donors between a wake-up call and business as usual: talking about politics, imagining the state and...

Donors between a Wake-up Call and Business as usual: Talking about Politics, Imagining the State and Revamping Aid in Bamako, 2012–2013

Isaline Bergamaschi

Mande Studies, Volume 19, 2017, pp. 77-104 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/677496

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/677496

77Mande Studies 19 (2017). Copyright © Mande Studies Association. doi: 10.2979/mande.19.1.06

Donors between a Wake-up Call and Business as usual: Talking about Politics, Imagining the State and Revamping Aid in Bamako, 2012–2013Isaline BergamaschiIsaline Bergamaschi is a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at the Université Libre de Bruxelles/REPI. She has published extensively on development assistance, political economy and international intervention in Mali since 2008.Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the transformations of international intervention in Mali since the crisis that burst in March 2012. It shows that the crisis in Mali generated interesting debates about international intervention in Mali and debates within the Bamako-based donor community in 2012 and 2013. Attempts at stopping doing “business as usual” were short-lived, but major changes in Mali’s transnational government have occurred under the influence of “new” stakeholders (emergency NGOs, the military, UN blue helmets and civilian staff ), agendas (the war on terror, “stabilization”, peace and state-building) and practices ( for instance, the UN “cluster” approach). This has created a renewed competition and a negotiated division of labour between different categories of international actors. This entails no “merging” between logics and practices of security and development (as argued by Mark Duffield, 2001). The presentation draws on empirical evidence accumulated through eight months of field-work, policy documents, non-participant observation and over 200 interviews car-ried out in Bamako since 2007.

KEYWORDS: development and humanitarian aid, donor policies, political economy, security and development, Mali

78� Mande�Studies�•�Volume 19�•�2017

European diplomat: “Make sure that the government knows that this is not business as usual. This time, conditionalities will enforce a real control on things”

IMF staffer:�“It’s not clear whether the government has understood that it’s not business as usual (. . .) In their minds, there was Brussels [donor�conference] (. . .), the election took place, now they are waiting for the money”�[sighs�in�the�room]

Donor meeting during an IMF mission in Mali, Bamako, 23/09/2013

Interpretating� the� politics� of� the� crisis� in�Mali� requires� that� one� analyse�the aid regime in the country. While the crisis’ international dimensions

have� typically� only� been� captured� through� the� consequences� of� the� fall� of�Kadhafi�in�Libya�or�the�narrative�of�the�“global�war�on�terror”�by�the�media�and policy-makers, I have shown elsewhere that the multi-dimensional cri-sis� in�Mali�was�due,�amongst�other�ancient� factors�and�complex�causes,� to�the� political� economy�of� extraverted� development,� dependency� and�donor-driven ownership (Bergamaschi 2014). This article in turn asks: How have aid donors�reacted�to�the�2012�crisis?�In�Mali,�aid�funds�account�for�a�significant�part�of� the�national�budget;�donors� co-produce public policies with public administrations�and�push�for�specific�reforms�of�the�economy�and�the�State�through conditionalities. For years, aid donors had a close partnership with President�Amadou�Toumani�Touré�and�supported�both�his�political�system�of�“consensus”�and�strategy�in�the�North.�Voluntarily�or�not,�they�contributed�to�widening�the�gap�between�the�elite�and�citizens�before�2012�(Bergamaschi�2014).�In�2012,�as�several�fragments�of�Mali’s�society�were�calling�for�change�and�questioning�the�State,�aid�agencies�changed�their�interventions�substan-tially;� they�have,� in�general,� promoted� continuity,� stability� and,� eventually,�the status quo.1

The�first�section�of�the�article�shows�how�agencies�revamped�aid�to�continue�disbursing�funds.�The�second�section�shows�that�the�crisis�opened�a�window�of� opportunity� for� change� in� the� aid�field� to� the� extent� that� it� led�donors� to�critically�assess�the�past�achievements�of�aid,�talk�about�politics�and�the�State�and�question�their�past�perceptions�and�practices.�This�section� lists� the�four�debates�that�dominated�the�discussion.�The�third�section�finally�explains�how�and�why�calls�for�change�in�the�field�of�aid�were�short-lived and why, when aid resumed,�donors�were� tempted� to�go�back� to�“business�as�usual”.�However,�I� argue,� the� crisis� changed� the� modalities� and� priorities� of� international�intervention�in�Mali.�Indeed,�major�changes�came�from�the�margins,�under�the�influence�of�“new”�actors�such�as�emergency�NGOs,�the�military�and�United�Nations�staff.

The� article� draws� on� my� work� on� the� appropriation� of� aid,� particularly�the� uses,� trajectories� and� effects� of� the� post-Washington consensus in Mali (Bergamaschi�2008,�2011a,�2011b,�2013,�2014).�This�previous�information�was�complemented by new empirical evidence gathered at a distance in 2012 and

Bergamaschi�•�Donors�between�a�Wake-up�Call�and�Business 79

during�four�weeks�of�fieldwork�realised�in�Bamako�in�June�and�September�2013.�Interviews�were�also�carried�out�with�French�aid�workers�and�staffers�of� the�European�Union� in� Paris� and�Brussels,� and� by� email�with�World�Bank� staff�based in Washington D.C.

Rather� than�offering� a� comparative� analysis� of� donor� reactions� to�political�turmoil�in�African�countries,�the�article�seeks�to�illuminate�the�confusion�that�characterized donor practices in Mali when the crisis hit its climax, i.e. between the�coup�in�March�2012�and�the�presidential�election�held�in�July�2013.�It�describes�the impressions and doubts, processes and debates that shaped donor reactions as�they�were�shared�on�the�ground;�and�makes�constant�references�to�the�words�used�by�actors�so�as�to�trace�the�emergence�(or�not)�of�a�common�vocabulary�and�understanding�about�the�crisis�in�Mali�amongst�them.�A�chronology�of�relevant�events is added in annex 1 to provide context and some key donors’ documents with�detailed�information�have�been�translated�into�English�(annexes�2–4).

Revamping�Aid�to�“Protect�Past�Achievements”

Immediately� after� the� coup,� donor� representatives� were� “shocked”,� “completely lost”,�“helpless”2.�The�2012�coup�generated�a�crisis�of�the�aid�regime�in�Mali.�It�took�donors�“by�surprise”3,�disrupting�their�beliefs�and�past�practices.�In�particular,�it�challenged�Mali’s�status�as�a�model�of�democracy�and�“donor�darling”�in�the�2000s (Bergamaschi 2014: 362). Until 2011, while tensions were arising in the North,�donors�and�diplomats�in�Mali�lacked�updated�analysis�about�the�conflict�dynamics and were not supporting any national peacebuilding or dialogue programme.

After� the� coup,� aid� agencies� found� themselves� “paralysed”� by� a� “paradox”: “to hold a legitimate election, the North must be recaptured. But it cannot be recaptured without an elected government”.� They� were� not� sure� “where to start with” (PTF Mali, 2012g.). The expatriate non-indispensable� staff� of� the� embassies� and�cooperation�agencies�of�Canada,�Denmark�and�Germany�were�evacuated� for�weeks� to� neighbouring�Dakar� or� Europe.�Donors� further� lacked� the� human�resources to understand and respond to the crisis.

Aid� agencies� adopted� the� following� measures� to� suspend� aid:� financial�disbursements�to�the�State�or�its�branches�were�cut;�technical�assistants�were�required�not� to�go� to� their�offices;�negotiations�about�new�projects�stopped;�ongoing projects were assessed (case-by-case) so as to maintain the execution of� the� goals� of� direct� assistance� to� the� population;� projects� supporting� civil�society� were� maintained;� humanitarian� assistance� continued� (Commission�européenne, 2012).

In� practice� though,� two� contradictory� trends� happened.� Firstly,� “if the totality of donors announced a suspension of aid, this decision has materialised with nuances” and�a�great�deal�of�variation.�Secondly,�most�agencies�“were concerned


to mitigate the effects of aid suspension on the country” and adopted “unique solutions” on� behalf� of “creative activism and pragmatism based on human solidarity” (PTF Mali,� 2012g.). Donors�were� eager� to� “protect� past� achievements”� (“préserver les acquis”,�in�French)�in�order�to�meet�the�needs�of�the�Malian�population�and�support�national�administration�in�the�midst�of�crisis.�Several�inteviewees�also�expressed� their�concern� to�avoid�“pushing�Mali’s�head�under� the�water”�but�rather�help�the�country�“stand�back�up�on�its�feet”�(“se relever” in French).

To disburse or not to disburse? formal rules and multi-level negotiations

With�the�interruption�of�democratic�rule�and�with�executive�power�in�the�hands�of�Captain�Sanogo�and� its�Conseil national pour le redressement de la démocratie et le rétablissement de l’Etat�(CNRDRE),�aid�in�the�form�of�budget�support,�i.e.�channeled�directly�through�the�National�Budget,�had�to�stop�for�all�agencies.�Working with, and through, the State was legally and politically impossible as� donors� feared� that� their� funds�might� directly� be� used� by� putschists.� Aid�workers�were�forbidden�to�have�contacts�or�talk�to�their�governmental�counter-parts4,�except�for�French�technical�assistants�who�received�oral�instructions�to�stay�connected�with�public�administrations and�went�back�to�work�just�four�or�five�days�after�the�coup.

Donors�reacted�differently�to�the�coup�depending�on�a�few�factors�that�are�overall�internal�to�aid�agencies:�the�existence�(or�not)�of�a�formal�protocol�to�deal�with�coups�d’Etat;�the�flexibility�of�their�aid�modality;�for�bilateral�donors,�the�government’s�political�and�ideological�colour;�the�dominant�interpretation�of�the�events�in�Mali�within�the�institution�and�its�different�divisions;�the�(de)centralization� of� the� decision-making power. Reactions to the crisis were also� determined� under� the� influence� of� key� individuals� recognized� in� the�réseau�as�credible,�experienced�and�knowledgeable�(in�the�case�of�Luxemburg)�as� well� as� through� the� negotiations� between� the� headquarters� and� country�representations.

What�follows�is�a�typology�of�the�profile�of�different�aid�agencies�and�how�this� profile� affected� their� reaction� to� the� coup.�Donors� are� divided� into� two�main groups sharing common constraints, visions, interests and reactions.

The�first�group�is�made�of�donors�that�were�completely�blocked�after�the�coup.�Usually, country agencies in this group are led by a conservative government at home (when it is a bilateral donor), are characterized by a concentrated decision-making�(headquarters),�and�rigid�procedures�that�do�not�allow�adaptation.�This�group� included:� The� African� Development� Bank;� Spain,� whose� cooperation�agency did not receive clear guidelines and stopped implementing projects and�disbursing�aid�in�2012�and�part�of�2013;�and�Canada,�which�suspended�all�aid,�budget�support�and�technical�assistance,�following�a�decision�made�at�the�highest level.


The second group gathers the pragmatists,�i.e.�the�majority�of�aid�agencies�in�Mali.�Whether�they�had�a�formal�protocol�regarding�working�in�crisis�(USAID)�or not (Luxemburg), these aid agencies did everything they could to continue with existing programmes and aid disbursements (except budget support). To do�so,�they�used�different�arguments,�“exceptions”�and�tactics�to�bypass�formal�impediments :� they� worked� with� decentralised� public� entities� (Germany),�the�private�sector�(Agence�française�de�développement,�and�Luxemburg)�and�NGOs/humanitarian�organisations�(Germany,�the�United�States),�as�illustrated�in�the�different�quotes�below :

The�Deutsche�Gesellschaft�für�Internationale�Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) :�«During the crisis, we could not work with the State anymore (. . .) I twisted things a bit : after the putsch, I told my minister : the code of local communities [«collectivités�territoriales »�in�Mali]�says that they are moral entities per se, so the German cooperation continued working with them. We spend three or four millions per year, and they [the�Malians] are grateful for that »5.

Agence�française�de�développement (AFD):�«On the 22nd of March, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ordered to interrupt cooperation (. . .) The majority of activities were blocked. However, the AFD could maintain its aid in non-sovereign domains: direct support to the population (cotton cooperatives and peasant organisations), humanitarian intervention (. . .). The AFD financed about thirty projects implemented by NGOs (. . .), the majority in the North; and used small subsidies to disburse aid by helping bank institutions to lend money to sustain the local economy through the provision of a guarantee mechanism »6.

Luxemburg:�“The agency of Luxemburg is a small agency (. . .). Luxdev quickly suspended their activities in April (. . .) But LuxDev has a culture of projects – not budget support – and they work at the local, decentralized levels. Therefore, the impossibility to work with the central government (. . .) did not affect their activities in Mali much (. . .) The country representation wrote a note to the headquarters to express their point of view: (i) we can continue with activities and programmes with local communities or when we implement directly, (ii) we can distinguish between the State and our project contractors for construction works to continue »7.

The�United�States:�“We have a firm law, we cut everything (. . .) We had no budget support (. . .) With humanitarian aid, food and health, we’re saving lives. But we no longer do anything in education, decentralization and security (. . .) We made some adjustments, case-by-base (. . .) Aid directed to populations has increased a lot »8.

As�development�assistance�was�blocked,�many�donors�channeled�their�funds�towards humanitarian aid, or presented pre-existing�or�fundable�development�programmes�as�“humanitarian”�ones.�Annex�2�contrasts�the�reactions�of�main�donors� in�Mali� after� the� coup.� As� two� representatives� of� European� bilateral�aid�agencies�said� in� June,�“the frontier between development and humanitarian aid is not clear”�and�in�this�troubled�period,�for�donors�all�was�“a matter of arguing the right way” vis-à-vis their headquarters.�.�.�As�a� result, 80%�of�German�aid�was disbursed in 2012 (via the Agence Nationale d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales�or�ANICT�-�which�is�a�state�agency�but�for�local�communities)9, and 70%�of�the�funds�provided�by�USAID10.


The European Commission receives more attention here as it represents the biggest� donor� in�financial� terms� in�Mali.� Following� the� coup,� the�European�Union� could�have� activated� article� 96�of� the�Cotonou� agreement,�which� can�lead� to� a� complete� suspension� of� fund� disbursement11. But the negotiations between�the�headquarters�and�the�country�delegation,�cooperation�services�and�diplomats led the Commission to continue implementing as many aid projects and programmes as possible.

While�some�key�staff�at� the�West�Africa�division�of� the�European�External�Action Service initially wanted to implement article 96 so as to “put some additional pressure on authorities in Bamako, especially putschists” and give the EU “more weight”, the delegation in Bamako strongly opposed it. The initiative did not�gain�momentum�amongst�influential�member-states�either, so�that�there�was�no�real�debate�about�this�at�the�Council.�Several�reasons�for�not�applying�article 96 in Mali were mentioned during interviews carried out in Brussels and Bamako.�First�and�foremost,�there�was�no�government�in�Bamako�to�discuss�with� in� the�context�of�article�96,�precisely�because�the�government�had�been�toppled by the military.

“There was the coup in March but the situation quickly normalised (. . .) Article 96 would have poured oil on the fire. We wanted to give Mali a chance”12

In addition, the article’s heavy implementation mechanism was considered too rigid�and�unhelpful�for�Mali:

“Article 96 enables us to formalise things, to have discussions at the Council, but it is also heavier, procedures are less flexible (. . .) After article 96, it takes a very long time to resume cooperation, so we thought it would push Mali’s head under the water”13.

In� the� absence� of� an� article� 96� scenario,� the� EU’s� response� consisted� of� a�provisional� administrative� suspension� of� all� budget� support,� and� a� case-by-base� assessment� (validated� by�DevCo)� of� projects� in� virtue� of� article� 22.1� in�the� financial� settlement� and� general� conditions� found� in� the� annex� of� each�convention� project,� for� cases� when� human� rights� or� the� political� situation�requires�it.�The�European�Commission�took�some�prudent�measures,�i.e.�kept�international�cooperation�on�hold,�except�for�direct�support�to�the�population�(non-focal sectors), transition and humanitarian aid14.� In�the�North,�projects�were�suspended�for�security�reasons.�When�possible,�the�funds�part�of�the�10th European Development Fund (EDF) that could not serve their original purpose (for� example,� the� road� between� Bourem� and� Kidal)� were� re-allocated,� for�example towards irrigation, water and sanitation programmes. The European Union� restructured� the� entire� suspended� EDF� portfolio� and� launched� the�biggest�State�Building�Contract�in�Africa�to�date�very�shortly�after�the�French�military� intervention� in� January� 201315. In 2013, the EU committed €327 million and €124.6 million were paid under the EDF programmes (European Commission, 2013).


Amongst the pragmatic donors, the most flexible one�was�the�Netherlands,�which� distinguished� itself� for� its� ability� to� quickly� adapt� to� the� new�circumstances:

“There are currently no reasons for the embassy to stop working, but more reasons to continue (. . .) Our cooperation was never suspended: the country representation took the lead and convinced the headquarters. Aid is channeled through NGOs, the UN and the like to achieve the goals (revised and prioritised) defined in the Plan�opérationnel�(PO) of the government in the sector of health (vaccines, disease surveillance, material support to technical services). We also provided humanitarian aid in the “buffer zone” [between the South and the occupied North,�i.e.�around�the�city�of�Mopti]�because the government asked us to. (. . .) When you are seriously committed, you cannot give up. (. . .) We had to respect cooperation protocols but with the consortium, we tested and adapted modalities”16.

The “reprise”: consensual principle, various triggers

In�May�2012,�the�European�Union�defined�“leading�principles”�for�donors:�to�support, and dialogue with the transition government, do no harm, ajust to turmoil (Commission européenne, 2012). However, the decision to cut and adapt�aid�was�not�coordinated�as,�after�the�surprise�created�by�the�coup, “each and everyone was in their internal kitchen (. . .) Donors were disorganised.” 17

During� the� first� months� of� 2012,� information� could� not� be� shared� and�collective decisions could not be made as each individual donor was sailing in murky�waters.�Instructions�from�headquarters�did�not�come�quickly�or�could�not be publicly communicated, and country representations had little room to manoeuvre�as�the�“Mali�issue”�raised�“renewed interest”18 in�their�headquarters.�“Politicians took over”19 in Brussels, Paris or Washington D.C.

Embassies and aid agencies started to coordinate analysis and decisions again� as� of� May� 2012,� as� demonstrated� by� the� extraordinary� donor� retreat�held�in�October�2012.�In�May�2012,�donors�collectively�distinguished�between�three�phases� to�make�sense�of� the�political� situation� in�Mali�and�adapt� their�interventions: the immediate post-coup phase, the transition phase and the return�to�the�democratic�order�(for�more�details,�see�annex�3).�For�the�transition�phase,�donors�agreed�to�help�Mali�“overcome the triple crisis (political, humanitarian, security)”�(PTF�Mali,�2012e.:�2)�and�“be strategic and focus their efforts on: providing essential basic services to the population to avoid a social explosion (. . .); support civil society initiatives (. . .) (in both the North and South); specifically support competent public institutions on key issues of the transition (. . .) to facilitate the return to the constitutional and democratic order” (PTF Mali, 2012b.).

In� July,� the� Council� of� Europe� (23/07/2012)� recommended� to� the� High�Representative�of�the�European�Union�for�Foreign�Affairs�and�Security�Policy�and�the�Commission�to�“make�proposals�with�a�view�to�a�gradual�return�to�development�cooperation”�(Council�of�the�European�Union,�2012).�Other�donors�were�reluctant�to do so due to human rights violations which occurred during the crisis and the immediate�aftermath�and� the� lack�of�a� strategic� vision� (roadmap)� to�overcome�


the�crisis.�By�October�2012,�the�political�and�technical�dialogue20 between donors and the government had almost totally resumed, direct project operations started again at the local level, technical assistance partially resumed in ministries, local communities and civil society organisations (PTF Mali, 2012g.).

After� this� important� move� from� the� European� Union,� the� decision� to�resume� aid� was� collectively� agreed.� As� soon� as� October� 2012,� most� donors�started� to�contemplate� the�possibility�of� resuming� their�aid�programmes:� the�“reprise graduelle”�in�French�(PTF�Mali,�2012f.;�PTF�Mali,�2012i.).�However,�the�triggers�for�resuming�aid�differed and caused “a very harsh debate between donors”21. The� triggers� selected� (see� annex� 4)� reflect� different� conceptions� of� Mali’s�crisis�and�political�legitimacy.�The�United�States�could�not�resume�aid�before�a�presidential election, signalling return to constitutional order. For the European Union, budget support did resume as soon as the government presented a “credible�and�consensual� roadmap”� (“feuille de route” in French). The election was not a strict pre-requisite�for�most�aid�agencies�(the�World�Bank,�the�French�AFD) as they wanted to “enable the country to act and overcome the crisis” and were willing�to�“accept other sources of legitimacy” (PTF Mali, 2012g).

The� rationale�behind� the� logic�of�maintaining�and� then� resuming�aid�was�two-fold: on the one hand to “protect past achievements”;� on� the�other�hand� to “avoid a degradation of indicators, especially in social sectors, and mitigate the crisis’ effects” (PTF�Mali,�2012e.;�PTF�Mali,�2012k.:�8–9). As noted by a French representative (Gueymard/� PTF�Mali,� 2012) :� “strong aid restrictions could create more problems than solutions (. . .) and a policy�of�making�things�worse”.�Donors�fear�the�“risk to destroy the capital previously invested (. . .) In Mali, cooperation has been collaborating with the government for the past forty years, systems have been established, people have been trained, infrastructures have been built (. . .)” (PTF Mali, 2012g.).

A�Window�of�Opportunity�for�Change:�Talking�about�Politics, Imagining the State

The�crisis� triggered�a� (re)politicization�of�donors� in� the�country�and�obliged�them to talk about politics in a much more intense and systematic way than they used�to�in�past�years.�“We realised that data was just paperwork”�said�a�staffer�of�the�European External Action Service in December 2012. The crisis led donors to think critically about politics, the State and aid in Mali, and opened a window of� opportunity� for� change� in� the� field� of� development� assistance� as� donors�were� ready� to� critically� assess�and�challenge� their�past�beliefs� and�practices.�This� section� draws� a� list� of� the� four�main� topics� that� generated� debate� and�sometimes tension within the aid community in Bamako in 2012 and 2013.

The� first� discussion� between� donors� dealt� with� the� nature� of� the� crisis�in�Mali.� In� general,� donors�moved� from� considering� the� coup� as� a� political�crisis�targetting�ATT�to�seeing�it�as�a�“systemic crisis”. Being based in Bamako,


donor representatives were well-aware�that�the�“crisis”�was�not�limited�to�the�country’s�Northern�regions�and�was�not�only�another�Tuareg�uprising:

“The crisis acted as a revelator. The coup started a social and security crisis. We realised that the system was a façade, we did our mea culpa”22

“Mali is facing three simultaneous crises: (i) military and securitarian, due to the occupation of the North (. . .), (ii) a political crisis which was revealed by the deficit of democracy and State, (iii) a food and humanitarian crisis following the bad agricultural campain of 2010–2011 and the armed conflict.”�(PTF�Mali,�2012f.)

LuxDev :�“It’s not just a political crisis at the highest level between Sanogo and ATT, but the crisis of a system”23.

Dutch�embassy : “People were fed up about exclusion (. . .). It’s a crisis between the State and citizens.”24

The� second� issue� dealt� with� donors’� potential� responsibility� in� the� turn� of�events:

“Of course (. . .) we wonder about our past interventions in Mali, on strategy, we’ll have to make a critical assessement and have honest discussions with Malian authorities”25.

“The crisis acted as as wake-up call and humility fix for donors: we cannot work the way we used to”26

Is it interesting to note that amongst the many uprisings and riots that occurred in�Mali’s�capital�city�immediately�after�the�coup�and�all�throughout�2012,�angry�Malians never took aid agencies and diplomatic representations as “a political or physical target (. . .), thus considering that they were at their rightful place”�(Gueymard,�2012). However,�the�aid�regime�was�indirectly�challenged�in�the�aftermath�of�the�coup.�The�coup�leader,�Captain�Sanogo,�was�critical�of�external�interference�and� protected� the� exclusive� role� of� the� Malian� army� in� responding� to� the�insecurity�in�the�North�(Whitehouse,�2012:�102�and�105)�until�he�had�to�flip�and�support�the�French�military�operation.�More�importantly,�as�Siméant,�Gavelle�and Traoré (2013) have shown, pro-coup�activists�successfully�mobilized�youth�on pro-sovereignty arguments.

The�majority�of�our� interviewees�were�eager� to�outline� the�perverse�effects,�blindness�or� cowardice�of� aid�workers�and�diplomats�during� the�decade� that�preceeded�the�2012�coup.�For�example,�the�group�of�donors�–�the�“collectif�des�PTF”�in�Mali�-�wanted�to�examine�“the role of donors and other actors in the establishment and maintenance of order that was pushed aside last March” (PTF Mali, 2012i.)

“I told donors, it’s your fault, too, you did not say anything during ATT’s reign (. . .)”27.

The�following�quote�by�a�member�of�the�German�embassy�in�Mali,�clearly�reflects�a minority position:

“We should stop thinking that donors had a big influence in the crisis (. . .) We cannot avoid crises of this kind (. . .). In Africa there is a crisis from time to time, that’s the way it is”28.


Many� testimonies� criticised� the� technocratic,� superficial� and� compliant�dimension�of�the�aid�system�that�was�established�in�the�past�decades:

“We were part of the crisis. Our well-functioning systems of harmonisation, ownership and alignment were empty. Processes became more important than content”29.

“A lot of monitoring is needed between disbursement and the report (. . .) We need to go to the field for a technical – not just financial – assessment (. . .) We used to drop data and statistics, to say «there are improvements but also limits ». It was just theater (. . .)”30

“We were compliant, we did not send the alert, our political dialogue was not demanding (. . .) In their internal systems, donors are evaluated according to their disbursements (. . .) In Mali, there were objective reasons not to disburse because conditionalities had not been respected. But it is not politically correct not to disburse when others do (. . .)”31.

The diagnosis and recommendations included in the power point presentation delivered� at� a� donor�meeting� in� 2012� highlights� that� “due to Mali’s success in combatting poverty and increased access to social services”,�donors�showed�“a great deal of tolerance” and were “more patient (. . .) than they should have been, especially in the fight against corruption and impunity”�(Verret/PTF�Mali,�2012).

The�third�meaningful�debate�that�divided�donors�dealt�with�the�North/South�division in Mali, which was paradoxically both crystalized and blurred during the� (uneven)� occupation� of� the� three� regions� of� the�North� (Timbuctu,�Gao,�Kidal) by insurgent groups during 2012. The occupation reactivated an ancient debate�amongst�donors :�is�the�North�of�Mali�poorer�than�the�South ?�Has�it�been abandoned by both successive governments and donors?

The� debates� that� took� place� at� the�World� Bank� after� the� coup� were� very�illustrative�and�reflected�a�controversy�that�gained�momentum�amongst�donors�earlier in the 2000s. Some World Bank-sponsored studies had shown that the Southern, cotton-producing� regions� of� Mali� were� actually� poorer� than� the�producers�of�other�goods�in�other�regions�and�inhabitants�of�urban�centers.�In�these studies, cotton is depicted as a poverty trap (Delarue et al.,�2009 :�7).�This�has�been�coined�the�«Sikasso�paradox »�by�the�Bank,�as�Sikasso�is�the�capital�of�the country’s cotton region.

However,�these�studies�are�not�accepted�by�all�actors�for�different�reasons.�First�of�all,�the�World�Bank�was�suspected�of�trying�to�sustain�their�key�conditionality�in�Mali,�i.e.�the�privatization�of�the�national�cotton�company�Compagnie Malienne de Développement des Textiles (CMDT) (Delarue et al.,�2009 :�7).�Secondly,�other�studies produced by the French AFD point out the methodological limitations of� the� studies� and� take� other� variables� and� another� –� not� strictly� financial� -�definition�of� poverty� into� account,� such� as� the� «feeling�of�well-being »� and�positive�externalities�like�the�provision�of�local�public�services�(Delarue�et�al.�2009 : 14). It is important to note that France has vested interests in the cotton sector�since�colonization�(Roberts,�1996) ;�and�that�the�AFD,�which�has�run�a�lot�of�programmes�in�the�cotton-producing regions in the past decades, was initially�against�the�CMDT’s�privatisation�(Bergamaschi,�2011a :�235).


The� issue� of� the� distribution� and� meaning� of� wealth� in� Northern� and�Southern Mali re-emerged� with� the� crisis� and� with� the� prospects� of� the�“reprise”.�The�World�Bank’s�country�agency,�mostly�composed�of�economists,�was�convinced�that�the�South�should�be�the�focus�of�future�programmes,�on�the�grounds�that “90% of the population lives in the South, there is stability and the economic situation is dramatic”�(World�Bank�country�agency,�Bamako,�November�2012,�by�skype).�In�contrast,�as�outlined�by�a�member�of�the�Social�Development�division�based�in�Washington,�the�headquarters�was�divided�on�the�issue.�In�particular,� the�Social�Development�division�lobbied�for�the�Bank�to�take�into�account political issues, governance and grievances:

“When they [the�economists] look at their poverty indicators, pure data, the South is poorer. We told them to look beyond data trafficking, and search for harmony. (. . .) We draw on feelings, which are mentioned in the World Development Report” (World Bank, Washington D.C., February 2013, by skype).

The� division� not� only� reflects� competing� visions� of� the�North� and� South� in�Mali,�but�also�corresponds�to�a�dichotomy�between�competing�conceptions�of�poverty�in�the�aid�field�more�broadly.�According�to�my�informant,�discussions�between the agency in Bamako and experts based in Washington D.C. led the World�Bank�as�a�whole�to�adopt�a�“balanced”�approach�to�poverty�and�to�the�different�regions�(North/South)�of�Mali.

In interviews carried out in Bamako in 2012 and 2013, most donors claimed to�refuse�to�put�the�focus�on�one�region�of�Mali,�or�even�to�divide�it�between�North� and� South� (AFD,� delegation� of� the� European� Union� in�Mali,� United�States� of� America),� and� instead� search� a� “balance”� in� future� interventions.�A note produced by the donor working group on basic social services and humanitarian/food�security�in�2012�stated�that�“we need to continue to approach Mali as a whole and not systematically fall into the dichotomy North/South. However, this must not lead to deny the specific needs of the North, for they are real” (PTF Mali, 2012j.).

African� Development� Bank (September� 2013):� “We have not opted for the North (. . .) otherwise in five years’ time there is a crisis in the South. (.�.�.) We need (. . .) a balanced development of wealth. We need to avoid a situation where the South produces and the North drinks tea”.

Germany. (September�2013):�“With our headquarters, we decided to have programmes in the North and South. We want to avoid a gold rush to the North (. . .) We need to avoid a situation where the South believes that the North made some trouble and now receives all the assistance”

Nevertheless,�at� least� two�factors�may� incentivise� them�to�think�of,� treat�and�intervene� in� the�North�and� the�South�differently.�On� the�one�hand,�with� the�politicization�of�the�“Mali�issue”�in�Western�capitals,�the�dominant�perception�of� the� conflict� in� Mali� as� a� local� expression� of� a� global� “war� on� terror”�


(Abrahamsen 2013) and its take-over�by�headquarters�(vs�country�delegations/�representations),� the� temptation� to� put� the� focus� on� the� Northern� parts�of the�country�was�palpable,�especially�in�the�case�of�France.�After�the�start�of�Serval,�French�authorities�were�concerned�to�improve�the�living�conditions�of�communities in Gao�and�Timbuctou “because there are worse off now than during the islamist occupation”32�and�ensure�a�sort�of consumer�service�after�military�action.

On�the�other�hand,�the�crisis�created�practical�obstacles�for�donors�to�treat�equally�the�North�and�South�of�Mali’s�territory.�This�was�already�the�case�prior�to�the�crisis.�As�Westerners�had�become�the�targets�of�kidnapping�at�the�turn�of�the�2010s,�many�resources�were�allocated�to�the�North,�but�donor�presence�in� the�North�was� very� limited� for� security� reasons.�Hence,� “its allocation was increasingly controlled by Bamako, systematically instrumentalised in local and national politics and by networks of influence and clientelism and badly planned” (Bergamaschi, 2014 :�354–5).�The�occupation�of�the�North,�followed�by�Serval�and�terrorist�attacks�made� the� implementation� and� supervision� of� aid� programmes� even�more�difficult33.

The last topic that triggered debate in the aid community in Bamako in 2012–2013�was�related�to�the�relevance�and�ways�for�donors�to�work�with�the�State in Mali. In particular, the crisis re-activated an older discussion about budget support, an aid modality that had gained in importance in the country in the last decade34. For the donors who were reluctant to channel aid through budget�support�before�the�coup,�such�as�Switzerland�or�Luxemburg,�the�crisis�was�proof�that�the�instrument�does�not�work�at�best,�or�is�even�dangerous�as�it�gives�recipient�government�a�free-hand35:

“For us, what happened in Mali illustrates the clear limits of budget support : we give millions without control, with weak systems of State controls, banal and rampant corruption, and that has dug a gap between a minority and the Malian population”36.

In�sharp�contrast,�interviewees�at�the�delegation�of�the�European�Union�in�Mali�were�still�convinced�of�budget�support’s�relevance�and�added�value:

“Budget support is made for disbursing, not to keep the money for us (. . .) It is vital. It’s a breath of fresh air. They [the�Malian�government] need it for the election etc. (. . .) We support the transition at a macro-level. The details are defined by the Malians”37.

Other� staffers�based� in�Brussels� admitted� that� a�more� critical� assessment�of�budget support was needed and was indeed taking place, but that it was not specific�to�recent�events�in�Mali38.

In line with these perceptions, the European Union resumed disbursing budget� support� very� quickly� after� minimal� conditions� were� met� in� 2013,�and�were� followed�by� other� important� donors39.� In� brief,� the� debate� about�budget�support�was� reactivated�by� the�crisis,�but� the� initial�postures�of�aid�agencies did not change and stayed very close to those prevaling in the pre-2012 situation.


Finally,�it�is�worth�noting�that�the�topic�of�“true”�or�“deep”�decentralization�was constantly mentioned in donor discussions about how to work with the State� in� the� future.� It� will� be� interesting� to� follow� what� these� discussions�engender in practice, as the recommendation is nothing new: decentralization was already used both by the Malian government and its international partners as�an�attempt�to�improve�living�conditions�in�the�North�and�“co-opt the Tuareg threat” (Seely, 2001) back in the 1990s. . .

Back to Business as usual: Continuity in Donor Interventions

As mentioned in previous sections, the crisis generated critical thinking amongst� the� donor� community� in� Mali.� Calls� for� change� multiplied� and�aid� workers� in� interviews� did� not� want� to� go� back� to� “business as usual” and ignore�“the�messages�sent�by�the�Malian�population�in�March�and�April�2012”� (Gueymard,�2012). However,� several� interviewees�considered� that� the�“window�of�opportunity”�created�by�the�crisis�was�quickly�closed�in�2013�with�the� adoption�by�of� the�Roadmap� for� the� transition,� the�donor� conference� in�Brussels and the presidential election:

“The donor conference has had perverse effects. There is no self-criticism (. . .) The government and donors live on aid money and disbursements. It’s their job. They’re intellectually lazy. The conference closed the window again, we speak about bigger sums of money than before”40.

“Big donors are in a logic of «business as usual » (. . .). The forces against change are very powerful (. . .) In practice nothing has changed”41.

Budget� support� resumed� in� June� 201342. My discussions with donor representatives� about� their� future� priorities� and� sectors� of� interventions�revealed� a� great� deal� of� continuity� with� what� each� of� them� used� to� do:� the�World� Bank� planned� to� put� the� focus� on� basic� social� services,� the� private�sector, agriculture and energy43 ;�the�EU�on�governance,�budget�support�and�infrastructure;�the�AFD�on�micro-finance, water and electricity, health, budget support�and�agriculture.�One�member�of�the�African�Development�Bank�said�“there will be continuity, we’ll do the same thing”, i.e.� infrastructure,� the� private�sector,�investment,�energy�and�the�creation�of�small�and�medium�entreprises44.

Regarding processes and the way aid is being implemented, several aid agencies were contemplating the possibility to launch programmes aiming at helping�Malian�populations�to�“resist�shocks”�and�develop�“resilience”�on�the�one�hand,�and�increase�control�over�the�use�of�funds�and�the�Malian�State�on�the other. The World Bank’s country director in Mali warned in March 2014 that as “there is distrust towards the governement (. . .), we want a very close monitoring and evaluation, and we’re going to use our own capacities (. . .) so as to avoid transfers


through and to the Treasury”.�Donors�multiply�and�complexify�follow-up matrixes, introduce variable tranches�for�the�disbursement�of�budget�support�and�the�EU,�the World Bank and the IMF run joint missions so as to increase coordination (ODI,� 2015 :� 27).� However,� monitoring� mechanisms� are� typically� so� weak�and data so poor (Bergamaschi, 2010b) that an increase in donor control and the�adoption�of�sanctions�in�case�of�slippage�is�at�best�doubtful.�The�way�the�“private�jet�scandal”�(2014)�was�handled�seems�to�provide�evidence�of�this45.

At�least�two�barriers�to�change�can�be�identified.�The�first�relates�exclusively�to�donors’�internal�constraints�and�is�a�classical�feature�of�“path�dependency”�in�institutions.�Priorities�of�aid�programmes�are�defined�by�headquarters.�For�example,� for� their�new�programming,�Canadian� aid�workers� could� «pick »�only� from� the� three�general� priority� sectors defined� in�Ottawa :� economic�development,�children�and�youth,� food�security.�Even�in�the�midst�of�crisis,�aid� agencies� are� tempted� to� continue� their� interventions� in� the� sectors� for�which�they�have�personnel,�experience�and�recognised�“added-value”. Heavy procedures prevent the biggest aid agencies to adapt 46. The pressure to disburse�funds�is�palpable�in�many�agencies,�and�was�potentially�accentuated�in�the�context�of�the�crisis�as�Mali�receives�renewed�geostrategic�attention :�“the requests we receive [from�the�headquarter] everyday pressure us to do things, to elaborate programmes for the next five years in forty-eight hours. . .”47. Interestingly, too,� donors�were� tempted� to� go� back� to� their� usual� sectors� of� intervention�(decentralisation� for� Germany,� good� governance� for� Canada)� since� they�interpreted the crisis’ root-causes� through� the� lens� of� their� pre-existing beliefs,�expertise�and�training:

“The local communitities [collectivités�territoriales] (. . .) acted as the last safeguard during the crisis (. . .) They kept this country going. It was kind of a miracle (. . .) We are going to boost decentralisation, that’s the solution”48.

“Governance setbacks result from the weaknesses of control upon the actions of the executive branch of power («contrepouvoirs »): the weaknesses of the political parties and system (. . .), civil society (. . .), public administration and justice”�(Verret,�2012).

The�second�factor�pushing�for�continuity�in�donor�interventions�is�related�to�the� pressure� exerted� from� the�Malian� government.� In� June� 2013,� an� official�of�the�Malian�budget�told�me :�“The conditions [for�the�resumption�of�aid] were the roadmap, elections, budgetary measures. We’re waiting for disbursement (. . .) We agreed with donors not to make the country’s situation worse, to adjust the budget, avoid major slippages otherwise donors were reluctant to start aid again”. In interviews, key informants� in� the� sectors� of� the� economy� and�finance,� the� reform�of�public�administrations�and�decentralisation,�health�and�the�budget�in�Bamako�in�June�2013�expressed�that�they�were�desperate�for�aid�to�resume.

First�of�all,�the�resumption�of�aid�was�related�to�their�widely�shared�desire�to�put�an�end�to�the�transition�as�soon�as�possible.�Officials�felt�that�they�had�a�hard time keeping the bar during this critical political period. They were tired


of�government�re-shufflings, the cast-power�of�the�military�over�the�transition�authorities� and� the� officers’� attempts� to� pillage� public� resources� and� sign�doubtful�procurement�contracts.�Due� to�aid�suspension�and�economic�slow-down, Mali’s national budget countrywide was drastically reduced by about 35 or 40% in 2012 (PTF Mali, 2012j.). This happened while both needs and tensions were on the rise, and social peace under threat. Ministries did their best to function�normally.�Salaries�of�civil�servants�have�been�paid�and�the�state’s�basic�public� spending have� been� ensured.� Civil� servants� have� guaranteed� overall�budget balance in 2012–2013 (Bergamaschi, 2013). At the macro level, the Malian�budget�needed�fresh�money�(budget�support)�to�organise�the�election�and�support/reform�their�army.

At� the� individual� level,� for� middle-range public servants, the suspension of� aid� also� meant� a� drastic� drop� in� their� revenue� (as� all� training� activities,�workshops and their associated per diem were suspended) at a time when some of�them�were�hosting�Northern�refugees�(members�of�their�“large”�families)�in�their�houses�in�Bamako�and�had�to�feed�them,�to�pay�school�fees�for�children,�etc.� The� year� 2012� revealed�Mali’s� dependence� towards� external� funds.� The�interruption�of�aid�disbursements�and�of�tourists�was�visible�and�palpable�in�Bamako�during�my�fieldwork�mission�in�June�2013,�as�it�had�serious,�concrete�effects�on�the�capital’s�economy,�especially�hotels,� taxis�and�restaurants,�but�also,�critically,�construction�works�and�public�investments.�Ordinary�citizens�and�small�businesses�felt�“weaned”49.

In addition, my interviewees wanted traditional aid to resume as they were very� critical� of� the� humanitarian� aid� flowing� in� the� country.� They� blamed�emergency� resources� and� projects� for� being� “very badly organised”,� “poorly monitored and supervised”�(by�national�accounting�systems�and�ministers),�“not visible”,�“poorly led”�and�“dominated by partners’ interests”. They dislike the methods of�NGOs�for�they�do�not�share�information�with�public�administrations�and�do�not use national implementation systems. This, they believe, risked destroying pre-existing national structures and public policies. Humanitarian projects are�also�“outside of development circuits” and�seen�as�interrupting�Mali’s�“path to development”50.

In� the� end,� both� donors� and�African� governments� have� an� interest� in� the�resumption�of�aid.�As�noted�by�a�French�technical�assistant�in�July�2013,�“when cooperation resumed, everyone was happy, with big smiles on their faces”.

Change coming from the margins: the transformations of international intervention

The� article� finally� argues� that� major� transformations� in� international�intervention in Mali are ongoing. It has considerably extended its scope with the� massive� arrival� of� humanitarian� organisations� addressing� the� looming�food� security� crisis� in� 2011� and� then� the� needs� of� populations� during� the�


occupation�of�the�country’s�Northern�regions�in�2012;�the�pursuit�of�military�and� security objectives and peace-building� activities� with� the� launch� of�MINUSMA�on�July�1st�2013.�The�modus operandi�and�purposes�of�international�interference�have� shifted� from�development� assistance� for�poverty� reduction�and�aid�efficiency towards a�more�fragmented�superimposition�of�rationales�and�organisations�(French�soldiers,�UN�civilian�staff�and�specialised�agencies,�Blue�hermets,�NGOs)�intervening�in a�more�complex�environment.

These� transformations,� however,� did� not� come� from� the� core� of� the� aid�regime,� i.e.� donors� themselves.� Instead,� they� are� coming� from� the�margins�via new actors, who challenged aid’s past achievements and introduced new practices in the country. Traditional donors have not disappeared and have not been�absorbed,�but�they�have�been�obliged�to�protect�their�areas�of�intervention�and, in some instances, to adapt.

A� real� “culture� shock”� opposed� traditional� aid�workers� and�humanitarian�staffers� in� 2012� and� 2013� as� aid� was� partially� suspended� and� redirected� to�NGOs�or�UN�agencies�and�as�emergency�relief�operations�were�proliferating�to�cope�with�the�crisis’�consequences.�The�two�professional�groups�have�different�countries�of�reference�and�expertise�(francophone,�aid-dependent�countries�for�developers,�zones�devastated�by�natural�disastrers�or�conflict�like�Haiti,�Kosovo,�Timor-Leste,� or� the� Democratic� Republic� of� the� Congo� for� humanitarians),�distinct�objectives,�reference�points�(poverty�reduction�and�economic�growth�vs resilience and saving lives) and working temporalities (short-term vs long-term), relationships with and integration into Malian society (humanitarian and�UN�workers�usually�have�shorter�postings)�and�security�rules.

In�NGOs�and�at�the�UN,�informants�viewed�the�crisis�in�Mali�as�a�humanitarian�crisis�and�a�consequence�of�state� failure.� In�public�meetings,�representatives�of� development� aid� agencies� countered� this� narrative� by� distinguishing�between political leaders, who had been disavowed by their constituency, and� the� State� apparatus,� which� despite� its� failures� “works”, highlighting that�public� administrations� “went back to work very quickly after the coup”51 and can be strengthened via governance project and constant political dialogue. Traditional� donors� invited� other� actors� not� to� “confuse the legitimacy of state institutions and of the government” (PTF Mali, 2012g.). In 2013, they were eager to state that the humanitarian crisis was over, so that development-oriented activities�could�take�over�emergency�relief.

For�humanitarian�organisations,�which�in�some�cases�arrived�in�Northern�Mali�just�when�most�administrations�had�fled�violence,�the�country’s�current�socio-economic�situation�is�the�result�and�indication�of�the�past�drawbacks�and�insufficiencies�of� international�development�assistance�and�the�Malian�state�alike (Bergamaschi, 2013). Humanitarian principles invite them to approach and�deal�with�the�Malian�state�as�a�party�to�the�conflict�and�establish�parallel�implementation units and structures each time it is necessary. Aid agencies, on the contrary, have worked in close partnership with the state apparatus


for� years,� tried� to� «build� its� capacities »� and� supported� interim� authorities�during�the�transition.�The�delivery�of�free�basic�health�services�by�NGOs,�was�seen�by�Malian�and�foreign�health�experts�alike�as�a�threat�to�the�viability�of�pre-existing�public�policies�and�financing�system.�As�humanitarian�assistance�tends�to�bypass�state�structures,�“the risk is to destroy the structures and services in the North, and that the population, who is now returning (. . .), feels abandoned” (PTF Mali, 2012g).

In 2012–2013,�one�was�left�with�the�impression�that�aid�in�the�North�tended�to be short-term�humanitarian�relief�delivered�by�NGOs;�while�donors�quickly�resumed� development� assistance� with� its� more� structural,� infrastructure�projects.� If� it� was� to� perdure,� this� dichotomy� could� perpetuate� an� ancient�development� in� the�country�and� fuel� the�conflict’s�dynamics.�Recent� surveys�have� shown� that� the� perception� of� inequality� in� public� investment� is�widely�shared� amonsgt� the�population� in�Mali:� “On either side, people feel that it is the others who are privileged and favoured by the State and its partners. The people of the South believe that the majority of investments in the country are in the North, while those in the North think the same of the South” (IMRAP and Interpeace, 2015: 134–135).

Humanitarian� organisations� were� critical� of� traditional� aid� and� donors.�One�staffer�of�MINUSMA�asked�in�an�interview�in�April�2014:�“The international community is very laxist with the government (. . .). Why do they keep giving money?”. Despite� the� high� financial� volumes� injected� in� the� country,� their� indicators�led them to consider that Mali was in a humanitarian crisis countrywide52. Developers�and�humanitarian�organisations�were�competing�for�information�about�and�access�to�the�North,�and�NGOs�had�a�clear�advantage.�Security�rules�were�strengthened�in�aid�agencies�and�embassies,�preventing�most�staff�to�stay�in�the�North�more�than�one�working�day�(they�were�not�allowed�to�stay�for�the�night).�Flights�from�Bamako�to�the�North�by�the�national�airlines�company,�Air�Mali,�were�interrupted�and�later�ensured�only�by�the�MINUSMA.

Humanitarian actors introduced new practices such as the clusters, which coordinate� all� emergency� relief� operations� in� key� sectors.� As� aid� thematic�groups�were� not�meeting� in� 2012� and� part� of� 2013,� and� because� they� had�committeed to avoid intervention overlap, donors had to attend them and “learn about a whole new system”53.� Because�humanitarian� actors�were�filling�a� lot� of� gaps,� some� donors� feared� that� they� would� “colonise”� their� space�of� development� intervention54.� Later,� in� late� 2013,� aid� donors� also� felt�threatened�by�the�growing�role�of�MINUSMA,�whose�mandate�included�the�coordination�of�all�aid�efforts�in�the�country.�“The role of donors has diminished because of diplomatic and security issues. The MINUSMA absorbs a lot of the political dialogue because of the North”,�said�a�German�diplomat�interviewed�in�June�2013.�As�international�intervention�is�transforming,�it�will�be�interesting�for�future�research�to�trace�the�depth�of�current�changes�and�their�implications�for�the�representations�and�practices�of�sovereignty,�and�on�the�way�politics�is�played�out in Mali.


Notes

1.� The�fieldwork�missions�in�Bamako�in�2013�and�2014�were�carried�out�thanks�to�the�financial�support�by�the�Universidad�de�los�Andes�(Colombia),�the�Käte�Hamburger�Kolleg/Centre� for�Global�Cooperation�Research� (Duisburg-Essen) and the Service de Coopération�et�d’Action�Culturelle�of�the�French�embassy�to�Mali.�I�thank�Laure�Traoré,�Pierre�Carrel,�Sidney�Leclerc,�Johanna�Siméant�and�Aurélien�Tobie�for�their�comments�on�a�previous�draft.

2.� These�adjectives�were�used�by�bilateral�donor� representatives�and�a�UN�staffer�during�interviews�carried�out�in�Bamako�in�June�2013.

3.� The�phrase�was�used�by�a�staffer�of�the�African�Development�Bank,�of�the�Dutch�embassy�and�in�a�note�writen�by�a�French�diplomat�(Gueymard/PTF�Mali,�2012).

4.� Most�aid�workers�confessed�they�did�not�respect�this�rule,�as�they�wanted�some�news�of�their�colleagues�and�«were hunting for information in Bamako at some point »,�said�one�French�technical�assistant�(June�2013).

5. Interview, March 2014.6.� Interview,�Paris,�December�2012�and�January�20137.� January�2013�(by�email)8.� USAID,�June�20139.� German�embassy,�June�201310.� USAID,�June�201311. Article 96 «can be invoked when the ‘essential’ elements spelled out in Article 9 of Title II

“ (human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law) and the “fundamental element” (good governance) have been breached, and should only be used after the means of regular political dialogue under Article 8 of the same title have been exhausted (. . .) Article 96 (. . .) provides the basis for the application of ‘appropriate measures’ (sanctions) which can lead to the suspension of cooperation (.�.�.) »�(ECDPM/James�Mackie�Julia�Zinke,�2005)

12. European External Action Service, Brussels, December 2012.13. Idem14. Idem15.� «The European Union (EU) began using State Building Contracts (SBCs) to provide budget

support to fragile and conflict affected states in early 2013 and (. . .) maintain the budget during periods of extreme crisis and to tackle corruption »� (ODI/Bernardi,� Hart� and� Rabinowitz,�2015 :�7�and�23)

16.� Dutch�embassy,�January�2013�(by�email)17.� Canadian�International�Development�Agency�(CIDA),�June�201318.� Delegation�of�the�European�Union�in�Mali,�September�201319.� CIDA,�June�201320.� While�“political”�dialogue�refers�to�contacts�between�ambassadors�and�members�

of�the�government,�technical�dialogue�refers�to�contact�between�agency�technicians�and�the ministers’ technicians.

21.� Representative�of�a�European�bilateral�donor,�September�201322.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�donor,�June�2013


23.� October�2012�(by�email).24. Interview, March 201425. European External Action Service, Brussels, December 201226.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�donor,�October�2012�(by�skype)27.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�donor,�March�201428.� Interview,�June�201329.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�donor,�March�201430.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�donor,�September�201331.� Donor�technical�pool,�January�2013�(by�skype)32.� French�aid�staffer,�February�2013�(by�skype)33. World Bank country agency, Bamako, September 201334. In the 2000s, budget support was promoted internationally to limit the number

of�projects,�enhance�government�‘ownership’�of�the�national�poverty�reduction�strategy�and align donor interventions on recipient policies and procedures (Bergamaschi, 2014 :�358).�In�Mali,�this�aid�modality�rose�from�12�to�42%�of�total�aid�between�1999�and�2009,�hence�accounting�for�almost�one-quarter�of�Mali’s�public�expenses�(ECO�Consult,�AGEG,�APRI,�Euronet,�IRAM�&�NCG,�2001).

35.� Donor�technical�pool,�January�2013�(by�skype)36.� Member�of�a�European�bilateral�aid�agency,�September�201337. European delegation in Mali, April 201438. European External Action Service, Brussels, December 2012.39. European delegation in Mali, September 201340.� Representative�of�a�European�bilateral�donor,�June�201341.� European�delegation�in�Mali,�June�201342. €220�million�were�disbursed�via� the�EU�State�Building�Contract� in� June�2013,�

followed�by�€62�million�by�the�African�Development�Bank�and�€26 million by France (AFD) in�October,�€85 million�by�the�World�Bank�and�€6.5 million by Denmark in December 2013�(ODI,�2015:�29).

43. World Bank, Bamako, September 201344. Bamako, April 201445. «Local media reported that a presidential jet worth between $34 and $40 million had been

purchased, and that a state guarantee of $200 million had been given for defense procurement. Neither of these contracts had been approved as part of the budget process (. . .) The military supply contracts appear to have involved significant overbilling (. . .) and excessive financing fees, as most of the payments were due to take place in 2015 and 2016 (. . .) The EU and all the budget support donors delayed decisions on their disbursements (. . .) The government dealt with these allegations in record time and proposed (. . .) remedial measures (. . .). The EU and other observers view these as strong signals against corrupt practices »�(ODI,�2015 :�28)

46.� Representative�of�a�European�bilateral�aid�agency,�March�201447. French aid worker, April 201448.� German�aid�worker,�March�201449. French-Malian�consultant�in�development,�June�2013.


50.� These�quotes�come�from�interviews�carried�out�at�the�PRSP�Unit�and�the�Ministry�of�Health�in�June�and�September�2013.

51.� Staffer�of�a�bilateral�European�aid�agency,�June�201352.� Staffer�of�a�French�NGO,�Bamako,�September�201353.� Representative�of�a�bilateral�donor,�September�201354.� Representative�of�a�European�bilateral�aid�agency,�June�2013

RefeReNces

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———.�“Appropriation�et�lutte�contre�la�pauvreté�au�Mali:�Interprétations,�pratiques�et�discours concurrents”, Revue Tiers Monde 205, 1 (2011b), 135–150

———.�“Collapsed,�failed,�criminalized?�Notes�on�the�State�in�Mali”,�African Arguments (2013):�http://africanarguments.org/2013/08/15/collapsed-failed-criminalized-notes -on-the-state-in-mali-by-isaline-bergamaschi/

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Duffield,�Mark,�Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security’ (London:�Zed�Books,�2010)

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European� Commission,� “Mali”� (Brussels,� 2013):� http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid /countries/mali_en

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concernée octobre 2012-septembre 2013” (Bamako, unpublished note, 2012b)PTF� Mali,� “Note� technique� sur� les� rôles� et� responsabilites� des� acteurs”� (Bamako,�

unpublished note, 2012c)PTF�Mali,� “Reprise� de� la� coopération� pendant� la� phase� de� transition ;� situation� 12�

septembre 2012” (Bamako, unpublished note, 2012d)PTF� Mali,� “La� coopération� au� Mali� après� le� coup� d’État� –� document� de� réflexion”�

(Bamako, unpublished note, 2012e)PTF�Mali,�“Termes�de�Référence�de�la�Retraite�Extraordinaire�des�Partenaires�Techniques�

et�Financiers”�(Bamako,�unpublished�note,�2012f)PTF�Mali,� “Retraite� Extraordinaire� des� PTF,� Thème� 2 :�Harmoniser� la� reprise� de� la�

coopération” (Bamako, unpublished note, 2012g)PTF�Mali,�“Retraite�Extraordinaire�des�PTF,�Axe�Stratégique�1 :�Gouvernances�démocratique�

et�économique,�Présidence�Canada”�(Bamako,�unpublished�note,�2012h)


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Annex 1. Chronology of aid and international intervention in Mali, 2012–2013

2012

March :� President�Amadou�Toumani�Toure� is� ousted� in� coup�d’Etat.� Aid� is�suspended

April :�Military� hands� over� to� a� civilian� interim� government.� The� «Accord-Cadre »�between�the�government�and�CNRDRE�is�signed

May :�The�Tuareg�MNLA�and�Islamist�Ansar�Dine�merge�and�declare�northern�Mali�to�be�an�Islamic�state.�The�European�Union�defines�“leading�principles”�for�aid,�and�donors�produce�a�document�about�the�three�phases�of�the�transition�and aid

June-July : Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda� capture� Timbuktu,� Kidal� and�Gao.� The�Council�of�the�European�Union�decides�to�gradually�resume�cooperation�in�Mali

October :�An�extraordinary�donor�retreat�is�held :�the�political�and�technical�dialogue as well as direct project operations at the local level resume, as well as� technical� (partially).�Donors�discuss� the� conditions�and�modalities�of� the�«reprise�graduelle »�(the�resumption�of�aid)

November :�Ecowas�agrees�upon�a�coordinated�military�expedition�to�recapture�the north

December :�UN�Security�Council Resolution�2085�«authorizes�the�deployment�of�an�African-led�[ECOWAS]�International�Support�Mission�in�Mali�(AFISMA)�for�an�initial�period�of�one�year. »

2013

January :�Operation� Serval� starts.� The�Malian�national� assembly� endorses� a�Roadmap� for�Transition.� It� included�planning� for� elections�on�2013� and� for�opening negotiations

February :�EU�Training�Mission�(EUTM)�of�the�Malian�army�starts

April :� United� Nations� Security� Council’s� Resolution� 2100� establishes�MINUSMA�to�support�the�stabilization�of�the�country�and�the�implementation�of�the�Roadmap�for�the�transition

May :�The�international�donor�conference�held�in�Brussels�pledges�€3.2bn to help rebuild Mali

June :�Government� signs� peace� deal�with�Tuareg�nationalist� rebels.� Budget�support resumes.

July :�MINUSMA� takes� over� the� authority� from�AFISMA.� Ibrahim�Boubacar�Keïta wins presidential election

100� Mande�Studies�•�Volume 19�•�2017A

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Annex 3. Harmonisation de la reprise (2013)


(2013)

Annex 4.

donors between a wake-up call and business as usual: talking about politics, imagining the state and...

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