changing organizational logics in major austrian enterprises
TRANSCRIPT
Re-publicization and establishment of public enterprises in Austria since the millennium Etienne Koo
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises
Master’s Thesis to confer
the academic degree of
Master of Science
in the Master’s Programme
General Management
Author:
Etienne Koo, M.Sc.
0855786 / 973
Submission:
Institute of Organization and Global Management Education
Thesis Supervisor:
A.Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Werner Auer-Rizzi
Assistant Supervisors:
Univ.-Prof.in Dr.in Dorothea Greiling
Assist.-Prof.in Dr.in Birgit Grüb
Linz, January 2015
Statutory declaration
I declare that I have authored this Thesis independently, that I have not used other than the declared
sources / resources and that I have explicitly marked all material which has been quoted either
literally or by content from the used sources.
The present Master Thesis is identical to the electronically submitted version.
Date, place Signature
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
I
Table of content
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
2. Research question ..................................................................................................................... 2
3. Methods of problem solution ................................................................................................... 2
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management ................................................... 3
4.1 Retrospection on significant developments in Austria ........................................................ 3
4.2 Public Management and its organizational logics ............................................................... 7
4.2.1 New Public Management ......................................................................................... 7
4.2.1.1 Conceptual premises ................................................................................ 8
4.2.1.2 Limits of New Public Management ....................................................... 10
4.2.2 New Public Governance ........................................................................................ 11
4.2.2.1 The concept and its idea of cooperation ................................................ 11
4.2.2.2 Public-Private Partnerships ................................................................... 12
4.2.3 Public choice .......................................................................................................... 13
4.2.3.1 Conceptual premises of public choice ................................................... 14
4.2.3.2 Rent seeking .......................................................................................... 15
5. The organization CIRIEC ...................................................................................................... 17
5.1 Structure at CIRIEC ........................................................................................................... 17
5.2 Research at CIRIEC ........................................................................................................... 18
5.3 Country analysis and policy trends .................................................................................... 19
5.3.1 Aim of the project .................................................................................................. 19
5.3.2 Methods of problem solution ................................................................................. 20
6. CIRIEC Austria ...................................................................................................................... 21
6.1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 21
6.2 Analysis of major Austrian enterprises .............................................................................. 23
6.2.1 ASFINAG .............................................................................................................. 24
6.2.1.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 24
6.2.1.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 24
6.2.1.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 26
6.2.1.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 27
6.2.1.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 33
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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6.2.2 Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft .............................................................................. 37
6.2.2.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 37
6.2.2.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 38
6.2.2.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 39
6.2.2.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 40
6.2.2.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 42
6.2.3 Österreichische Bundesbahnen Holding AG ......................................................... 44
6.2.3.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 44
6.2.3.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 45
6.2.3.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 46
6.2.3.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 48
6.2.3.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 51
6.2.4 Österreichische Bundesforste AG .......................................................................... 52
6.2.4.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 52
6.2.4.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 53
6.2.4.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 56
6.2.4.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 57
6.2.4.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 58
6.2.5 Österreichische Industrieholding AG .................................................................... 61
6.2.5.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 61
6.2.5.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 62
6.2.5.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 63
6.2.5.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 64
6.2.5.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 66
6.2.6 Österreichische Post AG ........................................................................................ 68
6.2.6.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 69
6.2.6.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 69
6.2.6.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 71
6.2.6.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 72
6.2.6.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 73
6.2.7 Österreichischer Rundfunk ORF............................................................................ 78
6.2.7.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 78
6.2.7.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 79
6.2.7.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 80
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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6.2.7.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 83
6.2.7.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 88
6.2.8 OMV AG ............................................................................................................... 89
6.2.8.1 Legal base .............................................................................................. 89
6.2.8.2 Main tasks .............................................................................................. 91
6.2.8.3 Organizational structure ........................................................................ 91
6.2.8.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ........................................................... 97
6.2.8.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession ...................... 98
6.2.9 Schienen-Infrastruktur-Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH ................................... 100
6.2.9.1 Legal base ............................................................................................ 100
6.2.9.2 Main tasks ............................................................................................ 101
6.2.9.3 Organizational structure ...................................................................... 103
6.2.9.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ......................................................... 103
6.2.9.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession .................... 105
6.2.10 Telekom Austria AG ............................................................................................ 106
6.2.10.1 Legal base ............................................................................................ 106
6.2.10.2 Main tasks ............................................................................................ 108
6.2.10.3 Organizational structure ...................................................................... 109
6.2.10.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ......................................................... 110
6.2.10.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession .................... 113
6.2.11 Verbund AG ......................................................................................................... 116
6.2.11.1 Legal base ............................................................................................ 116
6.2.11.2 Main tasks ............................................................................................ 118
6.2.11.3 Organizational structure ...................................................................... 120
6.2.11.4 Relationship to Austrian politics ......................................................... 122
6.2.11.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession .................... 124
7. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 127
7.1 State-owned vs. private enterprises ................................................................................. 127
7.1.1 Peculiarities in management and performance .................................................... 128
7.1.2 Governmental influences and policies ................................................................. 129
7.1.3 The role of trade unions ....................................................................................... 131
7.2 Situation in Austria .......................................................................................................... 133
7.2.1 Final reflection on selected enterprises ................................................................ 134
7.2.1.1 ASFINAG ............................................................................................ 135
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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7.2.1.2 Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft ............................................................ 136
7.2.1.3 Österreichische Bundesbahnen Holding AG ....................................... 137
7.2.1.4 Österreichische Bundesforste AG ....................................................... 139
7.2.1.5 Österreichische Industrieholding AG .................................................. 140
7.2.1.6 Österreichische Post AG ..................................................................... 141
7.2.1.7 Österreichischer Rundfunk ORF ......................................................... 142
7.2.1.8 OMV AG ............................................................................................. 143
7.2.1.9 Schienen-Infrastruktur-Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH ................... 144
7.2.1.10 Telekom Austria AG ........................................................................... 145
7.2.1.11 Verbund AG ........................................................................................ 146
8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 149
References................................................................................................................................... 153
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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List of figures
Figure 1: ASFINAG organizational structure ............................................................................... 26
Figure 2: ÖBB Holding Group organizational structure ............................................................... 47
Figure 3: OMV Group organizational structure ............................................................................ 96
Figure 4: Telekom Austria Group subsidiaries............................................................................ 109
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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List of tables
Table 1: ÖIAG stakes .................................................................................................................... 63
Table 2: ORF management ............................................................................................................ 81
Table 3: ORF subsidiaries ............................................................................................................. 82
Table 4: OMV Gas & Power subsidiaries ..................................................................................... 92
Table 5: Special companies transferred to Verbund AG ............................................................. 118
Table 6: Verbund AG subsidiaries .............................................................................................. 121
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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List of abbreviations
ABB Asea Brown Boveri
AKUT Akustisches Tunnelmonitoring
APA-OTS Austria Presse Agentur – Originaltext Service
APG Austrian Power Grid
APK Pensionskasse Aktiengesellschaft
ARE Austrian Real Estate
ASFINAG Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen Finanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft
ASAG Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen AG
ASECAP European association of operators of toll road infrastructure
ASG Alpenstraßen AG
ASTAG Arlberg Strassentunnel AG
ATX Austrian Traded Index
B2B Business to Business
BAG Brenner Autobahn AG
BAWAG PSK Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Österreichische
Postsparkasse Aktiengesellschaft
BIG Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft
B-PCGK Public Corporate Governance Codex
BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich
CAD Computer-aided-design
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFO Chief Financial Officer
CIRIEC International Centre of Research and Information on the Collective Economy
CTO Chief Technical Officer
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
EBT Earnings before taxes
EETS European Electronic Toll System
e.g. exempli gratia, for example
EGBV EconGas Beteiligungsverwaltung
ENAP École national d’aministration publique
ESM Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus
EVN Energieversorgung Niederösterreich
EWG Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
FIMBAG Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
GBH Gewerkschaft Bau-Holz
GDG-KMSFB Gewerkschaft der Gemeindebediensteten – Kunst, Medien, Sport, freie Berufe
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIS Gebühren Info Service
GKB Graz-Köflacher Bergbau
GÖD Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienst
GPA Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten, Druck, Journalismus und Papier
GPF Gewerkschaft der Post- und Fernmeldebediensteten
GSMA Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
IBBTTA International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association
i.e. id est, that is
IMB Immobiliengesellschaft des Bundes mbH
IMIB Immobilien- und Industriebeteiligungen GmbH
IPIC International Petroleum Investment Company
LTE Long Term Evolution
M2M Machine to Machine
Changing organizational logics in major Austrian enterprises Etienne Koo
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NEOS Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ÖBB Österreichische Bundesbahnen
ÖBf AG Österreichische Bundesforste AG
ÖGB Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund
ÖIAG Österreichische Industrieholding AG
ÖSAG Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen AG
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei
OMV AG Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung Aktiengesellschaft
ORF Österreichischer Rundfunk
ORS Österreichischer Rundfunksender GmbH
PAG Phyrn Autobahn AG
PPP Public-Private Partnerships
PROGE Produktionsgewerkschaft
PTA AG Post- und Telekom Austria AG
PTBG Post und Telekommunikationsbeteiligungsgesellschaft
RoLa Rollende Landstraße
SCHIG mbH Schienen-Infrastruktur-Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
TAAG Tauernautobahn AG
TIWAG Tiroler Wasserkraft
US United States
vida Verkehrs- und Dienstleistungs-Gewerkschaft
1. Introduction Etienne Koo
1
1. Introduction
In today’s globalized world, business is characterized by the free movement of capital, people and
goods as well as technological advancements which lead to interconnections all over the world.
Public as well as private companies have to adapt to these circumstances by reacting accordingly
when faced with increasing complexity or external challenges. In this, researchers such as
Hood (1991), Mastronardi (1998) or Schedler and Proeller (2009) assume the permanent
development of public companies towards usually private-related issues such as rationalization,
deregulation, flexibility and the appropriate use of performance indicators. However, other authors
like Naschold (1996) or Thom and Ritz (2006) criticize the implementation of these approaches
as trend which leads to the dismantling of the welfare state and ultimately the need for new refor-
mations by benefitting from problems. When it comes to Austria, the historical background of the
rather young Republic has to be considered when wanting to analyse major public enterprises.
Developments after World War I and II led to significant socialization tendencies and conse-
quently the strong connection of the state and to national enterprises. The then established bureau-
cracies, hierarchical structures and management tactics aligned with politics are still prevalent
today in a variety of Austrian public companies. The repeating crises, the latest being the global
financial economic crisis in 2008, led to the accumulative importance of the state as instrument of
emergency interventions and provider of capital. Yet, increasing liberalization tendencies within
the European Union as well as worldwide, lead to changes in how politicians intervene in the
management of public companies. Moreover, opposing topics of governance and public choice
gain increasing importance when it comes to the analysis of organizational logics. While the first
assumes cooperation of governmental and non-governmental institutions for the overall well-being
of everybody, the latter indicates that every individual is governed by self-interest and a rational
behaviour on what it wants and seeks. The latter also leads to negative consequences of rent-seek-
ing in alliance with Tullok (1967) who indicates that political representatives may transfer the
benefits away from the mass and towards a small elitist group. All these aspects are tackled by
researchers at CIRIEC; a non-governmental organization working on the collection of information
of public interest. Currently, some of them are handling the issue of whether the state plays an
increasing role in national and international companies within certain countries. The researchers
thereby build on the assumption that it does; mainly due to previous CIRIEC research, OECD
reports and World Bank reviews. However, for the purpose of contributing to the collection of
papers on this topic, this Thesis deals with the analysis of major enterprises in Austria.
2. Research question Etienne Koo
2
2. Research question
In order to find out whether the state plays an increasing role in national and international compa-
nies, the research team of the International Scientific Commission of Public Services and Public
Enterprises under the lead of the Austrian professor Gabriel Oberman started a call for papers on
this topic in 13 countries. The aim of those providing information to the researchers is to contribute
to the overall research question of “Is there an increasing importance of the state in national and
international enterprises?” Therefore a variety of sub-questions have to be answered in alliance
with CIRIEC; for example “Are there discussions about privatizations of public companies?” or
“Do politicians intervene in the management of major enterprises and if so, how?” Moreover, the
researchers at CIRIEC call for the provision of additional information on the organizational logics
within the companies as well as its relation to its surrounding; for instance competitors or trade
unions.
The underlying principle of the Thesis is therefore to contribute to the investigation of CIRIEC by
providing a thorough analysis of eleven major Austrian enterprises; thereby including all required
aspects posed by the research team.
3. Methods of problem solution
In order to provide appropriate information on the role of the state in major enterprises in Austria,
a qualitative documentary analysis is applied within this Thesis. Therefore, the Thesis is structured
among three parts where secondary desk research is utilized accordingly. The first part deals with
a thorough analysis of concepts of public enterprise management and the second part refers to the
main work, which is the analysis of eleven examples of major, primarily public, enterprises. While
the research within the first section focuses on renowned books and journals on the topics of New
Public Management, New Public Governance and Public Choice, the second part aims at capturing
the legal background, tasks, structure and relationship to Austrian politics as well as financial de-
velopments since the Great Recession within each enterprise example. Therefore, the main part
primarily includes research from wordings of law, law gazettes, homepages, journals and newspa-
pers. Unfortunately, a quantitative approach cannot be applied scientifically due to the fact that
especially the topic of political power plays and governmental influences within major companies
is not openly communicated by insiders. For the purpose of completeness, the third part deals with
the application of theoretical aspects and relevant concepts to the previously discussed examples
of enterprises. Again, the information of renowned books and journals as well as homepages is
exerted.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
3
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management
The first part refers to a conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management. Therefore, a
closer look is taken at historical developments in Austria since its establishment as First Republic
and hence after the dissolution of the monarchy after World War I. The reason behind this depic-
tion lies in the purpose of showing the importance of the government and role the state played over
time in Austria. Moreover, it shows the influence of politicians in the development of the Austrian
society as well as state-owned enterprises. Thereafter, a closer look is taken at the most important
aspects of public management and organizational logics behind it. Consequently the notion of New
Public Management is examined from different research points of view according to its theoretical
aspects as well as limitations. Connected to this is the concept of New Public Governance which
is analysed thereafter; thereby also including the idea of Public-Private Partnerships as special case
within governance. Finally, the concept of Public Choice, and therefore the idea of utility maxim-
izing individuals, is depicted as contradiction to the aspects of cooperation in governance. Related
to this, aspects of rent-seeking and possible negative consequences are discussed briefly.
4.1 Retrospection on significant developments in Austria
Since the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy in 1918, which marks both the end of
World War I and consequently the foundation of the First Republic of Austria, the country was
characterized by a strong public management.1 Right after World War I, the Republic had to cope
with the deprivations of the war, high inflation and unemployment rates as well as the insufficient
supply of necessities and significant destruction of living areas.2 At that time, the social democrat
Otto Bauer introduced a concept of socialization which is still prevalent in different forms in to-
day’s state-owned companies. The model aimed at socializing important industries in order to
revive the economy and improve the welfare of Austrian citizens.3 Heavy industries like coal, ore
mining, iron and steel were considered as ready for socialization first, while other businesses,
thereby excluding those dependent on foreign financial investors or small family businesses, were
prepared to be unified under a cartel-organization for the purpose of maximal concentration.4
1 cf. Weber, W.: Die Verstaatlichung in Österreich (1964): 36; Langer, E.: Die Verstaatlichungen in Österreich
(1966): 12; Deutsch, R.: Chronologie eines Kampfes (1978): 8; Turnheim, G.: Die staatliche Industrie Österreichs in
der Ersten Republik (2009): 7f. 2 cf. Weber (1964): 36; Langer (1966): 12; Turnheim (2009): 7f. 3 cf. Weber (1964): 37; Langer (1966): 11; Deutsch (1978): 10 4 cf. Weber (1964): 27ff.; Langer (1966): 13; Deutsch (1978): 10f.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
4
Bauer established a socialization commission which was responsible for the design of new organ-
izational backgrounds and legal guidelines.5 The socialization concept, however, did not manifest
the state as the ultimate owner of the socialized companies but rather drew on the notion of estab-
lishing a Supervisory Board of Directors which consists of representatives of workers, consumers
and the state in order to guarantee a fair participation of all parties involved in the well-being of
the industry.6 As already mentioned before, this model of supervising public companies is still
present in today’s state-owned companies and is discussed in more detail within the section of
major Austrian enterprises and their relationship to Austrian politics. Additional developments
during 1919 and 1920, which are still of importance nowadays, are the guidelines concerning an
8-hour-workday, unemployment insurance and support, the establishment of works councils as
well as the Chamber of Labour and social protection of children.7
Nevertheless, the period after the dissolution of the monarchy was characterized by a difficult
economic situation and under-used industrial capacities as well as high unemployment rates; a
circumstance which led to discussions about the viability of Austria and the subsequent connection
to Germany in 1938.8 Consequently, a variety of major enterprises in the areas of steel, copper,
aluminium, ore and chemistry were transferred into German ownership; thereby marking the big-
gest transfer of properties ever faced by Austria.9 Germany was already focused on the prepara-
tions for the war and hence all investments in the Austrian economy were not planned according
to Austrian strengths like leather and textile, but rather in alliance with the construction of war
machines and therefore mainly the primary industry.10 The time during World War II and the con-
nection of Austria to Germany was also characterized by investments in road building in Austria;
a circumstance discussed in more detail within the section 6.2.1 of ASFINAG later within this
Thesis.
In 1947, the American general George Catlett Marshall introduced the European Recovery
Program, also known as Marshall Plan; a strategy against poverty, hunger and chaos in Europe
after the end of World War II.11 At that time, Austria was occupied by four victorious allies and
did not only face high poverty and the lack of food supply, but also the fact that the allies claimed
5 cf. Weber (1964): 37.; Deutsch (1978): 10 6 cf. Weber (1964): 27 7 cf. Deutsch (1978): 9; Turnheim (2009): 10 8 cf. Turnheim, G.: Die industriellen Investitionen und die Staatliche Industrie zwischen 1938 und 1945 (2009): 15 9 cf. Sandgruber, R.: Ökonomie und Politik. In Wolfram, H. (ed.): Österreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom
Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (2005): 419; Turnheim (2009): 16f. 10 cf. Deutsch (1978): 20; Turnheim (2009): 15 11 cf. Bierling, S.: Geburt eines Mythos. In Holzhamer, H.-H. & Hoch, M. (eds.): Der Marshall-Plan. Geschichte und
Zukunft (1997): 17
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
5
all German Foreign Assets within their zone.12 Only the fact that the allies interpreted the assets
in a variety of ways led to the chance for Austria to protect the Austrian heritage and industries.13
In an attempt to do so, the politicians of the People’s Party and Social Democratic Party agreed
upon nationalizing a majority of essential companies and manifested this within the first Nation-
alization Act of 1946.14 This Act, also known under BGBl. Nr. 168/194615, included the direct and
indirect nationalization of 141 companies; thereby mainly referring to enterprises related to coal,
oil, steel and machinery, electronics, aluminium, ore and the banking sector.16 However, the
omnipresence of the Cold War and continuing disagreement on what constituted to German
Foreign Assets, led to a difficult economic situation for Austria and it was not until 1955, when
the State Treaty BGBl. Nr. 152/195517 was signed, that the nationalization of industries could be
fully implemented.18
During the 1960s, Austria joined the European Free Trade Agreement; however, rooted in the idea
of neutrality the country was not able to join the EWG19 and cooperate with its major trading
partners France, Germany and Italy.20 Additionally, the increasing importance of the consumer
goods industry and tertiary sector instead of the capital goods industry led to the fact that the public
industry grew at a noteworthy slower pace than the private industry in Austria.21 Throughout the
1970s this situation further worsened due to predominant salary and employment politics within
public enterprises in the era of Bruno Kreisky.22 These politics aimed at keeping the unemploy-
ment rates low and subsequently manifested in the plan that, even in times of high inflation, the
Austrian Trade Union ÖGB23 intentionally set collective agreements under the inflation rate.24
Initially successful, this budget expansive politic led to increasing troubles due to augmented
public debt and the subsequent need for structural adjustments in public industries during the
1980s.25 State-owned enterprises faced a severe crisis due to internal management problems, the
12 cf. Deutsch (1978): 23; Seidel, H.: Österreichs Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg
(2005): 299; Turnheim, G.: Die verstaatlichten Unternehmen zwischen 1945 und 1955 (2009): 30 13 cf. Deutsch (1978): 24; Turnheim (2009): 30 14 cf. Deutsch (1978): 25; Turnheim (2009): 31 15 There is no official translation 16 cf. Turnheim (2009): 34 17 There is no official translation 18 cf. Langer (1966): 48f.; Deutsch (1978): 32; Turnheim (2009): 32 19 EWG stands for Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft; Official translation being European Economic Community 20 cf. Langer (1966): 4; Clement, W. & Socher, K.: Wirtschaftspolitischer Hintergrund und Rahmenbedingungen
(2009): 179 21 cf. Clement & Socher (2009: 182 22 cf. Sandgruber (2005): 490; Clement & Socher (2009): 186 23 ÖGB stands for Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund 24 cf. Sandgruber (2005): 490; Clement & Socher (2009): 186 25 cf. Lacina, F., Lehner, D., Mitterbauer, P., Resch, A., Sandgruber, R. & Tumpel-Gugerell, G.: Österreichische
Industriegeschichte 1955 bis 2005: Die ergriffene Chance (2005): 36; Sandgruber (2005): 491; Clement & Socher
(1009): 186f.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
6
missing exploitation of strengths, the ignorance of long-term strategic goals and the deficit-
spending politics which primarily focused on the well-being of the employee rather than the com-
pany i.e. its economic situation.26 At that time, the state sold a variety of shares; amongst others
of companies such as Siemens Austria AG, Voest-Alpine Hebetechnik und Brückenbau AG and
OMV;27 the latter being discussed separately in section 6.2.8 within this Thesis.
Tendencies of privatization further increased during the 1990s when Austria joined the European
Union and subsequently aligned with contrary concepts of deregulation, neoliberalism and mod-
ernization rather than public regulations.28 In addition to this, the amendment of the laws ÖIAG-
Gesetz, BGBl. Nr. 204/198629 and ÖIAG-Finanzierungsgesetz30 aimed at achieving the maximum
industrial value added possible by assigning the Austrian industrial organization ÖIAG31 with the
establishment of privatizations and the sale of state-owned holdings.32 The organization ÖIAG and
its importance for the Austrian state is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.5 within this Thesis.
The retrospection of the history since the establishment of the First Republic shows the importance
of the state and governmental interactions in Austria. Especially the developments after World
War I and II indicate how the Austrian government intervenes in major industries and subsequently
also imply political influences and power plays which are depicted separately in each of the major
public enterprises discussed later within this Thesis. However, despite the fact that Austria can be
considered as special case due to socialistic and nationalized tendencies throughout its history, the
role of the state and how it manages public enterprises has changed; especially since the 1990s and
the joining of the European Union. This circumstance is discussed in more detail within the fol-
lowing part where a closer look is taken at concepts of public management.
26 cf. Wieser, O.: Unternehmenskultureller Wandel durch Privatisierung in Form von Management-Buy-Outs
innerhalb der verstaatlichten Industries Österreichs (1997): 22; Sandgruber (2005): 491f.; Clement & Socher (2009):
187 27 cf. Kraft, S. & Obermann, G.: Privatisierungen in Österreich und in anderen westeuropäischen Ländern: Ein
Überblick (1990): 60f. 28 cf. Clement & Socher (2009): 190f. 29 There is no official translation 30 There is no official translation 31 ÖIAG stands for Österreichische Industrieholding AG 32 cf. Österreichische Industrieholding AG: ÖIAG Bericht 1994-1999 (1999): 18f.; BGBl. Nr. 973/1993 §1 (4)
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
7
4.2 Public Management and its organizational logics
While a variety of researchers hold the opinion that the concepts of managing public and private
companies differ rather than overlap, Weber (1976) was one of the first to claim that there is no
difference between them at all as both root in the same social and economic principles.33 Moreover,
he established three forms of leadership; namely charismatic, traditional and legal; whereas the
latter includes bureaucracies as the purest form of rational order.34 According to Weber (1976),
bureaucracies in European countries manifest in a hierarchical public sector with strict regulations
concerning competences and qualifications.35 Civil servants are responsible for the exertion of
administrative tasks and even though they are subordinated to the state, they are categorized as
being superior to normal citizens.36 The concept furthermore indicates that civil servants are not
paid according to their performance but rather according to their position; moving up the hierarchy
can be achieved by age, rank and duration of employment.37 Thom and Ritz (2006) designate that
this form of bureaucracy is still prevalent in a variety of public companies today; especially within
German-speaking areas.38
However, new tendencies and increasing complexity led to a different picture of the state and its
tasks.39 While the tasks in public companies used to be manageable and clear, as well as relatively
constant and stable, they are now complex, dynamic, multidimensional and characterized by fast
changes.40 Moreover, politics used to be branded by the uncritical acceptance of authorities and
political parties; a circumstance that has radically changed as the society nowadays is categorized
by non-voters, protest-voters, a change in values and indifference.41 Public management has to
adjust to these new circumstances and apply new concepts accordingly. One of these concepts
refers to New Public Management and is discussed in more detail within the following.
4.2.1 New Public Management
Developed during increasing deregulation patterns throughout the 1990s, the concept of New
Public Management is, indeed, also for the Austrian public sector of significant importance when
33 cf. Weber, M.: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage (1976): 825f. 34 Ibid.: 551ff. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 cf. Thom, N. & Ritz, A.: Public Management. Innovative Konzepte zur Führung im öffentlichen Sektor, 3.
Auflage (2006): 5 39 cf. Budäus, D.: Public Management. Konzepte und Verfahren zur Modernisierung öffentlicher Verwaltungen
(1994): 43ff.; Thom & Ritz (2006): 7; Schedler, K. & Proeller, I.: New Public Management, 4. Auflage (2009): 7;
17 40 cf. Thom & Ritz (2006): 7 41 Ibid.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
8
having a look at major state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the conceptual premises as well as lim-
its of the idea of New Public Management are depicted separately subsequently.
4.2.1.1 Conceptual premises
As already specified within the retrospection on Austrian history, there are two contrary types of
ideologies which are the most prevalent among Western European countries; namely the ideology
of a welfare state as it is predominant within Austria and the ideology of neo-liberalism as it is
prevailing within the concept of the European Union.42 The first roots in the philosophy of seeing
the state as an active part of society and therefore an intervening institution when it comes to the
creation of social security and common welfare as well as the combat against social inequalities.43
The latter, however, is based on the philosophy of competition, individuality and the striving after
maximizing the performance by, for instance, privatizing major industries.44 The concept of New
Public Management lies in the overcoming of weaknesses within the ideological antagonism of a
social and a neo-liberalistic state45 and while Rhodes (1991) is considered to be the first to use this
new term,46 it is the concept of Hood (1991) which acquired the most acceptance among research-
ers until now.47 The author ascribes the new concept characteristics such as the focus on cost re-
duction, flexibility and discipline as well as the professional and active management of strategic
goals and performance indicators.48 Moreover, due to the already mentioned augmented complex-
ity and dynamic parameters, competition within the public sector increased and furthermore led to
temporary contracts and invitations to tender.49 In addition, Friedrichsmeier (2000) declares that
the fundamental difference between the political sector and the administration is that the first has
to define the long-term strategies, while the latter has to operatively implement them.50 This leads
to the assumption of the author that decentralizing federal offices and privatizing a variety of gov-
ernmental functions is essential within the concept of New Public Management.51 However,
Schedler and Proeller (2009) indicate that both the government and the administration are neces-
sities within the well-being and well-functioning of a state and it is not the primary goal of New
Public Management to replace governmental institutions by private ones but rather to strengthen
42 cf. Schedler, K.: Die Systemforderungen des NPM an Staat und Recht. In Mastronardi, P. & Schedler, K. (eds.):
New Public Management in Staat und Recht (1998): 4ff.; Schedler & Proeller (2009): 13 43 Schedler & Proeller (2009): 13 44 Ibid. 45 Schedler & Proeller (2009): 31 46 cf. Rhodes, R. A. W.: The Theory and Method in British Public Administration: the view from political science.
Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1991): 533ff. 47 cf. Hood, C.: A Public Management for all seasons? Public Administration, Vol. 69, No. 1 (1991): 3ff. 48 Ibid. 49 cf. Hood (1991): 3ff.; Schedler & Proeller (2009): 7; 17 50 cf. Friedrichsmeier, H.: New Public Management (2000): 15 51 Ibid.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
9
the public sector by focusing on former private-related aspects such as cost reduction, flexibility
and rationalization.52 This also includes the attempt to take the social and the neo-liberalistic
approach of state forms and focus on positive aspects within both of them.53 A similar approach is
taken by Reichard (2002) who, as a consequence, sees the state as an institution which has to fulfil
tasks of motivating and enabling instead of simply producing and rather than solely planning and
controlling, it furthermore has to activate and coordinate.54 A slightly different approach is taken
by Mastronardi (1998) who sees the concept of New Public Management as the beginning of a
significant reformation period in which former mistakes in public management are adjusted by the
application of liberalisation, privatization and deregulation concepts; thereby aiming at the im-
provement of the economy.55
Despite any interpretations of the conception itself, the fact that its beginnings root in New Zealand
during the late 1980s and have allocated over Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States
during the 1990s, led to the assumption of its political neutrality by Haldemann (1997).56 Though,
the author indicates that different perceptions of the concept evolved and during the 1990s, the
model of Wirkungsorientierte Verwaltungsführung (WoV)57 was established and implemented in
the public sector of Switzerland.58 The idea behind the concept of WoV was the inclusion of com-
petition and incentives as essential parts within the management of public enterprises; thereby also
incorporating private entities and third parties to accomplish all relevant tasks and obtain more
efficient results.59 Later also applied in Austrian public companies is the basic idea of performance
agreements which regulate the thorough preparation of future goals in detail on the one hand, and
the introduction of global budgets60 which aim at increasing internal control and transparency by
depicting not only balance sheets but full income statements on the other hand.61
Yet, major criticism is raised by a variety of researchers and for the purpose of coherence, the
limits and possible weaknesses of the concept are briefly discussed subsequently.
52 cf. Schedler & Proeller (2009): 53f. 53 Ibid. 54 cf. Reichard, C.: Governance öffentlicher Dienstleistungen. In Budäus, C., Schauer R. & Reichard, C. (eds.):
Public und Nonprofit Management. Neuere Entscheidungen und aktuelle Problemfelder (2002): 30f. 55 cf. Mastronardi, P.: New Public Management im Kontext unserer Staatsordnung. In Mastronardi, P. & Schedler,
K. (eds.): New Public Management in Staat und Recht (1998): 48 56 cf. Haldemann, T.: New Public Management und wirkungsorientierte Verwaltungsführung (WoV). In
Mitterlehner, R. & Kyrer, A. (eds.): New Public Management (1997): 9 57 There is no official translation 58 cf. Haldemann (1997): 10f. 59 cf. Schedler (1998): 37 60 Note: The translation refers to the German word Produktgruppenbudget (Globalbudget) 61 cf. Haldemann (1997): 13f.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
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4.2.1.2 Limits of New Public Management
In general, there are different opinions upon what can be characterized as weakness or disad-
vantage of the concept and therefore the next selected researchers and their aspects of criticism
represent solely a part of a bigger variety.
Authors like Naschold (1996) and Thom and Ritz (2006) post clear criticism on the concept of
New Public Management. While the first claims that modernisations which aim at deregulating
and liberalizing the public sector might ultimately led to the dismantling of the democratic welfare
state,62 the latter, ten years later, rather criticizes the fact that reformations tend to generate new
reformations by benefitting from problems.63 Jann (1998) even categorizes the concept as ideo-
logical trend and a way to create employment by consulting in the implementation of its principal
components.64 He furthermore heavily criticizes the context-ignoring adaptation of the ideas of
New Public Management without reflecting upon their suitableness.65 Besides, a variety of re-
searchers agrees upon the circumstance that the implementation of New Public Management ideas
tends to focus too much on internal reformations; thereby constricting the focus on further possi-
bilities and restricting the cooperation with external societal actors.66 In more detail, Rossmann
(2005) furthermore claims that the concept lacks a clear strategic focus on how the political and
administrative body cooperate; thereby meaning that the act of posing rationale aspects above
political ones, especially in areas where the political influence is omnipresent, can lead to signifi-
cant difficulties in the implementation phase.67 In addition, some authors raise concerns about the
implementation and usage of business economics management tools like for example the, already
62 cf. Naschold, F.: New Frontiers in Public Sector Management. Trends and Issues in State and Local Government
in Europe. Walter de Gruyter & Co Berlin (1996): 3f. 63 cf. Thom & Ritz (2006): 24 64 cf. Jann, W.: New Public Management. In Edeling, T., Jann, W. & Wagner, D. (eds.): Öffentliches und privates
Management. Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Respects? Leske und Budrich, Opladen (1998): 24f. 65 Ibid. 66 cf. Reichard (2002): 29; Bauer, H.: New Public Management und Governance – Strategien zur nachhaltigen
Weiterentwicklung der öffentlichen Verwaltung. In Bauer, H., Biwald, P. & Dearing, E. (eds.): Öffentliches
Management in Österreich. Realisierungen und Perspektiven (2003): 11; Löffler, E.: Good Governance als
Weiterentwicklung von New Public Management: Verschiedene Reformansätze in Europa. In Bauer, H., Biwald, P.
& Dearing, E. (eds.): Öffentliches Management in Österreich. Realisierungen und Perspektiven (2003): 267;
Rossmann, B.: Zur Bedeutung der Governance im Rahmen der Reorganisation des Staates. In Bauer, H., Biwald, P.
& Dearing, E. (eds.): Public Governance. Öffentliche Aufgaben gemeinsam erfüllen und effektiv steuern (2005): 22;
Trattnigg, R. & Wutscher, W.: Erfolgsfaktoren für Good Governance in der Verwaltung – eine Innensicht. In Bauer,
H., Biwald, P. & Dearing, E. (eds.): Public Governance. Öffentliche Aufgaben gemeinsam erfüllen und effektiv
steuern (2005): 48 67 cf. Rossmann (2005): 21f.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
11
previously in the concept of WoV indicated, full depiction of income statements and other finan-
cial criteria which can be misinterpreted.68 However, against this criticism holds the fact of
increasing transparency in the public sector.69
Similar to the concept of New Public Management, the concept of New Public Governance
simultaneously gained increasing importance during the late 1990s and thereafter and is conse-
quently depicted separately within the following section.
4.2.2 New Public Governance
While some see the concept of New Public Governance as a supplementation to New Public Man-
agement, others see it as an evolutionary development from the one to the other. In this Thesis,
both sides are depicted subsequently; thereby also considering the idea of Public-Private
Partnerships as a special form of implementing governance.
4.2.2.1 The concept and its idea of cooperation
Similar to the concept of New Public Management, the notion of Public Governance orientates on
the differences between the social welfare and neo-liberalistic state as well as its developments.
As already depicted within the section of retrospection on Austrian history, the social welfare state
went through a significant crisis during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to inefficient manage-
ment tactics aligned with Keynesian tendencies.70 Subsequently the quite different approach of
deregulation, liberalisation and privatization efforts emerged and, especially through the joining
of the European Union, it was fostered heavily within public enterprises.71 In order to compensate
for the negative aspects in both state forms and, in addition, restructure the public sector in an
efficient but not exclusive way, supplementary measures have to be considered. One approach is
to incorporate Governance; thereby referring to the aspect of including non-governmental and non-
public actors into the creation of well-being for the whole state.72 Moreover, the society is taken
into account as a difficult-to-lead subsystem which needs to be tackled in a cooperative and active
way.73
68 cf. Bolay, F. W.: Was haben eigentlich die Bürger von der Verwaltungsreform? Wirkungsorientierte
Verwaltungssteuerung und betriebswirtschaftliche Modernisierung. Verwaltung und Management, Issue 6 (2006):
325f.; Kuhlmann, S.: Hat das „Neue Steuerungsmodell“ versagt? Lehren aus der „Ökonomisierung“ von Politik und
Verwaltung. Verwaltung und Management, Issue 3 (2006): 149f. 69 cf. Haldemann (1997): 13f. 70 cf. Lacina, Lehner, Mitterbauer, Resch, Sandgruber, & Tumpel-Gugerell, (2005): 36; Sandgruber (2005): 491;
Clement & Socher (1009): 186f. 71 cf. Clement & Socher (2009): 190f. 72 cf. Rossmann (2005): 19; Thom & Ritz (2006): 10 73 cf. Jann, W.: Der Wandel verwaltungspolitischer Leitbilder. Von Management zu Governance? In König, K. (ed.):
Deutsche Verwaltung an der Wende zum 21. Jahrhundert (2002): 294f.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
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Some researchers see the concept of Public Governance as supplementation to the concept of New
Public Management, mainly because the latter focuses too much on rational and economic
approaches that might not fit with the needs of politically influenced state-owned enterprises with
a public mission.74 However, others like Osborne (2010) take a different approach by seeing an
evolution within the concept of New Public Management from a traditional administrative
approach to the approach of New Public Governance which poses the assumption that the concept
of New Public Management is only a step, or partial theory, on the way of further development
into a new theory that can possibly be applied successfully.75 Attempts to reduce bureaucracy refer
to strategies of Outsourcing, Total Quality Management or Lean Management and their imple-
mentation within the idea of New Public Management which led to decentralization and generali-
zation within the public sector.76 While researchers like Picot and Wolff (1995) define a clear
difference between private and public enterprises in the way that public ones do not constantly
face the pressure of reorganization due to changing markets,77 later research shows that the liber-
alisation of markets within the European Union as well as increasing global connections led to
augmented competitive factors for public companies as well and subsequently the pressure to adapt
to changing circumstances in a flexible and fast way.78
4.2.2.2 Public-Private Partnerships
Greve and Hodge (2010) indicate that Public-Private Partnerships can be characterized as a special
case within New Public Governance. The authors hold the opinion that the inclusion of non-
governmental and non-public actors in the society surrounding the public enterprise can lead to
partnerships that benefit both sides in the accomplishment of a specific task or efficiency.79
According to Bastin (2003), the concept exists since the mid-1990s and includes the time-restricted
contractual agreement between actors of the public and private sector to cooperate on the fulfil-
ment of projects; mainly, but not exclusively, the establishment of infrastructure or conveyance of
public services.80 A more detailed description of public-private partnerships is provided by
74 cf. Rossmann (2005): 21f.; Thom & Ritz (2006: 10f. 75 cf. Osborne, S. P.: The New Public Governance? Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public
governance (2010): 5 76 cf. Stößel, V.: Outsourcing in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Ein Instrument zur effizienteren Versorgung mit
öffentlichen Gütern? (1998): 69f.; Jann (2002): 292f.; Hopp, H. & Göbel, A.: Management in der öffentlichen
Verwaltung. Organisations- und Personalarbeit in modernen Kommunalverwaltungen (2004): 38ff. 77 cf. Picot, A. & Wolff, B.: Zur ökonomischen Organisation öffentlicher Leistungen. „Lean Management“ im
öffentlichen Sektor? In: Naschold, F. & Pröhl, M. (eds.): Produktivität öffentlicher Dienstleistungen (1995): 66f. 78 cf. Thom & Ritz (2006): 7; Schedler & Proeller (2009): 7; 17 79 cf. Greve, C. & Hodge, G.: Public-private partnerships and public governance challenges. In Osborne, S. P. (ed.):
The New Public Governance? Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public governance (2010): 149ff. 80 cf. Bastin, J.: Public-Private Partnerships: A Review of International and Austrian Experience. In Eilmansberger
T., Holoubek, M., Kalss, S., Lang, M., Lienbacher, G., Lurger, B. & Potacs, M. (eds.): Public Private Partnership
(2003): 2
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
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Klijn (2005) and Lenk and Röber (2011) who differ between two types of partnerships; namely
project-related and institutional ones.81 Within the first form, both the public and private partner
provide resources, share risks, costs and benefits and work together on a time-limited base.82 The
latter however, refers to a permanent form of cooperation; for example by creating a joint entity
with an own legal background and organizational structure.83 These partnerships give both sides
the opportunity to benefit from the other side by combining the often contradicting goals of
providing public goods with maximizing profitability; thereby adding value and increasing
knowledge.84 In addition to this, Lenk and Röber (2011) indicate that, due to financial restrictions
in the public budget, politicians tend to use public-private partnerships for the purpose of pre-
financing projects that otherwise could not be accomplished.85 A different approach of this
partnership is taken by Macdonald (2011) who designates the often-used possibility of creating a
state-owned enterprise with the freedom of acting in the sense and with the business tools of a
private one.86 However, this form includes the special condition that the business is always in arm-
length control of the government and consequently supported in case of financial distress,
problems or times of crises.87
In any case, the incorporation of governance for the future well-being of public enterprises implies
the inclusion of non-public and non-governmental actors as well. Public choice as a way of seeing
the management of public enterprises can be considered as a further approach and is therefore
discussed in more detail within the following section.
4.2.3 Public choice
This last part of the theoretical depiction refers to public choice as a form of seeing and doing
politics. It relates economic factors to political science; thereby implying that participating indi-
viduals in public surroundings always seek to satisfy their own demands based on self-interest.88
81 cf. Klijn, E.-H.: networks and Inter-organisational Management: Challenging, Steering, Evaluation, and the role
of Public Actors in Public Management. In Ferlie, E., Lynn Jr., L. E. & Pollitt, C. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of
Public Management (2005) 257ff.; Lenk, T. & Röber, M.: Public-Private Partnership as Part of Public Sector
Modernisation. In Lenk, T., Röber, M., Kuntze, M., Redlich, M. & Rottmann, O. (eds.): Public-Private Partnership
(2011): 1f. 82 cf. Lenk & Röber (2011): 1f. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid.: 2 86 cf. Macdonald, H. I.: PPPs: How Public, how Private, how Much a Partnership? In Lenk, T., Röber, M., Kuntze,
M., Redlich, M. & Rottmann, O. (eds.): Public-Private Partnership (2011): 1 87 Ibid. 88 cf. Dunleavy, P.: Democracy Bureaucracy & Public Choice. Economic Explanations in Political Science (1991):
3; Stretton, H. & Orchard, L.: Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice. Theoretical Foundations of the
Contemporary Attack on Government (1994): 123f.; Thom & Ritz (2006): 15
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
14
Connected to this, the topic of rent-seeking is explained briefly thereafter.
4.2.3.1 Conceptual premises of public choice
The theory of public choice was first introduced in the 1960s by James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullok; even though single parts of the concept can be traced back to the year 1776 and Adam
Smith’s “Wealth of Nations”.89 Basic topics within the public choice approach align with those
addressed in political science; namely voting rules and voting behaviour as well as political parties,
bureaucracy and the theory of the state.90 Contrary to Weber’s bureaucracy model, which sees the
civil servants as loyal and rational members of society, the concept of public choice implies that
public service staff acts individually upon self-interest.91 Buchanan and Tullok (1962) see the ra-
tional individual as egoistic utility maximizer92 and while Mueller (1979) expands this sight by
relating economics to political philosophy,93 Stretton and Orchard (1994) summarize the basic
thought behind public choice as the fact that people want the same thing in their economic as in
their political life.94 In alliance with this view, Thom and Ritz (2006) designate later that the self-
interest of civil servants manifests in collective public actions and subsequently political processes
which are composed of individual preferences.95 In other words, Thom and Ritz (2006) indicate
that the decisions and behaviour of politicians are the result of the sum of individual preferences
of civil servants.96 Additional premises defined by Dunleavy (1991) are the assumption that people
know their preferences and are not only able to list and rank them but also to pose logical con-
sistency on them.97 Moreover, the postulated picture of people as egoistic utility maximizers im-
plies that they always seek the cheapest and most beneficial solution; thereby acting in an efficient
manner that allows for preference optimization.98
Within the theory of public choice, bureaucracy plays a major role. According to Niskanen (1974),
civil servants, and in fact all those employed in the sector of public services, act upon self-interest;
a statement in which the researcher aligns with all previously discussed authors.99 However,
Niskanen (1974) sees public services sectors as monopolistic and intransparent and as a solution,
89 cf. Thom & Ritz (2006): 15 90 cf. Mueller, D. C.: Public choice (1979): 1 91 cf. Dunleavy (1991): 3; Stretton & Orchard (1994): 123f.; Thom & Ritz (2006): 15 92 cf. Buchanan, J. M. & Tullok, G.: The Calculus of Consent. In Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
(1962): 17ff. 93 cf. Mueller (1979): 1 94 cf. Stretton & Orchard (1994): 123f. 95 cf. Thom & Ritz (2006): 16 96 Ibid. 97 cf. Dunleavy (1991): 3 98 Ibid. 99 cf. Niskanen, W. A.: Nichtmarktwirtschaftliche Entscheidungen. Die eigentümliche Ökonomie der Bürokratie. In
Widmaier, H. P. (ed.): Politische Ökonomie des Wohlfahrtsstaates (1974): 208ff.
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
15
proposes to separate strategic planning from operative implementation while simultaneously fos-
tering competition among authorities.100 Contrary to Niskanen (1974) who, similar to Stretton and
Orchard (1994) and Thom and Ritz (2006) later, primarily focused on the relation between civil
servants and politicians, Downs (1974) in the same year mainly concentrated on the bureaucracy
within authorities; i.e. internal dynamics.101 He defines different types of employees within
authorities; namely newcomer, keeper, zealots, lawyers and civil servants.102 The focus within a
public authority, and consequently the effort on how well economic and organizational measures
are developed and implemented, depends on which types are predominant within the public
authority.103 Moreover, Downs (1974) implies the assumption of failure within authorities due to
their internal hierarchies, size and lack of appropriate control mechanisms.104 In more detail, the
author refers to the fact that big public authorities are generated and consequently need control
mechanisms; however more control also means more effort and expenditures which leads to the
establishment of new institutions responsible for the control.105 Thus, their size leads, again, to the
need for control; a spiral that keeps going and increasing bureaucracy and complexity.106 This
bureaucracy theory of Downs (1974) can still be applied in a variety of public enterprises today; a
circumstance depicted in more detail within the discussion section at the end of this Thesis. For
the purpose of completeness, the phenomenon of rent seeking as result of egoistic behaviour within
public companies is described briefly subsequently.
4.2.3.2 Rent seeking
Related to the picture of the rational and egoistic utility maximizer, Tullok (1967) formulated his
thoughts on rent seeking in a period of contradicting views on this topic. In the author’s opinion,
rent seeking mainly refers to monopolies and the circumstance that actors redistribute the aggre-
gated welfare away from the consumer and towards the monopolist itself.107 Tullok (1989) later
adjusts this view by posing that those that benefit do not have to be monopolists, but simply a
minority profiting from rents created for the greater good of a majority.108 The economist differs
between good and bad rent-seeking; thereby indicating that the action of seeking rents for having
100 Ibid.: 221ff. 101 cf. Downs, A. (1974): Nichtmarktwirtschaftliche Entscheidungssysteme. Eine Theorie der Bürokratie. In
Widmaier, H. P. (ed.): Politische Ökonomie des Wohlfahrtsstaates (1974): 202 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid.: 199ff. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 cf. Tullok, G.: Rent Seeking. In Rowley, C. K. (ed.): The Shaftesbury Papers, 2 (1993): 1 108 cf. Tullok, G.: The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking (1989): 1
4. Conspectus on concepts of public enterprise management Etienne Koo
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created something good is not per se bad but rather the action of exploiting these rents and re-
directing their positive effect for everybody to single actors;109 indeed, something carried out by a
lot of governments all over the world.110 Related to this, Krueger (1974) engaged in aspects of
governmental restrictions and subsequent actions of corruption and bribery connected to rent seek-
ing.111 Khwaja and Mian (2004) define corruption as a globally widespread phenomenon which
poses significant costs on the economy.112 Especially when it comes to lending, politicians choose
governmental banks for seeking rents as they are able to remain solvent even in times of high
default.113 Moreover, politicians can pursue corrupt loans more easily than other individuals and
at a lower cost than monetary bribes.114
The subsequent section of the Thesis refers to the main part and therefore the introduction of the
organization CIRIEC, its history and goals as well as its current project. Thereafter, CIRIEC is
applied to Austria by focusing on one of its latest projects and analysing eleven cases of major
Austrian enterprises. Later, these cases are applied to the previously depicted theoretical bases of
public company management and their organizational logics within a final discussion.
109 cf. Tullok, G.: Rents and Rent Seeking. In Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D. & Tullok, G. (eds.): The Political
Economy of Rent Seeking (1988): 51f. 110 cf. Tullok (1989): 1 111 cf. Krueger, A. O.: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking. The American Economic Review (1974): 291 112 cf. Khwaja, A. I. & Mian, A.: Corruption and Politicians: Rent-seeking in an Emerging Financial Market
(2004): 2 113 Ibid.: 7 114 Ibid.
5. The organization CIRIEC Etienne Koo
17
5. The organization CIRIEC
CIRIEC represents a non-governmental organization which works in a scientific way to collect
information on topics of public interest such as public authorities, public utilities and not-for-profit
associations.115 In addition to simply collecting the necessary information, the organization aims
at scientific research and the publication of significant work.116 The name CIRIEC is an acronym
and stands for “International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Coop-
erative Economy”.117 The original title of “International Centre of Research and Information on
the Collective Economy” trades back to the year 1947 when professor Edgard Milhaud founded
the organization at the University of Geneva in order to ensure the continuity of its research done
in the form of a journal known as “Annals of Collective Economy”.118 The association CIRIEC
kept its headquarters in Geneva until 1957 before it decided to move to Liège in Belgium where it
is still settled today.119
5.1 Structure at CIRIEC
The association is organized in a rather formal way by separating the general administrative bodies
from the scientific ones. While the first consist of the honorary president, president, vice-president
and other important members, as well as the International Board, International Secretariat and
General Assembly, the latter constitutes of the International Scientific Council and Commis-
sions.120 The honorary president, the president, the vice-president and other important members
account for the so called Praesidium which acts as the executive committee of CIRIEC and is
appointed for a period of two years.121 The International Board forms the Board of Directors and
is responsible for the composition of delegates and CIRIEC’s 13 national sections which are dis-
cussed in more detail later within this section.122 The International Secretariat is responsible for
the management of the daily work at CIRIEC and therefore in charge of accomplishing a fluent
work-flow.123 The General Assembly meets at the international congresses of CIRIEC every two
years and is responsible for the discussion of currently relevant topics.124
115 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: CIRIEC 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: History 119 Ibid. 120 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: Organization 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid.
5. The organization CIRIEC Etienne Koo
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The scientific parts, namely the International Scientific Council and the International Scientific
Commissions are responsible for topics in the areas of public services and social economy.125 The
contemporary president of the International Scientific Commission in charge of public services
and enterprises is the Austrian professor Gabriel Oberman who is presently focused on the future
of public enterprises.126
5.2 Research at CIRIEC
The organization of CIRIEC is divided into two types of members; collective and individual ones.
While the first consist of public agencies and corporations characterized as working in a non-profit
manner or having a scientific or cultural nature, the latter consist of individual researchers, profes-
sors, experts and others interested in the work of CIRIEC.127 In order to collect the appropriate
information accordingly, CIRIEC fosters a scientific network comprising of over 100 experts in
the areas of public, social and cooperative economy.128 All members have to pay an annual fee and
can only constitute to the scientific network if they are nominated by the association’s bodies.129
The work within the scientific network can be fulfilled within working groups or individually;
however, in any case the work is done on a complete voluntary base and the results are published
for all members.130
At present there are 13 national sections which consist of both collective and individual mem-
bers.131 The sections are situated in the countries Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Venezuela and the investigation con-
ducted by the members is usually done in English, French or occasionally German.132 The re-
searchers within these national sections as well as within the scientific network contribute to the
overall exploration on specific topics of interest by the conduction of working papers which can
be retrieved from CIRIEC’s homepage.133 One of the current calls for working papers refers to
country specific major public enterprises and policy trends within them; something more closely
examined within the following section.
125 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: Organization 126 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: Scientific network 127 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: National Sections and other Members 128 Ibid. 129 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: Scientific network 130 Ibid. 131 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: National Sections and other Members 132 Ibid. 133 cf. Homepage CIRIEC: CIRIEC’s collection of working papers
5. The organization CIRIEC Etienne Koo
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5.3 Country analysis and policy trends
The International Scientific Commission of Public Services and Public Enterprises led by the Aus-
trian professor Gabriel Oberman is currently working on the collection of papers concerning the
country specific analysis of major public enterprises and policy trends within their relationship to
the government.134 The new collection is considered as collaborative project and is conducted
together with Massimo Florio from the University of Milan in Italy, Philippe Bance from the
University Rouen in France and Luc Bernier from the ENAP in Québec Canada.135
The researchers build on the assumption that public enterprises steadily increase their role at a
local and national level, thereby mainly referring to research conducted by the OECD and the
World Bank as well as independent studies and previous CIRIEC research.136 Within this assump-
tion, a public enterprise is defined as an organization producing public services, having a public
mission and budgetary autonomy as well as managerial freedom of choice, being owned or con-
trolled by public sector entities or an organization where the ownership can be shifted to the private
sector.137 Moreover, the researchers define the term ownership as having effective control over the
organization; i.e. public institutions like governments, ministries or the parliament hold power in
the enterprise by, for example, contributing to the appointment of the top management.138
5.3.1 Aim of the project
The aim of the International Scientific Commission of Public Services and Public Enterprises is to
collect papers and consequently essential information on major public enterprises and their re-
lationships with governments regarding policy trends in the countries of CIRIEC’s 13 national
sections. The focus thereby is not restricted to national public enterprises but can be extended to
multinational and even global ones.139 Moreover, within these enterprises the main focus is on
energy, transportation, water, solid waste and manufacturing industries; the latter only if it is con-
nected to a public mission in defence, aero-space or high-tech solutions.140 The banking sector per
se is excluded from the research.141
134 cf. CIRIEC International Scientific Commission Public Services / Public Enterprises: Call for papers. Major
Public Enterprises: Country Analysis and Policy Trends. Draft Version (July 25, 2004) 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid.: 2 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid.
5. The organization CIRIEC Etienne Koo
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The goal is to find the most recent information on public enterprises categorized within the CIRIEC
definition, and certainly within one of the declared industries, for the purpose of analysing their
policy trends and governmental relationships since the year 2000 but specifically since the
year 2008; i.e. after the global financial crisis and subsequent phase of Great Recession.142
5.3.2 Methods of problem solution
In order to find out which policy trends characterize the relationship between major public enter-
prises and governments since 2008, the researchers pose the following questions for orientation:143
To what extent do public enterprises survive and even expand on a global level?
How do they perform on a national and international level and who are the major players?
How does the control of the government manifest and which missions do they assign?
Are public enterprises transforming themselves in multinationals?
In order to examine these questions accordingly, the analysis is aimed to be conducted in form of
a country specific survey of major public enterprises and the governmental body.144 After classi-
fying the major public enterprises in the country itself, their performance has to be identified
accordingly; thereby mainly referring to their achievement of set objectives, financial goals and
missions.145 Subsequently, the focus is on the analysis of current policy trends and how they affect
the public companies.146 These policy trends need to be analysed in a structured way regarding
elements of possible proposed privatizations, their relationship to trade unions as well as the im-
plementation of regulatory arrangements.147 The collaborative investigation on these areas of
concern are collected by CIRIEC from researchers all over the world and subsequently published
within the scientific network.
142 Ibid.: 3 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6. CIRIEC Austria
The overall purpose of CIRIEC is to collect and provide information of public interest; in that way
primarily including information on public authorities and utilities. While CIRIEC’s Honorary
President Erich Haider is simultaneously the Vice-President of CIRIEC Austria and the current
Executive Director at the company Linz AG,148 the contemporary collection of scientific papers
on country analyses and policy trends is conducted by the International Scientific Commission of
Public Services and Public Enterprises led by the Austrian professor Gabriel Oberman.149 Clearly,
the incorporation of research on the situation in Austria is of major importance. Therefore, infor-
mation is collected for eleven major Austrian enterprises; thereby including only those industries
approved by CIRIEC. This means that the corporations refer to businesses of energy, transporta-
tion and infrastructure as well as broadcasting, telecommunications and common goods for the
societal well-being. The first section deals with the methodology used to analyse the chosen
examples; in this way mainly referring to how research is conducted and which questions guide
the research process. Thereafter, the analysis of the, primarily public, major Austrian enterprises
is conducted in an alphabetical order.
6.1 Methodology
The key purpose of CIRIEC within this new collection of papers is to find out which role the state
plays in the management of key enterprises; thereby mainly referring to internal management prac-
tices, organizational logics, political influences as well as discussions about privatizations and the
relation to its workers. In alliance with CIRIEC, the research on these topics is accomplished
within a qualitative documentary analysis which means that the information provided within this
Thesis is based on secondary desk research. The reasons behind the application of a qualitative
approach instead of a quantitative one lies in the fact that political interventions and power plays
are only clearly visible to insiders who are not willing to share their knowledge and information
with external people. Therefore, the analysis of governmental influences and political parties
within the major Austrian enterprises discussed, is applied according to different documents; in
that way also including the wording of the law, amendments of the law, the depiction of organiza-
tional structures and hierarchies as well as their managing personnel, newspapers, homepages,
books and journals.
148 Homepage CIRIEC: Organization 149 cf. CIRIEC International Scientific Commission Public Services / Public Enterprises: Call for papers. Major
Public Enterprises: Country Analysis and Policy Trends. Draft Version (July 25, 2004)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Consequently, the following criteria is taken into consideration.
Is the company 100% public or a public-private mixture?
What are the political connections of the company?
Do political parties intervene in the management of the company?
Do politicians hold an occupation in the enterprise; e.g. a managing position?
Are there discussions or rumours about privatizations of completely public corporations?
How do the companies perform; especially since the global crisis?
What affects their logics and management tactics?
Is there a relation to trade unions?
The information is provided in a systematic order; thereby including all information expected by
CIRIEC. First, the legal base of the company is analysed according to different laws and its his-
torical roots. As already indicated within the retrospection on major developments in Austria after
World War I, the history plays a major role when wanting to analyse the connections of Austrian
enterprises to the state. Thereafter, the main tasks of the company as well as its organizational
structure, and therefore possible bureaucracies and hierarchies, are analysed. Subsequently, the
relationship to Austrian politics and hence connections to political parties, the National Council as
well as governmental representatives is depicted in more detail. This is, indeed, connected to the
organizational structure as it shows which position is occupied by politicians or political friends.
Thereafter, the company’s developments since the global crisis and subsequent phase of Great
Recession are investigated accordingly; thereby including information from balance sheets and
income statements as well as annual reports and strategic mission statements in order to provide a
holistic picture on both the financial and organizational side. All this information is provided for
each selected enterprise.
Later within this Thesis, each of the examples is summarized and connected to theoretical con-
cepts, in that way aiming at the provision of complete information on its logics and developments.
For the purpose of clarity, this final discussion of the examples also includes its connections to
trade unions and possible developments within the near future which are not discussed beforehand.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2 Analysis of major Austrian enterprises
In alliance with the requirements of CIRIEC, the following, fully or partly public, Austrian enter-
prises are analysed in an alphabetical order. First, the public limited company ASFINAG, which
is responsible for the Austrian highways and therefore road infrastructure, is studied in more detail.
The company is 100% state-owned and its history and developments are characterized by strong
political connections. Thereafter, the limited liability company BIG as the public manager of state-
owned real estates is depicted according to the required criteria. Next, the railway holding com-
pany ÖBB Holding Group as the strategic leading organization of a variety of subsidiaries in the
business of the transportation of goods and people is described. While both the company BIG and
the ÖBB Holding Group are 100% public, the first is known for being connected to the Austrian
People’s Party while the latter can be related to the Social Democratic Party; a circumstance de-
scribed in more detail within each enterprise analysis. The next company depicted is the Austrian
Federal Forestry Group ÖBf AG which is 100% public and responsible for Austria’s natural hab-
itats. Within this, the enterprise is in charge of managing, maintaining and protecting all natural
areas like lakes, hunting areas, fishery and forestry. Similar to BIG, the enterprise is primarily
connected to the People’s Party; yet, an aspect which is explained in more detail within the com-
pany’s section. Subsequently, the industrial holding company ÖIAG is described according to rel-
evant criteria. Most importantly, this state-owned company is responsible for the management of
public stakes as well as privatization efforts. The company holds stakes in three enterprises addi-
tionally discussed in separate sections within this Thesis; namely 52.8% of the Austrian Post
Group, 31.5% of the OMV Group and 28.4% of the Telekom Austria Group. The Austrian Post
Group is among the leading logistics and mail delivery services in Austria and as such, responsible
for the universal supply of postal services to all Austrian citizens. It is analysed after the ÖIAG
section and depicted in more detail, amongst others, according to its historical roots and close
relationship to the government, political parties and external shareholders. Afterwards the 100%
public broadcasting company ORF, as the biggest media company in Austria, is examined accord-
ing to CIRIEC criteria. The political connections of the company are manifold and therefore in-
vestigated in a very detailed way. After this, the partly by ÖIAG managed oil and gas company
OMV Group as the biggest listed industrial corporation of its kind in Austria is analysed thor-
oughly. Subsequently the 100% state-owned limited liability company SCHIG mbH as consulting
and service provider in railway infrastructure is depicted methodically. The third separately ana-
lysed company which is partly managed by ÖIAG is the Telekom Austria Group which is exam-
ined according to relevant CIRIEC criteria thereafter. Finally, the electricity provider Verbund
AG, as one of the leading electricity companies in Europe, is investigated more clearly.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
24
6.2.1 ASFINAG
Already founded in 1982, the public company Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen Finanzierungs-
Aktiengesellschaft ASFINAG150 is responsible for the creation and maintenance of Austrian high-
ways and interstates as well as the imposition of tolls for their usage.151 These highways and inter-
states comprise of 2,178 kilometres and the company has to secure the smooth and safe proceed-
ings on these streets at all seasons and weather conditions.152
6.2.1.1 Legal base
The legal background of the company is the law ASFINAG-Gesetz, BGBl. Nr. 591/1982153 which
regulates the establishment of a public limited company responsible for the financing of Austrian
highways and interstates as well as the planning and establishment of streets and tunnels;154
thereby simultaneously changing the Bundesministeriengesetz 1973, BGBl. Nr. 389/1973155
which manifested the tasks of all Austrian federal ministries at that time.156 This law thus regulated
that the Austrian Ministry of Traffic, Innovation and Technology is in charge of the company and
its responsibilities.157 This spin-out was accomplished under the government of the Social Demo-
cratic Party and the Austrian’s People Party.158 The company’s headquarter is located in Vienna
and its initial share capital was seven million euros whereas all shares remained in the ownership
of the state.159
6.2.1.2 Main tasks
The overall tasks of the company comprise of the financing, planning, building and maintenance
of highways and interstates in Austria; thus mainly focusing on the appropriate infrastructure and
safety.160 The focal emphasis of the company thereby lies on traffic information, appropriate man-
agement, safety issues as well as technological innovations and availability.161 In order to achieve
150 There is no official translation 151 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 3; Homepage ASFINAG:
Unternehmen 152 Ibid. 153 There is no official translation 154 cf. BGBl. Nr. 591/1982 155 There is no official translation 156 cf. BGBl. Nr. 389/1973 157 cf. BGBl. Nr. 389/1973 Abschnitt L: Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innnovation und Technologie 158 cf. Homepage Börse Express: Asfinag-Schulden wuchsen 2009 auf 11.3 Mrd. Euro (10.05.2010) 159 cf. BGBl. Nr. 591/1982 § 1 160 cf. BGBl. Nr. 591/1982 § 2(1) 161 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 4
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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these goals, the company has to impose tolls for the usage of the supervised highways and inter-
states.162 In general, the company is not financed by the state budget but primarily by the income
from motorway toll stickers and tolls.163 However, in 2013 the company decided to finance itself
via two alternative ways as well; first, the emission of two bonds with seven and 20 years maturity
and second, a 390 million euros credit granted by the European Investment Bank.164
One of the major goals of ASFINAG is to increase the safety on Austrian highways and inter-
states.165 The company therefore builds on the creation of two-tubes-tunnels and innovations like
the thermo-scanner which inhibits the entering of overheated trucks and the system AKUT166
which automatically recognizes unusual noises in a tunnel and sets an alarm.167 In addition, the
organization focuses on the commitment and education of the public via information campaigns
such as “Drängeln tötet!”168 which appeal at the responsibility of each driver.169
One of the major principles that guides the organizational politics and actions internally as well as
externally is sustainability. The company underlines its intention to balance the economic, ecologic
and societal expectations in a responsible way; thereby contributing to the circumstance of Austria
being an attractive industrial location.170 In order to reach the goal of comprehensive sustainability,
the company fosters research and development and builds on technological innovations in the area
of tunnel building and recycling.171 An example is the fact that the company established 330 square
metres of photovoltaics area as well as six wind generators on the roof of the tunnel Plabutsch172
thus aiming at significant cost reductions in electricity.173 This pilot project will be expanded
throughout Austria within the upcoming years.174 Moreover, due to the fact that Austria is a coun-
try with high transit traffic, the company holds the strategy that those trucks with less emissions
pay less tolls while those with high emissions pay higher tolls.175
162 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 24; Homepage ASFINAG:
Unternehmen 163 Ibid. 164 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 27 165 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 19 166 There is no official translation 167 Ibid. 168 Official translation for the slogan „Drängeln tötet!“: “Tailgating kills!” 169 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 21 170 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 4; 24; 34; Homepage ASFINAG:
Kernbereiche; Unternehmen; Verantwortung 171 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 26f. 172 There is no official translation 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 25
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Another important principle is built upon the customer; i.e. the people using the chargeable high-
ways and interstates.176 These customers include private people as well as touristic companies
using busses and corporations using trucks to transport their goods.177
6.2.1.3 Organizational structure
The public limited company ASFINAG holds responsibility over six limited liability companies.
Each of these divisional companies has its own Management Board and either a Supervisory
Board, an Advisory Board or at least a controlling organ.178
A brief depiction on how these companies currently position themselves under the authority of
ASFINAG can be retrieved from the following figure 1.179
Figure 1: ASFINAG organizational structure
176 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 13ff.; Homepage ASFINAG:
Kernbereiche 177 cf. Homepage ASFINAG: Maut 178 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 38ff. 179 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 38
ASFINAG
Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft
ASFINAG
Bau
Management
GmbH
ASFINAG
Commercial
Services
GmbH
ASFINAG
Maut
Service
GmbH
ASFINAG
European
Toll Services
GmbH
ASFINAG
Alpenstraßen
GmbH
ASFINAG
Service
GmbH
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The overall responsibility within ASFINAG is regulated as follows. The Management Board con-
sists of two members, namely Alois Schedl and Klaus Schierhackl.180 Both are responsible for the
subordinated limited liability companies; however, they have separated their responsibilities, e.g.
Schedl is additionally in charge of the marketing and communication part whereas Schierhackl is
responsible for the overall strategy as well as internationalization efforts and innovations.181 The
Supervisory Board of ASFINAG consists of six members; four of them are elected at the General
Assembly and two of them are appointed by the staff association.182
The number of members at the Management Boards and Supervisory or Advisory Boards differs
among the limited liability companies; for example the company ASFINAG Bau Management
GmbH183 has two Management Board and nine Supervisory Board members184 while the corpora-
tion ASFINAG Commercial Services GmbH185 counts two Management Board and six Advisory
Board members.186 The amount depends on the legal background as well as individual structure
and management of the subsidiaries; however, it is not analysed in more detail within this Thesis.
6.2.1.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
The need for highways in Austria was already known in 1926 when the concept of the Italian
autostrade187 was discussed for the first time.188 In 1928 the association for Austrian highways
decided to investigate which streets represent the most frequently used ones and consequently
should be expanded.189 Concepts for expansions of those streets were designed mainly by individ-
ual planners and not by the responsible authorities.190 Thus, it was not until March 1938, and the
connection of Austria to Germany, that the project of expanding Austrian streets to highways was
discussed again due to war preparations.191 Six days after the entry of German troops in Austria,
the programme for building 1,100 kilometres of highways was announced and in April the con-
struction work began.192 The then employed general director of the construction company Strabag
in Munich appointed Rudolf Ganter-Ullmann as the main construction engineer; himself the
180 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 39; Homepage ASFINAG:
Vorstand 181 Ibid. 182 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 40 183 There is no official translation 184 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 41f. 185 There is no official translation 186 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 52f. 187 Italian word for Autobahn 188 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 11 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid.: 12 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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manager of the company Vianova Straßenbau AG Wien193 in which the Strabag held the majority
rights.194 The overall goal of the construction was not only to improve the internal Austrian street
connections but also to connect Austria to its surrounding countries and increase transportability
and flexibility.195 Additionally, one of the underlying principles of the construction work was to
integrate the nature into the route of the highways; thereby guaranteeing eccentric views over
mountains and lakes.196 This, indeed, implied that the highways were not constructed according to
principles of efficiency and synergies; i.e. the overall goal was not to get from one place to another
in the fastest but rather in the most spectacular way.197
The beginning of 1942 marked the cessation of the highway construction in Austria and the plan
of building over 1,000 kilometres was not accomplished.198 However, a lot of highways were
partly finished and so the period after World War II was marked by the continuing work on them
in Austria.199 The time after World War II was characterized by high unemployment rates, high
poverty and the lack of food supply.200 Furthermore the victorious powers held a conference in
Potsdam during that time and decided upon reparation payments and other claims and even though
Austria did not have to transfer any reparation payments, the designed agreements defined that the
occupying powers were allowed to claim all German Foreign Assets within their zone.201 As
already depicted earlier within this Thesis, only the fact that there was no official definition on
what contributed to German Foreign Assets and how they were characterized, prevented Austria
from losing a variety of them.202 While the victorious powers interpreted these assets individually,
and each of them differently, the politicians of the Austrian’s People Party and Social Democratic
Party decided to nationalize a majority of essential companies in an attempt to prevent them from
falling into Soviet ownership.203 The Nationalization Acts of 1946 and 1947 regulated these
nationalizations in the areas of coal, oil, electronics, steel and machinery, aluminium and ore and
the baking sector.204 The full implementation of these acts was not until 1955 when the State Treaty
was signed and the victorious allies agreed upon not claiming any assets from Austria.205 However,
Austria’s politicians were already concerned with the continuing of the construction of highways
193 There is no official translation 194 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 12 195 Ibid.: 13 196 Ibid.: 13ff. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid.: 15ff. 199 Ibid. 200 cf. Seidel (2005): 299 201 cf. Deutsch (1978): 23; Turnheim (2009): 30 202 cf. Deutsch (1978): 24; Turnheim (1009): 30 203 cf. Deutsch (1978): 25; Turnheim (1009): 31 204 cf. Turnheim (2009): 31ff. 205 cf. Langer (1966): 48f.; 82
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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in 1953 and did not only amend the law Bundesstraßengesetz 1948206 but also introduced the
establishment of the limited liability company Autobahn-Studiengesellschaft m.b.H.207 which was
subsequently responsible for the planning and preparation of highways.208 The political connec-
tions were already present within this company through the occupation of the Supervisory Board
which was headed by the State Secretary Fritz Bock and additionally constituted of the Vice-
Deputy Governors from Upper Austria and Lower Austria Felix Kern and August Kargl, as well
as the general director of the bank Creditanstalt209 Josef Joham and the representative of the
nationalized industry within the VOEST210 Walter Hitzinger.211 However, the company only lasted
for half a year.212 The still open question on German Foreign Assets and the difficult situation led
to the fact that the government decided to reincorporate the tasks of highway construction into the
responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Trade and Reconstruction and dissolve the company.213
Throughout the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s the ministry was able to build around
500 kilometres of highways by financing it via the federal budget which constituted, among others,
of income from petroleum taxes.214 However, in 1964 this income was not enough to cover the
increasing traffic on Austrian highways and hence the subsequent need for further construction.215
Therefore, the government decided to establish several companies with the sole purpose of plan-
ning, financing and implementing the construction of specific highways in certain areas.216 Exam-
ples include the Brenner Autobahn AG (BAG)217 which was founded in 1964 to finish the con-
struction of the Brenner highway; the Tauernautobahn AG (TAAG)218 which was founded in 1969
and responsible for the construction of the Tauern highway; the Phyrn Autobahn AG (PAG)219
established in 1971 and in charge of the Phyrn highway as well as the Arlberg Strassentunnel AG
(ASTAG)220 which was founded in 1973 and responsible for the construction of the Arlberg
tunnel.221 However, the 1970s were characterized by ecological movements, open resistance and
protests against further highway construction and consequently the decreasing of the motorization
206 There is no official translation 207 There is no official translation 208 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 18 209 There is no official translation 210 There is no official translation 211 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 18 212 Ibid.: 19 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid.: 129 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid. 217 There is no official translation 218 There is no official translation 219 There is no official translation 220 There is no official translation 221 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 130
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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wave.222 The construction of highways delayed and in the 1980s two new corporations were
established; namely the two public limited companies Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen AG
(ASAG)223 in 1981 and Wiener Bundesstraßen AG224 in 1985.225
In order to achieve cost savings and simplify structural components, ASFINAG was founded in
1982 and subsequently responsible for the financing of projects and distribution of money among
the corporations; thereby also including the later founded Wiener Bundesstraßen AG.226 The
financing was accomplished via outside funds; however, the state was responsible and fully liable
for the public limited corporation ASFINAG.227 During that time, the Management Board con-
sisted of two members; Gerhard Janschek as the head of the credit-section, i.e. the financing area
of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance and Karl Rainer from the Management Board of the
company ASTAG.228 Both were assigned by the Federal Minister of Finance to prepare everything
for the foundation of the company ASFINAG on a part-time basis besides their actual jobs.229 In
addition to the period 1982 to 1987, Janschek stayed in the Management Board on a part-time base
throughout the years 1987 to 1994; together with Karl Just.230 Due to Janschek’s position in the
Federal Ministry of Finance, ASFINAG was able to simplify its financing structure by coordinat-
ing all financial activities with the demands of the state.231
The first consolidation of the six companies happened in 1993 for the purpose of achieving syner-
gies and saving costs.232 The law BGBl. 826/1992233 manifested the legal background of the con-
solidation and subsequently the merger of the six corporations into two, namely the public limited
company Alpenstraßen AG (ASG)234 responsible for the highways in Western Austria and the
public limited company Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen AG (ÖSAG)235 respon-
sible for the rest of Austria.236 While the companies BAG and ASTAG merged into ASG, the
companies TAAG, PAG, ASAG and Wiener Bundesstraßen AG merged into ÖSAG.237 Until 1996
over 660 kilometres of highways were constructed by the corporations through outside financing
222 Ibid.: 23 223 There is no official translation 224 There is no official translation 225 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 131 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid.: 136 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid.: 137 232 Ibid. 233 There is no official translation 234 There is no official translation 235 There is no official translation 236 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 131f. 237 Ibid.: 132
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
31
methods.238 However, in 1997 the tasks of the company ASFINAG were redesigned with the law
ASFINAG Ermächtigungsgesetz239 which indicated a significant change from the corporation as
sole financing association to a company responsible for the planning, construction and mainte-
nance of highways in Austria.240 Moreover, it was regulated that all shares were solely held by the
state which, subsequently, installed usus fructus rights241 for several Austrian highways for
ASFINAG.242 As a countermove to the guarantee of these rights, ASFINAG took over state liabil-
ities in the area of highway construction of over 5.662 billion euros.243 In addition, the shares of
the companies ASG and ÖSAG were fully transferred into the ownership of ASFINAG.244 The
then responsible executives in the Management Board were Engelbert Schragl and Bernhard
Engleder; the first being a member of the People’s Party and the latter representing a member of
the Social Democratic Party.245 However, the political constellation of the People’s Party and the
Freedom Party within the government at the beginning of the millennium led to discrepancies in
the management of the construction company and the appointment of new managers.246 In 2001
Engelbert Schragl was replaced by Walter Hecke and Franz Lückler.247 While the first was con-
nected to the Freedom Party and was new in the company, the latter was already employed at
ASFINAG as CFO of ÖSAG since the year 2002 and maintained contact to the People’s Party due
to his former job as head of the transportation department at the provincial government Styria.248
Subsequently, in 2002, the Management Board was expanded from two to three persons and
Bernhard Engleder was replaced by Christian Trattner; known as having good connections to the
Social Democratic Party.249 Walter Hecke officially withdrew his job in 2005 due to strategic dis-
crepancies with the other members of the Management Board about the topic of partly privatizing
the company.250 However, the other two members stayed in their positions until 2007 and in 2006
the duo was supplemented by Mathias Reichhold. From 2002 to 2003 Reichhold held the position
of Austrian Federal Minister of Traffic, Innovation and Technology and after his work for Magna
238 Ibid. 239 There is no official translation 240 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 132 241 Official translation for Furchtgenussrecht 242 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 132 243 Ibid.: 133 244 Ibid. 245 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 137f.; Homepage Der Standard: Auf- und Abfahrt in der Asfinag
(22.08.2008) 246 Ibid. 247 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 137ff. 248 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2006): 11 249 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Der dritte Mann für die Asfinag (15.11.2001); Homepage Der Standard: Asfinag:
Christian Trattner neuer Finanzchef (22.01.2002); Homepage Der Standard: Auf- und Abfahrt in der Asfinag
(22.08.2008); cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 139 250 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Auf- und Abfahrt in der Asfinag (22.08.2008); cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG
(2012): 139
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
32
until 2006, his connections to the Freedom Party simplified the entry into the company
ASFINAG.251
The legal background of the company manifests that it is allowed to impose tolls on highway users
for the purpose of financing the maintenance of existing and planning of new highways.252 The
introduction of tolls for cars under 3.5 tons in the year 2000 and subsequent implementation of an
electronic toll imposing system for cars over 3.5 tons and trucks represented a new step for the
financing of the company.253 In 2005, the enterprise changed its role and transferred itself into a
holding corporation which outsourced its operative tasks, such as planning, maintenance and the
imposing of tolls, to subsidiaries.254 The initial structure of three different subsidiaries responsible
for the regions East, North and South, was consolidated into one subsidiary in 2008, namely the
limited liability company ASFINAG Service GmbH.255 In addition to this, the limited liability
company ASFINAG Telematik GmbH was dissolved and its tasks integrated into the corporation
ASFINAG Mautservice Gesellschaft.256 This step was implemented, amongst others, due to heavy
criticism of the Austrian Federal Court on the management tactics and financial situation of the
limited liability company ASFINAG Telematik GmbH.257 Since 2007, the Management Board
consists of only two members again; namely Alois Schedl and Klaus Schierhackl; both of them
re-appointed for another full management period in 2012.258 This also aligns with the political
constellation of the Social Democratic Party and People’s Party in the then predominant govern-
ment. While Alois Schedl, as former head of budget in the Federal Ministry of Construction and
Technique, is considered as having connections to the Social Democratic Party, Klaus Schierhackl
is known as being close to the People’s Party.259 Yet, both of them were already employed at the
company before they were appointed as managers. Schedl was in the Management Board of the
251 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Auf- und Abfahrt in der Asfinag (22.08.2008); ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht
(2006): 11; ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 139 252 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 132; ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem
Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 24; Homepage ASFINAG: Unternehmen 253 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 133 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 256 cf. ASFINAG: 30 Jahre ASFINAG (2012): 133; Rechnungshof: ASFINAG Verkehrstelematik Follow-up
Überprüfung (2012/6): 145ff.; Rechnungshof: Wirkungsbereich der Bundesministerien für Verkehr, Innovation und
Technologie Finanzen. Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft: Verkehrstelematik
(2009/9): 143f. 257 cf. Rechnungshof: ASFINAG Verkehrstelematik Follow-up Überprüfung (2012/6): 145ff.; Homepage Der
Standard: Rechnungshof zerreißt Asfinag-Telematikprogramm in der Luft (06.08.2009); Homepage Die Presse:
Telematik Heftige Rechnungshof-Kritik an der Asfinag (06.08.2009) 258 cf. Homepage ASFINAG: Vorstand 259 cf. Homepage ORF: Verkehr (25.10.2007); Homepage ASFINAG: Vorstand
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company Wiener Bundesstraßen AG260 until 1993 and subsequently led ÖSAG until his appoint-
ment as managing director.261 Schierhackl worked at ASFINAG since 1997 when he was first
appointed as head of the department for tolls and subsequently as manager of the limited liability
company ASFINAG Maut Service GmbH until 2007.262 Due to his close connections to the Euro-
pean association of operators of toll road infrastructure ASECAP263 he accomplished to hold the
position as its president from 2011 until 2013.264 In addition, he is a member of the Board of
Directors in the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association IBTTA.265
As can be retrieved from the previous depiction of the construction company, ASFINAG can be
traced back to long historical developments; indeed, all of them characterized by political power
and governmental interventions through the appointment of the Management Board. The ideolo-
gies within the company can be regarded as a mixture of the principles of the different political
parties; always depending on which parties currently constitute the Austrian government. Due to
the fact that the state is liable for the financial situation and actions of the company, even though
it is not responsible for the direct financing of it, the state is interested in coordinating and leading
the company in an appropriate way. However, the interpretation of this differs among the political
parties and their representatives within the company. While the previous sections dealt with the
analysis of the company’s historical developments, structure and political connections, the follow-
ing part examines in more detail the developments of the organization since the period of the Great
Recession and therefore after the crisis in 2008.
6.2.1.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
Due to the fact that the company is not financed by the state budget, even though it is publicly
owned, it is dependent on the income from motorway toll stickers and tolls and subsequently the
economic situation in Austria and its surrounding countries. In 2009 the recession following the
economic crisis in Europe hit the company especially in the area of these incomes; indeed, because
the bad economic situation led to less transportation of goods and therefore less traffic in
Austria.266 While the income from car motorway toll stickers stayed the same, the income from
truck tolls decreased by around 13% in 2009 which indicates not only that private car users were
not able to compensate the decline in truck traffic but also a decline of 129 million euros in tolls.267
260 There is no official translation 261 cf. Homepage ASFINAG: Vorstand 262 cf. Homepage ASFINAG: Vorstand 263 ASECAP stands for Europäische Vereinigung mautfinanzierter Autobahnen, Brücken und Tunnels 264 cf. Homepage ASFINAG: Vorstand 265 Ibid. 266 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2009): 53 267 Ibid.: 52
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Moreover, the EBIT decreased significantly from 442.2 million euros in 2008 to 384.7 million
euros in 2009 which led to an annual result of 290.2 million euros in 2009; a decline of 39.8 million
euros in comparison to 2008.268 The fact that ASFINAG already decided on investments of around
550 million euros in the maintenance and creation of new highways and interstates in 2009 conse-
quently led to an increase in debts for the company due to declining incomes.269 The company
reacted by increasing the prices for car motorway toll stickers by the end of 2009.270
In 2010, ASFINAG started to reorganize the tasks among its subsidiaries and formulated a new
strategy based on the SMART-formula271 thus creating 17 main goals divided into 34 sub-goals
and 130 individual measures.272 In addition, the usage of synergy effects was one of the main
priorities and therefore the company decided to create the limited liability corporation ASFINAG
Service GmbH as result of a merger between the service centres East, North and South.273 The
organization furthermore started to increasingly focus on the core areas of safety, sustainability
and the growing attention towards the customer.274 An example for the safety aspect of business
was the established traffic safety programme 2020 which, amongst others, introduced the
emergency lane in case of traffic jam as mandatory future aspect of traffic in Austria.275 In addition
to this, the company installed emission-dependent regulations for tolls and subsequently tolled
those trucks with higher emissions higher than those with less and, even though the traffic amount
increased only slightly by 6.6%, this change in tolls did not only bring a sustainable aspect but
also more income for the company in 2010.276 The modification augmented the income from tolls
by around 11.0%, which equals an increase of 130 million euros, and consequently also enhanced
the EBIT from 385 million euros in 2009 to 450 million euros in 2010.277 The annual result in
2010 improved to 339 million euros.278 However, it has to be considered that, due to ongoing
projects in the creation of highways and interstates, the company’s balance sheet showed a signifi-
cant augmentation in its expenditures; from 941 million euros in 2009 to 1,318 million euros in
2010; an increase of 941 million euros.279 Moreover, ASFINAG reported a negative free cash flow
268 Ibid. 269 cf. Homepage Börse Express: Asfinag-Schulden wuchsen 2009 auf 11.3 Mrd. Euro (10.05.2010) 270 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Asfinag spürt Krise: Vignette wird teurer (21.05.2009) 271 SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound and aims at specifying the
strategies within a company according to these criteria. 272 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2010): 9 273 Ibid.: 10 274 Ibid. 275 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2010): 22f. 276 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2010): 26f.; 108 277 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht (2010): 107 278 Ibid. 279 Ibid.: 109
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of three million euros.280 However, the company managed to increase its employees by 43 people
from 2009 to 2010 which, amongst others, justifies the increase in personnel expenditures from
151 million euros in 2009 to 160 million euros in 2010.281
In 2011 the company fully integrated its sustainability efforts by, in addition to its annual report,
publishing a sustainability report including all relevant criteria.282 The attention of the company
started to focus on its Corporate Governance Codex, the recycling of construction material at site
and the fostering of its toll system for the further decline of emissions caused by transit traffic.283
Moreover, ASFINAG started several collaborations on a national and European level with traffic
agencies, federal authorities and agricultural industries.284 The intention thereby centred on the
conservation of biological diversity among the roads as well as the usage of synergies, overlapping
knowledge and networks.285 In addition to this, the organization increased its safety efforts through
the medial introduction of the emergency line in case of traffic jams as well as the decision to
legally manifest the emergency line in the law by the beginning of 2012.286 When it comes to the
financial situation by the end of 2011, the company handled to improve its results in a variety of
key performance indicators. The income of tolls increased again by 3.0%, i.e. additional 50 million
euros, due to an increase in truck traffic of 3.7%.287 This also manifested in an upsurge of EBIT
from 450 million euros in 2010 to 584 million euros in 2011.288 The annual result shows an aug-
mentation of 101 million euros from 339 million euros in 2010 to 440 million euros in 2011.289
Simultaneously the company managed to decrease its expenditures by 118 million euros in com-
parison to the previous year and the free cash flow improved to a positive number of 106 million
euros. 290
The beginning of 2012 marked the legally regulated duty of building an emergency line in case of
traffic jam in order to secure the drive-through for rescue teams.291 In addition to safety aspects,
the company heavily built on innovations and new technologies for the improvement of infor-
mation services and help at site.292 A major aspect in 2012 was the establishment of the European
Electronic Toll Service (EETS) which aimed at the simplification of tolls and traffic on a European
280 Ibid.: 110 281 Ibid.: 109 282 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2011) 283 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2011): 55; 71 284 Ibid.: 64 285 Ibid.: 54ff. 286 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2011): 33 287 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2011): 122 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid.: 122; 126 291 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2012): 16f. 292 Ibid.: 10ff.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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level.293 ASFINAG therefore intensified its cooperation with international partners and introduced
joint projects.294 These projects were expanded in 2013; an example being the EasyGo+ project
which includes only one on-board-unit for trucks driving through Austria, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden.295 By the end of 2012 the financial result of ASFINAG showed the following picture.
The income from truck tolls increased from 2011 to 2012 by 3.8% and due to the fact that the car
traffic also increased, the company’s income showed an additional 20 million euros solely from
motorway toll stickers.296 The total upsurge in income from tolls and motorway toll stickers of
60 million euros consequently increased the EBIT from 584 million euros in 2011 to 627 million
euros in 2012.297 The annual result enhanced slightly from 440 million euros in 2011 to 471 million
euros in 2012.298 However, the expenditures of the company amplified again from 548 million
euros to 669 million euros; mainly justified by new construction work within a PPP-project299 and
its subsequent opening in 2012.300 Furthermore, the free cash flow increased slightly to 167 million
euros.301
In 2013, the EBIT decreased a little to 626 million euros while the annual result enhanced a bit to
472 million euros.302 The liquidity of the company slightly improved as the free cash flow in-
creased to 188 million euros in 2013.303 Overall, 2013 marks a year of positive and steady, but
rather minor improvements in the financial data of the company.
The previous depiction of the 100% state-owned ASFINAG shows that, despite the attempts of
cost savings and the achievement of synergies, there is no tendency towards private related man-
agement tactics, policies or trends. Moreover, the discussion about a part-privatization of the com-
pany did not arise again since the leadership of Walter Hecke in 2005. Furthermore, the company’s
overall goal of planning, establishing and maintaining a comprehensive and nationwide highway
system can be regarded as having a national tenet subsequently contributing to the overall living
standards.
The following section deals with the analysis of the public Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft BIG304
a company responsible for the real estates of the Austrian state.
293 Ibid.: 21 294 Ibid. 295 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 13 296 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2012): 49 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid. 299 PPP-project refers to a Public-Private-Partnership project the ASFINAG started in 2009 to build a highway. 300 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2012): 51 301 Ibid.: 52 302 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 62; 69 303 Ibid.: 74 304 There is no official translation
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.2 Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft
The limited liability company BIG is 100% public and responsible for the administration of real
estates owned by the state.305 It manages around nine billion euros of fixed assets which currently
manifests in the administration of around 2,800 buildings.306 The main tenants for these buildings
are schools, universities and others such as juridical companies or churches.307
6.2.2.1 Legal base
The actual legal background of the company is the law Bundesgesetz zur Errichtung einer Bun-
desimmobiliengesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung und Verfügung über bundeseigene
Liegenschaften einschließlich Mietwohngebäude (BIG-Gesetz) BGBl. Nr. 419/1992308 which ba-
sically regulated the establishment of an administrative body responsible for the real estates of the
state as well as the management of the assets connected to them.309
However, in the year 2000 this law was modified and a new one came into force namely the law
Bundesimmobiliengesetz BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000310 which regulates the new organization of BIG.311
According to this law, the company is subsequently responsible for all buildings listed in Appendix
A and A.1 within the law and beforehand in the ownership of the Federal Ministry of Economy
and Labour.312 All buildings listed in the Appendices were transferred in four tranches throughout
the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.313 For this transaction, the law designated a payment of
33 billion Schilling, i.e. exactly 2,398,203,527.54 euros, from BIG to the Federal Ministry of
Finance.314 This was financed through the emission of international bonds.315 Historical buildings,
like museums, are not transferred into the responsibility of BIG due to their cultural heritage and
significance.316
The law was already amended in 2000 and changed several times throughout 2003, 2004 and 2005
and most recently in 2012.317 It states that the public real estates and assets have to be managed in
305 cf. Homepage BIG: Über uns 306 Ibid. 307 Ibid. 308 There is no official translation 309 cf. BGBl. Nr. 419/1992 310 There is no official translation 311 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 312 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 1(2) 313 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 13(1) 314 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 14 315 cf. Homepage BIG: Geschichte 316 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 1(2) 317 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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an economic and market-oriented way; thereby considering possible synergy effects and the sus-
tainable use of resources.318 Moreover, the limited liability company is allowed to establish sub-
sidiaries responsible for the administration of certain buildings and their assets; however, specifi-
cally excluded from this permission are buildings used for education, i.e. schools or universities
as well as correctional facilities.319
6.2.2.2 Main tasks
The company can be considered as the biggest service provider in the segment of real estates and
as such, the tasks of BIG manifest as follows.320 First of all, the enterprise offers the task of man-
aging the real estates; i.e. property management and maintenance which count as the core business
of BIG.321 This includes tasks such as the calculation and collection of rents, the management of
dunning processes, the inspection of buildings, the management of insurances, the commissioning
of external service providers for the fire protection and winter road maintenance as well as the task
of consulting in the areas of energy contracting.322 The latter refers to the possibility of optimizing
buildings with only little energy effort; a task which BIG fulfils by acting as an intermediate
between the user of the real estate and the company that optimizes the energy household within
the building.323 The advisory role of BIG in this case refers to the tasks of selecting proper objects
and designing necessary conditions as well as tendering the object and confirming the contract to
the best bidder.324 Additionally, BIG helps in the contract negotiations with the best bidder there-
after and accompanies the contract to maturity.325 Within the service of managing the real estates,
BIG employs 16 management teams throughout Austria; each of them being responsible for the
sustainable and also value enhancing support of the objects.326 There is one team each in Tyrol,
Vorarlberg, Salzburg and Carinthia, two teams each in Styria, Upper Austria and Lower Austria
and six teams in Vienna.327 All of them act upon the law Mietrechtsgesetz (MRG), BGBl.
Nr. 520/1981328 which regulates not only all areas connected to rents and buildings but also the
relation between lessor and lessee.329
318 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 1(1) 319 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 2(1); (2); (3) 320 cf Homepage BIG: Dienstleistungen 321 cf. Homepage BIG: Objektmanagement 322 Ibid. 323 cf. Homepage BIG: Energieeffizienz & Umweltschutz, Erfolgsmodell Bundes-Contracting 324 Ibid. 325 Ibid. 326 cf. Homepage BIG: Objektmanagement 327 cf. Homepage BIG: Objektmanagement, Standorte und Teams 328 There is no official translation 329 cf. BGBl. Nr. 520/1981
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The second major task of the service provider regards facility services; an area which is concerned
with the sustainable and holistic support of the real estates.330 This refers to the supervision and
maintenance of the objects throughout their whole life-cycle and within all diverse and relevant
areas such as technical assistance as well as the cultivation of green areas.331 Moreover facility
services include twenty-four-seven on-call service, inspection of objects and maintenance work,
minor repairs and consultancy work for safety, energy optimization and object management.332
The third task of BIG applies to data management and computer-aided-design which basically
refers to the systematic acquisition of data for the purpose of designing ideal space management.333
This also includes the measurement of buildings and external areas, their data absorption into the
system and subsequent data collection which can be used for CAD plans and designs.334
Overall, the public entity is not only acting as external service provider but also holds internal
responsibilities which are discussed within the following section of organizational structure.
6.2.2.3 Organizational structure
Primarily BIG is responsible for the support of its tenants; a task which the company fulfils within
the scope of three major divisions, namely universities, schools and special real estates.335 Experts
at BIG are responsible for the whole life-cycle of buildings within these divisions; i.e. the advisory
over topics such as the design and choice of site, the construction management, detailed planning
and the commercial and technical maintenance thereafter.336 The division schools constitutes
around 40% of the portfolio which manifests in 2.8 million square metres of area at around
320 locations.337 The division universities is concerned with the sustainable and efficient manage-
ment of the university buildings which count around 400 locations and an area of 1.6 million square
metres.338 The division special real estates is concerned with buildings of the Federal Ministry of
the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of Justice; all of them re-
quiring special safety aspects.339 Moreover, this division also includes specialized properties such
as churches, customs houses, cemeteries or embassies in foreign countries.340
330 cf. Homepage BIG: Facility Services, Rundumbetreuung für Gebäude 331 Ibid. 332 cf. Homepage BIG: Facility Services, Angebotene Dienstleistungen 333 cf. Homepage BIG: Datenmanagement & CAD 334 Ibid. 335 cf. Homepage BIG: Unternehmensbereiche 336 Ibid. 337 cf. Homepage BIG: Unternehmensbereich Schulen 338 cf. Homepage BIG: Unternehmensbereich Universitäten 339 cf. Homepage BIG: Unternehmensbereich Spezialimmobilien 340 Ibid.
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Structurally, the limited liability company has two major subsidiaries; the limited liability com-
pany ARE Austrian Real Estate GmbH341 and the limited liability company BIG Beteiligungs
GmbH;342 both of them directly subordinated to BIG.343 The first additionally holds 100% of two
other companies, namely the limited liability company ARE Austrian Real Estate Development
GmbH344 and the limited liability company ARE Holding GmbH345 which are responsible for other
participations of BIG.346
The company ARE was founded in the course of a restructuration of BIG in 2012 in which the
office properties demerged and transferred from the ownership of BIG into the ownership of
ARE.347 This spin-out and simultaneous establishment of a new company was implemented retro-
actively for the year 2012 so that by January 2013, the company ARE could start its operative
tasks.348 Since then it can be considered as Austria’s biggest owner of real estates; thereby mainly
referring to over 1.8 million square metres of space which equals over 600 objects.349 The total
operative revenues in 2013 contain revenues from facility services, sales, lessee investments, rental
revenues and others and sum up to almost 218 million euros; the biggest portion of it being the
rental revenues of over 150 million euros.350 Also in 2013, the subsidiary ARE Development
GmbH351 was founded with the purpose of focusing on the sophisticated area of owner apart-
ments.352 The restructuring of BIG and subsequent establishment of ARE and its subsidiaries roots
in the increasing importance of non-public customers; e.g. private tenants and the need for re-
focusing due to the crisis in 2008; something discussed in more detail later within this Thesis.353
6.2.2.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
Due to the fact that the company is 100% public, it is basically in the ownership of the Republic
Austria and represented by the Federal Minister of Science, Research and Economics; currently
Reinhold Mitterlehner.354 Mitterlehner, who holds the position as Federal Minister of Economics
since 2013, was appointed as party chairman of the People’s Party after the former chairman and
341 There is no official translation 342 There is no official translation 343 cf. Homepage BIG: Konzernstruktur 344 There is no official translation 345 There is no official translation 346 cf. Homepage BIG: Konzernstruktur 347 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 5 348 Ibid. 349 cf. Homepage ARE: Unternehmen 350 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 62 351 There is no official translation 352 Ibid.: 5 353 Ibid. 354 cf. Homepage BIG: Eigentümer Republik Österreich
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Minister of Finance Michael Spindelegger resigned due to discrepancies with the Social Demo-
cratic Party over a planned tax reform.355 Mitterlehner subsequently also took responsibility over
the position as Federal Minister of Science, Research and Economics in addition to his already
held positions356 thereby subsequently acquiring power within BIG.
The Management Board of BIG consists of two people; Wolfgang Gleissner and Hans-Peter
Weiss; both of them having connections to the People’s Party.357 Gleissner started his career during
the 1990s in the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and after several years within the
ministry, he changed to the BIG subsidiary Immobilienmanagementgesellschaft des Bundes
mbH358 where he was appointed as managing director subsequently.359 After the merger of IMB
and BIG, i.e. the dissolution of IMB, Gleissner was appointed as managing director of BIG in
2006.360 Weiss was employed at the Austrian Federal Forestry Group ÖBf AG after his studies
and subsequently held managing positions in Esterhazy companies before he was appointed as
managing director at BIG by the Federal Minister of Economics Mitterlehner in 2011.361 Both of
them additionally hold positions as managing directors at ARE since its establishment in 2012.362
The Supervisory Board of BIG consists of three publicly and two works council appointed mem-
bers and due to the fact that the company ARE is not obliged to establish its own Supervisory
Board, the one of BIG comes into force in case of need.363 The three publicly appointed members
consist of three people connected to the People’s Party. The chairwoman of the Supervisory Board
Christine Marek was a member of the Austrian National Assembly three times; the latest period
being from 2011 until 2013.364 Her career is characterized by a variety of political positions; from
the chairwoman of the People’s Party Vienna to positions in federal ministries and the employment
as Parliamentary State Secretary.365 Cordula Frieser was a member of the Austrian National
Assembly twice and subsequently employed in several Austrian committees.366 Wolfgang
Polzhuber is considered as part of the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economics.367
Thomas Rasch, who was appointed by the works council, is managing director at the Chamber of
Labour Vienna and not only in the Supervisory Board of BIG but also employed at the Federal
355 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Der Rücktritt von Michael Spindelegger (26.08.2014) 356 Ibid. 357 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 4 358 There is no official translation 359 cf. Homepage TU Wien: Lebenslauf Wolfgang Gleissner 360 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 4 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 4; Homepage BIG: Aufsichtsrat 364 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Christine Marek 365 Ibid. 366 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Mag. Cordula Frieser 367 cf. BIG Konzernbericht (2013): 42
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Ministry of Economics, Family and Youth.368 Manfred Fausik, also appointed by the works
council, is a member of the Social Democratic Party since 1980 and also employed at the Federal
Ministry of Economics, Family and Youth as a member of both the central and technical
committee.369
Compared to other public companies, BIG looks back at a relatively short history of 22 years. The
milestones of its foundation in 1992 and the law amendment in 2000 mark the development of
tasks and duties.370 As can be retrieved from the depiction of positions within BIG above, the
company is currently dominated by representatives of the People’s Party; a circumstance also con-
nected to the current political situation and constitution of external public positions relevant for
BIG such as the position of Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economics. The political
constellations also played an essential role during the Great Recession and subsequently; a fact
which is discussed in more detail within the following section.
6.2.2.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
Despite the fact that the global financial crisis and the subsequent phase of recession also hit the
company BIG, it has to be noted that the circumstances differ from other public companies. The
Credit Analysis of Moody’s International Public Finance in 2009 declared a stable outlook for the
company and the continuing of its AAA rating.371 Moreover, the report announced a balance of
the tasks and obligations with financial stability and therefore a better outlook than for other com-
panies.372 The report summarizes that the stable outlook roots in the strong link to the Austrian
government on the one hand, and subsequently high probability of the Republic to intervene in
troublesome situations on the other hand.373
However, the annual report of BIG in 2010 shows negative rental revenues of its major tenants
schools and universities was well as other public tenants in 2009 and 2010.374 This can be traced
back to the emergency measures established by the state after the crisis. The government decided
upon a deferment of rents for schools by simultaneously implementing the Economic Recovery
Programme II with the goal of fostering construction and maintenance.375 Consequently BIG lost
the rents of schools in 2009 and 2010; which make up 40% of its portfolio and over 240 million
368 cf. Homepage Arbeiterkammer: Thomas Rasch 369 cf. Homepage SPÖ Biedermannsdorf: Manfred Fausik 370 cf. Homepage BIG: Geschichte 371 cf. Moody’s International Public Finance: Credit Analysis Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft m.b.H. Vienna, Austria
(2009): 1 372 Ibid. 373 Ibid. 374 cf. BIG Konzernbericht (2010): 4 375 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Bundesimmobilien-Gesellschaft braucht eine Milliarde Euro (06.07.2009)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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euros in numbers.376 The governmental attempt to recover the construction industry and economy
in Austria led to planned investments of around 875 million euros; amongst others in projects such
as the continuing of the new building of the Institute of Technical Chemistry at the Technical
University in Vienna from 2007 until 2010.377 This amount constituted of 495 million euros for
new buildings and renovations, 300 million euros for thermic restoration and 80 million euros for
maintenance.378 However, the Economic Recovery Programme II only covered 340 million euros
of investments which led to a difficult financial situation for BIG and the subsequent need for
around one billion euros.379 Despite the borrowing of 200 million euros from the European Invest-
ment Bank in 2009,380 the cash flow from investment activity showed a negative number of over
345 million euros in 2009 and over 414 million euros in 2010.381 Thus, the total cash flow could
be recovered from negative 19 million euros in 2009 to positive 6 million euros in 2010.382
The subsequent years of 2011 and 2012 were characterized by a major improvement of the com-
pany’s financial situation. One reason roots in the fact that the rents for schools were reinstated
which led to an income from rents from schools, universities and other public tenants of 679 mil-
lion euros in 2011 and 730 million euros in 2012.383 Another reason stems from the demerger of
both assets and liabilities to the new established limited liability company ARE.384 The restructu-
ration of BIG during 2011 and 2012 aimed at additional cost savings and the use of synergies.385
Moreover, the attempts to sell a variety of objects in 2011 ultimately also intended to re-focus on
its core business which is the management of schools, universities and special public real estates.386
However, these sales and the attempts to sell a variety of areas, amongst others two mountains, led
to displeasure among the Austrian citizens and image troubles for the company.387 Nevertheless,
the company managed to further improve its financial situation and increase its income from rents
by 3.4% from 730.6 million euros in 2012 to 755.2 million euros in 2013 as well as its operative
revenues by 8.5% from 872.4 million euros in 2012 to 946.3 million euros in 2013.388
376 Ibid. 377 cf. Rechnungshof: Bericht Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft m.b.H.: Konjunkturbelebungspaket II (2008) und
ressort-spezifische Bauprogramme; Neubau des Institutsgebäudes für Technische Chemie der TU Wien
(2013): 109f. 378 Ibid.: 129 379 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Bundesimmobilien-Gesellschaft braucht eine Milliarde Euro (06.07.2009) 380 cf. APA OTS: Keine Finanzierungsnot bei Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft (06.07.2009) 381 cf. BIG Konzernbericht (2010): 22 382 Ibid. 383 cf. BIG Konzernbericht (2012): 8 384 Ibid. 385 cf. ARE Geschäftsbericht (2013): 5 386 cf. ORF: BIG-Abverkauf – Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft Österreich, ORF-Report (23.06.2011) 387 Ibid. 388 cf. BIG Konzernbericht (2013): 8
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Overall, the previous depiction of the time after the Great Recession shows that the public enter-
prise managed the continuing construction and maintenance of public buildings despite the lack of
public capital throughout the years. This was mainly achieved by the re-structuration concepts
which include the sale of unused properties and objects as well as the demerger of certain assets
and debt into the subsidiary ARE.
The following part deals with the state-owned railway company ÖBB Holding Group.
6.2.3 Österreichische Bundesbahnen Holding AG
Founded in April 2004, the ÖBB Holding Group389 is the strategic holding company of a variety
of ÖBB businesses and subsidiaries, amongst others, related to the Austrian railway system and
consequently transportation of goods and people.390
6.2.3.1 Legal base
The legal background of the enterprise ÖBB is represented by the law Bundesbahngesetz, BGBl.
Nr. 825/1992391 which regulates that the autonomous economic corporation “Österreichische Bun-
desbahnen” is turned into a company with legal personality; however, still represented by the
Federal Minister of Economy and Traffic.392 The law was amended several times throughout the
years and in 2003, the law Bundesbahnstrukturgesetz, BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003393 constituted the
establishment of the ÖBB Holding Group as responsible public limited corporation for all ÖBB
businesses and subsidiaries; i.e. the whole ÖBB group.394 The legal representative of the ÖBB
Holding Group is the Federal Minister of Traffic, Innovation and Technology and its headquarter
is located in Vienna.395
Further laws that apply to the ÖBB Holding Group are the law Eisenbahngesetz, BGBl.
Nr. 60/1957396, the law Schieneninfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesetz, BGBl. Nr. 201/1996397 which
also applies to the company SCHIG mbH analysed later within this Thesis, and the law Eisenbahn-
Hochleistungsstreckengesetz, BGBl. Nr. 135/1989398.399
389 Official translation for Österreichische Bundesbahnen Holding AG 390 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Unternehmen 391 There is no official translation 392 cf. BGBl. Nr. 825/1992 § 1 (1) 393 There is no official translation 394 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003 § 2 (1); Homepage ÖBB Holding: ÖBB Konzern 395 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003 § 2 (1) 396 There is no official translation 397 There is no official translation 398 There is no official translation 399 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Gesetzliche Grundlagen
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.3.2 Main tasks
The overall task of the ÖBB Holding Group is to secure the strategic direction of all companies
within the ÖBB group.400 Newly founded limited liability companies or public limited companies
within the corporation are managed by the ÖBB Holding Group which is additionally responsible
for the coordination of overlapping topics.401
Founded in 2004, the ÖBB Holding Group is, since then, in charge of the consistent strategic re-
focusing of all companies within the ÖBB group; thereby especially focusing on the achievement
of synergies among them and consequently the use of overlapping advantages.402 The newly
founded companies since then are market- as well as task-oriented and guided by the ÖBB Holding
Group.403 Moreover, in order to achieve consistency among all companies, at least half of the
capital representatives of the Supervisory Boards at each corporation consist of members of either
the Management or Supervisory Board of the overall ÖBB Holding Group.404
Furthermore, the entity is in charge of coordinating the research and development activities within
each company of the group.405 The focus thereby lies on the increasing liberalization tendencies
in Europe and how to react accordingly in order to secure the successful positioning within the
near future.406 The aim is to focus the core of research activities on technical, customer-oriented
and logistics innovations, like for instance new telematics-projects, the use of new materials in
infrastructure or special online customer information systems.407
An additional important task of the enterprise is to secure the group-wide communication and
marketing activities by fostering a transparent dialog internally as well as externally.408 According
to the ÖBB Holding Group, communication plays an essential role when it comes to the reputation
and image of the company, its brand and services.409 Communication thereby refers to informing
not only employees and other managers, but also customers, politicians, journalists, suppliers and
other stakeholders in direct contact with the company.410
400 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Aufgaben 401 Ibid. 402 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Strategische Leitgesellschaft 403 Ibid. 404 Ibid. 405 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Forschung & Entwicklung 406 Ibid. 407 Ibid. 408 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Konzernkommunikation und -marketing 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Indeed, Corporate Social Responsibility and sustainability play an essential role for the company
as well.411 Similar to other public companies, the ÖBB Holding Group focuses on economic,
ecological and social aspects within its corporate culture.412
6.2.3.3 Organizational structure
The law BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003 includes, in addition to the establishment of the ÖBB Holding
Group as overall strategic unit, the duty of this holding to create supplementary companies as part
of further restructuring efforts within ÖBB.413 Consequently, the law manifests the establishment
of the companies ÖBB-Personenverkehr AG414, Rail Cargo Austria AG415, ÖBB-Traktion
GmbH416, ÖBB-Technische Services GmbH417, ÖBB-Dienstleistungs-GmbH418, ÖBB-Immo-
bilienmanagement GmbH419, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG420 and ÖBB-Infrastruktur Bau
AG421.422 However, since 2004 some additional internal restructuration efforts took place and
therefore the current organizational structure deviates from the original attempt.
For the purpose of topicality, the following figure 2 contains a depiction of the current
organizational structure; however, thereby only including the prevalently most relevant companies
indicated within the law above. 423
411 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Nachhaltige ÖBB 412 Ibid. 413 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003 414 There is no official translation 415 There is no official translation 416 There is no official translation 417 There is no official translation 418 There is no official translation 419 There is no official translation 420 There is no official translation 421 There is no official translation 422 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 138/2003 1. Hauptstück, 2. Hauptstück, 3. Hauptstück, 4. Hauptstück, 5. Hauptstück,
6. Hauptstück, 7. Hauptstück, 8. Hauptstück 423 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: ÖBB Konzern. Organisation
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Figure 2: ÖBB Holding Group organizational structure
The Management Board of the ÖBB Holding Group consists of Christian Kern as CEO and Josef
Halbmayr as CFO;424 the former appointed in 2010 and the latter in 2008.425 Before his position
as CEO, Kern held Management Board positions in the Austrian Verbund AG and companies
related to it.426 CFO Halbmayr held positions in the former Post und Telekom Austria AG427 as
well as the further demerged Austrian Post Group and used to work in private banks as well as
controlling positions.428 The Supervisory Board consists of seven members appointed by the
capital representatives and four members appointed by the works council.429 The chairwoman of
the Supervisory Board is Brigitte Ederer; first vice-chairman is Ludwig Scharinger and second
vice-chairman is Herbert Kasser.430 The political connections of the Supervisory Board members
are discussed separately within the following section.
424 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organisation 425 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Management 426 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Mag. Christian Kern 427 There is no official translation 428 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Mag. Josef Halbmayr MBA 429 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organe der ÖBB Holding AG 430 Ibid.
ÖBB Holding Group
CEO: Christian Kern CFO: Josef Halbmayr
ÖBB
Personenverkehr
AG
Rail Cargo
Austria AG
ÖBB
Infrastruktur AG European Contract
Log. Austria GmbH
ÖBB Business
Competence Center GmbH
ÖBB
Werbung GmbH
50%
ÖBB Produktion
GmbH
50%
ÖBB Produktion
GmbH
49%
ÖBB Technische
Services GmbH
51%
ÖBB Technische
Services GmbH
ÖBB
Immobilien-
management GmbH
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.3.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
CEO Kern is known for his good performance within a public company that is mainly character-
ized by political power plays, high media attention and thousands of permanent employees who
cannot be dismissed.431 Several of his predecessors have failed due to these reasons; however,
Kern managed to increase customers, operative revenues and steer the media attention properly by
charming public appearances and connections to those politicians tied to the ÖBB Holding
Group.432 Initial connections to Austrian politicians have been tied by Kern already in 1991 when
he held the position as assistant of the State Secretary Peter Kostelka in the Federal Chancellery.433
His relation to the Social Democratic Party seems to be tight but nonetheless he is not an official
member of the party. Recently his contract has been expanded prematurely for another five
years.434 Since 2011 there are additionally discussions and speculations about his connections to
Werner Faymann and a possible candidature as his successor in the position as Federal
Chancellor.435
Josef Halbmayr as CFO is contrarily characterized as being close to the People’s Party; however,
not an official member either.436 Opposing to the CEO, his media attention is not as big and con-
sequently there are not as many speculations about his tactics, political connections and possible
future political positions.
Chairwoman of the Supervisory Board Brigitte Ederer is a member of the Social Democratic Party
and, in addition to this position, she also holds the position as member of the Supervisory Board
of ÖIAG.437 Her political commitment started as State Secretary at the Federal Chancellery from
1992 to 1995.438 Thereafter, she was a member of the National Council three times throughout the
1990s and subsequently held positions as head of the Social Democratic Party and general director
at the Austrian Siemens Group.439
431 cf. Homepage Profil: ÖBB-Chef Christian Kern hat Chancen, Nachfolger von Kanzler Faymann zu werden
(02.08.2014) 432 Ibid. 433 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Mag. Christian Kern; Homepage Format: Die Hochburgen des Proporzes
(11.06.2012) 434 cf. Homepage Profil: ÖBB-Chef Christian Kern hat Chancen, Nachfolger von Kanzler Faymann zu werden
(02.08.2014) 435 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Kann Kern Kanzler? Ein sozialdemokratisches Gerücht (08.05.2011); Homepage
Profil: ÖBB-Chef Christian Kern hat Chancen, Nachfolger von Kanzler Faymann zu werden (02.08.2014);
Homepage Kurier: „Den kann ich mir als Bundeskanzler vorstellen“ (27.09.2014); Homepage Kurier: So angezählt
ist Werner Faymann (29.11.2014) 436 cf. Homepage Format: Die Hochburgen des Proporzes (11.06.2012); Homepage Die Presse: Wie sich SPÖ und
ÖVP das Land teilen (24.07.2013) 437 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Mag. Brigitte Ederer 438 Ibid. 439 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Mag. Brigitte Ederer; Homepage Der Standard: Brigitte Ederer
wird ÖBB-Aufsichtsratschefin (10.09.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The already retired former director of the Upper Austrian Raiffeisen Landesbank440 Ludwig
Scharinger holds the position as vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board since 2012 and is known
for being close to Ederer’s predecessor Horst Pöchhacker.441 Despite the circumstance that he has
resigned from his positions in the Upper Austrian Raiffeisen Landesbank and Hypo Alpe Adria
Bank, he kept the position within the ÖBB Holding Group Supervisory Board.442 His career has
caught a lot of media attention; most recently again due to reviving investigations on bribery in
case of the building of the Terminal Tower in Linz in 2008 and subsequent distributions of
rentals.443 He is one of 28 accused people, amongst them also the former Minister of Finance Karl-
Heinz Grasser and Horst Pöchhacker with whom Scharinger is accused to have made deals on
those companies renting offices within the Terminal Tower.444 Thus, since November 2014 it
seems that the whole investigations have to be re-started due to breakdowns within the Civil
Court.445
The second vice-chairman Herbert Kasser simultaneously holds the position as general secretary
at the Federal Ministry of Traffic, Innovation and Technology since 2007446 and furthermore, is
the responsible manager of the department for infrastructural planning and financing.447 He is
known for being close to Werner Faymann and therefore the Social Democratic Party.448 In addi-
tion to his position as second vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board at the ÖBB Holding Group,
he is vice-chairman at the Austrian ASFINAG449 which is discussed in more detail earlier within
this Thesis.
Additional members of the Supervisory Board, and appointed by capital representatives, are Kurt
Eder, Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Leopold Specht and Paul Blumenthal.450 Kurt Eder is a member
of the Social Democratic Party and has been a member of the National Council from 1987 until
440 There is no official translation 441 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organe der ÖBB Holding AG; Homepage Der Standard: Linzer Bahnhofsturm: Ex-
Raiffeinsbanker Scharinger in Erklärungsnot (28.03.2014); Homepage Profil: Causa “Terminal Tower”: Justiz führt
neben Karl-Heinz Grasser 27 weitere Beschuldigte (14.04.2014) 442 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Ludwig Scharinger. Denkmal-Demontage auf Raten (02.04.2014); Homepage
Der Standard: Ludwig Scharinger kontrolliert wieder (09.07.2014) 443 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Linzer Bahnhofsturm: Ex-Raiffeinsbanker Scharinger in Erklärungsnot
(28.03.2014); Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Es wird eng für Scharinger (29.03.2014); Homepage Kurier: 28
Beschuldigte in Causa „Terminal Tower“ Linz (12.04.2014); Homepage Profil: Causa “Terminal Tower”: Justiz
führt neben Karl-Heinz Grasser 27 weitere Beschuldigte (14.04.2014) 444 Ibid. 445 cf. Homepage der Standard: Causen Buwog und Terminal Tower: Zurück an den Start (28.11.2014) 446 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie: Generalsekretär Herbert Kasser 447 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie: Herbert Kasser 448 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Faymann nominiert neuen Aufsichtsrat (05.04.2007); Homepage Die Presse:
Faymann holt sich einen Koordinator (28.02.2007) 449 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie: Generalsekretär Herbert Kasser;
Homepage ASFINAG: Aufsichtsrat 450 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organe der ÖBB Holding AG
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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2007.451 Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell held the position as consultant of the Minister of Finance from
1981 to 1984 and is now working as financial consultant at the Austrian institute for economic
research.452 In addition to her position in the Supervisory Board of the ÖBB Holding Group, she
is a member of the Supervisory Boards of the Vienna Insurance Group, the bank Commerzbank
AG453, the Austrian Federal Research Agency454, the limited liability company Wien Holding
GmbH455 and FIMBAG456.457 Officially she is not a member of any political party; however, her
regular contact to the politician Doris Bures initiate connections to the Social Democratic Party.458
The member Leopold Specht is known for being close to the Social Democratic Party as well;
especially to the former Federal Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer who appointed him into the
Supervisory Board position in 2007.459 Paul Blumenthal is known as former director of the Swiss
railway system and was appointed into the Supervisory Board by Doris Bures in 2010.460 However,
he is foremost known for his managerial career and not for political connections.
The third vice-chairman Roman Hebenstreit was appointed by the works council and is known for
his connections to the Social Democratic Party.461 Additional members appointed by the works
council are Andreas Martinsich, Gottfried Winkler and Günter Blumthaler.462 While Günter
Blumthaler is not officially connected to any political party, Andreas Martinsich and Gottfried
Winkler are related to the Social Democratic Party.463
The depiction of political connections of the members of the Management Board and Supervisory
Board of the ÖBB Holding Group show a clear tendency towards the Social Democratic Party;
mainly due to the fact that the majority of appointed people within the boards holds connections
to this party. The next part of the Thesis deals with an analysis of the organizational developments
within the corporation since the global economic crisis and subsequent phase of recession.
451 cf. Homepage Parlament Parlament Österreich: Kurt Eder 452 cf. Homepage WIFO: Lebenslauf Mag. Dr. Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell 453 There is no official translation 454 Official translation for Österreichische Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft m.b.H.; FFG 455 There is no official translation 456 FIMBAG stands for Finanzmarktbeteiligungsgesellschaft des Bundes; There is no official translation 457 cf. Homepage WIFO: Lebenslauf Mag. Dr. Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell 458 cf. Homepage Die Presse: SPÖ-Minister können ziemlich brutal sein (24.07.2012) 459 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Gusenbauers Mann in der Bundesbahn (11.01.2008) 460 cf. Homepage Die Presse: ÖVP zieht Aufsichtsräte aus ÖBB ab (26.05.2010); Homepage Die Presse: Doris
Bures, allein gegen alle (03.09.2010) 461 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organe der ÖBB Holding AG; Homepage SPÖ: Roman Hebenstreit 462 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Organe der ÖBB Holding AG 463 cf. Homepage Rudi Kaske FSG vida: Mag. Andreas Martinsich; Homepage FSG vida: Gottfried Winkler
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.3.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
Similar to other public companies discussed within this Thesis, the global financial crisis and its
consequences did not pass the ÖBB Holding Group either. The overall transportation rate sank by
18.0% from 2008 to 2009.464 Moreover, the operative revenues decreased by 3.6% from around
5.0 billion euros in 2008 to 4.8 billion euros.465 However, the company’s EBIT enhanced signifi-
cantly from around 6.4 million euros to 313.6 million euros.466 Furthermore the free cash flow
shows a negative number of 2.8 billion euros; thus not a real difference to the year 2008 when it
was minus 2.1 billion euros.467 However, the annual result for 2009 shows a positive number of
115.9 million euros.468
In 2010, the consequences of decreasing transportation hit the company drastically. Despite the
fact that the operative revenues could be improved by around 6.0% to 5.1 billion euros, the EBIT
declined to 254.8 million euros and the annual result dropped to negative 338.0 million euros.469
Thus, the company managed to enhance the free cash flow from minus 2.8 billion euros to minus
1.9 billion euros which indicates a slight improvement of the liquidity; however, still in the nega-
tive area.470
According to the Management Board of the ÖBB Holding Group, the year 2011 marks the begin-
ning of a period of enhancement and growth for the company.471 Throughout the year, the corpo-
ration set on a course of restoration and refurbishment and could thereby enhance some of its
financial figures.472 The operative revenues, for instance, increased slightly from 5.1 billion euros
to 5.3 billion euros and the EBIT significantly improved by 32.8% to 593.2 million euros.473 The
annual result still shows a negative number in 2011; however, the company managed to consider-
ably improve it from minus 338.0 million euros to minus 35.2 million euros.474 The free cash flow,
also still negative, enhanced slightly to minus 1.3 billion euros.475
Throughout 2012, the company handled to, again, enhance its financial figures. Despite the fact
that the operative revenues increased only minor to 5.2 billion euros, the EBIT improved to
701.0 million euros and the annual result enhanced considerably from negative 35.2 million euros
464 cf. ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2009): 8 465 Ibid.: 122 466 Ibid. 467 Ibid.: 125 468 Ibid.: 123 469 cf. ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2010): 52f. 470 Ibid.: 55 471 cf. ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2011): 1 472 Ibid. 473 Ibid.: 64 474 Ibid.: 65 475 Ibid.: 67
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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to positive 85.7 million euros.476 The free cash flow stayed negative but improved to minus
969.0 million euros in 2012.477
The most recent annual report available is for the year 2013 and it shows that the company man-
aged to further enhance some of its financial figures. The operative revenues stayed at 5.2 billion
euros and the EBIT improved only minor to 755.0 million euros.478 Moreover, the annual result
enhanced from 85.7 million euros in 2012 to 101.9 million euros in 2013; thereby indicating a rise
of 18.9%.479 However, after its gradual improvement over the years, the free cash flow deteriorated
again to minus 1.3 billion euros which indicates a decline of 35.5%.
After the initial deterioration of the financial situation of the company right after the global finan-
cial crisis hit Austria, the ÖBB Holding Group attempted to manoeuvre through the subsequent
phase of recession by investing in growth and innovations in order to stimulate the railway traffic
and transportation again.480
The following section of the Thesis deals with the analysis of a company responsible for the man-
agement of the public nature in Austria.
6.2.4 Österreichische Bundesforste AG
The Austrian Federal Forestry Group481 ÖBf AG is responsible for Austria’s nature and therefore
the management, maintenance and protection of public natural habitats.482 This includes the man-
agement of forests and hunting, lakes and fishing as well as topics of renewable energy, natural
reserve management and consulting.483 ÖBf AG consequently represents the biggest counsellor in
the areas of natural reserves, forestry, hunting areas and fishery.484
6.2.4.1 Legal base
The roots of the entity trace back to the year 1925 when the law BGBl. Nr. 282/1925485 initiated
the establishment of the “Österreichische Bundesforsten” for the purpose of managing the public
natural properties.486 The regulation was amended in 1977 by the law Bundesgesetz vom
476 cf. ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2013): 92f. 477 Ibid.: 95 478 Ibid.: 92 479 Ibid.: 93 480 cf. ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2011): 1f.; ÖBB Holding Geschäftsbericht (2013): 3f. 481 Official translation for Österreichische Bundesforste AG 482 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Unternehmensprofil 483 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG 484 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Unternehmensprofil 485 There is no official translation 486 cf. BGBl. Nr. 610/1977 § 1(1)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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17. November 1977 über den Wirtschaftskörper “Österreichische Bundesforste”487 which regu-
lated the establishment of an autonomous economic authority on the one hand and the transmission
of all properties stated within the law BGBl. Nr. 282/1925 to this authority on the other hand.488
This authority was under public control; i.e. calculated within the public budget, and henceforth
responsible for the management and administration of all forests, lakes and other natural properties
in the ownership of the state.489 However, in 1996 the government decided to demerge this part of
the public budget and re-organize the legal background of the authority into a public limited com-
pany; hence still under public control.490 Major reasons behind this decision were increasing in-
efficiencies, bad cost management and missing synergies which led to the need for a restructu-
ration of the company.491 The legal background of the Austrian Federal Forestry Group ÖBf AG
is therefore the law Bundesgesetz zur Neuordnung der Rechtsverhältnisse der Österreichischen
Bundesforste und Errichtung einer Aktiengesellschaft zur Fortführung des Betriebes “Öster-
reichische Bundesforste”, Bundesforstegesetz 1996, BGBl. Nr. 793/1996492 which consequently
manifests not only the establishment of the public limited company but also its tasks and duties.493
For the transmission of properties, the entity had to pay 100 million euros to the state until the end
of March 2005.494 Due to the fact that the company is still under public control, the Federal
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry embodies the official representative of the corporation and is
legally allowed to sell properties; however, only in accordance with the Federal Ministry of
Finance.495
6.2.4.2 Main tasks
Legally, the major tasks of ÖBf AG refer to the continuing of all responsibilities, duties and tasks
of the former “Österreichische Bundesforste”.496 Moreover, the company has to produce and uti-
lize the raw material wood in the most sustainable but also efficient way and take care of all lakes
and lakesides; i.e. their maintenance, the preservation of their ecological function, their protection
and preparation for people.497 Also legally regulated is the establishment of the two national parks
Donau-Auen and Kalkalpen which aims at their future protection and conservation.498
487 There is no official translation 488 cf. BGBl. Nr. 610/1977 § 1(1); (2) 489 Ibid. 490 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Rechtliche Grundlagen 491 cf. Homepage APA OTS: Molterer: Ausgegliederte Bundesforste sind Erfolgsgeschichte (24.10.2002) 492 There is no official translation 493 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 1(1) 494 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 2(2b) 495 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 4(4) 496 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 4(1) 497 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 4(2); (5) 498 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 4(3)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The national park Donau-Auen is, according to the company ÖBf AG, heavily influenced by
earlier developments such as the construction of gas pipelines, electric lines, agricultural areas,
routes and little bridges and consequently traffic.499 The major task of the company is therefore to
reduce the negative influences and simultaneously protect the natural habitat, its plants and
animals.500 This includes the management and protection of over 3,300 hectare of forest, over
500 hectare of meadow and over 1,200 hectare of fishery; 70% of it declared as sanctuary.501 In
addition to this, the entity is responsible for the maintenance of the castle Schloss Eckartsau502 and
its surrounding areas of over 27 hectare.503 The national park is open for guided tourism which
means that ÖBf AG employees organise tours and excursions as well as preserve bicycle and
hiking trails.504
Regarding the national park Kalkalpen, the company ÖBf AG has declared specific goals and tasks
that have to be accomplished. One refers to nature conservation projects which help in implement-
ing concrete measures to protect rare animals and trees.505 Connected to this is the task of combat
against the bark beetle which developed into a plague and consequently significant problem in
forests.506 This, indeed, represents an intervention into the natural developments within the na-
tional park; however, the company declares the need for certain regulations in order to maintain
the positive development of the habitats.507 This regulation also refers to the hunting of deer, roe
deer and chamois and hence in general the control of hoofed game.508 Similar to the national park
Donau-Auen, the national park Kalkalpen is also open for restricted tourism. There are over
220 kilometres of forestry streets which can be used as mountain bike trails, over 100 kilometres
of horse riding trails and several theme trails and wildlife watching platforms.509
In addition to the two natural parks, ÖBf AG is a partner in the management of the biosphere park
Wienerwald which represents a platform for education, research and development.510 It is conse-
quently open for visitors and an important partner in school projects, monitoring efforts and the
research on topics such as climate change, environmental issues and species extinction.511
499 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Nationalpark Donau-Auen. Unsere Aufgaben 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 There is no official translation 503 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Nationalpark Donau-Auen. Unsere Aufgaben 504 Ibid. 505 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Nationalpark Kalkalpen. Unsere Aufgaben 506 Ibid. 507 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Nationalpark Donau-Auen. Unsere Aufgaben; Nationalpark
Kalkalpen. Unsere Aufgaben 508 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Nationalpark Kalkalpen. Unsere Aufgaben 509 Ibid. 510 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Biosphärenpark Wienerwald. Unsere Aufgaben 511 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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As already indicated before, and within the law BGBl. 793/1996, one of the major tasks of the
company refers to the harvest and sale of wood.512 The company thereby also provides its service
of harvesting wood for private companies in Austria and abroad.513 80% of the sold wood refers
to coniferous wood, the other 20% to deciduous wood.514 The sale of wood is not only accom-
plished in person or via the phone, but also via an established B2B online platform where interested
parties can take part in an auction process.515
Another important task refers to the control of hoofed game and consequently hunting.516 ÖBf AG
is thereby responsible for the preservation of hunting areas, the balance of phases of hunting and
recreation as well as the control of animals hunted.517 Similar to this, the enterprise takes respon-
sibility over the fishery; by this means mainly referring to those 74 lakes and 2,000 kilometres of
rivers which are under public control and where fishing is allowed.518 Both hunting and fishing
inhibit the concept of sustainability and the philosophy that only an amount that can be recreated
can be retrieved.519 The responsibility over lakes also refers to the management and cultivation of
its shores by the establishment of bathing places, the leasing out of footbridges and anchorages
and attraction of tourists.520
In addition to the core tasks of wood, hunting and fishing, the company is one of the biggest Aus-
trian service providers in the area of forestry. Its portfolio includes, for example, the sustainable
forest management for private and municipal forests throughout Austria.521 This management also
contains the sustainable harvest of wood as well as its further commercialization, the cooperation
in unique part areas and the organization and management of other forestry companies.522
Moreover, the corporation offers forestry consulting which refers to the cartographic depiction of
forests, the planning of measures and a continuous inventory sampling procedure.523 Another im-
portant task applies to the sustainable forest management and therefore the planned construction
within forests.524 The company currently works on over 60 projects that have the goal of realising
ecologically and sustainably built trails, bridges and streets in difficult-to-access areas.525 This is
512 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Holz 513 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Holzernte 514 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Holzverkauf 515 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Holzauktionen 516 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Jagd 517 Ibid. 518 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Fischerei 519 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Jagd; Fischerei 520 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Seen 521 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Dienstleistungen. Waldbewirtschaftung 522 Ibid. 523 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Dienstleistungen. Forstliche Beratung 524 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Dienstleistungen. Forstliches Bauwesen 525 Ibid.
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closely related to the core task of technical planning which refers to the principle that nature and
technique do not have to be counterparts but can be balanced in a sustainable and efficient way.526
According to ÖBf AG, hiking and mountain bike trails as well as theme trails and riding paths
have to be planned carefully and subsequently established in consistence with the surrounding
nature.527 Another service of the company refers to the cultivation and care of trees in settlement
areas; a task which also includes orchard registers and concepts of tree designs.528
Besides the job as a service provider, the company fulfils the task of natural resources manage-
ment; i.e. the cooperation with nature protection project initiators, the operation of ecological spon-
soring, the preservation of protective areas as well as the implementation of compensation and
renaturation measures.529 The entity moreover applies its know-how in the construction and
maintenance of forestry streets and trails530 and is responsible for over 4,200 real estates which are
leased out to interested parties.531 The task of consulting is the only one explained in English on
the homepage and basically refers to customers abroad who want to make use of the corporation’s
expertise and diversified experience.532 Based on the philosophy of sustainability, the company
also engages in the latest and most sustainable production of energy through water, wind, photo-
voltaics and forest biomass.533
6.2.4.3 Organizational structure
The law BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 declares under paragraph ten that the company’s structure has to
include a Management Board and a Supervisory Board; the former needs to consist of two mem-
bers and the latter of six whereas three of them need to be appointed by the Federal Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry, one by the Federal Minister of Finance and two by the works council.534
The diverse portfolio and variety of tasks of the company indicate the need for a range of qualified
employees in addition to the management structure. According to the financial and sustainability
report of ÖBf AG, the company had an average of 2,916 employees in 2013.535 The report indicates
a steady reduction of employees since 2011; from 3,105 to 2,954 and thereafter
526 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Dienstleistungen. Technische Planung 527 Ibid. 528 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Dienstleistungen. Baumpflege / Baumkataster 529 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Naturraummanagement 530 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Straßenbau & Instandhaltung 531 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Immobilien 532 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Consulting 533 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Erneuerbare Energie 534 cf. BGBl. Nr. 793/1996 § 10(1); (2) 535 cf. Öbf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 31
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2,916 employees.536 It can be assumed that the reduction of employees roots in the economic crisis
and its consequences; a circumstance analysed separately within section 6.2.4.5.
6.2.4.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
Despite the fact that the Austrian government continuously confirms the independence of Super-
visory Board members in public companies, the circumstance that four out of six members are
appointed by federal ministries indicates a close connection to politics. The chairman of the
Supervisory Board Werner Wutscher is not only known for his position as former top manager in
companies such as Agrana or Rewe, he is also a former Cabinet employee of the Federal Ministers
of Agriculture and Forestry Franz Fischler and Wilhlem Molterer; both of them representatives of
the People’s Party.537 He was appointed as chairman by the former Federal Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry.538 Similar to this, the vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board Michael Höllerer is
also connected to the People’s Party through his former job as general secretary at the Raiffeisen
Zentralbank and his relations to Maria Fekter; a representative of the People’s Party and former
Austrian Minister of Finance from the period of 2011 to 2013.539 Hence, his appointment as vice-
chairman was conducted by the Federal Minister of Finance. The other two members of the
Supervisory Board Michael Esterl and Maria Sauer were both appointed by the Federal Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry and can be connected to the People’s Party as well.540 Michael Esterl
can be characterized as being close to the People’s Party primarily because of his former job as
office manager of the People’s Party parliamentary group and subsequent job as head of the
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s Office.541 Maria Sauer’s relations to the People’s
Party root in her job as director of the Upper Austrian Farmer’s Association.542
Consequently, all four Supervisory Board members appointed by Austrian ministries can be con-
nected to the People’s Party. The two members appointed by the works council, Josef
Reisenbichler and Lukas Stepanek both represent foresters and were assigned with the role of
worker’s representatives.543 Reisenbichler inhibits, amongst others, the positions as vice president
536 Ibid. 537 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Enttäuschte Hoffnungen: Minister für eine Stunde (14.12.2013) 538 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Management; Homepage APA-OTS: Werner Wutscher
Aufsichtsrat in der Kärntner Landesholding (11.08.2012) 539 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Proporz: Postenschacher in OeNB und FMA (07.01.2013) 540 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Management 541 cf. Homepage APA OTS: Landwirtschafts- und Umweltminister holt erfahrene Experten ins Ministerbüro
(16.12.2013) 542 cf. Homepage Bauern Zeitung: Nachhaltiges Wirtschaften prägt auch die Landschaft (05.02.2013); Homepage
OÖ Bauernbund: Präsidium 543 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Management
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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of the Upper Austrian Landarbeiterkammer544 and chairman of the trade union ÖGB545
Gmunden546 and can be characterized as closely connected to the Social Democratic Party.
Stepanek is already employed over 15 years at the company ÖBf AG and holds the continuous
position as forester and area manager.547 His close connections to Reisenbichler and their conjoint
engagement for the Austrian Foresters Association548 support the assumption of relations to the
Social Democratic Party; however, this cannot be clearly identified.
The Management Board consists of the two members Georg Erlacher as CEO and Georg Schöppl
as CFO; the first appointed in 2001 and the latter in 2007.549 Erlacher will resign his position as
CEO in March 2015 and, after three periods of management, not extend his contract again.550 As
already manifested within the law BGBl. Nr. 793/1996, the two Management Board members have
to be appointed by official tenders and should neither be appointed by federal ministries, nor con-
nected to political parties.551 Schöppl and Erlacher can therefore not be identified as having official
political connections.
6.2.4.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
According to ÖBf AG, the year 2009 was characterized by the consequences of the global eco-
nomic crisis which manifested for the company in a declining demand of wood and subsequently
deteriorating production in the wood industry.552 However, the shortages on the commodities mar-
ket evolved beneficial for the company by the end of 2009 as the company was able to increase
the prices for wood; thereby compensating negative numbers in other business areas.553 The oper-
ative revenues of the holding dropped by 13.6% from 257.5 million euros in 2008 to 222.6 million
euros in 2009.554 The EBIT worsened from 28.5 million euros in 2008 to 18.1 million euros in
2009; similar to the EBITDA which declined from 38.5 million euros to 28.3 million euros.555
However, the cash flow from operating activities decreased only slightly from 34.6 million euros
in 2008 to 33.8 million euros in 2009 and the company even managed to decrease its liabilities by
544 There is no official translation 545 ÖGB stands for Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund – There is no official translation 546 cf. Homepage Sozialdemokratische Partei Oberösterreich: Nationalratskandidat und ÖGB-Regionalvorsitzender
Josef Reisenbichler; Landesliste Josef Reisenbichler 547 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Ein naturverbundener Manager (18.05.2009) 548 cf. Homepage Verband Österreichischer Förster: Österreichische Försterzeitung 100. Jahrgang 2 (2012): 7 549 cf. Homepage Österreichische Bundesforste AG: Management 550 cf. Homepage Bauern Zeitung: Bundesforste: Erlacher zieht sich aus dem Vorstand zurück (29.09.2014); Wiener
Zeitung: Bundesforste suchen neues Vorstandsmitglied (29.09.2014) 551 cf. BGBl. Nr 793/1996 § 10(1) 552 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2009): 19 553 Ibid. 554 Ibid. 555 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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eight million euros.556 Overall, the balance sheet total fell around 29.2 million euros to
414.5 million euros.557
In 2010, the company introduced a new sustainability Balanced Scorecard which aimed at the
depiction of three factors; namely the economy, the society and the nature.558 The concept of the
Balanced Scorecard was first introduced by Kaplan and Norton in 1992; the main question was
how to appropriately evaluate the performance of a company.559 The motivation behind the publi-
cation was therefore an overall dissatisfaction with the fact that the value of a company used to be
evaluated almost exclusively by means of financial measures; a circumstance that could lead an
entity into wrong decisions about the future performance.560 The authors were convinced that com-
panies want both; the presentation of financial as well as operational measures and consequently
designed the concept of the Balanced Scorecard which aims at the depiction of internal as well as
external and financial as well as non-financial measures.561 In this sense, ÖBf AG implemented
the depiction of those financial and operational measures that are important for the performance
of the company; sustainability and environmental friendliness thereby playing a major role due to
the business of the corporation.562 When having a look at the financial data provided in the report
2010, it can be retrieved that the company managed to hold its results and, except for the operative
revenues which further declined to around 210.0 million euros, not report any more decreases.563
The company itself stated that the economic situation for the wood industry improved slightly
during 2010 and through long-term contracts with lessees, the corporation was not affected by the
real estate crisis and could even manage to improve its course of growth.564 EBIT, EBITDA and
the cash flow of operational activities stayed on the same level as the previous year; thereby indi-
cating the ability of the company to counteract to the crisis by focusing on core competences.565
The company additionally managed to further decrease its liabilities by around 7.9 million
euros.566
556 Ibid. 557 Ibid. 558 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2010): 6 559 cf. Kaplan, R. & Norton, D.: Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System. Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 85, Issue 7/8, (2007): 150 560 cf. Kaplan, R. & Norton, D.: The Balanced Scorecard – Measures that Drive Performance. Harvard Business
Review, January-February (1992): 71ff. 561 cf. Kaplan & Norton (1992): 71ff.; Amado, C. A. F., Santos, S. P. & Marques, P. M.: Integrating the Data
Envelopment Analysis and the Balanced Scorecard Approaches for Enhanced Performance Assessment (2012):
390ff. 562 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2010): 6 563 Ibid.: 10 564 Ibid. 565 Ibid.: 11 566 Ibid.
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In 2011, the entity declared its satisfaction with the developments within the wood industry; a
circumstance that can also be retrieved from its financial data. ÖBf AG managed to slightly in-
crease its operative revenues again from 209.9 million euros in 2010 to 213.7 million euros in
2011.567 Moreover, the EBIT increased from 18.1 million euros to 25.4 million euros; as well as
the EBITDA which increased from 28.7 million euros to around 36.0 million euros.568 The ampli-
fied earnings reflect the steadily enhancing production and demand of wood in 2011.569 However,
the combination of inventory built-ups and simultaneous usage of provisions connected to partic-
ipation risks, led to a heavy decline of the cash flow from operational activities from 32.1 million
euros in 2010 to 19.8 million euros in 2011.570 Also, the liabilities increased by 4.4 million euros.571
The year 2012 was, again, satisfactory for the company and it managed to improve the major
financial measures. The operative revenues increased by 6.2% from 213.7 million euros in 2011
to 226.9 million euros in 2012.572 Both the EBIT and the EBITDA improved again; the first from
25.4 million euros to 36.0 million euros and the latter from 36.0 million euros to 45.7 million
euros.573 Different to the previous year, the company handled to significantly augment its cash
flow from operational activities from 19.8 million euros in 2011 to 37.4 million euros in 2012.574
According to ÖBf AG, the major reason behind this augmentation lies in the very good business
development and performance of the company combined with an optimized management of obli-
gations.575 Moreover, the enterprise accomplished to decrease its liabilities from 140.3 million
euros to 109.9 million euros.576
The very positive trend could not be continued throughout the year 2013 and, even though the
company declares its satisfaction with the demand and business in general, the financial data mar-
ginally worsened again. The operative revenues improved only slightly from 226.9 million euros
to 227.5 million euros; thus, the EBIT decreased to 24.5 million euros and the EBITDA declined
to 32.3 million euros; the first representing a decline of 31.0% and the latter of 29.3%.577 The cash
flow from operational activities decreased from 37.4 million euros to 30.3 million euros; a fact
that roots in changes of tax provisions and the payment of income taxes.578
567 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2011): 9 568 Ibid. 569 Ibid. 570 Ibid. 571 Ibid. 572 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2012): 9 573 Ibid. 574 Ibid. 575 Ibid. 576 Ibid. 577 cf. ÖBf AG: Kombinierter Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 9 578 Ibid.
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Overall, ÖBf AG, as one of only few, handled the crisis and subsequent phase of recession in a
way that the company did not have to report drastically worsened numbers. Decreases in major
financial and operational measures were compensated by the focus on core competences, the con-
centration on significant strategic instruments and appropriate market observation. These tactics
led to the fact that the company could already report amplified results in the year 2010; a year in
which, for most other companies, the consequences of the recession period started to hit them.
The following part deals with the depiction of one of the most important public Austrian compa-
nies; namely the industrial holding company Österreichische Industrieholding AG579 which is re-
sponsible for the public stakes management.
6.2.5 Österreichische Industrieholding AG
The industrial holding company ÖIAG is a public corporation in charge of managing the state-
owned participations and stakes in enterprises as well as privatization efforts for the public sector
of Austria.580 The purpose of the company is to act close to the economy and manage the stakes of
the Republic in an efficient way by adding value.581 Moreover, if the state decides to privatize
some of its stakes or whole organizations, the entity will be responsible for the act of planning and
implementing the appropriate steps.582
6.2.5.1 Legal base
The industrial holding company was initially based on the legal background ÖIG-Gesetz, BGBl.
Nr. 23/1967583 and subsequently amended through the law BGBl. Nr. 439/1984584 whereas both
of them represent the original legal background of the company.585 In 2000, the law ÖIAG-Gesetz
2000 BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000586 came into force which regulates the legal aspects of the company as
well as its connections to the Austrian Post Group and the Austrian organization Telekom-
beteiligungsverwaltungsgesellschaft587 in more detail.588 The company’s headquarter is located in
Vienna and its initial share capital was 363,365,000 euros separated into 5,000 shares.589 The law
determines not only the fact that the Austrian Minister of Finance is responsible for the owning
579 There is no official translation 580 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Unternehmen 581 Ibid. 582 Ibid. 583 There is no official translation 584 There is no official translation 585 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2009): 36 586 There is no official translation 587 There is no official translation 588 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 589 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 1(1); (3)
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rights of the state at the annual general meetings but also the amount and constituency of the
Supervisory Board which consists of 15 members.590 Ten out of 15 members need to be reputable
entrepreneurs and CEOs of commercial enterprises or people with a long-standing experience in
economic topics.591 Five members are appointed by the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour and
include people that are members of the works council or staff association within an enterprise the
industrial holding company ÖIAG is directly or indirectly holding a stake in.592 All members need
to be elected and endorsed at the annual general meetings.593
6.2.5.2 Main tasks
The core tasks of the company refer to efforts of privatizations as well as the management of state-
owned participation rights.594 Moreover, the organization is responsible for the buying of stakes
and implementation of measures to manage them.595
The task of privatization management mainly aims at the partial or full privatization of public
stakes in companies the entity is responsible for as well as the appropriate implementation of this
act.596 An important aspect of privatizations is the repayment of debt and redemption of liabilities
of ÖIAG.597 Moreover, the partial or full privatizations aim at adding value to the organizations
privatized as well as the long-term securing of research and development capacities, high earnings
and the creation of work places.598 Privatization efforts by ÖIAG require the special order of the
Austrian federal government.599 However, within the current legislative period there is neither a
present order for privatizations, nor the attempt to privatize stakes in the near future.600
The duty of managing the participations of the state is handled under the aspect of Corporate
Governance which means to actively consider public interests and subsequently the securing of
work places and creation of value in order to ensure the importance of Austria as an attractive
business location.601 Of special importance thereby is the aspect of holding at least 25% and one
share to the voting share capital or contractual rights over third parties in order to guarantee the
590 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 2; § 3 591 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 4(1) 592 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 5(1) 593 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 4(3); §5(2) 594 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 1(2) 595 Ibid. 596 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 7(1) 597 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 7(3) 598 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 7(4) 599 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Privatisierungsmanagement 600 Ibid. 601 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 9(1); Homepage ÖIAG: Beteiligungsmanagement
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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influence of the industrial holding company in the long run.602 Moreover, the enterprise is entitled
to participate in capital increases in order to keep its stakes and influence.603
6.2.5.3 Organizational structure
As already indicated before, the organizational structure of ÖIAG depicts as follows. The Super-
visory Board consists of 15 members; ten of them being reputable representatives of major com-
panies in Austria and five of them representing the workers.604 Until the end of 2014, the workers’
representatives within ÖIAG are people from the companies A1 Telekom Austria Group, Austrian
Post Group, OMV Group and OMV Refining and Marketing GmbH605; indeed, all of them com-
panies in which ÖIAG holds stakes in.606 The contemporary executive manager of ÖIAG is the
engineer Rudolf Kemler.607
ÖIAG is currently handling participations in eight companies which are depicted in the following
table 1. Those in which the enterprise manages 100% are portrayed in alphabetical order first.
Thereafter, those companies the entity holds only part of the shares are mentioned in descending
order. For the purpose of consistency, these organizations are described concisely afterwards.
ÖIAG stakes608
Organization Participation in %
FIMBAG Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes609 100%
GKB Bergbau GmbH610 100%
IMIB Immobilien- und Industriebeteiligungen GmbH611 100%
Schoeller-Bleckmann GmbH612 100%
Austrian Post Group 52.85%
OMV Group 31.50%
APK Pensionskasse Aktiengesellschaft613 29.95%
Telekom Austria Group 28.42%
Table 1: ÖIAG stakes
602 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 9(2) 603 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 9(3) 604 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 2; § 3; § 4(1); § 5(1) 605 There is no official translation 606 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Aufsichtsrat 607 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Vorstand 608 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Beteiligungen 609 There is no official translation 610 There is no official translation 611 There is no official translation 612 There is no official translation 613 There is no official translation
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The corporations FIMBAG, GKB, IMIB and Schoeller-Bleckmann GmbH are 100% owned by
ÖIAG. While IMIB is responsible for the handling of outstanding business units,614 FIMBAG is
responsible for measures of re-capitalization of Austrian insurance or credit institutions by the
state.615 Its legal background builds the law Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz BGBl. I Nr. 136/2008616
which regulates the state interventions and measures to stabilize the financial market.617 GKB is
in charge of the controlled withdraw of the Austrian mining industry and simultaneous reculti-
vation.618 The limited liability company Schoeller-Bleckmann GmbH is, after the privatization of
all major business areas, in charge of processing the rest activities within the management of envi-
ronmental components as well as real estates.619
The Austrian Post Group represents the leading logistics and mail provider in Austria and with
52.80% the industrial holding company ÖIAG possesses the major part of this entity.620
The OMV Group is the biggest industrial company in Austria and operates in the area of oil and
gas and therefore the long-term delivery of energy for Austria.621 After the free float of 43.30% of
shares, the industrial holding company ÖIAG holds the second biggest portion of the company
with 31.50%.622
The company APK was first established in 1989 as the first Austrian pension fund and until today
represents one of the leading pension funds in Austria.623
The telecommunications company Telekom Austria Group is currently operating in eight coun-
tries; in Austria with the provider A1.624 Again, ÖIAG holds with its 28.42% the second biggest
portion of the company after the free float of 48.81%.625
6.2.5.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
ÖIAG is managed by one director, namely Rudolf Kemler. He was appointed in 2012 and through
this position is, since then, also chairman of the Supervisory Boards in the companies OMV Group,
Telekom Austria Group and Austrian Post Group.626 His appointment traces back to Maria Fekter
614 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: IMIB Immobilien- und Industriebeteiligungen GmbH 615 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: FIMBAG – Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes 616 There is no official translation 617 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 136/2008 618 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: GKB Bergbau GmbH 619 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Schoeller-Bleckmann GmbH 620 cf. Homepage: Österreichische Post AG 621 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: OMV AG 622 Ibid. 623 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: APK 624 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Telekom Austria AG 625 Ibid. 626 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Vostand
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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who then held the position as Minister of Finance and represents a member of the People’s Party.627
However, by now, both the People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party are not satisfied with
Kemler’s performance and management so far.628 In 2013, the Telekom Austria Group lost
65 million euros in a SWAP-deal in which the company betted on rising interests while they
actually fell.629 The causa was barely communicated and in the Supervisory Board meeting not
presented as something urgent by Kemler.630 Another thing is the very expensive decision on the
early dismissals of the two OMV Management Board members Gerhard Roiss and Hans-Peter
Floren in 2014 who both have to leave the company by mid-2015 and therefore have to be paid
several million euros in compensation.631 The ÖIAG Supervisory Board has unilaterally decided
that Kemler has to leave ÖIAG after his official managing period in October 2015 and will not be
granted a two-year contractual extension.632 Chairman Siegfried Wolf additionally declared that if
the concept of reformation for the ÖIAG holding, which is discussed within the following para-
graph, is fixed earlier, a new managing director could be appointed even before that.633
Internal problems as well as the problems with the Management Board of the OMV Group, led to
increasing media presence in August and September 2014 and subsequently the demand from gov-
ernmental side to finally reform the structure of ÖIAG. In the year 2000, the government constel-
lation of the People’s Party and Freedom Party decided upon a self-perpetuating Supervisory
Board and therefore control medium.634 This indicates that if one member of the Supervisory
Board leaves, the other members are allowed to appoint his or her successor by themselves; a
system that initially aimed at making ÖIAG free from any political influence.635 Thus, over time
this system led to the circumstance that the Supervisory Board consisted of private friends and
those that relate to each other in business.636 Since late 2013 the coalition of the People’s Party
and Social Democratic Party tries to reform the structure of the entity and change the self-
perpetuating way of appointing the Supervisory Board; thereby ultimately aiming at gaining in-
creasing political control again.637 In addition to this, the current discussions about a new structure
627 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Politische Planspiele in der ÖIAG (14.02.2014) 628 Ibid. 629 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Telekom Austria-Aufsichtsrat kritisiert Intransparenz des Vorstandes (22.11.2013) 630 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Politische Planspiele in der ÖIAG (14.02.2014) 631 Ibid. 632 cf. Homepage Kurier: ÖIAG: Aus für Rudolf Kemler (22.10.2014) 633 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: ÖIAG: Kemler-Vertrag endet mit 31. Oktober 2015 – oder noch früher, falls
Reform kommt (24.10.2014) 634 cf. Homepage Wiener Zeitung: ÖIAG-Reform droht in Sackgasse zu geraten (15.12.2014) 635 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Politische Planspiele in der ÖIAG (14.02.2014) 636 Ibid. 637 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: ÖIAG-Reform zurück am Start – Ausgang offen (17.09.2014); Homepage Die
Presse: Analyse: ÖIAG-Reform spießt sich (14.12.2014); Homepage Wiener Zeitung: ÖIAG-Reform droht in
Sackgasse zu geraten (15.12.2014); Homepage Kurier: Koalition bringt Reform der ÖIAG nicht auf Schiene
(16.12.2014)
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include speculations about the concept of the People’s Party which intends the complete restruc-
turation of the enterprise into two sections; one participation-holding and one infrastructure-
holding.638 While the first would include the already under ÖIAG control existing companies
OMV Group, Telekom Austria Group and Austrian Post Group, the latter would include new com-
panies like Verbund AG, ÖBf AG, Casinos Austria and the ARE part of BIG.639 Other speculations
even include the incorporation of ASFINAG or the rail network division of ÖBB; a circumstance
which the trade unions of both companies publicly stated against.640
In any case, the participants of the working group around a reformation of ÖIAG are the Federal
Chancellor Werner Faymann from the Social Democratic Party and the Vice-Federal Chancellor
Reinhold Mitterlehner from the People’s Party as well as the Minister of Finance Hans Jörg
Schelling and Minister of Justice Wolfgang Brandstätter; both of them representatives of the
People’s Party.641 In addition to the official political representatives, the director of the Austrian
Chamber of Labour Werner Muhm, the director of the Austrian Trade Union Erich Foglar, the
ÖBB president Brigitte Ederer and the industrialist Norbert Zimmermann participate in the refor-
mation discussions.642 Originally, the final reformation concept and subsequent restructuration
should be finished by the end of November 2014; however, according to the government, the work
on the reformation will take longer.643
6.2.5.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
Due to the fact that the company is 100% state-owned and responsible for the management of the
shares of the Republic of Austria in other companies, for example the Austrian Post Group, the
OMV Group or the Telekom Austria Group, its annual report is separated into an overall financial
statement as well as individual financial statements for each participation.644 Based on the circum-
stance that the companies Austrian Post Group, OMV Group and Telekom Austria Group are an-
alysed separately within this Thesis, a closer look is taken at their individual annual reports within
their sections and is therefore not depicted further within this ÖIAG section.
Similar to other companies examined within this Thesis, the global economic crisis hit the entity
in 2009 and consequently the income statement shows a decline in operative revenues from around
638 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Analyse: ÖIAG-Reform spießt sich (14.12.2014); 639 Ibid. 640 cf. Homepage Wiener Zeitung: ÖIAG-Reform droht in Sackgasse zu geraten (15.12.2014); Homepage Kurier:
Koalition bringt Reform der ÖIAG nicht auf Schiene (16.12.2014) 641 Ibid. 642 Ibid. 643 cf. Homepage Industriemagazin: ÖIAG neu – Reform-Arbeitsgruppe hat bis Ende November Zeit (16.10.2014);
Homepage Kurier: Koalition bringt Reform der ÖIAG nicht auf Schiene (16.12.2014) 644 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2009-2013)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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29,000 euros to 28,000 euros.645 Moreover, the net profit reduced drastically from over 573 million
euros in 2008 to only 367 million euros in 2009; a decline of almost 36.0%.646
The recession hit the company in 2010 when the operative revenues declined from around
28,000 euros to around 9,000 euros; a reduction of 67.8%.647 However, through the dissolution of
capital reserves and retained and carried forward profits from 2009, the enterprise was able to
slightly increase its net profit from around 367 million euros to over 406 million euros.648
The economic situation generally worsened throughout 2011 as the year was characterized by
financial insecurities and rating disasters.649 It was the year when the European Union decided
upon the ESM650 as successor of the in 2010 implemented European Financial Stability Facility.651
Despite the fact that Austria could increase its gross domestic product by 3.1%, the average in-
crease within the European Union zone was only 1.5%;652 thereby posing a challenging situation
on all companies acting in an international surrounding; like those companies ÖIAG holds signif-
icant stakes in. Moreover, the stock markets show significant negative tendencies during that time;
the ATX, for instance, fell around 35%.653 ÖIAG subsequently decided upon a capital increase
which was implemented in June 2011 and comprised of 27,272,727 shares for 27.5 euros each.654
The gained capital was ultimately reinvested in the preservation of 31.5% of shares in the OMV
Group which itself implemented a capital increase.655 Despite the fact that the Austrian Post Group
decided to reduce its dividends, the OMV Group and Telekom Austria Group slightly increased
theirs; thereby increasing the income from shareholdings a touch from 243,000 euros in 2010 to
over 247,000 euros in 2011.656 The company furthermore managed to increase its net profit from
406 million euros to over 458 million euros; however, it did not report any operative revenues for
the year 2011 which indicates a decline of around 8,000 euros to zero.657
Throughout the year 2012, the European Central Bank continued its course of expansion and kept
the key interest rate low.658 Economic activities within the European Union further decreased to
0.6%; however, Austria could, at the same time, increase its economic activities by 0.8% and the
645 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2009): 34 646 Ibid.: 35 647 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2010): 32 648 Ibid.: 33 649 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2011): 41 650 ESM stands for Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus 651 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2011): 40 652 Ibid.: 41 653 Ibid. 654 Ibid. 655 Ibid. 656 Ibid.: 51 657 Ibid.: 50f. 658 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2012): 42
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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ATX enhanced again by 27%.659 For ÖIAG, the income from shareholdings declined from around
247 million euros to around 224 million euros as well as the annual net profit which decreased
from 233 million euros to 211 million euros.660 However, through retained and carried forward
profits from 2011, the company managed to significantly enhance its net profit from around 458
million euros to almost 520 million euros.661 Again, the company did not report any operative
revenues.662
The latest annual report available is the year 2013; a time characterized by a weak economic re-
covery and a further increase of economic activities by 0.4% in Austria.663 However, in the Euro-
pean Union zone the economic activities further declined by 0.4% and unemployment rates stayed
high.664 Despite the fact that the income from shareholdings decreased again to 195 million euros,
the company managed to slightly increase its net profit to 552 million euros through retained and
carried forward profits from 2012.665 However, again ÖIAG does not report any operative
revenues.666
In addition to the financial developments within the company, the government attempts to restruc-
ture the enterprise since fall 2013; thus more intensively recently; a circumstance already discussed
within the previous section.
The subsequent part of the Thesis deals with the Austrian postal service Austrian Post Group and
consequently a company the entity ÖIAG holds a significant amount of shares in.
6.2.6 Österreichische Post AG
The Austrian Post Group667 is characterized as the leading logistics and mail delivery service in
Austria.668 It is responsible for the safe and universal supply of postal services to all Austrians;
thereby also considering conditions of fair competition.669
659 Ibid.: 43 660 Ibid.: 53 661 Ibid. 662 Ibid. 52 663 cf. ÖIAG Geschäftsbericht (2013): 44 664 Ibid. 665 Ibid.: 53 666 Ibid.: 52 667 Official translation for Österreichische Post AG 668 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Die Österreichische Post AG – Konzerninformationen 669 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 § 1(1)
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6.2.6.1 Legal base
The history of the post traces back to the year 1490 when the first standardised postal connection
was established in Europe.670 In 1887, the K.K. Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung671 represented
the responsible organization for postal and telecommunications services in Austria and it was not
until 100 years later that these two services separated.672 In 1996 the law Poststrukturgesetz673 was
amended and consequently transferred the public administration of the company into a public lim-
ited company which was named Post- und Telekom Austria AG (PTA AG)674.675 Its shares were
completely held by the public holding company Post und Telekommunikationsbeteiligungsver-
waltungsgesellschaft (PTBG)676 which represented a holding corporation in which the postal and
telecommunications part could co-exist under state-control.677 However, in 1998 both services
split and became individual businesses.678 Currently, the Austrian Post Group is based on the law
Bundesgesetz mit dem ein Postmarktgesetz erlassen wird und das KommAustria Gesetz geändert
wird, BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009679 which regulates the structure, tasks, duties and rights of the com-
pany.680 An essential part of the law is the postal secret which all former, actual and past employees
of the postal company have to guarantee.681
6.2.6.2 Main tasks
The prior task of the organization is the universal postal service; i.e. the nationwide basic supply
of postal services to affordable prices.682 This includes the collection, sorting, transportation and
delivery of mail up to two kilograms and parcels up to ten kilograms as well as the consignment
of valuables.683 However, this service does not include possible returns of mails or parcels as this
falls into the legal concern of sender and recipient and costs of returning articles need to be dis-
cussed and handled between those two.684 In addition, the service of postal delivery needs to be
accomplished within five work days nationwide; thereby excluding Saturdays.685
670 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Geschichte der Post 671 There is no official translation 672 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschichte 673 There is no official translation 674 There is no official translation 675 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschichte 676 There is no official translation 677 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschichte 678 Ibid. 679 There is no official translation 680 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 681 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 § 5(1); (2) 682 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 § 6(1) 683 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 § 6(2) 684 cf. BGBl I Nr. 123/2009 § 6(4) 685 cf. BGBl I Nr. 123/2009 § 10(1)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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With the law BGBl I Nr. 123/2009 coming into force, the Austrian Post Group is determined as
the primary universal service for postal delivery in Austria.686 However, after five years, i.e. in
2014, the regulatory authority has to examine whether there are other companies that can provide
the same universal service at better conditions; e.g. for a better price which would decrease the
overall costs for this service.687
In addition to the universal service, the organization sees itself as the service provider of commu-
nication and information technology as well as data processing.688 This also includes the step-wise
adaptation to new developments, like the invention of the post card or the introduction of Express
Mail Service and subsequently the guarantee of up-to-date services for Austrian citizens.689
In addition to financial measures, a major part of the performance of the company consists of non-
financial criteria such as the satisfaction of customers, employees and other stakeholders.690 In
order to find out more about the concerns of the different stakeholder groups, the Austrian Post
Group, for the third time, held a stakeholder conference in 2013 and invited about 30 representa-
tives of different groups to discuss a variety of topics.691 With regard to this conference, the com-
pany thereafter published a materiality matrix which gives an overview over what is important to
stakeholders and the Austrian Post Group; especially where they overlap and where they differ in
their priorities.692 Topics which are considered to be very important for both sides are the avoid-
ance of waste, e-mobility, efficiencies in the areas of energy and costs, climate and health related
issues, the entity’s value and an increase in revenues.693 However, topics such as sponsorship in
cultural and sportive events, further acquisitions, retraining and the promotion of women as well
as multicultural issues play an important, but not very important role for both the stakeholders and
the company.694
In addition to this, the postal organization attempts to implement the strategic vision of sustaina-
bility and a Code of Conduct which determines, in a compulsory way, the ethical and legal aspects
on how employees of the Austrian Post Group are expected to act and interact on an internal as
well as external base.695 Values within this Code of Conduct include the appropriate treatment of
686 cf. BGBl I Nr. 123/2009 §12(1) 687 Ibid. 688 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Die Österreichische Post AG – Konzerninformationen 689 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Geschichte 690 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Nachhaltig in jeder Hinsicht 691 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Die wichtigsten Stakeholder 692 Ibid. 693 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Wesentlichkeitsmatrix 694 Ibid. 695 cf. Österreichische Post AG: Code of Conduct (2011): 2
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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customers, transparency, good communication and special rules applied in case of bribery, gifts,
donations and invitations.696
6.2.6.3 Organizational structure
The postal organization is divided into the Supervisory Board and the Management Board.697 The
first currently consists of 12 members; four of them are appointed by the staff association.698 Due
to the fact that the Austrian state-owned ÖIAG holds the majority of shares, in more detail 52.8%,
the chairman of the Supervisory Board is the current CEO of ÖIAG; i.e. Rudolf Kemler.699 The
Management Board consists of four members; each of them being responsible for a different area
within the company.700 The contemporary CEO Georg Pölzl was appointed in 2009 and is in
charge of the overall strategic vision of the company, as well as the internal and external commu-
nication, risk management, corporate governance measures and online innovation management.701
The current CFO Walter Oblin was appointed in 2012 and is responsible for all financial aspects
of the organization as well as legal aspects connected to them.702 Since 2011 the company is
divided into two operative divisions, namely “Brief, Werbepost und Filialen”703 and “Paket und
Logistik”704 the first thereby representing the main generator of revenues and therefore the division
that works on continuous improvements.705 Since 2004 Walter Hitzinger is the director of the
division “Brief, Werbepost und Filialen” and since 2005 Peter Umundum is responsible for the
division “Paket und Logistik”.706
Before this, the company had a three-division-model which separated between the mail, parcel and
logistics services.707 However, the merger of the parcel and logistics department as well as the
fusion of the mail and branch network responsibilities led to the advantage of synergies and the
attempt to save costs.708 In 2013, the division “Brief, Werbepost und Filialen” generated revenues
of 1,510.8 million euros and the division “Paket und Logistik” of 857.3 million euros.709
696 Ibid.: 6 697 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Jahresbericht (2011): Die Österreichische Post im Überblick 698 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Die Österreichische Post AG – Konzerninformationen 699 Ibid. 700 Ibid. 701 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Unternehmensstruktur; Vorstand 702 Ibid. 703 There is no official translation 704 There is no official translation 705 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Jahresbericht (2011): Die Österreichische Post im Überblick 706 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Unternehmensstruktur; Vorstand 707 Ibid. 708 Ibid. 709 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Jahresbericht (2013): Die Österreichische Post im Überblick
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The company holds multiple amounts of shares in a variety of subsidiaries; not only in Austria but
also in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Montenegro,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey.710
6.2.6.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
The former T-Mobile manager Georg Pölzl was appointed as CEO of the Austrian Post Group in
2009 by the eight capital representatives; despite the fact that the four works council members
voted against him.711 He is known for having relations to the People’s Party; however, in compar-
ison to other possible managers, he is not directly identifiable with this party and therefore seen as
rather independent.712 Former managers of the Austrian Post Group used to be close to the Social
Democratic Party; however, in this case the party did not suggest any new manager for the period
of 2009 to 2014.713 It can be assumed that this is also related to the period of recession and conse-
quently difficult future lying ahead in the year 2009; in addition to the consequences of the crisis
and the upcoming recession period, the Austrian Post Group had to be prepared for the planned
post market liberalization in Austria in 2011.714
The contract of the CFO Walter Oblin was recently extended until 2018 due to declared good
performance throughout struggling past years.715 The Management Board member Walter Hitziger
was first appointed as a member in 2004 and subsequently took responsibility over the division
“Brief und Logistik” and in 2011 over the new merged division “Brief, Werbepost und Filialen”.716
Also since 2011, the division “Paket und Logistik” is carried out by the Management Board mem-
ber Peter Umundum who is part of the board since 2005.717 Both Hitziger and Umundum are in
charge of the quality and efficiency within their areas and consequently responsible for the future
development and growth of the entity.718 Similar to Pölzl, the other Management Board members
Oblin, Hitziger and Umundum cannot be related directly to any political party; a circumstance that
impedes the in-depth analysis of connections to Austrian political parties and their influence on
internal management tactics.719
710 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Ausgewählte Beteiligungen des Konzerns Österreichische Post 711 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Pölzl neuer Post-Chef (15.06.2009) 712 Ibid. 713 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Neuer Postchef: Der SPÖ gehen die Manager aus (15.06.2009); Homepage Der
Standard: Pölzl neuer Post-Chef (15.06.2009) 714 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Pölzl neuer Post-Chef (15.06.2009) 715 cf. Homepage APA OTS: Walter Oblin als Finanzvorstand der Post wiederbestellt (11.11.2014) 716 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Vorstand 717 Ibid. 718 Ibid. 719 cf. Homepage Die Presse: ÖIAG-Chef: „Steirerblut“ für die Österreichische Post (04.03.2011)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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With regard to the Supervisory Board, the Austrian Post Group has declared its compliance with
the Corporate Governance Codex and its C-rule 53 which states that the members of the Supervi-
sory Board have to be independent in the sense that they are not family members of a Management
Board member, they are not part of the Supervisory Board for longer than 15 years, they are not
in the Management Board of another company and have not been part of audits of other companies
within the last three years.720 Moreover, the members are neither allowed to have business con-
nections to the company or its subsidiaries, nor is the company allowed to grant them any
credits.721 However, one has to recognize that the independence of members does not refer to con-
nection to political parties which indicates that it is not prohibited to be part of a political party
and simultaneously hold a position within the Supervisory Board of the Austrian Post Group. The
capital representatives are therefore all announced to be “independent”; however, due to the fact
that the state-owned ÖIAG holds the majority shares of the Austrian Post Group, the chairman of
the Supervisory Board is also the managing director of ÖIAG and therefore Rudolf Kemler.722 As
already indicated before within this Thesis, Kemler cannot be easily connected to any political
party; despite his connections to the Austrian industry and his leadership in the Viennese industrial
association.723 All other capital representatives cannot be connected directly to any political party.
6.2.6.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
In 2009 the effects of the global financial crisis also hit the Austrian Post Group. The Management
Board decided to increase efficiency and rationalization efforts by reducing the material expendi-
tures by about 30 million euros and cutting back around 20% of planned investments for the year
2009.724 In addition to this, the company aimed at saving costs by deciding not to expand or to
replace expiring contracts but rather make use of external partners.725 Thus, the organization in-
tended to save costs by keeping the collection and sorting but outsourcing the delivery of mails
and parcels through the integration of private organizations into its postal system.726 This change
concerned about 5% of the 11,000 employees and included 24 communities.727
720 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Aufsichtsrat 721 Ibid. 722 Ibid. 723 cf. Homepage Kurier: Rudolf Kemler neuer Chef der ÖIAG (07.09.2012) 724 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Hauptversammlung der Österreichischen Post AG
(06.05.2009) 725 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Post: Pressearchiv: Keine Kündigungen – 2009 wirtschaftlich
schwieriges Umfeld erzwingt Einstellstopp (14.05.2009) 726 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Freiwerdende Stellen werden in der Briefzustellung durch
Zustellpartner ausgeglichen (14.05.2009) 727 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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During the first months in 2009, the Austrian Post Group reported significant reductions in both
operative revenues and EBIT; the first declined by around 2.4% and the latter by around 4.3%.728
Moreover, the daily business of the company reduced due to the recession and its consequences
which manifested in a decline of 4.6% in business in the division “Brief”.729 The corporation fur-
thermore claims that the agreed wage increase of 3.7% in 2008 led to high costs and therefore
increasing problems in 2009.730 Nevertheless, the balance sheet of the Austrian Post Group in 2009
shows, compared to other public companies during the time of recession, a rather positive picture
of financial resources of 340.4 million euros and liabilities of only 143.8 million euros.731
In an attempt of restructuring the situation for its employees, the campaign “Postler zum
Bund”732was announced and intended to shift employees from the postal service to other public
service companies on a voluntary base; however, with the financial incentive of granting them a
one-time payment of 10,000 euros.733 The general director of the Austrian Post Group Rudolf
Jettmar furthermore announced the intention of sending hundreds of employees from the postal
service to the local police; thereby aiming at the possibility of creating a win-win situation for both
sides.734 After several weeks of testing this pilot project, the police reported its satisfaction and
more employees followed and were shifted from the postal service to the local police stations.735
The necessary educational background was provided by the Austrian Post Group.736 However, in
order to achieve the goals of increasing efficiencies by reducing costs, the Austrian Post Group
not only restructured its employees but also increased its efforts in the promotion and expansion
of the Post.Partner model which generally aims at the creation of synergies and new partner-
ships.737 Shops throughout Austria can increase their portfolio by partnering up with the Austrian
Post Group and offering postal services in addition to their usual products within their stores.738
The aim of Post.Partner is to create a win-win situation by saving costs on the side of the Austrian
Post Group as well as diversifying the offering and increasing the amount of customers on the side
728 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post AG: Schwieriges Marktumfeld 2009
durch schlechte Konjunkturlage (19.05.2009) 729 Ibid. 730 Ibid. 731 Ibid. 732 There is no official translation 733 cf. Rechnungshof: Personalmaßnahmen im Rahmen der Reorganisation der Österreichischen Post AG, Bericht
(2014/6): 285 734 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Postler zur Polizei: Post-Generaldirektor Jettmar sieht
Potential für mehr Übertritte (02.09.2009) 735 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: „Post-Polizisten“ bald bundesweit im Einsatz (22.10.2009) 736 Ibid. 737 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Post.Partner; Rechnungshof: Österreichische Post Aktiengesellschaft –
Schließung von Postfilialen, Bericht (2011/12): 103ff. 738 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
75
of the shops.739 In 2009 the establishment of new partnerships and subsequent opening of new
Post.Partners all over Austria was heavily fostered by the management.740
The Austrian Post Group aims at a risk-averse strategy by attempting the lowest risk possible in
business and holding an equity ratio of around 40%, high accruals and no borrowing require-
ments.741 Nevertheless, the effects of the recession hit the company; a fact that can be retrieved
from its financial statements and balance sheets. While the operative revenues increased by 5.4%
from 2007 to 2008742 they declined by 3.5% in 2009.743 Moreover, the EBIT rose by 4.1% from
2007 to 2008744 but decreased heavily by 11.9% in 2009.745
The subsequent years were characterized by significant developments within the postal and logis-
tics market such as the planned market liberalization in 2011 and the increasing use of electronic
mailing instead of letters.746 Moreover, the internationalization of commercial streams as well as
the increasing possibilities to shop online brought both challenges and opportunities for the Aus-
trian Post Group.747 In order to react to new tendencies and different customer expectations while
simultaneously conquering the effects of the recession, the company decided to install an online
portal, simplify its offerings, reduce complexity, increase availability and protect customer
privacy.748 These attempts were built on four strategic pillars; namely the defence of its core com-
petences, the growth in defined markets, the increasing efficiency and flexibility in its cost struc-
ture as well as innovations and customer orientation.749 In addition to this, the Austrian Post Group
intensively focused on the further expansion of its Post.Partner model which aimed at the instal-
ment of one Post.Partner in each Austrian community.750 This goal aligned with the strategy of
gradually focusing on the customers’ needs and demands in a more flexible way.751 In April 2010,
the company reported 1,752 post offices; 1,125 self-operated and 627 operated by partners.752 In
order to achieve the goal of saving costs, the organization aimed at redesigning the structure of the
739 Ibid. 740 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: 34 neue Post.Partner starten in dieser Woche (06.07.2009);
Rechnungshof: Österreichische Post Aktiengesellschaft – Schließung von Postfilialen, Bericht (2011/12): 103ff. 741 cf. Österreichische Post AG: Österreichische Post Geschäftsjahr 2008, Investorenpräsentation (2009): 13f. 742 Ibid.: 10 743 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post AG Geschäftsjahr 2009 (16.03.2010) 744 cf. Österreichische Post AG: Österreichische Post Geschäftsjahr 2008, Investorenpräsentation (2009): 10 745 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post AG Geschäftsjahr 2009 (16.03.2010) 746 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Post will mittelfristig wieder wachsen und setzt
Konzernumbau konsequent fort (18.02.2010) 747 Ibid. 748 Ibid. 749 Ibid. 750 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Mehr Post für Österreich (25.01.2010) 751 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Mehr Post für Österreich (25.01.2010); Rechnungshof:
Österreichische Post Aktiengesellschaft – Schließung von Postfilialen, Bericht (2011/12): 103ff. 752 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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post offices by striving to close those self-operated offices which involved losses and replace them
with new partners.753 As a result, the company reported an increase of 0.3% in operative revenues
and an increase of 5.0% in EBIT by the end of 2010.754
In 2011 the Austrian Post Group opened up the prototype of a post office that included a bank in
Innsbruck and hence represented the new collaboration with the bank BAWAG P.S.K.755 which
aimed at the intensified cooperation between the banking and postal sector in Austria.756 The in-
tention behind this connection was not only to save costs and achieve synergies but also to bundle
competences and increase customer satisfaction by offering a professional and comprehensive
service in addition to longer opening hours.757 Besides, the company decided to save costs by
making use of synergies and internally reorganizing its divisions by reducing them from three to
two; namely “Brief, Werbepost und Filialen” and “Paket und Logistik”.758 Furthermore, the enter-
prise increased its sustainability attempts by introducing its concept of delivering mail and parcels
in e-cars, e-moped and e-bicycles in order to achieve the strategic goal of CO2-neutral delivery.759
The idea behind this is the fact that the company needs about 15 million litres of fuel and
180 million kilowatts energy each year which contribute not only to the cost structure of the
organization but also to its environmental balance.760 Moreover, its employees travel about
200,000 kilometres per day in order to deliver the mail and parcels to customers; an amount which
needs to be tackled appropriately according to the Austrian Post Group.761 As a result, the company
managed to increase its operative revenues and EBIT again in the year 2011; the first by 4.2% and
the latter by 7.3%.762
In addition to cost savings through changes in internal and external structures and partnerships,
the company gradually focused on its online presence and the development of online tools and
services for customers throughout the years 2011 and 2012.763 Examples include the information
of customers via e-mail and text message when their mail or parcel arrived as well as services such
753 Ibid. 754 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post 2010 (15.03.2011) 755 There is no official translation 756 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Offizielle Eröffnung der ersten Filiale neuen Typs von
BAWAG P.S.K. und Post in Innsbruck (13.01.2011) 757 Ibid. 758 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Aufsichtsrat stellt Weichen für zukunftsorientierte
Führungsstruktur (20.01.2011); cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Nächster Schritt bei der
Neuausrichtung (01.09.2011) 759 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Die Österreichische Post nimmt die ersten E-Autos in
Betrieb (05.10.2011) 760 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post stellt CO2 neutral zu (07.07.2011) 761 Ibid. 762 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post 2011 (15.03.2012) 763 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv 2011; 2012
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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as online tracking, tariffs calculators and format templates for letters and parcels.764 Subsequently
the entity reported positive results for 2012; i.e. an increase in operative revenues of 0.7% and an
upsurge in EBIT of around 8.9%.765
Overall, the company managed to manoeuvre through the phase of recession by implementing cost
saving measures, using synergies, organizational restructuring attempts, collaborations and the
establishment of new partnerships through concepts like the Post.Partner model or the bank
alliance.766 However, the Austrian Audit Court indicates in its report that the Austrian Post Group
had only limited scope of activity due to the high dismissal protection of around 75% of its em-
ployees.767 Moreover, the report designates that the policy of sending employees in early retire-
ment throughout the years 2002 until 2011, the average age of retirement thereby being between
51 and 55 years, led to costs of around 39.3 million euros in 2012 and 2013.768 Criticism is raised
by the Austrian Audit Court that both the ÖIAG as owner of the Austrian Post Group as well as
its Management Board did not specify enough efforts to keep employees but rather focused on the
model of sending them into retirement early; a model which ultimately aims at the upheaval of
costs from the company to the state and will cost approximately 187.66 million euros more in the
years from 2014 until 2021.769 The report specifies that the average age of retirement for an
employee of the Austrian Post Group is 53.6 years while the average age of retirement of a usual
civil servant lies at 60.5 years and the legal retirement age at 65 years.770 The time between 53 years
and 65 years of a former Austrian Post Group employee costs the state around 450,000 euros.771
The Austrian Audit Court therefore recommends to implement stricter criteria for retirement;
especially early retirements.772 Moreover, quite contrary to the positive view of the Austrian Post
Group, the Austrian Audit Court sees the campaign “Postler zum Bund” and its subsequent
implications as verification needed and therefore recommends to check on whether there is an
actual need for those people in other public areas and how their tasks are designed.773 Indeed, the
764 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Post kündigt Paket-Zustellung per SMS und Mail an
(05.10.2011); cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Über uns 765 cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Österreichische Post 2012 (14.03.2013) 766 cf. Rechnungshof: Österreichische Post Aktiengesellschaft – Schließung von Postfilialen, Bericht (2011/12):
103ff.; Rechnungshof: Personalmaßnahmen im Rahmen der Reorganisation der Österreichischen Post AG, Bericht
(2014/6): 273ff. 767 cf. Rechnungshof: Personalmaßnahmen im Rahmen der Reorganisation der Österreichischen Post AG, Bericht
(2014/6): 275; cf. Homepage Österreichische Post AG: Pressearchiv: Klarstellung (14.05.2009) 768 Ibid.: 273; 279ff. 769 Ibid.: 281 770 Ibid.: 282 771 Ibid. 772 Ibid.: 358f. 773 Ibid.
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company should attempt a collaboration with the Austrian Employment Service AMS in order to
prevent high unemployment rates in the near future.774
The subsequent section of the Thesis deals with the detailed analysis of the Austrian broadcasting
company ORF.
6.2.7 Österreichischer Rundfunk ORF
The Austrian foundation ORF is the biggest media company in Austria and fulfils the public order
of terrestrial broadcasting.775 It is responsible for the neutral public information about economic,
political and social topics through its established platforms.776 By now these platforms built a
broad media network and include not only TV but also radio channels and online platforms.777
6.2.7.1 Legal base
The legal background of the organization is the law Bundesgesetz über den Österreichischen
Rundfunk (ORF-Gesetz, ORF-G), BGBl. Nr. 379/1984778 which regulates not only the duties and
rights, but also the tasks, competitive aspects, control areas and structure of the organization.779
The media company represents a federal public law foundation with legal personality and is head-
quartered in Vienna.780
In 2010, the comprehensive amendment BGBl. I Nr. 50/2010781 of several laws such as the
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz782, Komm-Austria-Gesetz783, Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003784,
Verwertungsgesellschaftengesetz 2006785, ORF-Gesetz, Privatfernsehgesetz786, Privatradioge-
setz787 and Exklusivrechtegesetz788 led to significant changes within the Austrian broadcasting
business.789 The company KommAustria790 was assigned with the legal control over ORF and its
subsidiaries thereafter.791
774 Ibid. 775 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 1; 2 776 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4(1) 777 cf. Homepage ORF: Offenlegung 778 There is no official translation 779 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 780 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 1(1) 781 There is no official translation 782 There is no official translation 783 There is no official translation 784 There is no official translation 785 There is no official translation 786 There is no official translation 787 There is no official translation 788 There is no official translation 789 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 50/2010 790 There is no official translation 791 cf. Rundfunk & Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH: Österreichischer Rundfunk
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6.2.7.2 Main tasks
The company is responsible for the distribution of contents via three Austrian-wide and nine pro-
vincial radio stations as well as two Austrian-wide television programmes.792 Its major tasks are
regulated in the law BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 and build the foundation of the behaviour of the people
employed there.793
The core task of ORF lies in the public service which manifests in the information of the Austrian
citizens about relevant topics in all areas; especially economic, political and social ones.794 More-
over, the company has to secure the understanding of democratic cohabitation and European inte-
gration.795 In addition to the fostering of public understanding and joint living, the foundation has
to consider a broad spectrum of interest groups; thereby mainly referring to people at all ages and
in all kinds of health conditions.796 The latter primarily denotes to the equal treatment of disabled
people and the promotion of their integration into the labour market.797 The appropriate public
information of the Austrian citizens, according to the law, also includes the information about
health, sports, nature, the environment and its protection as well as the principals of
sustainability.798 In addition to all these tasks, the law regulates that the media company has to
consider the importance of the legally recognized churches and religions.799
All these single tasks contribute to the overall mission of the company to pay attention to a diverse
design of its programmes; i.e. to offer the appropriate mixture of entertainment, information,
culture and sports for every Austrian citizen.800 Of special importance is the main evening pro-
gramme from 8pm to 10pm in which the law regulates the duty of broadcasting only sophisticated
content.801 According to the law, this should also contribute to the distinctiveness of the organiza-
tion compared to private and commercial broadcasting networks and consequently manifest the
quality of the transmitted contents.802 Besides, the responsible people and journalists employed at
the media company have the right of independence; thereby not only referring to the independent
media reporting but also to the independence of political influence and state intervention.803
792 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 3 (1) 793 cf. Homepage ORF: Der ORF 794 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (1) 795 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (2); (4) 796 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (9); (10) 797 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (10); (19) 798 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (14); (15) 799 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (12) 800 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 2 801 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 3 802 Ibid. 803 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4 (6)
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In addition to these tasks, connected to rights and duties within the broadcasting network, the law
regulates special orders concerning different areas of public interest. This includes the orders of
special interest channels within the areas of sports, culture, content relevant on a European level
and online offerings.804 Moreover, since 1996 the media organization is working closely together
with the Ministry of Education and Women and signed an Educational Media Agreement which
designates the transmission of knowledge in educational institutions for children and adults.805
6.2.7.3 Organizational structure
The Austrian broadcasting organization ORF consists of three major institutions, namely the Foun-
dation Board806, the general director and the viewers’ and listeners’ council807 which, together,
form the management of the foundation.808
The members of the Foundation Board are appointed by a variety of people. Six of them are
appointed by the federal government under the consideration of the circumstance that each politi-
cal party has to be represented by at least one member in the Foundation Board.809 Nine members
are appointed by the provinces and nine again by the federal government.810 In addition to this, six
members are appointed by the viewers’ and listeners’ council and five by the works council which
aims at assigning people that have either the appropriate educational background or an outstanding
reputation among the Austrian society.811 The Foundation Board and its members have to act in
the sense of a Supervisory Board of a public limited company and therefore consider due diligence
and responsibility towards the foundation.812 Hence the board has to accomplish tasks such as the
supervision of the management, the approval of transmitted contents in accordance with the quality
system, the approval of contracts, the control of the annual financial statement, consulting duties
in case of problems and the approval of regulations concerning the programme designs and coor-
dination.813
When it comes to the general director of the organization, the Foundation Board has the task of
appointing this position and subsequently, with the advice of the appointed general director, the
further directors and provincial directors.814 The general director is appointed for the period of five
804 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 4(b); 4(c); 4(d); 4(e) 805 cf. Homepage ORF: Bildungsmedienabkommen ausgeweitet 806 Official translation for Stiftungsrat 807 Official translation for Publikumsrat 808 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 19(1); Homepage ORF: Der ORF 809 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1) 810 Ibid. 811 Ibid. 812 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(2) 813 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 21(1); (2) 814 cf. Homepage ORF: Stiftungsrat
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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years and has to set general regulations for the design and coordination of the programmes on
television, radio and online platforms.815 Moreover, the position contains tasks of controlling other
directors, establishing long-term plans and visions in the areas of programmes, technic and finance
and contributing to the preservation of the quality system.816 The additional directors and
provincial directors are in their position for the same time period as the Foundation Board which
appointed them.817 They are hierarchically directly subordinated to the control of the general
director and each of them is responsible for the financial, economic and social aspects of the
television, radio and online programme within his or her area of concern.818 Table 2 provides a
brief overview over the current directors of the broadcasting company.
ORF management819
Name: Position / Area:
Dr. Alexander Wrabetz General Director
Directors
Name: Position:
Mag. Richard Grasl Commercial Director
Mag. Kathrin Zechner Television Director
Mag. Karl Amon Radio Director
Ing. Michael Gätzhaber Technical, Online and
New Media Director
Provincial directors
Karlheinz Papst Burgenland
Karin Bernhard Carinthia
Norbert Gollinger Lower Austria
Roland Brunhofer Salzburg
Gerhard Draxler Styria
Helmut Krieghofer Tyrol
Mag. Kurt Rammerstorfer Upper Austria
Dr. Brigitte Wolf Vienna
Markus Klement Vorarlberg
Table 2: ORF management
815 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 23(1); (2) 816 Ibid. 817 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 24(1) 818 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 25(1); (2) 819 cf. Homepage ORF: ORF-Geschäftsführung
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In order to provide a brief overview over the ORF network, the following table 3 includes its seven
subsidiaries which are, for the purpose of completeness, described shortly thereafter.
ORF subsidiaries820
GIS Gebühren Info Service GmbH821
ORF-Enterprise GmbH & Co KG822
ORF Fernsehprogramm-Service GmbH823
ORF Marketing & Creation GmbH & Co KG824
ORF-Mediaservice GmbH & Co KG825
ORF Online und Teletext GmbH & Co KG826
ORS Österreichische Rundfunksender GmbH & Co KG827
Table 3: ORF subsidiaries
The limited liability company GIS Gebühren Info Service GmbH is 100% owned by ORF and
employs about 200 employees.828 Its overall task is the charging of fees for the use of the public
broadcasting service; however, the entity is furthermore responsible for the distribution of the fees
among the provinces as well as public relations work to increase the number of users as stated
within the Rundfunkgebührengesetz (RGG) BGBl. I Nr. 159/1999829 which represents its legal
background.830 The company ORF-Enterprise GmbH & Co KG is responsible for the selling of
advertising time in the networks of ORF; thereby mainly referring to radio and television adver-
tising.831 The subsidiary ORF Fernsehprogramm-Service GmbH is in charge of producing an offer
of information, entertainment and service that fits the needs of electronic distribution on a national
as well as international base.832 The company Marketing & Creation GmbH & Co KG is respon-
sible for the production of material which accompanies the usual media content such as, for exam-
ple, tickets for events prepared by the organization.833 The subsidiary ORF-Mediaservice GmbH
820 Homepage ORF: Offenlegung 821 There is no official translation 822 There is no offical translation 823 There is no official translation 824 There is no official translation 825 There is no official translation 826 There is no official translation 827 There is no official translation 828 cf. Homepage GIS: Impressum 829 There is no official translation 830 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 159/1999 § 4(1) 831 cf. Homepage ORF-Enterprise GmbH & Co KG: Impressum 832 cf. Homepage ORF III: Impressum Online-Angebot ORF III; ORF Fernsehprogramm-Service GmbH 833 cf. Homepage ORF Ticketservice: Impressum und Kontakt nach § 5 ECG; ORF Marketing & Creation GmbH &
Co KG
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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& Co KG is in charge of consulting those responsible for media and information technology.834
Similar to the subsidiary ORF Fernsehprogramm-Service GmbH, the company ORF Online und
Teletext GmbH & Co KG is responsible for the production of a national and international enter-
tainment, information and service offering which fits the needs of electronic distribution.835 The
last subsidiary ORS Österreichische Rundfunksender GmbH & Co KG is characterized as a service
company in the area of broadcasting and additional broadcasting services. It is, amongst others,
based on the BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 and a member of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce.836
6.2.7.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
The connections of ORF to the government are most prevalent through the ORF Foundation
Board837 which consists of 35 members and acts in the sense of a Supervisory Board and General
Assembly of a usual public limited company.838 Six of those members are appointed by the Aus-
trian federal government under consideration of the political parties currently sitting in the Aus-
trian National Council.839 At least one member of each party represented in the Austrian National
Council has to be appointed in the ORF Foundation Board; 840 thereby consequently representing
the political interests of the party. Additional nine members are appointed by the Austrian federal
government itself and another nine are selected by the nine Austrian provinces each.841 Six mem-
bers are appointed by the ORF viewers’ and listeners’ council and the remaining five are selected
by the central works council.842 The regular term of office for the Foundation Board is four
years.843
The current members of the ORF Foundation Board and their political connections can be depicted
as follows. In May 2014 the chairwoman Brigitte Kulovits-Rupp was replaced by Dietmar
Hoscher. 844 Politically, this did not lead to any changes as both of them are known for being part
of the Social Democratic Party.845 Similar to Hoscher, the re-appointed vice-chairman Franz
Medwenitsch was chosen by the Austrian federal government; thus, he does not show any official
834 cf. Homepage ORF Mediaservice: Impressum 835 cf. Homepage ORF: Offenlegung 836 cf. Homepage Österreichische Rundfunksender GmbH & Co KG: Impressum 837 Official translation for ORF Stiftungsrat 838 cf. Homepage ORF Kundendienst: Stiftungsrat 839 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1) 840 Ibid. 841 Ibid. 842 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1) 843 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(4) 844 cf. Homepage ORF Kundendienst: ORF: Konstituierung des Stiftungsrats 845 cf. Homepage Der Standard: ORF-Chef Wrabetz hat „keine Wahrnehmungen“ über Vorgaben aus Parteien
(06.05.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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political connections.846 The member Thomas Zach was appointed by the Austrian federal gov-
ernment on proposal of the People’s Party, the member Norbert Steger on proposal of the Freedom
Party, the member Hans Peter Haselsteiner on proposal of the NEOS, Günter Leitold on proposal
of Team Stronach and Wilfried Embacher on proposal of the Green Party.847
The replacement of Brigitte Kulovits-Rupp by Dietmar Hoscher led to the resigning of Kulovits-
Rupp in the SP-“Freundeskreis”848.849 According to Kulovits-Rupp, the major reason behind the
resigning is the presentation of Hoscher as new chairman of the Foundation Board; a circumstance
which the former chairwoman cannot reproduce.850 Before his appointment, Dietmar Hoscher held
a variety of positions within the Social Democratic Party, amongst others, as Minister Secretary,
member of the Federal Council and member of the National Council.851 His connections to the
Social Democratic Party are, indeed, strong.
Thomas Zach is mainly known for his management function in the Austrian State Printing Office
which ended in 2013 and his collaboration with Christoph Ulmer with whom he founded the con-
sulting company Gradus Proximus Advisory.852 Since his appointment in the Foundation Board,
Zach is furthermore head of the ÖVP-“Freundeskreis”.853
The member Norbert Steger held a variety of positions within the Freedom Party over his lifetime.
He was party chairman, Austrian vice-chancellor and member of the Austrian Parliament.854 He is
furthermore known for having additional connections to members of the Social Democratic and
People’s Party and cached media attention in 2013 when he voted in favour of the re-appointment
of Wrabetz as general director; despite the order of Strache not to do so.855 The position in the
ORF Foundation Board is officially the last and only position the already over 70 years old Steger
holds for the Freedom Party.856
Hans Peter Haselsteiner is mainly known for his career in the company Strabag, his support in the
launch of the private railway Westbahn857 and his committment in arts.858 His political engagement
with the NEOS started with private investments in the new party and its medial presence and after
846 cf. Homepage ORF Kundendienst: ORF-Stiftungsrat: Die Mitglieder; ORF: Konstituierung des Stiftungsrats 847 cf. Homepage ORF Kundendienst: ORF-Stiftungsrat: Die Mitglieder 848 There is no official translation.
„Freundeskreis” stands for the unofficial name of the parliamentary groups within the Foundation Board. 849 cf. Homepage Kurier: Kulovits-Rupp verlässt SP-Freundeskreis (05.05.2014) 850 Ibid. 851 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Mag. Dietmar Hoscher 852 cf. Homepage Profil: Wie gedruckt (16.03.2013) 853 cf. Homepage OÖ Nachrichten: Zach übernimmt Leitung von ÖVP-„Freundeskreis“ (06.05.2014) 854 cf. Homepage Parlament Republik Österreich: Dr. Norbert Steger 855 cf. Homepage Profil: Norbert Steger: Wie der Ex-FPÖ-Obmann in der Partei umrührt (01.08.2013); Homepage
Kurier: FPÖ nominiert Norbert Steger erneut für den Stiftungsrat (18.03.2014) 856 Ibid. 857 There is no official translation 858 cf. Homepage Salzburger Nachrichten: Hans Peter Haselsteiner: Baulöwe mit Herz für Kunst (04.09.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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the entry of the party into the Austrian National Council, Haselsteiner was proposed as ORF Foun-
dation Board member; thereby continuously claiming the contradicting personal attempt to de-
politicize the media company ORF.859 The party and Haselsteiner recently faced heavy criticism
for defending the political course of striving for the legalization of marihuana and soft drugs in
Austria.860
The member Günter Leitold was chosen by Team Stronach after the initial appointment of Willy
Haslitzer, former ORF provincial director of Carnthia in the period from 2009 to 2011, failed due
to inconsistencies with the law.861 The law indicates that a possible member of the Foundation
Board is not allowed to inhibit the political position as Provincial Member of Parliament within
the past four years to date of his appointment.862 Haslitzer held the position of Substitute Provincial
Member of Parliament and even though discussions about whether the position as substitute and
not real Provincial Member of Parliament is an actual political position, this job led to the refusal
of appointing him into the ORF Foundation Board.863 Haslitzer, who expected more support from
Team Stronach, resigned from the party and subsequently went to the party Unabhängige Liste864
where he currently puts his effort in.865 His successor Leitold exhibits not as much media attention
and is basically known as investment banker for Capital Bank.866
Wilfried Embacher is a lawyer and since 2010 not only an appointed member of the ORF Foun-
dation Board but also partner in the lawyer company Ecker Embacher Neugschwendtner.867 So
far, there has not been much media attention about him and his political commitment to the Green
Party.
In addition to the members appointed by the parties within the Austrian National Council, the
Austrian federal government is in charge of appointing nine members into the Foundation Board.
One of them is the re-appointed vice-chairman Franz Medwenitsch who, as well as Franz Küberl,
does not exhibit any official connections to political parties and therefore acts independently.868
From the Social Democratic side, the members Andrea Brem, Rudolf Ertl and Andrea Schellner
859 Ibid. 860 cf. Homepage Kurier: Cannabis: Haselsteiner verteidigt Kurs der Neos (30.10.2014) 861 cf. Homepage ORF News: Haslitzer aus Team Stronach ausgetreten (05.04.2014) 862 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(3) 863 cf. Homepage Kleine Zeitung: Willy Haslitzer zum Stiftungsrat bestellt (28.03.2014); Homepage ORF: Haslitzer
darf nicht in den ORF-Stiftungsrat (01.04.2014) 864 There is no official translation 865 cf. Homepage ORF News: Haslitzer aus Team Stronach ausgetreten (05.04.2014); Homepage Kleine Zeitung:
Haslitzer will für Unabhängige Bürgermeister werden (20.10.2014) 866 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Bestätigt: Banker Leitold zieht für Team Stronach in den ORF-Stiftungsrat
(10.04.2014) 867 cf. Homepage Ecker Embacher Neugschwendtner: Mag. Wilfried Embacher 868 cf Homepage Die Presse: Die Neuen im ORF-Stiftungsrat stehen fest (23.04.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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were appointed.869 Also from the Social Democratic side, but not willing to take the position, was
the vice-director of the Medical University Vienna Karin Gutierrez-Lobos who also resigned from
the SP-“Freundeskreis”.870 Instead of Gutierrez-Lobos, the speaker of the Austrian Samaritan
Association Martina Vitek-Neumayer took the position.871 Despite the fact that the Austrian
Samaritan Association roots in the concept of social democracy, it officially declared its independ-
ence from any political party in 2012; thereby also including the Social Democratic Party and
referring to the associations Kinderfreunde872 and ASKÖ873 which, contrary to the Samaritan
Asscociation, are manifested in the statutes of the party.874 From the side of the People’s Party,
Herbert Fechter and Herwig Hösele were newly chosen; Rainer Rößlhuber was re-appointed.875
Furthermore, the ORF viewers’ and listeners’ council is responsible for the appointment of six
members into the Foundation Board.876 In 2014, the council’s members declined from 36 to 31
and the position of the chairman changed from Hans Preinfalk to Ilse Brandner-Radinger who
formerly held the position as vice-chairwoman and is known for being close to the Social Demo-
cratic Party.877 Four out of six members appointed by the viewers’ and listeners’ council are close
to the Social Democratic Party; namely Erich Fenninger, Willi Mernyi, Sigfried Meryn and
Daniela Zimmer.878 The remaining two appointed members Walter Marschitz and Petra Stolba are
connected to the People’s Party.879
Additional nine members are appointed by each of the Austrian provinces.880 The governor of the
province Vorarlberg Markus Wallner, who is a member of the People’s Party, appointed Alfred
Geismayr as a member of the Foundation Board.881 Geismayr is a business economist and lawyer
and known for being a partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers in Vorarlberg.882 For the province
Tyrol, Josef Resch was already appointed in 2011 when the former chosen member Helmut
Krieghofer resigned for the chance to apply as ORF provincial director.883 Both were appointed
869 Ibid. 870 cf. Homepage Die Presse: ORF-Stiftungsrat: SPÖ-„Freundeskreis“ verliert Leiterin (20.05.2014) 871 cf. Homepage OÖ Nachrichten: Personalrochade nach zwei Wochen im Stiftungsrat (20.05.2014) 872 There is no official translation 873 There is no official translation 874 cf. Salzburger Nachrichten: Auch Samariter verabschieden sich von SPÖ (14.09.2012); Homepage Der Standard:
Transparenzgesetz: Auch Samariter-Bund will nicht mehr Teil der SPÖ sein (14.09.2012) 875 cf Homepage Die Presse: Die Neuen im ORF-Stiftungsrat stehen fest (23.04.2014) 876 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1) 877 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Die Neuen im ORF-Stiftungsrat stehen fest (23.04.2014) 878 Ibid. 879 Ibid. 880 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1) 881 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Landeshauptmann und neuer Stiftungsrat „verkennen Aufgabe“ (14.03.2014) 882 Ibid. 883 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Josef Resch folgt Krieghofer im ORF-Stiftungsrat nach (09.09.2011)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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by the Tyrolian governor Günther Platter who is a member of the People’s Party.884 In the province
Salzburg, the social democrat Wolfgang Wörter was followed by Matthias Limbeck who is known
for being close to the People’s Party.885 Since 2001 the province Upper Austria is represented
within the Foundation Board by Margit Hauft who was appointed for the new period starting in
2014 by Josef Pühringer; a member of the People’s Party.886 The representative for the province
Lower Austria is Alberich Klinger who was appointed by the governor of Lower Austria and mem-
ber of the People’s Party Erwin Pröll.887 For Vienna, the tourism director Norbert Kettner, who is
known for being close to the Social Democratic Party, was appointed in the Foundation Board.888
The province Burgenland is represented by Brigitte Kulovits-Rupp who is close to the Social Dem-
ocratic Party and has already been described before.889 She held the position as chairwoman of the
Foundation Board and after her replacement resigned from the SP-“Freundeskreis”.890 The prov-
ince Carinthia is represented by Siggi Neuschitzer who was initially appointed by the party BZÖ
and has been re-appointed by the Social Democratic governor of Carinthia Peter Kaiser in 2014.891
The appointments of the nine provinces show a mixture of people related to the Social Democratic
Party as well as People’s Party, even though some of the representatives are not officially con-
nected to political parties.
The remaining five members are appointed by the central works council.892 In comparison to other
public companies, where about half of the Supervisory Board members are appointed by the works
council, the circumstance that only five out of 35 members of the Foundation Board are selected
by the works council shows a rather vague connection to the workers. However, the media com-
pany ORF does not officially have a Supervisory Board and compensates this by the Foundation
Board. It can therefore be assumed that this is one reason, amongst others, why the constitution of
the board members is different to usual Supervisory Boards. Overall, the political presence and
also dominance within this company is apparent; both officially and unofficially. On the one hand,
the appointment of political representatives as arranged within the actual National Council into the
Foundation Board is legally manifested in the law BGBl. Nr. 379/1984; on the other hand, the
unofficial nomination of political representatives happens through the appointment of provincial
884 cf. Homepage Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung: Landeshauptmann Günther Platter 885 cf. Homepage ORF News: Limbeck folgt Wörter als ORF-Stiftungsrat (15.11.2013) 886 cf. Homepage Bezirksrundschau: Margit Hauft bleibt im ORF-Stiftungsrat (2014) 887 cf. Homepage Amt der NÖ Landesregierung: Dr. Erwin Pröll Landeshauptmann, ÖVP; Homepage ORF: ORF-
Stiftungsrat: Die Mitglieder 888 cf. Homepage Kurier: ORF-Stiftungsrat „ermattet“ (11.12.2013) 889 cf. Homepage ORF: ORF-Stiftungsrat: Die Mitglieder 890 cf. Homepage Kurier: Kulovits-Rupp verlässt Sp-Freundeskreis (05.05.2014) 891 cf. Homepage Der Standard: ORF-Stiftungsrat: Neuschitzer sichert Landeshauptmann Kaiser Solidarität zu
(06.05.2014) 892 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 20(1)
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governors and representatives of the federal government; both sides characterized by political
structures.
6.2.7.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
The year 2008 marks the beginning of a period of necessary cost savings and the establishment of
actions and measures to accomplish them.893 Already in 2007 the company faced troubles due to
declining viewer rates, the need to set-off a variety of television series and subsequently a de-
creasing market share; the attempt to reform the programmes failed and general director Wrabetz
was confronted with new challenges.894 In addition to this, the organization faced severe competi-
tion from new media like YouTube, online movie portals, private podcast offerings and video-on-
demand offerings which can be transmitted via telephone lines.895 In October 2008 the company
searched for a new mission by the attempt to combine the new Web 2.0 technology with its clas-
sical tasks of radio and television programmes while at the same time having to deal with an op-
erative loss of around 60.5 million euros.896 In competition with private and commercial television
programmes, ORF was confronted with huge criticism when adapting their programme by in-
tegrating an increasing amount of US-based commercial series throughout 2009.897 Despite the
crisis and declining viewer rates for the previously designed programmes in 2007 and 2008, the
public criticised the company for not having a clear strategy and having to re-focus on its core
competences which, especially but not exclusively, also include its statutory obligation.898 More-
over, associations and representatives of the Austrian filming industry heavily criticised the cor-
poration for not sending enough Austrian material but rather series and programmes from
abroad.899
When it comes to the effects of the Great Recession, the report of the Austrian Audit Court in the
year 2012 indicates that the organization has accomplished to react accordingly by attempting to
save costs through decreasing the number of employees by 9.9% in the period from 2008 until
2011.900 This manifests in a reduction of about 700 employees.901 In the same time period the
foundation reduced its wage supplements by around 28.6% and between 2010 and 2011 it managed
893 cf. Homepage ORF Kundendienst: ORF-Stiftungsrat: ORF bilanziert zum vierten Mal in Folge positiv (n.d.) 894 cf. Homepage News: Reform der ORF-Reform kommt: Wrabetz spricht in NEWS exklusiv über neue Pläne!
(05.06.2007) 895 cf. Homepage Format: TV ist in der Krise. Und bekommt eine neue Chance (17.05.2007) 896 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Leidbild ORF sucht Leitbild (12.10.2008) 897 cf. Homepage Format: ORF ist am Weg zum Spartenkanal für US Serien (26.03.2009) 898 Ibid. 899 cf. Film Austria: Pressekonferenz: Die Krise des ORF und die massiven negativen Auswirkungen auf die
österreichische Filmwirtschaft (23.03.2009); Homepage Der Standard: Ö-Film und ORF-Krise: Den Kanzler beim
Wort nehmen (10.09.2009) 900 cf. Rechnungshof: Bericht Österreichischer Rundfunk; Follow-up-Überprüfung (2012): 449 901 cf. Homepage ORF: ORF-Stiftungsrat: ORF bilanziert zum vierten Mal in Folge positiv (n.d.)
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to save around 22 million euros by changing the contractual service rights.902 The change of the
bonus system also contributed to cost savings. It implied that bonus payments in the future will
only be approved for goals that can realistically be reached and contribute in a positive way to the
overall organization in the long-run as well as consist of measurable components.903 Besides, regu-
lations for severance payments were reformed and those directors signing contracts for the period
from 2012 until 2016, for the first time, did not receive the offer of severance payments after the
end of their period.904 This regulation roots in the new principle of only receiving something if
there is an appropriate consideration involved.905
In addition to cost savings, the organization intended to flatten its hierarchical structure by reduc-
ing the organizational levels from five to four; thereby re-structuring the responsibilities and short-
ening the decision-making procedures.906 As a result, it managed to accomplish its economic goals
and achieve a positive balance sheet four years in a row for the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.907
In consistency with the alphabetical order, the following part deals with the analysis of the OMV
Group as major Austrian enterprise where a significant amount of shares is held by the, already
depicted, public industrial holding company ÖIAG.
6.2.8 OMV AG
The OMV Group is the biggest publicly listed industrial corporation in Austria and specialized in
the extraction and commercialization of oil and gas.908 With over 27,000 employees in four core
business units, the company does business on a global level.909
6.2.8.1 Legal base
The company was initially founded in 1956 as so called Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung
Aktiengesellschaft (ÖMV AG)910 and since its establishment represents one of the most successful
industrial companies in Austria.911 In 1965 the law Übertragung der Anteilsrechte des Bundes an
der “Martha” Erdöl Gesellschaft m.b.H. und an der „ÖROP“ Handels-Aktiengesellschaft für öster-
reichische Rohölprodukte, BGBl. Nr. 194/1965912 manifested the transmission of shares from the
902 cf. Rechnungshof: Bericht Österreichischer Rundfunk; Follow-up-Überprüfung (2012): 455 903 Ibid.: 456 904 Ibid. 905 Ibid. 906 Ibid.: 451 907 cf. Homepage ORF: ORF-Stiftungsrat: ORF bilanziert zum vierten Mal in Folge positiv (n.d.) 908 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Über OMV 909 Ibid. 910 There is no official translation 911 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschichte 912 There is no official translation
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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two companies „Martha“ and „ÖROP“ to the public limited company Österreichische Miner-
alölverwaltung Aktiengesellschaft.913 The years thereafter were characterized by several openings
of gas pipelines and beginning internationalization.914 In 1987 the company decided to partly pri-
vatize for the first time and started the emission of 15% of its share capital.915 It was already in
1989 when the company decided to privatize additional 10% of shares.916 During the 1990s, OMV
heavily fostered its international expansion and opened up gas stations in the Czech Republic,
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia.917 In 1994 the Abu Dhabi based company IPIC918 bought
19.6% of shares and in 1996 additional 15% of shares were issued at the stock exchange. 919 The
company itself also bought shares; 25% from the chemical company Borealis in 1998, 10% of the
Hungarian oil company MOL in 2000, 25.1% of the Romanian oil company Rompetrol in 2002,
45% of shares of the corporation Bayernoil-Raffinierverbund920 in 2003 as well as 313 BP gas
stations and 139 Avanti gas stations in several countries in 2003.921 2004 marks an important year
for OMV as this was the year when the company decided a capital increase and subsequently more
than 50% of shares were in free float for the first time.922 In 2005 the company, conjointly with
IPIC, determined to buy 100% of shares of the chemical company Borealis and simultaneously
sell all Romanian Rompetrol shares.923 In 2008 the consortium ÖIAG and IPIC increased their
shares to hold 50.7% of the company;924 today the actual percentage held by the public ÖIAG is
31.5% and the percentage held by IPIC is 24.9%.925 In 2008 the company sold all acquired MOL
shares and in 2014 all acquired Bayernoil Raffinierverbund shares.926 With its increasing interna-
tionalization efforts, the company decided to change the name ÖMV into OMV in order to simplify
the term for global circumstances;927 a fact which also manifests the reason behind the declaration
of the company as solely with its abbreviation OMV instead of a full name like in other cases
within this Thesis. Subsequently, the major tasks of the OMV Group are depicted in more detail.
913 cf. BGBl. Nr. 194/1965 § 1(1); (2) 914 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschichte 915 Ibid. 916 Ibid. 917 Ibid. 918 IPIC stands for International Petroleum Investment Company, Abu Dhabi 919 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschichte 920 There is no official translation 921 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschichte 922 Ibid. 923 Ibid. 924 Ibid. 925 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: OMV AG 926 Ibid. 927 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschichte
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.8.2 Main tasks
The 2014 statutes of the company regulate not only the duties and responsibilities but also major
tasks of the company. Hence the company is responsible for its subsidiaries; i.e. their management
and eventual sale.928 Furthermore, the company’s major business is the production and extraction
of hydrocarbon and other mineral resources as well as their storage and commercialization for
third persons, stationary power sources, vehicles and heating installations.929 Complementary to
these tasks, the OMV Group is responsible for adequate services in relevant industries; i.e. the
planning, consulting and implementation in the areas of chemistry, electrical engineering, infor-
mation technology, insurances, licencing, mechanical engineering, transportation as well as tour-
istic areas like gastronomy and hotel business.930 All this also includes the instalment of appropri-
ate machinery, reinsurances, lines and pipelines as well as adequate waste management which is
also in the responsibility of the entity.931 In addition to the company’s business of installing, main-
taining and managing gas stations, it provides garages, car washes and authorized repair centres.932
Indeed, each business unit within the company is specialized on specific tasks and their appropriate
implementation; a circumstance explained in more detail within the following section of organi-
zational structure.
6.2.8.3 Organizational structure
The oil and gas company OMV Group is structured in a simple functional way; the Management
Board thereby consisting of five members, including the CEO and CFO.933 The corporation is
designed among four internal business divisions; namely OMV Exploration and Production,
OMV Gas and Power, OMV Refining and Marketing and OMV Global Solutions.934
The limited liability company OMV Exploration and Production GmbH935 represents the first busi-
ness unit and is concerned with the goal of searching, finding and exploring oil and gas all over
the world.936 The global activities include, amongst many more, countries like the Arabic Emirates,
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Libya, Madagascar, Namibia, Norway and Romania.937 The com-
pany’s strategic goals for 2021 include growth and the most efficient use of existing assets.938
928 cf. OMV AG: OMV Aktiengesellschaft Satzung 2014 § 2(1) 929 Ibid.: § 2(2); (3) 930 Ibid.: § 2(4) 931 Ibid.: § 2(6); (7); (8); (9) 932 Ibid.: §2 (10) 933 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Organigramm 934 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Geschäftsfelder 935 There is no official translation 936 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Exploration & Production. Was ist E&P? 937 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Exploration & Production. Weltweite Aktivitäten 938 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Exploration & Production. E&P Strategie 2021
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Moreover, the company aims at further acquisitions, intensified exploration tactics and increasing
integration with the OMV division Gas and Power.939
The OMV Gas and Power business unit focuses on the value-added chain of gas; thereby mainly
referring to gas as the cleanest fossil energy source and, next to coal, among the most important
producers of electricity in Europe.940 The strategy for 2021 concentrates on the maximization of
the value-added chain and thorough portfolio optimizations and expansions which should be
achieved by fostering the most attractive markets and building supportive infrastructure like pipe-
lines and storages.941 According to the OMV Group, Austria was among the first countries to
actively participate in the liberalisation of the gas market in 2002 and the EU subsequently fostered
the liberalisation by regulating that the gas trade is organized among juristically independent gas
providers in order to foster competition.942 Due to this the OMV Group decided to re-structure its
company and, despite the fact that the business division OMV Gas and Power is responsible for
the fossil energy source gas, it decided to demerge the business of gas transportation and storage
to specialized subsidiaries.943 For the purpose of completeness, the following table 4 provides an
impression of those subsidiaries; a short description of them follows thereafter.
OMV Gas & Power subsidiaries
Adria LNG d.o.o.
Central European Gas Hub AG
EconGas GmbH
Enerco Energy Inc
Gas Connect Austria
Gate Terminal b.v.
Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH944
OMV Enerji Ticaret Ltd Sti
OMV Power International GmbH
OMV Petrom S.A.
OMV Samsun Elektrik Üretim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.
OMV Trading GmbH
Table 4: OMV Gas & Power subsidiaries
939 Ibid. 940 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power 941 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. G&P Strategie 2021 942 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften 943 Ibid. 944 Still listed on the Homepage but already closed in 2013
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The Adria LNG d.o.o.945 represents a joint venture between the limited liability company OMV
Gas and Power GmbH, the E.OM Ruhrgas946 and Total und Geoplin947 and aims at the construction
of a re-gasification terminal on the Island Krk in Crotia.948 The public limited company Central
European Gas Hub AG949 represents the most important gas hub in Continental Europe and offers
a platform for the trade of gas via a virtual trading point.950 It is therefore of special importance to
the OMV Group and particularly the company OMV Gas and Power GmbH. The limited liability
company EconGas GmbH951 is responsible for the direct sale of gas to European business custom-
ers and international trading places; the limited liability company OMV Gas and Power GmbH
holds the majority of 50% of its shares while other Austrian energy companies hold the rest; i.e.
EVN AG952 owning 16.51%, Wien Energie953 possessing 16.51%, EGBV954 holding 14.25% and
Energie Burgenland955 possessing 2.73%.956 The company Enerco Energy Inc957 was established
with the sole purpose of simplifying the import and trade of gas in Turkey and the limited liability
company OMV Gas and Power GmbH holds 40% of its shares.958 The limited liability company
Gas Connect Austria GmbH959 is 100% owned by the OMV Group and represents the Austrian
transportation partner of gas for Europe; thereby taking responsibility over the commercialization
of transportation capacities and the maintenance of the gas-transit-network.960 The project Gate
Terminal b.v.961 again represents a joint venture; however this time not initiated by the OMV
Group but by the companies Gasunie962 and Vopak963 whose representatives aimed at the estab-
lishment of a terminal for liquefied natural gas in Rotterdam.964 The limited liability company
OMV Gas and Power GmbH decided to take part in the joint venture in 2007 by acquiring 5% of
it and consequently manifesting itself a good strategic position for liquefied natural gas in
945 There is no official translation 946 There is no official translation 947 There is no official translation 948 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Adria LNG d.o.o. 949 There is no official translation 950 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Central European Gas Hub AG 951 There is no official translation 952 EVN stands for Energieversorgung Niederösterreich – There is no official translation 953 There is no official translation 954 EGBV stands for EconGas Beteiligungsverwaltung 955 There is no official translation 956 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. EconGas GmbH 957 There is no official translation 958 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Enerco Energy Inc 959 There is no official translation 960 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Gas Connect Austria GmbH 961 There is no official translation 962 There is no official translation 963 There is no official translation 964 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Gate Terminal b.v.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Europe.965 The subsidiary Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH966 is still listed on the
homepage; however, as already indicated before, the company was closed in 2013 due to financial
troubles.967 The corporation OMV Enerji Ticaret Ltd Sti968 is a 100% OMV Gas and Power sub-
sidiary located in Turkey for the purpose of using chances in the increasing liberalized Turkish
market.969 The establishment of the limited liability company OMV Power International GmbH970
in 2007 marks the entry of OMV into the electricity business and includes all activities related to
electricity.971 In 2004, the OMV Group acquired the majority shares in the Romanian Petrom and
subsequently established OMV Petrom S.A.972 for the purpose of serving big business custom-
ers.973 The subsidiary OMV Samsun Elektrik Üretim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.974 is 100% owned by
the OMV Group and is located in Istanbul for the purpose of satisfying the increasing energy
demand in Turkey.975 The last subsidiary OMV Trading GmbH976 is also 100% owned by the
OMV Group and aims at the optimization of electricity trade by combining a diversity of markets
in order to increase the net value added.977
The business unit Refining and Marketing is responsible for around 4,200 gas stations in more
than eleven countries worldwide; in addition to owned refineries.978 According to the company,
gas stations nowadays represent multifunctional services centres in which refuelling the tank is
only one of a variety of possibilities.979 The strategy for 2021 refers to increasing operative rev-
enues through measures of de-investments, growing through the integration of the petrochemicals
business and optimizing the financial performance through re-organization and improved integra-
tion.980
The business unit OMV Global Solutions represents the shared service centre of the whole OMV
Group and, as internal service provider, aims at the fostering of professional consulting actions.981
In addition to David C. Davies, who is a member of the Management Board and responsible for
965 Ibid. 966 There is no official translation 967 cf. Homepage Format: Aus für Nabucco Gesellschaften werden geschlossen (21.08.2013) 968 There is no official translation 969 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. Enerji Ticaret Ltd Sti 970 There is no official translation 971 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. OMV Power International GmbH 972 There is no official translation 973 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. OMV Petrom S.A. 974 There is no official translation 975 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. OMV Samsun Elektrik Üretim Sanayi ve
Ticaret A.S. 976 There is no official translation 977 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Gas & Power. Tochtergesellschaften. OMV Trading GmbH 978 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Refining & Marketing 979 Ibid. 980 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Refining & Marketing. R&M Strategie 2021 981 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Global Solutions. Positionierung
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the OMV Global Solutions division, the business unit has its own management structure with two
additional members; namely Ana-Barbara Kuncic and Johannes Lainer.982 The unit employs over
1,500 employees and aims at the provision of services in the areas of Human Resources, Finance,
Facility Management, IT and even Occupational Healthcare; both nationally and internationally
for the whole OMV Group.983
The CEO, currently Gerhard Roiss, is solely responsible for business units related to the overall
functioning of the group itself; i.e. the business departments Human Resources, Technology
Office, Legal, Strategy, Development, Public Affairs and Communications and sustainability.984
He is not connected to any operative business units of the company.985 The CFO, currently David
C. Davies, is responsible for both overall group business units and operative business units.986 The
first, indeed, refer to finance based topics like Investor Relations, Internal Audit, Controlling,
Finance and Compliance while the latter refer to the business units OMV Global Solutions and
OMV Insurance Broker.987 The remaining three Management Board members are each responsible
for one business unit and connected operative fields.988 Manfred Leitner is responsible for the
business department OMV Refining and Marketing, thereby also including the department petro-
chemicals.989 Jaap Huijskes is in charge of the business department OMV Exploration and Pro-
duction and Hans-Peter Floren of the OMV Gas and Power department.990
For the purpose of clarity, this structure is depicted within the following figure 3.991
982 Ibid. 983 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Global Solutions. Positionierung 984 cf. Homepage OMV AG: OMV Organigramm; Homepage OMV AG: Vorstand 985 Ibid. 986 Ibid. 987 Ibid. 988 Ibid. 989 Ibid. 990 Ibid. 991 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Figure 3: OMV Group organizational structure
In addition to the Management Board, the structure of OMV contains a Supervisory Board con-
sisting of 15 members; ten of them appointed by the capital representatives and five appointed by
the works council.992 Due to the fact that the Austrian industrial holding company ÖIAG possesses
over 30% of the OMV Group, Kemler represents the chairman of the Supervisory Board; just like
in the Austrian Post Group and Telekom Austria Group.993 His political connections are analysed
in a separate part within this Thesis. According to the OMV Group, all members of the Supervisory
Board represent notable and qualified people within a vast variety of branches on a national and
international level.994
992 cf. Homepage OMV: Aufsichtsrat 993 Ibid. 994 Ibid.
Management Board
Gerhard Roiss
CEO
David Davies
CFO
Manfred Leitner
Refining, Marketing
Petrochemicals
Jaap Huijskes
Exploration &
Production
Hans-Peter Floren
Gas & Power
Operative
Business Areas:
OMV
Global
Solutions
OMV
Insurance
broker
Operative
Business Areas:
OMV
Refining &
Marketing
Petrochemicals
Operative
Business Areas:
OMV
Exploration
&
Production
Operative
Business Areas:
OMV Gas
& Power
Holding Business
Areas:
Development
Strategy
HR
Public Affairs
Legal
Technologic
Office
Communications
& Services
Holding Business
Areas:
Investor
Relations
Controlling
Internal Audit
Finance
Compliance
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The subsequent section of the Thesis refers to a closer analysis of the people within the Manage-
ment Board and their possible political connections.
6.2.8.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
There have been a lot of discrepancies and problems recently within the OMV Management Board.
First, the member Jaap Huijskes, who is in charge of the department OMV Exploration and Pro-
duction, announced his early withdrawal of the corporation in September 2014; officially solely
due to private reasons.995 Instead of staying until 2018, as fixed within his contract, he communi-
cated to ÖIAG managing director Kemler that he attempts to leave the company already by mid-
2016.996
Also in September 2014, Kemler talked to Gerhard Roiss about an early removal; however in this
case by mid-2015.997 Roiss has already been working within the company for 25 years; he holds
the position as CEO since 2011 and his contract officially lasts until spring 2017.998 The possibility
of an early dismissal of the CEO caught a lot of media attention due to probable compensation
payments totalling several million euros.999 However, already in October the speculations about
an early dismissal of Roiss by June 2015 fixed.1000 The reasons behind this seem to be internal
discrepancies with other Management Board members as well as the stagnating and partly bad
financial figures of OMV since his appointment as CEO.1001 There are speculations about the bad
internal organizational climate and assumptions that Roiss’ management led to the voluntary early
withdrawal of Jaap Huijskes as well as troubles with the member Hans-Peter Floren who also has
to leave the company by mid-2015 and therefore before the official termination of his contract.1002
The additional dismissal of Floren roots in former discrepancies with Roiss who, in August 2014,
attempted to empower his Management Board member by sending a proposal to Kemler with the
concept of splitting up the department Gas and Power.1003 The impression of internal power plays
and consequently following early dismissals led to a significant drop in the value of the OMV
995 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: OMV-Vorstand Jaap Huijskes geht vorzeitig (16.09.2014) 996 Ibid. 997 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Warum OMV-Chef Gerhard Roiss gehen muss (10.10.2014); Homepage Format:
Gerhard Roiss muss Mitte 2015 den OMV-Chefsessel räumen (14.10.2014) 998 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Warum OMV-Chef Gerhard Roiss gehen muss (10.10.2014) 999 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Warum OMV-Chef Gerhard Roiss gehen muss (10.10.2014); Homepage Format:
Gerhard Roiss muss Mitte 2015 den OMV-Chefsessel räumen (14.10.2014) 1000 Homepage Format: Gerhard Roiss muss Mitte 2015 den OMV-Chefsessel räumen (14.10.2014) 1001 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Warum OMV-Chef Gerhard Roiss gehen muss (10.10.2014) 1002 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: OMV-Vorstände Roiss und Floren müssen vorzeitig gehen – Nachfolge noch
offen (10.10.2014) 1003 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: OMV-Vorstände Roiss und Floren müssen vorzeitig gehen – Nachfolge noch
offen (10.10.2014); cf. Homepage Die Presse: Warum OMV-Chef Gerhard Roiss gehen muss (10.10.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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share.1004 In addition to this, Kemler generated the impression of inconsistencies due to the com-
munication of contradicting information. In the General Assembly that manifested the early dis-
missals, he emphasized that the reasons for them do not correlate with anything displayed in the
Stock Corporation Act; however, in an official interview with ORF he publicly justified the early
displacements by problems with the Stock Corporation Act.1005 These arguments led to further
troubles due to their indefensibleness. The Austrian Stock Corporation Act defines the reasons for
an early dismissal of members of the Management Board as the gross breach of duties, the inability
to manage the company properly or the vote of no-confidence from the side of the Supervisory
Board.1006 As neither of this happened officially, the arguments of Kemler turned out to be un-
tenable and had to be re-formulated; the Supervisory Board unanimously decided upon the early
dismissals based on the combination of negative internal developments and the bad financial situ-
ation of the OMV Group.1007
Connected to these troubles are problems with Kemler himself who was originally appointed as
ÖIAG managing director in 2012 by the then Minister of Finance Maria Fekter; a representative
of the Austrian People’s Party.1008 However, politicians from both sides, i.e. the Social Democratic
Party and the People’s Party, are not satisfied with his performance since the appointment and both
parties attempt to completely re-structure ÖIAG; thereby also appointing a new managing direc-
tor.1009 Indeed, this circumstance is discussed in more detail within the section 6.2.5 ÖIAG.
6.2.8.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
Similar to other companies, the financial success declined from the year 2008 to 2009; thereby
marking the consequences of the financial crisis. The company’s operative revenues dropped by
29.8% from 25.5 billion euros to 17.9 billion euros in 2009 and its EBIT dropped from 2.3 billion
euros to 1.4 billion euros.1010 Furthermore, the results from ordinary business activities dropped
by 47.8% from 2.3 billion euros to 1.2 billion euros and the annual net profit decreased from
1.6 billion euros to 716 million euros.1011 In addition to this, the cash flow from operative activities
declined significantly from 3.2 billion euros in 2008 to 1.8 billion euros in 2009.1012 According to
1004 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: OMV-Vorstände Roiss und Floren müssen vorzeitig gehen – Nachfolge noch
offen (10.10.2014) 1005 cf. Homepage Kurier: Noch-ÖIAG-Vorstand Kemler: Probleme mit dem Aktiengesetz (29.10.2014) 1006 cf. BGBl. Nr. 98/1965 § 75(4) 1007 cf. Homepage Kurier: Noch-ÖIAG-Vorstand Kemler: Probleme mit dem Aktiengesetz (29.10.2014) 1008 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Politische Planspiele in der ÖIAG (14.02.2014) 1009 Ibid. 1010 cf. OMV AG: Geschäftsbericht (2009): 72 1011 Ibid. 1012 Ibid.: 78
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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the company, the global economic crisis led to lower oil prices and subsequently less profit mar-
gins; however the corporation indicates in its financial report that its integrated strategy manifested
in a stable financial position throughout 2009.1013
In 2010, however, the company managed to increase a majority of financial numbers again; despite
the upcoming recession phase. The operative revenues increased to 23.3 billion euros and the EBIT
stayed the same.1014 Moreover, the results from ordinary business activities improved slightly to
1.9 billion euros and the annual net profit enhanced significantly to 1.2 billion euros.1015 Also the
cash flow from operative activities increased from 1.8 billion to 2.9 billion euros;1016 thereby in-
dicating an improvement of the financial position of the company again.
In 2011, Gerhard Roiss was appointed as CEO and consequently responsible for the subsequent
performance of the company; i.e. its financial statements and balance sheets. The situation of the
corporation further improved as the operative revenues increased again by 46.0% from 23.3 billion
euros to 34.1 billion euros.1017 Furthermore the corporation managed to slightly increase its EBIT
to 2.5 billion euros.1018 Both the results from ordinary business activities and the annual net profit
enhanced slightly; the first from 1.9 billion euros to 2.2 billion euros and the latter from 1.2 billion
euros to 1.7 billion euros.1019 However, the cash flow from operative activities decreased from
2.9 billion euros to 2.6 billion euros.1020
In 2012 Roiss managed to proceed the good course and further increase the operative revenues
from 34.1 billion euros to 42.6 billion euros.1021 Also the EBIT improved again slightly to
3.1 billion euros; just like the results from ordinary business activities which increased from
2.2 billion euros to 2.9 billion euros.1022 The net annual profit enhanced by 7.1% to 1.8 billion
euros and the cash flow from operative activities improved by 45.9% to 3.8 billion euros.1023
2013 marks a rather challenging year for the company due to the planned and implemented trans-
formation of the company from a downstream focused corporation into an upward focused one; a
circumstance connected to significant investments for the purpose of growth.1024 The operative
1013 Ibid.: 9 1014 cf. OMV AG Geschäftsbericht (2011): 70 1015 Ibid. 1016 Ibid.:76 1017 Ibid.: 70 1018 Ibid. 1019 Ibid. 1020 Ibid.: 76 1021 cf. OMV AG Geschäftsbericht (2013): 70 1022 Ibid. 1023 Ibid.: 76 1024 Ibid.: 4
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revenues stayed the same while the EBIT fell from 3.1 billion euros in 2012 to 2.7 billion euros.1025
Furthermore, the results from ordinary activities fell marginally from 2.9 billion euros to 2.3 billion
euros and subsequently the net annual profit also declined a touch to 1.7 billion euros.1026 Thus,
due to the adequate management of liabilities and provisions, the company was able to increase its
cash flow from operative activities from 3.8 billion euros in 2012 to 4.1 billion euros in 2013.1027
Due to the fact that the financial statement of 2014 is not published yet, there is no analysis on
financial data possible for this crucial year in which the early displacement of three out of five
Management Board members was announced; thus one of them voluntarily.
The following case of the SCHIG mbH shows a different picture and diverse developments con-
cerning the connections to the government and developments after the Great Recession.
6.2.9 Schienen-Infrastruktur-Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH
The company SCHIG mbH is considered as independent consulting and service provider in the
area of rail transport.1028 It is 100% state-owned and represented by the Federal Ministry of
Transport, Innovation and Technology.1029
6.2.9.1 Legal base
The legal background of the company builds the law Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung einer
Schieneninfrastrukturfinanzierungs-Gesellschaft, (Schieneninfrastrukturgesetz SCHIG), BGBl.
Nr. 201/19961030 which was introduced in 1996 and amended several times nearly every year since
its implementation.1031 Article 194 of the original Federal Law Gazette states the establishment of
the company for the purpose of financing investments in the area of public rail transport with an
initial share capital of 10 million Schilling and located in Vienna.1032 Throughout the years the law
was amended several times and in 2005, as part of the ÖBB reformation, the entity was trans-
formed from a financing company into a service and consulting provider; indeed, still 100% state-
owned.1033 The legal act of doing so was presented as a so called spin-out for the purpose of new
establishment and basically indicates that the SCHIG mbH was transformed into a new founded
1025 Ibid.: 70 1026 Ibid. 1027 Ibid.: 76 1028 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technik: Glossar: SCHIG mbH 1029 Ibid. 1030 There is no official translation 1031 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 1032 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 § 1 (30.04.1996) 1033 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Aufgaben und rechtliche Grundlagen
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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corporation with an initial share capital of two million euros and still located in Vienna.1034 This
amendment also changed the tasks connected to the corporation; a circumstance discussed in more
detail within the following section.
Then and now, and in alliance with the legal background of the ÖBB Holding Group, the com-
pany’s legal background is connected to the law Eisenbahngesetz 1957, BGBl. Nr. 60/1957 and
the law Bundesbahngesetz, BGBl. Nr. 825/1992; both of them regulating the rail transport in Aus-
tria.1035
6.2.9.2 Main tasks
As already indicated before, the company is 100% state-owned and represented by the Federal
Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology.1036 Initially, the company was founded with
the sole thought of financing projects and necessary investments in the railway infrastructure for
the public rail transport in Austria.1037 In addition, the corporation was responsible for the provi-
sion of services under the aspect of increasing liberalization in the railway market and infrastruc-
ture.1038
However, in January 2005 the tasks of the company changed due to the organizational change
from a financing company into a service provider of the state;1039 a circumstance already dis-
coursed within the previous section. Before the change, the company was mainly responsible for
the financing of investments in the railway infrastructure which also manifested in the conclusion
of contracts with third parties for the conjoint-financing of projects.1040 Connected to this, the cor-
poration was not only responsible for the financing part per se but also for all tasks correlated or
connected to this part and subsequently also additional tasks that helped in improving the situation
for the public rail infrastructure in Austria.1041
After the legal and organizational change, the corporation is still responsible for all administrative
tasks connected to the daily business of railways as stated within the Eisenbahngesetz 1957, BGBl.
Nr. 60/1957;1042 i.e. the establishment of registers of licenses and driving permissions as well as
those for vehicle occupations.1043 However, the company also focuses on new areas; for example
1034 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 § 2 (04.11.2014) 1035 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996; Homepage SCHIG mbH: Aufgaben und rechtliche Grundlagen 1036 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technik: Glossar: SCHIG mbH 1037 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Aufgaben und rechtliche Grundlagen 1038 Ibid. 1039 Ibid. 1040 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 Artikel 194 § 1; § 3 (30.04.1996) 1041 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 Artikel 194 § 3 (30.04.1996) 1042 There is no official translation 1043 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 § 3(1) (04.11.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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the task of appearing as a central settlement agent in the rail transport; thereby primarily referring
to climate and energy funds, terminal and connecting railway support as well as the support of
freight traffic.1044 Moreover, SCHIG mbH is responsible for the conclusion of Public-Private Part-
nership projects with the purpose of conjoint financing of innovations in the area of railway
transport.1045 As of today, the entity is part of two PPP-projects; both of them accomplished
through the establishment of subsidiaries responsible for them.1046 The first project was accom-
plished by the subsidiary Rail Test & Research Gesellschaft mbH RTR1047 and refers to the
climate-wind-tunnel located in Vienna which is unique in its kind and fosters tests on rail vehicles
under extreme climate and aerodynamic circumstances.1048 The tests build the base for the certifi-
cation and licencing of railway vehicles.1049 The second PPP-project was accomplished by the
RoLa1050 Regensburg Projektgesellschaft mbH RPR1051 and refers to the RoLa-Terminal Regens-
burg which represents the first cross-border PPP-project of its kind in this area.1052
One of the most important tasks of the limited liability company is the control of infrastructure; an
assignment which is considered to be a major support for the Federal Ministry of Transport Inno-
vation and Technology as well as the Federal Ministry of Finance in the area of rail transport.1053
In this sense, the company is responsible for the accomplishment of its mission of acting according
to the criteria of thriftiness, efficiency and usefulness.1054
Additionally, the corporation acts in the sense of a so called Benannte Stelle1055 which refers to
the fact that SCHIG mbH can be considered as accredited inspection department and notified area
for interoperability in the area of railway traffic and transport.1056 The company thereby acts in an
independent way and guarantees its customers that those employees responsible for the develop-
ment, assembly and maintenance are not involved in the same for competitors.1057
The company also acts as an engineering office and provides expert opinions on all topics related
to the rail traffic and transport; e.g. the safety of tunnels, the traffic itself, the technical aspects and
1044 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Aufgaben und rechtliche Grundlagen 1045 cf. BGBl. Nr. 201/1996 § 3(1) (04.11.2014) 1046 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: PPP-Projekte 1047 There is no official translation 1048 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: PPP-Projekte 1049 Ibid. 1050 Official translation for RoLa is Rollende Landstraße 1051 There is no official translation 1052 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: PPP-Projekte 1053 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Infrastrukturkontrolle 1054 Ibid. 1055 There is no official translation 1056 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Benannte Stelle 1057 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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employee protection.1058 In addition, and in cooperation with other engineering offices and experts,
SCHIG mbH offers opinion on hydraulic engineering, noise protection, architectural aspects and
waste management.1059
6.2.9.3 Organizational structure
The service provider SCHIG mbH is structured in a rather formal way. The organization is 100%
state-owned and consequently represented by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and
Technology.1060 Internally, the company is structured among four departments; namely the divi-
sion of legal aspects, personnel and procurement, the division of the promotion and traffic financ-
ing control, the division of notified body and infrastructural control as well as the division of rail-
way infrastructure services. As already indicated before, the company additionally holds 100% of
the two subsidiaries RTR and RPR.1061
The controlling organs of this structure are the management, the Supervisory Board and the proc-
urators.1062 The management is performed by only one person; namely Ulrich Puz.1063 The Super-
visory Board currently consists of nine members; the chairman Roland Schuster and vice-chair-
woman Ursula Zechner as well as two regular members from the Federal Ministry of Transport,
Innovation and Technology.1064 One member originates from the holding company Vienna
Municipal Works1065 and one from the Federal Ministry of Finance.1066 Another member is the
chairman of the works council and two are appointed by the workers’ representatives of the works
council.1067 The responsible procurators consist of three members; two of them are male.1068
6.2.9.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
As already indicated before, the company’s mission is to act in the sense of thriftiness, efficiency
and usefulness when it comes to its role as service provider and supportive consultant in the area
of rail transport.1069 Moreover, SCHIG mbH acts in the sense of the Public Corporate Governance
Codex (B-PCGK) which was introduced by the Austrian government in 2012.1070 The Austrian
1058 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Ingenieurbüro 1059 Ibid. 1060 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organigramm 1061 Ibid. 1062 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organe 1063 Ibid. 1064 Ibid. 1065 Official translation for Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG 1066 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organe 1067 Ibid. 1068 Ibid. 1069 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Infrastrukturkontrolle 1070 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Compliance
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Federal Chancellery claims that the codex aims at implementing international and national stand-
ards for the management and control of public Austrian companies and their subsidiaries.1071 The
ultimate goal of the codex is to increase transparency and make the role of the state more traceable
and comprehensible.1072
The connections to the Austrian government and politics are rather clear within this company. The
managing director Ulrich Puz entered the company ASFINAG in 2008 after his studies and sub-
sequent career as professor at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna.1073
He stayed only two years at ASFINAG before being employed at SCHIG mbH as managing
director.1074 He is known for being close to the People’ Party.1075
As already indicated before, the Supervisory Board consists of nine members; four of them, in-
cluding the chairman and the vice-chairman of the board, are also employed at the Federal Ministry
of Transport, Innovation and Technology.1076 Since the first of September 2014, the ministry is led
by Alois Stöger who replaced Doris Bures; both of them being members in the Social Democratic
Party.1077 One of the Supervisory Board members, Bernhard Bauer, is also employed as Ministerial
Counsellor at the Federal Ministry of Finance.1078 On the first of September 2014, Hans Jörg
Schelling, a member of the People’s Party, was appointed as the new Austrian Federal Minister of
Finance, thereby replacing Michael Spindelegger.1079 The Supervisory Board member Walter
Anderle is connected to the Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG1080 a company responsible for the
sustainable energy supply and public transportation in Vienna.1081 The Management Board of this
company consists of a mix of people connected to both the Social Democratic as well as the Peo-
ple’s Party which indicates that both interests are supported in SCHIG mbH with the appointment
of Walter Anderle.1082
Overall it can be assumed that the two political parties, i.e. the Social Democratic Party and the
People’s Party, are equally well represented within the company SCHIG mbH; mainly due to the
constitution of the Supervisory Board which includes people with connections to both. Moreover,
1071 cf. Bundeskanzleramt Österreich: Public Corporate Governance Kodex (2012): 6 1072 Ibid. 1073 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organe 1074 Ibid. 1075 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Ein Herz für Hinterbänkler (23.07.2010) 1076 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organe 1077 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie: Liste der Verkersminister der
Zweiten Republik 1078 cf. Bundesministerium für Finanzen: Geschäfts- und Personaleinteilung, Stand: 15.10.2014 1079 cf. Homepage Bundesministerium für Finanzen: Finanzminister Dr. Hans Jörg Schelling 1080 There is no official translation 1081 cf. Homepage Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG: Unternehmensprofil 1082 cf. Homepage Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG: Vorstand
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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the appointment of three members by the works council, in addition to the six other members of
the Supervisory Board, denotes a well-defined relationship to its employees.1083
6.2.9.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
The company first struggled during the year 2009; a fact which can be retrieved from the income
statements of 2008 and 2009. While the net financial income decreased from 68,416 euros in 2008
to 40,785 euros in 2009, the remaining profit decreased even more drastically.1084 In the year 2008,
the negative profit from ordinary activities (EBT) of 319,587 euros could be compensated by prof-
its from the previous year of 626,739 euros which led to a positive net profit of 307,160 euros.1085
However, in 2009 the negative profit from ordinary activities (EBT) increased to 323,089 euros
and the remaining net profit from the previous year of 307,160 euros could not compensate the
augmentation; thereby leading to a negative net profit of 15,928 euros.1086
The Great Recession and its consequences worsened the situation for the company throughout
2010. The profit from ordinary activities (EBT) further increased to negative 473,132 euros which,
together with the negative net profit of 15,928 euros from the previous year, led to a negative net
profit of 489,061 euros in 2010.1087 The ongoing consequences of the financial crisis led to a de-
crease in transportation and subsequently less market share for the public railways.1088 Moreover,
the lack of harmonisation among the railway services throughout the European Union led to an
increase of market share for more flexible private railways; consequently also worsening the situ-
ation for the Austrian SCHIG mbH.1089
The year 2011 was characterized by the attempt of growth and investments for the purpose of
building work places and increasing railway traffic.1090 Collective efforts led to a significant im-
provement of the net profit from ordinary activities (EBT) which augmented to a positive number
of 124,594 euros.1091 This result could reduce the negative net profit from minus 489,061 euros to
minus 364,367 euros.1092 Restructuration efforts throughout the year 2012 led to further, but only
slight, improvements in the net profit which decreased to minus 332,883 euros; thereby indicating
that the net profit from ordinary activities (EBT) was significantly lower than the year before;
1083 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Organe 1084 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2009): 83 1085 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2008): 89 1086 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2009): 83 1087 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2010): 85 1088 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Schiene verliert an Marktanteil (25.08.2010) 1089 Ibid. 1090 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2011): 6ff. 1091 Ibid.: 79 1092 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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showing a positive number of only 31,583 euros.1093 This result could be improved by the end of
2013 when the income statement shows an increase in the net profit from ordinary activities (EBT)
to 63,071 euros.1094 This, indeed, further decreased the negative net profit and by the end of 2013
the income statement shows a negative number of 269,811 euros.1095
The developments in the income statements of the company SCHIG mbH since the financial crisis
in 2008 and the subsequent period of recession show that the company still struggles with the
consequences; i.e. the slump in railways traffic and transportation. The significant deterioration of
the net profit in 2009 still affects the corporation, its tasks and future measures and, as can be
retrieved from the depiction of the financial situation above, the company still needs to recover as
even the latest income statement shows a negative net profit.
The next depiction of a major Austrian enterprise refers to the Telekom Austria Group and there-
fore the biggest provider of telecommunications services in Austria.
6.2.10 Telekom Austria AG
The telecommunications company Telekom Austria Group1096 is the biggest of its kind in Austria
and positioned not only nationally but also internationally in seven more countries; namely Bela-
rus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lichtenstein, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia.1097 However, in Austria the
Telekom Austria Group is represented with the provider A1; itself the leading communication
provider on the market with around 5.7 million customers in mobile telephony and 2.3 million
customers in fixed network telephony.1098
6.2.10.1 Legal base
In 1887 the responsibility for the telephone was transferred to the administration K.K. Post- und
Telegraphenverwaltung which represented the telecommunications and, since then, was under
public control for over 100 years.1099 It was in 1996 when the law Poststrukturgesetz was amended
and in this course, the administration company was transferred into a public limited company
named Post- und Telekom Austria AG (PTA AG).1100 The public holding company Post und
Telekommunikationsbeteiligungsverwaltungsgesellschaft (PTBG) owned 100% of the shares of
1093 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2012): 75 1094 cf. SCHIG mbH: Geschäftsbericht (2013): 83 1095 Ibid. 1096 Official translation for Telekom Austria AG 1097 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Über uns 1098 cf. Homepage A1: Unternehmensprofil 1099 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschichte 1100 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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PTA AG and even though the postal and telecommunications part of the company each held their
own businesses, all of them were under state-control.1101
In 1998 the complete liberalisation of the telecommunications market in Austria led to the separa-
tion of PTA AG and subsequently the fact that the Telekom Austria Group turned into a separate
business.1102 The legal background for this was represented by the law Telekommunikationsgesetz
BGBl. I Nr. 100/19971103 which was amended several times over the years thereafter.
In January 2000 the PTBG was transferred into the ownership of the industrial holding company
ÖIAG which thereafter held 44.4% of shares in the Telekom Austria Group when its shares quoted
for the first time at the stock exchange in Vienna and New York.1104 After going public, the Tele-
kom Austria Group decided to expand its foreign presence and open up subsidiaries as well as
obtain shares in other telecommunications companies abroad.1105 Telecom Italia initially held 25%
of the Telekom Austria Group shares; however, it decided to sell its shares between 2002 and 2004
completely and therefore increased the free float of shares to 52.8%; the rest still owned by the
Austrian ÖIAG.1106 Yet, the industrial holding company itself decided to sell 85 million shares and
consequently increased the free float of shares again to 69.8% by the end of 2004.1107 Over the
following years, the company extensively focused on the expansion and growth abroad; especially
in East and South East Europe and in 2007 the company decided to delist its stocks from the New
York Stock Exchange.1108
By today, the company’s legal background is based on the law Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003,
BGBl I Nr. 70/20031109 which aims at the fostering of competitive surroundings in the telecom-
munications sector in Austria in order to support the cheap, reliable and fair pricing of telecom-
munications for everybody.1110 The law regulates specific measures which ultimately intend to
create a modern communication infrastructure as well as secure communication services and the
safeguard of the interests of the public.1111 The law furthermore specifies that everybody is entitled
to provide telecommunications services as long as the provider acts compliant to this law.1112 How-
ever, these providers are legally controlled and the competition is regulated in case one of them
1101 Ibid. 1102 Ibid. 1103 There is no official translation 1104 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschichte 1105 Ibid. 1106 Ibid. 1107 Ibid. 1108 Ibid. 1109 There is no official translation 1110 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 1(1) 1111 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 1(2); (3) 1112 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 14
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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might get too powerful.1113 Of special importance for telecommunications companies is the limited
liability company KommAustria which is in charge of several tasks among the providers; like for
instance the distribution of frequencies, the approval of changes, the regulation of competition,
dispute settlements and the declaration of regulations.1114 KommAustria operates in cooperation
with the Telekom-Control-Kommission1115 which consists of three members appointed by the
Austrian federal government and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Tech-
nology.1116 While the first member has to be a judge, the second one has to have a technical back-
ground and the third either an economical or juridical background.1117 The public appointers indi-
cate a strong relationship to the government; something discussed in more detail within a separate
section later within this Thesis.
6.2.10.2 Main tasks
One of the major tasks of the Telekom Austria Group is, indeed, the comprehensive provision of
telecommunications services in Austria and its subsidiaries abroad. However, the repression of
fixed telephone infrastructure by mobile telephony and other electronic media led the company to
forced adaptation to new circumstances and the establishment of innovations in its segments.1118
One of its business segments denotes the machine-to-machine communication (M2M) which rep-
resents the automatic data transfer of a variety of electronic devices such as the washing machine,
the bicycle, the vending machine, the printer, the surveillance camera or even the dog’s collar.1119
The company takes responsibility over the connection of different devices in the private and busi-
ness sector and therefore accomplishes the duty of offering a flawless connection.1120 In the busi-
ness sector this responsibility refers to the management of car and ship fleets as well as the auto-
mation and remote maintenance of whole industries or asset tracking of machinery and vehi-
cles.1121 In addition to this, the Telekom Austria Group works heavily within the wholesale and
international sales industries by providing its customers with flawless telecommunications ser-
vices.1122 This also includes tasks such as consulting, international mobile device management, the
1113 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 34; §35 1114 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 120(1) 1115 There is no official translation 1116 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 § 118(1) 1117 Ibid. 1118 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsfelder 1119 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: M2M 1120 Ibid. 1121 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: M2M Unser Angebot 1122 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsfelder; International Sales, Wholesale
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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establishment of an international corporate network as well as global reporting and global account
management.1123
The strategy of the Telekom Austria Group is based on four pillars; namely the exploitation of
strategic chances, the optimization of its core businesses, operational excellence and convergence
in the offering of mobile and fixed telephony devices.1124
6.2.10.3 Organizational structure
The Telekom Austria Group holds 100% of its eight subsidiaries; each of them telecommunica-
tions providers.1125 In Austria, this subsidiary is the provider A1 which itself holds 100% in
22 limited liability companies in Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech-Republic, England,
Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Turkey.1126 In addition to A1, the Telekom
Austria Group possesses 100% of seven other major telecommunications providers; each of them
is depicted briefly within the following figure 4.1127
Figure 4: Telekom Austria Group subsidiaries
1123 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Products and Services 1124 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Strategie 1125 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Struktur; Struktur der Telekom Austria Group 1126 Ibid. 1127 Ibid.
Si.mobil
Slovenia
A1 Telekom
Austria
Mobiltel
Bulgaria
Telecom
Liechtenstein
Vipnet
Croatia
Vip operator
Macedonia
Velcom
Belarus
Vip mobile
Serbia
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The Telekom Austria Group is furthermore structured among a Management Board and a Super-
visory Board.1128 While the first consists of three members, namely Hannes Ametsreiter as general
director, Sigfried Mayrhofer as CFO and Günther Ottendorfer as CTO,1129 the latter consists of
15 members; ten of them elected during the General Assembly, four of them appointed by the
works council and one appointed by the staff association of the Telekom Austria Group.1130 The
Supervisory Board has installed three committees which are responsible for the control of balance
sheets and income statements, as well as monetary benefits for members of the Management Board
and the proposal of new candidates for vacancies.1131
6.2.10.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
The telecommunications industry in Austria can be characterized as being influenced by public
control and power; a circumstance which is predominant despite the fact that the industrial holding
corporation ÖIAG successively developed to a minority shareholder of the Telekom Austria
Group. In April 2014 the industrial holding company ÖIAG signed a Syndicate Agreement with
the American billionaire Carlos Slim, thereby agreeing that the Mexican telecommunications pro-
vider América Móvil holds sole control over the Telekom Austria Group in the future.1132 The
contract led to a mandatory offer and América Móvil proposed all small shareholders 7.15 euros
per share; thereby aiming at acquiring as much of the 44% free float shares as possible.1133
Although not all shareholders agreed, Slim managed to acquire shares for around 57.6 billion euros
and conclusively over 50% of the Telekom Austria Group which makes América Móvil the ma-
jority shareholder.1134 In return for the Syndicate Agreement, ÖIAG received veto rights.1135 This
change leads to the following shareholder structure; América Móvil holding 59.7% of shares,
ÖIAG owning 28.4% of shares and 11.9% of shares which remain in free float.1136 The Syndicate
Agreement also included an increase in stock capital by the end of the year 2014 and in November
2014, the shareholders ÖIAG and América Móvil decided upon an increase of one billion euros;
604 million euros provided by Carlos Slim and 287 million euros provided by ÖIAG.1137 The rest
1128 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Group 1129 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Vorstand 1130 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Aufsichtsrat 1131 Ibid. 1132 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Österreich nicht mehr größter Telekom Aktionär (15.07.2014) 1133 Ibid. 1134 Ibid. 1135 Ibid. 1136 cf. Homepage Format: Kapitalspritze für die Telekom: ÖIAG und America Movil stemmen 891 Millionen Euro
(07.11.2014) 1137 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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of 109 million euros had to be provided by the free float shareholders in order not to decrease their
holding percentage.1138
When having a look at the internal controlling structure of the Telekom Austria Group, the
following can be communicated. The CEO Hannes Ametsreiter started his career in the private
industry before becoming product manager at the mobilkom Austria and managing director of
marketing and sales thereafter.1139 He worked his way up the hierarchy within the company and in
2009 became CEO of the Telekom Austria Group as well as CEO of A1 in 2010.1140 He received
several awards over the years and even though he is not officially related to any political party, he
is a member of the Management Board of the global industrial association GSMA1141 which indi-
cates connections to topics relevant for companies, rather than workers.1142
The CFO Sigfried Mayrhofer was appointed this year as predecessor of Hans Tschuden who was
eliminated by the Supervisory Board three years before the official end of his contract.1143 He
started his career in the company VOEST and, similar to the CEO, after entering the Telekom
Austria Group worked his way up the hierarchy by holding a variety of leading positions within
the company.1144 Just like Hannes Ametsreiter, he is not officially connected to any political party.
Günther Ottendorfer as the CTO possesses over 20 years of experience in the area of telecommu-
nications.1145 Before being appointed as CTO in the Management Board in 2013, he contributed
to the foundation of max.mobil in Austria and collected management experience as CTO for T-
Mobile Austria, Germany and technological director for T-Mobile international.1146 He further-
more worked in Australia in the Management Board of Optus Singtel; the second biggest telecom-
munications provider there.1147 Günther Ottendorfer was appointed as third member of the Man-
agement Board in an extraordinary meeting with the purpose of helping in the future development
of the fourth telecommunications generation LTE.1148
1138 Ibid. 1139 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Hannes Ametsreiter Chief Executive Officer, Telekom Austria Group
Chief Executive Officer A1 1140 Ibid. 1141 GSMA stands for Groupe Speciale Mobile Association 1142 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Hannes Ametsreiter Chief Executive Officer, Telekom Austria Group
Chief Executive Officer A1 1143 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Telekom Austria: Sigfried Mayrhofer neuer CFO für ein Jahr (06.05.2014) 1144 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Siegfried Mayrhofer Chief Financial Officer, Telekom Austria Group
Chief Financial Officer A1 1145 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Günther Ottendorfer Chief Technology Officer, Telekom Austria Group 1146 Ibid. 1147 Ibid. 1148 cf. Homepage APA OTS: Günther Ottendorfer zum CTO der Telekom Austria Group bestellt (04.04.2013);
Homepage Der Standard: Telekom-Vorstand nimmt Günther Ottendorfer auf (02.04.2013)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The Supervisory Board of the Telekom Austria Group constitutes of 10 general members and five
members appointed by the works council.1149 Since 2012, the chairman of the Supervisory Board
is Rudolf Kemler; the general manager of the industrial holding company ÖIAG and therefore also
the chairman of the Austrian Post Group and OMV Group.1150 Despite the fact that he holds several
additional positions, amongst others as a member of the Advisory Board at the Webster University
Vienna or as a member of the Management Board at the Viennese industrial association, he cannot
be clearly identified politically.1151 The vice-chairman is the CFO of América Móvil; Carlos García
Moreno Elizondo.1152 Further members of the Supervisory Board that are part of América Móvil
are Alejandro Cantú Jiménez as general counsel, Carlos Jarque as director for international rela-
tions and Oscar Von Hauske Solís as CEO of Telmex International and Chief-fixed-line-operations
officer at América Móvil.1153 Additional members are the consultant Elisabetta Castiglioni, the
director for asset management and privatizations at ÖIAG Günter Leonhartsberger, the investor
Ronny Pecik and two members of the Philip Morris Austria limited liability corporation Reinhard
Kraxner and Stefan Pinter.1154 Ronny Pecik is known for his deals with the Austrian companies
Böhler-Uddeholm and VA Tech where he sold his shares with significant profits; however, not
without heavy criticism about his strategy of aiming at the sole achievement of short-term prof-
its.1155 He was also a crucial part in the takeover of América Móvil as he, as one of the biggest
direct and indirect shareholders of the Telekom Austria Group, sold his shares completely to the
Mexican telecommunications provider.1156 He is not only part of the Supervisory Board at the
Telekom Austria Group but still a huge investor and involved in several new deals; most recently
he bought the 101 years old Palais in the Schottengasse in Vienna; the old centre for the bank Bank
Austria.1157 Additionally, and conjointly with René Beko from the Signa-Holding, he bought the
development-project of the Bank-Austria-Campus at the Viennese Praterstern.1158 Ronny Pecik
can therefore be described as highly powerful and influential person in Austria; even without a
clear political position from his side.
1149 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Mitglieder des Aufsichtsrats 1150 Ibid. 1151 Ibid.; Homepage Kleine Zeitung: Rudolf Kemler, ÖIAG-Chef, im Porträt (07.09.2012) 1152 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Mitglieder des Aufsichtsrats 1153 Ibid. 1154 Ibid. 1155 cf. Homepage Profil: Ronny Pecik: Der härteste Kapitalist Österreichs im Profil (05.05.2014); Homepage
Kurier: Ronny Pecik: Der Regisseur des Telekom-Deals (27.04.2014) 1156 Ibid. 1157 cf. Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Ronny Pecik jetzt Hausherr in der Bank Austria-Zentrale (20.02.2014) 1158 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Signa und Pecik übernehmen Campus-Projekt der Bank Austria (26.09.2014)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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The relation to the works council is clearly defined and five members of the Supervisory Board
are appointed by it.1159 Only one member, namely Alexander Sollak, comes directly from the Tel-
ekom Austria Group and is employed as chairman of the Trust Committee.1160 All other members
are employed at the A1 subsidiary and either chairman, vice-chairman or members of the central
works council at the A1 Telekom Austria Group.1161
Despite the fact that the managing and controlling actors within the Telekom Austria Group are
not directly connected to politics, the overall management and control is. The circumstance that
the Austrian holding company ÖIAG still possesses over one quarter of shares of the Telekom
Austria Group leads to political influence in decisions over the future developments of the com-
pany; even though the majority shareholder is now the Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim. The
political connections of the company ÖIAG are discussed separately within the section 6.2.5 of
ÖIAG within this Thesis and are therefore not analysed further within this part. Instead, the fol-
lowing part deals with an analysis of the company’s financial and organizational developments
since the Great Recession.
6.2.10.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
In case of the Telekom Austria Group, the financial statements and data show that the recession
hit the company for the first time in 2010. Despite the fact that the operative revenues decreased
by 7.1% from the year 2008 to 2009, all other financial measures could be improved.1162 The
EBITDA margin increased by 40.1% from 1.3 billion euros in 2008 to 1.8 billion euros in 2009.1163
In addition, the operating result improved by 184.9% from 120.7 million euros in 2008 to
343.9 million euros in 2009 and the free cash flow increased by 10.9% from 756.2 million euros
to 674.0 million euros.1164 It was by the end of 2010 when the financial measures showed
decreasing tendencies for the first time. Not only the operative revenues decreased again by 3.1%
to 4.7 billion euros, also the EBITDA margin decreased by 9.1% to 1.6 billion euros and the free
cash flow dropped by 5.9% to 634.0 million euros.1165 Though, the company managed to increase
its operating result by 27.3% to 437.9 million euros; an outcome achieved mainly by the strategic
focus on quality, diversity, innovation and responsibility.1166 The Management Board declared in
its financial statement in 2010 that the consistent intense competitive situation as well as
1159 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Mitglieder des Aufsichtsrats 1160 Ibid. 1161 Ibid. 1162 cf. Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsbericht (2009): 2 1163 Ibid. 1164 Ibid. 1165 cf. Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsbericht (2010): 2 1166 Ibid.: 2ff.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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consequences of the crisis on the monetary market, like for example the devaluation of the rouble
in Belarus, led to a difficult situation and worsening results for the company and its subsidiaries.1167
With regard to the subsidiaries in Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Serbia and
Slovenia the financial reports of the Telekom Austria Group show that, while financial measures
such as the operative revenues, the EBITDA and the operative result exhibited consistently
positive numbers throughout 2008 and 2009, the year 2010 marks the beginning of negative results
for the subsidiaries.1168
The situation worsened dramatically throughout 2011. The operative revenues of the Telekom
Austria Group further declined by 4.2% to 4.5 billion euros, the EBITDA decreased by 7.2% to
1.5 billion euros, the free cash flow dropped by another 25.7% to 479.2 million euros and, above
all, the operative result dropped from positive 437.9 million euros in 2010 to negative 7.5 million
euros in 2011; the worst result since a long time.1169 The operative result of minus 7.5 million
euros has to be seen as the sum total of operative results of all subsidiaries; and in 2011, all of
them showed, again, negative results.1170 The operative result in Austria dropped by 42.3% due to
restructuration measures; in Bulgaria the operative result even dropped by 66.0% and in Croatia
by 18.0%.1171 All this, did not lead to negative overall operative results for the subsidiaries but the
declines led to significant worse situations for each of them.1172 Additionally, the devaluation of
the rouble in Belarus, led to the development of an operative result from 73.4 million euros in 2010
to minus 255.2 million euros in 2011.1173 All this contributed to the bad overall operative result of
negative 7.6 million euros for the Telekom Austria Group in 2011. However, the reasons for the
bad results are depicted within the financial report and specified as a further devaluation of the
rouble and hyperinflation in Belarus, restructuration efforts in Austria as well as increasing price
pressure and international competition.1174 Moreover, regulations on a national and EU-wide level
restricted the freedom of pricing by setting price ceilings and, in combination with the weak econ-
omy, this led to one of the worst financial statements since the foundation of the company.1175 In
order to tackle these negative influences accordingly, the company aimed at refocusing its strategy
by concentrating on the increase of fixed-line networks and acquisition of new customers by,
amongst others, diversifying the portfolio with the telecommunications providers bob and tomato
1167 Ibid. 1168 Ibid.: 4 1169 cf. Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsbericht (2011): 6 1170 Ibid.: 52 1171 Ibid. 1172 Ibid. 1173 Ibid. 1174 Ibid.: 14 1175 Ibid.: 15
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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which offer cheap conditions by waiving additional services.1176 In combination with the concept
of strict cost management, active tariff policies, investments and the effort to secure the position
as innovation leader, the company attempted to counteract against the consequences of the crisis
and subsequent recession.1177
The Telekom Austria Group thereby managed to increase its overall operative result again and
progress from minus 7.6 million euros in 2011 to positive 456.8 million euros again in 2012.1178
Yet, the operative revenues slightly declined to 4.3 billion euros while the EBITDA stayed the
same.1179 However, the free cash flow decreased again by 32.1% to 325.4 million euros.1180 Similar
to 2011, the company declared the reasons to be the intense international competition, price pres-
sure and price regulations as well as bad economic situations; especially in Belarus and Serbia.1181
As a consequence, the corporation refocused its strategy and attempted to optimize its core busi-
ness in the mature markets Austria, Bulgaria and Croatia by simultaneously achieving convergence
in the telecommunications area within these markets.1182 Additionally, the Telekom Austria Group
focused on operational excellence and strict cost management which included a conservative
financial strategy and management according to priorities.1183
The most recent financial statement of 2013 focuses on past investments and the future of the
Telekom Austria Group. It shows a further worsening of the situation for the company under the
aspect of investments and the goal of future profitability.1184 The operative revenues continued
their steady decline and decreased by 3.4% to 4.2 billion euros.1185 Moreover, the EBITDA de-
clined to 1.3 billion euros and the operative result decreased by 17.4% to 377.6 million euros.1186
The most drastic deterioration can be seen in the free cash flow which decreased from positive
325.4 million euros in 2011 to negative 716.7 million euros in 2013; thereby indicating not only
the investments accomplished within the previous year but also the financial capacity of the com-
pany and the probable inability to repay debts within the near future.1187 The strategy behind this
is also declared within the report and stated as the need to adapt to international circumstances and
react to the intense competitive situation on the markets.1188 Moreover, the Management Board
1176 Ibid.: 14ff. 1177 Ibid. 1178 cf. Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsbericht (2012): 2 1179 Ibid. 1180 Ibid. 1181 Ibid.: 13 1182 Ibid.: 20ff. 1183 Ibid. 1184 cf. Telekom Austria Group: Geschäftsbericht (2013) 1185 Ibid.: 3 1186 Ibid. 1187 Ibid. 1188 Ibid.: 5
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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declares in the report that the future trend of permanent connectivity and increasing demand for
data communication needs to be met with appropriate investments in technology, investor rela-
tions, innovations and compliance in order to achieve the goal of growth in the future.1189
The financial reports and income statements of the Telekom Austria Group show that the company
still struggles with the consequences of the crisis and subsequent recession and attempts to com-
pensate the negative results by further investments in order to meet future demands and trends.
Connected to this, the ownership structure plays a major role and even though the Austrian ÖIAG
is not the majority shareholder anymore, it exhibits influence through its positions in the Supervi-
sory Board.
The last case deals with one of the major public companies specialized in the generation of elec-
tricity; namely the corporation Verbund AG; in general simply designated as Verbund.
6.2.11 Verbund AG
This public limited company is focused on the area of electricity generation through hydro power
and can be considered as one of the leading electricity companies in Europe.1190 With the Danube
and a variety of rivers that flow throughout Austria, the country is known for being close to the
water and eager to make use of this water as energy source.1191 Verbund makes use of this and
generates over 90% of electricity through hydro power.1192
6.2.11.1 Legal base
The company’s history can be traced back to the period after World War II and restructuration
efforts thereafter.1193 1947 marks not only the year of the foundation of the company but herein
two important developments. As already depicted within the retrospection on major historical de-
velopments in Austria since the establishment of the First Republic in section 4.1, 1947 was the
year when George Catlett Marshall introduced the so called European Recovery Program, also
known as Marshall Plan, to conquer against poverty, hunger and chaos in Europe.1194 The exact
reasons behind the plan are still discussed today, but the foremost is regarded to be the interest of
the United States in the prevention of further communistic expansion throughout Europe.1195 At
that time, Austria was occupied by four victorious allies and can be regarded as a special case due
1189 Ibid. 1190 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Über uns 1191 Ibid. 1192 Ibid. 1193 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1194 cf. Bierling (1997): 17 1195 Ibid.: 15ff.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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to the fact that it received, in relative terms per capita and in relation to the GDP, more money out
of the plan than other European countries.1196 However, the victorious powers claimed their por-
tion of Foreign German Assets in Austria and in an attempt to save essential industries, like coal,
steel, aluminium, ore and also electricity from falling into Soviet ownership, the Austrian govern-
ment decided upon two Nationalization Acts.1197 While the first Nationalization Act of 1946, also
known under the legal name BGBl. Nr. 168/1946, nationalized, directly and indirectly, 141 enter-
prises in the area of steel, coal, electronics, oil, aluminium and ore,1198 the second Nationalization
Act of 1947, also known under the legal name BGBl. Nr. 81/19471199, attempted the establishment
of a new organization within the electricity industry1200 and therefore marks the birth of the Öster-
reichische Elektrizitätswirtschafts-AG1201 or Verbundgesellschaft1202 today known as Verbund
AG.1203 The company was 100% state-owned and received the public mission of re-establishing
the electricity supply in Austria.1204 Despite the fact that the corporation was operating with a
significant lack of capital, it built two power plants until the end of the 1940s.1205
In 1987 the company experienced a significant turning point when the second Nationalization Act
was amended in the law BGBl. Nr. 321/19871206 and thus, changed organizational rules for com-
panies manifested within this Nationalization Act.1207 The amendment made it possible for the
company to go public in 1988 and sell 49% of its shares to investors;1208 in more detail to 50,000
domestic and 20,000 foreign investors.1209 Moreover, the law regulated the transmission of state-
owned shares of certain special companies into the ownership of Verbund for the amount of six
billion Schilling.1210
For the purpose of completeness, table 5 provides a brief overview over the special companies
transferred to Verbund in 1987.1211
1196 cf. Seidel (2005): 299 1197 cf. Weber (1964): 69; Langer (1966): 47; Deutsch (1978): 23ff.; Turnheim (2009): 31 1198 cf. Turnheim (2009): 34 1199 There is no official translation 1200 cf. Weber (1964): 268ff. 1201 There is no official translation 1202 There is no official translation 1203 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1204 Ibid. 1205 Ibid. 1206 There is no official translation 1207 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987; Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1208 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987 Artikel II (2) 1209 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1210 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987 Artikel II (1) 1211 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987 Anlage zu Artikel II
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Special companies1212
Österreichische Donaukraftwerke AG1213
Österreichische Draukraftwerke AG1214
Österreichisch-Bayerische Kraftwerke AG1215
Donaukraftwerk Jochenstein AG1216
Ennskraftwerke AG1217
Tauernkraftwerke AG1218
Verbundkraft Elektrizitätswerke GmbH1219
Table 5: Special companies transferred to Verbund AG
The joining of the European Union in 1995 and its inherent liberalization concept, led to increasing
competition and subsequent pressure on the company.1220 The law Rechtsvorschrift für Eigentums-
verhältnisse an den Unternehmen der österreichischen Elektrizitätswirtschaft, BGBl. I
Nr. 143/19981221 regulated the ownership structure of all companies in the area of electricity and
hydroelectric power generation in Austria.1222 In an attempt to react to the liberalization of the
former quasi regulated electricity market, the company heavily fostered internationalization and
expansion within Europe throughout the early 2000s.1223 By 2005, the corporation was represented
in more than 20 countries with 13 subsidiaries in Europe and one in Turkey.1224 In 2010, after
63 years of history, the company decided to change its official name Österreichische Elektri-
zitätswirtschafts-AG into Verbund AG1225 and increase its initial share capital.1226
6.2.11.2 Main tasks
In general, the company can be regarded as having five core tasks. One of the major tasks is the
generation of electricity, i.e. the provision of electricity for private households and businesses;
1212 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte; BGBl. Nr. 321/1987 Anlage zu Artikel II 1213 There is no official translation 1214 There is no official translation 1215 There is no official translation 1216 There is no official translation 1217 There is no official translation 1218 There is no official translation 1219 There is no official translation 1220 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1221 There is no official translation 1222 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 143/1998 § 4 1223 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1224 Ibid. 1225 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1226 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 86/2010 § 1
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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mainly generated by hydroelectric power plants.1227 The company thereby considers the environ-
ment not only as contributor but, moreover, as important part in the whole electricity circle.1228
Due to the fact that Verbund generates over 90% of electricity through water energy, the whole
philosophy circles around sustainability and environmental friendly methods.1229 One third of the
area around its power plants is considered as nature reserve and protected area and the company
annually invests around 45 million euros in environmental projects to protect the domestic fauna
and flora.1230 Core locations within this business area are Albania, France, Germany and
Romania.1231
The second key task refers to the transmission of electricity; a task accomplished by the fact that
the company owns the biggest and most efficient high-voltage grid in Austria.1232 The transporta-
tion of electricity is in the responsibility of the subsidiary Austrian Power Grid AG (APG)1233
which is 100% owned by Verbund.1234 APG transports around half of the electricity needed within
Austria.1235
The subsidiary Verbund Trading GmbH1236 is responsible for the third task, namely the trade of
electricity; domestically and throughout Europe.1237 The centre of the limited liability company is
located in Vienna and from there the subsidiary trades electricity at the most important energy
stock markets in London, Paris, Rome and others.1238 In addition to electricity, the company trades
with emission certificates and so called Green-certificates which are a tradable commodity and
represent the environmental value of renewable energy.1239
Since 2005, the company participates in the field of directly selling and distributing electricity in
the liberalized domestic electricity market.1240 Since then, it managed to acquire over 320,000 pri-
vate household customers who obtain their electricity 100% from hydroelectric power plants.1241
1227 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Strom aus Wasserkraft 1228 Ibid. 1229 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Wirksamer Schutz für Mensch & Natur 1230 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Strom aus Wasserkraft 1231 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Stromerzeugung
1232 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Stromübertragung 1233 There is no official translation 1234 Ibid. 1235 Ibid. 1236 There is no official translation 1237 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Stromhandel 1238 Ibid. 1239 Ibid. 1240 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Stromvertrieb 1241 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Indeed, in addition to private customers, the company also delivers electricity to businesses and
the industrial sector in Austria.1242
The last major task of Verbund refers to investments in innovations and the provision of electricity
services.1243 This mainly includes convenience services like home solutions for the control of light-
ning, heating and others, decentralized eco-packages like photovoltaic solutions, energy-optimi-
zations and energy consulting as well as e-mobility.1244 The latter denotes to a joint-venture with
Siemens Austria and the task of investing in research and development as well as the further im-
provement of electric vehicles.1245
6.2.11.3 Organizational structure
The ownership of Verbund is separated as follows. The amendment of the second Nationalization
Act constitutes that 51% of shares have to stay in the ownership of the state and hence the Republic
of Austria which is represented by the Federal Minister of Economy, Family and Youth.1246
Around 25% of shares are owned by the company EVN AG which is 51% owned by the province
Lower Austria, and the company Wiener Stadtwerke Holding AG which is 100% owned by the
town Vienna.1247 Five percent are owned by the company TIWAG-Tiroler Wasserkraft AG1248
which is 100% owned by the province Tyrol.1249 This indicates that, after the majority ownership
of the Republic of Austria, the next big portion of shares is owned by several Austrian provinces.
The rest, and therefore the minority of shares, is in free float.1250
The core markets of the company are France, Germany, Italy and Romania and it is structured
among 12 subsidiaries which, for the purpose of completeness, are briefly depicted within the
following table 6.1251
1242 Ibid. 1243 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Energiedienstleistungen 1244 Ibid. 1245 Ibid. 1246 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987; Homepage Verbund AG: Impressum 1247 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Impressum 1248 There is no official translation 1249 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Impressum 1250 Ibid. 1251 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Über uns; Impressum
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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Verbund AG subsidiaries1252
Verbund Hydro Power AG1253
Verbund-Innkraftwerke GmbH1254
Verbund Thermal Power GmbH & Co KG1255
Verbund Renewable Power GmbH1256
Verbund Trading GmbH1257
Verbund Trading & Sales Deutschland GmbH1258
Verbund Sales GmbH1259
Verbund International GmbH1260
Verbund Management Service GmbH1261
Verbund Telekom Service GmbH1262
Verbund Tourismus GmbH1263
Verbund Umwelttechnik GmbH1264
Table 6: Verbund AG subsidiaries
Each of the subsidiaries is controlled by two managers responsible for the overall business of the
companies.1265 The organization of the overall company is handled by a Management Board and
a Supervisory Board.1266 The first consists of four persons; Wolfgang Anzengruber as chairman,
Johann Sereinig as vice-chairman, Peter Kollmann as chief financial officer and Günther
Rabensteiner as additional member.1267 The Supervisory Board consists of nine capital represent-
atives and five representatives appointed by the works council.1268
1252 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Impressum 1253 There is no official translation 1254 There is no official translation 1255 There is no official translation 1256 There is no official translation 1257 There is no official translation 1258 There is no official translation 1259 There is no official translation 1260 There is no official translation 1261 There is no official translation 1262 There is no official translation 1263 There is no official translation 1264 There is no official translation 1265 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Impressum 1266 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Management und Struktur 1267 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Vorstand 1268 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Aufsichtsrat
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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6.2.11.4 Relationship to Austrian politics
Verbund can be considered as a special case due to the fact that its foundation can be traced back
to the period of reconstruction after World War II and the attempt to save the Austrian economy
by legally manifesting major industries in the first and second Nationalization Act.1269 The second
Nationalization Act built the ground for the establishment of the company and also regulated its
public tenet of contributing to the reconstruction and improvement of the Austrian economy by
providing a functioning electricity network and subsequent supply.1270 It was not until the 1990s
that an amendment to the Nationalization Act was signed and the company could grow and raise
capital by going public and selling 49% of shares.1271 This history and the companies’ develop-
ments throughout the years raise the assumption that the relationship to the Austrian government
has always been close; even after its initial public offering and further internationalization.
Since 2009, the chairman of the Management Board, and therefore CEO of the company Verbund,
is Wolfgang Anzengruber; a manager known for being very communicative and with a broad net-
work in the areas of economy and politics on a regional, national and international level.1272 His
former positions in the Management Boards of the companies ABB Energie AG,1273 ABB Öster-
reich,1274 Salzburger Stadtwerke AG,1275 Salzburg AG1276 and his position as CEO in the company
Palfinger AG1277 lead to significant networks within the Austrian economy.1278 Moreover, his co-
operation with the Austrian Federation of Industry1279 leads to essential political connections.1280
His predecessor was Ulrike Baumgartner-Gabitzer, former chief of the cabinet of the Federal
Minister of Economy Wolfgang Schüssel who is a member of the People’s Party.1281
The vice-chairman of the Management Board, Johann Sereinig, is known for having strong con-
nections to the Social Democratic Party.1282 He used to be the consultant of the Federal Minister
1269 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Unternehmensgeschichte 1270 Ibid. 1271 cf. BGBl. Nr. 321/1987 1272 cf. Homepage Industrie Magazin: Rang 5: Wolfgang Anzengruber (28.10.2013) 1273 There is no official translation 1274 There is no official translation 1275 There is no official translation 1276 There is no official translation 1277 There is no official translation 1278 cf. Homepage Industrie Magazin: Rang 5: Wolfgang Anzengruber (28.10.2013); Homepage Verbund AG:
Vorstand 1279 Official translation for Industriellenvereinigung 1280 cf. Homepage Industrie Magazin: Rang 5: Wolfgang Anzengruber (28.10.2013) 1281 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Ein Präsident als Kriegserklärung (30.03.2007) 1282 Ibid.
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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of Finance in 1984 as well as consultant and chief of the cabinet of the Federal Chancellor Franz
Vranitzky.1283
The position as CFO is the first job in Austria for Peter Kollmann who started working at renowned
companies such as Salomon Brothers International Ltd., Dumas West & Co, Lehman Brothers
International and Bank of America Merrill Lynch abroad after his studies at the University of
Economics in Vienna and London School of Economics.1284 Due to the fact that his appointment
was supported by the Austrian parliament member Wolfgang Katzian, who is connected to the
Social Democratic Party, it can be assumed that Kollmann is related to this party.1285 However, he
is officially a big trade unionist and not connected to any political party; although he was already
connected to the Austrian economy and politics before his job as CFO; for example the initial
public offering of the company Telekom Austria Group or the sale of the Austrian Airlines.1286
The fourth member of the Management Board, Günther Rabensteiner, was appointed in 2011 and
is responsible for the international agenda of the company.1287 Before this position he was the
manager of the subsidiary Verbund Trading AG.1288
As already indicated before, the Supervisory Board consists of nine capital representatives and
five members appointed by the works council.1289 The chairman of the Supervisory Board, Gilbert
Frizberg, was appointed in 2007.1290 Despite the fact that he resigned his job as financial referent
of the People’s Party Styria, he is still known for having strong connections to the People’s
Party.1291
The vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board, Peter Püspök, was appointed in 2000 and his contract
is valid until 2015.1292 He is the former CEO of the Raiffeisenlandesbank Niederösterreich-Wien
AG1293 where he served in the Management Board for nine years before retiring in 2007.1294 He
was appointed as financial referent for the People’s Party in 2006 and despite his retirement one
1283 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Vorstand 1284 Ibid. 1285 cf. Homepage OÖ Nachrichten: Peter Kollmann: Von Wels in die große Finanzwelt (07.03.2013) 1286 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Verbund sucht eine eierlegende Wollmilchsau (01.03.2013) 1287 cf. Homepage Bloomberg: Verbund appoints Guenther Rabensteiner to Management Board (GER); Homepage
Der Standard: Rabensteiner vierter Verbund-Vorstand (10.03.2011) 1288 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Vorstand 1289 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Aufsichtsrat 1290 Ibid. 1291 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Ein Präsident als Kriegserklärung (30.03.2007) 1292 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Aufsichtsrat 1293 There is no official translation 1294 cf. Homepage Der Standard: Raiffeisen-Püspök will mehr Qualität (03.09.2007)
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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year later, he still serves as the vice-chairman in the Supervisory Board of Verbund.1295 This indi-
cates that both, the chairman and the vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board, have strong political
connections to the People’s Party. The second vice-chairman Reinhold Süßenbacher is mainly
known for his engagement in the Austrian family-owned company Umdasch Group which he man-
aged for eleven years before changing his position.1296
The connection to the works council is visible at this company mainly due to the fact that the
Supervisory Board does not only include the nine capital managers but also five workers’ repre-
sentatives.1297 The head of the workers’ representatives, Anton Aichinger, is the chairman of the
group works council of Verbund itself.1298 One member, Ingeborg Oberreiner, is considered chair-
woman of the overall staff association and the three other members are part of the central works
council; two of them, Kurt Christof and Wolfgang Liebscher being in the position of a chairman
and one, Joachim Salamon, being solely a member.1299 The fact that three different forms of works
councils are represented within the Supervisory Board shows a distinct connection to its workers’
representatives.
6.2.11.5 Organizational developments since the Great Recession
The year 2009 marks the beginning of a troublesome time for the electricity provider; a fact which
can be retrieved from the annual report and the statement of the Management Board in 2009.1300
The record number of 2008 could not be met again and the main performance indicators fell. The
operative revenues declined from 3.7 billion euros to 3.5 billion euros and the operative result, i.e.
the EBIT, dropped by 9.1% from 1.1 billion euros to 1.0 billion euros.1301 The net result, i.e. the
consolidated income, fell by 6.2% from 686.6 million euros to 644.4 million euros.1302 Despite the
worsening of the financial situation, the Management Board emphasized the successful interna-
tional management and operations of the company; thereby mainly referring to the acquisition of
13 hydroelectric power plants at the Bavarian Inn from the energy company E.ON in Germany
and thus the biggest acquisition ever implemented in the history of Verbund.1303 Moreover, the
1295 Ibid. 1296 cf. Homepage Die Presse: Reinhold Süßenbacher (05.09.2008) 1297 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Aufsichtsrat 1298 Ibid. 1299 Ibid. 1300 cf. Verbund AG: Geschäftsbericht (2009): 4ff. 1301 Ibid.: 2ff. 1302 Ibid. 1303 Ibid.: 5
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
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company heavily invested in its additional core markets Italy and Turkey and re-focused its strat-
egy on the most important markets only.1304
However, the recession and its consequences led to a decreasing demand for alternative energy
and therefore decreasing business for the company. The financial situation did not improve
throughout 2010 and in order to further invest and keep its A-rating, the company decided upon
the increase of its initial share capital from 308.2 million euros to 347.4 million euros by the emis-
sion of new shares.1305 In addition to this, Verbund initiated several restructuration and savings
measures and sold some of its shares in power plants.1306 However, by the end of the year the
annual report shows that the operative revenues further fell to 3.3 billion euros and the EBIT de-
creased to 828.5 million euros.1307 Also the consolidated income declined significantly to
400.8 million euros and the free cash flow reached its worst figure of minus 1.0 billion euros.1308
While the company tried to calm its shareholders by increasing the dividend in 2009 from
1.05 euros to 1.25 euros, the recession and its consequences led to the collapse of the dividend in
2010; to a price of 0.55 euros per share.1309
By the end of 2011 the company managed to slightly increase its operative revenues again to
3.4 billion euros; however, the EBIT further worsened to 462.3 million euros.1310 In its annual
analysis, the company for the first time mentioned the difficult market situation and decreasing
economic developments; primarily due to factors such as the high debts of certain European coun-
tries and the US, as well as the nuclear accident in Japan which led to new debates about nuclear
power plants versus hydroelectric power.1311 Moreover, the company declares that mild weather
conditions and high energy prices in 2011 led to decreasing energy consumption; especially in the
alternative energy area hydroelectric power because over 70% of domestic energy consumption
can be traced back to oil, gas and coal.1312
In 2012 Verbund managed to increase its EBIT to 666.9 million euros and therefore improved the
result in comparison to 2011 and 2010.1313 Still, the operative revenues decreased significantly to
1304 Ibid.: 6 1305 cf. Verbund AG: Geschäftsbericht (2010): 6 1306 Ibid.: 7 1307 Ibid.: 3 1308 Ibid. 1309 Ibid.: 4 1310 cf. Verbund AG: Geschäftsbericht (2011): 3 1311 Ibid.: 15 1312 Ibid. 1313 cf. Verbund AG: Geschäftsbericht (2012): 4
6. CIRIEC Austria Etienne Koo
126
2.7 billion euros.1314 The management declared the year 2012 as a difficult one; mainly character-
ized by the implementation of further savings and restructuration measures.1315 However, the com-
pany emphasized the positive development throughout the year, despite the complicated situation,
and highlights its environmental efforts in the electricity sector.1316
In the year 2013, the enterprise managed to keep its operative revenues on the same level; yet, it
significantly worsened a variety of other performance measures. The EBIT fell from positive
556.9 million euros in 2012 to negative 269.7 million euros and the profit from ordinary activities
dropped from positive 415.6 million euros in 2012 to negative 672.6 million euros.1317 According
to the annual report 2013, the conditions for the electricity market throughout Europe further wors-
ened in 2013.1318 Bad economic conditions, overcapacities in the electricity market and the mas-
sive support of new alternative energies led to a decreasing trade of emission certificates; one of
the core businesses of Verbund.1319 Moreover, the entity declares the domestic demand for elec-
tricity as only slightly higher than in 2012 and even though this indicates a slight increase, the
dependence on imports amplified as well, thereby worsening the situation for the domestic elec-
tricity producer Verbund.1320 Overall it can be assumed that the global financial crisis and its
subsequent consequences, including the period of recession and worsened economic situation for
almost all domestic companies, led to significant troubles for the electricity company Verbund.
Summing up the examples, it can be adhered that the majority of the enterprises is concerned with
goods that relate to the greater good of the public like for example transportation, the establishment
and maintenance of appropriate infrastructure, the provision of electricity and telecommunications
services as well as the broadcasting of information and provision of gas and oil. However, while
some of them are completely public, and therefore fulfil a stronger public tenet, others are influ-
enced by external shareholders and consequently subject to developments within the market.
Depending on its history and employees, political connections and governmental interventions
differ among the examples. In order to provide a holistic picture of the aspects important in public
management, its differences to private management as well as other important criteria related to
the examples discussed, the following part of the Thesis contains a discussion of those aspects;
lastly also related to the analysed enterprises again in a summarizing connection and conclusion.
1314 Ibid. 1315 Ibid.: 10 1316 Ibid. 1317 cf. Verbund AG: Geschäftsbericht (2013): 6 1318 Ibid.: 14 1319 Ibid. 1320 Ibid.: 15
Discussion Etienne Koo
127
7. Discussion
After having analysed each enterprise according to its legal background, main tasks and organiza-
tional structure as well as relationships to Austrian politics and financial developments throughout
the global economic crisis and subsequent phase of recession, this part deals with a final discussion
of addressed topics and further relevant aspects related to them.
In alliance with the requirements of CIRIEC, the discussion deals with a thorough analysis of
aspects related to major public or fully public enterprises and how they differ from fully private
ones. Due to the fact that CIRIEC aims at examining public companies and how they are affected
by politics, the subsequent section depicts not only similarities and differences between the man-
agement and performance of state-owned versus private enterprises, it also shows how policies
influence public companies and the internal organizational logic. For the purpose of completeness,
the importance of trade unions as well as their relation to state-owned enterprises is indicated
briefly before all previous aspects are combined and applied to form a picture of the situation in
Austria. Thereafter, each of the previously analysed major Austrian enterprises is connected to the
designated theoretical aspects in order to contribute to CIRIEC’s research accordingly.
7.1 State-owned vs. private enterprises
While Sayre (1948) and Weber (1976) support the point of view that there is no difference between
state-owned and private enterprises due to the fact that they root in the same social, economic and
managerial principles,1321 a variety of researchers defines clear contrasts between the two. The
need for state-owned enterprises, in both welfare and liberalistic state forms, is mostly justified by
the fact that there has to be an instrument that concerns itself with the greater well-being; i.e. non-
economic goals, social issues, the employment of citizens as well as the protection of natural re-
sources and regional habitats.1322 These tasks are accomplished by those employed within the pub-
lic sector and, according to Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008), consequently do not always
serve the greater good but often benefit an elitist minority that acts upon self-stated ideological
reasons.1323
1321 cf. Sayre, W. S.: An outline of American government, 10th edition, Barnes & Noble, New York (1948): 100f.;
Weber (1976): 825f. 1322 cf. Grout, P. A. & Stevens, M.: The assessment: Financing and managing public services. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, Vol. 19 (2003): 215f. 1323 cf. Goldeng, E., Grünfeld, L. A & Benito, G. R. G.: The Performance Differential between Private and State
Owned Enterprises: the Roles of Ownership Management and Market Structure. Journal of Management Studies,
Vol. 45, No. 7 (2008): 1245
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
128
In order to give a better overview, the differences and similarities of state-owned versus private
enterprises are categorized among related topics of concern and discussed subsequently; thereby
starting with peculiarities in the management and performance of both.
7.1.1 Peculiarities in management and performance
Contrary to Weber (1976) and in alignment with Sawyer (1948), the researcher Jann (1998) created
an assumption on how managers in public and private enterprises can be similar and different at
the same time. While managers of state-owned enterprises have to deal with the same issues as
private ones; like for instance issues concerning suppliers, customers, personnel, subordinates,
media, the public and other surrounding organizations, public managers, additionally, have to deal
with public courts, representatives of political parties, civil servants, different interest groups, sen-
ates of the National Council and committees.1324 Jann (1998) assumes that this makes both man-
agers alike and different at the same time; however, recent research includes a component not
considered thus far; namely competition. According to Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008) the
aspect of competition needs to be tackled when having a look at the management of state-owned
versus private enterprises; mainly because it affects the tactics applied.1325 Despite the fact that
competition is usually more present in private than public industries, managers whose incentives
are based on performance will actively foster competition in order to enhance the performance of
the company; an act usually accomplished within private companies.1326 Connected to competition
are different views on the learning process from competitive surroundings. While Barnett, Greve
and Park (1994) assume that those managers facing high competition have a higher potential for
learning,1327 researchers like Tan (2002) and Tan and Peng (2003) indicate that state-owned enter-
prises have a higher chance of learning even though they might not face heavy competition simply
due to the fact that they have a longer life-expectancy as they will not exit the market even in hard
times.1328
1324 cf. Jann (1998): 35 1325 cf. Goldeng, Grünfeld & Benito (2008): 1245 1326 cf. Cuervo, A. & Villalonga, B.: Explaining the variation in the performance effects of privatization. Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 25 (2000): 582f.; Villalonga, B.: Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership
effects from political, organizational and dynamic effects. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization,
Vol. 42 (2000): 45f. 1327 cf. Barnett, W. P., Greve, H. R. & Park, D. Y: An evolutionary model of organizational performance. Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 15 (1994): 12f. 1328 cf. Tan, J.: Impact of ownership type on environment-strategy linkage and performance: evidence from a
transitional economy. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 39 (2002): 335f.; Tan, J. & Peng, M. W.: Organizational
slack and firm performance during economic transitions: two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 24 (2003): 1250f.
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
129
Notwithstanding the assumptions about learning, a majority of research indicates the inferiority of
state-owned enterprises to private ones due to internal management problems and a lack of appro-
priate incentives as well as suitable benchmarks.1329 While managers in private enterprises are able
to monitor their performance by benchmarking, i.e. comparing their tactics and performance with
those of its competitors, the public managers often face a quasi-monopoly position in which there
are no other companies to benchmark with.1330 Moreover, managers of private enterprises are usu-
ally compensated according to their individual performance and the development of indicators like
the return on assets or EBIT; yet, managers of public companies generate returns that often flow
into a public budget which does not benefit any specific individual.1331 The fact that there are not
as many bonus systems and performance incentives is often compensated by the circumstance of
job security within public enterprises.1332 In addition to individual incentives, public and private
managers face differences in organizational incentives in the sense that the private industry is con-
stantly monitored by the market; e.g. investors and other participants that control if resources are
allocated efficiently and if not, replace the responsible manager.1333 In alliance with this, Cuervo
and Villalonga (2000) designate that the reasons for the usually inferior performance of state-
owned enterprises to private ones do not only lie in inappropriate incentives but also in the possi-
bilities of applying a more decentralized structure, broader business strategies, innovative
approaches as well as the easy replacement of top managers.1334 Subsequently, state-owned enter-
prises are not directly affected by the disciplining measures of markets as their existence, and
connected to this the possible dismissal of managers, is related to politicians rather than the mar-
ket.1335 This also indicates that managers of public companies have to have a different set of skills
which also includes the competence of networking and dealing with politicians;1336 a circumstance
discussed in more detail within the following section 7.1.2.
7.1.2 Governmental influences and policies
A variety of researchers indicate that the value of a politically closely connected company is
affected by changes in the political landscape and henceforth, assume that the relation between
1329 cf. Goldeng, Grünfeld & Benito (2008): 1247f. 1330 cf. Grout & Stevens (2003): 215; Goldeng, Grünfeld & Benito (2008): 1248 1331 cf. Goldeng, Grünfeld & Benito (2008): 1248f. 1332 Ibid. 1333 cf. Goldeng, Grünfeld & Benito (2008): 1249 1334 cf. Cuervo & Villalonga (2000): 583 1335 cf. Megginson, M. & Netter, J.: From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privatization. Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol. 39 (2001): 323f. 1336 cf. Tan & Peng (2003): 1251
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
130
politicians and the corporation can add significant value.1337 Connected to this relation, however,
is the risk of uncertain future policies; thereby designating that possible political connections of
companies can change with the political landscape and subsequently, the companies face the chal-
lenge of dealing with future policy uncertainty.1338 Despite the fact that this circumstance is usually
applied to private companies bonding with governmental officials, this condition can also affect
state-owned enterprises as the right to vote and change the political map can lead to significant
deviations in the way the public enterprises are managed. A logical continuation is made by Fowler
(2006) who states that divided governments reduce the uncertainty of policy risk due to the fact
that the parties need to negotiate terms and conditions of possible future policies; a circumstance
that inhibits governmental control by solely one party.1339 Füss and Bechtel (2008) expand this
assumption by indicating that the chances of policy changes are significantly lower under divided
governments than they are under unified or single-party ones.1340 With regard to this, Kim,
Pantzalis and Park (2012) pose the assumption that the degree of intervention between the state
and the government is a determinant of uncertainty about future policies which, in other words,
means that the proximity to political parties is essential for stock returns.1341
Connected to this is the, already in section 4.2.3.2 discussed, topic of rent-seeking and possible
negative tendencies related to it. Krueger (1974) defines rent-seeking in means of competition and
indicates that government officials might increase their expected rent officially by, for example,
locating a company in the capital of a country, or unofficially by, for instance, employing friends
or relatives.1342 Moreover, due to the fact that there is significant competition over government
jobs, bribery might decide upon possible careers.1343 With regard to this, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) distribute the statement that political elites have an interest in keeping a certain status-quo
in order to grant an advantage over strangers who try to intervene from outside.1344 Additionally,
Bellettini, Ceroni and Prarolo (2014) pose the assumption that political barriers through bureau-
1337 cf. Fisman, R.: Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (2001):
1096f.; Goldman, E., Rocholl, J. & So, J.: Do politically connected boards affect firm value. Review of Financial
Studies, Vol. 22 (2009): 2332f.; Goldman, E., Rocholl, J. & So, J.: Political Connections and the Allocation of
Procurement Contracts (2010): 2 1338 cf. Kim, C. F., Pantzalis, C. & Park, J. C.: Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications
of proximity to political power. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 106 (2012): 196f. 1339 cf. Fowler, J. H.: Elections and markets: the effect of partisanship, policy risk and electoral margins on the
economy. Journal of Politics, Vol. 68 (2006): 91f. 1340 cf. Füss, R. & Bechtel, M. M.: When investors enjoy less policy risk: divided government, economic policy
change and stock market volatility in Germany, 1970-2005. Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 14 (2008): 288f. 1341 cf. Kim, Pantzalis & Park (2012): 226 1342 cf. Krueger (1974): 292 1343 Ibid. 1344 cf. Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A.: Economic backwardness in political perspective. American Political
Science Review, Vol. 100 (2006): 116f.
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
131
cracy and regulations are used strategically for the purpose of establishing a network of compul-
sory members that prevent others from entering.1345 Indeed, within this politicians fear political
competition and the possibility of not being re-elected due to inefficient policies.1346 As a conse-
quence, they use the support of the built network to acquire electoral advantages and enhance the
probability of being re-elected.1347 This aligns with the fact that the turnover rate of politicians in
developed countries is rather low.1348
Subsequently, the role of trade unions and their connections to politics are analysed briefly.
7.1.3 The role of trade unions
The microeconomic theory of trade unions by Oswald (1982) is one of the basic works on how
trade unions can be characterized and which role they play in society. Oswald (1982) indicates
that they can be assumed as coalition of workers who have similar skills and seek the fair distri-
bution of wages by applying negotiation power.1349 This means that they are able to bargain about
the amount of hours worked as well as the minimum wage paid to workers.1350 An important issue
in the membership of a trade union, especially in big groups, is the free-rider problem; i.e. efforts
will not only apply to members but to all workers.1351 Convincing others of the demand for union-
ism is therefore often a difficult issue.1352 According to Olson (1965) big groups as trade unions
are only formed because they are either part of the employment, and therefore mandatory, or be-
cause the unionized individuals offer others incentives for joining.1353 However, Booth (1985) and
later Schnabel (2003) address this by applying the theory of social custom which indicates that
individuals join groups with possible free-rider problems due to the reputation gained when being
a part of the group.1354 Workers may be even more eager to join the union if already a lot of people
are part of the union and the group is large; a circumstance contradicting Olson’s (1965) incentives
approach for unionism as it addresses independence in the decision of joining.1355 Connected to
1345 cf. Bellettini, G., Ceroni, C. B. & Prarolo, G.: Knowing the right person in the right place: Political connections
and resistance to change. Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2014): 642 1346 cf. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006): 116f.; Bellettini, Ceroni & Prarolo (2014): 642 1347 cf. Bellettini, Ceroni & Prarolo (2014): 642 1348 Ibid.: 643 1349 cf. Oswald, A. J.: The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union. The Economic Journal, Vol. 92 (1982): 577 1350 Ibid. 1351 cf. Schnabel, C.: Determinants of Trade Union Membership. In Addison, J. T. & Schnabel, C. (eds.):
International Handbook of Trade Unions. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (2003): 13 1352 Ibid.: 13f.; 16 1353 cf. Olson, M.: The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge MA (1965): 5f. 1354 cf. Booth, A. L.: The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union Membership. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 100 (1985): 255f. ; Schnabel (2003): 16 1355 cf. Schnabel (2003): 16f.
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
132
this, Kladermans (1986) developed three models of the reasons why people join unions. The frus-
tration-aggression approach indicates that workers join the union due to their dissatisfaction with
the overall situation and because they see the chance to actively change something.1356 The
rational-choice approach designates the rational weighing of benefits against costs and thereafter
deciding in favour or against a membership.1357 The interactionist approach sees the membership
in the light of the social context of the individual; i.e. the private and work surrounding as well as
family and friends and their influence on the person.1358 In any case, Streeck and Hassel (2003)
indicate that nowadays, members of trade union have to intervene in two different surroundings;
namely the state and therefore political area as well as the market and therefore liberalistic area of
collective bargaining.1359 While the 1980s and 1990s in Europe were characterized by the circum-
stance that unions were seen in the context of social progress, they subsequently focused more on
economic policies and collective bargaining again.1360 However, especially in the democratic
European countries, their connection to politicians is still prevalent.1361 Streek and Hassel (2003)
thereby differentiate between the liberalistic and the social welfare state.1362 While unions within
the first state form are quite independent and focused on economic activities, they are rather sub-
ordinated to political parties in the second state form due to the fact that the intervention of the
government plays an essential role in the establishment of social well-being and developments
within the industry.1363 Consequently the relation of political parties and trade unions is fairly
close.1364
After having depicted additional theoretical aspects of importance when wanting to analyse major
primarily fully public enterprises and their internal logics as well as political relations, the follow-
ing final part deals with the illustration of the situation in Austria. This includes not only the por-
trayal of Austria as a special case, but also the application of theoretical aspects to the recent situ-
ation. In addition, each chosen public enterprise is reflected separately according to the discussed
aspects thereafter.
1356 cf. Kladermans, B.: Psychology and Trade Union Participation: Joining, Acting, Quitting. Journal of
Occupational Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1986): 199f. 1357 Ibid. 1358 Ibid. 1359 cf. Streeck, W. & Hassel, A.: Trade unions as political actors. In Addison, J. T. & Schnabel, C. (eds.):
International Handbook of Trade Unions. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (2003): 335 1360 Ibid.: 336 1361 Ibid. 1362 Ibid.338 1363 Ibid. 1364 Ibid.
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
133
7.2 Situation in Austria
According to Parris, Pestieau and Saynor (1987), the Austrian parliament exercises significant
control over public enterprises; especially in the area of railway and postal services.1365 However,
tasks of monitoring and control are, in general, not accomplished by the federal cabinet or com-
mittees but are rather formalized in specific laws and acts; thereby including those ministries
responsible for the public enterprise and its performance.1366 Peculiarities in the management of
Austrian public enterprises can be traced back to historical roots and the socialization concept of
the social democrat Otto Bauer who initiated the notion of managing public companies with a fair
distribution of representatives of workers, consumers and the state.1367 The basic idea behind this
type of management is still present in today’s state-owned companies and even though they had
to adapt to different external conditions and a more liberalized market, the influence of political
representatives is still high; a circumstance depicted in more detail within the analysis of each
company as well as the subsequent reflection on selected enterprises.
When it comes to the relationship with trade unions, the Austrian ÖGB1368 is the representative
institution to deal with. It can be considered as a holding institution responsible for seven individ-
ual trade unions; each of them related to a different industry.1369 The union GPA1370 is responsible
for private people and journalists while the union GÖD1371 is in charge of public services and
GDG-KMSFB1372 responsible for civil servants and those employed in arts, sports and media.1373
GBH1374 is in charge of the construction and wood industry and GPF1375 responsible for the post
and telecommunications industry.1376 The union PROGE1377 takes care of those employed in the
production and the union vida1378 is responsible for everything related to traffic and the services
industry.1379 The overall organization ÖGB sees itself as the independent representative of workers
in all industries and therefore central point of contact for employers, the state and politicians.1380
In its mission statement, the company underlines its efforts to accomplish a fair distribution of
1365 cf. Parris, H., Pestieau, P. & Saynor, P.: Public Enterprise in Western Europe. Croom Helm, London (1987): 86 1366 cf. Parris Pestieau & Saynor (1987): 101 1367 cf. Weber (1964): 27 1368 ÖGB stands for Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund 1369 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Gewerkschaften 1370 GPA stands for Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten, Druck, Journalismus, Papier 1371 GÖD stands for Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienst 1372 GDG-KMSFB stands for Gewerkschaft der Gemeindebediensteten – Kunst, Medien, Sport, freie Berufe 1373 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Gewerkschaften 1374 GBH stands for Gewerkschaft Bau-Holz 1375 GPF stands for Gewerkschaft der Post- und Fernmeldebediensteten 1376 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Gewerkschaften 1377 PROGE stands for Produktionsgewerkschaft 1378 vida stands for Verkehrs- und Dienstleistungs-Gewerkschaft 1379 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Gewerkschaften 1380 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Über uns
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
134
wealth and consequently social justice for every worker.1381 This does not only include collective
bargaining, but also the legal aspects of working conditions as well as sustainable developments
in the economy and society.1382
Yet, it has to be considered that, similar to Germany, there are two formally separated interest
groups for employees in Austria which are the works council and the trade union.1383 While the
first constitutes of four to five members of the internal company staff and is responsible for the
representation of the own colleagues in the company; the latter is in charge of representing the
interests of the workers in the whole industry; for example metal processing.1384 Despite the fact
that works councils are often part of the Supervisory Board and have an information and hearing
right, it is the trade union that has the power to bargain for collective wage increases and prescribed
working conditions in collective agreements.1385 In Austria, the system of collective agreements
can be characterized as broad and efficient as 95% of employees are subject to a branch collective
agreement within their employment.1386 Yet, only 14% of those companies possess a works council
which indicates a regulation-gap when it comes to negotiated collective agreements and the
representation at site.1387 However, all state-owned companies discussed within this Thesis have a
works council that is also represented within the Supervisory Board; a circumstance discussed in
more detail within the following section of final reflection.
7.2.1 Final reflection on selected enterprises
This last part of the Thesis deals with the final reflection of selected major enterprises in Austria.
For the purpose of simplification, the order of analysing the companies stays the same alphabetical
order as previously within this Thesis; thereby starting with the company ASFINAG and ending
with Verbund. In order to provide a holistic picture, each case is reflected upon its individual
peculiarities concerning its background, tasks, structure and political connections, as well as its
connection to theoretical concepts and assumptions.
1381 cf. Homepage ÖGB: Mission Statement 1382 Ibid. 1383 cf. Guger, A., Runggaldier, U. & Traxler, F.: Lexikon der Arbeitsbeziehungen, Beschäftigung und sozialen
Sicherung Österreich. Manz Verlag, Wien (2001): 90ff. 1384 Ibid. 1385 Ibid. 1386 cf. Traxler, F. & Behrens, M.: Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures. In EIRO comparative
report (2002) 1387 cf. Flecker, J, Hermann, C. & Schmid, A.: Betriebe ohne Betriebsrat in Österreich – wachsende Lücken und
alternative Vertretungsstrategien. In Artus, I., Böhm, S., Lücking, S. & Trinczek, R. (eds.): Betriebe ohne
Betriebsrat. Informelle Interessensvertretung in Unternehmen. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, (2006): 292f.
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
135
7.2.1.1 ASFINAG
The public company ASFINAG is responsible for the creation and maintenance as well as securing
of safe proceedings on all Austrian highways and interstates.1388 The company developed itself out
of a long history from the first need of streets during the 1920s, over the recreation phase after
World War II, to social tendencies and the task of the state to build streets for its citizens during
the 1970s. Until 1982 the task of constructing highways was accomplished within the assignments
of the Austrian Federal Ministries; however, in that year the government decided to restructure
this organization and establish ASFINAG as responsible legal entity.1389 Due to the fact that the
company is responsible for a task which was already accomplished by the state, and smaller public
enterprises before the establishment of ASFINAG, the enterprise can be considered as fulfilling a
solely public mission. The responsibility of creating highways and interstates as well as their
according maintenance relates to contributing to the greater-good and well-being within the
society. Despite the fact that the company, by now, interacts with other enterprises of its type on
an international, especially EU-wide, level, its tasks are primarily focused on Austria and the mo-
bility of Austrian citizens. Moreover, the long historical developments of the company indicate a
close relationship to the Austrian government. This circumstance is still prevalent today and man-
ifests, for instance, in the appointment of the Management Board. When the governmental con-
stellation of the People’s Party and Freedom Party in the early 2000s led to discrepancies about
the management within ASFINAG, the Management Board was simply expanded from two to
three persons and a manager who was close to the Social Democratic Party was integrated as well.
Indeed, the extension of the board members was officially justified by strategic management and
organization-related reasons; however, the political power plays within this 100% state-owned
enterprise were clearly visible. Currently, the governmental constellation of the Social Democratic
and People’s Party aligns with the representatives at the ASFINAG Management Board which are
either close to the one or the other party; however, indeed not officially members of them. The fact
that the state is officially liable for the financial situation and actions of the company, leads to
political power plays and governmental interventions on how to appropriately manage the finan-
cial conditions of the public enterprise; even though the company is not directly financed by the
state but by the income from tolls and external credits.
1388 cf. ASFINAG Geschäftsbericht mit integriertem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht (2013): 3; Homepage ASFINAG:
Unternehmen 1389 cf. BGBl. Nr. 591/1982
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
136
Overall, ASFINAG cannot be aligned with the concept of New Public Management; however, it
sometimes makes use of Public-Private Partnerships as indicated within the New Public Govern-
ance approach. In alliance with Jann (1998), it can be communicated that the company’s managers
have to deal not only with suppliers, customers and the media but also with political parties, the
National Council and different interest groups. Due to the fact that the company holds a monopoly
within Austria, the component of competition as indicated by Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito
(2008) cannot be added in its analysis. Yet, connected to the research of Tan (2002) and Tan and
Peng (2003), it can be assumed that the long historical developments from the first need of streets,
over the phases of World War II and recreation as well as subsequent developments and even
liberalization tendencies, led to significant learning effects and consequently appropriate adjust-
ments over time which, indeed, aligns with the assumption of the researchers that companies with-
out competition phase high learning curves as well. When it comes to trade unions, there is no
clear connection of the company to a specific trade union; however, currently the debates about a
possible integration of ASFINAG into ÖIAG lead to the circumstance that the trade union GPA-
DJP, which is actually responsible for private people and journalism cooperates with the works
council of ASFINAG against an integration into ÖIAG.1390 The reasons behind that lie, indeed, in
discussions about partly privatizing the company after its integration; a circumstance the company
itself sees no benefits in. It can be assumed that the company’s future will continue to be charac-
terized by political interventions and often also power plays; especially when it comes to the cur-
rently discussed re-organization of ÖIAG and possible new integrations. Rooted in its historical
connections to the government and previous developments, it cannot be assumed that the organi-
zational logics of the company changed significantly.
7.2.1.2 Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft
The public limited liability company BIG is responsible for the administration of around 2,800 real
estates owned by the state.1391 As such, it accomplishes a variety of tasks such as the calculation
of rents, the inspection of buildings, maintenance, consulting and many more structured among
the three divisions schools, universities and special real estates.1392 Moreover, due to the fact that
the company’s emphasis is focused on Austria and real estates within this country, it cannot be
considered as public multinational or international enterprise. The enterprise is 100% public and
its representative is the Federal Minister of Science, Research and Economics.1393 Since 2013 this
1390 cf. Homepage APA-OTS: ASFINAG-Beschäftigte wehren sich gegen Eingliederung in ÖIAG (07.11.2014) 1391 cf. Homepage BIG: Über uns 1392 cf. Homepage BIG: Objektmanagement 1393 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 141/2000 § 1(2)
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
137
position is held by Reinhold Mitterlehner and consequently a member of the People’s Party. Also,
the two managing directors as well as three Supervisory Board members of BIG are connected to
the People’s Party; thereby indicating the dominance of this party within the management of the
company. This, indeed, also roots in the distribution of positions among the political parties.
Contrary to the previously discussed ASFINAG, the public company BIG looks back on a rather
short history of 22 years; however, each year being influenced by governmental constellations and
consequently political interventions in its management. The logics behind its management are
focused on the generation of income through rents and sales as well as the maintenance of im-
portant public buildings and hence rather long-term focused instead of short-term profit-oriented.
The factor competition can therefore only be applied in the rent of living space; however, not in
the income from schools, universities or special real estates like courts due to the fact that the latter
are also public and need to pay to BIG and not a private counterpart. Within its business, private-
related aspects as indicated within the concept of New Public Management by Hood (1991) or
Schedler and Proeller (2009) are of importance for BIG as well; mainly due to the fact that aspects
of cost reduction, flexibility, rationalization and the focus on performance indicators play a signif-
icant role in the real estate industry. Moreover, the ideas of rent-seeking as formulated by
Tullok (1967) apply to this company as well due to its public efforts. The company’s connection
to its employees is rather clear not only because representatives of the works council are part of
the Supervisory Board but also because it is clearly connected to the trade union GÖD which is
responsible for employees within the public service. Overall, the company’s business represents a
rather stable and secure one in the future; certainly, characterized by governmental constellations
and political interventions. The speculations about integrating the ARE part of BIG into ÖIAG in
the course of the discussions about its restructuration, might change the rather stable predominant
organizational logics within the near future.
7.2.1.3 Österreichische Bundesbahnen Holding AG
The transportation company ÖBB Holding Group is a strategic holding corporation responsible
for a variety of subsidiaries within the area of railway and bus transportation.1394 Despite the fact
that its focus is mainly concentrated on the Austrian market, the company had to adapt to EU-wide
liberalization tendencies as well as internal competition. The establishment of the Austrian West-
bahn diminished its monopoly position in the area of railway transportation. Moreover, the fact
that the railway company Westbahn also entered the bus segment and offers cheap bus trips to
neighbouring countries, led to significant price pressure for the ÖBB Holding Group. In addition,
1394 cf. Homepage ÖBB Holding: Strategische Leitgesellschaft
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
138
the company had to adapt to international tendencies and increasingly cooperate with surrounding
countries and therefore EU-wide transportation companies; indeed, most of them also state-owned.
Due to the fact that it is 100% public, its connections to Austrian politicians are rather clear.
Legally, its representative is the Federal Minister of Traffic, Innovation and Technology; currently
Alois Stöger and therefore a member of the Social Democratic Party. In general the company is,
quite contrary to the previously discussed real estate manager BIG, characterized by Social
Democratic tendencies as the CEO as well as the majority of Supervisory Board members can be
connected to this party. In alliance with Weber’s (1976) conceptions, the entity can be considered
as bureaucracy in its purest form. A majority of civil servants within the corporation are paid
according to their age, rank and duration of employment; thereby also including a lot of permanent
staff which cannot be dismissed even though they might perform badly. As indicated by Public
Choice authors Niskanen (1974), Stretton and Orchard (1994) and Thom and Ritz (2006), the con-
nections within the company are focused on those between the civil servants and politicians and
in alliance with Downs (1974) the company’s organization can also be connected to internal
dynamics and increasing complexity. Over time, the ÖBB Holding Group went through a variety
of restructuration phases; often depending on the political parties influencing the management of
the company. This led to increasing internal hierarchies and, with augmenting size, to the need for
control mechanisms. However, Downs (1974) indicates that control needs effort which in turn
requires expenditures which, in the end, need control again. The spiral of bureaucracy and control
continues; thereby not only steadily increasing expenditures but also complexity. Its increasing
size through the continuing restructuration and creation of subsidiaries, lead to the alignment with
the research of Jann (1998) and his assumptions about having to deal with private-related parties
like customers and suppliers as well as public ones like politicians and committees. However, in
addition and contrary to ASFINAG, the competitive aspect as posed by Goldeng, Grünfeld and
Benito (2008) can also be included as the private company Westbahn diminished its monopoly
position in Austria. This also leads to the fact that, due to increasing internationalization and pri-
vate competition, the company has to apply aspects of New Public Management; thereby focusing
on cost reduction, flexibility as well as rationalizations. In alliance with the descriptions of
Hood (1991) and Schedler and Proeller (2009), the enterprise has to find the right balance between
providing a common good and maximizing profits. Indeed, connected to this, the topic of rent-
seeking plays a major role; especially when having a look at the representatives of the company
and, for instance, the scandals around Supervisory Board member Ludwig Scharinger. The repre-
sentation of the works council within the Supervisory Board as well as connections to the trade
union vida, show a clear defined relation to its employees. However, the fact that three out our of
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
139
four members of the works council can be connected to the Social Democratic Party shows, again,
a tendency towards this party within the company. Again, a connection to the currently in the
media discussed restructuration of ÖIAG can be established as speculations about demerging the
ÖBB rail network division and integrating it into ÖIAG emerged recently. However, as by now,
there are no concrete concepts on this and due to the fact that there are no official discussions about
possible privatizations either, it can be assumed that the organizational logics of the company do
not change within the near future.
7.2.1.4 Österreichische Bundesforste AG
The Austrian Federal Forestry Group ÖBf AG represents the biggest counsellor in the areas of
natural reserves, forestry, fishery and hunting areas and is consequently responsible for the mainte-
nance, management and protection of these public natural habitats.1395 Its tasks are completely
focused on Austria and the natural habitats within this country and even though the company is
actively operating within the wood industry, which means that it offers the sustainable harvest of
wood as well as its further commercialization and consulting activities, it cannot be characterized
as multinational player. Its roots trace back to the year 1925 and after several legal amendments
as well as restructuration efforts, the company became a separate legal entity; however, ever since
the company is 100% state-owned and therefore represented by the proper ministry which is em-
bodied by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; currently Andrä Ruprecht from the
People’s Party. In addition to this, and quite contrary to the previously discussed ÖBB Holding
Group, all four Supervisory Board members can be connected to the People’s Party; however,
different to other enterprises discussed, the Management Board members cannot be officially re-
lated to any political parties. The connections to its employees is rather clear. The works council
is represented within the Supervisory Board and its two members are foresters and therefore qual-
ified employees. The responsible trade union is PROGE and therefore the union responsible for
the production industry. Similar to the ÖBB Holding Group, the Austrian Federal Forestry Group
can be characterized as bureaucracy in the sense of Weber (1976); mainly but not exclusively due
to the fact that the company is structured in a clear hierarchical way and employees are paid
according to their age and duration instead of performance. Moreover, its connections to Austrian
politics aligns with Fisman (2011) as well as Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009; 2010) who indicate
that close connections to politicians can add significant value. The circumstance that the company
acts within the wood business and faces competition, leads to the application of New Public
Management tendencies like cost reduction and flexibility. Similar to the ARE part of BIG and the
1395 cf. Homepage Bundesforste AG: Unternehmensprofil
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
140
ÖBB rail network division, there are currently speculations about integrating the company into
ÖIAG in the course of its upcoming restructuration. However, rooted in the fact that the primary
business of the company is concerned with the greater well-being of everybody through the pro-
tection, maintenance and appropriate management of Austrian natural habitats, there are no
tendencies towards changing organizational logics or serious discussions about possible privatiza-
tions.
7.2.1.5 Österreichische Industrieholding AG
Responsible for the participations as well as privatization efforts of the state, the industrial holding
company ÖIAG acts close to the economy.1396 Its roots trace back to the period after World War II
and through several legal amendments and the attempt to protect Austrian industries, the company
was established for the efficient management of public stakes. Efficient management in this sense
also refers to partly privatizations of Austrian companies; hence thereby aiming at keeping at least
25% and one share to the voting share capital or contractual rights over third parties in order to
guarantee the continuing influence of ÖIAG.1397 Three important participations refer to the OMV
Group, the Telekom Austria Group and the Austrian Post Group; each of them already discussed
in more detail in section 6.2.
The focus of the enterprise can be considered as both national and international. On the one hand,
the corporation is primarily responsible for the appropriate management of Austrian public stakes;
however, on the other hand, these stakes might be part of multinational enterprises, like it is the
case with the OMV Group. Therefore, ÖIAG has to adapt to both national and international aspects
and its managers have to know what is best for Austria by including international progresses and
possible tendencies in the development of their stakes. The current CEO Rudolf Kemler was
appointed in 2012 by Maria Fekter who is a representative of the People’s Party; however, his
performance was criticized by both the People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party and there-
fore his contract will not be extended in October 2015. Currently, there are heavy discussions
about restructuring the company due to the evolvement of diminishing political influence since the
governmental constellation of the Freedom Party and the People’s Party in the early 2000s. They
decided that the responsible people within the management of the company can decide upon pre-
decessors themselves if someone leaves the company. In alliance with the concept of rent-seeking,
some say that this led to the allocation of people that are not qualified to lead a company like
ÖIAG; e.g. friends or business partners. However, others hold against these arguments by posing
1396 cf. Homepage ÖIAG: Unternehmen 1397 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 24/2000 § 9(2)
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
141
increasing political influence as harmful to the management as well. In any case, the current gov-
ernment is working on restructuration plans; thereby also including ideas such as extending the
Management Board from one to two managing directors or incorporating other public companies
into ÖIAG. The most recent proposal of a restructuration is to change the legal structure of the
company from a public limited company into a limited liability company as well as changing the
management from one managing director to a colloquium of political and neutral parties.1398 Con-
sequently it can be assumed that organizational logics are about to change within ÖIAG and future
discussions about the further privatization of public companies might arise. Relations to trade un-
ions are currently only focused on debates with trade unions and works council representing those
companies that are discussed to be incorporated; mainly because companies like ASFINAG, ARE
or the ÖBB rail network division are not willing to be incorporated.
7.2.1.6 Österreichische Post AG
The Austrian Post Group, as leading logistics and mail delivery service in Austria, is responsible
for the safe and universal supply of postal services to all citizens.1399 It can be characterized as the
corporation with the longest history among those depicted within this Thesis. Despite the fact that
the official establishment of postal and telecommunications services in Austria origins in 1887,
the roots of postal service trace back to the year 1490.
With increasing liberalization tendencies in the postal market in Austria during the 1990s and early
2000s, the company had to adapt to accumulative competition, interconnectedness and complexity.
In alliance with Hood (1991) and Schedler and Proeller (2009), the enterprise consequently
focused on the balance between offering a public service and achieving cost reductions. However,
the difficulty in this was, and still is, the fact that the corporation is structured in the sense of
Weber’s (1976) bureaucracy concept which indicates a strict hierarchical structure, incentives
according to age and rank as well as the circumstance that a majority of employees is permanent.
The act of reducing employees by sending them into early retirement led to heavy disparagement
by the Austrian Federal Court. The institution criticized this tactic as a displacement of costs:
instead of the company paying wages, the state had to pay early retirements. Moreover, after the
initial approval of the attempt to displace them within the public sector by sending postal officers
to the police, this method ceased to continue as well. Instead, the company increasingly focused
1398 cf. Homepage Kurier: ÖBIB – Regierung greift durch (13.01.2015); Homepage Wirtschaftsblatt: Neue ÖIAG
verwaltet OMV, Post und Telekom mit den „garantiert besten Köpfen“ (13.01.2015); Homepage OÖ Nachrichten:
Der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner bei der ÖIAG (13.01.2015); Homepage Die Presse: ÖIAG-Privatisierungen:
Zwischen Protesten und Korruptionsvorwürfen (13.01.2015) 1399 cf. BGBl. I Nr. 123/2009 § 1(1)
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
142
on the improvement of customer services through the establishment of online information plat-
forms, the implementation of the Post.Partner concept and the integration of banking facilities.
This aligns with the idea of New Public Management and attempts to increase flexibility while at
the same time rationalize. Over time, the shares of the Austrian Post Group, initially all held by
the state, were sold and despite the fact that the majority of 52.8% is still under public control and
managed by ÖIAG, the company has to align with the needs and demands of its shareholders and
therefore apply performance indicators and long-term strategies. Balancing public as well as pri-
vate needs as indicated by Jann (1998) is one of the major concerns of the enterprise; as well as
the appropriate tackling of international and national competition. The entity’s connection to its
employees is clearly defined by the circumstance that the works council is represented within the
Supervisory Board and the people are connected to the trade union GPF which is responsible for
all workers related to post and telecommunications services. It can be assumed that the govern-
mental attempt to restructure ÖIAG will also have consequences for the Austrian Post Group;
mainly but not exclusively because the industrial holding company represents its majority share-
holder. With the restructuration of ÖIAG, and consequently the possible change of political con-
stellations within this company, influences on the Austrian Post Group might change as well.
7.2.1.7 Österreichischer Rundfunk ORF
Austria’s biggest media company ORF fulfils the public order of terrestrial broadcasting, thereby
having the mission of distributing neutral information about politics, social and economic issues
via TV channels, radio channels and online platforms.1400 The purpose of the entity implies its
public order and the fact that it interacts on a national but not international level. However, it faces
severe competition from private channels; especially from the neighbouring country Germany.
Politics play a major role within ORF; a circumstance especially visible within the Foundation
Board which consists of 35 members and acts in the sense of a Supervisory Board. The fact that
each political party represented within the National Council is allowed to appoint one member for
the Foundation Board as well as the fact that, in addition, the nine provinces appoint one member
each as well, is unique among the discussed enterprises within this Thesis. Currently there are
representatives of six different political parties within the Foundation Board. Moreover, the
circumstance that Austrian citizens have to pay GIS1401 fees, leads to a monopoly position for the
company. These conditions align with the assumptions of Belletini, Ceroni and Prarolo (2014)
who think that regulations and bureaucracy are used strategically for the purpose of establishing a
1400 cf. BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 § 1; § 2; Homepage ORF: Offenlegung 1401 GIS stands for Gebühren Info Service
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
143
political network of members who prevent outsiders from entering. In case of ORF, the relation-
ship to the government and political parties is strong; however, contrary to other public companies,
ORF has no Supervisory Board which is connected to the works council. Different to other enter-
prises, the central works council is represented by the fact that it appoints five out of 35 members
of the Foundation Board. In addition to this, the connection to the trade union GPA-DJP, which is
responsible for private people and journalists, is rather clear. When being compared to other
enterprises within this Thesis, it can be communicated that the broadcasting company ORF is not
only highly influenced by politics but also clear in its organizational logics and structure. There
are no discussions about possible privatizations, its incorporation into ÖIAG or other restructu-
ration efforts which leads to the assumption that the company will not change its organizational
logics or design soon.
7.2.1.8 OMV AG
The OMV Group is the biggest publicly listed industrial enterprise in Austria and with its four
business units and over 27,000 employees it interacts mainly in the area of extracting and com-
mercializing oil and gas on a global level.1402 Since its establishment in 1956 the company repre-
sents one of the most successful industrial Austrian enterprises. By keeping 31.5% of shares after
the company went public, the Austrian state attempted to secure and continue its influence. How-
ever, due to the fact that the enterprise is among the top global players in its business by now, it
has to adapt to different cultures, habits of doing business as well as liberalization processes.
The political influence is given by the circumstance that Kemler, as the managing director of the
completely state-owned ÖIAG, is also the head of the Supervisory Board at the OMV Group; yet,
major guidance comes from the Abu Dhabi based company IPIC. Most recently the enterprise
caught media attention due to the Kemler approved early dismissal of two Management Board
members; a circumstance which will probably cost millions of euros in compensation payments.
However, contrary to other public companies discussed within this Thesis, the OMV Group is not
a typical public company but rather an exception due to its global presence and international con-
stellation of the Management and Supervisory Board. Therefore, the political influence is not as
strong as in 100% state-owned companies like for example ASFINAG, BIG, ÖBf AG or the ÖBB
Holding Group formerly depicted. Certainly, the reasons behind less political influence also lie in
the circumstance that the above mentioned companies provide goods or services that, in general,
serve the greater good or well-being of the public; however, the OMV Group sells a competitive
good and is foremost not in charge of serving the public with a common good. Consequently, the
1402 cf. Homepage OMV AG: Über uns
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
144
management is, even more in this than in other discussed enterprises, focused on rationalizations,
cost savings and quick adaptations through learning. Contrary to the 100% state-owned enter-
prises, the OMV Group can be managed by making use of benchmarks. In alliance with Grout and
Stevens (2003) as well as Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008), the enterprise is able to compare
its strategy, tactics and performance to its main competitors; thereby increasing competition again
and simultaneously enhancing its learning effects. Moreover, the oil and gas industry is constantly
monitored and the enterprise is therefore under persistent pressure to react and adapt to develop-
ments within the market. Five out of 15 members of the Supervisory Board are appointed by the
works council which indicates a clear relation to its employees. However, due to the fact that the
enterprise owns a variety of subsidiaries in diverse business areas, there is no clear connection of
the workers to one specific trade union. Overall, the company faces several internal changes within
the upcoming year. In addition to the early dismissals of Roiss and Floren by mid-2015, the change
of the managing director position of ÖIAG in October 2015 will affect the position within the
Supervisory Board of the OMV Group. Moreover, influences might change and political interven-
tions might occur due to the attempted structural changes of ÖIAG. All this leads to the assumption
that, contrary to other discussed enterprises, organizational logics within the company might trans-
form within the following year.
7.2.1.9 Schienen-Infrastruktur-Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH
The limited liability company SCHIG mbH is 100% state-owned and since 2005, as part of the
ÖBB Holding Group reformation, it can be regarded as independent consulting and service pro-
vider in the area of rail transport.1403 Despite its efforts in a PPP-project with Regensburg, the
company acts on a national base which means that it cannot be regarded as international or multi-
national player within its field.
For the purpose of supporting the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology, the
company is in charge of controlling the infrastructure; thereby acting according to its major criteria
of thriftiness, efficiency and usefulness.1404 The cooperation with the ministry is close; also due to
the fact that the Federal Minister of Transport Innovation and Technology, currently the Social
Democrat Alois Stöger, is the official representative of the company. Moreover, out of nine
Supervisory Board members, four are also employed at the ministry. The others are either con-
nected to the Federal Ministry of Finance, and therefore currently the People’s Party or officially
independent. This indicates a political mix of people close to the Social Democratic Party as well
1403 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbh: Aufgaben und rechtliche Grundlagen 1404 cf. Homepage SCHIG mbH: Infrastrukturkontrolle
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
145
as the People’s Party within the management of the enterprise. The circumstance that the company
depicts itself as independent consulting and service provider, as well as the fact that it fosters the
management according to the criteria of thriftiness, efficiency and usefulness, aligns with the re-
search of Hood (1991) and Schedler and Proeller (2009) who indicate that the concept of New
Public Management is characterized by the focus on cost reductions, discipline and the profes-
sional management of performance indicators. Moreover, the participation in two major PPP-
projects, one of it even being the first cross-border project of its kind in this area, matches with the
indication of PPP by Bastin (2003), Klijin (2005) and Lenk and Röber (2011) who see them as
time-restricted contractual agreements between a public and a private actor for the purpose of
fulfilling a project; often in the area of infrastructure like in this case. Furthermore, the declared
independence of SCHIG mbH points to the research of Macdonald (2011) who indicates that some
public companies are built in the sense of acting like private ones; however, always in arm-length
control of the government. The company’s relationship to its employees is defined in a rather clear
way. Three out of nine members of the Supervisory Board are appointed by the works council
which specifies a representation of one third. Besides, the worker’s connections to a trade union
are, since the reformation of the ÖBB Holding Group and SCHIG mbH’s transformation from a
financing company to a service provider, rather unclear. Overall, the company is, similar to for
example ASFINAG or BIG, 100% state-owned and therefore highly influenced by political inter-
ventions and governmental decisions. However, contrary to other enterprises there are no discus-
sion about integrating SCHIG mbH into ÖIAG or other privatization rumours. Consequently, it
can be assumed that the organizational logics within the company will not change significantly
within the near future.
7.2.1.10 Telekom Austria AG
The Telekom Austria Group is the biggest telecommunications company in Austria. It is positioned
internationally in seven additional countries and with around 5.7 million customers in mobile
telephony and 2.3 million customers in fixed network telephony, the company’s provider A1
represents the leading communication supplier in Austria.1405 As already depicted within the
section of the Austrian Post Group, the postal and telecommunications services tended to be man-
aged together; however, in 1996 they were separated and with the liberalization of the telecom-
munications market in Austria in 1998, Telekom turned into a separate business.
Two years later, the company was transferred into the ownership of ÖIAG and after the initial
public offering of its shares at the stock exchange, the industrial holding company ÖIAG kept
1405 cf. Homepage Telekom Austria Group: Über uns; Homepage A1: Unternehmensprofil
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
146
44.4% of its shares. This, and the fact that the ÖIAG managing director Kemler is also the head of
the Supervisory Board of the Telekom Austria Group assume political influence. This influence
seemed to diminish in 2014 when ÖIAG signed a Syndicate Agreement with the Mexican billion-
aire Carlos Slim and approved that he is allowed to buy the majority shares of the Telekom Austria
Group and consequently hold control over the enterprise in the future. By now, Slim’s telecom-
munications company América Móvil holds the majority of 59.7% of shares while ÖIAG holds
only 28.4%. However, the entity’s CEO, CFO and CTO are still Austrians and even though they
are not officially connected to any political party but rather worked their way up the hierarchy,
this circumstance determines significant influence. Conforming to the research of Jann (1998),
these managers have to align with customers, suppliers and subordinates as well as they have to
adapt to different interest groups and committees. This leads to the assumption that the company
primarily faces challenges within the liberalized market and not so much within its relationship to
politicians. In alliance with Cuervo and Villalonga (2000), Grout and Stevens (2003) as well as
Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008), the company faces aspects of competition and has to react
accordingly by decentralizing its structure, controlling its costs and monitoring the market as well
as benchmarking. Similar to the previously discussed SCHIG mbH, the works council is repre-
sented by one third; which means that out of 15 members, it appoints five into the Supervisory
Board. In Austria, the workers can be connected to the trade union GPF which is responsible for
the postal and telecommunications service industry. However, its international presence leads to
the circumstance that the connections to foreign trade unions is rather unclear. In the near future,
the planned restructuration of ÖIAG as well as new positioning of its managing director might
lead to changes within the Telekom Austria Group. Currently, the CFO of América Móvil holds
the position of vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board; the exit of Kemler by October 2015 could
lead to changes within this as well. Yet, the company’s international presence and the fact that the
political influence might continuously diminish due to the majority shareholder Carlos Slim, leads
to the assumption that future organizational logics and management tactics do not depend on Aus-
trian politicians or governmental interventions but rather on criteria related to privately managed
companies.
7.2.1.11 Verbund AG
The last analysed company can be considered as one of the leading electricity companies in
Europe.1406 Verbund is focused on the generation of electricity through hydro power; a business
which is of great importance for Austria where a variety of rivers and the Danube flow through.
1406 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Über uns
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
147
The company’s history traces back to the restructuration phase after World War II and the trans-
mission of major industrial companies into public ownership. In 1988 the company went public;
51% of shares stayed in the ownership of the state while over 32% were transferred to regional
energy suppliers and 20% were released for free float.1407 The majority shares of 51% are repre-
sented by the Federal Minister of Economy, Family and Youth Reinhold Mitterlehner who is a
member of the People’s Party. While the company’s CEO Anzengruber can be connected to the
People’s Party as well, the vice-chairman of the Management Board as well as the CFO can be
related to the Social Democratic Party. Despite the fact that over half of the shares are state-owned,
the circumstance that additionally over 30% are in the ownership of regional energy companies
leads to strong political connections and the possibility of governmental interventions. This aligns
with Jann’s (1998) research on having to deal with political parties and the National Council when
wanting to manage a foremost public enterprise. Moreover, the historical roots of the company
indicate a strong connection to the state ever since. As depicted by Fisman (2001) and Goldman,
Rocholl and So (2009; 2010), this connection can add significant value to the enterprise. Moreover,
it can be assumed that the thereby connected risk of uncertainty about future policies due to a
possible changing political landscape can be minimized by the circumstance that both predominant
political parties are equally represented within Verbund. This can be seen contrary to, for example,
BIG which is primarily dominated by the People’s Party or the ÖBB Holding Group which is
foremost dominated by the Social Democratic Party. The relationship to the workers seems to be
clear as the works council is represented within the Supervisory Board and, contrasting to the two
previously discussed enterprises, the works council is represented by slightly more than one third
as five out of 14 members are appointed by it. Besides, the workers can relate to the trade union
GPA-DJP. Within the near future, the company will be confronted with discussions about its in-
corporation into ÖIAG in the course of its restructuration attempts. Similar to ASFINAG and ARE,
the company already stated against a possible inclusion or privatization efforts. However, if the
company is included into ÖIAG, this will change its organizational logics significantly. By now,
there are no tendencies towards an internal change of political interventions or logics.
Based on the previous discussion of relevant concepts for the management of public enterprises
and inherent logics and tactics as well as the subsequent applicative analysis of selected major
Austrian enterprises, the developments of organizational logics within those enterprises do not
point towards significant changes. Those companies which are 100% state-owned and therefore
1407 cf. Homepage Verbund AG: Informationen zur Verbund Aktie
7. Discussion Etienne Koo
148
represented by a federal ministry, and consequently a member of a specific political party, are
indeed more influenced by governmental interventions as well as changing policies and political
power plays. The predominant parties seem to distribute their representatives among the different
major public enterprises; a circumstance previously depicted. For instance, while the companies
BIG and ÖBf AG seem to be highly influenced by the People’s Party, the ÖBB Holding Group is
strongly connected to the Social Democratic Party. Yet, companies like ORF or SCHIG mbH seem
to be characterized by a political mix; the first having members of all parties represented within
the National Council in its Foundation Board and the latter being branded by the two predominant
People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party. The corporations which are related to international
aspects and external shareholders, and therefore not 100% state-owned, are characterized by lib-
eralization tendencies as well as cost and competitive pressure which leads them to adapt to the
market, its competitors and rationalization tactics and even though some of the solely public en-
terprises face the pressure of liberalization as well, they aim at applying a mixture of politics and
market related aspects within their management. In alliance with the theoretical assumptions of
Weber’s (1976) bureaucracy model, a variety of major public enterprises within Austria still faces
strict hierarchical structures and bureaucratic influences which consequently lead to increasing
costs through payment by age and rank instead of performance, as well as slower adaptation to
changing markets. By combining private-related with public issues and hiring appropriate man-
agement personnel who implements new tactics and different organizational logics, public enter-
prises aim at improving their performance compared to private ones. However, political interven-
tions and restrictive actions in terms of destructive rent-seeking in the sense of Tullok (1967), can
lead to significant costs for the economy and subsequent dissatisfaction. Therefore, the public
companies nowadays, no matter if they are 100% public or a public-private mixture, need to be
aware of movements within the political landscape as well as the market surrounding them.
8. Conclusion Etienne Koo
149
8. Conclusion
Within this Thesis, the overall aim was to contribute to the research of CIRIEC on the state and its
role within major national and international, partly of fully public, enterprises as well as their or-
ganizational logics and important developments. Due to the fact that the main focus was on the
provision of according information, the Thesis was dedicated to the application of a qualitative
documentary analysis through secondary desk research.
In the first section the focus was on a holistic conspectus on concepts of public enterprise manage-
ment. Based on the circumstance that the Republic of Austria is relatively young, and since its
establishment characterized by political interventions and a close relationship to the government,
this part also includes a brief retrospection on significant developments in Austria since the end of
World War I until recently. Moreover, the past political background and economic as well as his-
torical developments of a country can give insights into its possible future. Due to the fact that the
majority of chosen enterprise examples relate to either fully state-owned or at least partly state-
owned companies, the first part subsequently also dealt with the concepts of new Public Manage-
ment and New Public Governance. The importance of the first lies in the fact that it positions itself
between the ideological antagonism of the social welfare state and the liberalistic state and there-
fore attempts to manage public enterprises by incorporating disciplines and indicators that might
help in adapting to the increasingly complex environment. The latter, however, rounds off this
concept by posing the idea of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental institu-
tions for the appropriate management of a public company. It therefore also includes the idea of
Public-Private Partnerships which was not only described within this first part but also applied by
two of the discussed enterprises. For the purpose of completeness, additionally, the concept of
Public Choice and its ideas of the rational value-maximizing individual were explained further.
According to researchers on this topic, this approach often explains the political behaviour and
bureaucracies within public enterprises. Connected to this, the topic of rent-seeking and possible
negative relations like bribery or corruption were depicted briefly.
The second part was concerned with the underlying background of the whole Thesis and therefore
its main part. It related to the thorough analysis of the chosen examples of major Austrian enter-
prises. In alliance with CIRIEC, the selected fully or partly public companies dealt with businesses
that are of importance for every citizen and therefore also contribute to the greater well-being of a
8. Conclusion Etienne Koo
150
society. These industries refer to electricity, infrastructure, transportation, broadcasting, telecom-
munications as well as public natural habitats and real estates. Indeed, some of them have a stricter
public tenet than others; nevertheless, all of them refer to goods that are needed by the public and
generate costs or benefits for the society as a whole.
Ultimately, the Thesis aimed at the provision of detailed information on organizational logics,
management tactics, political connections and structures within major Austrian enterprises. The
final discussion shows that those companies which are 100% state-owned, are usually more related
to political power plays and governmental interventions than others. Politicians are employed in
management positions and the predominant parties tend to distribute these positions among them.
However, within those companies not completely public but with shares in free float or specific
external shareholders, like it is the case with the Telekom Austria Group or the OMV Group, the
political influence is still high. Moreover, increasing liberalization tendencies within the European
Union as well as on a global level, lead to the need for public enterprises to adapt to dynamic
surroundings as well; even though they might possess a quasi-monopolistic position. Therefore
the concepts of New Public Management, New Public Governance and Public Choice, despite the
fact that they were developed decades ago, are still of importance in today’s research and subse-
quent implementation in public companies worldwide.
Concluding, and based on all aspects refurbished within this Thesis, the research question on
whether there is an increasing importance of the state in national and international Austrian-
originated companies, cannot be answered with assurance; however, tendencies point towards no;
thereby considering that Austria can be regarded as a special case. The previously depicted history
of Austria and its developments after World War I and II shows that the state has always played a
major role in the Austrian society and economy; especially after World War II when a majority of
important industries for Austria were made public in order to guarantee their continuation and re-
establish the well-being among the citizens. As already indicated before, the then developed forms
of structures and internal hierarchical systems are still prevalent today in a variety of Austrian
public companies. These historical developments and research on recent trends and changes within
major enterprises shows, that the influence of the Austrian state, and therefore also Austrian
politicians, has always been strong in public companies. This is especially true for those
corporations which are 100% state-owned and therefore legally represented by a certain ministry
which is, indeed, occupied by a political party. Yet, in Austria this is also true for companies which
are not 100% state-owned; a circumstance which can be explained by means of the public ÖIAG.
8. Conclusion Etienne Koo
151
Even though the company sold a variety of shares it still aims at keeping the control over the
enterprises. In case of the Austrian Post Group it kept more than half of the shares and even though
the management wanted the IPIC to enter the OMV Group, it looked after having more shares, and
therefore more control, than the Abu Dhabi oil enterprise. Even in case of the Telekom Austria
Group, where the majority is now owned by the Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, the company
aimed at keeping formal control over the business by signing a Syndicate Agreement that, even
though it grants the major ownership to América Móvil, also includes the fact that the managing
director of ÖIAG holds the management chair of the Supervisory Board and is granted veto rights.
This means that an Austrian decides upon major steps like the appointment of the management
which is, by now, still Austrian-based within the Telekom Austria Group.
Closing, it seems that the influence of the state is not increasing in those enterprises 100% state-
owned due to the fact that they are already highly influenced by state interventions. In addition,
despite the above posed circumstance that the state attempts to keep control over enterprises not
100% state-owned as well, there is no indication that the influence of the state increased over the
past years, or will increase within the near future, in those enterprises. This assumption is based
on the following reasons.
The year 2014 was characterized by a variety of developments within major Austrian companies.
While ÖIAG decided to sign a Syndicate Agreement with the Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim to
acquire the majority of the Telekom Austria Group, the OMV Group attained media attention
through internal discrepancies and the subsequent decision by Kremler to approve the early dis-
missal of the CEO and another Management Board member. Moreover, in 2014, most of the
analysed companies faced slight economic and financial difficulties or only minor improvements
to the previous year after they were actually able to recover from the consequences of the financial
crisis and subsequent phase of recession. All these factors contribute to the future developments
in 2015 and throughout the year, the situation might change again for some of the discussed enter-
prises. First, the early dismissal of two Management Board members of the OMV Group led to
heavy discussions and the fact that Kemler’s contract will not be extended in October 2015.
Second, current debates about the restructuration of the legal structure as well as management
colloquium of ÖIAG led to media attention and criticism on political power plays and the distri-
bution of positions. Third, while some rumours relate to the incorporation of additional companies
like ASFINAG or ARE into ÖIAG, others talk about the possible complete sale of managed rest
shares. Moreover, as soon as some managers leave and the restructuration of ÖIAG is fixed, those
companies holding a significant portion of shares, like it is the case with IPIC and América Móvil,
8. Conclusion Etienne Koo
152
might intervene and distribute their own managers among the most important positions. This is
especially probable in the case of Carlos Slim who, now that he owns the majority of the Telekom
Austria Group, will want to have significant decision rights as well. All this indicates that changes
are about to occur within certain Austrian enterprises which might affect the organizational logics
as well as management tactics within the near future. Therefore, additional research should be
conducted on what happens to these companies and how changes affect them.
A further question would be whether political parties actually should be managing public enter-
prises or if they should appoint experienced neutral third parties that possess the appropriate
knowledge and skills. On the one hand, it is logical that political representatives want to manage
public enterprises as each party considers its ways of thinking and solving issues as the best for
the society. On the other hand, the distribution of political representatives among different posi-
tions within public enterprises can lead to inadequate appointments, significant inefficiencies and
negative effects of rent-seeking. Moreover, if the political landscape changes due to elections,
positions will be changed and new people will be appointed. This leads to negative developments
because the positive effects of recently implemented measures might not have aroused and their
interruption and course change leads to significant costs. This aligns with the research of Zand and
Sorensen (1975) based on the ideas of Lewin (1947) who sees the implementation of actions in
phases of unfreezing, moving and refreezing.1408 After unfreezing the effects, significant costs
occur which would turn into positive effects as soon as they reach the state of refreezing; however,
often projects are interrupted and changed in the moving phase which leads to an even further
decline of performance. This aligns with what happens when positions in companies are trans-
formed due to changes in the political landscape.
Notwithstanding the previous analysis, it has to be considered that this Thesis includes only eleven
out of a variety of fully or partly public enterprises in Austria. Despite the fact that these eleven
count as the most important ones, the CIRIEC-conform research on them denotes only a portion
of developments within those companies. Moreover, as already indicated before, major restructu-
ration efforts, as well as changes within the upcoming year, will lead to adaptations and further
changes in the discussed enterprise examples that, for the purpose of completeness, would need to
be tackled next.
1408 cf. Lewin, K.: Frontiers in group dynamics: concept, method and reality in social science; social equilibria and
social change. Human Relations, Vol. 1 (1947): 5f.; Zand, D. E. & Sorensen, R. E.: Theory of Change and the
Effective Use of Management Science. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20, Issue 4 (1975): 534f.
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