caune hélène, jacquot sophie, palier bruno (2011), "boasting the national model: the eu and...

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Introduction

French elites have an ambiguous and contradictory relationship to Europe, especially in the social domain: on the one hand, they claim to inspire European integration developments, but, on the other hand, they tend to deny the influence of such developments on the national reform processes. This chapter aims to analyse this intriguing situation and its consequences in the context of the process of Europeanization of French social policies.

On this issue, the classical explanation that can be found in the Europeanization literature, linked to the fit/misfit mechanism, would here mean that the degree of Europeanization would depend on the degree of fit/misfit between European orientations for welfare reforms and the national welfare regime (Caporaso et al., 2001). However, we consider that this hypothesis is too static because it does not really pay attention to the present impact of past relations of the considered member state to the European Union (EU), and it neglects the role of actors in the process, except as intermediary variables. Domestic actors are reflexive and strategic when using the EU as a resource or a con-straint (Jacquot and Woll, 2003; Woll and Jacquot, 2010). Our chapter confirms that the changes implied by European requirements differ according to the various types of European resources and the way such resources are used by decision- makers and other relevant stakeholders. In fact, what we observe is that in France the mechanism of change is more horizontal (i.e. time and the consequences of past actions matter, strategic interaction between different national groups of actors matter)

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2Boasting the National Model: The EU and Welfare State Reforms in FranceHélène Caune, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier

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France: Boasting the National Model 49

than vertical (a divergence between European requirements or guide-lines and national situation).

French elites have long pictured the country as capable of shaping European outcomes. Since this ability has been undermined (due to the Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], the increasing interest of the EU in social policies “unfit” for the French system and the enlarge-ment process), the French relationship to Europe has became double- edged. What we illustrate in this chapter is that the usage of Europe will depend on the general relationship of France with Europe, on the type of resources used and also on the specific politics in the field of welfare reforms. French decision- makers have denied European influ-ence in the traditional welfare fields (employment and pensions), but have referred to it in social policy fields where innovations were to be implemented, such as anti- discrimination and disability policies. Partly because European requirements were not of the same nature (cogni-tive resources in the first case, more legal resources in the second case), the actors have not used these resources in the same manner. However, these differences also should be linked to the specific national politics in each field. In the area of social protection, decision- makers and poli-ticians hardly referred to European pressures. In welfare, for example, where traditional actors still prevail, the only references to Europe were made in order to underline the intrinsic quality of the French model, what we call a “boasting strategy”. In other fields (anti- discrimination and disability), when decision- makers referred to European require-ments, they did not present them as a pressure on the French welfare system; but European resources have been actively mobilized by new actors that were about to impose innovative ways of doing within these fields. These actors have used European demands as legitimizing and problem- solving resources and have hence entered the decision- making processes.

Part 1 of this chapter addresses the conceptualized fit/misfit hypoth-esis. Background information on the French welfare regime is provided so that the country’s welfare characteristics constitute a starting point from which to evaluate the potential political cost of European- induced reforms. We then analyse the country’s long- term relationship with Europe. As one of the founding members of European integration, French elites have long pictured their country as a model for the devel-opment of European policies. However, at the European level, the devel-opment of social policy frameworks has not always been theoretically compatible with the French schemes. This discrepancy has explained the decreasing support of French elites and citizens towards the EU.


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50 Hélène Caune, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier

Part 2 will focus on the key features of recent major welfare reforms: (a) the traditional conservative- corporatist fields based on a male- breadwinner logic (employment and pensions), which evolved from demand side poli-cies to supply side policies (employment) and multi- pillarization (pen-sions), and (b) diversity policies based on the non- universalist group logic of the French Republican model which shifted to the recognition of specific groups and types of discrimination (anti- discrimination and dis-ability). While traditional cases (employment and pensions reforms) are linked to European cognitive and normative resources, new fields (anti- discrimination and disability) relate to both legal and political/cognitive resources. Nevertheless, in all cases, policy structures have been dramati-cally reformed. In the traditional fields, all dimensions have changed (objectives, principles, procedures and financial instruments). In the new fields, objectives remain the same (integration), but all others dimensions have changed (principles, procedures and financial instruments).

After having looked at the content of reforms in part 2, part 3 identifies how decision- makers and the relevant stakeholders have used European resources to change the objectives and principles of French welfare policies. All recent French welfare reforms are in line with European- defined orientations. However, the possible influence of Europe on the reforms is rarely spelled out or advocated as such. We claim that the diversity of French usages of Europe can only be explained by taking into account the political dimension of past usages of Europe, the sub-stantive dimension of the changes induced by European requirements and the specific politics of the field.

In this chapter, we draw on interviews with political actors and par-liamentary debates to analyse if and how different actors used specific European resources to promote policy changes, as well as how they con-sider European constraints. We tell a synthetic (but systematic) story of French employment- friendly welfare reforms in the light of EU initiatives and we confront both specific European requirements and the types of resources involved with the changes actually introduced at the national level. We also analyse how French decision- makers use such resources and discuss the features of related policy changes. These elements help us to understand how the EU has had an impact on the French welfare state.

France and Europe: a difficult relationship, between leadership and denial

The French welfare model is categorized as a conservative- corporatist welfare regime (Esping- Andersen, 1990; Palier, 2010a). It typically relies

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on social contribution earned through work and employment protec-tion. Since the 1990s, the misfit between the French welfare system and European social policy orientations has increased. Decisions- makers, as well as political leaders, are, hence, increasingly vigilant ‘against any-thing perceived as threatening protected employment and social pro-tection’ (Palier and Petrescu, 2007: 62).

In this book, we test the hypothesis that the older the EU member country, the lower the level of scrutiny they experience and, hence, the more likely it is that they do not seriously consider European require-ments. In France, early membership is reinforced by the country’s per-ception of its leading role in the European integration process. As far as the country’s level of both legal transposition and practical compliance with European schemes is concerned, France is known to belong to the neglecting world of compliance (Falkner et al., 2005).

Considering these three French characteristics – (i) a conservative- corporatist welfare system unfit with European requirements; (ii) being a founding father of European integration which pictured itself as a locomotive of the EU and (iii) constituting a world of traditional neglect towards European requirements – we do not expect France to be keen to transpose European demands by any means. Rather, we can predict that the usages of Europe will be poor or denied.

The rationale of this section is to identify the evolution of the French–EU relationship. The sequencing presented stresses a major turn-ing point in the early 1990s, with the backlash of the 1992 Maastricht referendum ( ‘yes’ received only 51.05 per cent of the vote) as an early indicator. Since the preparation of the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1990s difficult national welfare reforms, French citizens are increasingly in doubt as to whether the EU is likely to sustain their welfare model.

From leadership to denial

The long- term relationship between France and the EU shows that the country is keen to comply with Europe as long as the EU is built follow-ing its image and it reflects its model. The relationship between France and the EU can be divided into four phases, characterizing France from a position of European leader to one led to deny that Europe is influenc-ing its own national policies.

1957–late 1970s: the Gaullist print on the vision of Europe as a large France

During the first phase (1957–late 1970s), France acted as a driver of European integration and tried to frame Europe so that it would both


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mirror the French model and strengthen national interests. De Gaulle demonstrated his capacity to freeze European integration if it did not fit with his vision. His successors, Pompidou (1969–74) and Giscard d’Estaing (1974–81) were less obsessed with French grandeur and the French European policy dramatically changed.1 In the early 1970s, French citizens felt that the coordination of social policies at Community level was “important” or “very important” (74 per cent).2 Among the French population, 61 per cent felt that belonging to the Common Market was a good thing. During this first phase, both European policies and administrative organizations were largely inspired by French models and conveyed a French approach to public problems (Parsons, 2003). French elites pictured the European project as a “large France”, meaning that European integration would strengthen national interests (Evans, 2007; Schmidt, 2007).

1982–92: quiet functionalism and permissive consensus

The second phase (1982–92) initiated the French decoupling with Europe. European policies challenged the French model in the fields of economic planning, stock market regulation and industrial and employment policies. During this decade, French elites used Europe as a driver of change and implemented reforms in the name of the Single Market. The pro- Single Market coalition between Mitterrand, Kohl and Delors maintained a rather positive relationship between the European project and French citizens, who remained passive towards the European project. This acceptance of European influence by citizens has been termed “permissive consensus” (Key, 1961: 32–5; Inglehart, 1970).

This second phase sowed the seeds of the French decoupling from Europe. In France, debates on monetary policy did not divide along traditional political left–right lines but crystallized internal divisions within political parties (Lequesne, 2008). In the early 1980s, Mitterrand committed to stabilizing public finance, which constituted an impor-tant step in anchoring French politics to the European sphere. It also seriously weakened the French supporters of national economic and monetary sovereignty. At that time, 60 per cent of French citizens favoured a European government.3 They did not feel that Community and national identity were contradictory, but rather complementary.

In France, this period was characterized as an ‘elite- dominated process with very little electoral salience’ (Grossman, 2007: 986). The framing of Europe by French elites explained the general public permissive con-sensus and the acceptance of a quiet functionalism; however, the Single


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Market and EMU de facto represented the last episodes of this European construction, as imagined by the founding members (Lequesne, 2008).

The 1990s break- up of French leadership: increasing divergence between French policies and European guidelines

The Maastricht treaty marked a turnaround and increased public defi-ance towards the European project. Future European enlargement her-alded the end of French leadership in Europe. In 1992, governmental political parties consensually favoured the Maastricht treaty referen-dum for ratification (achieving marginal success with 51.05 per cent of the population voting in favour). This treaty inspired a new approach to public policy and increased the divergence between French policies and European guidelines. French elites used Maastricht as a scapegoat to dilute political responsibility with regard to difficult welfare reforms, which resulted in ‘Europe being charged with all the real or supposed negative consequences of economic adjustment, welfare state reform and globalization’ (Grossman, 2007: 987–8). The backlash of the Maastricht referendum illustrates the changing relationship between France and Europe. Blame avoidance strategies (Weaver, 1986) implemented by political leaders resulted in a changing conception of European refer-ences; whereas mentioning European demands had been useful in the past, it became rather harmful in the second half of the1990s. This new phase was animated by distributive concerns and evaluations of abso-lute economic performance (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007: 128) and sig-nalled the end of the passive delegation of citizens’ trust in European elites.

The 2000s: the defence of the French social protection model

The failure (54.67 per cent) of the referendum on the ratification of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005) is emblematic of this fourth sequence. The referendum strongly mobilized French citizens (69.34 per cent) and raised intense debates on economic and social issues. Among voters, 31 per cent feared the potential negative effects of the Constitutional Treaty on the French employment situa-tion.4 Governmental parties consequently choose to seemingly, in their discourse, defend the French social model but their support failed to reconcile French citizens with the European project (Caune et al., 2007). In 2006, France was the only founding member of the EU to have a majority of negative responses on the positive effect of enlargement.5 Citizens’ support towards European integration decreased, but the general positive tendency was not reversed (Belot and Cautrès, 2006).

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In 2008, with the French Presidency of the European Council, political leaders revealed strong activism regarding the ratification of the Lisbon treaty and the financial crisis. Assuredly they wanted to reinvest in the European project after the crisis due to the rejection of the treaty estab-lishing a constitution in 2005 (Dehousse and Menon, 2009).

We see that the vertical gap (misfit dimension) between French poli-cies and European normative pressures has tended to increase, pushing for change and reforms. However, the French elites’ attitude is also a function of the horizontal historical gap and the answers to these pres-sures cannot be similar to the previous ones (time dimension).In the 1980s and 90s, the changing perceptions of citizens regarding the EU meant that, from that time on, any public political claim made in the name of European demands would de- legitimize any potential reform instead of reinforcing it.

Recent welfare reforms in France: going in the EU- defined direction

When looking at recent welfare reforms, we are at the heart of the French paradoxical relationship towards Europe. The analysis demonstrates a number of concordances between the content of French reforms and European guidelines. At the same time, it also stresses an important hiatus between practice and discourse, since reforms of the traditional social policies are barely linked to EU development.

In this section, we underline the concordance between EU guidelines and French social policy orientation. In recent years, specific policy measures have induced a shift in traditional and new social policies. This reorientation of social policies is in line with the main ideas pro-moted at EU level.

Employment: lowering the cost of labour, developing activation measures

French labour market policy has experienced many reforms since the mid- 1990s. One of the main themes around which social policy reori-entations were organized in the 1990s was employment and the nega-tive effects of social protection. Two elements were put forward: a) labour costs were supposedly too high for companies and prevented them from hiring; b) welfare payments were too passive and thus acted as a disincentive for the unemployed to return to active employ-ment. Two new typically supply sided sets of policies have been devel-oped to deal with this: those to lower the cost of labour and those

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concerned with welfare benefit activation. These reforms crucially mark a rupture with the French conservative- corporatist model of welfare protection.

Lowering social charges

Lowering “social charges” became a primary objective of employment policies in France during the 1990s. This objective has clearly been associated with the “imperatives” of the Single Market, since French employers have claimed throughout the 1980s and early 1990s that labour costs were too high in France to enable French firms to compete with their European counterparts.

Policies to lower “social charges” were first very specifically targeted and later came to apply to all lower wages. Without referring to it, this change echoed the White Paper on Growth, Competitivity and Employment published in 1993 by the Commission, which promoted the ‘reduc-tion of employers social security contributions and increased revenue through other means so as to neutralize the effects on the social protec-tion of workers’, as well as the criteria set in Maastricht.

To make up for the drop in receipts induced by these policies, new tax sources were devised and/or raised (particularly taxes on tobacco and alcohol). In 1990, a major innovation was introduced with the crea-tion of the general social contribution (Contribution Sociale Généralisée [CSG]), a tax (deducted at the source) on all income, including indirect income and income on capital, earmarked for social expenditure. It was originally set at a low rate (1.1 per cent of income) but was later raised considerably higher (7.5 per cent of income as of 1998). Between 1993 (large- scale lowering of “social charges” was undertaken in the context of the five- year law on employment) and 1995 (a plan was launched to expand the CSG), a threshold seems to have been crossed leading to a deep- seated transformation in the funding of certain areas of social protection. Gradually, taxes were to play an increasing role in social protection financing: whereas social contributions represented 80 per cent of the funding of welfare benefits in the early 1980s, they had dropped to two- thirds by early 2000.

Activation policies

Since the 1980s, employment policies have also been affected by a change of paradigm. From a vision in which unemployment was prima-rily perceived as linked to collective causes and therefore involuntary, there has been a shift to an analysis of unemployment as resulting from individual causes, thus viewed as voluntary. In the wake of these new


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conceptions, new policies have gradually been developed based on the will to activate social policies (Palier, 2006).

The initial measures taken in the late 1980s aimed at fostering activity among the unemployed first applied to young people and the long- term unemployed. They were later expanded, with a minimum benefit pay-ment, the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI), in 1988. Policy measures started to affect unemployment insurance in 1992. The allocation unique degressive (AUD) reduced both the level of unemployment benefit and its duration. Activation was finally implemented across the board with the 2001 reform of unemployment insurance schemes. The allowance paid was changed from an unemployment benefit to a job- seeking allow-ance (allocation pour la recherche d’emploi [ARE]), which was necessarily accompanied with a return- to- employment action plan signed by the beneficiary (plan d’action pour le retour à l’emploi [PARE]) (Palier, 2006). In addition, a new measure aiming to foster employment was introduced in 2001, the “employment bonus” (prime pour l’emploi) which aimed to “make work pay”. Following this trend, a new benefit was created in 2008, the RSA (revenu de solidarité active), which is supposed to pro-gressively replace RMI in the long run. This benefit is aimed at provid-ing anybody taking a (low- paid) job with a state- financed complement, which guarantees to workers a better income than the people on RMI (Palier, 2010). Here again, the national actors who have implemented these policies (mainly the social partners for unemployment insurance, and the government for minimum income schemes) have not referred to EU discourses, nor to European employment strategy, despite the fact that it openly called for activation.

Pension reform: returning to work, remaining on the labour market

With respect to pension schemes, the situation in France in the early part of the twenty- first century does not look promising. According to the projection made in a French national report in September 2002, public expenses are set to increase rapidly, from 12.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 16.3 per cent in 2040 (Palier, 2010b). According to a European projection, the pension system would evolve from having a surplus of 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2005 to a deficit of 1.8 per cent of GDP in 2020 and 3.8 per cent in 2040. This would lead to an increase in the con-tribution rate of 10 per cent.6 In France, the activity rate of workers older than 55 is one of the lowest in Europe (31.9 per cent in 2001; 38 per cent in 2008), and the average age of effective retirement is just under 60. Due to this early retirement and the baby boom, the cost of

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pensions has increased tremendously since the late 1990s. The financial weight of this has increased pressure on the pension system (Mandin and Palier, 2004).

The reforms in the 1990s have been few and remained relatively limited. The Balladur reform, adopted on 1993, only concerned pri-vate sector employees. The main measure was to lengthen the period of contribution necessary to be entitled to a full pension (50 per cent of the reference wage) from 37.5 years to 40 years. The 1995 Juppé plan proposed to align the new conditions to civil servants but it was aban-doned in the face of social pressure (Palier, 2000). The lack of decision with regard to reform created some differences in the replacement rate between private and public sector employees.

After the re- election of Jacques Chirac in 2002, the Prime Minister, Jean- Pierre Raffarin, set pension reform on its agenda. The princi-pal stake rapidly became the alignment of public sector employees with private sector employees’ regimes. Measures were enacted in an attempt to significantly curb the rise in early retirement, once viewed as the preferred instrument to complement economic reorganization. Consequently, a U- turn was performed, away from the preferred policy orientations of the 1980s (Erhel et al., 2005; Palier, 2006).

Even through there was a big social movement, as well as some impor-tant strikes in May 2003, the Government obtained the agreement of the employers’ organizations and of two trade unions – the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail) and CGC (Confédération Générale des Cadres) – to adopt the reform. The bill obtained the support of a strong government majority in Parliament and was adopted in July 2003. A facultative regime of pensions financed through capitalization for private sector employees (PERP [Plan d’épargne retraite populaire]) was also accepted by Parliament (Palier, 2003) and the different pathways for early exit from work have progressively been closed.

Consequently, the 2003 Fillon reform followed the main orientations of the EU: to ensure the financial sustainability of the pension system, by introducing some parametric measures (lengthening the period of contribution) and by developing some supplementary private pensions plans in order to compensate the diminution of the public pension. It also follows the orientation of the EU concerning the active ageing pol-icy: to encourage people to work longer, through a system of bonus and sanction; to develop lifelong learning in order to preserve their abil-ity to work; and to close the early exit schemes. Finally, the European orientation related to the principle of equity and alignment between public and private sector pension regimes is also taken into account

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(Mandin and Palier, 2004). The same could, of course, be said with respect to the pension reforms implemented in 2010, which further prolonged the working career necessary to access a full pension (form 40 to 41.5 years) and shifted the legal age of retirement from 60 to 62 (Palier, 2010b). Here again, despite being in line with EU requirement, no French government dared to refer to the EU orientation (as readable, for instance, in the Open Method of Coordination pension guidelines). Furthermore, the French government convinced the Commission to postpone the publication of its 2010 Green Paper on pensions from spring to July 2010 so that its publication would not interfere with the French 2010 pension debate and be interpreted as the EU imposing this unpopular pension reform.

The new “universalization of discrimination”

In contrast with the traditional fields of employment and pensions, anti- discrimination policy not only refers to cognitive and normative resources but also to legal resources in the form of specific Directives. In this case, France had to implement a Directive that could have been perceived as highly contradictory with regard to its own national tradi-tion of integration, which denies the relevance of taking into account any community- or ethnic- based differences among citizens.

The Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 ‘implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin’, is known in France as the ‘Race Directive’. The Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 ‘establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation’ extends the scope of the groups protected by European law. Both Directives lay on the new Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam which enables the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Race Directive is concerned with all forms of racial discrimination in the areas of employment, education, social security, health care and access to goods and services and must be implemented at the domestic level within three years. It critically challenges the French Republican model based on the nation as a whole (‘La République une et indivisible’), which does not recognize the existence of specific groups based on racial or ethnic origins. During the phase of negotiation of this Directive, France has tried – and, to a certain extent, succeeded – to soften the contradictions with its model by opposing affirmative action (Calves, 2002). France has, however, also changed its own approach to


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discrimination – first, with a law in 2001 and, secondly, by the creation of a new anti- discrimination body, the HALDE (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité) in 2004.

Whereas French national legislation previously only recognized direct discriminations, the law of 16 November 2001 introduced the recog-nition of indirect discriminations in the employment field. This law marked a crucial turning point in French anti- discriminatory policy because it allowed for new resources for action in many different fields: sexual harassment, labour law, penal justice, administrative regulations and housing (Simon and Stavo- Debauge, 2004). Going a step further, the law 2004- 1486 of 30 December 2004 created the HALDE in the form of an Administrative Independent Authority aimed at fighting discrim-ination and, thus, implementing one of the requirements of the Race Directive.

The implementation of Directive 2000/43 and the creation of the HALDE show that France managed to deal with a European demand that previously constituted a challenge to its model. The creation of an independent body to fight discrimination first appeared on the national agenda in 1997 but was dismissed in 1999. At that date, a political win-dow of opportunity opened (soon to be closed again) and a consultative body was created (Chappe, 2008: 52–60).

The implementation of the Race Directive introduced an important debate on the French Republican model of integration and was, above all, an interesting case of agenda widening. Here, the EU served as a way to legitimize major symbolic institution- building. What was interesting in this case was that, although the Directive was first seen as challeng-ing the national model, it was nevertheless framed as an instrument to reinforce the French model of integration. In 2002, Chirac Presidential discourse in Troyes included the creation of an independent body. It was presented as a way to strengthen the French integration model, which had been put endangered by recent electoral successes of the extreme right- wing party Front National, whose leader Jean- Marie Le Pen achieved victory over the then leader of the left, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, going on to be Jacques Chirac’s opponent in the second round.7

With the law of 2004, political decision- makers managed to a) answer European requirements and b) politically safeguard the Republican model. Not only did they create the institution to fight direct or indi-rect racial discrimination required by the Directive, they also extended concerns to other discriminations “prohibited by law”, but also engaged in a process of universalization with the introduction of discrimination


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based on sexism, homophobia and religious intolerance. Thus, France enlarged the scope of the institution required by the Directive.

During the parliamentary phase, the creation of such an institution was rather consensual. The opposition between right and left focused on the level of power of the institution, and hence its efficiency. Debates arose on the composition of the HALDE (whether the participation of NGOs would be obligatory or only possible) and on the guarantee of equal representation between men and women. Non- political actors were finally empowered, as required by the Directive. Bones of conten-tion mainly crystallized on the introduction of sexual orientation and disability issues. Indeed, there was no French framework to deal with such situations, although a law on homophobia was to be discussed by Parliament. The amendments voted on by the Sénat during its first lecture reinforced the recognition of several discriminated groups and, hence, largely undermined the debates during the second lecture at the Assemblée Nationale. To justify this position, French MPs eventu-ally referred to other Directives on equal treatment between men and women. The recognition of all forms of discrimination can be seen as a process of “universalization of discrimination”.

For French actors, the recognition of a large set of discriminations (including sexual orientations and disability) was a way to avoid focus on racial and ethnic groups that would contradict the French Republican model.

Disability: from a medical to a social approach

Since the 1970s, the French approach to disability has been character-ized by a mixed- system that combines ordinary schooling and meas-ures for special schooling (Cardou and Poizat, 2007). Since 1987, the law has required that firms of more than 20 employees employ 6 per cent of disabled persons. However, the employment rate of disabled workers has never exceeded 4 per cent. In the early 2000s, recognition of weak French employment rates highlighted comparisons to rates elsewhere in Europe and fuelled debates on the disabled worker issue.

At the European level, financial resources are available, although they are marginal (programme Equal). Several Directives had been voted on the basis of Article 13 of the Amsterdam treaty. Council Directive 2000/78/EC created a general framework and Directive 2001/85/EC provided a definition of the persons considered as disabled or with reduced mobility. Directive 2004/18/EC reaffirmed the principles of non- discrimination and equal treatment and recognized protected


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employment for disabled workers as a social insertion modality. Finally, the European approach also relied on European soft law, such as the European Charter on fundamental rights, which provides cognitive and normative frames and promotes a general and social approach to discrimination. Hassenteufel and Mohanu (2010) showed that French NGOs in the field of disability have been increasingly dissatisfied with French schemes and have directed political attention towards other European models, especially the Swedish one, in an effort to change the content of policies in France.

The French law of February 2005 confirms the right to compensation of disabled people on the basis of their disability, which was introduced in the law on social modernization of January 2002. However, the prin-ciple is strengthened and redefined towards the personal project (life project). The law introduces a crucial innovation, which constitutes a change of the policy objectives. Indeed, it affirms the principle accord-ing to which every disabled child or teenager should be accommodated in the regular school of his or her neighbourhood. The law, hence, also reaffirms the creation of appropriate buildings that allow disabled stu-dents to pursue their schooling. Employers are also supposed to take appropriate measures to allow disabled workers to continue in their job and to benefit from professional training

The usages of Europe in France: a contrasted landscape

In order to picture the nature of the usages of Europe that are made dur-ing the processes of French welfare reforms in the social field, one has to acknowledge a contrasting landscape. There is a selective – rather than a clear- cut – denial of the influence of Europe in these reform processes. Whereas the European influence is largely denied in traditional fields, the actors involved in new fields often use European resources to legiti-mize policy changes and to put the issues they advocate on the public and political agenda.

Boasting and denial in well- entrenched policy fields

In the employment and pensions domains, French policymakers often deny the European influence. Rather, they maintain that reforms are only national. ‘In France, there is a will to not show the importance of Europe: Brussels that regulates everything, this appears as a ghost’ (interview from a French official in Erhel et al., 2005). While blame- avoidance strategies were used in the 1980s, French decisions- makers


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have realized since that such strategies harm French citizens’ support for European integration. Above all, such strategies also backfire on decision- makers. Indeed, in return, citizens may blame national poli-cymakers for not having been able to secure national interests and pref-erences when European policies were being defined in Brussels or in the implementation of national reforms. As national political leaders have long underlined their ability to shape European policies, citizens are not easily convinced when difficult welfare reforms (i.e. lowering unemployment and pension benefits) are presented in the name of the EU. Hence, it is sometimes more prudent for French decision- makers to deny external pressures (Caune, 2010).

Table 2.1 A panorama of different reforms: dimensions of policy change and actors

Key features Years

Dimension/degree of change

Reform promoter

Pro- reform coalition

Anti- reform coalition

Employment 1998–2003

All dimensions (supply side policies).

Government (left and right).

Employers, government parties, economists.

Trade unions.

Pensions 1990–2000

All dimensions (multi- pillarisation).

Government (right).

Employers, right- wing parties, economists.

Trade unions, left- wing parties, public opinion.

Anti-discrimination

2000–4 Principles, procedures and financial instruments (integration/anti- discrimination).

Government (right).

Government parties (left and right), NGOs, associations.

Traditionalist right.

Disability 2005 Principles, procedures and financial instruments: social approach and accessibility.

Government (right), associations.

Associations coalition through the Conseil National consultative des personnes handicapées (CNCPH). Users.

Some associations involved in physical disability (e.g. UNAPEI).

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This feature characterizes the way French policymakers deal with Europe when employment policy is concerned. When French civil serv-ants involved in the Open Method of Coordination processes discuss the influence of the European strategy, they generally put forward French voluntarism, rather than external pressures (OECD) or the role of the Commission. In short, French decision- makers are keener to empha-size the uploading processes of European integration (the introduction of employment as a European concern thanks to the mobilization of French politicians and civil servants) rather than the downloading processes (the Europeanization of national schemes) (Barbier and Sylla, 2001). For instance, they stress that the European pluri- annual annual logic of the OMC is directly drawn from the French quinquennial law (loi quinquennale). In 1996–97, French representatives at the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the European Council of Ministers (COREPER) were attributed a specific task – to develop the employment chapter of the Amsterdam treaty. These elements show that French poli-cymakers are more likely to boast about French influence than they are to recognize that of European demands on national policymak-ing. In other words, the French habit of stressing their own ability to shape Europe according French principles is still alive and well. By con-trast, recognizing the influence of the EU on national reforms is more difficult.

In the pension field, policymakers do not boast about their influence on European orientations; however, they still deny European influence. The argument they stress is that European incentives in the pension field occurred too late to be taken into account in the national reforms process:

The report of national strategy was a stylish exercise. The French report respects the questions prepared by the Commission. We respected the number of pages (25–30 pages). However difficult, the last important reform occurred 10 years ago. We were preparing the Fillon reform. During the elaboration of the Fillon reform, as for the elaboration of the national strategy report, we have juggled with the OMC. In September, the main objective was that we did not give the feeling that the reform was actually made, although it had to be discussed with the social partners. It was very important, not to give the impression that Brussels imposed the reform. It has been very present in the strategies of the successive governments. (Quoted in Erhel et al., 2005)


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In interviews, even though policymakers deny any direct European influence, they recognize that the OMC was not a totally distant phe-nomenon. Looking at French policymaking processes, it is then diffi-cult to argue that the EU has imposed any of the recent trends observed in the first section. However, it does not mean that there is no link between EU requirements and national reforms.

Boasting and problem- solving in new fields

In this section, we show that in new welfare fields (anti- discrimination and disability), new, marginalized or previously delegitimized actors have used the EU as a resource. The EU can help them to overcome insti-tutional and traditional constraints, especially linked to Republicanism and its unitarian imperative. In two recent debates concerning the crea-tion of the HALDE and the reform of law on disability – both linked to European Directives – previously non- legitimate actors have been the only ones to make explicit reference to Europe.

In the case of anti- discrimination, external pressures (the Race Directive, but also international engagements, or foreign experiences in the UK, Belgium, or Canada) were presented as potential examples to reinforce the French integration model without changing it dramati-cally. French supporters of the reform did not use Europe as a stick (‘we have to do it anyway’), but rather presented it as an opportunity to provide a serious solution to strengthen the French universalist model, politically weakened by the 2002 Presidential election.

The creation of the HALDE was only possible because it was included in a broader scenario, or, a storyline, that legitimized its inclusion in a larger policy framework (Chappe, 2008). Before 2000, the creation of an institution to fight discrimination, especially racial discrimination, was totally blocked by the Republican Pact and its veil of ignorance concerning citizens’ origins and differences. In 2002, the presence of the French leader of the extremist right in the second round of the Presidential election was interpreted as a sign of the weakening of the Republican model. The 2002 Presidential election created a window of opportunity. NGO members in favour of an extensive transposition of the 2000 Directive used this instrument to push for a penalization of discriminatory acts. However, they did not succeed because the fight against discrimination has been “re- universalized”, that is, presented as safeguarding equality between the citizens of the Republic (Chappe, 2008). In the course of the debates in Parliament, representatives from all the political parties have referred to the EU in order to underline its


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role as a progressive arena. The argument according to which the EU is not only a community based on law and market but also a moral com-munity was especially directed towards the political left. Actors on the right of the political scale stressed the social character of the Directive to undermine possible left criticisms. Europe has been a legitimizing stimulus, giving added value to the project when it could be demon-strated that it was not only imposing market- driven retrenchment on social policies but also could contribute to improve social conditions for minority groups. The downloading of the European approach to dis-crimination (based on both the recognition of discriminated groups and the political necessity to guarantee their rights) in the French domestic context was, then, considered as a positive reference to strengthen the national model.

Also, in 2004, the political context was set by the adoption of a law prohibiting religious signs in schools, which raised intense politi-cal debate on the French integration model. The main attack targeted the restrictive or prohibitive aspect of the law and crystallized tradi-tional left–right political cleavages, as well as intra- party cleavages. As the political opposition saw it as a defensive initiative, the gov-ernment consequently presented the HALDE as a supportive coun-terpart. To reassert both rights and duties, political actors linked the reassertion of French secularism with the fight against discrimination (Chappe, 2008). According to the Minister of Parity and Professional Equality, Nicole Ameline (UMP), the French transposition process of the Directive placed the country in an advanced position in Europe.8

Boasting about French principles of “liberty, equality, fraternity” was prevalent in political debates and the foundations of the 1789 French revolution were often cited. Such a solution allowed for the implemen-tation of European requirements while avoiding criticism on the very principles of the Republican model. Hence, supporters of the reform used the EU as a resource, not only to gain legitimacy and overcome domestic constraints linked to the Republican model, but also to legiti-mize the model itself.

The political process leading to the creation of the HALDE firstly targeted the French model of integration. The solution found was to universalize the principle of discrimination by extending the remit of the institution to cover all forms of discrimination, not only those based on ethnic and racial origins. Whereas, at first sight, the Directive challenged the integration model, it was not used as a scapegoat for the changes. European requirements were, rather, pre-sented as a way to legitimize the model itself, but furthermore, in

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the context of the 2002 Presidential election, as a problem- solving recipe.

Problem- solving usage of European resources is also at the heart of the reform process in the field of disability. The legislator recognizes that Article 9 of the law (employment and laid- out schedule for disa-bled) directly derives from Directive 2000/78.9

French NGOs involved in the management of disability subscribed to the social approach because they needed to address increasing dissatis-faction (Hassenteufel and Mohanu, 2010). The development of a com-parison between the national situation and that in European countries introduced a window of opportunity in France, and brought new ideas and new examples to national debates. Also, explicit references to the Directive had been spun to answer national needs. The parties responsi-ble for European and international issues at the inter- ministerial delega-tion for disabled people stressed that,

the European ideology is about non- discrimination. ... The title of the law, ‘law for equal treatment and right, and the participation and citizenship of disabled people’ typically refers to a Community approach, that is, a policy defined according to the rights of the peo-ple. ... From the logic of protection founded by the law of 1975, the logic of the law of 2005 promotes a logic based on the rights. (Quoted in Hassenteufel and Mohanu, 2010)

NGOs involved in the management of disability have filtered the European approach. These NGOs have focused on two elements: compensation and accessibility. There was also a debate between the NGOs involved in mental disability, which were aligned with the social approach, and those in charge of physical disability, which were more favourable to the medical approach and stressed a “reality prin-ciple”. The government did not deny this articulation between both approaches, but rather focused on the need to adapt the French policy to new stakes and new possibilities.

As shown by the analysis of Parliamentary debates, the case of dis-ability shows that European references were mainly presented through the identification of French backwardness when compared to other countries.10 The need to implement Directive 2000/78 is not referred to, except when it comes to the defence of a particular definition of disabil-ity. In such cases, French MPs did not hesitate to refer to the European definition.11 Along with the other policy cases under study, promot-ers of the reform reasserted the political will to strengthened national

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solidarity. However, in the case of disability, it is noticeable that French NGOs played an important role in the agenda- setting process (Ponvert- Delucq, 2005). They gathered in the National Consultative Council of Disabled Persons (CNCPH) and they favoured the social approach promoted by the EU. European references were used more to stress the policy results of foreign models than focus on the need to transpose the Directive.

Our cases demonstrate that the EU and its requirements have been diversely used and, hence, have to be differentiated according to the type of policy field, either “traditional” (employment, pensions) or “new” (anti- discrimination, disability). In traditional fields, the general trend is a denial of European impact accompanied by boasting about the French model. In new fields, the usages of Europe are more ambigu-ous. Indeed, in both types of welfare fields, political actors have shown a propensity to boast. However, in the case of new areas, European requirements are indeedused to legitimize reforms and provide oppor-tunities to solve policy problems.

Conclusion: the need for a double contextualization

In order to understand this ambiguous situation, we consider that anal-ysis has to be contextualized, taking into account both the political and policy sector dimension.

First, politics and past reforms matter. To understand the cautious-ness of policymakers when it comes to referring to a European influ-ence, the complex and difficult France–Europe relationship has to be included in the picture. The hypothesis of “goodness of fit” does

Table 2.2 Role and usages of Europe

Policies Role of Europe Resources Usages

Employment Reform catalyst (but denied).

Cognitive and normative.

Denial and boasting.

Pensions Reform catalyst (but denied).

Cognitive and normative.


Anti- discrimination

Reform catalyst and agenda setter.

Legal, cognitive, normative and political.

Problem solving and boasting.

Disability Reform catalyst and agenda setter.

Legal, financial, political and normative resources.

Problem solving and boasting.

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not have sufficient explanatory power. It is a too static a conceptual instrument. None of the cases under study really fit with European requirements and this dimension is not sufficient to understand the role played by European incentives. In this misfit situation, we could expect that policymakers would either neglect or fully use the EU. This hypothesis is, however, not sufficient to understand their denial. Actually, typical French denial has to be connected with the elite and/or public opinion in relation to the EU. In France, this rela-tionship is ambiguous since citizens generally favour European inte-gration but see it as a threat to welfare fields. This situation should be linked with previous blame- avoidance strategies implemented by political leaders in the 1980s. As political actors realized that such strategies could backfire on them, using Europe to legitimize difficult welfare changes became a dangerous political game. Indeed, as French citizens are usually told that their political leaders are able to shape European outcomes, it is difficult to use such outcomes as a resource to legitimize welfare reforms. In such a case, political leaders would be seen as either losers of the European political game in Brussels or as supporters of reforms that have not been democratically discussed at the national level.

Secondly, within this general context, the different types of usage are directly linked to the type of resources available at the European level. In cases of cognitive and normative resources (employment and pensions), French politicians can easily boast of their achievements. By contrast, when legal resources (Directives) are involved (anti- discrimination and disability), this is more problematic, lending them-selves more to legitimizing reform promoters’ action. In such cases, the promoters of reforms do not challenge the national model. Rather, such actors tend to use European requirements to stress the need of reform, which would finally enhance the model rather than transform it. Such attitudes reflect the relevance of our membership hypothesis. As French elites cannot really use Europe to promote policy reforms, they instead underline the grandeur of domestic policy schemes. When confronted with European demands, requiring these schemes to change, French actors usually present the reforms as a way to enhance the traditional principles of a policy field. The role and influence of Europe within a reform process is, therefore, not acceptable when the reform is in oppo-sition to the French post- war myth- like social model. Since policymak-ers anticipated that the public might perceive reform negatively, adding another negative reference to Europe would be counter- productive. The alternative perspective is that the reforms made in these domains will


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“save” the French welfare state institutions – and so save their specifici-ties (Palier and Petrescu, 2007).

In the traditional fields, European references and ideas are, thus, denied because they are understood as alien to and endangering the sys-tem. In short, they are thought to be neo- liberal, unfit for the national system, which must remain untouched. In a new field, such as the fight against discrimination, the usages of Europe can become a positive resource when either the reform conforms to the national model or when it adds something considered as positive to this model. In fine, all the policy cases under study have dramatically changed. France is certainly not “frozen” in terms of its welfare state, but the framing of reforms is indeed frozen.)

Notes

1. Pompidou put an end to the French veto with regard to the adhesion of Great Britain with the 1972 referendum and Giscard d’Estaing launched the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978.

2. However, the issue is not specifically more important for them than for other countries: Ireland – 87 per cent; Italy – 83 per cent; UK – 72 per cent; Germany – 71 per cent. Source: Eurobarometer, Europe as the Europeans Sees It, 27 November 1973.

3. Eurobarometer, 28 December 1987, pp. 36 and 47.4. Flash Eurobarometer, 171, June 2005, p. 17.5. Special Eurobarometer, 251, The Future of Europe, 2006, p. 55.6. European Council (2003), Joint Commission/Council Report on adequate and

sustainable pensions (06- 03): 145.7. In the Presidential discourse of 14 October 2002, in Troyes, President Chirac

introduced the idea of the creation of an independent authority to fight all forms of discrimination due to racism, religious intolerance, sexism or homophobia. Speech available at: http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_archives/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2002/octobre/discours_du_presi-dent_de_la_republique_prononce_a_troyes.1560.html

Table 2.3 Perception of the content of the reform and usages of Europe

Perception of the content of the reform

Reference to Europe by the reform promoter Type of usage

Retrenchment (employment and pensions)

No reference or negative reference.


Progressive (anti- discrimination and disability)

Direct but soft reference. Problem solving and boasting.

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8. ‘Ce texte place la France en avant- garde européenne’, Deuxième séance du mardi 7 décembre 2004, Assemblée Nationale.

9. Parliamentary report no. 1599, MP Jean- François Chossy, Assemblée nation-ale, 13 May 2004.

10. Jean- Michel Dubernard (UMP), Président de la commission des affaires cul-turelles, familiales et sociales. ‘Le retard français sur les pays d’Amérique et d’Europe du Nord ne se rattrape décidément pas’, Assemblée Nationale, Deuxième séance du 1er juin 2004.

11. Pascal Terrasse (SRC): ‘Toutefois, un des éléments fondamentaux de ces textes a toujours été la reconnaissance de la notion de handicap, dont la définition doit en outre s’inscrire dans la norme européenne puisqu’il faut transposer en droit français une partie de la réglementation européenne. Or, aujourd’hui, la notion de handicap telle que vous la définissez est con-traire à ce principe européen et fait même l’unanimité contre elle. Quant à la position du Conseil économique et social, elle est exactement inverse à celle que vous prétendez’, Assemblée Nationale, Troisième séance du 1er juin 2004.

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