ENACTMENT OF AN ANTI-POLITICAL DYNASTYLAW THROUGH PEOPLE’S INIATIVE: A PROPOSAL

A Mini-Thesis Presented toAtty. Eisma Osorio

University of Cebu- College of LawCebu City

In Partial Fulfilment Of the Requirements of the SubjectLegal Research and Thesis Writing

Submitted byLucio C. Avergonzado

I. Introduction

One of the noblest state policies that our Constitution so

declares is its express prohibition against political dynasties.This

is intended to give substance to the desire for the equalization of

political opportunities.1 It is a sad reality though that after

almost three decades since the so-called EDSA Constitution was framed

prohibiting political dynasties , the dynasty-controlled congress has

failed to pass an enabling law defining political dynasty, making

this constitutional ban an empty rhetoric, lofty in its wordings yet

lacking in substance.

Attempts to give tooth to this constitutional mandate had

been conscientiously made, but all failed. In 1987, Senator Teofisto

Guingona, Jr. filed an anti- political dynasty law which was passed in

the senate but was killed in the lower house by inaction.2 Today,

there are two anti-political dynasty bills pending in Congress

1 Art .2, Sec. 26, Constitution2 GMA News Online, Mark Meruenas, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/297800/news/nation/it-s-final-sc-won-t-compel-congress-to-enact-anti-political-dynasty-law, March 5, 2013 6:40pm

authored by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago3 and its counterpart in

the lower house co-authored by former Rep. Satur Ocampo and Rep.

Teddy Boy Casino.4

Upon the other hand, on March of this year, the Supreme Court

has ruled with finality against compelling Congress to pass a law that

would have set in motion a Constitutional provision banning political

dynasties.5 The highest court in denying the petition for mandamus of

Senator Guingona declared that to compel Congress to enact anti-

political dynasty law would breach the principle of separation of

powers of the co-equal branches of the government. This is a sad

declaration coming from a body that prided itself to be the guardian

of the Constitution. 6

Without having enough support from colleagues of each dynastic

houses, and embolden by the declaration of the Supreme Court, the

introduction of these bills has thus become illusory and merely

3 SenateBill No. 2649- An Act To Prohibit the Establishment of Political Dynasty

4 House Bill No. 2493-An Act Prohibiting the Establishment of PoliticalDynasty

5 GMA News Online, Mark Meruenas, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/297800/news/nation/it-s-final-sc-won-t-compel-congress-to-enact-anti-political-dynasty-law, March 5, 2013 6:40pm

6 Henry Duenas, Jr. vs.HRET and Angelito Reyes,  G.R. No. 185401,July 21, 2009

promotive of false hopes, left into oblivion, hence, in light of the

current political set-up where majority of the elected officials in

Congress belong to established political clans, the enactment of an

anti-political law by its own efforts is but a clear impossibility.

Thus, the only remaining hope for its enactment lies through the

sovereign Filipino people themselves, in the exercise of their power

to directly propose, enact or approve national legislation thru the

concept of initiative and referendum.

II. Background of the Study

A. The 1986 Constitutional Commission debate on Political Dynasty

The political dynasty provision was authored by Commissioner Jose N.

Nolledo. A similar provision had already been rejected under the

article on local government, but Nolledo entertained the hope that the

Constitutional Commission might still approve one because, as he said,

“It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision in the

Constitution is very popular outside but does not seem to enjoy the

same popularity inside the Constitutional Commission.”7 He was also

7 Bernas, Joaquin, “Political Dynasties”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://opinion.inquirer.net/39638/political-dynasties,  October 29, 2012

faintly hoping that Congress would do what the commission would not

do. Hence his impassioned plea:  “And so I plead with the members of

the Commission to please approve this provision. . .   [W]e leave it

to Congress to determine the circumstances under which political

dynasty is prohibited. The commission will not determine hard and fast

rules by which political dynasty may be condemned. But I think this is

a very progressive provision and, in consulting the people, the people

will like this provision. I hope the commission will hear the plea of

the people.8

Commissioner Sarmiento supported the proposal. He contended that by

including this provision, “we widen the opportunities of competent,

young, and promising poor candidates to occupy important positions in

the government. While it is true we have government officials who have

ascended to power despite accident of birth, they are exceptions to

the rule. The economic standing of these officials would show that

they come from powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.”9

It was very clear that the provision against political dynasty was

met with no ordinary opposition during the 1986 deliberations on the

framing of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In fact, it was

8 Ibid9 Bernas, Joaquin,The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009, p.98

intentionally put in Article 2 together with its provisions that are

not self-executing instead of including it in the provisions on local

government.

Recently, the Supreme Court, thru Justice Carpio defined political

dynasty as a “phenomenon that concentrates political power and public

resources within the control of a few families whose members

alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits”10

B. Review of Related Literature

This section presents a review of books and scholarly researches

associated with political dynasties in the Philippines.

In his book entitled “An Anarchy of Families: State and Family

in the Philippines”, McCoy explores the pervasive influence of the

modern dynasties that have led the Philippines during the past

century. From the Osmeñas to the Lopezes and Pardo de Taveras, elite

Filipino families have acted as formidable coalitions —controlling

capital, dominating national politics, and deploying paramilitary

force. Beyond Manila, strong men such as Ramon Durano, Ali Dimaporo,

10 Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R No. 180050, April 12, 2012

and Justiniano Montano have used “guns, goons, and gold” to accumulate

wealth and power in far-flung islands and provinces.” 11

These dynastic families and other political clans have thrived

for decades with unbroken political chains and have clung into power

without any serious opposition during the elections. Once a term limit

of an incumbent ends, the wife, their children, or in case of default,

their relatives would automatically be the next candidate.

Interestingly, there is an evidence of a causal effect of entering

politics on the probability of having relatives in office in the

future. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close

elections, Querubin found out that individuals who win their first

race by a small margin and have access to office have four times more

likely to have a relative in office in the future than individuals who

run but lose by a narrow margin and never serve. This suggests that

(access to) the political system is an important source of dynastic

persistence and concentrates disproportionate political power in a few

families.12

The term limit of elected offices as set forth in the

Constitution and Local Government Code was hoped to curb the

11 McCoy, “ An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines”12 Querubin, Pablo “ Political Reforms and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties of the Philippines, 1st Edition,2011, p.2

prevalence of political dynasties. A study conducted by Dewan and

Myatt (2010) discussed the effect of time horizons on the

performance of government officials within a theoretical framework.

They suggested that the performance of a government official is a

function of the security and longevity of the tenure in office.

They argued that government officials with long and secure terms

perform well because of the high imputed value of the longevity of

their political status. The expected cost of losing the post due to

underperformance, therefore, is high given that the term length is

long. Alternatively, the cost of eviction from office is low if the

term length is short. Accordingly, the performance of politicians

with short terms is expected to be worse than officials with longer

terms.13 It is clear then that holding power in long terms augments

political capital that is transmitted from one generation of a

dynastic clan to another, thus creating an advantage which would

benefit to those members of the clan who are not actually an

efficient, capable, and effective public administrators. This in

effect, contributed to the already disadvantage position of a non-

dynastic amateur politician to challenge the already established13 Dewan, T. and D.Myatt. 2010. Dynamic government performance: Honeymoons and crises of confidence. Economics Series Working Papers 500, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. http://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/500.html.

and incumbent one in office. So the electorate, instead of

considering the plans and visions of these non-dynastic amateur

politicians that would bring about changes in the problematic

status quo, they may just stay in their comfort zones by refusing

to adapt the necessary changes needed to really achieve the

economic and political potential of a certain locality.

This finding is consistent with the outcome of the study

conducted by Asako et.at (2010) in which they developed a

theoretical model of the behavior of dynastic politicians with

inherited political advantages. Their model predicted that dynastic

candidates possess an electoral advantage over non-dynastic

candidates.14

In summary, the related literatures cited above imply that an

established political dynasties, under the present political system

have all the strategic advantages in such a way that holding up

with their political bases is a fact already accepted by the

people. It thus becomes normal scenario to the electorate, a

political phenomenon they have already accepted as fact.

14 Asako Matsubayashi and M.Ueda. 2010. Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan. Mimeo. http://www.psci.unt.edu/~tmatsubayashi/research/seshu.pdf.

C. Movement Against Political Dynasties Invoking People’s

Initiative

This section examines the status quo of the people’s movement

against political dynasties as an alternative to pass a national

legislation. In this connection, the legal basis as well as opinions

of legal scholars as regards people’s initiative is considered.

Father Joaquin Bernas has conceded that the realization of the

dream that the provision on political dynasties would widen access to

political opportunities will very probably be exhaustingly long in

coming.15This may be true if we rely on the effort of the Congress

alone. However, as the ultimate legal sovereign, the Constitution has

reserved to us a provision that would empower us to directly pass,

alter, or repel laws inasmuch as it follows the constitutional

requirements.16

The Initiative and Referendum Act provides that any duly

accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a

petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,

and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of

the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization15 Bernas, Joaquin,The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009, p.99

16 Art. 2, Sec. 26 and Art. 6, Sec.32, 1987 Constitution

proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.17 With this

statutory basis, a group called MAD (Movement against Dynasties) filed

a bill in Congress seeking to prohibit political dynasties.18

Another political group, Social Justice Society and Kapatiran

have initiated a signature campaign aiming to collect at least 10

percent of registered voters’ signatures with at least three percent

of every legislative district as required by law.19 The group warned

that unless an anti-dynasty law is passed, the “privatization” of the

governments in the hands of few political families would continue.20

CHAPTER III

A. The Dynastization of the Philippines

The reasons for the apparent salience of political dynasties in

the country today can be drawn from the country’s political and

economic history. The existence of political dynasties was neither

patterned after the Marcoses and their cronies nor was it a product of

17Section 11, RA 6735 or "The Initiative and Referendum Act" , the enabling law on People’s Initiative18 As reported by Mangunay, Kristine Felisse, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Thursday, July 18, 2013, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/447245/group-invokes-peoples-initiative-vs-dynasties

19 Sec. 5, R.A 673520 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/305134/groups-press-for-peoples-initiative-against-political-dynasties

the election system; it has already been in place for the past six

centuries. There are three notable periods in history that pertain to

the evolution of the political dynasty. The first period dates as far

back as the pre-colonial period; the second commenced during the

Spanish regime; and the third in 1898 when US colonization began.21

The occurrence of political dynasties was believed to be first

recorded in the pre-Magellanic period. In his book “The Making of a

Filipino, Renato Constantino pointed out that “communities at this

time were already accustomed to an early form of government and

politics.” The pre-colonial society had the datu, raja, and maharlika

as rulers and stewards of tribal communities. According to

Constantino, their strong familial bonds espoused the development of

the leadership and social prestige of this ruling class. Perhaps the

datu, raja, and maharlika class served as archetypal models for the

formation of political dynasties in the Philippines.22

During the Spanish colonial period, the term principalia was

introduced. The principalia embodied the new kind of local elite. To

Constantino, the principalia “was composed of the wealthy landowners, many

of whom were descendants of the early datus and maharlikas.” This time, the

21 Constantino, Renato. (1982), The Making of a Filipino: A Story of Philippine Colonial Politics. Quezon City: R. Constantino22 Ibid

former datu “has been entrusted with fiscal and administrative duties

and became adjuncts of Spanish power. From mere administrators of

socially-owned land during the pre-Magellanic period, the principalia

eventually became formal owners of these lands.” The principalia, along

with the mestizos, illustrados, mestizo-sangley, creole, and Chinese

mestizos constituted the local oligarchs of the country.

The third period was highlighted by “the introduction of

education and  suffrage by the US that catapulted the elites in the

first local elections in 1903 and the first national elections in

1907.23 The elites capitalized on education to acquire new knowledge

and information. Through education, both the local and national elites

obtained a new form of mechanism, which the French sociologist Pierre

Bourdieu  called “cultural capital.” Education was the ticket to

election participation and a prerogative of wealth. In history, the

first elections only catered to the propertied class, which comprised

less than one percent of the population. William Howard Taft directed

this first-ever election limiting the number of participation only to

the local and national elites.24

23 Constantino, Renato. (1982), The Making of a Filipino: A Story of Philippine Colonial Politics. Quezon City: R. Constantino24 Ibid

In his treatise on political dynasty, Tuazon revealed that

nearly 50 percent of the country’s current political dynasties owe

their ascendancy to post-Marcos (1986) political deals when most

elective positions were filled up by appointees of then President

Corazon C. Aquino, “including the Ampatuans of the infamous

Maguindanao massacre.” In the entry of political appointees, it is

understood that more families were allowed to establish their

respective dynasties in the political arena. The prevalence of

political families in various public posts has become commonplace in

the Philippine government today.25

According to Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, an outspoken

advocate against political dynasties and author of an anti-political

dynasty bill now pending in Congress, political dynasties rule over 94

percent of the country’s 80 provinces. Citing 2010 election figures,

she said in the Senate, 80 percent or 18 of the 23 senators were

members of political families. In that same election year, 74 percent

or 170 of the 229 district representatives in the House of

Representatives belonged to political families. During the 15th

Congress, 52 or 91 percent of the 56 party-list seats in the Lower

25 Tuazon, Bobby. (2012 September). Election 2013: Horizontal and Vertical Expansion of Political Dynasties. Issue Analysis: Policy Study, Publication and Advocacy (PSPA), 3. Retrieved from http://www.cenpeg.org 

House were held by millionaires. Ten nominees came from political

clans.26 Although the recent May 2013 election has resulted to the

downfall of some big names in politics like the Jalosjos clan in

Zamboanga peninsula, Ampatuans of Maguindanao, Villafuertes’ of

Camarines Sur and the Garcia clan of Cebu, still this is just a

portion of the pie. Most political clans have tightened their grip for

power.

B. The Social and Economic Impact of Political Dynasties

Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the

system of extended families. However, this extended family system, an

otherwise beneficial concept when applied to the social aspects of

human endeavour, finds it pernicious effects in the political arena

where public office becomes the exclusive domain of influential

families and clans that are well-entrenched in Philippine politics.

The monopoly of political power and public resources by such families

affects the citizenry at the local and national levels. The socio-

economic and political inequities prevalent in Philippine society

26 As reported by Christina Mendez, Philstar.com, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/03/01/914637/miriam-philippines-worlds-political-dynasty-capital, March 1, 2013,

limit public office to members of ruling families. In many instances,

voters, for convenience and out of cultural mindset look up to these

ruling families as dispensers of favours, and thus elect relatives of

these politically dominant families. 27

According to Querubin, “the role of political dynasties in

shaping the economic and political institutions constitute the

fundamental determinants of economic development.xxx Political

dynasties can undermine the quality of democracy and economic

development in the long growth.” 28

Several scholars argue that the dynastic nature of Philippine

politics has led to a personalized style of politics that undermines

the creation of a strong state and the adoption of country-wide

policies.29 As a consequence, the reform of important economic

institutions is often blocked by members of dynasties who benefits

from the status-quo. This has also prevented the emergence and

27 Santiago, Miriam, Explanatory Note, Senate Bill 264928 Querubin, Pablo, Political Refoms and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties of the Philippines,2011, 1st Edition, p.229 Hedman, Eva and John Sidel (2000) Philippine politics and society in the twentieth century : colonial legacies, post-colonial trajectories, London, Routledge.

consolidation of political parties that address the demands of broader

constituencies. 30

Others claim that the resiliency of dynasties is associated with

rent-seeking and the allocation of state resources to further private

interests.31 This conclusion is consistent with the opinion of a well-

known economist Winnie Monsod. According to her, while it is hard to

generalize just how much political dynasties affect economic

development, these may hinder local economic development “to the

extent that rents for the political clan are created by restricting

competition in local markets and by leakages in the allocation and

delivery of public goods to the poor.”32In this connection, history is

replete with examples to justify this claim. For example, many

businessmen-politicians were investigated by the graft court for using

public funds to benefit their businesses. For example, Senator Manuel

Villar was accused of using his influence as a senator in inserting in

the General Appropriation Act an amount of P200 million pesos to

finance the construction of the C-5 Road Extension project that had

benefited his housing business.33

30 Ibid31 McCoy, Alfred (1994) An Anarchy of Families, Madison, WI, University of WisconsinPress.32 Monsod, on her 2003 paper for the United Nations Development Programme33 http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/182541/news/nation/the-c5-extension-controversy

To sum up the arguments above, the author believes that the

prevalence of political dynasties can deteriorate the quality of a

democratic ideal by limiting, if not eliminating the political

and economic competitions within the state. Consequently, this will

prevent people from effectively communicating their needs to their

government, allow dynastic officials to use the powers of the state

for self-serving interests without fear of replacement or

administrative sanctions, and skewing the selection of political

leaders favouring those with influence, possibly preventing the

best and the brightest from serving in the government, and/or

biasing policies in favour of certain groups.

C. The Pro- Political Dynasty Arguments, Considered

During the 1986 Constitutional Commission deliberations on the

provision of political dynasty, Commissioner Christian Monsod argued

against it, saying that “we have to be very clear on what we mean and

not just have a provision that can be interpreted in a very wide

latitude. I say so because this is a restrictive provision. It

excludes and it disqualifies. We should think very hard about this

before we put things in the Constitution that will deprive the people

of the right to a full choice as to who should be their local

leaders.” He added: “I just want to note that the ultimate objective

in cleaning the election process is to make sure that an elective

office is accessible to all, whether rich or poor. If we are going to

say that in order to democratize we will have to disqualify somebody,

this does not sound right.”34

This argument has gained popularity among those dynastic

politicians in defending their side. For example, Ferdinand “Bongbong”

Marcos Jr. when asked about what is his stand about political

dynasties said that “the voters are the best judges to determine if

the candidates are qualified and competent.”35

Jinggoy Estrada, another member of a political clan justifies

political dynasties in this way. He said, “In the Constitution, there

is a freedom of choice. If there is a performing official or a very

qualified and credible person, would you deprive him of running for

office simply because he belongs to a so-called political dynasty or

political family. It works both ways. In the end, it would be the

people who will decide,’’36

34 Bernas, Joaquin, On Political Dynasties, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 201335 Casayuran, Mario, Political Dynasty: Relevant or Not, Published in PDI, July 30,201336 Ibid

Another member of a political clan Nancy Binay, who won in the

May 2013 senatorial election defended political dynasties in this wise

“As long as malinis ang proceso, why ban candidates from running? Why

deprive the people of choice… it works both ways, deprive other

candidates from running but you are also depriving the voters of

people who na pwedeng pagpipilian. If qualified, why ban, kasi pareho

ang apelyedo?’’ 37

There is also a view that political dynasties afford

reformists extended time horizons that enable the planning and

implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with

shorter tenures often yield to populist demands and shun difficult

but necessary reforms that pay-off in the future but critical to

sustained, robust, and inclusive growth. It is also possible that

dynastic politicians may possess legacy-related motivations that

are strongly linked with the overall outcomes in their respective

jurisdictions. Thus, the longer their tenure the more they tend to

care about long term outcomes.

D. The Spirit of the Constitution, The Author’s Argument

37 Ibid

The justifications cited above are familiar. In fact, if we will

ask those politicians connected to well-established political clans,

there is a 99 - percent guarantee that they will come up with the same

line of reasoning. It seems to me that these justifications had

already run thru their veins, always available whenever needed. And

they have mastered the craft of delivering it, so that it would appear

very convincing.

Convincing are the arguments of these politicians, they are

however very one-sided and self-serving. It does not really count well

if the Constitution is our barometer. Despite severe opposition

against its inclusion in Article 2 as part of the state policies, the

prohibition against political dynasties was nevertheless included. I

do not believe that those who were against it merely conceded to

shorten the debates. It would be very unintelligible to say that the

framers of our Constitution have put this provision as a decorative

sentence adorning the organic law. The truth is, this is a

constitutional mandate, wherever it may be placed in the Constitution.

Indeed, the author agrees with Senator Guingona in his position that

the Congress may be liable for abrogating a sacred constitutional duty

by not enacting a law against political dynasties.38 The fact that this

provision is not self-executing does not take away the truth that this38 Ibid on page 1

is a constitutional command. Our Congress should not resort to

technicality to justify its willful inaction as regards this mandate.

E. The Author’s Proposal: Direct Legislation of An Anti-

Political Dynasty Law Thru People’s Initiative

Since Congress is the principal playground of political

dynasties, the realization of the dream that the provision on

political dynasties would widen access to political opportunities,

will very probably be exhaustingly long in coming39, or worst won’t

come at all. In this regard, the author’s proposal of directly

enacting this law is the remaining hope for its passage. In doing

this, we are only confirming a well-accepted democratic principle that

the voice of the people is the supreme law of the land. We have proven

this during People’s Revolution.

F. A Sacred Call

The continuing phenomenon of political dynasties today reflects

the encompassing influence of traditional politics, elite persistence,

crony capitalism, and political patronage. These monsters are

difficult to defeat, but it can be defeated. If indeed the remaining

hope for a passage of an anti-political dynasty law is thru people’s

39 Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary. 2009. P.99

initiative, then it is worth all the effort. This requires a

deliberate, united, and purpose-driven effort. We need to exploit the

present public clamor to pressure the Congress and to let them know

our feelings as regards this very important constitutional mandate. We

need to have a broader media mileage to further gain public support

and get the favorable sentiment of the masses. We need to utilize the

social media and other networking websites to instill public awareness

of the issue. We should create effective linkages to different

progressive and reform-oriented non-government organizations to

facilitate grassroots involvement of this issue. Most importantly, our

vote matters. We should vote for those politicians who are against

political dynasties. We should therefore exhaust all the meta –legal

and legal means to achieve this noble objective.

In the coming 2016 Presidential election, two choices can be

made- for or against dynastic politicians. The choice then is ours.

And let this choice be the start of change. A change for a better and

more responsive democracy

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION

Democracies promote political equality—equal voice in

government decision-making—through one person one vote, equality

before the law, and free speech, among others. In turn, such

provisions are expected to enhance equal consideration of

preferences and attention to the needs of all citizens. In

countries where the vast majority is from the lower income segment

of society, democratic institutions potentially open the door for

more responsive and pro-poor policy-making. This setting is

critical in terms of investments in human capital, which are

important for long-term economic growth. Democracies could

therefore contribute to poverty and inequality reduction as well as

promote high and inclusive economic growth. However, as already

been established, the existence of these political dynasties have

been the plagued that threatens the very core principle of

democracy.

It is by this reason that the author is wholeheartedly

convinced by the words of the then Senator Alfredo Lim that “by the

time that the bill is enacted into law, it will usher in a new

social and political order, which might in the long run provide a

direction that will salvage our sinking ship and restore our lost

glory in terms of political maturity and development.”40

CHAPTER V. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Asako, Matsubayashi and M. Ueda, 2010, Dynastic Legislators:

Theory and Evidences from Japan

2. Bernas, Joaquin, 2009, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines:

A Commentary, Quezon City

3. Constantino, Renato, 1982, The Making of a Filipino: A Story of

Philippine Colonial Politics,Quezon City

4. Hedman, Eva and John Sidel, 2000, Philippine Politics and

Society in the 20th Century: Colonial Legacies and Post –Colonial

Trajectories, London Routledge

5. Dewan, T. and D.Myatt, 2010, Dynamic Government Performance:

Honeymoon and Crises of Confidence, Economic Series Working

Papers 500, University of Oxford, Department of Economics

6. McCoy, Alfred W, 1994, An Anarchy of Families: State and Families

in the Philippines

40 Lim, Alfredo S., Political Dynasty: Anathema of Democracy(Privilege Speech), January 24, 2005

7. Querubin, Pablo, 2011, Political Reforms and Elite Persistence:

Term Limits and Political Dynasties of the Philippines, Quezon

City

8. Tuazon, Bobby, 2012, Election 2013: Horizontal and Vertical

Expansion of Political Dynasties,Quezon City