decentralisation, democracy and development in a post-conflict society: commune councils in cambodia

public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 25, 75–87 (2005)

Published online in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.349

DECENTRALISATION, DEMOCRACYAND DEVELOPMENT IN APOST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: COMMUNE COUNCILS IN CAMBODIA

PETER BLUNT1y AND MARK TURNER2*,z1GPO Box 364, Macksville NSW, Australia

2School of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Australia

SUMMARY

This article explores explanations for the development of a particular form of decentralisation in the post-conflict state of Cam-bodia. It looks at the context in which decentralisation has taken place, and analyses critical aspects of the functioning of themain elements of decentralisation: the commune councils. The article demonstrates that decentralisation has faltered due to alack of fit with Cambodia’s socio-cultural and institutional context. This helps to explain why there has been relatively littledevolution of decision-making power to commune councils in Cambodia. But this is not the complete answer. A more powerfulexplanation is one in which an unconducive general environment for decentralisation complements a lack of real political enthu-siasm for the idea, and a government agenda that is more consistent with pragmatic short-term political gains (such as the con-solidation of political party interests) than it is with the bolder, largely ideologically-driven interests of donors in the post-conflict establishment of strong forms of popular participation and political pluralism.Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

All countries emerging from periods of debilitating conflict confront the major issue of how they are going to

reconstruct the state. In some instances they may decide to re-establish or revitalise old institutions and organisa-

tions while in others there may be the desire for innovation. Many variables influence the choices that are made: for

example, the level of destruction and dislocation, the retained capacity of government organisations, national cul-

ture and values, the availability of skilled personnel, the ideology or visions of leaders and their personal interests,

the degree of political stability and the amount and character of external assistance.

There is no one formula and no single path for post-conflict states. While their situations differ, they are all weak

states in that they lack political, administrative and technical capacity. But the degree of weakness varies, as does

the potential for rapid reconstruction and the maintenance of stability. Cambodia represents an extreme case. There

was no recognisable state when Vietnamese forces ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979. It required reinvention in

every aspect. Among the choices facing all post-conflict governments is the question, to what degree should power

and authority be decentralised? In some countries, such as Uganda, the government decided to build on autono-

mous local authorities set up during the civil war (World Bank, 1999). In other cases, such as Kosovo and

Mindanao, peace agreements included provisions for political decentralisation and placed selected services in

the hands of local governments (Turner, 2001; Weller, 2001). But for some governments the principal objective

has been to establish central control and only later to transfer responsibilities to subnational governments or

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Correspondence to: M. Turner, School of Business and Government, University of Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia.E-mail: [email protected]. Blunt is a freelance consultant in development management and governance. He has held tenured-full professorships in management atuniversities in Australia, Britain and Norway, and is currently working in Cambodia as a technical adviser on decentralisation. Address forcorrespondence: GPO Box 364, Macksville, NSW 2447, Australia, [email protected]. Turner is Professor in the School of Business and Government, University of Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia, [email protected].

authorities. This was the model adopted by Cambodia where decentralised local democracy was only introduced

more than 20 years after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, it is a very limited form of decentralisation.

Although the legislation gives the impression of the democratic devolution of wide-ranging powers the reality is

one of continued central control.

This article examines state rebuilding in Cambodia, arguing that stabilisation and the consolidation of political

power have been the principal concerns of government for more than 20 years. Thus key state actors have had little

real interest in democratisation and the creation of a developmental state. However, the recent introduction of

democratically elected commune councils seems to represent a move in the latter direction. This article explores

whether this experiment represents a genuine devolution of power or merely disguises the theme of central control

by the Cambodian state and political consolidation by the ruling party. The analysis highlights the influence of

important aspects of the environment on decentralisation and how these can severely circumscribe the achievement

of the declared intentions of a decentralisation programme. It considers the rationality of modest government aims

as opposed to the grander ideologically driven ambitions of donors.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DECENTRALISATION

Cambodians had already endured 5 years of civil war before 1975 when the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom

Penh and assumed the reins of state. Any hopes for a return to normality were quickly dashed as the new rulers

proceeded on their radical path to a new Cambodia. Towns and cities were evacuated and their populations trans-

ferred to rural areas. Forced labour was used to extend agricultural production. Private property was abolished.

Parents and children were often separated. Organised religion was destroyed. Education was suspended and all

previous government institutions were abolished (Hannum, 2000). The human toll was appalling. It is estimated

that ‘excess mortality’ involved more than 1.7 million people, their deaths due to execution, starvation and disease.

Among those targeted for liquidation were the educated functionaries of the state who were ‘irremediably tainted

by their association with the old order’ (Hannum, 2000).

When Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in 1979 and overthrew the Khmer Rouge they found a country in

ruins. ‘There were no institutions of any kind—no bureaucracy, no army or police, no schools or hospitals, no state

or private commercial networks, no religious hierarchy, no legal system’ (Gottesman, 2002, p. x). Infrastructure

had collapsed through neglect and there were no functioning urban centres. Millions wandered the country seeking

relatives, former homes, food or refugee camps across the Thai border.

The Vietnamese did not go home after their victory. They remained to ensure the state was reconstructed

according to their preferences and to dissuade the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and other opposition forces from

attempting to retake control. Together with the new Cambodian government Vietnamese advisers directed the

rebuilding of the state but were confronted with profound problems such as the ‘extermination of civil servants

[which] had erased a national memory of how government worked’ (Gottesman, 2002, p. 50). The chosen path was

along socialist lines with a strongly centralist emphasis. Officials were appointed or elected at the district or com-

mune levels but had little to administer in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Autocratic tendencies char-

acterised government. There was no place for democracy in the ideologically driven state in which a ‘sprawling

and heterogeneous network’ of government organisations was emerging. Patronage was rife and performance

unimportant in a bureaucratic system which was unconcerned with efficiency and effectiveness but valued loyalty

and compliance.

By the time the Vietnamese withdrew in 1989 there was relative stability in most of the country, but it remained

a post-conflict society rather than a developmental state. There was still armed opposition to the government in

some provinces, the economy had made little progress under collective agriculture, infrastructure was rudimentary,

poverty was widespread, 350,000 refugees remained in border camps and the government was impoverished. The

collapse of the Soviet block had dried up the flow of aid. Few services were provided to the rural population, and

even in those activities where there had been considerable expansion, notably in education, it had ‘spawned a crisis

of quality, orientation and timing’ (Ayres, 2000, p. 148). The Paris Peace Accord of 1991 offered hope with the

promise of huge amounts of aid and ‘free and fair’ elections between political parties which until then had been

76 P. BLUNT AND M. TURNER

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 25, 75–87 (2005)

locked in armed conflict. The United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) rolled into Cambodia with thou-

sands of civilian advisers, police and military personnel and a huge treasure chest of resources. The UNTAC-orga-

nised election for a national assembly brought out almost 90% of the voters, but UNTAC’s other achievements

were less notable. The centralised government and bureaucracy ‘administered around UNTAC’ enabling the ruling

Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to ‘ignore aspects of the peace settlement which they found unpalatable’ (Thayer,

1996, p. 131). Furthermore, rehabilitation and reconstruction were, as one official put it, ‘one of the least effective

parts of UNTAC’ (Brown and Zasloff, 1998, p. 124).

UNTAC departed in 1993 without creating political stability. UNTAC had provided ‘an edgy incomplete pause

in war-making’ (Kamm, 1998, p. 39). Two parties, CPP and FUNCINPEC, now shared government in an uneasy

alliance neither being willing to make and implement the policies required for sustained and equitable develop-

ment. Dividing and defending the spoils rather than the pursuit of good governance of office were the preoccupa-

tions of the political elite. Decentralisation was not even on the agenda and coherent policy elusive. Tension

mounted between FUNCINPEC and CPP leading to a violent coup in 1997 by CPP which then increased its votes

in the 1998 election, quite possibly because the electorate valued stability and was concerned about the possibility

of a return to civil war. Twenty years after the defeat of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia was still enmeshed in post-

conflict societal dynamics.

As some stability returned so too did foreign aid and economic growth, albeit heavily concentrated in Phnom

Penh. However, the underlying informal structure of government remained intact in the form of networks of per-

sonal allegiance that offer members security and opportunities for rent-seeking in return for loyalty (Hughes,

2003). Donor-funded programmes and projects commencing in the mid-1990s and continuing today have

attempted to build capacity, increase popular participation and promote substantive reform in public administration

but with limited success.

One of the most significant of these initiatives has been decentralisation, which commenced in February 2002

with the election of commune councils (DOLA-CCDP, 2003a). It emerged onto the political agenda through the

confluence of three factors. First, in 1995 the donor-funded Seila programme was set up ‘to strengthen local gov-

ernance as a key to poverty alleviation’ (Seila, 2000). Its demonstrated success in promoting small-scale local

infrastructure projects, its capacity to attract funding and its non-threatening nature ensured its maintenance but

more importantly focussed attention on local government units.

Second, in the 1990s, donors became concerned with good governance and the popular view that a leading way

to promote good governance was through decentralisation (World Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1995; ADB, 1999). This

found expression in Cambodia in the establishment of the multi-donor Partnership for Local Governance (PLG), in

donor reports and the government’s Governance Action Plan (UNDP, 1997; Kato et al., 2000).

Third, the CPP saw possibilities for further consolidating its grip on power by extending its influence at the

grassroots in the communes. By marshalling its resources and relying on a public desire for stability it could

capture more official positions in electoral competition. Networks could be extended downwards and across the

country. Decentralisation need not be threatening to central government. If it could be constructed in a way that

limited the delegation of authority and resources it could even enhance central control. Such an approach fitted

well with the historical development of the Cambodian state in which centralisation and hierarchy were persistent

principles, whatever the nature of the regime in office.

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF DECENTRALISATION IN CAMBODIA

Successful decentralisation requires a context in which dominant values are supportive of genuine decentralisation.

These might include such things as a commitment to popular participation, the acknowledgment of local auton-

omy, support for bottom-up decision-making and special consideration of the most vulnerable. One way of deter-

mining whether such supportive conditions prevail is to analyse Cambodia in relation to the specific cultural

dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980) (see also Blunt, 1991). The findings set out in Table 1 clearly demon-

strate that Cambodia’s cultural context is largely unreceptive to the values that are the essence of decentralisation

(DOLA-CCDP, 2003b).

DECENTRALISATION, DEMOCRACYAND DEVELOPMENT 77


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233103125_Organisational_Culture_and_Development?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-5885f7de-c8dd-47f2-87be-538f8b7fb791&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIyOTkzNTA0MztBUzoxMzcyMTQ5Nzc2NDY1OTJAMTQwOTcyNjAwODAxNQ==

Many authors have observed that in Cambodia hierarchy is a dominant organisational principle with a long

history (Martin, 1994; Chandler, 1996; Ayres, 2000; O’Leary and Nee, 2001). Conformity to the principles of hier-

archy and to the requirements of one’s position within it can be observed in many interactions in Cambodian

society. It is hardly surprising that the introduction of democratic elections has not resulted in major changes to

these values. A recent survey by the Asia Foundation (2003, p. 10) noted that while the vast majority of

Cambodians are keen to participate in elections they do so in order to ‘fulfil their civic duty. Almost none think

that elections offer an opportunity to provide input into government policy and composition or to change the direc-

tion of their country’. This is not to argue a static model of society in which values and behaviour remain

unchanged over centuries but rather to indicate that the ‘counterpoints’ existing in Cambodian society have to

compete with extremely powerful values which are mobilised to support the organisational principle of hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the precise workings of that hierarchy and possibilities for social mobility within it do change.

THE GOVERNANCE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALISATION

For a system of decentralisation to be effective in bringing decision-making authority and accountability closer to the

people being served there are certain contextual aspects of governance that will support or inhibit progress. We con-

sider governance to comprise those activities of government, the private sector and civil society that contribute to the

representation of popular interest and the management of national and local affairs (UNDP, 1995, 1997; Blunt, 2003).

As noted above, the major institutions of government in Cambodia are still in a process of recovery and rein-

vention following decades of war and civil disturbance. A number of them present serious challenges to decen-

tralisation. First is the need to separate clearly the powers of the judiciary from those of the executive arms of

government and the legislature. Second, the judicial system is seriously flawed resulting in a lack of public con-

fidence or trust in it. Third, audit offices do not always function in accordance with the law, lack transparency and

are subject to political interference. Fourth, public revenues are only 12% of GDP making them among the lowest

in the region. Reasons for this include: inadequate enforcement of the relevant laws; ad hoc exemptions, leakage of

Table 1. Culture and organisation in Cambodia

Cambodia’s position on Definition Implications for decentralisationHofstede’s culturaldimensions

High power-distance Strong preference for hierarchical relationswithin organisations, which are strictlydefined and observed. Unwilling to takeinitiative without clear instructions orapproval from above

Very unreceptive—especially to bottom-updecision making, but also even to consultationwith subordinates. Leaders analyse, decide andinform. They rarely consult and never havedecisions made for them from below

High uncertaintyavoidance

Strong preference for clear definition inall organisational circumstances, particularlyin relation to authority and responsibility,and in relation to rules and procedures

Unreceptive—especially to circumstanceswhere problems must be analysed in a creativeor unstructured way, and where there are noestablished rules or procedures

Medium masculinity Preference for some role separation betweenmen and women. Women are accepted byboth sexes as being less powerful. Womenmust follow strict moral codes while mencan get away with bad behaviour

Somewhat receptive—to ideas that give greaterpolitical participation to women (AsiaFoundation 2003). Less receptive to the idea ofwomen having power ‘over’ men

High collectivism High value given to the needs and interestsof the group over the individual. Extendedfamily relations and obligations to kin andethnic affiliates take precedence overorganisational interests. The idea of the‘common good’ is defined and understoodprimarily in terms of kinship

Unreceptive—especially to ideas thatcontradict the priority of obligations toextended family and kin. This affects the socialacceptability of rent seeking and particularism.



https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44832772_Governance_conditions_roles_and_capacity-building_needs_in_rebel-held_areas_of_Southern_Sudan?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-5885f7de-c8dd-47f2-87be-538f8b7fb791&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIyOTkzNTA0MztBUzoxMzcyMTQ5Nzc2NDY1OTJAMTQwOTcyNjAwODAxNQ==

revenues and limited administrative capacity. Fifth, it is essential to continue the shift of public expenditure away from

military and law enforcement agencies towards the social and economic sectors, to ensure that actual disbursements

follow budget and that leakage is minimised. Sixth, although significant reductions have been made and are in pro-

spect, the large sizeof themilitary andpolice continues to be a problem. Seventh, provincial administrations have little

decision-making power, and act mainly as the administrative arms of central government and the line ministries.

Eighth, land ownership is beset by legal ambiguity and inconsistency, corruption, policy confusion and a lack of

human, financial andmaterial resources (Kato et al., 2000, p. 38). And crucially, ninth, formany civil servants salaries

remain largely below subsistence levels, which makes rent seeking a rational and systemic response.

With regard to civil society, since the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in December 1991, the number and

variety of local and international NGOs active in Cambodia has increased dramatically. In 1997, NGOs accounted

for 7.4% of total public expenditures and are active in health, roads and rural development, social development,

human resource development, human rights and legal aid. However, the SIDA Advisory Team on Democratic

Governance (SATDG, 2003, p. v) concludes that ‘in the case of Cambodia . . . civil society is weak’. The basis

for this conclusion is the low degree of voluntary participation by citizens, the undemocratic structures of many

NGOs, and their dependence on external sources of financing.

There are many media organisations operating in Cambodia, including foreign language newspapers—in

Chinese, English and French—and a number of private TV stations. The media are relatively free from political

interference, particularly in Phnom Penh where they appear to have some licence to report political and social

events as they see them. However, less favourable assessments have also been made. Citing as evidence the arrest

of several editors at the time of the burning of the Embassy of Thailand, some observers regard the ‘present situa-

tion in Cambodia’ to be ‘far from ideal’ (SATDG, 2003, p. 13). According to the same source, there are also dif-

ficulties of access to information in a governance setting characterised as ‘authoritarian and secretive’ (ibid.).

Despite the fact that incentives for foreign direct investment are among the most attractive in the region, such

investment is low. The private sector is relatively underdeveloped. There is some growth in segments such as tour-

ism and garment manufacture, but the structure of the economy is still dominated by agriculture. Inadequacies in

the legal framework (particularly concerning property rights and dispute settlement) and the judicial system, defi-

ciencies in the physical infrastructure and extraordinarily high transaction costs are a brake on investment.

In the face of such fundamental problems as have been listed above serious questions can be raised about the

wisdom of embarking on a complex and expensive national decentralisation programme.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF DECENTRALISATION

The institutional context of decentralisation has a major bearing on whether genuine delegation of decision-

making and transfer of resources can actually take place. In Cambodia, the institutional arrangements for decen-

tralisation result in central agencies retaining strong control over these matters (DOLA-CCDP, 2003c). The roles of

the main national entities involved in decentralisation and deconcentration, which are complex and sometimes

conflicting, are set out in Table 2.

Nearly all of these entities have tentacles that reach down to the level of the commune. There is a certain amount

of role ambiguity and the potential for considerable role conflict, such as between Council for Administrative

Reform and National Committee for Support to the Communes. This complex, congested and overlapping system

allows government entities to protect their vested interests in the status quo. Thus, the political interests of entities

are safeguarded even if it may be at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness. Participating central agencies are

satisfied as long as they can resist encroachments onto their territory.1

1Recently, following suggestions from the donor community, government has established a high-level Working Group charged with thedevelopment of a ’strategic framework’ for the development of decentralisation and deconcentration in Cambodia. The Working Group will besupported by a group of senior technical advisers resident in Cambodia who are familiar with the issues and represent the main donor interests.The major purposes of this proposed arrangement are to provide cohesive technical support to the government in the formation of policy optionsfor decentralisation and deconcentration; in identifying alternative strategies for implementation; and in the structure and execution of donorassistance. The Working Group is expected to produce options for government to consider by mid-2005.



Table 2. Apex entities for decentralisation and deconcentration

Entity Role vis-a-vis deconcentration Role vis-a-vis decentralisation

1. National Committee to Supportthe Communes (NCSC)—aninter-ministerial body whosemembership comprises: Ministerof Interior (chair), the Minister incharge of the Council of Ministers(vice chair), the Minister ofEconomy and Finance(vice chair), the Minister ofRural Development, the Ministerof Land Management, Urbanismand Construction, the Minister ofPlanning, the Minister ofWomen’s and Veterans’ Affairs,and the Ministry of Interior(MOI) Director General ofAdministration (permanentmember). The Department ofLocal Administration (DOLA)serves as secretariat to theNCSC. The NCSC has a5-year mandate and receivesbudgetary support from theMOI

Makes recommendations to the Royal Governmentof Cambodia and takes action concerning thefollowing aspects of decentralisation:

� Commune boundaries� Administrative structures, staffing and procedures� The promotion of democracy and participatorymanagement with accountability and transparency

� Interactions between communes� The development of the capacity of communecouncils

� The management of commune revenues� Technical assistance to communes� Disseminating information concerning thefunctioning of the commune councils

� The implementation of decentralisation policy andreform of public administration

� Drafting laws, regulations and standards for theapplication of the Law on Communes/SangkatAdministrative Management

� Determining transitional procedures forcommunes without sufficient capacity to assumeresponsibilities under decentralisation

� Monitoring and evaluating activities that are underthe jurisdiction of the NCSC

2. Ministry of Interior (MOI) Control, but not appointment, ofprovincial/municipal governors

DOLA and Provincial Office of LocalAdministration (POLA) responsible for communestaffing, administration and capacity building. MOIchairs the NCSC—inter-ministerial decentralisationpolicy body—and houses its secretariat, DOLA

3. Ministry of Economy andFinance (MEF)

Responsible for national and provincialbudgets, revenue generation, andfinancial management through thenational and provincial treasuries andthe provincial departments ofeconomy and finance

Manages the commune financial system, administersthe Commune/Sangkat Fund (CSF) under thedirection of the CSF Board (or agent), and developsand regulates commune own-source revenues

4. Ministry of Planning (MOP) Assists with the production ofprovincial development andinvestment plans—throughprovincial departments of planning

Develops commune development planningprocedures, assists with training, provides technicalplanning support (e.g. commune profiles), and helpsto integrate provincial and commune developmentplans

5. Ministry of RuralDevelopment (MRD)

Operates large provincial departmentsof rural development and districtoffices that collaborate withsectoral ministries

Provides technical assistance for the delivery ofselected rural services in the commune and assistswith village planning and village interaction withcommunes

6. Sectoral ministries—for example, Agriculture,Forestry and Fisheries;Health; and Education

Operate deconcentrated offices andprovide services at provincial andsometimes district levels

Provide specialist help in their areas of expertisethrough their provincial and municipal staff; underthe law, can delegate functions to the communes, butthis must be accompanied by resources

7. Council on AdministrativeReform (CAR)

Responsible for developing adeconcentration framework and forgeneral governance reform that willaffect provinces and districts. It iscurrently drafting a law ondeconcentration

Indirect—through general governance reform andthrough its influence over deconcentration



In addition to the apex entities described above, in the last few years a number of other agencies have emerged

that have an explicit decentralisation support mission. The roles of these agencies are briefly described in Table 3

above.

Of the agencies listed in the table, the Seila programme probably exerts the greatest influence on the course of

decentralisation and deconcentration. Seila is financed by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. As indi-

cated, Seila provides multi-sectoral provincial rural development committees with control over the allocation of

rural development budgets. The provincial governor chairs these committees. Mainly through its capacity building

work, Seila is able to exert some influence on other ministries such as planning and rural development.

The major line ministries currently undertake all service delivery in subnational territories in areas such

as health, education, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, rural development and infrastructure. Delegation of services

by line ministries to the commune, that is, decentralisation, is permissible under existing legislation so long as

necessary resources accompany them. To date, no such delegation has taken place and prospects for it in the short

term are constrained by the centralist preferences of ministries, budget restrictions, disbursement anomalies and

political will. There are undoubted capacity limitations at the provincial, district and commune levels, but these are

secondary factors.

Evidence of reluctance to delegate decision-making power occurs even within ministries. Delegation to lower

levels, or offices in subnational territories, concerns responsibilities for the performance of certain tasks or duties

rather than the assumption of authority over them or of associated budgets. This is a weak form of deconcentration

(Turner, 2002).

Current legislation concerning the structure, roles and functions of provinces and districts is not well developed.

The province is a deconcentrated unit of the state to which the law assigns formal responsibility for ensuring that

Table 3. Other government agencies involved in supporting decentralisation and deconcentration

Agency Role and/or objectives

1. Seila programme (Supported by the Partnership forLocal Governance—PLG—project, which provides‘advisory services and financial resources for theimplementation of the RGC [Royal Government ofCambodia] Seila programme’)

The programme’s goal is ‘to contribute to poverty alleviationthrough good governance’. The ‘immediate objective’ of theprogramme is ‘to institute decentralised systems and strategiesto manage sustainable local development’. The Seilaprogramme also fulfils an ‘aid mobilisation and coordination’(a ‘programming framework’) role for channelling donorsupport to the RGC’s decentralisation and deconcentrationreform programme

The Seila programme has a broad mandate that encompassessubstantial technical assistance to the establishment andoperation of: the commune as a level of government; and anational network of trainers and facilitators, and others, whoprovide training and other support services to the communes.The programme could also play a significant role in thedevelopment of deconcentration in the country

2. Provincial Offices of Local Administration (POLAs) Provide a link between the provincial administration and thecommune councils, and give various types of support—training, technical advice, and so on

3. Provincial Rural Development Committee (PRDC)(chaired by the governor who reports to MOI, whichpotentially confuses lines of control between MOIand MRD; includes representatives of line departments)

Provides a channel for much Seila support to the communes

4. Provincial Department of Rural Development Provides technical support to communes on rural services

5. Provincial Department of Planning Responsible for the technical review of sub-nationaldevelopment plans and for overseeing planning training andsupport



necessary expenditures are made in relation to: staff and administration; facility maintenance and the operating

costs of certain services such as public lighting, fire fighting, rubbish collection, roads, public gardens, water sup-

ply, social affairs, sanitation and health services. However, the centre largely determines the quantum of such

expenditures.

Provincial planning has been developed under the Seila umbrella and is now overseen by the MOP. The five-

year Provincial Development Plan (PDP) and three-year investment plan are multi-sectoral, but few projects have

been implemented because of a lack of funds. Those that have been implemented have been financed by ‘off-

budget’ Seila funds through the annual provincial investment funds facility. The district is a sub-division of the

province and is probably most accurately described as a part of the province working in compliance with instruc-

tions from the province.

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNE COUNCILS

Cambodia is organised into 20 provinces, four municipalities and 1,621 communes and sangkats, of which 1510

are rural communes. The municipalities of Phnom Penh, Kep, Pailin and Sihanoukville have 111 sangkats. The

number of communes per province varies between 173 in Kompong Cham and 21 in Mondolkiri. In 1998, 35% of

communes had populations of less than 5000, 20% had more than 10,000 and the average size was 8000.

There are 11,261 elected commune councillors, of whom about 8.5% are women and 10.2% are ethnic mino-

rities. While all communes face very similar development problems—poverty, lack of empowerment, poor health

care and so on—the severity of these problems differs between them. In the more remote rural communes, devel-

opment problems are exacerbated by inaccessibility, poor infrastructure and services, lack of communication facil-

ities and pronounced skill deficits. Commune councils are intended to help government address problems of rural

poverty and deprivation more directly and more effectively and efficiently. They are also supposed to represent and

encourage the deepening and widening of popular democracy and accountability.

Article 43 of the Law on the Administration and Management of Commune/Sangkat (promulgated on

12 January 2001) defines the duties of commune councils as follows:

� Maintain security and public order.

� Arrange necessary public services and be responsible for the good process of these affairs.

� Encourage the creation of contentment and well being of the citizens.

� Promote social and economic development and upgrade the living standards of the citizens.

� Protect and conserve the environment, natural resources and national cultural heritage.

� Reconcile concepts of citizens to have mutual understanding and tolerance.

� Perform general affairs to meet the needs of citizens.

Article 47 of the same law provides that ‘detail’ and definition can be supplied to these duties by sub-decree

following a proposal from the Ministry of Interior. Even so, the above roles are discretionary and supplementary

since councils have no authority over the police, education, health or other services and are explicitly excluded from

involvement in forestry. A sub-decree issued in March 2002 does little to impart precision or clarity to these roles:

� ‘Promote and facilitate the development of the commune/sangkat by invoking assistance, and mobilising capa-

cities’.

� ‘Promote and coordinate the process of democracy in the commune/sangkat’.

Table 4 below summarises the main activities currently undertaken by commune councils, and the amount of

decision-making involved. The data presented in Table 4 are derived from detailed, qualitative studies in six pro-

vinces and one municipality of 16 communes, falling into three broad categories: poor rural commune, typical

rural commune and sangkat (DOLA-CCDP, 2003b).

One of the most significant features of the functions outlined in Table 4 is connected with develop-

ment planning, where there is considerable variability between communes in relation to knowledge and



‘capture’.2 The extent to which commune councillors and clerks knew what were the major objectives and projects

contained in ‘their’ plan varied: in a few instances there was little knowledge or understanding of the plan among

councillors. This implied the possibility of capture at higher levels in the system or within the commune itself.

Within the commune capture might consist in the location of development infrastructure—roads, wells, culverts

and so on—to suit the interests of local elites rather than the community as a whole. Our situational analyses would

lead us to expect this. Indeed, it would be surprising if significant elements of capture were not to be found.3 This is

commonplace in other parts of the governance system and we could find no compelling reasons why this part of the

system should vary from the norm.4 The precise location, and degree of capture is not uniform across communes. It

Table 4. Current (actual) commune council functions and decision-making

Function Decision-making

1. Development planning Some: Can determine contents and priority of submitted developmentplans, and can exercise some influence over which projects receivefunding. But the unreliability of disbursement of development fundscould seriously undermine the significance of planning decision-making

2. Civil registration None: Entails application of rules and standardised procedures, adeconcentrated function of MOI

3. Land dispute resolution and land allocation Some: But current legal status uncertain because informal andadvisory only

4. ‘Maintenance’ of peace and security Some: Liaison, informal and advisory only. Sometimes supervision ofcommune police

5. ‘Maintenance’ of records None: Entails application of rules and standardized procedures

6. Economic transaction records None: Entails application of rules and standardized procedures

7. Representation of community needs None: Can gather and represent expressed needs and their priority, butno control over government action

8. Information provision None: Mainly downward transmission and dissemination. Someinteraction with line ministries and upward reporting

9. Mobilisation of community support Some: Can influence priority development projects for communitysupport

10. Staffing None: the only permanent staff member, the commune clerk, isappointed by MOI and is an employee of MOI

11. Finance Limited: most financial management is done at the provincial andmunicipal levels; validity checks only at the commune level; controlover small petty cash payments and possibly small amounts of revenuefrom civil registration

2Capture by higher levels in the system or by elites can occur for one or more of the following reasons: first, because it follows the system normsof hierarchy and centralised control; second, because of the opportunities that exist for rent seeking or personal advantage; or, third, because theactivity is beyond the capability of those responsible for it (resulting in what might be called ’technocratic capture’). We would be surprised ifsome forms of capture were not evident as they are commonplace throughout the governance system in Cambodia, as they are in decentralisedsystems in other developing countries. Even in the Philippines, which Manor (2003) identifies as one of the few successful cases ofdecentralisation in developing countries, problems of capture are widespread.3On the other hand, a recent review of the Seila programme conducted by the DFID/Sida Permanent Advisory Team reports ’no evidence of elitecapture’ (2003, p. iii).4The ADB governance report, referred to earlier, notes: ‘There remains a risk that provincial and/or district authorities will seek to instruct orexercise control over commune councils’ (Kato et al., 2000, p. 75). The report goes on to observe that ’It is highly unusual, however, to havedemocratically elected commune council reporting to non-democratically chosen officials such as governors and district chiefs. This mayweaken the impact of such political decentralisation or eliminate its value altogether’ (ibid.).



can be expected to vary according to the relative influence of key actors at different levels in the system (down to

village chief), and possibly the size of the commune and hence the development grant.5 Second, community invol-

vement, that is, the ability and interest of councillors to gather information from their constituents concerning their

needs also varied significantly.6

Our empirical survey also demonstrated that, first, communes have little finance of their own to manage. To

date, in most communes revenue from civil registration will have produced no more than US$100 (at 10 cents

per registration). Even when registration gets into ‘full swing’ the amount of revenue raised will not be significant,

particularly after the backlog has been cleared. Second, the provincial or municipal treasury manages nearly all

commune financial activities. All work connected with financial procedures at the level of the commune is done by

the commune clerk.

For most communes, particularly in the rural areas, councillors tend to be men over 40 years of age who possess

low levels of formal education. They are all also clearly influential members of their respective political parties,

and mostly dignified and respected elders of the community. Many of them are farmers. They are also conservative,

particularly in relation to the observance of strict hierarchies of authority, the role of women and the importance of

uncertainty avoidance. As in some other parts of Southeast Asia, leaders make decisions and followers are

informed of them and expected to conform without question. Followers must show deference. Assertiveness

and outspokenness on the part of followers are anathema. Leaders who seek the views of their followers or sub-

ordinates may be regarded as weak and ineffectual (Blunt and Jones, 1997; O’Leary and Nee, 2001).

Our interviews with commune councillors confirmed that the hierarchical structure described above was strictly

applied to the social order of the commune council itself. If this structure of social relations signifies the prevailing

culture within the council (which we believe it does), then it seems unlikely that councillors would employ a dif-

ferent form of social interaction in their relations with citizens, or with higher levels in the bureaucracy.

The functions currently performed by commune councils entail relatively little or no decision-making. Table 4

above analyses each council function in terms of the decision making associated with it. It is clear that, with the

possible exception of development planning, the extent of decentralisation to commune councils is very limited. A

certain amount of decision-making is associated with the identification of expressed needs and the priorities

assigned to those needs and, to some extent, to the needs that receive support. Also, it seems that commune coun-

cils exert informal influence over land allocations, which has considerable potential for poverty reduction and

could be enhanced. There is variable ability to take action on security matters and council chiefs are sometimes

called in to informally mediate in cases of domestic violence or land disputes.

The commune councils’ authority over development funds is constrained by supply controls at the provincial

level. Management accounting of commune funds is carried out at the level of the province and municipality, a

situation which raises the question of whether commune councils with little or no financial autonomy can be clas-

sified as genuine devolutionary bodies (Kato et al., 2000).

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND DECENTRALISATION

There are five main issues here. First, there is strong support among donors for decentralisation programmes that

entail high levels of community participation and high levels of delegation of decision-making power to the lowest

levels of local government.

Second, a variable, but probably generally low, level of knowledge exists among donors concerning compara-

tive and Cambodian evidence of the realities of decentralisation and deconcentration and their effects on poverty

reduction. This is conducive to goal displacement—towards outputs (for example, training) and away from out-

comes (for example, poverty reduction). It also means that there can be significant time lags between statements of

5Even with varying degrees of capture, and therefore less than ideal targeting of development activities, the fact that in many communesdevelopment projects are being implemented under the commune councils is clearly beneficial. The challenge is to improve on what is beingdone and to give ordinary people as much practice as possible in deciding for themselves.6Again, our findings on this issue differ from those of the DFID/SIDA Permanent Advisory Team who found that ‘the process appeared to behighly participatory’ (2003, p. iii).



intent and perceptions of their manifestation in practice, with implications for the inevitable tensions between form

and substance.

Third, the undoubted organisational strengths and output delivery effectiveness and efficiency of the Seila/PLG

programme have created something of a bandwagon effect with respect to donor funding of decentralisation. This

funding is considerable and constitutes a significant input to government. The Seila/PLG financial management

systems are efficient and transparent. As a result, donors have understandable confidence in the Seila/PLG system

although this means that considerable decentralisation funding is tied to a single approach.

Fourth, the first three points mentioned above create a strong ‘push’ effect for decentralisation from the donor

community, with funds flowing mainly through a single channel. The response from government has two dimen-

sions: one proclaims rhetorical endorsement of donor interests (a ‘pull’ effect) while the other conceals consider-

able political risk aversion to rapid devolution of decision-making.

Fifth, the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ effects referred to are likely to have significantly different geneses. We suggest above

that the push effect stems from largely ideological preferences on the part of donors for bottom-up, democratic

forms of governance that may yield poverty reduction benefits. On the other hand, the pull effect from government

is likely to stem from more immediate pragmatic political and economic considerations.

This situation is potentially problematic for two reasons. First, it is possible that the political and economic

interests of government can be achieved through strong policy statements and legislation, but limited implementa-

tion. On the other hand, donor preferences and expectations may be unfulfilled, resulting eventually in a loss of

donor confidence and reduced funding. A weak decentralisation, or decentralisation that is stronger on form than

substance, may also erode public confidence, thereby making subsequent attempts at substantive decentralisation

more difficult.

Limiting expectations for decentralisation, and basing them on a realistic assessment of government interests,

and governance and commune circumstances, can reduce these risks. Spreading investment in decentralisation so

that different perspectives are brought to bear on the issues can reduce such risks but simultaneously open up new

possibilities.

CONCLUSION

The empirical reality of decentralisation in Cambodia is similar to that found in a number of developing countries

where there is also little devolution of decision making. Manor (2003, p. 5) observes that ‘this problem continues to

limit or wreck the potential of elected local bodies. Some governments have well-designed plans to empower and

fund decentralised institutions, but refuse to implement the plans’.

If this state of affairs is as common as Manor suggests, it is clearly important to try to understand why it comes

about and, in particular, to consider the differences between the parallel agendas that can exist, especially those of

government and donors. One question of interest is whether the more modest range of potential political and devel-

opment benefits that are on offer from such weak forms of decentralisation can be sufficient to make them worth-

while from both points of view. A related question is: under what circumstances might this happy coincidence

occur?

The evidence presented is designed to illuminate the above question and to support an argument with the fol-

lowing structure: first, the broad historical, cultural and governance settings of decentralisation in Cambodia are

not conducive to strong forms of decentralisation. Second, the institutional arrangements immediately surround-

ing decentralisation are complex and subject to considerable tension and conflict over power and resources.

Third, the commune councils constitute a weak form of political decentralisation. Fourth, the government’s major

aims have been to ensure peace and stability and consolidation of the political future of the ruling party, which to

a great extent have been achieved by this limited form of decentralisation. Fifth, peace and stability is valued by

citizens and is clearly a prerequisite for social and economic development. Sixth, the donor agenda of participa-

tory governance at the local level as a basis for democratic governance is unlikely to be realised in the short-term.

Seventh, government has managed its rhetoric in a way that ensures that donor interests are endorsed so as to

ensure the flow of financial and technical assistance necessary to satisfy its own political agenda. Eighth, in a



post-conflict state like Cambodia recognition should be given to the more pragmatic (albeit self-serving) short-

term benefits reflected in the interests of government. And ninth, this analysis supports the view that pragmatism,

based on a thorough and realistic assessment of context, rather than ideology, should inform the character and

pace of governance reform.

The extensive literature on decentralisation in developing countries suggests that for ‘devolution to elected

multi-purpose councils’ to work well there are three essentials:

(1) adequate powers must be devolved to lower levels; (2) adequate resources (especially financial resources)

must be devolved; and (3) reliable mechanisms to ensure downward accountability must be created. If any one

of these three elements is absent, systems or initiatives will fail. If one or more are weak, then systems or

initiatives will perform poorly (Manor, 2002, p. 20).

In Cambodia, we have demonstrated that the first and second essentials are weak; and that the electoral system

makes for weak downward accountability. If one or more of these conditions remains the same, then decentralisa-

tion will perform poorly in Cambodia. If one or more of them should worsen significantly, then decentralisation

could fail.

To date, the main achievement of decentralisation in Cambodia has been to contribute to the maintenance of

peace and stability (by ensuring political continuity). This is clearly an important development benefit for a post-

crisis country with the recent history of Cambodia. Much more is possible, but for these possibilities to be realised

(and political stability to continue) attention must be given soon to the essential conditions for strong decentralisa-

tion outlined above. Persuading government that the political risks of devolving power and resources are negligi-

ble, and that significant political benefits are a much more likely outcome, we believe is a role for the donor

community. Donors must find credible ways of reassuring government that such reforms ‘can help senior political

leaders to fulfil most of their fondest wishes’ (Manor, 2002, p. 56), which tend to be: ‘I want to govern authorita-

tively’; ‘I want to be re-elected (remain in power for as long as possible)’; ‘I want to maximise my influence and

overcome resistance at all levels—all the way down the political system and society to the grassroots’; ‘I need

political allies at all levels within government, and a social base among groups with formidable numerical

strength’; ‘I want to avoid being personally threatened—now and in the future’; ‘I want to deliver something

meaningful to people, despite excruciating fiscal constraints’; and ‘I want to be respected now and remembered

later for adventurous accomplishment’ (Manor, 2002, p. 56).

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decentralisation, democracy and development in a post-conflict society: commune councils in cambodia

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