diaspora, faith, and science: building a mouride hospital in senegal

DIASPORA, FAITH, AND SCIENCE:BUILDING A MOURIDE HOSPITAL

IN SENEGAL

ELLEN E. FOLEY AND CHEIKH ANTA BABOU*

ABSTRACTThis article examines a development initiative spearheaded by themembers of a transnational diaspora – the creation of a medical hospitalin the holy city of Touba in central Senegal. Although the constructionof the hospital is decidedly a philanthropic project, Hôpital MatlaboulFawzaini is better understood as part of the larger place-making projectof the Muridiyya and the pursuit of symbolic capital by a particularMouride dahira. The dahira’s project illuminates important processes offorging global connections and transnational localities, and underscoresthe importance of understanding the complex motivations behind dia-spora development. The hospital’s history reveals the delicate nego-tiations between state actors and diaspora organizations, and thecomplexities of public–private partnerships for development. In a reversalof state withdrawal in the neo-liberal era, a diaspora association was ableto wrest new financial commitments from the state by completing a largeinfrastructure project. Despite this success, we argue that these kinds ofprojects, which are by nature uneven and sporadic, reflect particular his-torical conjunctures and do not offer a panacea for the failure of state-leddevelopment.

WHILE MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE a set oftransformations commonly glossed as globalization, much of the Africancontinent occupies a tenuous position in this new economic landscape.Many urban and rural regions suffer from the neglect of diminished statesthat no longer have the means or the mandate to address escalatingpoverty, inadequate public services, or the dearth of livelihoods. Inresponse to worsening conditions, many Africans are emigrating to largercities, different countries, and new continents in search of social andmaterial opportunities that they lack at home.

*Ellen E. Foley ([email protected]) is an Assistant Professor of International Developmentand Social Change at Clark University. Cheikh Anta Babou ([email protected]) is anAssociate Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania. The authors would like tothank the individuals who agreed to participate in our research and the anonymous reviewersof the article.

African Affairs, 110/438, 75–95 doi: 10.1093/afraf/adq063

© The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

Advance Access Publication 23 November 2010

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Once thought of as a straightforward path from departure to assimila-tion, migration is now understood as a process in which migrants estab-lish social formations within a transnational space as they continue toparticipate in cultural, economic, and political life in their home andhost countries.1 The establishment of African diaspora communitiesthroughout Europe and North America has fuelled new kinds of circu-lation of people, goods, and values.2 In spite of the sociological rich-ness and complexity of these diasporas, one dimension in particular hascaught the imagination of the international development community –

the large and increasing volume of remittances that migrants sendhome.Globally, the value of migrant remittances is greater than official

development assistance and foreign direct investment; recorded remit-tances doubled between 2002 and 2007.3 African migrants have partici-pated in this growing trend. Although North Africa receives the greatestvolume of remittances, in 2007 sub-Saharan Africa received US $10.8billion. The top five receivers were Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Senegal,and Uganda.4 In 2007 alone Senegal received nearly US$1 billion fromits diaspora.5

As remittances and diaspora projects now overshadow traditional formsof development aid, scholars and development professionals have begunto assess the impact of remittances and the social forces behind them.Some question whether transfers promote equity and sustainable develop-ment or aggravate inequity.6 Others suggest that diasporas function aspart of the unfolding of global capitalism that has usurped state-led‘development’.7 In a fascinating example of cultural innovation,Bob-Milliar describes Akan communities pursuing development through

1. Peggy Levitt and B. Nadya Jaworksy, ‘Transnational migration studies: past develop-ments and future trends’, Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007), pp. 129–56.2. Cheikh Anta Babou, ‘Brotherhood solidarity, education and migration: the role of thedahiras among the Mouride Muslim community of New York’, African Affairs 101, 403(2002), pp. 151–70; Sophie Bava, ‘De la baraka aux affaires: ethos économico-religieux ettransnationalité chez les migrants sénégalais mourides’, Revue Européenne de MigrationsInternationales 19, 2 (2003), pp. 69–84; Mamadou Diouf, ‘The Senegalese Mouride tradediaspora and the making of a vernacular cosmopolitanism’, Public Culture 12, 3 (2000),pp. 679–702.3. Dilip Ratha, ‘Leveraging remittances for development’ (Paper, Second Plenary Meeting ofthe Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, Oslo, Norway, 2007). Most scho-lars estimate that officially recorded remittances make up 50 percent or less of totalremittances.4. Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu, ‘Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008’ (The WorldBank, Washington, DC, 2008).5. Ibid.6. Barbara Merz, Lincoln Chen, and Peter Geithner (eds), Diasporas and Development(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007).7. Giles Mohan, ‘Embedded cosmopolitanism and the politics of obligation: the Ghanaiandiaspora and development’, Environment and Planning A 38, 5 (2006), pp. 867–83.

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granting chieftaincy to diasporic Africans.8 Grillo and Riccio highlight thepotential of translocal development in which non-state entities in theNorth and South, including migrant associations, collaborate on pro-jects.9 Still others argue that diaspora initiatives might transform the verynotion of development itself, and urge caution when attempting to incor-porate migrant efforts into normative understandings of development.10

In spite of these questions, enthusiasm for ‘diaspora development’remains high. Remittances have not yet attained the status of magicbullet, but they are seen as a ‘promising source of resources for attainingthe Millennium Development Goals’ and as a means to ‘leverage fundsfor development’.11

In this article we seek to move beyond the current enthusiasm for dia-spora development to examine its numerous paradoxes. We do sothrough an analysis of Hôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini, an initiative spear-headed by a Mouride dahira (a mutual aid group of Mouride disciples)whose members live primarily in North America and Western Europe.Although the hospital project is decidedly philanthropic, we contend thatHôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini is better understood as part of the larger‘place-making project’ of the Muridiyya and the pursuit of symboliccapital by an increasingly powerful dahira.12 The notion of place makingdraws attention to the processes by which Touba’s material transform-ation (physical expansion, demographic growth, creation of ritual spaces)becomes infused with religious significance. The dahira’s insistence onachieving Shaikh Amadou Bamba’s holy vision of Touba first and fore-most, and meeting the needs of its residents second, underscores theimportance of understanding the complex and multiple motivationsbehind diaspora development.

By building Hôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini, the Mouride dahira enteredthe realm of large capital projects the likes of which typically fall under

8. George Bob-Milliar, ‘Chieftaincy, diaspora, and development: the institution ofNk suohene in Ghana’, African Affairs 108, 433 (2009), pp. 541–8.9. Ralph Grillo and Bruno Riccio, ‘Translocal development: Italy–Senegal’, PopulationSpace and Place 10, 2 (2004), pp. 99–111.10. Claire Mercer, Ben Page, and Martin Evans, Development and the African Diaspora:Place and the politics of home (Zed Books, London and New York, NY, 2008).11. Samuel Maimbo and Dilip Ratha (eds), Remittances: Development impact and future pro-spects (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005), p. 2; Ratha, ‘Leveraging remittances fordevelopment’.12. The Muridiyya is a Sufi order that originated in Senegal in the early twentieth century.It is the most widespread and fastest-growing Muslim brotherhood in Senegal. For more onthe history of the Murid order see Cheikh A. Babou, Fighting the Greater Jihad: AmaduBamba and the founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913 (Ohio University Press,Athens, OH, 2007); Jean Copans, Les Marabouts de l’arachide (L’Harmattan, Paris, 1988);Donal C. O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The political and economic organization of anIslamic brotherhood in Senegal (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971); Cheikh T. Sy, La Confrériesénégalaise des mourides (Presence Africaine, Paris, 1969).

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the mandate of the developmentalist state. Nonetheless, we argue thatthis project represents a distinct form of development, and one that is noteasily incorporated into state schemas for urban development or publichealth.13 Equally important, the hospital’s history reveals the delicate andoften contentious negotiations between state and non-state actors and dia-spora organizations. The hospital project’s complicated and costly road tosuccess highlights the pitfalls of the neo-liberal age in which ‘develop-ment’ has been relegated to actors in the private sphere who attempt toclose the gap between needy populations and an ineffective state.14

Our analysis of how dahira are positioning themselves as developmentplayers remaking the Mouride homeland also offers a new dimension toscholarship on the Muridiyya.15 The Mourides were once known as aSufi order comprised largely of rural peasants who laboured on their ownfields and in the fields of their religious leaders.16 Over the past 30 yearsthey have transformed into an increasingly urban, transnational tariqa(Sufi order) whose followers have come to rely on local, national, andinternational commerce as their primary economic strategy. Touba, thereligious capital of the Mourides, founded by Sheikh Amadou BambaMbakke in the nineteenth century, is now Senegal’s second largest city,with close to one million inhabitants.Recent research on the Mourides examines their migration across

Africa, Europe, and North America, how they reproduce their insti-tutional structures in new social settings, and how they have inventednew circuits of accumulation.17 As a project of the Mouride disapora,the hospital illuminates the processes through which Mouride emigrantsforge global connections and capitalize on the opportunities affordedby their transnational social networks. The dahira’s profound commit-ment to building the holy city of Touba, its ability to persevere in theface of significant technical and financial obstacles, and its internalcrisis of leadership around the time of the hospital’s completion arecrucial to understanding the Muridiyya’s resilience, dynamism, andadaptability.

13. Mercer et al., Development and the African Diaspora.14. Mohan, ‘Embedded cosmopolitanism and the politics of obligation’.15. Three major trends can be discerned in the scholarship on the Mourides. Early scho-lars were concerned with the order’s political significance as an instrument for the adaptationof the Wolof ethnic group to colonial rule. A second trend focused on the economic dimen-sion of the Muridiyya and emphasized its contribution to the expansion of peanuts as a colo-nial cash crop. A later trend explores the urbanization of the order and the emergence of aglobal Mouride diaspora. For an exploration of these different trends and their sources seeBabou, Fighting the Greater Jihad, pp. 2–4.16. Copans, Les Marabouts de l’Arachides; O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal.17. Diouf, ‘The Senegalese Mouride trade diaspora’, p. 681.

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‘Money and know-how are not the same’: the story of Hôpital MatlaboulFawzaini

Hôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini is the first privately funded hospital ever builtin Senegal by a Muslim organization, the dahira of the same name.Mouride dahira have been a familiar feature in Senegal for the past severalgenerations. Dahira initially helped ease the sense of dislocation of newlyarrived Mouride dwellers in Senegalese cities.18 Dahira in Africa, Europe,and North America form networks that facilitate travel, insertion into hostcommunities, and employment. While some dahira focus on mutual assist-ance among members, others contribute to public works projects and serveas civil society partners for the state and non-governmental organizations.

Members of Matlaboul Fawzaini collected annual dues and specialcontributions for the hospital project in Africa, Europe, and NorthAmerica over a period of ten years. Between the time of groundbreakingand the completion of the hospital in 2003, the various chapters of thedahira contributed an astounding FCFA5 billion (US$10 million).19

Upon its completion, Matlaboul Fawzaini handed the hospital keys to thethen Mouride Khalife-General, Serigne Saliou Mbakke.20 Serigne Salioudesignated the Ministry of Health as the structure that would becomeresponsible for ensuring the hospital’s ongoing operations.

Five individuals, including the hospital director and his chief of staff,arrived at the hospital structure early in 2005 with the charge of making itoperational; they found empty buildings with no furniture, no medicalequipment, and no supplies. Less than 18 months later the hospitalemployed nearly 200 clinical and auxiliary personnel, the majority ofwhom were being paid with the hospital’s own revenue. It has sincebecome a Level III National Hospital under the jurisdiction of theSenegalese Ministry of Health, and it is the only hospital to have this tech-nical designation outside of the capital city Dakar.

The earliest formulation of the organization that was to becomeMatlaboul Fawzaini emerged under the leadership of Daam Ndiaye, adynamic Mouride emigrant who settled in Spain in the mid-1980s.21 Hebecame president of the Mouride dahira of Madrid, and was the first

18. Babou, ‘Brotherhood solidarity, education and migration’.19. The hospital project is exceptional for its duration, scale, and the amount of moneyraised. In his study of Mexican hometown associations, Orozco found that most groupsattempted projects that cost US$10,000 or less and that few associations last longer than tenyears. Manuel Orozco, ‘Hometown associations and their present and future partnerships’,USAID report, Washington, D.C. (2003).20. The Khalife-General is the religious head of the Mourides. After Bamba’s death in1927 his sons and then grandsons succeeded one another in this position at the top of theorganization.21. Interview, Moustapha Thioune, founding member of Matlaboul Fawzaini-New York,New York, 12 July 2007.


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Senegalese to own a boutique in Spain. In 1990, upon the occasion ofSerigne Modou Bousso Dieng Mbakke’s visit, Ndiaye launched the ideaof a project that would be funded by all of the Mouride dahira in Spain: aproject to build a hospital in Touba.22 In 1991 Ndiaye received theKhalife-General’s permission to begin the project and he created theAssociation des émigrés sénégalais au service de Cheikh Amadou Bamba.23

Members of Ndiaye’s association began collecting funds for the hospi-tal, but financial support faltered after a year. After convening a meetingin Touba in 1994 with at least a thousand Mourides in attendance,Ndiaye finally launched a dahira with sufficient institutional heft tomanage the project. The dahira was named Matlaboul Fawzaini, whichreferences a poem written by Amadou Bamba in the 1880s after he dis-covered the site that would become Touba. Matlaboul Fawzaini means‘the search for two happinesses’ (in this world and the next) and itconveys Bamba’s utopian vision for the city.24 The poem is essentially asupplication: Bamba prayed that God bless Touba and its inhabitants andthat He make of Touba a sanctified city of light, faith, peace, and prosper-ity. The new dahira set as its central purpose the realization of Bamba’sprayer.Once Matlaboul Fawzaini was established, Mourides became members

by purchasing membership cards in sums determined by geographiclocation and based on an estimation of the relative affluence of theMouride community in question. Membership cards in African countriescost considerably less than cards sold in Europe and North America.Membership dues were renewed annually in the form of sas, a longstand-ing Mouride fundraising practice.25 Matlaboul Fawzaini soon became thefirst dahira to take the form of a non-governmental organization (NGO)with bylaws, board members, and a salaried staff. It is now recognized bythe government of Senegal as a tax-exempt non-profit organization. Thedahira has over 60,000 members with national chapters and a global

22. The late Serigne Modou Bousso Dieng Mbakke was the elder son of Serigne FalilouMbakke, second caliph of the Muridiyya (1945–68). Serigne Modou Bousso first grabbedthe limelight when he challenged the leadership of his uncle, Caliph Abdou Lahad (1968–88). They reconciled and he gained notoriety for the supposed efficacy of his prayers to helppeople get visas, especially for Europe. He travelled abroad frequently and had a large fol-lowing among the Mouride diaspora.23. Cheikh Gueye, Touba: La capitale des Mourides (Karthala, Paris, 2002).24. Ibid., p. 249; Eric Ross, Sufi City: Urban design and archetypes in Touba (University ofRochester Press, Rochester, NY, 2006).25. The Wolof word sas can be translated as load, assignment, or duty. It refers to a cashsum or amount of work that Mouride leaders request from their disciples individually or col-lectively to complete a task. During the course of building the hospital the highest annual sasrequested by the dahira amounted to CFA100,000 ($200). Interview, Moustapha Thioune,New York, NY, 12 July 2007.

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headquarters in Touba. Daam Ndiaye served as president throughout the1990s and beyond the completion of the hospital project.26

The hospital’s construction began in 1994 on a site donated by theKhalife-General. A turning point came two years later when SerigneSaliou selected a group of medical professionals to tour the constructionsite and to provide feedback on the project. Taking advantage of theMinister of Health’s visit to Touba, a strategic meeting was organized thatassembled dahira members, representatives of the Ministry of Health, andother technical advisers. Although this meeting was an occasion for repre-sentatives of the state to influence the hospital project, these experts werehand-selected by the Khalife-General and many of them were Mourides.The man who became the first hospital director, Falilou Diop, was one ofthe more prominent Mouride civil servants who attended the meeting.27

This technical consultation, which occurred after the dahira had spentapproximately US$1.2 million dollars, was clearly long overdue. Theadvisers concluded that the construction to date was completely inap-propriate, and they had the unpleasant task of telling the dahira membersthat the new structures needed to be torn down. As Falilou Diopexplained, the technical team had two options. They could ignore theproblems and let construction continue, or they could provide honestfeedback about the numerous problems in evidence.28 (The buildingmaterials were not up to code, doorways could not accommodate stretch-ers and other medical equipment, and so on.) The technical team toldthe taalibe (student or follower of a mystical order), ‘What you have built,it is too small. It is no good. If you want this to be a first-rate hospital,you have to knock down what has been built and start over’.29 Heated dis-cussions between the technicians and the dahira members followed, withthe taalibe accusing the experts of being soxor (malicious or mean).

There was talk of converting the hospital into a medical centre, but thedahira members decided to persevere and build a Level III hospital. TheKhalife-General contributed to the compromise by donating more land sothe dahira could expand the structure’s footprint. Nearly 80 percent ofthe structure was demolished and construction began again with guidancefrom the technical team. Underlying the willingness of the dahira to over-come this setback was the acknowledgement that this medical structurewas being built to honour the memory, vision, and spiritual guidance ofthe Mouride’s founding saint. The divine inspiration behind the project

26. Gueye, Touba: La capitale des Mourides.27. Interview, M. Saar, hospital chief of staff, Touba, 12 May 2006.28. Interview, Falilou Diop, hospital director, Touba, 20 May 2006.29. Interview, M. Saar, hospital chief of staff, Touba, 12 May 2006.


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contributed in large part to the dahira’s determination to see itscompletion.Although the dahira finished the hospital, the poor formulation of the

original plans has had lasting effects. Doctors and administrators concurthat aside from financial problems, the current size of the hospital is theirmain operational constraint.30 There is not enough space for the currentmedical personnel and no room for expansion to add other specialties. In2006 the physical therapy unit was operating in the laundry facility andother specialties were doubled-up and practising in the same wings. Thislack of space continues to pose problems for the hospital’s day-to-dayoperations.31 As the chief of staff reflected, ‘money and know-how are notthe same’. In spite of the dahira’s extraordinary capacity to mobilizemillions of dollars for a large project, they did not have the technicalexpertise to ensure its success. Without the intervention of theKhalife-General, who was the impetus for the technical consultation,many more millions would have been spent on a potential failure.When the construction of the hospital was nearly complete in 2002 the

dahira members presented it to the Khalife-General, who in turn gavethe hospital to President Abdoulaye Wade. Serin Saliou told Wade thatthe Mourides had built the structure to serve the populace of Touba, butthat it was his desire that the Ministry of Health oversee its operation.The Khalife-General’s gift of the hospital to the state, in the person ofSenegal’s first Mouride President, is charged with numerous socio-political ramifications.32 It is an admission of the brotherhood’s inabilityto run a complex medical structure, but it also served as an opportunityto leverage state resources for Touba.The Mourides have always been suspicious of state encroachment in

Touba and Sheikh Saliou’s attitude was consistent with the tacit divisionof labour that governs Mouride relationships with the Senegalese govern-ment. Mourides have invested millions of dollars to refurbish the GreatMosque, to establish a modern Islamic library, and to build glamoroushouses for distinguished guests, but they have also shied away from shoul-dering investments they see as the state’s responsibility. With the

30. Ibid.; Interview, Amadou Diouf, Elhadj Dieng, Abdoulaye Wone, Boly Diop, andAynina Gueye, hospital physicians, Touba, 13 May 2006.31. Rebecca Sheff, The Problem with Eating Money: Remittances and development withinSenegal’s Mouridiyaa (unpublished Honours thesis, Macalester College, 2009).32. The history of the Mourides is one of confrontation and accommodation to the Frenchcolonial state, and compromise with the post-colonial state for influence over Senegal’s citi-zens and disciples. See David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societies and Frenchcolonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania 1880–1920 (Ohio University Press, Athens, OH,2001); Leonardo Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and citizens inFatick (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995); and Donal C. O’Brien, SymbolicConfrontations: Muslims imaging in the state in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY,2003).

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Matlaboul Fawzaini hospital, dahira members agreed to raise money forthe hospital’s construction, but after this initial investment theKhalife-General delegated the cost of running the hospital to the state.

In late 2004 the Minister of Health, Dr Issa Mbaay Samb, contactedFalilou Diop, then the director of one of the most renowned hospitals inthe country. In Diop’s words, ‘Samb approached me, he told me that theMourides have built the hospital, and they want me to come run it.’33

Diop agreed to leave his prestigious post in Dakar and he arrived inTouba in late 2004 with a team of four other people. They spent over US$200,000 fixing the remaining construction mistakes and bringing thehospital up to code; the team successfully transformed a set of emptybuildings into a functioning hospital in less than four months. PresidentWade and the Minister of Health inaugurated the hospital on 25 March2005. By 2006 it employed 190 people, only 60 of whom were civil ser-vants paid by the Ministry of Health.34 The hospital paid the remainingstaff with funds generated by its own activities.35

A place-making project extraordinaire: the city of Touba, Senegal

Hôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini offers a significant example of the capacity ofoverseas emigrants to conceptualize, fund, and implement projects thatwould normally fall within the portfolio of the state. The financial andhuman resources mobilized by the dahira bolster the arguments of scho-lars who see in diaspora organizations tremendous potential to becomedevelopment actors. Yet the pursuit of ‘development’ is not the raisond’être of Matlaboul Fawzaini. Instead it has dedicated itself to a centralMouride objective: building the holy city of Touba as the realization ofthe founding saint’s holy vision. Matlaboul Fawzaini’s hospital is less anachievement of ‘development’ than of bringing Touba a step closer toBamba’s vision for the city, which increases the symbolic capital of thedahira at the same time.

Throughout the Muridiyya’s history realizing Bamba’s dream forTouba has served as its central project. Bamba established the city afterbeing visited in a vision by the angel Gabriel, who told him that the sitewould become a spiritual metropolis of universal significance.36 AfterBamba’s death in 1927 his sons and successors began the actual construc-tion of the city. The Great Mosque in Touba, the site of Bamba’s

33. Interview, Falilou Diop, hospital director, Touba, 20 May 2006.34. By 2008 the hospital staff had grown to 260 employees. Sheff, The Problem with EatingMoney, p. 60.35. Like all government health structures in Senegal, the hospital is run on a model ofpartial cost recovery. It charges user fees for medical appointments and for hospitalization,and also sells pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies to patients.36. Gueye, Touba: La capitale des Mourides; Ross, Sufi City.


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mausoleum, was constructed over several decades and is the largestmosque in sub-Saharan Africa. Touba is a spiritual and an economicbeacon; for the past 50 years it has attracted rural migrants seeking relieffrom drought and ongoing economic crisis. Its population growth overthe past 50 years has astounded scholars and politicians alike – Toubacounted 2,127 residents in 1958, and this number grew to 125,000 by thelate 1980s. The population reached 300,000 by 1993, and current esti-mates are between 800,000 and one million.37

Building the city of Touba has not only been the central project of theMourides, but also one that has been accomplished with little assistancefrom non-Mourides, including the government of Senegal. Touba is asocio-political enclave within the Senegalese state; the Khalife-Generaland his advisers oversee Touba’s expansion and development. TheMuridiyya reserves the right to alienate and distribute land in Touba.Urban settlement has proceeded in successive waves of lotissement (landallocation) organized by the khalifes.38 The bureaucratic and rationalizingimpulse of the Senegalese state has never successfully reached Touba andit has remained largely illegible and impenetrable to outsiders, from stateauthority to development actors.39

In spite of its unique administrative status, Touba faces similar chal-lenges to other rapidly expanding locales. The demands of urban life posenew challenges for the Mouride leadership, particularly in the context ofextending infrastructure such as sanitation, health care, and housing tomeet the needs of Touba’s growing population. What distinguishesTouba from other urban centres is that religious leaders can deploy thereligious devotion of Mouride disciples to mobilize vast sums of moneyand labour for major urban projects. In the absence of state authority andstate resources to manage Touba’s development, a social field hasemerged in which Mouride associations jockey for prestige and baraka(blessings) from the Khalife-General through their efforts to construct theholy city. As the good works of Mouride dahira are playing an increasinglyimportant role in managing Touba’s development, the ability to marshalthe earning power and labour of dahira members has catapulted severallarge dahira, like Matlaboul Fawzaini and Hizbut Tarqiyaa, into positionsof prominence.Touba is also a site where personal ambitions and dreams are realized.

Regardless of their country of residence, most Mourides attempt to makethe annual pilgrimage to Touba on the occasion of Magal, the celebrationof Bamba’s return from a seven-year exile in Gabon. Magal provides an

37. Gueye, Touba: La capitale des Mourides.38. Ibid.; Ross, Sufi City.39. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1998).

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occasion for receiving Bamba’s baraka through the mediation of his suc-cessors and for renewing allegiance to one’s marabout.40 In addition tothe annual Magal, many Mouride migrants build impressive villas inTouba as expressions of their financial success, which also serve as evi-dence of the baraka that Bamba bestows upon his hardworking and piousfollowers. The final aspiration of Mouride taalibe is to be buried in theholy city after death, thereby securing Bamba’s blessings as they move tothe afterlife. Touba is a complex signifier for Mourides, and a space thathas become meaningful through the execution of both collective and indi-vidual projects.

Several significant changes in the internal dynamics of the Muridiyyaunderpin the emergence of the hospital project as the central aspiration ofa large collective of overseas Mourides. With the growth of the Mouridediaspora, Touba itself is becoming an increasingly global locale, that is, alocale produced at the intersection of global movements of people,material resources, and ideas.41 As migrants spend longer periods of timeaway from Senegal, Touba has come to occupy a prominent place in theimagination of transnational Mourides. In response, taalibe who share adeep commitment to achieving Bamba’s vision are forging new socialconnections and transcending traditional scales of human interaction toreproduce dahira abroad and to create the holy city at home. The increas-ing reliance on migration as a key economic strategy for Mouride discipleshas reinforced attachment to Touba as the centre of the global Mouridediaspora, ‘The logic governing Mouride mobility requires the constantpresence of the Touba sanctuary… . There is an undeniable concomi-tance between the construction of the point of reference [Touba] andmobility.’42

The dahira that launched the hospital project illuminates the conver-gence of these recent trends. As a transnational dahira with over 60,000members in Europe and North America, Matlaboul Fawzaini offers itsadherents an extensive network for insertion into host communities andadaptation to life abroad. At the same time, the dahira’s commitment tobeing an engine of development in Touba reveals its members’ spiritualattachment and nostalgia for the holy city, and their desire to participatein the ongoing construction of Touba even from afar. The elaborateorganizational structure of the dahira, and its success in attaining thestatus of a legal non-profit organization, reflect attempts by Mouride

40. Christian Coulon, ‘The grand Magal in Touba’, African Affairs 98, 391 (1999),pp. 195–210.41. Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of Globalization (W. W. Norton and Company, New York,NY, 2007), p. 132; Zsuzsa Gille and Seán Ó Riain, ‘Global Ethnography’, Annual Review ofSociology 28 (2002), pp. 271–95.42. Diouf, ‘The Senegalese Mouride trade diaspora’, p. 698.


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taalibe (and Mouride intellectuals in particular) to modernize the brother-hood’s activities and reputation at home and abroad.43 Although the hos-pital is a development project of sorts, it is also the culmination ofmigrant longing for the spiritual homeland, a reflection of their commit-ment to achieving Bamba’s vision of the holy city, and a display of thedahira’s financial and symbolic capital.

Baraka or biomedicine? The hospital as a unique therapeutic structure

Reflecting the multiple and complex motivations behind its construc-tion, the hospital has taken shape as a distinct place where science,faith, technology, and baraka converge. This convergence occurs insocial relations at the hospital as well as in its physical structure – thehospital’s departments are organized around a central courtyard that isequipped with both a mosque and a helicopter landing pad. The hospi-tal’s origin as a taalibe-initiated project shapes how Mouride patientsinteract with the medical personnel, how they assess the quality andcost of the care they receive, and their sense of ownership of the hospi-tal itself. Hospital personnel feel that they have a mandate to heal thesick and to relieve suffering, and to emulate the pious work ethic andsolidarity that produced the hospital in the first place. A sense of adivine mission underlies therapeutic encounters and other social inter-actions at the hospital.When asked what might be different about the hospital, given its

origins as a religious project, most employees were quick to stress thatit is a modern biomedical facility that functions like any other hospi-tal.44 The prestige of being the only Level III hospital outside ofDakar is central to the pride that medical personnel and dahiramembers take in Hôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini. Yet in the wake ofassertions about the hospital’s modernity and technical sophistication,evidence of its particularity emerge. ‘There is the tendency for hospitalstaff to transform themselves into taalibe when important maraboutsarrive at the hospital,’ one doctor acknowledged.45 In the presence ofhigh-ranking marabouts, some hospital staff forgo professional conductand enact taalibe–sheikh relations by prostrating themselves on theirhands and knees in front of their religious superiors (who also happento be patients).

43. Ibid.44. Interview, S. Seck, hospital social work director, Touba, 30 May 2006; Interview,J. Bogol, Matlaboul Fawzaini physician, Touba, 17 May 2006; Interview, Amadou Diouf, ElHadj Dieng, Abdoulaye Wone, Boly Diop, and Aynina Gueye, hospital physicians, Touba,13 May 2006.45. Ibid.

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Staff narratives offer a clear indication that there are numerous personaland professional motivations behind their work at the hospital. All of thehospital’s top administrators had distinguished careers before arriving atHôpital Matlaboul Fawzaini. Given Touba’s distance from Dakar, whichfor Senegal’s intellectual class represents ‘all of Senegal’, these doctorsand administrators relinquished far more prestigious, comfortable, and inmost cases more lucrative positions to work at the hospital. Some of theattraction came from wanting to be part of something entirely new.‘Building a functioning hospital from scratch is not something you oftenget to do in the course of a normal medical career’ explained onedoctor.46

For the Mouride intellectuals working at the hospital, mystical and reli-gious motivations weighed heavily in their decision to relocate to Touba.In recounting their stories, they convey that their professional work at thehospital is infused with religious significance and animated by theMouride ethic of khidma.47 One young doctor described his choice in thefollowing manner:

We came to Matlaboul Fawzaini leaving behind us greater opportunities for materialadvancement, but as young men who love our country and have a desire to serve it, andas disciples of Sheikh Amadou Bamba, who suffered so much for his people, we thoughtthat our place was here… to bring our contribution to the well being of our compatriotsand fellow disciples.48

Other doctors and medical personnel described their willingness to forgothe comforts of Dakar for the chance to contribute in such a fundamentalway to the residents of Touba and to realizing Bamba’s vision.

Touba exerts a strong pull on Mourides in the diaspora and throughoutSenegal. Just as a sense of being called to fulfil Bamba’s mission featuresprominently in dahira members’ stories about the hospital project, so theMouride staff reflect on their own attachment to Touba. This mysticalconnection figured prominently in the story of the Human ResourcesDirector, who had spent most of his career far from both Dakar andTouba. In one interview he stressed that he had known for some timethat he was going to end up in Touba, largely because of successivedreams in which he was being called upon by various deceased Mouridesheikhs.49 He spoke of the conversations he had with them in thesedreams, and of his growing sense that Touba was calling him. ‘When

46. Ibid.47. Khidma means service to others, and it was used by Amadou Bamba alongside theconcepts of amal (labour) and kasb (gains) to refer to work. Khidma differs from the otherconcepts in that, in Bamba’s view, it signifies work in the name of God for the sake ofrewards in the hereafter.48. Ibid.49. Interview, Issa Ndiaye, Touba, 31 May 2006.


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I got my assignment to come here,’ he said, ‘I wasn’t in the leastsurprised.’Even non-Mouride staff report being influenced by the sense of devo-

tion that Mouride taalibe bring to their work at the hospital and in Toubamore broadly. Touba looms large in the Senegalese landscape because itoccupies a space outside the bounds of the state and because of therenowned religious zeal of Mouride taalibe. Touba’s distance from Dakar,its extreme heat, and the local ban on alcohol, tobacco, movies, andmusic create an image of a puritan and inhospitable place. This repu-tation extends to the world of donors and NGOs – there is almost nopresence of any of the major development agencies that are active inSenegal in the holy city. These agencies (and to some extent state struc-tures) are reluctant to accept the necessary compromises and sharing ofpower that operating in Touba would require.For all of these reasons, one young doctor spoke of his disappointment

after he had been assigned to the Touba Health Centre for his four-month medical residency. He assumed that daily life in Touba would betedious and difficult, and he hoped to be relocated as soon as possible.The doctor continued, ‘I told my supervisor I would try to make itthrough the first month, but then I would have to be transferred else-where.’ Instead, after only a few weeks, he was ‘seduced’ by the atmos-phere in Touba, by the Mourides’ organizational capacity, and by theirwillingness to work hard for the benefit of the population. He concluded,‘Like many of my colleagues, coming to this hospital was a challenge thatI took with some misgivings. But we are rewarded every day by what wehave been able to achieve in only one year on behalf of the population ofTouba.’50 He added that he can imagine spending a good portion of hiscareer in Touba.In spite of their varied itineraries and different motivations for accepting

their posts at the hospital, there was a widespread consensus among thestaff that they are all working harder in Touba than they would in mostother medical facilities. They are driven to meet the acute needs of thepopulation of Touba, and also by the sense that they are working to fulfila divine mission that Matlaboul Fawzaini entrusted to them. The originsof the project as homage to Serigne Touba continues to shape the dailypractices of the personnel who are now charged with carrying out itsmedical and administrative functions. For the dahira members and thehospital staff, the technologically sophisticated hospital is a symbol of amodernizing Touba, but it is also the concrete realization of Bamba’svision and evidence of his continued blessing of the holy city.

50. Interview, Amadou Diouf, Elhadj Dieng, Abdoulaye Wone, Boly Diop, and AyninaGueye, hospital physicians, Touba, 13 May 2006.

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Dahira and public–private partnerships: an alternative to state-leddevelopment?

In spite of its rocky beginning and operational constraints, the hospitaladdresses an acute need for biomedical infrastructure in Touba itself andthe surrounding region. There has been little to no expansion of govern-ment medical services in Senegal for the past two decades. HôpitalMatlaboul Fawzaini is one of two hospitals in the region of Juurbel with atotal population of almost 2 million residents.51 While the hospital pro-vides an example of transnational civil society filling the gap betweencitizen needs and state capacity, the short- and long-term viability of thiskind of development remains uncertain. The dahira’s responsibility forthe hospital ceased in 2002, and the current administrators and staff faceongoing challenges.

The most evident set of problems at the hospital are those related to itscurrent capacity in the light of Touba’s population growth.Administrators estimate that the structure needs to double in size (fromthree to six hectares) to achieve its potential as a hospital with Level IIIranking. The director of human resources cannot hire additional staffbecause of the shortage of space.52 Doctors express frustration with thespace constraints; except in rare cases they need to discharge patientsafter three or four days because of the bed shortage. Both clinical person-nel and administrators blame these problems on the lack of foresight withwhich the dahira undertook the project.

The other major impediment to the hospital’s functioning is related tofinances, and the fragile balance of responsibility between the Ministry ofHealth, the hospital administrators, and the Muridiyya for the hospital’soperating costs. During interviews in 2006, the hospital staff asserted thatthe hospital falls within the administrative hierarchy of the state. As salar-ied civil servants they wanted to make claims on the Ministry of Health toobtain additional personnel and financial support for the hospital. Yet atthat time the hospital received an annual budget of US$660,000 from theMinistry of Health, which covered approximately 50 percent of its costs.The remaining expenses were being covered by the hospital’s own reven-ues. The hospital is now accumulating debt and must occasionally divertpatients to other medical structures to obtain pharmaceuticals.53

In spite of the hospital’s status as a state structure, the hospital adminis-trators are keenly aware of the social and political stakes involved in

51. The Henrich Lubker hospital built by German cooperation in Diourbel in the 1960swas barely functional throughout the 1980s and 1990s. European donors approved fundingto rehabilitate the hospital in 2004.52. Interview, Issa Ndiaye, Touba, 31 May 2006.53. Sheff, The Problem with Eating Money.


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receiving financial assistance from both the state and the Mourides. Theycurrently have many needs and are continually sending requests to theHealth Ministry for additional support.54 The unofficial response is thatthe hospital should go to the Khalife-General and ask the Muridiyyato make up the difference between the hospital’s overhead and statefinancing.There are several ways to read this response. It could be understood in

the broader context of the muted political tension spurred by Mourideaspiration for autonomy versus the state’s desire to extend its control overthe Mouride heartland. In the recent past, this tension was expressed inthe form of Mouride resistance to the introduction of state-sponsoredFrench education in Touba and opposition to ending the free supply ofwater in the holy city. It also could be an allusion to the weak capacity ofthe state, or an attempt to test the Sufi order’s seemingly inexhaustibleability to mobilize labour and capital. For their part the hospital adminis-trators understand that returning again and again to the Muridiyya forfinancial assistance could be perceived as a subtle allegation that theHealth Ministry is failing to support the hospital. In the potentially con-tentious realm of state–tariqa politics, such a critique could easily result inbacklash against the hospital itself and a loss of existing state funding.The political ramifications of these funding sources are perceived differ-

ently by actors inside and outside of the hospital. During a tour of thehospital the chief of staff spoke openly about the hospital’s financial chal-lenges, the shortcomings of the hospital’s current structure, and the see-mingly endless need for more money.55 On the tour was a high-rankingmarabout who was part of Serigne Saliou’s circle of advisers. This mar-about, who had not previously visited the hospital, suggested that SerigneSaliou could easily remedy any of the hospital’s needs. In his words, ‘IfMatlaboul Fawzaini can’t continue financing the hospital, someone elsewill take over. We can get other taalibe to provide the funding.’Although the chief of staff sees his financial challenges as symptomatic

of Senegal’s underfinanced health system, his religious counterpartalluded to the ability of the Mouride leadership to tap into the vastcapacity of the brotherhood. His enthusiasm for the hospital contrastswith apparent government reservations about increasing its funding. As adahira-initiated project, its success can be counted as part of the broaderlegacy of the Muridiyya. The structure is definitively a Mouride hospital.The social and political capital accrued by the dahira and theKhalife-General from successfully bringing such an ambitious project tofruition will never be extended to the state.

54. Interview, M. Saar, hospital chief of staff, Touba, 12 May 2006.55. Ibid.

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In the light of the permanent association between the hospital and thetaalibe who financed its construction, the state has little to gain by increas-ing its support of the hospital. Given the historical conflation of the statewith the ruling party in Senegal, state legitimacy stems from the rulingparty’s monopoly over state resources and their distribution through partynetworks.56 In exchange citizens reward party leaders with electoral fide-lity. This clientelist system leaves little room for state enthusiasm inresponse to projects initiated by civil society, which carry an implicit cri-tique of the state’s shortcomings. While it would have been difficult forPresident Wade to deflect the Mouride’s gift of the hospital to the citizensof Senegal, the insufficient funding the hospital has received to datereflects limited means and state ambivalence about supporting a Mourideproject. The current financing reflects a compromise in which the stateprovides just enough financial support to deflect accusations that it hasabandoned Touba.

The state’s ambiguous relationship with the hospital is even more intri-guing since the government continues to show a commitment to enhan-cing the city’s infrastructure. In the past state investment in Touba was ameans of ensuring the continued loyalty of the Khalife-General, and thussecuring his ndigal (recommendation), which guaranteed Mouridesupport in presidential elections.57 President Wade has devised his ownproject for Touba, for which he has pledged an investment of CFA200billion over ten years to build new roads and to extend the electrical gridand water supply. Wade’s attitude indicates that the state is more inter-ested in garnering credibility through its own initiatives in Touba than insupporting Mouride projects, even when the latter respond to theimmediate needs of the population.58

What future for diaspora development in Senegal and beyond?

Within the context of Senegal’s deep Islamic history and vibrant Sufilandscape, the Mourides have long attracted the attention of scholars andresearchers for their dynamism and their ability to transcend major shifts

56. For further examination of the state and its relations with the citizenry see MomarCoumba Diop (ed.), Le Senegal contemporain (Karthala, Paris, 2002), especially ‘Lacitoyenneté mise en perspective’ pp. 501–47.57. See Linda Beck, ‘Reining in the marabouts? Democratization and local governance inSenegal’, African Affairs 100, 401 (2001), pp. 601–21 for an analysis of how historically thestate has used investment in infrastructure to leverage political support.58. In 2009 the Khalife-General’s spokesman issued a scathing critique of the lack of gov-ernment support for Touba. He highlighted the paltry financing of Matlaboul Fawzaini hos-pital that was built ‘entirely by talibe’ and receives the least amount of funding of anySenegalese hospital. (Walfadjri, ‘Gestion des affaires de Touba: le porte-parole du khalife generaldes mourides decrie le laxisme du gouvernement’, 20 November 2009). <http://www.seneweb.com/news/article/26853.php> (20 November 2009).


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in Senegal’s political economy over the past 100 years. Recent scholarshiphas examined how this Sufi order, and particularly Mouride dahira, havebeen remarkably adept at harnessing new social and economic conditions.The Mouride diaspora offers an example of ‘globalization from below’whereby ‘small players, as opposed to mega-corporations, make use of theopportunities offered by globalization’.59 In contrast to early theorizingabout globalization which anticipated cultural homogenization, theMourides have continued to ‘appropriate the possibilities offered by glo-balization… to take advantage of it and to be borne by it in every sense ofthe word’.60 Mouride dahira reflect changing social circumstancesinternal to the Muridiyya and the ways that the Sufi order has capitalized,literally and figuratively, on transnational migration as an economic strat-egy and source of symbolic capital.61

Matlaboul Fawzaini is not unique in its transnational membership, butit provides a remarkable example of the potential scale and capacity ofdiaspora associations. After a slow beginning, the dahira established a suc-cessful transnational bureaucracy that effectively coordinates chapters in ahalf-dozen countries with tens of thousands of members. By becoming aformal NGO registered in Senegal, it has numerous advantages over moread hoc diaspora associations, including its minimal tax burden and itsability to import materials and equipment duty-free.The vast sums of money raised for the hospital, the successful com-

pletion of the construction project, and the ability to sustain the projectfor more than a decade are unprecedented for a Muslim organization inSenegal. In contrast, secular NGOs in Senegal run by migrants that focuson translocal development have had difficulty mobilizing resources fortheir projects.62 Without the motivation of religious piety or a sense ofallegiance to a collective spiritual project, most migrants use their remit-tances for family welfare and expect the state to provide for basic needsand infrastructure.63 ‘Development’ as an end in itself does not appear tobe a compelling objective for savings or investment.In spite of its successes, over the past several years Matlaboul Fawzaini

has suffered from a crisis of leadership. Accusations of corruption leviedagainst several of its members and ensuing struggles to wrest control of

59. Giles Mohan and A. B. Zack-Williams, ‘Globalization from below: conceptualizing therole of the African diasporas in Africa’s development’, Review of African Political Economy 92(2002), pp. 211–36, 233. See also Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers: An essay on thegeography of anger (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2006) p. xi.60. Diouf, ‘The Senegalese Mouride trade diaspora’, p. 682.61. Babou, ‘Brotherhood solidarity, education and migration’.62. Grillo and Riccio, ‘Translocal development: Italy Senegal.’63. See Sheff, The Problem with Eating Money for a comparison between MatlaboulFawzaini and L’Association pour le codéveloppement (ASCODE), a secular NGO with manyMouride members.

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the dahira from the current leadership have stalled attempts to pursueequally ambitious projects. This crisis reflects new tensions between theincreasingly numerous descendants of Amadou Bamba and a dynamicgeneration of young Mouride disciples. While the former claim a right topower and leadership based on saintly genealogy, the latter stake theircredibility on their ability to help fulfil their sheikh’s ambitions for Touba.

The leadership conflict also illustrates the growing fault line betweenarabisants (Mouride intellectuals with a Koranic education and little or noliteracy in French) and francisants (Mourides with degrees from franco-phone institutions). Daam Ndiaye, the dahira’s first president, stems fromthe arabisant group, and his authority has been challenged by francisants.While francisants have little interest in the more traditional dahira thathelp rural migrants adapt to urban settings, Matlaboul Fawzaini’s tax-exempt NGO status offers a platform for lucrative business opportunitiesand as such has become an arena of contention.64 Rather than beingcoopted by the state or harnessed for state-coordinated development pro-jects, the dahira faces internal threats to its continued operation.

In addition, as with all things in Touba, future development effortsmust receive the blessings of the Khalife-General. The passing of SerigneSaliou Mbakke in 2008 and of his successor Mouhamadou Lamin BaraMbakke in 2010 have ushered in a new era for the Muridiyya. It is tooearly to assess the extent to which the new Khalife-General, SerigneCheikh Sidi Mokhtar Mbakke, will embrace and facilitate diaspora- ordahira-initiated projects in the holy city. The longevity and future efficacyof Matlaboul Fawzaini are far from certain.

As a product of African transnational organizing, Hôpital MatlaboulFawzaini illustrates the varied motivations behind diaspora projects, thedistinctive processes by which these projects come to fruition, the tremen-dous potential of diaspora philanthropy, and the numerous problems thatcan plague its execution. As scholars have found in studies of hometownassociations in Mexico, Cameroon, and Tanzania, these associationsoften have limited skills in project management, and their identification ofneed does not always coincide with the most immediate developmentneeds of their home community.65 The difficulties that plagued theMouride hospital project echo these concerns – the project was poorlyconceptualized, the dahira did not have the technical expertise to design ahospital, and over US$1 million was wasted on inadequate constructionbefore outside technical consultants helped redesign the building plans.

64. A similar leadership dispute between arabisants and francisants emerged in the dahiraHizbut Tarqiyya, and the Khalife-General ultimately stepped into resolve the conflict. SeeBeck, ‘Reining in the marabouts’.65. Mercer et al., Development and the African Diaspora; Orozco, ‘Hometown associationsand their present and future partnerships’, p. 42.


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Although the region lacked a top-tier hospital, the health of Touba’sinhabitants could easily be improved with access to clean drinking water,adequate nutrition and shelter, a robust sanitation system, and compre-hensive primary health care.66

The rise of diaspora-sponsored projects raises a nexus of questionsabout the development role for states in the neo-liberal moment, compe-tition and collaboration between state and non-state actors, and the veryfuture of the development paradigm itself. Some scholars express concernthat ‘such projects disproportionately burden migrants and make themresponsible for functions that rightfully belong to states’.67 Okome arguesthat regardless of what remittances can accomplish in African settings,they should be considered only an adjunct to state efforts to combatpoverty and marginalization.68 Those most enthusiastic about diasporadevelopment see the potential for states to regain some of their dimin-ished resources, to leverage the value of remittances to obtain credit ininternational finance markets, and to partner with dynamic diasporagroups that can conceptualize and execute small-scale projects.69

In spite of the global trend for ‘development’ funded by private capitalinvestment, the Senegalese state displays tremendous ambivalence aboutdiaspora-initiated projects. In an interesting twist on state–brotherhoodrelations, the transfer of the hospital to the Ministry of Health affordedthe Mourides an opportunity to secure additional state resources onterms of their choosing. Bestowing the hospital structure on theSenegalese government forced it to accept fiscal and technical responsibil-ity for its functioning. Although in many situations non-state actors arereplacing the state’s historical functions, this case suggests that diasporaassociations can wrest new commitments from the state by successfullycompleting infrastructure projects. Yet the Senegalese government hasonly partially embraced the hospital, primarily because it stands to gainlittle legitimacy from the success of a Mouride project.The case of Matlaboul Fawzaini highlights the distinct processes and

outcomes of diaspora projects. The hospital stemmed from a unique con-stellation of religious motivations, economic opportunities, and transna-tional collaboration. The possibility of replicating this developmentstrategy, even by Matlaboul Fawzaini itself, is far from obvious. Even the

66. Touba’s residents rely on potable well water brought in from outlying villages bydonkey cart, and its lack of a stable water system has facilitated several outbreaks of cholerain the past few years. There are not enough primary health clinics to serve the needs of thecity’s growing population.67. Peggy Levitt and Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen, ‘The transnational turn in migrationstudies’(Working Paper, Global Commission on International Migration, Global MigrationPerspectives, No. 6, 2004), p. 8.68. Okome, ‘African diasporas’.69. Ratha, ‘Leveraging remittances’; Maimbo and Ratha, Remittances.

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most ardent supporters of diaspora development acknowledge that remit-tances are not public money but personal flows, and states may have littleability to direct these resources towards sustainable or equitable develop-ment projects.70 States and non-state actors may also have competingmotivations, as seen in the reluctance of the Senegalese state to expendresources that won’t reinforce its own legitimacy.

Given the limited reach and competence of many African states, theenthusiasm for remittances as a lifeline for the poor and a panacea for adevelopment comes as no surprise. Our analysis reinforces the conclusionthat there is no replicable model for international development or public–private partnerships to be derived from the complex and contingentprojects pursued by transnational migrants.71 In spite of the Mouridepenchant for innovation and mobilizing vast material resources, it isunclear whether a Sufi organization (or any non-state actor) can managea city that will soon have over a million residents. Touba’s status as a reli-gious enclave creates particular challenges for its development and forstate–Mouride collaboration.

Although Matlaboul Fawzaini undertook a project designed to benefitTouba and the surrounding region, we should remain mindful that remit-tances and diaspora philanthropy privilege some families, communities,and regions while others are doubly marginalized by state neglect and thelack of resources transferred by transnational migrants. As a product ofthe uneven expansion of global capitalism (which in many cases has over-taken state-led development) the economic investments of diasporaassociations are bound to be equally sporadic and unsystematic.72 Theextent to which the individual and collective savings, projects, and dreamsof Africans living in global diasporas can remedy the ills of a marginalizedcontinent remains to be seen.

70. Levitt and Jaworksy, ‘Transnational migration studies’; Maimbo and Ratha,Remittances.71. Grillo and Riccio, ‘Translocal development: Italy–Senegal’; Mercer et al., Developmentand the African Diaspora.72. Mohan, ‘Embedded cosmopolitanism.’


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diaspora, faith, and science: building a mouride hospital in senegal

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