bureaucracy and class: the algerian dialectic

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BUREAUCRACY AND CLASS: THE ALGERIAN DIALECTIC

Marnia Lazreg

The problem of the role played in politics by the bureaucracy - defined as the category of individuals who hold positions in a state apparatus for the purpose of fulfilling functions officially meant to serve the public interest - has been resolved neither by those referred to as academic sociologists nor by their Marxist counterparts. The irony, however, is that while Weberians emphasize the structural constraints that a bureaucratic apparatus (be it private or state) exerts on the expression of the bureaucrats' own interests as members of groups outside of the structure, they are ready to concede that in socialist societies the state bureaucrats have e.volved into a class of their own. To add to the confusion, a few Marxists who to a greater or lesser.extent use adequate criteria, such as the ownership of the means of production, the relations of production, and consciousness of kind, in their class analyses of social structure, are themselves all too ready to admit that socialist societies are typically run by a bureaucratic class. In doing so, they mean to update Marx's definition of class, insofar as they equate the legal ownership of the means of production with its control or point out that Marxism cannot account for itself [ 1 ]. But since socialist systems as they exist today are still structurally different from capitalist systems, the concept of bureaucratic class runs into theoretical and practical inconsistencies. These are strenuously explained away by remarking that the bureaucratic class differs from its capitalist ruling

Marnia Lazreg is Assistant Professor of Sociology, New York School for Social Research, New York.

class counterpart especially in that it is more egalitarian in its outlook [3]. No convincing explanation is given as to why a bureaucratic class does not simply decide to own rather than simply control the means of production. Nor is it explained why, given the totalitarian character of the social system within which it operates, it should be more egalitarian than its capitalist counterpart. In other words, there is a lingering doubt in the minds of those who advance tile thesis of the bureaucratic class as to whether a bureaucracy can truly be a class. Instead it is left as a "class but", caught up in the theoretical bind of being simultaneously a class and a nonclass.

The purpose of this paper is to help understand the dynamics of a bureaucracy in its formative stage, with particular reference to Algeria, a newly constituted nation-state that claims to be building a socialist system [2]. A close-up view of the ways in which the Algerian bureaucracy has been trying to relate to state power may shed some light on the actual role played by the state apparatus in class emergence. I would like to contend that under the Algerian form of socialism bureaucrats do not constitute a class. Rather, they use the state apparatus so as to (1) promote the interests of the incipient classes or groups they are derived from, and (2) reinforce these interests by bringing to the fore new social groups that may crystallize into classes.

The mechanism through which these objectives are realized is here referred to as "the bureaucratic production of class." The concept of production is borrowed from Marx [41. It

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refers here to the dialectical process of shaping loosely structured social forces into either articulated fractions of classes or full-fledged classes whose presence affects the existing balance of power. In this sense, the process of production of classes is catalytic.

DEFINITIONS

The term bureaucracy as it is used in this paper refers to the incumbents of executive positions in the hierarchically organized administrative and economic branches of the state apparatus at both the local and national levels. The military is not included as there is no readily available data on it.

The bureaucracy is treated as a "social category" whenever the focus of the analysis is on the bureaucracy's relation to the state rather than to society. The term "bureaucrat" will often be used interchangeably with bureaucracy as defined above. Whenever the insti.tu- tion within which bureaucrats operate is analyzed, the concepts of apparatus or structure will be used.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND !"

The perspective toward bureaucracy adopted. here is in the critical Marxist tradition, which encompasses and transcends the Weberian conception. The latter has been widely debated and need not be reviewed. It is important , however, to point out that Weber viewed bureaucratic organization as part of an inexorable process of rat ional ism. Within this framework bureaucracy may pursue interests derived from the logic of its own mode of functioning rather than from the social class to which its members belong. For the purposes at hand, two elements in Weber's theory must be recalled: First, the inevitability of the increasing bureaucratization of the modern state and the need to control the bureaucracy's propensity to seek power. This control would ideally be exercised through an

efficient parliamentary system. Second, the structure and ethos of the bureaucratic apparatus is such that bureaucrats are unable to wield power successfully. Weber describes the bureaucratic structure as a "precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied purely political as well as purely economic or any other sort of interests in dominat ion" [5]. Elaborating on this point, Dahrendorf affirmed that the bureaucracy is "a reserve army of a u t h o r i t y . . , a mercenary army of class conflict" [6]. As such, "it is always in battle, but it is forced to place its strength in the service of changing masters and goals." This means that "although they always belong to the ruling class, because bureaucratic roles are roles of dominance bureaucracies never are the ruling class."

This view agrees with Bendix's assertion that "bureaucracy i s . . . all powerful and at the same time incapable of determining how its power should be used" [71. This apparent paradox is due to the fact that the administrative skills that bureaucrats possess provide them with an autonomy which is undermined by their professional code of "independent and impm;sonal performance". Indeed, the latter requ!res that they fulfill their duties regardless of their disagreements with the policies they are expected to implement.

The import of this brief theoretical review is that bureaucrats, as agents operating within a fixed environment, are a dynamic force but are nevertheless hemmed in by the very structure that gives them life. Admittedly, these structural constraints have been given exaggerated importance. Procedural rules and codes of behavior have indeed been by-passed under circumstances ranging from wars and revolutions to the dissolution of the moral fabric of a society. But in the case of Algeria, a society involved in an ambitious program of industrialization requiring a broad range of skills (both national and foreign), rules of procedure and codes of behavior receive a

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special emphasis, to the point where hier- archical lines solidify.

One manifestation of this is the extreme deference and prestige accorded to higher- echelon bureaucrats who lead a sheltered and secluded life in their offices, carrying out an active and tightly scheduled daily program. These bureaucrats naturally enjoy considerable material privileges and are anxious to perpetuate the structure that gave them their careers. They perform tasks which they generally find exciting in that they entail participation in the building of socioeconomic structures practically from scratch. However, they also realize that the state apparatus within which they serve allows them only a limited freedom of action in terms of promoting the long-range interests of the social groups or classes from which they come or with which they have affinities [8].

If the bureaucracy operating under parliamentary conditions cannot become a class, can it evolve into one within a socialist system? Djilas answers the question affirmatively and argues that the "new class" in the Soviet Union has emerged out of the party~ Djilas' conception of the "new class" is significant in that it reveals his dilemma in wanting to adapt the concept of class to individuals who owe their power to a bureaucratic structure without themselves being bureaucrats. Hence the problematic formulation of the "new class" and its no less problematic implications for class theory. Djilas refers to the "new class" as the "political class" whose members are not bureaucrats but "political leaders" who hold an "administrative monopoly" [9]. Furthermore, although the members of the "new class" are not bureaucrats, "only a special stratum of bureaucrats [emphasis added], those who are not administrative officials, make up the core of the governing bureaucracy." The looseness of this definition is self-evident and does not require elaboration. What is important , however, is to examine its theoretical implications.

First, class membership is equated with in- stitutional position. This means that there is

no way to determine the evolution and development of class over time unless it is assumed that positions are inherited. There is not enough evidence about the Soviet Union or other socialist societies to conclude that the sons and daughters of "political leaders" also become such. Second, the concept of control as used by Djilas is absorbed in the concept of ownership [10]. Ownership of the means of production is claimed to be "collective." The lack of distinction between administrative control and actual ownership imposes an artificial bond of solidarity between the members of the "new class." Furthermore, it makes it ahnost impossible to analyze conflicts and antagonisms within the class itself. Third, Djilas' conception of class makes it difficult to understand class conflict. The assumption is that the "new class" is all powerful insofar as it originated from the proletariat and up- holds a seemingly proletarian ideology. How then can the proletariat express its grievances against the "new class" and how does one study their antagonistic relationship? Fourth, since the rule of the "new class" is claimed to be total, class conflict is deflected onto the international level. It is the relationship between the bureaucratic class and the outside world that determines the extent to which class rule changes. An elaboration of this point is to be found in Carlo (see note 3).

For all these reasons, I believe that the concept of the "new class" (e.g., the bureaucratic class) does not contribute to the theory of class. In fact, there is a sense in which it constitutes a theoretical regression because it subsumes a socialist system under a capitalist one regardless of structural differences. When applied to the Algerian situation, Djilas' conception of class does not help us understand the process through which bureaucracy evolves into a class, if it does so at all. Indeed, in Algeria the party is not as powerful or as central to policymaking as it is in the Soviet Union. The Algerian FLN was first established for the specific purpose of waging a war against the French colonial

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forces [ 11 ]. After independence, the FLN had to be reconverted and readjusted to civilian and peacetime conditions. This process has not yet been completed; nor has it been successful. Under the first Algerian government, headed by Ben Bella between 1962-1965, the debate over the party centered around the issue of its membership. While Ben Bella favored a membership restricted to those who had taken part in the revolution, his opponents advocated a party open to the masses. After the 1965 coup that brought Colonel Boum~diene to power, the party was opened to all those who accepted the new president 's policies [ 12]. In 1968, the "year of the party," an appeal was made by Boum~diene to the "cadres" (or managerial personnel) of the nation to take part in a program of restructuring the party. The appeal met with some coolness, as the cadres explained that participation in the party 's activities could not be the sole criterion of at tachment to socialism [ 13 ]. Although party cells exist at the district and communal levels, the influence of the party over the conduct of internal and external policy is limited [14].

This brief allusion to the FLN indicates that in the Algerian case the party is not the environment within which a class could emerge. The party is a weak institution theoretically meant to control government policies [ 15 ], but practically confined to organizing local elections and coordinating the activities of mass organizations, such as youth, women's and peasants' organizations.

If under the conditions of Algerian socialism the bureaucracy cannot emerge as a class out of the party structure, could it be formed within the administrative and economic structures of the state apparatus?

An examination of the Marxist and neo- Marxist conception of bureaucracy brings me to the second part of the theoretical discussion. The thrust of Marx's analysis of bureaucracy was that it represented the essence of political alienation. In other words, its claim to "rat ional" praxis is belied by its opportunist ic concerns.

This is a guide for research. To study bureaucracy one should not treat it in isolation from the social environment in which it is located. More concretely, to understand the process through which the Algerian bureaucracy attempts to overcome its structural constraints, we need to analyze the social forces that operate outside of the state apparatus.

The most fully articulated Marxist treatment of bureaucracy appears in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [ 16]. There Marx traces the evolution of the French bureaucracy from feudalism to the nineteenth century. It is pointed out that bureaucracy has fulfilled three functions throughout the history of France It was, first, "the only means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie." Second, after the bourgeoisie assumed power the bureaucracy became "the instrument of the ruling class." Lastly, under Louis Bonaparte it became "completely independent".

One interpretation of the concept of the " independent" status of the bureaucracy could lead to the conclusion that a bureaucracy may become a class in its own right if the structure within which it operates is severed from any controlling agents or agencies. An- other interpretation, the one adopted by structuralist Marxists [ 17], affirms that when a capitalist society is characterized by a number of classes or fractions of classes of equal strength, so that a "power bloc" is constituted, the bureaucracy becomes autonomous. In fact, that autonomy is claimed to be necessary in order to serve better the classes in power or fractions thereof. This interpretation obviously elevates the special case of "Bonapartist state" to a general and universal category [18]. Fur- ther, since it focuses on the nature of the state under advanced capitalism, it is of little use for an analysis of a bureaucracy in a society involved in the process of socialist construc- tion. A careful reading of Marx's analysis of the Bonapartist state, however, reveals that my conception of the bureaucracy is theoretically anticipated.

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After asserting that under Louis Bonaparte "the state seem[s] to have made itself completely independent ," Marx hastens to add, "Yet that state power is not suspended in mid air. Bonaparte represents a class and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small holding (Parzellen) peasants" [19]. In other words, the bourgeoisie that had consolidated the state throughout the history of its evolution had not lost that state. What it had lost was its leadership. The history of the measures and countermeasures taken in favor of and against the peasantry testifies to the actual nature of the Bonapartist state. Bona- parte felt it

to be his mission to safeguard "bourgeois o r d e r " . . . . He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Neverthe- less, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of the middle class and daity breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But, by protecting its material power, he generates its power anew [20].

We are right back where we started: The coup d'~tat was but a change in leadership. The bureaucrats go along with the measures taken by Bonaparte in order to build a peasant social base to his regime. But practically all of them end up increasing the material base of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, the bureaucracy was independent, but independent to act in the interests of its social class.

The implications of this analysis for my thesis are twofold : (1) a class may not have state power and yet play a dominant role in the political direction of a society; and (2) the independent or autonomous character of a bureaucracy hides the consolidated nature of its social base. Conversely, to strengthen its position within the state apparatus, a bureaucracy may look to ways of securing support from outside. In the Algerian case, this procedure can mean promoting the social groupings to which the bureaucracy is affiliated into a full-fledged class by providing them with

indirect participation in the political decision- making process. The interests of other classes or fractions of classes may also be promoted, the aim being that the latter may be used as bargaining elements in the battle for state power and class hegemony (as will be described later).

To sum up, Weber's ideal conception of the bureaucracy as being ultimately restricted from wielding power successfully, combined with Marx's historical analysis of the dynamism of the bureaucracy in seeking and wielding power even indirectly, as in the case of Bonapartism, have led me to specify the characteristics of the Algerian bureaucracy.

The Algerian bureaucracy operates in an environment marked by precapitalist, capitalist, and socialist socioeconomic structures. These require a vast bureaucratic apparatus which, in the absence of some countervailing institutions and channels, becomes the focus of political struggle between two main forces: a liberal technocratic bourgeoisie [21], and a petty bourgeoisie, itself composed of a radical and a conservative fraction. Under conditions of rapid economic development and social change, the need for material security, order, and control becomes a preoccupation which makes the higher echelons of the state apparatus act with a view to their long-term interests. Hence the hypothesis here offered: (1) The Algerian bureaucracy will actively seek to perpetuate the structure within which it operates. It will seek to reproduce the conditions of its existence as a social category. (2) In doing so, it will (a) seek to articulate the interests of the class to which it is affiliated, and (b) promote intentionally or unintentionally the interests of other incipient classes or fractions of classes. In other words, it will "produce" classes.

The unfolding of this process will now be examined in more concrete terms. The practical behavior and strategies of the Algerian bureaucracy will be analyzed through a selected number of government decisions that have been

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taken since 1962, namely the establishment of workers' self-management, the agrarian reform, the body of rules relating to private investments (e.g., the Code of Investments), and the decentralization of the state apparatus.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ALGERIAN BUREAUCRACY

Unlike the French bureaucracy, which evolved into a political force instrumental in the triumph of its class over feudalism, ab- solutist monarchy, and the Revolution, the Algerian bureaucracy suffered from a lack of continuity inherent in the specific history of Algeria. Algeria has experienced two types of colonial domination: a precapitalist Turkish colonization ( 1519-1830) , and a capitalist French colonization ( 1830-1962) . The Turkish colonial state was bureaucratized, but it was decentralized enough so that the indigenous population experienced it as a remote entity which asserted its existence only at tax collec- tion times. Although it employed local functionaries, the Turkish state was essentially staffed with Turks. It perceived itself, and operated, as an alien structure. The relative ease with which it disintegrated when the French invaded Algeria in July 1830 was related to the degree to which it was alienated from the larger society.

The French colonization, on the other hand, created an all-embracing bureaucratic apparatus that served as a pervasive means of social and political control of the indigenous population. It was staffed almost exclusively with French colonists, plus a sprinking of Algerians at the lowest echelons, as is shown in Table l [221.

At the height of the war of national liberation, a program to train Algerians for mid-level administrative positions within the colonial bureaucratic structure was started in an effort to sever the FLN from its social base and belatedly to redress the job inequities of the past. The Algerians who were selected for this program came from a bourgeois and petty-

TABLE I

Algerian Bureaucrats in the Colonial Bureaucratic Structure in 1955

Algerians Non- Percent Algerians Algerians

Category A (executives) 205 7,090 2.8

Category B (skilled personnel) 3,278 19,542 14.4

Category C and D (clerical/messen- gers and miscel- laneous) 6,648 19,745 25.2

bourgeois background. However, as Table II indicates, the results of that training program were not significant [23].

With independence in July 1962, a massive exodus of French bureaucrats and other experts emptied out the colonial apparatus. At the same time, the new Algerian leadership, although divided as to the type of government to establish, was eager to restore order and ensure continuity. It chose to maintain the colonial bureaucratic structure and promoted existing personnel to higher functions. A reshuffling thus occurred. Personnel holding B positions were promoted to A positions, while C and D categories were reserved for war veterans. At the central level (the ministries), A positions were held by individuals having social ties with either the landed or the professional bourgeoisie.

Statistics on the size and evolution of the A and B categories since 1963 are partial and contradictory, and therefore do not permit a conclusion as to whether the executive positions have been stabilized. It appears, however, that between 1965 and 1966 the open recruitment policy practised in 1963 and 1964 was reduced [24]. This could be interpreted as a TABLE II

Percent of Algerian Bureaucratic Personnel in 1960

Category A 5.2 Category B 11.8 Category C 19.4 Category D 53.7 (including policemen)

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desire to rationalize the bureaucratic structure by cutting down on the number of overlapping functions; or it could mean that after the chaotic years following independence, the higher echelons of the bureaucracy felt more secure, and, especially after the coup d'6tat of June 1965, could undertake to control the recruitment process. The fact that the "vacan- cy rates are highest only at the conception and implementation levels" [25] (i.e., A and B categories) may reflect, apart from the generally recognized lack of highly qualified personnel, a firm commitment to further protect and screen entry to A positions, especially at the ministerial level. Indeed, the phenomenon of unemployed or underemployed graduates is now making its appearance in parts of Algeria. Inscribed in the structure of the Algerian bureaucratic apparatus is, therefore, a tendency toward conservation and exclusion which reflects the sociopolitical forces at play in the larger society.

The proclamation of socialism as the socioeconomic orientation of the new Algerian state in 1963 created a situation whereby a bureaucratic structure suited for colonial-capitalist needs was asked to serve socialist objectives. The typical response of the bureaucracy was to formally acquiesce, while in practice acting as a brake on decisions which it interpreted as limiting the scope of its action. Two examples may be cited: workers' self-management and bureaucratic decentralization.

WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

In the aftermath of the war of national liberation, rural workers placed agricultural enterprises abandoned by French colonists under their own management. Workers' self- management, which thus spontaneously evolved, was endorsed by the government in March 1963. From then on the various attempts at codifying this system of labor organization brought about an ever increasing control by the bureaucracy [26]. The result of this bureau-

cratic infringement upon the autonomy of worker-managed enterprises was that self- management did not spread to the rest of the economy. Rather, it was contained. In industry, for example, whenever a unit has been deemed inoperative as a unit managed by workers it has been placed under state management. A system of state-owned enterprises has gradually emerged as the new form of economic organization.

DECENTRALIZATION

The decentralization of the administrative apparatus started in 1967 with the establishment of a Communal Code and was completed by a Wilaya (District) Code in 1969. The purpose of these codes was to endow communes and districts with financial, economic, and legal autonomy. This was predicated on a "period of transition" during which the commune, for example, was to be strictly con- trolled by the appropriate authority. People's assemblies were elected by universal suffrage to head communes and districts. But even after four years of experience with the communal reform, the legal texts concerning the actual definition of the functions of the people's assemblies had not been issued. Besides, "clashes with authority in control and bureaucratic slowness constitute many obstacles that can be overcome only by a revision of the legislation which should now permit the re- conversion of the structure of the wilaya" [27 ]. The wilaya is the controlling agency of the commune. Similar difficulties in implementing decentralization have also been encountered by the wilayas themselves. Summing up this situation, President Boum6diene declared that it

is due first, to the general circumstances under which our country lives (insufficient number of competent cadres [281; second, to the lack of experience and practice. This is perhaps also due to certain individuals in charge of the communes . . . . The presidents and the members of the communal people's assemblies who were elected by the people have failed to fulfill their duties and neglected the people's affairs to take care of their own [29].

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These are among the variety of strategies with which the Algerian bureaucracy has been attempting to protect its position within the state apparatus. Paralleling this effort, the bureaucracy has sought to "reproduce" itself within the larger context of social relations with the groupings and classes outside of the state apparatus.

THE BUREAUCRATIC PRODUCTION OF CLASS

An historical analysis of Algerian society shows that its evolution had been stunted by the double Turkish and French colonization [30]. Only after independence had been achieved did the loose but self-conscious social forces start to restructure themselves into classes with definite political orientations and the awareness of a commonali ty of interests. The actual dynamics of power relations has taken the form of an antagonistic alliance between the "technocratic" bourgeoisie, located in the administrative and economic state apparatus, and the petty bourgeoisie. Their common goal is the industrialization of the country; their divergences lie in the conception of the political process that leads to that goal. The former favors a more liberal approach to development, one that approximates the state capitalist model characterized by a rapid and capital intensive industrialization. The latter favors a version of Islamic socialism with special emphasis on the improve- ment of the peasantry's living conditions.

The industrialization policy pursued by the government provides the bureaucracy with the opportuni ty not only to defend its purely bureaucratic interests as a social category but also to promote the interests of the class it is affiliated with, and those of groupings that might enhance its bargaining position in a situation of crisis. This will be discussed in terms o f the Code of Investments and the Agrarian Reform.

CODE OF INVESTMENTS

In 1963 the Ben Bella government had

decided to permit foreign investments in Algeria. Being aware of the political implications of inviting foreign capital, the government devised a body of rules aimed at controlling the scope and structure of capital investment and maximizing its usefulness for the economic development of Algeria. However, the technocrats felt that these rules, known as the Code of Investments, were too narrow and vague as to the guarantees accorded private investment and that national private capital was not given sufficient incentives.

The 1965 coup d'4tat enabled the technocrats to revise the Code of Investments, making it more flexible. "Legitimate guarantees of private capital" were made more detailed and explicit. Both national and foreign investors were encouraged to invest "within the framework of national economic development." The state, in the revised version of the code, "pledges to share the investors' concerns with establishing and developing the[ir] enterprises" [31 ]. While the 1963 code held up the threat of "state expropriat ion" of private industries, the revised version mentions that the state can "take back" industries only under special circumstances [32]. At the same time, the procedure for applying for a permit to invest is made easier. Furthermore, a representative of the workers' union is dropped from the National Commission that reviews applications for investment permits [33].

This search for investments fits a program of economic development which stresses the creation of heavy industry and the production of oil, gas, and their derivatives. What is significant is that this industrialization is based on the most sophisticated, labor-saving technology, which ends up increasing rather than decreasing Algeria's dependence on the international industrial powers. The social implication of this economic approach is that the technocratic bourgeoisie needs support outside the working class and the peasantry. Hence its effort to have the government extend guarantees and privileges to Algerian capital owners who

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would invest in light and small-scale industry. The importance of the Code of Investments

goes beyond the creation of more jobs for the unemployed. It has a significant social value in that it is stimulating the emergence of a class of national capitalist industrialists. Table I l l gives an idea of the role of private enterprises in the national economy [34].

TABLE III

Distribution of Economic Enterprises in 1968

Number Percent

National corporations 260 26.4 Other public enterprises 43 4.3 Private enterprises 516 52.4 Workers' self-managed enterprises 166 16.9

THE AGRARIAN REFORM

As early as 1964, a legal draft was drawn for the purpose of restructuring the rural conditions of production. The draft was delayed in 1965 for "further preparat ion." It was passed in 1966 but it was not to take effect until the fall of 1967 [35]. Its opponents (besides the landowners) were Algerian "cadres" who argued that the reform would entail the fragmentation of the land, resulting in the weakening of the rationalization of production. They also argued that the agrarian reform had already been performed when the colonists' estates were nationalized.

The purpose of the agrarian reform of 1971 was to "end the exploitation of man by man" by fighting absenteeism and limiting the ex- tensive private property in land and cattle [36]. It appears that this goal is antithetical to the one pursued in the industrial sphere, where the emphasis on the accumulation of capital overrides the egalitarian distribution of surplus value. Statistics show that between 1969 and 1973, 1 billion dinars (1 dinar = $0.25) was spent on the 9 million peasants and unemployed and 2.5 billion on the rest of the population [37]. It would be a lengthy undertaking, and outside the scope of this paper, to review in

detail the various components of the reform. What is more important is to investigate the kind of obstacles that it has encountered.

The local administrators of the agrarian campaign have more often than not tried to undermine rather than implement it. This is due to the fact that local officials have personal stakes in the ownership of the land to be re- distributed among peasants. Only a politically independent and external body of overseers would be in a position to determine to what extent these officials have undermined the objectives of the reform, and students were chosen to play that role. Every summer students have gone into the countryside to interview peasants about their needs and explain to them the con- tent of the agrarian reform. The students have also tried to check on the activities of the local authorities and report back to the Ministry of Agriculture. The criticism is often meticulous, thorough and muckraking in its willingness to expose official wrongdoing. Thus, it has been revealed that two methods were used by the local authorities to inform peasants of their rights under the reform. One was to hold meetings and read legal texts in classical Arabic, which the peasants do not understand. The other was to post the texts, knowing full well that the majority of the peasantry cannot read. The extent to which the students ' reports have been acted upon cannot be assessed accurately because of a lack of available in- formation. However, it is an established fact that the students' action has brought about complaints from local officials who object to what they consider a weakening of their bureaucratic roles.

The agrarian reform is an example of the use of the state apparatus to alter the conditions and relations of production of the peasantry in an a t tempt to extend the social base of the petty bourgeoisie. Conwr~ely, the obstacles that the agrarian campaign has encountered and continues to meet reflect the strength of the bureaucracy in opposing measures that threaten the existence of the class with which it is affiliated.

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Summing up the import of the Code of In- vestments and the Agrarian Reform, it appears that in the battle with the technocrats the petty bourgeoisie is the less successful. Indeed, the technocrats are now in a better bargaining position than ever before since they have acquired an extra degree of freedom as a result of the liberalization of investments. It is not in- conceivable that if they are threatened by the petty bourgeoisie, the technocrats will find in the emerging industrialists a source of support. On the other hand, if the latter outgrow the legal restrictions placed upon them and seek more independence from the state apparatus, they might throw the technocrats into an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie.

CONCLUSION

The general proposit ion formulated in this paper is that a bureaucracy under socialism plays a catalytic role in class formation, but does not in itself constitute a class. Rather, the bureaucracy may, under the historical conditions described here:

1. Seek to reproduce itself as a social category, thereby insuring the perpetuation of its conditions of existence.

2. Promote the interest of the social forces from which it issued or with which it is affiliated, enabling these to emerge as full-fledged classes.

3. Seek political bargaining power by making it possible for new classes or fractions of classes to emerge. This is facilitated, in the case of Algeria, by the specific socioeconomic con- figurations of a post-colonial society that claims to be building socialism. There is room for the manipulation of the state apparatus for purposes other than that of the public good.

In this t reatment of the Algerian bureaucracy, I have confined myself to the role of the bureaucracy as a determinate social category. I have not examined the interaction between the social forces catalyzed by the bureaucracy and the state apparatus. Nor have I examined

the dialectical response of the Algerian people to this particular concatenation of power. The question also remains whether the approach presented here is valid in cases analogous to contemporary Algeria. And this leads to the ultimate question, that of the historical con- t inuity of such bureaucratic behavior since the very origins of the state as a socio-economic formation.

NOTES

1 On the first, see C. Bettelheim, Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1923 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and on the second, M. Djilas, "The New Class," in C. Heller, ed., Structured Social Inequality (New York: MacMillan, 1965).

2 I would like to thank Wolf V. Heydebrand for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this article, and Emil Oestereicher for his suggestions.

3 See Paul M. Sweezy, "The Nature of Soviet Society," Monthly Review, November 1974 and January 1975; and A. Carlo, "The Socio-Economic Nature of the U.S.S.R.," Telos, vol. 21 (1974).

4 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 85-88.

5 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 23l.

6 R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 301.

7 R. Bendix, "Bureaucracy and Power Relations," in R.K. Merton et al., eds., Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1952), p. 129.

8 M. Lazreg, "Job Attitudes, Participation and Communica- tion Among High-Ranking Employees of an Algerian Oil and Gas Organization" (Master's thesis, New York University, 1970).

9 Djilas, "The New Class," p. 156. 10 Ibid., p. 158. 11 M. Bedjaoui, Law and the Algerian Revolution (Brussels,

1961). 12 H. Boum~diene, Discours du President Boumddiene,

19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, vol. 2 (Constantine: El Baath, 1970), p. 114.

13 ElMoud]ahid, December 15, 1968. 14 A. Remili, "Parti et Administration en Alg~rie." Annuaire

de l'A frique du Nord, vol. 7 (Aix-en-Provence: Editions du Centre de la Recherche Scientifique, 1968).

15 FLN Commission Centrale d'Orientation, La Charte d'Alger (Alger: Imprimerie Nationale Alg~rienne, 1964).

16 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 122.

17 See Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (New York: Praeger, 1975).

18 See Ralph Miliband, "Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," in R. Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science (New York:

305

Vintage Books, 1973): and Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in ibid.

19 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 123. 20 Ibid., p. 131. 21 The term "bourgeoisie" is inadequate when applied to the

Algerian situation because its European usage connotes more economic power and strength than the Algerian bourgeoisie actually has. For want of another term, however, it is used here to refer to the economic and political role that this Algerian class is trying to play.

22 A. Remili, Les lnstitutions Administratives Alg~riennes (Alger: SNED, 1973), p. 185.

23 Ibid., p. 187. 24 Ibid., p. 188. 25 Ibid. 26 See Ian Clegg, Workers" Self-Management in Algeria (New

York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); M. Laks, Autogestion Ouvribre et Pouvoir Politique, 1962-1965 (Paris: EDI,

1970); and C. Chaulet, La MitMfa Autog~Me (Alger: SNED, 1970).

27 Remili, Les Institutions Administratives, p. 118. 28 A "cadre" is a category A functionary or a professional. 29 Boumgdiene, Discours de Prdsident Boumddiene, pp.

192-194 . 30 M. Lazreg, "The Emergence of Classes in Algeria" (Ph.D.

dissertation, New York University, 1975). 31 Le Code des lnvestissements (Alger: Pr4sidence du

Conseil, 1967), p. 15. 32 Ibid., p. 16. 33 Ibid., p. 17. 34 Industrie, vol. 3 (Alger: Minist~re d 'Etat Charg~ des

Finances et du Plan, 1968). 35 T. Tidafi, L'Agriculture Alg~rienne (Paris: Maspero, 1969),

p. 160. 36 La R~volution Agraire (Alger: Pr~sidence du Conseil, 1971). 37 K. Ammour, C. Leucate, and J.-J. Moulin, La Vole

Algdrienne (Paris: Maspero, 1974), p. 26.

Dialectical Anthropology 1 (1976) 295 -305 © Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

bureaucracy and class: the algerian dialectic

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