CONTEXTUALIZATION AND WORD

MEANING

A SEMANTICO-PRAGMATIC STUDY

BY

ASSISTANT LECTURER

ALI KHALAF JAFAR AL-ZUBAIDY

ة� ي� ت�� ما ة� - ب�راغ ى الكلمة� : دراسة� دلالي� اق� ومعن السي�ل المدرس المساعد ي� �من- قدي� ي� ت12 عفر الز �لف ج على� خ

لص خ المست�لال ي� الكلمات� من- خ د معان� وف عي س من- السهل الوق� لي�ى� . وف ى الكلمة� ءا من- معن ر �ف ج Uكش �ة� ي وع من- العلاق� ي� ن و ا[ ادها ا[ و مض ها ا[ �ات عطاء مرادف gامكن- �ي� ي كلمون- والد ولة المت� ق� �اطن- لما ي ى الي� ة� المعن مكان- معرق �ة� ي همي� عد من- الا[ �ة ي ات�� ت� د �الوقها ت تU ا[ ة� الدراسة� من- حي� همي� كمن- ا[ �ا ي لات� المحت�ملة� للكلام . وهي وي�� ا[ لال الي� ة من- خ اق Uكس اسي�ة� لخل ي� ت�� ما لي الب�راغ gة� ا ى الكلمة� والخاج� ب��ر معن ف�ر �ى� ي ة� علم الدلالة� ف اف صلاحي� Uس خاول اكي� �تة� ي� ى كاق ارة� والمعن Uش gات� الا �ن- علاف ما لو ا[ ت� اف ق Uس لي اكي� gدراسة� اشعى ال �ة� . ت اكل العالق� Uمسالكلم ظ� المت� وة� لف لي ق� gاج- ا حت� �ها ت ت م ا[ مل ا[ لي الج� gعا ا ن ى مق� عطاء معن gلا" " .

ارة� Uش gات� الا �وء علاف ى� ض ن- علم الدلالة� ف ن- هى� ا[ د gكلة� ا Uمشالال , Uميل ال ي� على شب1 اظ� . ف لف وظ للا[ ب� ى المض ى� دراسة� المعن ا ف ي� سب1 ك¥ ت د ركي� Uلا مرش gو اى ما ه والمعنات� �وء علاف ى� ض لها ف �وي ا[ �م ي �ا ما ت د gل ا ي� ق� لي المسن� gدا ا اك¥ ع هت� هي د ملة� , شا[ ر الج� ب� Uش �"ت "

د gك¥, ال ك°بUر¯ من- د من- ا[ ض ت� ´ها ت ت ملة� لا[ ي� الج� لا اخد معان� gا هى� اة� م لي� ي� ق� ى لكتما المسن� ارة� والمعن Uش gالاملة� ة الج� ي� دمت� ق خ ي� است� اق� الد عرف السي� �ة خالما ي ات ا ف د. لد هدي�� �و ت كلم عن- وعد ا[ ر المت� عب� �ما ي ي�� رلك¥ عا لد ن� �ح ت ض صودة� للكلمات� ش́بت� ي� المف� ان- المعان� . ف

ي«ن- علم الدلالة� �ام ماب �ام ي سخ� اك¥ ات ن- هي ي«ن- الدراسة� ا[ ي� �تى� ي� لعرات�س ف عاون دا[ الن� وة� حست� المي� ر الق� Uصى� اب ف� �لي ي gدراسة� اهدف ال ت� ة� . ق ي� ت�� ما "والب�راغ "

ة� ي� ت�� ما ي«ن- علم الدلالة� والب�راغ �ظ ب �اف¯ مدي الب�راب Uكس ى الكلمة� واسي� ب��ر معن ف�ر � .ية� ي� ر كاق ب� ى غ ارة� والمعن Uش gات� الا �ن- علاف ب�رض الدراسة� ا[ ق �ة ي وعلي�ى� وة� الن� ات� الق� �علاف دعى �ات� ي �ر من- العلاف ج Åوع ا لي ن gاج- ا حت� �ى الكلمة� ب�ل ت د معن خدي�� �ى� ت "ف "

رات�س ) لها غ ع واعد1975ت�سن� و الق� ادي[ ا[ دعى المي� �ري ي ج ات� ا[ من- مسمي� ( ض .

هة� �وة� من- ج ي«ن- الق� �ظ ب �ف الزاب Uكش ي �̄ة� ت ي� ت�� ما ي«ن- علم الدلالة� والب�راغ �ة� ب عرض العلاق� �خالما ي فري ج هة� ا[ �ى من- ج ارة� والمعن Uش gوالا . ات� �عظ العلاف �لم ي دا ف �ل الدراسة� واسعة� خ اصي� ف �ن- ي gما ا ي�� وى كلمة� ن- معن gة� . ا ر لكل علاق� �م وضف موج دت�� ف� ن� �ى� ت ف كن� رة� وي ب� Uثل ك اصي� ف �ة� ي ) الدلالي�sense ) ارة� Uش gلى الاق� ع طب� ت �ة ت ات�� ء د ى� Uشى� العام . ال طف� و المت مى� ا[ اهت� لمف اها ا[ معي �مخدد يدم خ �ى� ت ى� الخالات� الن� رات�س ف ة� غ ت�2 ر ظ� لي ب gار ا Uضلا. وت��س رخا مف Uها شواع ن� لق� ا[ �ى� لا ي الن�

Uحت .الب�رات�س واعد غ ق� �ة� ي ر وة� معر ن- الق� لي ا[ gدراسة� الضت� ال "وخ "

ى� ة� ف ي� ة� الب� ي� ر كاق ب� ى غ ارة� والمعن Uش gات� الا �الكامل وان- علاف �ملة� ي ى الج� د معن خدي�� �ى� ت عد عاملا خاسما ف �يعرض �ة� ي �هات ى� الت ن- . وف كلمي� مل المت� �ها ج مت ض ت� ´ى� ت ة� الن� امض همة� والع ل المت� ]م المساب خل معظ�ة� لي� ي� ق� ري لدراشات� مسن� ج حتU وا[ الب� �ة� ي علق� ات� المن� وصي� عص الب� � .الدراسة� ي

I

ABSTRACT

It is not easy to standat meanings of words by simply giving theirsynonyms, antonyms, or whatever type ofrelation that reveals part of word meaning. Atthe same time, it is important to figure outthe underlying meaning of what is being said byspeakers. This can be done through exploringthe possible interpretations of speech. Herelies the importance of the study in that ittries to find out the validity of semantics indeciding word meaning, and the need forpragmatics to solve insoluble problems. Thestudy tries to discover whether sense andreference relations are sufficient to givesatisfactory meaning to sentences, or they needthe force of the speaker's utterance.

The problem, then, isthat semantics, in terms of sense and referencerelations, is relatively a poor guide to thestudy of the exact meaning of utterances. Forexample, the sentence:

- I will go there tomorrow. refers to futurity if interpreted in termsof sense and reference relations. But, futurityis only one meaning of the utterance for itimplies more than that; the speaker may expressa promise or a threat as well. Therefore, oncethe context, within which the utterance is said

, is known , the exact meanings of words willbe made clearer accordingly.

The study shows the one-to-one correspondence between semantics andpragmatics. It aims at investigating the effectof "force", in terms of Grice's CooperativePrinciples, on the determination of word-meaning, and exploring how much semantics andpragmatics are related to each other.

It is hypothesized thatsense and reference relations are not enough todecide word-meaning , they need , in thisrespect , another type of relations called "force relations " that are exploited by Grice(1975) but within other labels , namely "principles " or " maxims."

Once the relationship between semantics andpragmatics is presented, the bound betweenforce , on one hand , and sense andreference , on the other hand , is revealed.

Since the particularitiesof the study are too wide , not much detail isgiven to semantic relations ; only a briefaccount of each relation is expounded. Themeaning of sense is limited to its generallogical or conceptual meaning. The same isapplied to reference whose types receive not

much detail. Grice's theory is referred to onlyon occasions that serve the study.

The study concludes thatforce enhanced by Grice's maxims is a decisivefactor in deciding the meaning of sentences asa whole and that sense and reference relationsare not quite enough in solving most of themysteries and ambiguities that underliespeakers' utterances. Finally, the studypresents some recommendations related to thestudy and some other recommendations forfurther studies.

II1

SECTION ONEREFERENCE RELATIONS

1.1 Introduction

In order to havecommunication , there should be a mutualunderstanding between the speaker and thehearer . This understanding is achieved bymeans of being aware of what we say , asspeakers , and aware of what is " meant " bywhat is said , as hearers. It is very well-known that " meaning " represents the core ofsemantics. Philosophers and linguists believethat in order to know the meaning of a word,people must agree on their " diverse emotiveand other reactions to it " (Osgood , 1976 :40). In other words , people must agree on the" referent " of the linguistic sign; to narrowor shorten the distances of semantic spaceamong individuals in order to reach high degreeof referential agreement. That referent isreached at via its " reference " , which is therelationship between words and things, actions,events and qualities they refer to or " standfor " ( Lyons, 1968 : 424). Referenceis believed to be the core of semantics, butalone it is not enough in the determination of

word- meaning. Hence , a need arises to knowthe " sense " of the word denoted; and that iswhy the core of semantics has been shifted intothe study of " sense relations ". One mightthink now that sense is the same as meaning ,whereas , in fact, sense refers to the "customary usage " of one of the differentmeanings of a lexical item or expression, whenmeaning of a lexical item or expression refersto the collection of the senses it is said tohave in the dictionary ( Katz , 1972: 36).

Therefore , a distinctionshould be made between sense relations andreference relations; but , this is not the end.Lyons (1977: 200) states that "…the distinction[ between sense and reference ] is crucial oncewe take into account the utterance of sentencesin actual contexts ", a fact stressed by manysemanticists and theorists , but not givenheavy reliance on the determination of word-meaning. Katz ( 1972 : 240 ) , forexample , says that " sense has to dowith that part of the relation that is determinedby inherent features of the expressions asopposed to that part that is determined byaspects of the nonlinguistic contexts." AgainLyons ( 1977 : 180) emphasizes the fact that "reference is an utterance-dependent notion ,and that whenever we talk of an expression in a

given sentence as having reference , we areassuming that the sentence in question has been, or could be , uttered with a particularcommunicative force in some appropriate contextof use …. " That is to say that sense andreference are not the only factors whichdetermine word-meaning , rather there is thefactor of " force " that plays an importantrole in determining word-meaning. Once werealize that "force" is related to pragmatics ,it becomes clear that word-meaning is not onlydetermined by semantics , via sense andreference relations, but by pragmatics aswell. This is clearly manifested in Austin's(1962) theory of "Speech Acts " discussed inhis work How to Do Things with Words , in Searle's(1969) Speech Acts and in Sadock's (1974) Toward aLinguistic Theory of Speech Acts.

1.2 Reference : Background

First of all , "reference " indicates the relationship betweenwords and the things , actions , events andqualities they refer to or stand for. It is ,sometimes , referred to as the " denotation "meaning of words. Theories of meaning try torelate the meaning of words to their reference.The traditional theory of reference conceivesof reference as the real existence of objectsthat are referred to by words. In other words ,

they exist as human beings , animals and othercreatures. Thus , a distinction is made between" reference " and " referent ",where the former refers to the name of thething it stands for, and the latter refers tothe thing or object referred to (Lyons ,1968:428). Contrastingly , Yule (1996 : 130)believes that " words themselves don't refer toanything. People refer."

The "concept " theory hastwo versions , one is the " sign " theory byFerdinand de Saussure , and the other isthe " semiotic

triangle " theory set by Ogden andRichards (1923) in their work The

2 Meaning of Meaning. According to Saussure alinguistic sign consists of a " signifier " ( a sound image )and a " signified " (a concept ) , which are connected by means of apsychological " associative bond. " Ogden and Richards , on the otherhand , present their idea in a triangular form: Thoughtor Reference

Referent symbol The " symbol" stands for the linguistic item( word , phrase ,etc.), whereas the "referent"stands for the object in the outside world.These two ( the symbol and the referent) arenot directly linked (hence dots are used inbetween) , therefore , a need for a linkagearises , and this is achieved by the " concept" , referred to as" thought or reference "( Palmer ,1981:24).

However , these theoriescannot account for all the words in thelanguage. For example , what is the referent ofwords like " the "," if " and " so " ?They cannot give an answer at all. At the levelof sentences , the matter is not too muchbetter. When one says " John is a clerk " ,he is referring to a particular individual bymeans of the referring expression " John ".True reference means to the hearer the correctidentity of the individual in the sentence ,i.e. , the referent himself as an existing bodyor person in the world of experience. Therefore, it is the speaker who refers to himself orother entities in the environment ( Lyons ,1977 : 177 ). The more will be said aboutsentences in the following point.

1.3 Types of Reference

Various types of referenceshould be put into consideration

once a study tackles the idea of reference.Each type is discussed briefly due to thenature of the present study. Lyons ( 1977 :179-87 )

3 presents most of these types. First of all,there is the " singular definite reference ".Inone of its manifestations , it refers toreferences known by definite pre- and/or post-description to it. For example, " The tall manover there " , the reference " man " is pre-described by " the tall ", and post-describedby " over there ".

Many philosophers try tosubsume " reference " under " naming ",but, it is , possible to refer to persons orplaces , without knowing their names ,satisfactorily via a definite description. Forinstance , in the sentence , " The man who washere yesterday " , the speaker is successful inreferring o the referent " man " by means ofthe relative clause " who was here yesterday ",making known to the hearer which " man " ismeant , and depending on the assumption thatthe hearer knows that a man came hereyesterday. In many cases , the definite article" the " is enough to give a satisfactorydescription of the referent , based on theshared knowledge between the speaker and the

hearer. For example , if one says to his wife "I haven't seen the cat today ", where " the cat" is mentioned for the first time , she knowswhich cat is meant. The same is true when anEnglishman uses the expression " the queen "within a context , he refers to the queen ofEngland and no other person.

The second type comprisesthe " correct reference " and the " successfulreference ." Here, the definite description ofthe referent denotes its truthfulness , for ifthe description of the referent is true , thereference is said to be " correct ". But , thereference is successful even if thedescription is not true , i.e., " it does notdepend upon the truth of the descriptioncontained in the referring expression". We myrefer to somebody, incorrectly, butsuccessfully, as a teacher when he is a doctor.

The third type is the "non-referring definite noun- phrase ". Thenoun-phrase is definite , though it is notpreceded by a definite article, referring to aspecific person or individual. For instance , "Smith " represents this type of reference inthe sentence , " Smith's murder is insane ".

The fourth type can berepresented in the sentence " Every evening atsix o'clock a buzzard flies over the house" , where two

4

interpretations can be elicited. First , ifthe speaker means by " a buzzard " a particularbuzzard , then he is referring to an 'indefinite , but " specific " , reference.Second , if he means " some buzzard or other" , he is referring to a " non-specific "reference by means of the indefinite noun-phrase " a buzzard ".

" Distributive andcollective general " reference forms the fifthtype. It is best explained by the example ,"Those books cost £5 ", the phrase " those books" can be referred to as " each of thosebooks ", thus used distributively , or as "that set of books " , which is , therefore ,used collectively.

The other type is "opaque " and " transparent " reference. Acontext is non opaque , or referentiallytransparent , if the statements are formed fromthis context by first filling the blank withone term of a true identity statement , and ,then , filling it with the other , having thesame truth value. For example , the context (2)is transparent since (3) and (4) are eitherboth true or false , given the truth of (1)( Katz, 1972:262 ):

(1) The girl living above John = the ugliestgirl in the world.

(2)Bill kissed …………….

(3) Bill kissed the girl living above John.(4) Bill kissed the ugliest girl in the world.

In the context " Mr.Smith is looking for the Dean " , " the Dean "is an opaque reference if it refers to thespeaker's description of " the Dean "referentially , and not to Mr. Smith'sdescription. This happens under the assumptionthat the Dean is Professor Brown , when Mr.Smith thinks that Professor Green is the Deanas he says , " I am looking for the Dean ."The reference is still opaque even if thespeaker substitutes the coreferentialexpression " Professor Brown " for " the Dean "as he says , " Mr. smith is looking forProfessor Brown " ( Lyons , 1977 : 192-3 ).

Finally , a reference is" generic " when it refers to the whole classof the referent , not to this or that group ofthe referent , nor to any particular referentof the class. Consider the following :

5

- The lion is a wild animal.- A lion is a wild animal.- Lions are wild animals.

Each of these examples has a " generic "proposition. It is clear that " genericreference " is timeless , tenseless andaspectless , for when we say "Lions were wild

animals" or " Lions have been wildanimals ", this suggests that lions are no morewild now , and this is completely absurd(ibid : 194 ).

6

SECTION TWO

SENSE RELATIONS

2.1 What is " sense " ?

Sense is said to be theconceptual ( logical , denotative orcognitive ) meaning in linguisticcommunication. It is the essential meaning oflanguage through which meanings of sentences ,on their natural conception , appear and areunderstood. This is due to the fact that theconceptual meaning has an organization similarto that of syntax and phonology (Leech , 1974 :10 ). However , the conceptual meaning givesthe semantic interpretation of sentences. Thesemantic interpretation of a lexical item isregarded as the set of semantic representationsof its senses. These semantic representationsof the sense of a lexical item , phrase ,clause or sentence are referred to as its "readings ". The semantic representation of oneconcept or another is referred to as the "semantic marker " of a lexical item. Hence , a" reading " is a set of semantic markers alexical item is said to have , giving it themeaning by which it is known , anddistinguishing it from other lexical items( Katz , 1972 : 37 ). For example , the word" woman " can be symbolized in terms of itsreadings ( or distinctive features ,analogically with phonology ) :

Woman = [ + HUMAN ] [ - MALE ] [ + ADULT ]

as distinct from or in contrast with " boy" , " man " or " girl ".

There is a tendencyhypothesizing the universality of conceptualmeaning , but tangible differences are observedamong languages. The different numbers ofcolours each language has is a good example. Inaddition , some cultural variations in theperception of the same lexical item are foundamong different languages. For example , theword " owl " has a bad sense in some cultures ,the Arab world for instance , but a good sensein others. Even in the same culture , a personmay conceive of a lexical item positively inone situation , and negatively in another. Acountryman feels pleasant for

7 seeing a field of buttercups plants , butrestless when seeing them in his garden andconsiders them as weeds ( Leech, 1974 : 30-31 ).

Linguists , proponents ofRelativism , believe that language controls ourminds and experience , but this idea has beenrevolted by Chomsky's Universalism. Chomskyproposes that languages have the same basicconceptual framework. He argues that languages

share a universal set of semantic features orcategories , and the difference between onelanguage and another is in the choice among thesubsets of these categories. Such categoriesare like animate / inanimate , human / non-human , concrete / abstract , etc. He believesthat all human beings are endowed with aninnate genetic ability to language. In otherwords , it is the mind that controls thelanguage , hence , the mind realizes anddistinguishes the meanings of concepts orsenses of the words.

2.2 Sense Relations

Sense is concerned withintralinguistic relations , those that holdbetween one linguistic item and the other.There are two types of sense relations ,syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations.Syntagmatic relations refer to collocation ,where one lexical item collocates or goes withanother , which is not replicable by any otherlexical item due to the force of theserelations. For example , the lexical item" bark " collocates only with " dogs " and noother lexical item.

Paradigmatic relations ,on the other hand , include synonymy,antonymy , hyponymy , relational opposites ,

polysemy and homonymy. Synonymy refers to thesameness of meaning , where it is assumed thatone lexical item or phrase can replace theother without any change in meaning. Forinstance," dead " and " deceased " are said tobe synonymous in " His deceased/dead friend ".But , there is no complete synonymy.

Antonymy refers to theoppositeness of meaning. When someone says, "It is cold " , this means that " It is not hot". But, " not hot " does not necessarily mean "cold " , for " It is not hot " almost

8 refers to a " nice weather " , but not "cold ". This is due to the principle ofgradability found between gradable antonyms ,whereas , non-gradable antonyms yield tocomplete antonyms , for instance , " Thiscat is female " implies that " This cat is notmale " ; " His brother is alive " implies " Hisbrother is not dead. "

Hyponymy is a relation ofinclusion ,where one lexical item is includedin another wider lexical item. For example, "lion " and " elephant " are included in "mammal " or " animal " ; " tulip " and " rose "are included in " flower " and so on. It is amatter of class-relationship( Palmer ,1981:85). Relations of hyponymy mayform grading relations. This is virtually truewhen we realize that " rose " is included in "

flower " , and " flower " is included in "plant ". But, " rose " is the immediate hyponymof " flower " and the latter is the immediatehyponym of " plant ". Nevertheless, withinhyponymy , there is a relation of entailment ,for example , " This is a rose " entails " Thisis a flower " (ibid:87).

Relational opposites areincluded within antonymy relations. Theydisplay symmetry in their meaning such as"buy/sell " , " give/receive " , " husband/wife" , " examiner/examinee " , etc.

Polysemy means thedifference in meaning of one lexical item. Forexample , the lexical item " bank " ispolysemic in the sense that it means " abuilding where money is deposited or changed" , or " a shore " or " a pool " , etc.homonymy , on the other hand , is divided into" homophony " , where two lexical items havethe same pronunciation , though differ inspelling and meaning like "knight/night " and " sea/see ", etc. , and "homography " , where two lexical items have thesame spelling , but differ in meaning andpronunciation such as " lead/li:d/ " meaning "to guide " and " lead /led/ " referring to acertain type of metal. However , polysemy andhomonymy are , sometimes , problematic andcannot be distinguished, and this is not goingto be tackled due to the limits of the study.

92.3 Sense and Reference

It has been stated thatsense explicates intralinguistic relations thathold between linguistic items. Reference isconcerned with the relationship between theselinguistic items and the ( non-linguistic )world of experience. In fact , referencerelations form the centre of semantics , as ithas always been believed , but , senserelations have occupied language a great deal.Dictionaries , for example , depend on senserelations , where a new unknown word isidentified by defining it in terms of otherlexical items whose sense and reference arealready known. Nevertheless , the recenttendency in linguistics is to limit the studyof semantics to sense relations only due totheir efficiency in determining the meaning oflexical items , individually or within largerunits like a sentence , in any language( Palmer , 1981 : 31-2).

Reference theorystipulates that lexical items have meanings bydenoting things in the world ; the object being

the meaning. However, such a theory cannotaccount for imagery objects or lexical itemsand past events , or words like " the ", " if "or " and ", which have no physical existence.Therefore, one has to speak about thedifferentiation between the " reference " ofthe item and its " sense." In otherwords , it is to distinguish between what alexical item denotes and what itconnotes( Parkin , 1982 : 42).

The same object may beviewed differently , i.e. , one reference hasdifferent senses. Frege's ( 1892) classicexample shows this difference :

- The Morning Star is the Evening Star. Reference is the same since both " theMorning Star " and " the Evening Star " referto the same planet , but different senses forthe sentence conveys information referring to afact that the hearer has not been aware of ;otherwise , the sentence conveys nothing but amere tautology. Therefore , both expressionscannot be synonymous for they do not have thesame sense , rather the same reference( Lyons, 1977 : 197).

Frege believes thatproper nouns have sense and reference.

10 He hints at giving a description ordefinition to " personal names ",

relationship terms ", " pronouns " ," titles" , " cities " ," rivers " , etc. This could betrue for some , not all , languages, like

Arabic . For example, " الح sælɪh / is a / " ص¯¯¯¯personal name which has the connotation of anadjective referring to " a good man " in

addition to being his name , compare , " ل �ة رخ اتالح هت� " ɪnnehu rædʒulun sælɪh / and / "ص̄¯ الحد ليص̄¯ gا ðehebə sælɪh ɪlæ ?emelɪhi /. A problem/ " غملةarises in this respect , but not always is thecase , when the bearer of the name does nothave, or may contrast with , the sense of theadjective implied in his name , that is ,

the bearer is a villain , " ب��ر ر U¯¯¯ل ش �الح رخ¯¯¯ / " ص¯¯¯sælɪh rædʒulun ʃərri:r/. The name has acquireda bad sense although its connotation is good.And this is to conclude that sense is not agood reflection of the connotation of propernames. However , the problem of personal namesis no more discussed for a full study is neededto account for their relation with what theyrefer to or represent and their sense. Moreover, such a relation is bound by culturalvariation , where names have sense andreference in some cultures , whereas onlyreference in others. For example , what is themeaning of , the connotation that coincides

with , the proper nouns " John , Jack ,Bill, etc."?

Away from the problemdiscussed in the precedent paragraph , let usconsider the following example and see howsense and reference are successful in attainingmeaning :

- It is cloudy today.In terms of reference " cloudy " refers to thespeaker's experience of the outside world,seeing clouds in the sky and , therefore ,refers to the weather as being " cloudy ". Inother words , the lexical item " cloudy" obtains its meaning from the physicalexistence of , and in relation to , thematerialistic clouds. " Today " denotes thedate in which the speaker sees the observableclouds , and it is the date in which the sayingtakes place , the present time. But , can "today " be seen or touched? A question thatreference cannot answer.

In terms of sense , "cloudy " has in its connotation the gatheringof clouds, suggesting darkness, sunless or dimatmosphere , or somber , or muddy. " Today " ,on the other hand , has the sense of presentday in which both the saying and the gatheringof the clouds

11 take place. Yet , seeing the differentsenses suggested by the lexical item " cloudy "

, we do not know which sense is meant to beconveyed. Then , how can we predict the meaningof the whole sentence , and on what basis ? Aquestion that sense can never answer. But, oncewe know " who is speaking to whom, and in whatcontext ", the meaning of the sentence isrestricted and understood, and can easily bededuced. This would ,then , imply the speaker's" force " on the choice of lexical items tohave them mean the way he wants. The idea of "force " is elaborated on in the followingsection.

12SECTION THREE

FORCE AND GRICE'S COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE

3.1 Force and Sense

It is evident so far that" sense " resembles the core of semantics. Itwill , then , be the main concern of thepresent discussion. Leech (1980 : 80) relatessense to force , in an attempt to relatesemantics to pragmatics. " Sense " reflects theformal logic of the deep structure of thesentence , whereas " force " entails a promise,a command , a warn , a request , a permissionand so on.

In his analysis oflanguage , the linguist should rely on the twomedia of language , i.e. , the spoken and thewritten. Actually , both media need contexts inorder to stand on the meanings of the sentencesor utterance included, for otherwise no text orsituation is understood. Let us reconsider the

last example in the light of what we havehere ;

- It is cloudy today. If seen from a pragmatic point of view ,this sentence is interpreted differentlyaccording to the context in which it occurs ,and , hence , different forces accordingly. Thesentence could be a warn said by a wife to herhusband , advising him to take his umbrella forit might rain; or it could be said by somebodyto his friend implying that it is not hot today, for there will be no sun; or it could be saidby a mother addressing her children ,commanding them not to go out ; or it might besaid by a grandmother talking to her grandson ,advising him to put on heavy clothes lest hemight catch cold. The list is open for moreinterpretations , but , what do all theseinterpretations suggest ? A question that "force " can answer easily , not like itspartners ( sense and reference ) which stop ata certain point . Once the context or situationis unveiled , or the speaker and the hearer areidentified , the implied meaning of thesentence , or utterance , can easily bepredicted.

To assure what has beenclaimed so far , compare these two pairs ofsentences ;

13

1. A. I will be here at 9 tomorrow. B. You will be here at 9 tomorrow.2. A. Can't you borrow the money ? B. Can't I borrow the money ?

Semantically , the first two sentences havethe sense of futurity , but the person who "will be here at 9 tomorrow " is different , thespeaker in the first and the hearer in thesecond. However , the same sentences aredifferent in meaning , pragmatically speaking.The first sentence has the force of a promiseor a threat , whereas the second has the forceof a command.

The same can be said aboutthe second pair. The first sentence ( i.e.,sentence 2.A. ) implies " possibility " , onsemantic basis , where it means " Isn't itpossible for you to borrow the money?" While ,pragmatically , it has the force of an "impatient suggestion ". The second sentence inthe second pair ( sentence 2.B.) has the senseof " permission " , but has the force of both" permission " and " request " depending on thecontext. This simply means that" can " hasdifferent senses but are not distinguishedunless the context is revealed ( Leech , 1980 :81 ).

Another example is thefollowing :

- Can you play the violin ? Semantically , the sense of the sentence isto ask about the ability of the hearer to playthe violin , whereas , in fact , it implies anadditional meaning , representing a request toplay the violin ( roughly speaking " Pleaseplay the violin "). These two differentmeanings are acquired due to the situationwithin which the sentence occurs.

However , sometimes ,humorous effects might be the result ofmisrecognition , when , for example , a visitorof a city , being lost, asks a passer-by :

Visitor : Excuse me , do you know where theAmbassador Hotel is ?

Passer-by : Oh sure , I know where it is(and walks away).

14 The passer-by answers the direct question(do you know….?) literally ( I know…),misrecognising the indirect request in thevisitor's question ( where the Ambassador Hotelis). The misunderstanding results from the factthat the visitor tries to be more polite indirecting his request , and not using a command, but the visitor takes it as a command not arequest ( Yule , 1996 :133 ).

Contextualization , as itseems to be , tells us so much about what is

meant by a certain lexical item , and withoutwhich lexical items lose their interpretivesense. It is made clear that semantics alonedoes not give the complete meaning of what issaid , and that the reconciliation betweensemantics and pragmatics , in terms of senseand force , offers a good understanding to themeaning of lexical items, a case that isclarified and expanded on in Grice'sCooperative Principle. You might respond to arequest or a question but not in a satisfactoryway , or you may give information , yet you arenot cooperative , a subject matter of thefollowing section.

3.2 Gricean Cooperative Principles

Among the prominent theoriesand principles* in pragmatics is Grice'sCooperative Principle. Grice has suppliedpragmatics with a list of so-called maximswhich determine the appropriateness of anutterance in a given situation ( excludingexceptional situations like trials , exams ,etc.). In order to go on a cooperativeconversation , interlocutors have to obeycertain principles. These principles make outGrice's maxims of quality , quantity ,relevance and manner. Quality refers to thetruthfulness of the saying , false statementsshould be avoided. Quantity refers to the

informativeness of the speaker's response. Heshould be as informative as required , notgiving too little nor too much information tothe other participant in the conversation.Relevance assumes that turns betweenparticipants should be clearly related. Mannerassumes that speakers have to be perspicuous :clear , orderly and brief , avoiding obscurityand ambiguity(www.universalteacher.org.uk/lang/pragmatics.htm). In addition to Politeness Principle ( Leech , 1983 ),

the Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson ( 1986 ) and Levinson's( 2000) GCI Theory ( Generalised Conversational Implicatures).

15 Grice (1975 ) believesthat utterances automatically createexpectations which lead the hearer to thespeaker's intended meaning. These expectationsare depicted in terms of the maxims mentionedabove. In order for the hearer to becooperative , he should choose aninterpretation that satisfies theseexpectations ( or maxims ). This couldpragmatically contribute to implicatures ratherthan to explicit , truth-conditional content.Thus , figurative speech , jokes , playing withwords, etc. violate these maxims ( Wilson , D.and D. Sperber , 2004 : 250-51 ). Examining the example abovebetween the visitor and a passer-by , we notice

that the latter's response has relevance butlacksquantity and this explains the deficiency inthe conversation. The passer-by is notcooperative and thus violates , but validates ,Grice's cooperative principle. Grice's aim behind hisprinciple is to discover the mechanism by whichwe can distinguish between what is said andwhat is meant. He is concerned with whetherspeakers know which implicit meaning isconveyed and whether their addressees canunderstand the intended meaning ( Davies , 2000: 3 ). Consider the following conversation ,A: Is there another pint of milk ?B: I'm going to the supermarket in fiveminutes.Speakers of English would inferentially assumethat there is no milk at the moment , but itwill be brought from the supermarket in a shorttime. Such an implication is reached at by theCooperative Principle.

Conversationalimplicatures are thus the core of Grice's theory. They draw the distinction betweenwords meaning , their literal meaning when said by a speakerand the speaker's intention when he uses them in a certain context ,which , by no means , is far

from what is being said ( StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy , 2006). When you are asked to lunch and youreply , " I have a one o'clock a class I'm not prepared for." Youindirectly reject this invitation by giving reason for notcoming to lunch and this is implied in your response.

16SECTION FOUR

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

To know the relation between" sense " and " force " means exploring therelation binding semantics to pragmatics.Semantics

( the study of the sense of words) studiesthe meaning of sentences as structures in agiven language , whereas pragmatics ( the studyof language use ) deals with the interpretationof the meaning of these sentences in a givenspeech situation , i.e. , what they are to thespeaker and the hearer. We can simply say thatsemantics is the " body" of thelanguage and pragmatics is its " soul ". A bodywithout a soul does not have power or " force "

, namely dead , and a soul without a bodycannot be " sensed " or felt.

It is evident that semanticsis unavoidable in deciding meanings of lexicalitems. Nonetheless , we still need the contextwithin which these lexical items are said tooccur , otherwise , it is misleading to rely onsemantics alone. Semantics , for example ,tells us that the speaker of the followingsentence :

- He will be here at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

is expressing the " will " of another person ,rather than the hearer , to come " here at 9o'clock tomorrow morning ." But , this is halfof the fact for semantics tells us nothing about thestate of coming , is it to strike a friendlyappointment , a threat or a promise ( from thespeaker's side , where he wants to calm downthe hearer , roughly speaking " Don't worry ,he will be here …." ) ?

Therefore , the force that underlies the statement decides what is meant by what is said. It is the relation that holds between the speaker and the hearer which expresses the force ; the force to apologise , thank , promise , approve , congratulate , command , etc. The choice among these is dependent on the

implicatures of the statement or the utterance. " I've got a headache " has the implicatures

17 of a warning , a request , or an apology , or it could be a plausible answer to " How are you ? " (Kempson,1975:202-3). Theydepend on how much truthfulness , informativeness , relevance and clarity that speakers convey to hearers and addressees respond to addressers.

3.3 Recommendations

It is recommended thatone should not decide on the meaning of a wordbefore knowing the context in which it occursnor decide on the meaning of a whole sentencewithout a pre-knowledge of the situation inwhich it occurs in order to stand at the exactinterpretation.

The researcher recommendsthat force be studied in Arabic, investigating the differences in theeffect of context in both English and Arabic. Misunderstanding leadsto ambiguity , a subject which can also be studied alone , comparingambiguity in English and Arabic.

It is also recommendedthat the practicality and validity of Grice's Cooperative Principle could beexplored in the Arabic language by applying its maxims to selectedtexts or contexts.

18BIBLIOGRAPHY

Davies , Bethan (2000) " Grice's CooperativePrinciple: getting the

Meaning across " in Nelson , D. andP. Foulkes ( eds.) Leeds

Working Papers in Linguistics 8 , pp 1-26.Grice , H. Paul (1968) " Utterer's Meaning ,sentence-meaning , and

Word-meaning" in Foundations of Language 4, pp 225-242.

Fromkin , V. and Rodman , R. (1983) An Introductionto Language. New York : Holt, Rinehart andWinston.

Jaszczolt, K.M. (2002) Semantics and Pragmatics,London: Longman.

Katz , J.J. (1972) Semantic Theory. London : Harperand Row.

Kempson , Ruth M. (1975) Presupposition and theDelimitation of Semantics. Cambridge :Cambridge University Press.

Leech , G. (1974) Semantics. Middlesex : Penguin.……………. (1980) Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics.

Amsterdam : John Benjamin.Levinson , Stephen ( 1983 ) Pragmatics . Cambridge

: Cambridge University Press.Lyons ,J. (1968) Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.………….. ( 1977) Semantics , Vol.ɪ . Cambridge :

Cambridge University Press.Osgood , C.E. (1976) Focus on Meaning : Explorations in

Semantic Space. New York: Mouton.Palmer ,F.R. (1981) Semantics , 2nd ed. Cambridge :

Cambridge University Press.Parkin , D. (ed.) (1982) Semantic Anthropology.

London : Harcourt , Brace , Jovanovich.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006) in

http://plato.stanford.edu/info.htm.Wilson , D. and Sperber , D. (2004) " Relevance

Theory " in Horn , L. and G., Ward (eds.) The

Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford : Blackwell ,607-632.

Yule , George (1996) The Study of Language , 2nd ed.Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

19INTERNET SOURCES

- http://www.asha.org/public/speech/ development/pragmaticLangu-age Tips.htm

- http://www.dan.sperber.com/ relevance_theory.htm

- http://www.lotsofessays.com/viewpaper/ 1682525.html

- http://www.universalteacher.org.uk

20