April 2009.
Eight Malaysians of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds living in the capitol area,
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Kuala Lumpur, comprised the group. Participants were recruited through contact with an
inter-faith dialogue leader to discuss multiculturalism in Malaysia. The participants were
all middle-aged, evenly divided by gender, and included three Malays, two Chinese, two
Indians, and one who described herself as hybrid--of mixed ethnicity. A brief sketch of
the participants’ ethnoreligious backgrounds is provided using pseudonyms: (1) James,
Chinese-Malaysian Muslim; (2) Jennifer, Chinese-Malaysian Buddhist; (3) Ibrahim,
Malay-Muslim man; (4) Norazam, Malay-Muslim man; (5) Dorothy who describes
herself as hybrid and from Sabah; (6) Peter, Indian-Malaysian Christian; (7) Shanthi,
Indian-Malaysian Hindu woman: and (8) Ramlah, Malay-Muslim woman. Shanthi wore
a sari; the other participants did not wear culturally identified clothing. Participants
spoke in English with some code-switching with Malay.
Our research team includes two Malaysian scholars, a Malay and the other of
Indian ancestry, and a visiting scholar from the US. The North American and Indian-
Malaysian researchers served as discussion facilitators for the group. We had prepared
questions, but by and large, allowed the discussion take its own course. The eight
participants and two discussion facilitators sat around a large table. The meeting lasted
for two hours and twenty minutes. The meeting was audio-recorded and relevant
portions were transcribed using a modified Jefferson format (see Appendix for
transcription symbols).
The data extracts below were selected after multiple listenings to the recording
and reading over the transcripts. We selected data extracts for analysis which reflected
problematic or contested aspects of multiculturalism. The first section below examines
statements that tell of the growing ethnic separation between Malays and non-Malays. In
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the criticisms or accounts for this ethnic separation, participants draw on discursive
aspects of religion. In the second section we examine accounts containing ethnoreligious
discourse.
The Discursive Construction of Multiculturalism in Malaysia
We begin by looking at how participants characterize multiculturalism. As will
be seen, participants characterize the current situation by terms such as “polarized,”
“separated,” “divided,” and the like. Here we examine how participants discursively
represent, evaluate, or explain such multicultural problems.
“The good-old days”
Early on in our focus-group discussion the notion of “the good-old days” was
brought up by participants to contrast to the socially distant and politicized contact of
today. Participants had different senses of “the good-old days.” We begin by examining
the different accounts and positionings towards this collective memory.
To get the focus group started, the facilitators posed a question about
multiculturalism in Malaysia. Coincidently a few days prior to our meeting Prime
Minister Najib called for “Bangsa Malaysia” (One Malaysia). We asked: “What’s your
sense of the current situation as regards religion and identity and race or nationality in the
sense of how things are if I may ask a very broad question.”
Each participant was requested to make an opening statement of their views. The
first two speakers gave rather broad abstract statements about the hope for national unity.
The third speaker then offered the following account about a conference he attended on
multiculturalism. Notice the contrast he draws between the past, “the good-old days,”
and today, the problematic present of being “polarized”.
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#1. (S:3. Note: RB is one of the discussion facilitators)
01 James: there’s a workshop (.) they then asked people to
02 think like ah how do they think about how
03 Malaysia is supposed to be[( ) very=
04 RB: [Hm
05 James: =colorful and how they see Malaysia is supposed
06 to be, ↑I just summarize what I feel at the end
07 of it, they felt that there’s something which
08 they called §the good-old days§ and most of the
09 participants are quite ol(h)d h[h so they=
10 Participants: [hhhhh
11 James: =remember the good-old days by people are free to
12 interact with each other and feel so free: and
13 they can visit each other’s house:: and eat: and
14 sit together but now they feel that we have been
15 polarized >okay< there was the actually (count)
16 even though there is lip services of a- of
17 integration and so forth but a- but a by and
18 large political party has been creating more and
19 more polarizations among the group
This reporting from the workshop takes the form of a problem narrative: the collective
memory of an idyllic past (“the good-old days”) has given way to the problems of today
(“polarized”) (Gergen & Gergen, 1983; Van Dijk, 1987). James’ narrative uses the
membership category, “people” at the “workshop,” which he laughingly describes as
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“quite ol(h)d” (line 9). James’ characterization of “the good-old days” gets unpacked in
terms of positive contact as “people are free to interact with each other and feel so free:
and they can visit each other’s house:: and eat: and sit together” (lines 11-14). These
favorable relations are then contrasted with the problematic present, or “now,” the feeling
of being “polarized” (lines14-15).
In telling this narrative, James draws on the voice of the old people via free
indirect speech (Li, 1986), mixing their words, “the good-old days,” with his own in
summation. In drawing on the old people’s voices, James can present their critical
assessment with a footing of just conveying what was said. That is, he reports their
criticism, “they feel that we have been polarized” (lines14-15). In Goffman’s (1981)
terms, James is the “animator,” rather than the “author,” of this complaint.
James continues pointing to the “political party” as responsible for the increasing
“polarizations among the group” (line 12) it becomes unclear whether he is referencing
the old people or speaking for himself. Left implicit here is the political party in question
and what groups are polarized. James’ problem narrative uses contrast categories: “the
good-old days,” when people were free to interact with each other, with the “now” of
feeling “polarized” due to politics. On his account, the political level has negatively
affected the everyday life of ordinary Malaysians.
Other participants draw on this phrase, “the good-old days,” comment on it and
extend it in different directions. In the next extract, Jennifer extends the problem
narrative in being more pointed about the politics. She is the second speaker after James
(extract #1) and she offers the following explanatory account for the current problematic
situation:
16
#2. (J: 4)
1 Jennifer: Yeah I agree with what James said about the
2 good-old days when we played together and nobody
3 ever talked about what race you were from it is
4 largely the government’s fault and also of course
5 ( ) uhm how do you say it Ismal-iz-my-
6 <Is-lam-iz-ation> of government ( ) slowly
7 creeping in
“The good-old days” is used as a shorthand formulation for James’ narrative.
Jennifer’s recounting of “the good-old days” adds the specific social activity, “played
together.” She contrasts this playing together with the current situation of talking about
race. The notion of ‘race’ continues to be used in everyday parlance even though it has
been largely discredited as a scientific concept (Miles, 1989; Ray, 2009). Jennifer is
more pointed in attributing responsibility for the negative change to the government,
specifically, to the Islamization of government (lines 3-4). The national government is
largely run by Malays who are Muslim.
In this extract we see the uses of two key terms, “race” and “Islamization,” both
of which are presented in a critical light as creating division among peoples. In both
extracts 1 and 2 we also have this contrast between everyday, ordinary activities (visiting,
eating and sitting together, and playing) and the political party/government. And the
latter is singled out and criticized for damaging the positive relations among groups by
emphasizing racial/ethnic differences. So in both these accounts we have a portrait of the
political seeping into the everyday life and leading to a heightening of ethnoreligious
difference and increasing social distance between groups.
17
In response to these negative assessments we get a somewhat more nuanced,
defensive evaluation from the next speaker, Norazam, who is Malay. He offers a counter
explanation of the current situation.
#3. (N: 5)
01 Norazam: this thing about racialization and polarization
02 >yeah it’s there< but it’s not as bad as what we
03 imagine (.) because- but like myself I have got
04 very close Chinese friends very close Indian
05 friends I don’t say because I was abroad it’s
06 there because human nature is there like will
07 attract like so I have got other Malay friends
08 I’ve got Chinese friends Indian friends who
09 interact but we do have some problems because for
10 the last thirty forty years we had problems in
11 school (.) it started in schools because- I’m
12 very sure that the founding fathers of Malaysia
13 never wanted us to be separated it’s just- it’s a
14 development of history and we had the- we had
15 the- I do not know if you’re aware RB that we
16 had a very painful episode in our history the May
17 13th riots [ involving the two bigger communities
18 RB: [Hm uh
19 Norazam: = the Chinese and the Malays the Chinese said
20 the Malays started it and the Malays said the
18
21 Chinese started it ( ) whatever it is? the
22 impact was there
Here Norazam formulates the criticisms of the prior speakers as “racialization and
polarization” (line 1). But he moves to diminish the magnitude of these problems by his
assessment, “>yeah it’s there< but it’s not as bad as what we imagine” (lines 2-3). He
minimizes the prior speakers’ complaints by a “yes, but” [account]. As he explains the
intergroup tensions, “it’s there because human nature is there like will attract like” (lines
5-7). This explanation invokes “human nature” along with an interpersonal-relations
principle, “like will attract like.” By drawing on these quasi-scientific, folk explanations
(Hewitt & Hall, 1973), Norazam attempts to naturalize, and thereby normalize, the social
distance between groups.
In terms of the relations between groups, Norazam talks about his own
relationships as having “very close Chinese friends very close Indian friends” (lines 4-5).
But, as he elaborates, we “interact but we do have some problems” (line 9). Norazam
moves to explain the current situation by broader historical causes: “problems in school”
(lines 10-11) and “the May 13th riots” of 1969 (lines 16-17). Unlike the prior speakers
(extracts 1-2), he attempts to portray these problems as understandable--as he puts it “a
development of history” (line 14). In accounting for the May 13th riots Norazam draws
on the voices of the conflicting ethnic groups by using choral speech (Tannen, 2008),
“the Chinese said…and the Malays said…” (lines 19-21). His assessment of these riots,
“the impact was there” (line 22), represents the current strained relations. Again we see
another historical explanation for the current social distance between groups. So we have
competing collective memories or contested accounts for the current ethnopolitical
tensions.
19
The next participant, Ibrahim, also Malay, references “the good-old days” in order
to recognize the previously mentioned problems, but he offers different ways to see the
current situation.
#4. (I: 7)
1 Ibrahim:…I: I: also like to spend a little time
2 reminiscing on the good-old days because every
3 ti:me I give talks on inter-faith and often
4 questions from the older generation who say
5 why::: are the people here now not as warm: to
6 one another=last time we used to go to each
7 others’ houses uhm I think the general perception
8 is ah it used to be good in the good-old days
9 and not any more uhm: (.) uhm but we cannot just
10 grumble on that without having a reality check to
11 what has happened?
Here Ibrahim’s narrative abstract (Labov & Waletzky, 1967) “reminiscing on the good-
old days” (line 2), is hearably a bit ironic--perhaps echoing James’s embedded laughter
(extract #1) in noting the “old” participants. He uses choral speech to give voice to the
view of the “older generation” (lines 4-7). His affective metaphor, “now not as warm: to
one another,” gives voice to the older generation’s complaint along with their report of
the good-old days, “we used to go to each others’ houses” (lines5-7). But he then
immediately shifts footing to raise doubts about the older generation’s problem
assessment, as he puts it, “the general perception is ah it used to be good in the good-old
days” (line 7-9). The implication here, of course, is that it really was not so “good in the
20
good-old days.” He continues to cast doubts by referring to the older generation’s
problem narrative as “grumbl(ing)” which he contrasts to “a reality check” (lines 9-11).
He then proceeds to lay out this “reality check” as a more accurate version of events.
As Ibrahim continues with an extended turn at talk, he offers a couple of
explanations for what he calls the growing “difference” between groups. One is that each
ethnic community wants its own schools to preserve their language and culture (not
examined here). In addition, he offers a second explanation about Malays becoming
more educated about their Muslim religion:
#5. (I: 8)
1 Ibrahim: and when after- after independence and then (.)
2 not immediately after independence there was a
3 slow but noticeable and now obvious difference
4 (.) in the attitude of the Mala:ys (.) and their
5 religion last time you can say the Malays were
6 all so open because they did not know much about
7 religion (.) so as the Malays became more
8 educated about religion and realized that there
9 were rules and regulations about being a Muslim
10 (.) it means not just: (.) calling yourself a
11 Muslim but also there are rules and regulations
12 to follow
Here Ibrahim formulates a version of what others have said about the good-old days:
“you can say the Malays were all so open…” (lines 5-6). “Open” is an interesting
metaphor which seems to echo James’s previous version in extract #1, “people are free to
21
interact with each other and feel so free:” (lines 11-12). But for Ibrahim, this “so free”
and “so open” is not the idyllic past as in James’s narrative, but reflects a state of Malay
ignorance, as he puts it “not know(ing) much about religion” (lines 6-7). The “reality
check” for Ibrahim is the “rules and regulations about being a Muslim” (line 11-12). He
does not specify these “rules and regulations” are, but the implication seems to be that
they proscribe against the free and open relations of the past. So Islam gets invoked to
explain the changes in contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, between Malays and
other groups. Unlike Jennifer’s criticism of “Islamization” (extract #2), Ibrahim is not
criticizing these changes.
As Ibrahim moves to conclude he returns to his formulations “reality check” and
“the good-old days” to comment on the current social distance between groups.
#6. (I: 11)
1 Ibrahim: …so these are my observations about the reality-
2 check what happened how did it happen from the
3 good-old day- or the not-so-good-old days, of
4 course I have not mentioned the role of
5 politicians and all that that we know (.) add to
6 the problem every time that there’s elections the
7 politicians need votes so you can be seen as a
8 hero they will bring up racial and religious
9 issues that we all know
Here Ibrahim continues to undermine the notion of “the good-old days” by correcting it
to “the not-so-good-old days” (line 3). Again he contrasts “the good-old days” to the
22
“reality-check.” This combined with his attributing “the good-old days” to the older
generation becomes a way to challenge that viewpoint.
Ibrahim appends an explanation, mentioned previously, about “politicians” as a
main source of group tension (lines 4-9). So again we have a portrayal of the political
dynamic adversely affecting the interpersonal contact between ordinary people of
different groups.
Another use of “the good-old days” comes a bit later on. Here an interlocutor,
Norazam, ironically formulates Dorothy’s account of her past as “the good-old days.”
#7. (D: 25)
1 Dorothy: …I mean seriously coming from Sabah and Sarawak
2 ( )before ya know the politics and the
3 (.) privileges that have been given because of
4 conversion and- and also your race ( [ )
5 Shanthi: [Yes
6 Dorothy: = ya know my best days are there other than
7 ( [ )
8 Norazam: [Good-old days hhh[hh
9 Dorothy: [Not good-old days- I’m
10 sorry it’s still good I’m sorry I go back to
11 Sabah it’s still good we still drink at the same
12 table we don’t care you could have a God above
13 you I mean it’s just a Chinese God in a coffee
14 shop but here we are sitting down Muslims and all
15 eating drinking talking coffee shop so I think
23
16 that politics and- and this privileges that ya
17 know been used selectively has been a the one
18 that has divided us all
Here Dorothy is criticizing some of the government’s policies on religion and race
(lines 1-3). As she discloses, “my best days are there,” Norazam overlaps her saying,
“Good-old days hhhhh” (lines 7-8). Given that the prior uses of “the good-old days”
were associated with the elderly, such an ascription of Dorothy is hearably a mocking or
a teasing. In addition, Norazam appends laughter to underscore the irony. Dorothy does
not attend to the humor and gives a serious response (lines 9-18) (Drew, 1987). She
resists Ibrahim’s ascription with, “Not good-old days,” but then immediately corrects
herself by “it’s still good” (line 11). In support she repeats her avowal, “it’s still good,”
and then specifies the “good” activities: “sitting down…eating drinking talking” (lines
11-15). Notice how similar this listing of intergroup contact is to James’ listing of social
activities (excerpt #1, lines 13-14).
Norazam’s teasing ascription, “Good-old days,” is hearably responsive, not only
to Dorothy’s avowal, “my best days are there” (line 6), but also to her criticisms of
government policies on religion and race. Given that the national government is
effectively controlled by the Malays, and that Norazam is Malay, her criticisms can be
heard as directed at them. As she specifies the criticisms: “the politics and the (.)
privileges that have been given because of conversion and- and also your race” (lines 2-4).
The use of “privileges” here is a short-hand for ‘special Malay privileges.’ Such
privileges are part of the policy of positive discrimination in education and the economy
for the Malays. So Norazam’s ironic use of “good-old days” can be heard, not only as a
24
tease for one reminiscing on the past, but also on a political level to disparage Dorothy’
criticisms of Malay privileges.
By way of summary, we have examined the various uses or responses to the
formulation, “the good-old days,” to get at how participants represent multicultural
contact. “The good-old days” is used within various discursive practices, for instance, to
tell a problem narrative of the loss of free and open relations between groups (extracts
#1-2 and 7). But other participants attempt to undermine this narrative by contrasting
“the good-old days” with “reality check,” by negating it, calling it “grumble(ing),” or by
using “the good-old days” ironically, (extracts 4-7). Other terms which assessed the state
of multicultural contact included: “separated” (extract #3), “not as warm” (extract #4),
“so open” (extract #5), “still good” (extract #7) and so on. Another discursive practice
involved listing the particular forms of communication and contact: “visit…eat and sit
together” (extract #1), “played together…never talked about race” (extract #2), or “eating
drinking talking” (extract #7). There seems to be a consensus that the current state of
multicultural relations are problematic, though differences in how problematic.
Participants offered various explanations for the problematic relations: “Islamization”
(extract #2), Malays becoming more educated “about religion” (extract #5), “human
nature” (extract 3), and so on. The political level is represented as adversely affecting the
everyday interactional level between groups (extracts #1, 2, 6, 7). In terms of the cultural
groups where the tensions lie, it seems to break down along ethnic and religious lines:
between Malays who are Muslim and the other Malaysian groups. So talk about
multicultural relations merges into talk about religion and ultimately into talk about
politics.
25
Discursive Aspects of Identity: Religion, Boundaries, and Communication
Religion seems to have emerged as a particularly salient area of cultural
difference, especially for the Malays. As we have seen, becoming more knowledgeable
of Islam’s “rules and regulations” was said to lead to restrictions in the free and open
contact between groups (extract 5). The so-called Islamization of government has been
cited for creating group tensions (extract 2, 6-8). This ethnoreligious resurgence can be
used discursively as a marker of identity, but also can increase social boundaries between
groups. In this section, we examine how participants portray various aspects of religion
as part of talk about identity and contact between groups.
Given participants’ prior comments about religion and other identity terms, one of
the discussion leaders raises the question about which of the various identities matters
most for participants:
#8. (N: 12-13)
1 RB: We have these different kind of terms put on the
2 table about religion or ethnicity or race or
3 nationality I mean what about in terms of your
4 own identity I mean is there something that comes
5 first?
((skip eight lines))
14 Norazam: a good Muslim he will always react (.) as a
15 Muslim [ above Malaysian above Malay
16 RB: [Hm
((skip one line))
18 Norazam: The true participating Muslim will react first
26
19 as a Muslim
((skip 15 lines))
35 Norazam: so you asked the question of me? I’m a teacher
36 to my son and his friends Muslims first then the
37 Malays then Malaysians (.) then of course
38 we’re members of one whole family
Here Norazam responds that for Malay Muslims, religious identity matters more than
ethnic identity or national Malaysian identity. He presents his answer using the
evaluative membership terms, the “good Muslim” (line 14) or “the true participating
Muslim” (line 18). He uses the extreme-case formulation, they “will always react as a
Muslim” (lines 14-15), said emphatically. Then again, they “will react first as a
Muslim” (line 18-19). His final summation states his own view which he identifies as a
response to the question. He presents the identities hierarchically: Muslim religious
identity first, followed by Malay ethnic identity, then Malaysian national identity (line
36-38).
A bit later we get a similar kind of answer from another participant about the
hierarchy of Malay identities. Here a common Malay slogan is drawn upon to articulate
this hierarchy of identities.
#9. (I: 20-21)
7 Ibrahim: I would say the majority so the majority of the
8 Malay mind-set you can get a clue there is an
9 often oft-quoted Malay phrase demi agama, bangsa,
10 negara you know already the priority which means
11 for the sake of religion race and nation ↑that’s
27
12 a standard Malay phrase you know it’s a
13 (priority) religion race and nation I’m- you’ve
14 gone to school you heard this whenever there’s
15 speeches you mention the three if it’s a Malay
16 speaking it is agama bangsa nagara so you got the
17 answer
These two extracts underscore the importance of religion in Malay discourse such that
being Muslim is avowed as primary before ethnicity and nationality. This hierarchy of
identities gets encapsulated in this “oft-quoted Malay phrase” (lines 9-10). It is
interesting how certain utterances become crystallized as phrases or slogans and become
quoted by others. Here Ibrahim labels this phrase as his answer (line 16-17) which he
explains captures the “mind-set” of the Malays (line2). Also, this hierarchy of identities
indicates that the connectedness between Malay Muslims and non-Muslims appears
rather thin. Shared religion is presented as a primary form of connectivity and
community in these Malays’ discourse.
A rather different view of religion and difference is offered by another participant
in the following; here James comments on the communicative aspects of religion in both
a positive and a negative sense.
#10. (S: 15-16)
4 James: as one Koranic verse say invite people by your
5 good- good- by your good action by your good
6 deeds so that people see:: your (works) and >ask
7 what religion< but by seeing your action? they
8 are interested what religion are you? and then
28
9 you can share with them then othat’s beautifulo
10 but I’m a Muslim do- do whatever I do and so
11 forth ( ) avoid this and avoid that and how I
12 dress and so forth >see< ↑but as what we see
13 inside the papers (.) how many of these people
14 are corrupt, how many people do a lot of abuses
15 and so forth
((skip 4 lines))
20 so:: for example I’m attached with this group
21 services international we are a small group of
22 people but what we do is very interactive
23 whenever we meet we do community work (.) they do
24 services and (do things for) people and when we
25 talk about religion we talk about religion but we
26 try to understand other people and then you your
27 view you your opinion and so forth I may disagree
28 with you but (then) I respect you ( )
James invokes a Koranic verse about the power of good deeds and actions which he
claims others will see and then ask you about your religion. James uses indirect speech in
summarizing the Koranic verse; his summary speech seems to blend into his own
imagining of an action scenario. Here is the implicit contrast between words and deeds,
prescriptions/proscriptions and actions. This “words versus deeds” is a familiar trope;
words are easy while actions reveal who you really are. The scenario that he envisions
29
projects that when others see your good deeds, they will be moved to ask what religion
you are, which in turn “you can share with them” (lines 8-9).
He contrasts this power of good actions and deeds from the Koran to the
hypothetical example of the proselytizing Muslim who is discovered to be “corrupt”
(lines13-14). Instead of just describing the hypocritical Muslim, he takes on and
performs that prototypical voice, “do whatever I do and so forth ( ) avoid this and avoid
that and how I dress” (lines10-12). So we have the portrayal of the corrupt Muslim who
prescribes/proscribes in contrast to the “beauty” of “good action” and “good deeds” as
expressed in the Koran.
Earlier in recounting his background, James described himself as a Chinese-
Malaysian who converted to Islam in order to marry a Malay (not shown in the above
transcript). Being a Muslim himself perhaps gives him more license to criticize “the
corrupt Muslim.”
James illustrates further the power of good deeds and actions with an account
about his community group that does community service. As he tells it, they do discuss
religion but they try to understand one another; even if they disagree, they “respect” one
another (lines 25-28). His recounting of community work and service leads into talk
about religion. Religion, of course, can be one of the most sensitive topics between
different groups. Notice the contrasts he draws between “talk about religion but we try to
understand” (lines 25-26) and between “I may disagree with you but (then) I respect you”
(lines 27-28). James invokes the metadiscursive notions, “try(ing) to understand” and
“respect,” as possible solutions to managing talk about religious difference.
30
In the following we can see another ecumenical view of religion which is
contrasted to a dominant Malay version of Islam.
#11. (J: 22-23)
1 John: You know the reason that I’m interested is
2 because I have friends from Sabah Sarawak they
3 are way: ahead of us in race (.) and religious
4 traditions and they have been so because of
5 history in the same families you may not have
6 heard of it in the same family you might have a
7 Christian[ a Hindu you have a =
8 Dorothy: [a Christian
9 John: = Muslim you may even have a Buddhi[st and they=
10 Dorothy: [Yes
11 John: =intermarry no question (.) they interpret the
12 Koranic verses no (comparison) to religion in a
13 way to do that and be ( ) so they are
14 quite comfortable in having in one family
15 people of different relig- that’s why I wanted to
16 know: [ because I believe they were a glowing =
17 Dorothy: [Yes
18 John: = tribute and a model for the rest of Malaysia
19 >I mean that’s my personal view<
((skip 8 lines))
28 John: I know the personal experience of people there
31
29 they have taken a stand some of whom have been
30 Christians who married Muslims and the judge
31 who’s (then) from Malaysia went there and he said
32 you cannot but they said look we’ve been
33 practicing this all along and ( ) so
34 these are actual examples of inter ( ) in Sabah
35 so that’s why I wanted to hear before I give my
36 personal views
One way that participants discuss multicultural relations is to cite times or places when or
where such contact has been successful. Such temporal or geographic reference allows
for a comparison or contrasts to the current time or place. We have already seen this
practice of noting of more successful times of multicultural contact through “the good-
old-days” narratives (above). Here John cites a place, Sabah and Sarawak (the states of
East Malaysia), and makes a contrast as their being “way: ahead of us in race (.) and
religious traditions” (line 2-4). Dorothy’s active recipiency (lines 8, 10, 17) of John’s
descriptions and assessments displays her alignment with him. Earlier she described
Sabah and Sarawak favorably in terms of multicultural contact (extract #7).
John proceeds to describe how in a family there may be members of different
religions. He lays out the different religions by listing the four main faiths of the region.
Then he says people of these different religions “they intermarry” immediately followed
by the emphatic, “no question” (lines 9-11). Intermarriage, of course, is probably the
most intimate form of multicultural contact. John then moves from this account of
multiculturalism to his favorable assessment, calling it “a model for the rest of Malaysia”
(lines 18-19).
32
John continues by conveying what he heard from “the personal experience of
people there” (line 28). He tells the narrative of a judge from Malaysia who tells
Christian-Muslim couples, “you cannot.” But these couples, as he puts it, take “a stand”
and reply, “look we’ve been practicing this all along” (lines32-33). In this exchange
between the judge’s censor and the couple’s justification, John uses direct speech in
performing the couple’s constructed dialogue. The implication in this narrative is that the
judge is a Malay Muslim from peninsular Malaysia. In addition, unlike the peninsula,
Sabah and Sarawak are not majority Muslim states and consequently allow for more
liberal interpretations of “the Koranic verses” (lines 11-12).
By way of summary, participants discursively portray religion in terms of
difference. Differences can be overcome by showing “respect” for others or by doing
“good actions” (extract #10) or by “intermarriage” or in more progressive places such as
Sabah and Sarawak (extract #11 and 7). Religious difference can also create boundaries
between groups but unifies people within those boundaries. For the Malay-Muslim
participants here, religion is avowed as the primary signifier of identity (extracts #8-9).
So religion can be used discursively to comment on multiculturalism and one’s imaged
community.
Discussion
The project here has been to see what our discursive analysis perspective could
reveal about multiculturalism through an in-depth look at Malaysians in conversation.
We did not expect to find any new positions or solutions to the problem of
multiculturalism, but rather to discern how a mixed group of ordinary Malaysians would
grapple with potentially sensitive topics. Our focus group could be taken as a kind of
33
nascent public sphere. Participants, in drawing on various discourses, had to converse—
to address one another’s points and responses. Two themes emerged from our data: the
growing separateness between the Malays and non-Malays, and the discursive uses of
religion for identity and communication. Discussing multiculturalism quickly turned into
accounts about the decline of everyday social contact between Malays and the others.
There was consensus that these intergroup relations were strained than in the past, but
disagreement over the degree of this strain or how to explain it.
Turning to our discursive analysis perspective, we examined how participants’
accounts get constructed: what practices are used and what social realities are claimed or
contested. Participants offer accounts to characterize the situation in various ways: as
having changed for the worse, as problematic, or as understandable. In their accounts
some participants use discursive practices of contrast structures: the past versus the
present (i.e., from good to bad), grumbling versus reality check (i.e., from bad to
understandable), or good works versus being hypocritical (i.e., appearance and reality).
Generally participants’ accounts portray, not a single event, but a recurring state-
of-affairs, e.g., increased social distance; e.g., Malays becoming more aware of their
religion. In these accounts various categories of persons are portrayed. The
persons/actors/characters generally are represented, not as individuals, but as an
aggregate--as a group (e.g., the older generation; the government; the Malays; friends
from Sabah Sarawak), or as a prototypical actor (e.g., the good Muslim; the corrupt
Muslim), though there are a few references to a specific individual (e.g., my son; the
judge). These two features of the accounts—as recurring or as about the aggregate—are
ways to magnify or underscore the problematic assessment.
34
In offering these accounts participants frequently use various kinds of voicing to
represent actions or to evaluate the social actors. One kind of voicing is attributing words
to others, so-called reported speech, for instance, to the older generation (excerpt #1, #4),
the Chinese and the Malays (excerpt #3), the corrupt Muslim (excerpt #10), or the
exchange between the judge and the couple from Sabah (excerpt #11). Another kind
voicing was the performing the “oft-quoted Malay phrase” (excerpt #9), or the passage
from the Koran (excerpt #10). Also, voicing was used a key word or phrase to evoke a
prior speaker: “the good-old days.” This phrase was transformed as “the not-so-good old
days” (excerpt #6), or used ironically (excerpt #7). A related practice to voicing is
referring to the talk itself, so-called metadiscourse: “nobody talked about…” (excerpt #2),
“reminiscing” (excerpt #4), “you asked a question” (excerpt #8), “talk about religion”
(excerpt #10). These various kinds of voicing or metadiscourse play a key part in
constructing the account in criticizing, defending, or explaining the teller’s stance. These
accounting practices in portraying others also display the teller’s own identity or stance.
Through accounts about others, the teller in effect, positions him/herself.
Now turning from these micro discursive practices to the broader social realities
claimed in these accounts. As the discussion preceded, references to religion—Islam in
particular—became more evident. Islam was cited to explain the increased social
distance between groups in a favorable sense, e.g., Malays becoming more aware of
Islam’s “rules and regulations” or in a negative sense, e.g., “Islamization of government”
or as a way to bridge differences, e.g., through doing good works as cited in the Koran.
Being Muslim was avowed as a strong marker of identity for two of the Malay
35
participants. They articulated this identification by a hierarchical ordering of identities
that was formulated by a popular Malay slogan (extract #9; also evident in extract #8).
Looking at these accounts from broader theoretical perspectives, this increased
Islamic identification reflects an ethnoreligious resurgence used as a discourse of identity
to differentiate Malays from non-Malays (Peletz, 1997; Ganesan, 2005). One is
reminded of Freud's notion of “the narcissism of minor differences”: the magnification of
differences between groups who are otherwise alike (Blok, 1998). The reemergence of
religion has been used politically as a marker of identity and as a boundary in
ethnopolitical conflicts or culture wars, not only in Malaysia, but throughout the world
(e.g., Hindu nationalism in India; Orthodox Christianity in Serbia; evangelical
Christianity in the US; Zionism in Israel and the Occupied Territories; and so on).
The politicalization of everyday relations and a growing ethnic separation lends
support to the ethnopolitical conflict perspective (Ellis, 2006). This is consistent with
Fee’s (2006, p. 214) claim that ethnicity affects how Malaysians comport themselves at
all levels, from the public to the private, e.g., eating, children’s education, worship, and
“how to relate to different people socially and professionally.” Our findings support
Mutalib’s (2007, p. 40) claim that Malaysia is not so much a multicultural society but a
“bi-modal society” between Muslims and non-Muslims (also see Mandal (2004)). The
non-Malays seem to coalesce in voicing criticism of the politically dominate Malay
policies as well as the growing ethnic separation. Such challenges unite the politically
weaker, non-Malays in opposition to the dominate group.
In terms of “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006), for these Malays their
ethnoreligious identity clearly is most salient. The non-Malays accounts point in a more
36
cosmopolitan direction (Vertovec & Cohen, 2003; Appiah, 2006; Rodrequez & Chawla,
2010, ch.12), e.g., “the good-old days” of free intergroup contact, the relationships as told
of in Sabah and Sarawak, or by respecting each other’s differences in religion. The
challenge for the idea of Malaysia as a multicultural state seems to be how to begin an
identity-widening process, that is, working towards a superordinate identity for her
diverse peoples (Ellis, 2006). Hooker (2004) argues for reconfiguring “the Malay-Islam
nexus” such that Islam could be presented as a civil religion in uniting rather than in
dividing peoples. For instance we saw James, a Chinese-Muslim, cite a Koranic verse in
a non-sectarian way, e.g., doing good works and inviting others to religious dialogue
(extract #10). While the two Malay men draw on their ethnoreligious identity, rather than
their national identity as Malaysian, at least they are willing to engage in this intergroup
conversation.
In reflecting on this project, we wondered about the focus group as a
communication context. When people were invited they were told the purpose was to
discuss multiculturalism in Malaysia. Given the volatile character of this topic, it is not
surprising that much of the talk centered on differences, grievances, or complaints.
Another factor is the presence of the American scholar. As an outsider, the American
more easily can raise “sensitive questions” about identity, ethnicity, or religion.
Participants, in turn, may draw certain assumptions about the American’s stance, e.g., as
neutral, as uninformed, or as critical. The discussion coordinators mentioned at the outset
that they intended to write an article on this meeting. This may have motivated
participants to speak out and advocate for their position. A focus group provides a kind of
37
public space where citizens can talk about ethnopolitical issues, address one another’s
concerns, and tell their side.
As a caveat, our group meeting was composed of only eight participants and the
two discussion coordinators. We acknowledge the limits of the generalizability of these
findings, though several of our claims are consistent with other writings. Of the two hour
and twenty minute meeting, the data we examined here is no longer than fifteen minutes
in duration. The issues surrounding “the good-old days” and religious identity and
communication are two key areas of contestation that arose in the session. Several other
issues were also discussed which we could not cover due to our detailed discursive focus.
The participants in our focus group were all middle aged, urban, of middle-class
background, and had some connection to the inter-faith dialogue leader. We can imagine
that a different demographic group of Malaysians, such as university students, may report
more social cohesion (Tamam, 2009).
The contribution of this study comes from the particularity and in-depth look at
the speech practices in discussing multiculturalism. To our knowledge no one has done
an analysis of Malaysians’ discourse on such matters; how ordinary Malaysians give
voice to or contest various ethnopolitical positions. These individual participants draw
upon wider ethnopolitical discourses in criticizing, defending, or telling their side. We
offer a fine-grained look at these discourses of multiculturalism in Malaysia—at how
accounts get produced, voiced, or contested by participants. Like most contemporary
societies, multiculturalism is unavoidably politicized, but among our participants there
was a willingness to face sensitive issues and engage each other in discussion. Our focus
group could be seen as a small step in this direction of opening up a place for discussion
38
about sensitive issues. Discussion or dialogue is no panacea, of course, but such
intergroup conversations will at least make others more aware of conflicting viewpoints
and open up the possibility of finding commonalities or agreement.
39
Notes
1We identify these as languages rather than dialects based on the criterion that
they are not mutually intelligible (Lee & Hall, 2009: 118).
2 When I (the lead author) first visited Malaysia in 1981 I noticed only two
women wearing the hijaab (head scarf), but returning in 2008, the majority of Muslim
women in the capitol area of Kuala Lumpur seemed to be wearing the hijaab.
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