due diligence: case studies concerning the spread of islam

2015

James Madison University

Themes in Global History-

Dr. Sandman

[DUE DILIGENCE: CASE STUDIES CONCERNING THE SPREAD OF ISLAM] Joseph Daniel Wilson

Mausoleum of the Samanids, Bukhara

Sankore Mosque, Timbuktu

Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta

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Introduction

The academic consensus concerning the spread of Islam is that it was transmitted via one

of three main vehicles: conquest, trade, and traveling clerics. Conquest constituted the bulk of

conversions in the first centuries of Islam, as adherents of the nascent faith exploded out of the

Arabian Peninsula and captured lucrative territories of the fading Roman and Sassanian Empires.

Local elites and their clients found it expedient to conform to the culture and religion of the new

political authority. Trade is the second pillar of this triad, as Islamic merchants traveled by land

and sea in order to obtain the goods of distant countries. Merchant cities throughout Afro-Eurasia

provided separate quarters for Muslim traders and soon Islam found converts among local

populations. The ruling and commercial classes found conversion a profitable and pragmatic

convenience. Mendicant clerics, often adherents to the mystical Sufi tradition, often traveled

where neither conqueror nor trader dared to tread. As Sufism was intermittently looked upon as a

heresy, individual Sufis as well as entire brotherhoods (tariqas) settled on the fringes of the

Islamic world. There they spread Islam in malleable forms, creating syncretic belief systems that

appealed to followers of foreign faiths. Yet one must question if these catch-all themes of

conversion sufficiently address the realities of religious transformation in the many lands to

which Islam spread.

A major question arises from this compartmental approach to the spread of Islam. While

these three modes, these labels, are convenient and easy to use in teaching broad survey courses,

they do not capture the true nature of global Islamization. The aforementioned modes of

transmission were effective in different places at different times. Neither were they mutually

exclusive, a major problem with the compartmental approach. Trade and traveling clerics went

hand in hand, sometimes following a period of conquest. Often, all three were utilized in the

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same locale in different periods. Therefore, one must research case studies wherein multiple

agents of conversion were utilized in order to attempt a global history of the spread of Islam.

Firstly, Bukhara and the surrounding lands of Central Asia were subject to conquest in the

centuries immediately following the death of the Prophet. How the local elites reacted to

attempts at conversion speaks to the true nature of Islamization in lands that were militarily

subdued. Secondly, West Africa's first converts were trans-Saharan merchants, yet the region

became an Islamic society of the course of centuries. This required more than just the influence

of commerce. One must examine how Islam developed in West Africa in order to see how all

three pillars of transmission worked in concert. Thirdly, it is believed that the islands of the

Indonesian archipelago converted to Islam due to contact with Arab merchants in the Indian

Ocean trade system. Yet folklore of the region includes traveling Islamic saints and clerics

among their conversion stories. A closer examination reveals that Sufi clerics aided in creating a

fictive legacy that linked Indonesia with the Islamic holy land. As will be illustrated, the three

pillar theory of conversion is too simplistic a model to explain the realities of Islamization.

This study is necessary because the existing literature concerning the spread of Islam is

non-comparative, narrowly focused on specific geographic regions, and confined to essays by

specialists. The body of academic literature concerning the spread of Islam is not homogenous,

yet each work exhibits similar patterns of research. Many of the books are collections of essays

which are arranged geographically. This allows for authorities in particular global regions to

expound at length on the history of Islam in narrowly defined territories. Others works include

thematic essays, yet geographic essays dominate the field. This approach allows an expert on

each global region or particular topic to write a specific history of Islam in a single cultural

context. The thematic articles do not tend to follow a hard chronology. Rather than solely

3

focusing on religion, they emphasize what Islam contributed to politics, science, and economics.

While these thematic writings cross geographic boundaries, they do not sufficiently reconcile the

three pillars theory of the spread of Islam. Case studies are necessary in order to test the

durability and elasticity of the conquest, trade, and traveling cleric model of the spread of Islam.

Central Asia

The greatness of Central Asia in the 7th

century was measured by the power of the city-

states of Transoxiana. Bukhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Tashkent, and other trade cities spread out

over the arid plains and river valleys west of the Tien Shan Mountains and north of the Hindu

Kush Mountains. They prospered among the meager farms of the oases. In this period they sat

firmly atop the crossroads of the world, middlemen of the Silk Road trade route. They became

wealthy from commerce, built high walls, and made uneasy military alliances with the Turks of

the steppe. Both China and Persia coveted their fortune and strategic position, but neither had the

resources to mount a military expedition to conquer these remote yet prized cities. It was a new

contender from Arabia that challenged their hegemony of the Silk Road.

The Arab conquests of the 7th

and 8th

centuries seemed unstoppable. They toppled the

Roman and Sassanian governments of the Near East, even though greatly outnumbered by the

armies of the established order. While many of the Arab conquerors then turned west and

subdued Egypt and North Africa, others turned east and subjugated Persia. The lords of

Transoxiana were not ignorant of the storm swirling in their direction. In the late 7th

century the

leaders of Bukhara began paying tribute to the Arab governor of Khorasan (eastern Persia) in

order to inhibit any further conquests.1 This tribute only encouraged more Arab invasion. After

initial failures and small raids, the Arabic warlord Qutaib b. Muslim (d. 715) took Bukhara and

1 Richard N. Frye, Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996) 14.

4

Samarkand in 706. Yet the campaign was costly and fighting so far from the Arab heartlands had

stretched the general to his limits. His victory was not total, but a negotiated surrender. The

details of the peace settlement are contentious and ultimately cost him his reputation among the

soldiery.

Arab chroniclers disagree as to exactly what occurred upon the capitulation of Bukhara.

The historian al-Baladhuri (d. 892) recorded that Qutaib b. Muslim negotiated an annual tribute

of 1.2 million dirhams, but that there was also an alternate account that the figure was as low as a

onetime payment of 700,000 dirhams and that the city provided three days of food, drink, and

entertainment for his army.2 Both accounts agree that Qutaib b. Muslim destroyed the various

Zoroastrian, Hindu, and Buddhist idols in the city.3 Al-Tabari (d. 923) recorded that the tribute

exacted from Bukhara was 2.2 million dirhams per year, 30,000 slaves delivered on the spot, and

that the city be emptied of all combatants so Qutaib b. Muslim could enter the city and erect a

mosque.4 Then again, al-Tabari also wrote that he may have settled for as little as the destruction

of the Zoroastrian fire temples, all idols, and 100,000 slaves.5 The truth likely resides between

these extremes. He left Arab troops in the cities as a garrison and divided quarters of the cities

among his captains as spoils, yet Qutaib b. Muslim was also magnanimous and compromising

with local rulers whose families had ruled for generations.6 This attitude of reconciliation may

have led to his death.7

2 Scott C. Levi and Ron Sela, eds. Islamic Central Asia: An Anthology of Historical Sources, (Indianapolis: Indiana

University Press, 2010) 13. 3 Scott C. Levi and Ron Sela, eds. Islamic Central Asia: An Anthology of Historical Sources, (Indianapolis: Indiana



University Press, 2010) 18. 6 Richard N. Frye, Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996) 15.


5

When Qutaib b. Muslim died in 715, his captains were unable to maintain control of the

cities he conquered. He was killed by his own men in battle when a new caliph was named in

Damascus. The rising regent was no friend of Qutaib b. Muslim. Had his soldiers been more

loyal, had he ruled the citizens of Transoxiana with a firmer fist, and had he exacted more tribute

to distribute to his soldiers, perhaps Qutaib b. Muslim would have survived regime change. His

warriors believed he was too friendly with the locals, having integrated many of them into his

army.8 While the ruler of Transoxiana, Qutaib b. Muslim did a great deal to spread Islam to the

inhabitants of Central Asia. He established a mosque in Bukhara and the other cities of

Transoxiana. He also gifted two dirhams to every worshipper who attended Friday afternoon

prayer.9 This friendly religious persuasion had a tremendous effect on converting the masses, but

not the ruling classes.10

As the region was religiously cosmopolitan, with adherents to Buddhism,

Nestorian Christianity, Hinduism, and native Zoroastrianism, convincing the working classes to

adopt a new religion was no mean feat for a conqueror. This monetary bribe and other

concessions led Qutaib b. Muslim’s captains to complain that many new converts were

illegitimate and only professed the faith in order to escape the head tax on all non-Muslims

(jizya).11

As patrons of substantial sections of the trade cities, their revenue depended on

collecting this tax from their clients. Their heavy rule and retribution following the death of

Qutaib b. Muslim led to numerous rebellions in the city-states, most of them successful. This

created so much chaos that the entire region had to be reconquered by Nasr b. Sayyar (d. 748),

the Muslim governor of Khorasan. To placate the angry citizens, Sayyr offered even more local

freedoms to the ruling classes, a more equitable tax system, and pardon for those complicit in the





6

previous rebellions. This not only satisfied the masses, but with the native ruling classes finally

integrated into the political system upon conversion to Islam, the process of assimilation to the

religion of the conqueror was nearly complete. Rank military subjugation had not worked.

Political enfranchisement was the key to success.

The Abbasid revolution pulled Central Asia closer to the center of the Islamic world. A

disaffected Persian element of Islam based in Khorasan committed a coup. They overthrew the

Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) of Damascus and founded the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258),

eventually building the new capital of Baghdad. The city-states of Transoxiana were politically

aligned with Khorasan and thrived under Abbasid rule. In the 9th

century the Tahirid dynasty

(821-873) ruled the city-states of as de facto kings, though nominally they owed allegiance to the

Abbasid caliph.12

In the late 9th

and 10th

centuries, Ismail Samani (d. 907) brought together the

various city-states under his solitary rule by defeating his many contentious relatives in a series

of hard won battles, thus uniting the Samanid Emirate (819-999). Historians recounted that

Ismail Samani, a native Central Asian, was a devout Muslim, a great warrior, accessible to the

common man, a supporter of learning and the arts as well as a just ruler: a hero-king of legend.13

Islam was fully integrated into the culture of Central Asia. In three centuries Islam had evolved

from the religion of the raiders at the border to the faith of the indigenous paragon of kingship.

Conquest is too simple a word to describe what took place in Bukhara and, more broadly,

Central Asia. The subjugated citizens were bribed into attending Friday services, not compelled

by force. The ruling classes only converted when enticed with political enfranchisement. They

successfully rebelled against their foreign conquerors. They received concessions and incentives

12

Richard N. Frye, Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996) 33. 13

Richard N. Frye, Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996) 42-43.

7

in order to accept external rule. Once empowered, the ruling families struggled among

themselves to establish a legitimate Islamic hegemony. Islam only became the majority religion

when it became politically expedient. One cannot be compelled to believe in divine revelations

against one’s will. Only incentives, spiritual or earthly, drive men and women to adhere to creeds

and faiths. The initial conquest was but one facet of conversion in Central Asia. Adhering to the

new faith of the external empire was not done quickly and neatly, but took two centuries and was

met with resistance.

Sub-Saharan West Africa

Islam came to sub-Saharan West Africa, referred to in Arabic as the Sudan, from the

western portion of North Africa, known in Arabic as the Maghreb. It was there that a portion of a

minor sect of Islam fled following a schism among the faithful in the 7th

century. Called Ibadism

or Kharijite Islam, these believers were dismayed by the bloody controversy surrounding the

succession of the caliph in the early decades of Islam. They seceded from the main body of the

greater Islamic community (umma) in order to practice what they believed was a purer form of

Islam. These Arab followers of Ibadism lived in small, exclusive communes in the trading cities

of the Maghreb. Their presence influenced their Berber neighbors and many of the nomads

converted.14

Some of these early adopters were of the Sanhaja family of Berber tribes. The

Sanhaja took part in the regular caravan trade that crossed the Sahara. This well-established

merchant network made stops in the city-states of Senegambia as well as to the city-states along

the Niger River. Some of the Sanhaja were settled among the Sudanese and practiced commerce

on the other side of the desert. The Arabs called this border region the Sahel, meaning the shore,

as the Sahara was likened unto a sea of sand. These settled Berbers engendered the first Islamic

14

Jacob K. Olupona, African Religions: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 92.

8

conversions in the Sudan. As more immigrants came to the Sudan, more and more of them

Arabs, Ibadism was supplanted by the much more orthodox Sunni Maliki madhhab. By the 10th

century, Arabic sources stated that Muslim districts existed in two trade cities of the Sudan:

Bilad al-Sudan in Ghana and Gao on the eastern bend of the Niger River.15

This illustrates the

second pillar concerning the spread of Islam: trade.

Trade initially brought Islam to the Sudan and the merchants and kings were eager to

convert to the faith of the caravan traders. More accurately, the expediency of converting to the

religion of one’s commercial partners brought Islam to the ruling classes and merchant classes of

the Sudan. Advantageous agreements and contracts were made with members of a shared faith

who spoke the same language. As John O. Hunwick put it, Arabic became the Latin of the

Sudan. This is no small thing. The Arabic lingua franca propagated trade across myriad tribal

regions where disparate dialects were spoken. The first record of a king converting to Islam is

that of War Dyabi (fl. c. 1035) of the Senegambian kingdom of Takrur.16

Takrur became a

vernacular Arabic term for the Sudan due to this early adoption; black Africans became Takruri.

The historian al-Bakri (d. 1054) recorded three Sudanese kingdoms: Gao, Ghana, and Takrur.17

Of Gao, he said the king was Muslim, but not his subjects.18

He wrote that Ghana was not

Muslim in any regard.19

But of Takrur he stated that the king was pious to the point of zealotry

and impressed Islam upon his subjects as well as his neighbors.20

This was the exception that

proved the rule: Islam was an aristocratic religion in the Sudan. The working classes maintained

15

John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford History of Islam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 476. 16

Jacob K. Olupona, African Religions: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 92. 17




John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford History of Islam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 476.

9

indigenous beliefs as there was little incentive in conversion in the early years of Islam. They

were not obliged to convert, but they did in time.

Islam slowly spread to Africans via contact with other Africans, generally through non-

violent means.21

This is true no matter the social standing or occupation of the adherent. In the

initial phases, Muslim converts were "tiny minorities in a potentially hostile environment."22

The

ruling classes could have snuffed out Islam had they desired. No Arab army marched on

Timbuktu and demanded conversion or death, which is a common yet fallacious trope

concerning the spread of Islam. Conversion was a deliberate political and economic decision of

the ruling classes. Islam offered another path, another venue of legitimacy. Few Sudanese kings

demanded religious change of their subjects, as most were subsistence agrarians, pastoralists, or

fishermen. Relatively few were involved in commodity trade: gold, salt, and ivory were procured

by traders in the forest band to the south or in the Sahara to the north. Yet Islam gradually grew

and developed syncretic qualities with Sudanese religions. Therefore, Islam in the Sudan is an

African phenomenon, an African experience, no matter the initial origin. The merchants of the

Maghreb "were carriers of Islam rather than agents of Islamization, opening isolated societies to

external influences."23

Islam, in one form or another, spread to all strata of society, despite its

ruling class origins.

That the king and merchant classes of these Sudanese kingdoms converted early is a

phenomenon that requires further explanation. This is a trend that carried over into the age of

Sudanese Empires.24

Even in the time of such venerated Islamic rulers as Sundiata (d. c. 1255)

and Mansa Musa (d. 1337), the working classes were not compelled to worship as their kings.

21

John O. Hunwick, Islam in Africa: Friend or Foe, (Accra: Ghana University Press, 1976) 9. 22

John O. Hunwick, Islam in Africa: Friend or Foe, (Accra: Ghana University Press, 1976) 9. 23



10

The legends surrounding Sundiata portray him as a ruler that held tight to the magical indigenous

traditions of the Sudan but also invoked Islam in a rather syncretic manner.25

He came to power

legitimately and did not require any extra trappings or outside authority to justify his station.

Juxtapose this to the oral tradition concerning Askia Mohammed (d.1538). He was depicted as a

zealous Muslim that conquered surrounding peoples in the name of Allah and demanded that

mosques be built in every village in his domain. These two heroes of Sudanese lore and history

exemplify the major trends of Islam in the Sudan: compromise as well as militancy.26

Just as

now, Islam was invoked during acts of violence only when it met a political end. Askia

Mohammed desired the favor of the clerics and scholars (ulama) of Timbuktu. Casting his

conquests as a jihad was only part of his overall strategy to woo the ulama and earn the favor of

an important sector of society. Askia Mohammed also went on the hajj and convinced the

Islamic establishment in Cairo to name him Caliph of the Sudan, religiously legitimizing his

claim to authority. He had killed the heir of the ruling dynasty, and was possibly complicit in the

death of the previous regent. Askia Mohammed was not technically the proper king by definition

of African rules of succession. His acts on behalf of Islam gave him political authority.

While the advantages of practicing the same religion as that of one's most lucrative

trading partners and the attached domestic political advantages may be a sufficient explanation

as to why the ruling classes adopted a foreign pious and legal system, it does not explain why

Islam was eventually accepted by the masses. Two primary, interconnected factors account for

the popularity of Islam among the working classes. The first concerns the notion of sacred

kingship. The trappings of Islam enhanced the king's already high standing and added official

symbols and ceremonies to his regal personage. This is important as the king represented the

25


Nehemia Levtzion, ed. Conversion to Islam, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979) 208.

11

health of the country and was imbued with magical abilities that allowed him to protect the

people; Islam increased the overall prestige, power, and bearing of the ruler.27

An already

established system of taboos and rites protected the king from evil.28

Islam added another layer

of defense and the people desired this as the vigor and well-being of the king mirrored the

condition of the kingdom. Muslim clerics said prayers for the king’s success, made him shielding

amulets containing verses from the Koran, and bestowed blessings (baraka) upon him.29

In

return, the king gave the ulama a wide berth and gifted them in material wealth as well as slaves.

This was all very public, meant to instill confidence in the regent and the ulama. The working

classes desired a blessed king, a king whose magic was strong, who made the country safe.

Maintaining an equitable relationship with the ulama was important for a king that desired the

gifts of Islam and the legitimacy it offered.

The second factor that popularized Islam among the working classes of the Sudan was the

syncretic nature of Islam. Many among the ulama, especially in Gao, partook in Sufi mysticism.

This practice was particularly forgiving of local derivations of the faith. Just as the king enjoyed

amulets of protection, so did the average citizen. Sufi clerics prepared these tokens, made from

bits of leather upon which Koranic verses were written and then blessed. Soldiers, the third

column of the aristocracy, particularly enjoyed these favors, yet most everyone could afford

these mystical symbols. Amulets were an important factor in the long term Islamization of the

masses, as they were a continuation of Sudanese magical customs.30

The people of the Sudan

were also very fond of the Arabic folk traditions surrounding the djinn. Djinn were spoken of in

the Koran and Islamic scholars deemed them a real entity, though some, such as Ibn Khaldun,

27



Nehemia Levtzion, ed. Conversion to Islam, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979) 210. 30


12

thought them metaphorical. The Sudanese associated djinn with their own indigenous nature

spirits; ethereal creatures that inhabited or personified bodies of water, trees, or other natural

entities.31

Djinn revealed secret wisdom to rulers and performed great feats of magic. They were

incredibly popular in Sudanese stories, both folk tales and in Islamic lore. Thus Islam spread

from the Maghreb to the Sudan, from ruler to subject, mixing Arabian and African religious

traditions, and ensuring that continuous trade created wealthy kingdoms on both sides of the

Sahara.

While trans-Saharan trade is the most celebrated and discussed factor in the Islamization

of sub-Saharan West Africa, both conquest and Sufi clerics also played significant roles in

converting the masses. Askia Mohammed erected mosques in newly acquired villages and

demanded religious change of the tribes he subdued. Sufi clerics created an environment in

which indigenous beliefs, such as sacred kingship and nature spirits, melded with Islamic

traditions. Islamization took centuries to unfold and required many avenues of transmission that

shifted over time. Therefore, all three pillars of the traditional factors of Islamization were

involved in the conversion of sub-Saharan West Africa. These forces were separated temporally,

as each required employment in different conditions. Sub-Saharan West Africa’s experience with

Islam is illustrative of the complex nature of Islamization and the many methods by which

peoples and regions convert.

Southeast Asia

Like Central Asia but unlike the Sudan, Islam was not the first major international

religion that entered Indonesia. Trade brought Hinduism and Buddhism to the islands before the

31

Jacob K. Olupona, African Religions: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 36-

37.

13

foundation of Islam.32

These ancient religions were practiced as a hybrid in Indonesia, as they

were not “mutually exclusive.”33

Indeed, the Buddha was born into Hinduism. Buddhism and

Hinduism share many of the same concepts, such as samsara and moksha/nirvana. One could

successfully argue that Buddhism is a reformed version of Hinduism. Therefore, a syncretized

version, Hindu-Buddhism, is perfectly malleable and was practiced in Indonesia prior to the

arrival of Islam. These Indian faiths offered the Indonesian ruling class literacy and new

technologies, as well as diplomatic contacts.34

Local regents retained Indian advisors of the

Brahmin caste.35

These Brahmin ministers engendered trade relations with India, converted the

masses, and distributed knowledge among the members of the court in order to please the king

and increase their own standing in the Indonesian kingdoms.36

As Hinduism "sanctioned

universal kingship," religion was a vital political tool in early Indonesia.37

Hindu-Buddhism held

sway in Indonesia for many centuries prior to the coming of Islam.

Like Hindu-Buddhism, Islam arrived in the ports of Indonesia as a result of trade. In the

Postclassical period, "cloves and pepper were the equivalent of oil and natural gas."38

Indonesia

was the homeland of these spices. The first Arab merchants arrived in their dhows circa the 10th

century, eager to trade for Indonesian flavorings, medicines, and preservatives. In time Islamic

traders dominated the Indian Ocean trade system. As occurred in the Sudan, conversions to Islam

32

Robert Pringle, Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,

2010) 20. 33


2010) 21. 34 Robert Pringle, Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,

2010) 20. 35


2010) 29. 36


2010) 20. 37


2010) 20. 38


2010) 17.

14

began with the ruling classes and for the same reasons: political and economic expediency. There

is a long silence between the first suggestion of Muslim traders in Indonesia and evidence of

significant conversion. It appears that the first regal converts, the early adopters, resided on

Sumatra and made the statement of faith in the 14th

century.39

Local kings on Java followed in

the 15th

century.40

A significant factor in fostering these conversions was the monsoon winds.

Arab merchants were often forced to spend months in port waiting for the seasonal shift in

weather patterns before they could sail home. In major ports like Malacca, a cosmopolitan town

of means, Muslim merchants wiled away their days among the locals and other foreign traders.

In this organic manner, Islam and other Arabic customs were diffused to the Malay Peninsula.

Islam and Hindu-Buddhism were practiced side by side without contention or controversy. In

time, Islamic converts outnumbered adherents to the ancient faiths.

In order to conduct business, hold power, or engage in overseas trade, it became

increasingly expedient to convert to Islam. Islam gradually became the dominant religion of the

ruling classes and the merchant classes.41

In theory, this may seem antithetical, as one of the

great social appeals of Islam is the equality of all members of the umma. Yet, just as in the Sudan

and Central Asia, socialism did not spontaneously break out upon conversion. This speaks to the

varied interpretation of the Koran and less puritanical adherence to scripture that marks the vast

majority of the history of Islam. Homogeneity as well as flexibility in religion and culture were

and remain good business. More practically, those of the working classes that converted rose in

social status as this allowed them into the ranks of those that conducted trade. Yet the

39


2010) 23. 40


2010) 23. 41


2010) 29.

15

prohibitions against eating pork and consuming alcohol may well have been difficult barriers for

many Indonesians, as these were societal norms.42

Further, the custom of cremation was deeply

ingrained by centuries of Hindu-Buddhism.43

These habits and rites must have been quite

problematic in ascending the social ladder. As Islam grew in prominence, and adherents grew

more pious, the faithful desired a history within the umma, a legacy as old as their lineage within

Hindu-Buddhism. What they did not have in fact they created in folklore.

Kings must have a proper ancestry in order to rule with legitimacy. To remedy the lack of

Muslims in royal lineages, Indonesians syncretized the stories concerning Hindu-Buddhist saints

with their newly adopted faith. One holy man, called Tuan Tuaggang Parangan, became a

legendary figure in Malaysia. In his legend, Parangan arrived in Malaysia from across the sea

astride a swordfish.44

He demanded that the local ruler repent and convert or face hellfire. After

winning a contest in which he pitted his personal magical powers against the kings, Parangan

brought a flood to the kings capital and commanded his swordfish to attack the citizens until the

king submitted to Islam.45

The king conceded, but only after Tuan agreed that the king could

consume his stockpile of pickled pork before conversion.46

Over time, the old saints like

Parangan were given complicated blood lines that included the Prophet.47

Local holy sites were

venerated in the same manner and with the same ceremonies as the Ka’ba.48

Nine Indonesian

42


2010) 29 & 30. 43


2010) 29. 44


Nehemia Levtzion, ed. Conversion to Islam, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979) 148. 46 Nehemia Levtzion, ed. Conversion to Islam, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979) 148. 47


2010) 31. 48


2010) 31.

16

holy men from the Hindu-Buddhist past were recast as wali Allah (friends of God).49

This was

accomplished due to the presence of Sufi mystics in the courts of Indonesian kings. As in the

Sudan, the Sufis aided in syncretizing Islam to local customs and smoothing over the rough

edges of Islam as to make it more accessible.50

Indonesians wanted a place in the origins of Islam so desperately that they fabricated

stories that placed them paramount in the Prophet’s vision of the faith.

In time to come, when I have passed away, there will rise in the east a city called

Semudera. When you hear tell of this city make ready a ship to take to it the

regalia and panoply of royalty. Guide its people into the religion of Islam. Let

them recite the two statements of the profession of faith. For in that city shall God

(glory be to Him the Exalted) raise up saints in great number.51

As was the Indonesian experience with Hindu-Buddhism, so was their experience with

Islam. The ruling and merchant classes converted first and for the same reasons. Islam aided in

securing trade agreements and legitimizing local rule. Without jihad, without coercion, Islam

came to Indonesia and prospered. Southeast Asians found meaning and pleasure in the practice

of their faith. Yet, the importance of Sufi clerics and their ability to knit indigenous cultural

threads into Islamic cloth is lost in the tale of commerce. Sufis aided in syncretizing Indonesian

saints with Islam and created prophecies that tied Indonesia to revelations of the Prophet. Today

some 205 million Muslims live in Indonesia, more than any other nation.52

More than half the

49


2010) 31. 50


2010) 32. 51



2010) 17.

17

Indonesian Islamic population lives on Java.53

The rest are spread out among the 17,000 or so

islands that comprise Indonesia. Add in the Muslims that live in the Philippines, Vietnam,

Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma and Southeast Asia rivals any Islamic region on the globe

in terms of population. More than trade bound them to their faith. Belief in an ancient connection

to the holy land of Islam and the favor of the Prophet created a truly Southeast Asian version of

Islam.

Conclusion

The three main pillars of conversion theory concerning the spread of Islam are not

sufficient to explain the historical, global phenomenon. Conquest, trade, and mendicant clerics

played roles in Islamization, but not exclusive roles. They cannot be separated out as single

factors that operated in a vacuum. Neither were they employed in one era or region. To say that

Islam spread to sub-Saharan Africa because of trans-Saharan trade is inaccurate as it only tells

part of the complex story. Conquest did not bring Islam to Central Asia, as they successfully

rebelled and only accepted the Arabic yoke with political enfranchisement. While commerce

transmitted Islam to Indonesia, it was the Sufi clerics that cultivated the faith and made it bloom.

One might argue that the three main pillars theory is a simplification only used to generalize a

complex idea for non-specialists. This notion has real merit. Yet it is only a small step further to

inform non-specialists, survey course students, of cases that highlight the complex nature of the

global spread of Islam. One must perform due diligence in reminding students that large themes

in global history are just that: large themes. Themes are formed from studying the details. These

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2010) 18.

18

case studies reveal that, while one theme may appear more prominent than another in a given

region or time period, more than one theme is in play.

19

Bibliography

Esposito, John L., ed. The Oxford History of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Fisher, Humphrey J. “Conversion Reconsidered: Some Historical Aspects of Religious

Conversion in Black Africa.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 43,

No. 1 (January 1973): 27-40.

Frye, Richard N. Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996.

Hunwick, John O. Islam in Africa: Friend or Foe. Accra: Ghana University Press, 1976.

Levi, Scott C. and Ron Sela, eds. Islamic Central Asia: An Anthology of Historical Sources.

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Levtzion, Nehemia, ed. Conversion to Islam. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979.

Olupona, Jacob K. African Religions: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2014.

Pringle, Robert. Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity. Honolulu: University

of Hawaii Press, 2010.

due diligence: case studies concerning the spread of islam

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