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BRAZILIAN COOPERATION AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICAN

AGRICULTURE

JOHN WILKINSON

Report prepared for Actionaid.

Rio de Janeiro, Novembro de 2013

(Preliminary Version with Incomplete References)

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INTRODUCTION

In this Report, we draw on a rapidly growing literature dealing with Brazilian “cooperation for

development” activities as these relate to Africa. We are concerned more specifically with the

implications of Brazilian cooperation for agriculture in Africa. While Brazilian cooperation has

its own characteristics it is situated within broader trends associated with the phenomenon of

South-South cooperation, particularly that involving the BRICS countries.

The Report is divided into four sections in addition to this introduction. In the first, we identify

the new features associated with Brazil´s international cooperation and situate this within the

broader perspective of BRICS and South-South cooperation.

The second section provides a profile of Brazilian cooperation and is divided into three

segments. The first of these focuses on the dimensions of the cooperation agenda and its

different components: humanitarian aid, student grants, technical cooperation, contributions

to multilateral organisations, together with investment, trade and financial cooperation. The

second considers the numerous actors involved in cooperation - public, private and civil

society. A characteristic of Brazilian cooperation is the simultaneous participation of different

government sectors and agendas. The third segment identifies different modalities of

cooperation – bi, tri and multi-lateral – and their respective dynamics.

In the third section, we focus on Brazilian cooperation and investment initiatives in Africa,

discussed first in terms of leading projects and then by individual countries. We will be

particularly concerned with their impacts on agriculture, land and traditional communities.

The fourth section draws together the above analyses to present final considerations and

conclusion on the impact of Brazilian cooperation and investments on agriculture in the

African continent.

SECTION ONE: BRAZIL AND SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

While remaining a recipient country, Brazil has increasingly positioned itself, since the turn of

the millennium and more particularly since the beginning of the Lula Presidency in 2003, as a

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new “partner in development” (the term donor is rejected) within a framework of South-

South “cooperation for development” strategies and policies. Its cooperation initiatives have a

specifically Brazilian content but have also become integrated into a broader vision of

emerging country cooperation primarily concretised in the BRICS summits, the latest of which

in 2013 has agreed on the formation of a BRICS Development Bank.

This new style horizontal, South-South cooperation oriented to development set itself off from

the traditional North-South cooperation of the countries grouped in the Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, seen to be hierarchical or vertical and focused on

aid rather than development. Around the turn of the millennium the two groups of countries

appeared to be evolving in diametrically opposed directions. The BRICS countries´ notion of

cooperation for development, combining traditional “aid-style” activities with financing,

investment, trade and business involvement, contrasted with the DACs moves to “untied aid”

and financing only on especially favourable or “concessionary” terms.

North-South cooperation, however, was at the same time being subject to radical internal

review. In a series of meetings beginning in Rome and then consolidated in Paris and Accra,

the DAC Group established sustainable development as the goal of cooperation and defined a

number of principles for the future government of cooperation, highlighting the protagonist

role of developing countries in the definition of priorities, mutual partnership, a focus on

results and the need for transparency and accountability. It also opened its forum to civil

society participation.

These shifts prepared the way for a growing convergence between North-South and South-

South cooperation which was to be formally consolidated in the Busan Declaration for

Effective Development Cooperation of 2013 whose signatories included the BRICS countries,

albeit under the proviso of assuming “differential commitments”, the most important of which

was voluntary adherence to the goals and principles.

This macro level convergence also finds its expression at micro level in the emergence of

trilateral projects, to be discussed below, involving Northern donors, emerging economy

country cooperation and developing country(ies).

There is little doubt that the inauguration of the Lula government in 2003 saw an important

shift in the Brazilian Government´s international focus with the African continent assuming

centre stage. Most of the literature on this subject highlights the number of visits to African

countries by the Brazilian President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, often with significant

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government and private sector delegations. In the wake of these visits, embassies in African

countries were doubled, a tendency which was reciprocated with a similar increase in African

country embassies in the Brazilian capital.

This focus, however, was part of a broader concern with Brazil and “the South´s” role in

multilateral forums and negotiations. Two years earlier the Doha “development round” had

begun, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with Northern country dominance as

expressed in the G8 and particularly the restricted number of permanent members of the UN

Security Council, to which both India and Brazil aspired. These two countries along with South

Africa formed the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 to promote coordinated action by these

countries´ foreign ministries in multilateral negotiations and the Forum was instrumental in

the creation of the G20 later in the same year.

Although its formalization would only occur with the Summit in 2009, the notion of a new

global economic pole provided by the large emerging countries, christened the BRIC (Brasil,

Russia, India and China), later BRICS (with the inclusion of South Africa), was already being

popularized as from 2001. For its part, the Millennium Goals placed the African continent as

the decisive challenge and its, then, fifty four countries with their very active presence in the

UN structures provided a decisive base and lobby for the emerging countries´ aspirations to

greater clout in the multilateral arena. A key result in this direction was to be the election, in

2011, of Jose Graziano da Silva, who had been responsible for Brazil´s Zero Hunger

programme, to the head of the FAO, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization based in Rome.

As the first decade of the millennium progressed, Brazil´s general geopolitical concerns

became complemented with a specific, multifaceted agenda. Already in 2003, the IBSA Forum

registered Brazil´s concern to promote biofuels which had been given a decisive impulse with

the launching of the flex-fuel car in Brazil in the same year. Ethanol from sugarcane was

increasingly presented as a key development strategy for African countries, a position

reinforced by its characterization as “good ethanol” in contrast to the bad ethanol based on

corn or wheat. In addition to its flagship role as a development model, the promotion of

ethanol in Africa became an attractive option for Brazilian investors interested in accessing the

EU market, without tariff barriers. The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) has

played a leading role in the financing of these biofuels projects.

With the success of Brazil´s Zero Hunger and Family Grant conditional cash transfer

programmes in raising some 29 million above the poverty line and reaching/exceeding the

Millennium Goals, these programmes became presented as strategies appropriate for the

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global struggle against poverty and food insecurity, particularly on the African continent. As

the decade progressed, these initiatives were accompanied by the promotion of broader

programmes for family farming judged to have been successful in Brazil – the public

purchasing programme for family farm products (PAA), the 30% public school meals market

reserve for products from the family farm sector (PNAE), and the “More Food” (Mais

Alimentos) programme comprising credit lines for farm improvements, particularly equipment

and machinery geared to increasing productivity.

Brazil has traditionally developed a special relation with the Lusophone countries in Africa, and

Angola and Mozambique respectively are the principal recipients of investments and technical

cooperation. Nevertheless, Brazil´s interests extend to the African continent as a whole.

EMBRAPA, Brazil´s national agricultural research and development organization, set up an

Africa office in Ghana in 2006 and has been responsible for implementing technical

cooperation activities in a large number of African countries as we shall see below. In 2009, in

the wake of the food prices crisis and the unfolding of the broader financial crisis the

preceding year, the Brazilian President laid out an ambitious proposal for cooperation at the

Africa Union summit. This in turn led to the Brazil-Africa Dialogue meeting in Brasilia in 2010

where Brazil´s agricultural experience and public policies were debated and cooperation

agreements signed with a range of African countries.

Brazil presents itself as a model both for large-scale agribusiness and for family-farm-based

development and food security. The degree to which the two are compatible is hotly contested

by members and representatives of each but both models have their own institutional

expressions and policies, with a Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) broadly associated with

agribusiness and a Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) dedicated to the promotion of

family farming, particularly through the PRONAF, the national family farm programme, created

along with the MDA in 1999. This dualism, therefore, is not associated with any one political

party and the family farm is a legally constituted social category in Brazil.

With the election of Graziano da Silva as director-general of the FAO, Brazil´s family farm and

food security policies have become the basis of an all-Africa cooperation for development

programme, involving the World Food Programme, and the UK Department for International

Development (DFID), agreed on in 2011 and with pilot projects planned for some 10 African

countries.

In addition to its promotion of biofuels, Brazil has also become recognized as, and sees itself

as, having developed a general model of agro-industrial development for savannah regions

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based on its transformation of the Brazilian “cerrado” region into the world´s most dynamic

agribusiness pole for grains/oils. This is also seen to be particularly relevant for the African

continent which is considered to have an abundance of similar lands. The role of Brazilian R&D,

developed by EMBRAPA, is recognized to have been decisive in adapting these soils to grains

production. Japanese aid to Brazil was also central to the financing of pilot colonization

projects in different regions of the cerrados during some 20 years. This model is now being

promoted in a tripartite arrangement with Japan again as a partner for the 14 million hectares

of savannah land located along the Nacala corridor in Mozambique.

Brazil, therefore, is centrally involved in the promotion of cooperation for development in

Africa and with this aim offers its whole range of agricultural policy and strategy options,

whether promoting the family farm and food security, biofuels, or agribusiness more generally.

At the same time, while African countries have become the principal global focus of food

security and agricultural development concerns, this continent has also been identified as the

last agricultural frontier, attracting waves of investment projects. Such investments, widely

dubbed as “land grabbing”, are provoking heated debates over notions of “available land”,

traditional farming and food provision practices and land tenure rights. In analysing Brazil´s

presence on the African continent we will be particularly concerned with evaluating impacts

on land use and land tenure and the degree to which Brazil contributes or not to the “land-

grabbing” phenomenon.

SECTION TWO: A PROFILE OF BRAZILIAN COOPERATION

2.1 BRAZILIAN COOPERATION: DIMENSIONS AND COMPONENTS

Brazil describes its solidarity diplomacy and development cooperation as demand driven, non-

conditional and without commercial interests. This may be true with regard to a large part of

humanitarian aid, student grants, technical cooperation and contributions to multilateral

organisations, the traditional categories associated with aid. Even here, though Brazil has

shifted its focus from isolated initiatives to what are called “structuring projects” such as the

“Cotton 4” project offering Brazil´s experience in reviving its cotton production after the

decimating effects of the cotton boll weevil, to Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad. Such

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projects clearly imply a more proactive organization of the “supply” side of cooperation and, in

this particular case, also stem from mutual trade interests in contesting US cotton subsidies.

Also, as we have seen, in addition to these projects, cooperation is increasingly taking the form

of adapting Brazilian policies on food security and family farm based agriculture to the realities

of different African countries and regions. These programmes clearly involve elements of

conditionality, with the “Mais Alimentos” programme, for instance, providing credit for the

exclusive purchase of Brazilian equipment and machinery and specifying in addition the type of

machinery permitted. Purchases, however, are provided on a concessionary basis via the

Ministry of Industry and Trade´s (MDIC) PROEX credit line administered by the Banco do Brasil.

The promotion of biofuels and agriculture in savannah regions has a more clearly commercial

component and receives financing from the BNDES on favourable but not concessionary terms

(as would be required by DAC cooperation principles). These activities are developed in close

cooperation with private actors and will be discussed in more detail below.

Brazilian technical cooperation is coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), a

Department of the Ministry for Foreign Relations (MRE) which was constituted when Brazil

was exclusively a recipient of donor cooperation. A first official review of international

cooperation activities was prepared by IPEA in 2010 entitled: Brazilian Cooperation for

International Development (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional,

2005-2009). This study defined cooperation as involving “entirely non-reimbursable funding”

comprising four categories: humanitarian aid, student grants, contributions to international

bodies and regional banks, and technical cooperation.

In the period under study the total amount of cooperation was calculated at some US$1.4

billion, (R$2.9 billion), the result of international cooperation actions by over a hundred federal

public bodies. 76% of these resources corresponded to contributions to international

organizations and regional banks with the remaining 24% divided between humanitarian aid,

student grants and technical cooperation. On an annual basis cooperation doubled during this

period in current values and increased by 50% calculated in constant values. Humanitarian aid

is overwhelmingly directed to Latin American countries, whereas aid, in the form of student

grants, includes special programmes for Mozambique and more generally for Portuguese

speaking African countries (CPLP).

Technical scientific and technological cooperation activities (TSTC), developed within a

framework of “solidarity diplomacy”, accounted for over R$250 million during this period with

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values in 2009 tripling those of 2005. 27% of expenditures were directed to CPLP countries on

a bilateral basis and Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for over two thirds of

this cooperation. With regard to agriculture of relevance to Africa, the IPEA study singles out

cooperation on cocoa in the Cameroons and the Congo, and, as an example of the shift to

structuring cooperation, the initiatives on agro-ecological zoning and agroenergy, the latter

involving two “Ethanol Weeks” with the participation of 111 Brazilian government technicians

and 58 developing countries representatives. The Table below shows that as from 2009 TSTC

cooperation with Africa was on a par with Latin America and was increasing much faster.

Trilateral cooperation activities involving a northern donor are also being adopted. These have

the advantage of additional access to funding, which becomes more important in the case of

structuring cooperation projects, and can build on prior experiences of cooperation when

Brazil was a recipient country (the Mozambique savannah initiative in partnership with Japan

would fit into this category). At the same time, they might call in question the distinctiveness

of South-South cooperation.

Agriculture is the largest single item of TSTC accounting for some 22% of total expenditure.

Such cooperation takes the form of Brazilian researchers and technical personnel working in

situ with developing country partners, primarily from EMBRAPA although as many as 20

organizations during this period have been involved. As we have seen above, such technical

cooperation is shifting from isolated demand-driven cooperation towards structuring projects.

Cabral (2011), in her study of Brazil-Africa cooperation includes also a reorientation from

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individual training to the adaptation of Brazilian public policies to the African setting, the

promotion of concessional credits and the increasing importance of tri-lateral cooperation

initiatives.

Excluded from the IPEA study (but to be included in a subsequent updating) is the increasingly

important category of economic and financial cooperation, which (following Cabral, 2011)

includes: the pardoning of debts (calculated at US$474.2 for the period 2005-2009),

concessional credit for Brazilian exports (some US$1.7 billion in the same period) and cash

donations. The former two are linked since debts are an obstacle to receiving credit. The

figure for concessional credit may also include credit supplied by the BNDES which has become

increasingly important, especially the “Exim Automático” whereby BNDES takes on the credit

risk of the banks involved and the political risk of the importing countries.

Information specific to cooperation with Africa which also includes data for 2010 is contained

in the ABC on-line publication, Brazilian Technical Cooperation (2011). According to this

publication, Brazil programmed some US$71 million for the three years 2010-2013 involving

126 bilateral projects in execution with 42 countries, 82 of which in CPLP countries, and two

pluri-lateral, “structuring” projects, the Cotton 4 mentioned earlier, and one concerning the

storage and use of native seeds. The budget of US$22 million for 2010 was more than twice

that of the previous year. This document insists that cooperation is demand driven but

translates this as being “responsive to national priorities”. It then provides a detailed

description of two Brazilian programmes – the food acquisition programme (PAA) and the

school meals programme (PNAE) - which became strategic focuses of cooperation initiatives in

the wake of the 2010 Brazil-Africa Dialogue meeting in Brasilia.

2.2. ACTORS INVOLVED IN COOPERATION: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Above we have drawn attention to the large number of organizations involved in Brazilian

cooperation initiatives. This has been interpreted by some authors (Cabral, 2011) as a

fragmentation of cooperation and a lack of clear priorities, (associated perhaps with the

affirmation of a demand-driven policy), leading to a pulverisation of activities. Brazil has been

compared unfavourably in this respect with Chinese cooperation, whose priorities are

presented in its White Paper on China´s Foreign Aid, (2011). Such a view, however, has been

challenged and the Proceedings document of the 2010 Brazil-Africa Dialogue indicated as

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providing the guidelines of Brazil´s cooperation discussed and agreed on with African country

representatives, (Pierri, 2013).

The multiplicity of actors and the multi-layered nature of Brazilian cooperation can be

understood in part as a reflection of Brazil´s diversified and decentralised higher education and

research structure. In addition, current cooperation has been built on to its historic relation

with Portuguese speaking African countries (CPLP), evident in the concentration of projects

referred to above.

The Brazilian Association for Cooperation (ABC), a department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(MRE) is responsible, for cooperation initiatives. This body was created when Brazil was a

recipient country and it has, therefore, had to restructure its priorities. Proposals for

cooperation must be channelled through the ABC and in this sense its modus operandi may be

said to be demand-driven. In practice, however, as cooperation has shifted to structuring

projects and the promotion of Brazilian public policies other Ministries and federal bodies have

become involved in the execution of cooperation programmes.

While Lusophone countries remain central, cooperation as from 2003 assumed the continent

as a whole as its field of operation. The establishment by EMBRAPA of an Africa Office in

Ghana in 2006 was the clearest expression of this orientation. From its base in Ghana

EMBRAPA entered into dialogue with 61 institutions and 35 countries. By 2012, 35 projects

were underway, 26 under negotiation and 9 in the phase of implementation. This cooperation

was developed within a strategy of establishing synergies with regional and all-African

programmes, especially New Partnerships for African Development launched by the African

Union, (NEPAD/AU), and the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP).

This demand-driven, “retail” approach was, however, progressively replaced by more

coordinated initiatives and the EMBRAPA Africa Office was discontinued and refocused as a

Ghana office. EMBRAPA has representatives in a small number of other African countries.

We have already mentioned the strategy of structuring projects. These have been

complemented by the creation of the Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Platform, promoted

by the World Bank, EMBRAPA, and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), which

has seen been supported by DFID, IFAD, and the Gates Foundation. This platform provides a

competitive framework for the promotion of networked research and aims to create scale in

research cooperation. A complementary training centre has been established by EMBRAPA in

Brasilia, particularly directed to African researchers.

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A second development has been the refocusing of cooperation on the reproduction of Brazil´s

public policies, particularly those relating to food security and the strengthening of the family

farm base of agriculture. This latter, however, is complemented with a similar promotion of

large-scale models of agricultural development in the case both of sugarcane/ethanol and

savannah grains/oils cultivation.

In the former case, two of these programmes, the food acquisition and the local/family-farm

school meals supply policies, involve the Ministry for Agrarian Development (MDA) and the

Ministry for Social Development (MDS) and have been adopted as UN programmes led by the

FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP).

A third, related programme, Mais Alimentos Africa, is focussed on the supply of Brazilian

agricultural equipment and machinery, particularly, tractors with a view to consolidating a

family farming sector. This is also an MDA programme but is strongly promoted by the private

sector, the Brazilian Association of Equipment and Machinery (ABIMAQ). Its main feature is a

line of “tied” credit opened up by Brazil´s Chamber for Foreign Trade, (CAMEX) of some

US$640 million for the import of clearly specified Brazilian products. The Brazilian Mais

Alimentos has currently become the principal market for small tractors in Brazil and as this

market matures exports become increasingly important. The PROEX credit line managed by

the Bank of Brazil which includes concessionary credit is a major instrument in exports linked

to cooperation. We will discuss these programmes in more detail in section three.

In an interview with Leovegildo Lopes, head of the EMBRAPA-AFRICA office 2010-11, Brazil´s

interest in actively promoting sugarcane/ethanol is clearly indicated: “Normally, the ABC works

on the basis of demand and we attend demands coming from governments locally. The only

thing we have introduced, and which is not part of their traditional agricultural culture is

sugarcane, because we want to develop ethanol as a global energy commodity.” (GGN,

25/05/2012).

He continues by indicating that it is now the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) which has

assumed responsibility for researching the technical-economic feasibility of producing

sugarcane ethanol in different African (and Latin American) countries. This project has received

wide-based international financing and includes also funding from FINEP, (Financer of Studies

and Projects linked to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation), and APEX,

(Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Investments) in Brazil. Depending on the

individual governments responses this may lead to productive and infrastructure investments.

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The Nacala savannah project is a special case aimed at reproducing the success of the Brazilian

cerrados agricultural development model. Here the Fundação Getulio Vargas Projects, an

Institute created by the FGV, has assumed responsibility for the initial elaboration of the

project which includes a legal framework and the development of a long-term investment fund

of some US$1-2 billion. A contract to this effect has been signed by the ABC, UNDP, the

Japanese International Cooperation Agency, (JICA) and the FGV. This latter has also been

responsible for promoting visits to the region by farmer delegations from the Brazilian

cerrados. We will discuss this project, which also includes a family farming component, in

greater detail below.

Brazil´s National Development Bank (BNDES) is the principal source of financing to African

Governments and Brazilian firms in Africa. This been overwhelmingly concentrated in Angola

and Mozambique and has primarily benefitted Petrobras, Vale and the leading Brazilian

construction firms. In recent years, BNDES has developed a series of instruments and actions

aimed at facilitating its investments outside of Brazil. In 2003, it established a credit line for the

internationalization of Brazilian firms. BNDES subsidiaries have been set up in London and

Uruguay and one is now planned in South Africa, for the African continent as a whole.

Agreements have been reached with the BRICS countries and with the African Development

Bank which includes the creation of a fund for project finance.

The goal is now to create conditions for investing broadly in Africa and the proposed pardoning

of the debt of some 12 African countries to the value of US$900 million is a measure designed

to enable BNDES financing to these countries. The BNDES EXIM Brazil has been created for this

purpose as has the new Directorship for Latin America and Africa. Investment in Angola,

amounting to US$5.8 billion, has been underwritten with petroleum, and similar guarantees

and risk management mechanisms are now being explored for other African countries.

To date, BNDES investments have been centred on infrastructure, minerals and petroleum.

Some of these investments have important indirect impacts on agriculture and rural

communities since they may provoke displacements and resettlement projects. Vale and

Odebrecht have been the objects of mobilizations in this sense and similar opposition is

emerging in the case of the Nacala corridor in Mozambique. The BNDES finances

sugarcane/ethanol projects in Angola (Odebrecht in cooperation with Damer and the State

firm Sonangol), Ghana (Northern Sugar Resources), Mozambique (Petrobras with Companhia

de Sena and the State firm Petromoc). It also financed Dedini for the construction of a plant, in

partnership with Kenana Sugar Company, in the Sudan. These investments are part of the

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systematic promotion of biofuels in Africa as part of Brazil´s efforts to create a global ethanol

market. These include the adoption of biofuels policies in African countries and the import of

Brazilian ethanol. They also include tripartite agreements whereby the export of ethanol from

African countries is guaranteed – by the UK in the case of Sudan and Sweden in the case of

Ghana. The BNDES has signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Development Bank and is

financing ethanol investments also in this country.

In 2010, the BNDES organized a seminar in Rio de Janeiro, to celebrate its 60th anniversary

entitled “Investing in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges and Infrastructure for Economic

Cooperation”. At this seminar, the BTG Pactual bank declared that it was launching an Africa

Investment Fund of some US$1 to 2 billion. Another private bank, BRADESCO, has also shown

interest in Africa entering with the BNDES in its agreement with the African Development

Bank.

We have already mentioned APEX in relation to the studies being carried out by the FGV. This

agency is also active in Africa where it has set up offices in Luanda. In 2009, APEX organized an

agricultural equipment and machinery fair in Dakar, Senegal. This was followed the year later

with an agreement signed between the Brazilian Chamber for Agricultural Equipment and

Machinery (CSMIA) and EMBRAPA to set up an Agrishow Pro-Africa on-line site to promote the

sale of equipment and machinery. BNDES and APEX signed a three year agreement in 2009 for

the diversification of exports to Africa. At the same time, APEX has been promoting the

establishment of Brazilian small and medium firms in Africa and data compiled by IPEA identify

the presence of such firms in Algeria, Angola, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal,

South Africa, and the Sudan (World Bank, IPEA, 2010).

Civil society is also involved in cooperation activities and the ABC has signed an agreement

with Mozambique and South Africa for the recovery and use of traditional seeds which is to be

developed in partnership with the Brazilian ONG IBASE and the social movements Popular

Peasant Movement (MPC) and Women Peasants of Brazil (MCB).

2.3 DIFFERENT MODALITIES OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Many cooperation agreements take a bilateral form but these are only rarely isolated from

broader institutional arrangements. Brazil´s early agreements with both Angola and

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Mozambique were situated within the special relationship developed with Portuguese

speaking Africa. EMBRAPA has signed numerous agreements with individual African countries,

particularly in the case of developing research capacity, but these have followed a broader

continental strategy expressed first in the establishment of an EMBRAPA-Africa office in

Ghana.

As African countries within their various national and continental bodies have adopted

regional and continental strategies Brazil´s cooperation has reflected these global priorities

formalised, for example, in the African Union´s New Partnerships for Agricultural Development

(NPAD) and the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP). Similarly,

visits to different African countries have usually been combined with participation in broader

regional or summit meetings.

At the same time, Brazil has adopted continental wide promotion strategies as in the case of

cooperation for the development of bioenergy. The Brazil-Africa Dialogue Forum held in

Brasilia in 2010 was also directed at African countries as a whole and became a generalized

platform for the promotion of Brazilian public policies on food security and family farm-based

development. With the election of Graziano da Silva as head of FAO, the Brazilian coordinator

of the Zero Hunger programme, cooperation with Africa became situated within a global

cooperation policy.

Whether the cooperation assumes a bi- pluri- or multi-lateral form it is increasingly conducted

on the basis of broad regional and global priorities within which specific national needs are

situated. Brazil presents itself as a major developing country which has successfully designed

and implemented public policies to effectively address globally agreed priorities on food and

energy security. It also presents itself as a model for combining family farm and large-scale

commercial agriculture, although the possibility of such a harmonization is hotly contested in

Brazil itself.

Of particular interest is the emergence of a new modality of cooperation, trilateral

agreements. These involve traditional donor countries in the “North”, the new emerging

economies and traditional recipient countries. There is a natural logic to this evolution in that

the “Northern” partner may well have previously been a donor to the emerging economy now

itself involved in cooperation. This is the case for the project to reproduce the cerrados

“success story” in the Nacala corridor, which brings Japan and Brazil together once again, but

this time in Mozambique. On the other hand, it suggests that efforts to present the emerging

economies´ “cooperation for development” model as a radical alternative to “Northern aid”

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are now on the wane. As we saw above, northern donors within the DAC committee of the

OECD have substantially reformulated their aid objectives bringing them more into line with

development goals. In addition, the trilateral model is particularly attractive to Brazil since it

provides a key source of financing and/or access to Northern markets, an ideal complement to

Brazil´s technical and policy design expertise.

3. BRAZIL AFRICA COOPERATION: MAJOR PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS AND COUNTRY

EXAMPLES AND IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE

3.1. A TYPOLOGY OF BRAZILIAN COOPERATION/INVESTMENT

In this section we are less concerned with technical cooperation as such although this is

increasingly integrated into broader investment and policy promotion initiatives. The focus will

be on cooperation/investment activities which have impacts on the agrarian structure, models

of agricultural development and traditional community land and resource access rights.

We refer both to projects and to countries, although these clearly often overlap, and will try to

identify where possible the different national institutional arrangements in place as these

affect the conditions under which cooperation and investments are undertaken. This latter is

an increasingly important consideration given initiatives to establish agreements on the

conditions under which investments in developing countries should be undertaken. We refer

here to the World Bank promoted Principles for Responsible Investment (PRAI) and the

Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure on Land, Fisheries and Forests

in the context of National Food Security, adopted by the UN Committee on Food Security (CFS)

The BNDES will be a particular focus of attention since it is responsible for the greater part of

investment credit to firms, countries and regional institutions and is actively structuring its

conditions of operation to increase its activity in Africa. Nevertheless, as we have seen, other

bodies, (APEX), sources of credit, (PROEX, Pronaf), and international agencies (JICA, DFID, FAO,

World Bank) are also involved, often in conjunction with the BNDES.

It is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of the impacts of Brazilian

cooperation/investments in Africa given the difficulty of acquiring reliable information and the

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on-going, dynamic character of these activities. The Land Coalition initiative on land-grabbing

which is being continuously updated is probably the best model for tracking cooperation and

investments in real time. In addition, the current study must limit itself to available

documentation.

To organize this analysis and provide a framework for identifying types of impacts which can

then also be explored in cases not identified in this Report we will proceed on the basis of a

typology involving the major different forms of cooperation/investment.

The first of these comprises INDIRECT IMPACTS. Here we are concerned with investments in

non-agricultural sectors, particularly mining and infrastructure which lead to dislocation of

farming communities and may be combined with resettlement programmes. Investments by

Odebrecht in Angola and investments in the Nacala corridor in Mozambique include these

types of impacts.

FAMILY FARM/FOOD SECURITY investments provide a second category. Here the effects are

less immediate and perhaps will only be captured over the medium term. We can, however,

identify likely impacts. The issue here is the degree of transferability of the family farm model

and its implications in the African context. There is considerable debate on the appropriate

farming model for African countries (Jayne et al, 2010; Deininger & Byerlee, 2011). The typical

smallholder would have one to two hectares and is thus far removed from the median

beneficiary of the Brazilian Pronaf programme. The impacts to be identified here, therefore,

are those related to the possible social differentiation consequences of adopting Brazilian

programmes particularly when these include hard technology as in the case of the Mais

Alimentos programme.

A third category relates to the impacts of SUGARCANE/ETHANOL promotion. Within the dualist

logic of Brazilian agriculture the large-scale commercial farming model is promoted for

sugarcane/ethanol. At the same time, the sector has adapted to the concerns and demands of

global markets which have led in Brazil to the conditioning of investments on agro-ecological

zoning and the adoption of sustainable certification. Plantation-style sugarcane is also justified

as a “good” source of energy, and one which is adapted to broader development concerns

through the generation of electricity. In Brazil, a preference for own production has led to a

decline in the importance of independent raw material suppliers. The predominant mix in

African countries will only emerge as investments advance and should be a concern for

empirical investigation. A considerable number of African countries are now committed to

biomass energy policies and have benefitted from Brazilian investments. Both direct land

17

impacts and the degree to which cooperation/investments are conditioned on the

sustainability criteria adopted in Brazil will be examined.

A fourth category, the SAVANNA model, is also concerned with large-scale farming

cooperation/investment, this time associated with Brazil´s occupation of the cerrados,

savannah region on the basis of highly mechanised grain/oils production. This model has been

championed by the World Bank as marking a new phase in agricultural development

characterized by the emergence of efficient large-scale farming. The African continent has the

largest tracts of savannah land for which this model is seen to be the most appropriate

development model. Brazil is centrally involved here as we have seen in Mozambique, with

Angola also being considered. An appreciation of the impacts of this savannah model of

cooperation/investments involves issues of displacement and the debates on un/under-

utilized land versus traditional community land rights. It also includes the broader impacts of

the adoption of this model on rural labour and food security.

Although there may occasionally be pure examples of the above typologies, in practice they

will tend to be a combination of the different elements. Of particular note is the promotion of

family farming in combination with large-scale commercial farming projects. The Odebrecht

Capanda Agroindustrial Pole (PAC) in Angola would be a clear example here and the Nacala

corridor for large-scale grains and oils similarly envisages the incorporation of family farming.

A second caveat in relation to the phenomenon of land-grabbing is also in order. Dominant

interpretations focus on the importance of investments from capital-rich, resource poor

emerging countries, which, in a context of increased uncertainly with regard to the supply of

foodstuffs and their availability in global markets, are engaged in the direct take-over of land in

third countries. Finance capital, and specifically commodity investments funds are also

identified as a source of major land investments. Demand created by Europe´s biofuels targets

(which have subsequently been revised downwards) would be a third driver of these

investments.

Brazil, whose agribusiness is second only to that of the US, is clearly not to be included in this

category. Even with regard to ethanol, its domestic market is still by far more important with

medium/long term growth assured, and the central concern is to promote a global market.

Nevertheless, sugar/ethanol provides an ideal investment opportunity for export to Europe

and the savannah region will likely become increasingly attractive as expansion in the Brazilian

Cerrados becomes legislatively more restrictive and land more expensive.

18

Given this, it is not surprising that direct land investments by Brazilian firms in African

countries are very modest when compared for instance with Europe, the Middle East and

China. If the Nacala corridor takes off, of course, this may well change, but in the meantime

Brazil, as we have seen, is equally concerned with exporting (machinery and know how) and

investing in the growing domestic market for consumer goods in Africa (see our discussion of

Apex, 2012).

3.2 INDIRECT IMPACTS

Brazil´s investments in Africa represented only 0. 6% of total FDI in the continent as of 2012. Of

the BRIC countries, China´s investments amount to over US$100 billion, and India comes

second with over US$30 billion. Brazil is in third place with some US$24 billion, while Russia

trails far behind with only US$4 billion. On the other hand, Brazil´s investments have increased

by 10% a year over the last several years.

Until now such investments have been limited to the extractive and construction industries

and major efforts are now directed at diversifying Brazil´s presence. The greater part of these

investments have been in Portuguese speaking African countries, particularly Angola where

Odebrecht has been present for over 25 years and Mozambique where Vale´s investments

represent over half this country´s GDP. There is great interest in extending Brazil´s private

sector presence to the rest of Africa, particularly to those countries which have stable

governments and have experienced high sustained growth in recent years. Six African

countries are among the world´s top ten fastest growing countries. To the extent that this

diversification is geared to capturing gains from the growing domestic markets in these

countries such investments are less likely to have major consequences for land issues.

Brazil´s extractive and construction firms, on the contrary, are directly concerned with natural

resources which often involve displacement and resettlement and their investments beyond

the Lusophone countries are increasing. Petrobras is present in Nigeria, Tanzania and Namibia.

Vale which moved into Africa in 2004 has investments in Gabon, Liberia, Guinea, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and South Africa, in addition to Angola and

Mozambique and intends to invest a further US$7 billion in the coming years. OAS has a

presence in Guinea, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea, as also has Odebrecht which is also active in

Liberia and Libya where Camargo Correa also has investments. Andre Guttierez is also active in

a number of African countries. In addition to the immediate impact on local communities

19

through displacement and (sometimes) resettlement, these investments in roads, energy and

ports make subsequent investment in large-scale commercial agriculture that much easier.

As we saw earlier, the Brazilian government is negotiating a debt pardon which will benefit

twelve countries, only two of which are Lusophone. The motives are economic since this will

clear the way for investments from BNDES, by far the largest financer of Brazilian firms in

Africa.

3.3 FAMILY FARM/FOOD SECURITY RELATED INVESTMENTS

This Report is concerned with impacts of Brazilian cooperation on agriculture, land and local

farming communities. Brazil´s social programmes dealing with hunger and food security have

now established themselves as standards for international adoption. Three programmes in

particular – PAA, PNAE and Mais Alimentos - have become integrated into Brazil´s cooperation

with Africa. The first two programmes have become amalgamated in the PAA Africa

Programme which was launched in 2012, jointly by the Brazilian Government, the FAO, the

World Food Programme (WFP) and DIFID (UK). Five countries – Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique,

Niger and Senegal are now implementing this programme and other countries are likely to

follow. The goal is to strengthen local food production through public procurement schemes

particularly focusing on school meals. The programme works through farmers´ organizations,

mobilizes NGOs, and includes seed improvement projects and technical support.

The Mais Alimentos programme was launched in Brazil in 2008 as a line of credit for on farm

infrastructure, equipment and machinery and also for the financing of agroindustries.

Depending on the modality, credit conceded can be up to R$150,000 (individual), R$750,000

(collective) and, in the case of agroindustries, R$300,000 (family), and up to R$35 million in the

case of cooperatives. Interest rates are subsidized (1%-2% per year) with ten years to pay

beginning after two or three years.

Sales of tractors have been a particular feature of this programme. In 2009 over 80% of

tractors from 11-78 CV in Brazil were sold through this programme. These sales, over 17.000 in

this period, represented 38.3% of the sector´s total tractor sales. It is not surprising, therefore,

that as this market matures in Brazil, the agricultural machinery sector has been a key

supporter of the internationalization of the Mais Alimentos programme.

20

Within the framework of the Mais Alimentos Africa programme, the Brazilian Chamber of

Exports (CAMEX) authorized a line of credit to the value of US$640 million during the two years

2011-2012 for the export of equipment and machinery, principally tractors. BNDES and the

Banco do Brasil operate these resources. By 2012, five African countries had adhered to the

programme – Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Senegal – and were negotiating the

import of tractors.

Two issues need to be further researched in relation to this programme. In the first place, it

would be important to have a greater understanding of the family farm profile of the

programme´s beneficiaries in Brazil, the results which this programme has achieved, and the

degree to which credit repayment conditions are proving viable.

And secondly, this form of technology transfer poses most clearly the question of whether and

under what conditions the Brazilian family farm model can be reproduced in the context of the

different African countries. The development debate in Africa has highlighted the precarious

conditions of much small holder faming on the continent, where median production units may

often be from 0.1-2.0 hectares with use but not ownership rights, and where farming is often

the responsibility of women and where there is very little in the way of technical assistance.

Jayne and colleagues (2010, 2012) have concluded that modernisation programmes in these

conditions, which do not take into account basic access to resources and know how, tend to

favour a small number of already well positioned farmers, marginalizing the majority of the

small holder sector.

African countries participating in this programme are currently negotiating imports of

machinery and particularly tractors and it is therefore too early to discuss impacts. Some

indications of a perceived lack of fit between the Brazilian and African contexts can be gleaned,

however, from the requests for higher powered tractors to be included in the programme.

The above programmes presuppose the possibility of promoting or strengthening family

farming in African countries along the lines in which this is occurring in Brazil. It would be

opportune to explore the similarities and differences between the Brazilian and the (often

varied) African contexts as an input to programme (re)formulation. Without such an

understanding, these cooperation programmes may have unexpected results as regards

farming patterns and access to land. The need for such a discussion is reinforced by the way a

“naturalised” division of labour between family farming and large-scale commercial faming

seems to underscore Brazil´s cooperation programme´s. In Brazil, such a natural division of

labour is contested on either side, and current institutional arrangements, without which a

21

separate family farming sector would be difficult to envisage, represent an uneasy and

continuously negotiated truce. Not only, therefore, is it unclear whether Brazil and African

countries share sufficiently similar small holder dynamics, it is even less obvious that a small

holder sector can flourish without strong institutional underpinning which most African

countries lack.

3.4 THE SUGARCANE/ETHANOL INVESTMENT MODEL

The promotion of a global sugarcane ethanol market was a central plank in Brazil´s geo-

political programme during the first decade of the millennium, and was presented as a

development strategy, a key to energy security, and a contribution to global goals in relation to

greenhouse gases. Various African countries adopted biofuels programmes and became

important markets for Brazilian ethanol exports. This diplomatic and trade offensive has been

accompanied by investments in sugarcane/ethanol plants.

In Angola, Odebrecht has set up a plant in collaboration with Damer, a private, and Sonangol, a

State Angolan firm. With a total of forty thousand hectares, production comes on line in

2013/14 and is scheduled to progressively substitute the 225 thousand tons of sugar imported

annually. Ethanol and electricity will also be produced. When production is at capacity it is

likely that exports will also be envisaged.

In Ghana, the BNDES is financing the construction of a plant for the Ghana Northern

Resources. Initially, Constran, a Brazilian engineering company, was mentioned but later

Odebrecht is indicated as the firm which will be responsible for construction of the plant. This

investment is closer to what has been described as the “land grabbing” phenomenon to the

extent that the goal is to produce ethanol for export to Europe in response to the EU biofuels

targets. The Swedish company, Svensk Etanolkemi AB has contracted to purchase the first ten

year´s production (Bizzard, 2008).

In Sudan, the Kenana Sugar Company contracted the Brazilian Dedini, with Brazilian funding, to

build an ethanol plant to complement its long established sugar complex. The production is

primarily directed at the domestic biofuels market where an E10 is in place, but is also geared

to exports to the EU. The Kenana Sugar Company, dates back to the seventies and was the

result of international investments in close collaboration with the Sudan government. The

22

more recent shift to ethanol is a response to the emerging biofuels market but does not in

itself involve new land investments. On the other hand, there are understood to be a further

10 projects for new plants which are envisaged to involve Brazilian participation (Schlesinger,

2012).

Ethiopia and Brazil have signed a broad agreement for the promotion of biofuels. A Brazilian

sugar company, BDFC Ethiopia received over 17.000 hectares to produce sugar in 2007, (Alemu

& Scoones, 2013) in a region prepared with infrastructure for irrigated agriculture. Unable to

implement its project, this land has now been taken back by the government and a portion

handed over to an Ethiopian firm. Sugar and ethanol are priorities for Ethiopia which is totally

dependent on oil imports and will certainly figure in future collaboration in the framework of

the cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 2012.

Zimbabwe signed a cooperation agreement with Brazil in 2011 and is one of the African

countries which is participating in the Mais Alimentos Africa programme. It has also entered

into ethanol production with a large-scale plant, bought from Brazil, which is able to meet the

country´s blending targets and positioned to become a major regional exporter. With

investment costs of some US$600 million, the complex has 60.000 hectares with a further

60.000 still to be incorporated. Employment is calculated at 4.500. In addition to supplying the

plant, Brazilian participation includes the provision of technological knowhow.

Mozambique has become a prime focus of international attention for biofuels and more

broadly for commercial agricultural investments. Official estimates have claimed that only 10%

of its 36 million hectares are cultivated. Other calculations would reduce available land to as

little as 7 million hectares. In 2009, the Mozambique government adopted a national policy for

the promotion of biofuels and in the following year Brazil and the EU created a Sustainable

Development of Bioenergy Project for Mozambique and contracted the Getulio Vargas

Foundation to carry out feasibility studies with financing from Vale. In agreements at

Government level a figure of US$6 billion was placed on the level of proposed Brazilian

investments (Thaler, 2013).

Petrobras, via Petrobras Biocombustíveis, controls, along with Tereos, the Brazilian Guarani

company which has a 75% stake in the Companhia de Sena sugar plant in Mozambique and is

now investing in the production of ethanol from molasses (Schlesinger, 2012). Petrobras also

announced plans for the construction of a biofuels plant to attend domestic demand created

by the ethanol blending target of E10. The Odebrecht subsidiary, ETH Bioenergia proposed

investments of US$1.1 billion in an ethanol plant and the Brazilian Sugarcane association,

23

UNICA, encouraged investments in Mozambique. It has been suggested that Cosan, Brazil´s

leading sugar/ethanol company (now with Shell) and Copersucar which groups together a large

number of sugar companies also have an interest in investing in Mozambique. It is not clear,

however whether these proposed investments will materialize given not only the impact of the

financial crisis on the Brazilian ethanol sector but also the proposed freezing of biofuels targets

to more or less their current levels in the EU (Thaler, 2013).

A number of biodiesel initiatives, largely using jatropha, have also been promoted. Here

Brazil´s biodiesel programme has served as a model for integrating family farming as raw

material suppliers. Brazilian jatropha seeds have been used in the Moçamgalp biodiesel

projects and Petrobras entered into an agreement with the Italian oil company ENI for

biodiesel production. Jatropha, has, however, not proved to be the magic bullet initially

imagined and many investments have been put on hold.

The Mozambique ProCana project has been subject to detailed analysis (Borras et al, 2011).

This project was promoted by a British firm in negotiation with the Mozambique government

which conceded 30.000 hectares. Dedini, the Brazilian firm, was contracted to provide the

sugar/ethanol factory. Before this project finally collapsed it exposed all the ambiguities of

these large-scale investments even when negotiated with African country governments –

displacement of local communities, unavailability of “available” land, and asymmetry in

negotiating power even when formally obeying consultation procedures.

The above are individual examples of Brazilian involvement in the sugar/ethanol and biodiesel

sectors of a number of African countries. To date, construction, equipment and machinery and

technology transfer comprise the main components. Odebrecht, however, as ETH Bioenergy

(in partnership with the Japanese Sojitz), is a leading sugar/ethanol producer in Brazil and its

investments in Angola will make it a leading player in the African market with privileged access

(via the Everything but Arms agreement) to the EU.

Over the last decade Brazil has put together a sophisticated institutional framework for the

global promotion of biofuels. In addition to agreements with the US, it reached an

understanding with the EU, and individually with Holland, for tripartite initiatives on

renewable energies in Africa, and signed an agreement on biofuels with the UEMOA. These

initiatives received a programmatic framework within the Pro-Renova programme, under the

responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Relations. The Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) was

contracted to elaborate viability studies in collaboration with individual country governments

in Africa and Latin America for food and bioenergy production. Many such studies have now

24

been completed and await decisions on investments. These studies have incorporated zoning

criteria developed in Brazil but are silent on one aspect of changes in the Brazilian

sugar/ethanol sector – the phasing out of manual cane cutting and the adoption of

mechanization. In addition to environmental considerations – the need to burn the cane

before harvesting- the shift to mechanization was motivated by pressure regarding the

unacceptable physical conditions associated with manual sugarcane harvesting. Nevertheless,

it is this manual harvesting model which seems to be proposed for adoption in the African

context.

3.5 THE SAVANNAH MODEL

Brazil´s cooperation for development in Africa is presented as combining a family farm model

oriented to food security and a large-scale commercial farming model which has been seen to

underpin the transformation of the Brazilian “Cerrados” region and is presented as a broader

agricultural development model for the savannah regions of Africa. Currently the Pro-Savana

project in Mozambique is the most important expression of this latter cooperation

programme. The Brazilian model of large-scale mechanized oils/grains farming has been

interpreted by the World Bank, and popularized in important media such as the Economist, as

inaugurating a new phase of efficient large-scale mechanised farming, drawing on the

advantages of information and communications technology and “no-tilling” production

systems, made possible by herbicide resistance genetically modified seeds. In addition, such

large-scale farming models are seen to be particularly effective in environments characterized

by market failures related to faulty infrastructure and support systems, since the scale of these

operations justifies external investments (Deiniger et al, 2011).

The Pro-Savana Project is Brazil´s most important trilateral cooperation initiative, involving the

Japanese Cooperation (JICA), the Brazilian ABC and the Mozambique Institute for Agricultural

Research. This Project is divided into three phases, comprising training, the elaboration of a

plan for agricultural development and a programme of rural extension, of which only the first

dealing with the improvement of research and technical capacity is in operation. The region in

question is the Nacala corridor which, in addition to offering similar agricultural conditions to

those of the Brazilian “cerrados”, is endowed with a deep sea port, a railway connecting the

port to the rich mining region developed by Vale, and an airport which is being transformed to

25

carry international flights. Japan is undertaking the reforms in the port and Odebrecht the

airport with financing from the BNDES.

The project aims to develop both family and large-scale farming. In the first phase, currently

underway, a range of Brazilian seeds are being adapted (soy, maize, sorghum) and it is

envisaged that some 40.000 farmers will receive support from 500 agricultural researchers

extension workers trained within the project.

At the same time, the Mozambique government has conceded land for large-scale Brazilian

farmers and some 40 farmers from the state of Mato Grosso have already visited the region.

This land is being offered for 50 years at the price of US1.38 per hectare, conditioned on the

use of 90% Mozambican labour. Conditions for the import of Brazilian machinery are under

discussion (Nascimento, 2012). The SLC Agricola, one of the largest agricultural firms in Brazil

with some 250.000 hectares planted in 2011-12, is currently initiating investments in

Mozambique after thoroughly prospecting other regions globally (Scheller, 2012). The Pinesso

Group, from Mato Grosso do Sul, is also present in Mozambique (and the Sudan).

For Brazilian farmers from the “cerrados” the Nacala corridor has many advantages. In

addition to cheap land and a more favourable regulatory climate this region is much closer to

Brazil´s principal agricultural commodity market – China. Producing in Africa can also bring the

benefit of more favourable access to Northern markets through the US “African Growth and

Opportunity Act and the EU “Everything but Arms Initiative”.

Through, EMBRAPA, Brazil is also in a second trilateral cooperation agreement with the

Mozambique government and USAID in a four year food security and nutrition project. This is

specifically designed for domestic markets food crops (especially horticulture) and for the

strengthening of family farm production.

Although the Pro-Savana project is still, at an early phase researchers have identified

displacement of local communities and the problems of implementing meaningful consultation

processes where the land belongs to the State and democratic institutions are fragile or

inexistent, (Garcia et al, 2013). According to some estimates, the Nacala corridor, some 14.5

million hectares, is home to 5 million small farmers who produce food for subsistence and

local and regional markets. They are represented by many organizations - UNAC, ORAM, ROSA,

Plataforma de Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Nampula, MUGED, Fórum Terra, União

Provincial de Camponeses de Niassa, Justiça Ambiental – who complain of not being consulted

by the FGV which is carrying out the feasibility study for the Project, (Mello, 2013). These

26

organizations already have already experienced the negative effects of investments by

Chinese and European firms which have received land from the Mozambican government

occupied by local communities (Issufo, 2012, Pinto, 2012).

SECTION FOUR. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Along with the other BRICS countries, Brazil has presented its “cooperation for

development” as a partnership, radically different from the traditional North-South aid

of the DAC countries. In fact, as we have shown, there has been considerable

convergence in the objectives of both groups of countries, expressed in the joint

signing of the Busan Declaration.

Brazil´s cooperation discourse emphasizes the demand driven nature of its

cooperation and many projects are clearly developed in response to specific requests

from Governments and organizations in African countries. Nevertheless, in its option

for “structuring projects” and its promotion of cooperation along the lines of its

principal social and economic policies for agriculture, food security and development,

Brazil gives clear priority to the promotion of its own development policies as the basis

for cooperation.

These programmes, however, have been debated and negotiated in the leading African

forums, and initiatives are developed on the basis of agreements with individual

Governments interested in participating.

Brazil´s diplomatic concerns are also an important criterion in the priority given to

cooperation with Africa as a whole, as part of its goal for a seat on the UN Security

Council, and to individual projects such as the “Cotton 4”, involving countries which

have supported Brazil´s action against US cotton subsidies at the WTO.

Brazil has, furthermore, integrated major economic goals – the development of a

global biofuels market, and the transnationalization of its agribusiness – into its

cooperation for development.

27

In both its social and economic cooperation, Brazil has not embraced two major

critiques of traditional aid/cooperation programmes, that credit should not have

strings attached and that it should be provided on concessional terms. In the Mais

Alimentos programme, credit is supplied only for Brazilian machinery and only for

tractors within a specified power range. BNDES credit for governments and firms

includes favourable conditions but is not provided on a concessionary basis.

Whether Brazil´s cooperation programmes and the investments funds provided

primarily by the BNDES are contributing to the phenomenon known as land-grabbing

has emerged as an important concern. Some have characterized Brazil´s presence in

Africa as “neo-colonialist”. It should first be emphasized that Brazil´s investments in

Africa are dwarfed by those of China and by Northern investors. Nevertheless, it is

likely that Brazil´s investments in African agriculture will assume an increasingly

strategic role if projects such as the Nacala corridor advance.

The objectives of “land-grabbing” have been the subject of much discussion with the

most important motives being identified as: the concern for food and energy security

by resource-poor capital-rich emerging countries; speculation caused by rising

commodity prices; investment funds diversifying their portfolios; and the perspectives

raised by global, and particularly EU, biofuels targets. “Land-grabbing” has often been

seen as targeting weak states and involving the manipulation of local communities

whose land rights are effectively disregarded.

Only a very few private Brazilian firms have invested to date in agricultural activities in

Africa. Agricultural trade between Brazil and the continent is very modest and highly

favourable to Brazil. In terms of trade and investment, as we have seen, Brazil has a

particular interest in the emerging domestic markets of African countries. Its

cooperation programmes are directed at the continent as a whole and are conducted

at Government level, increasingly within a tri-partite and/or multilateral, UN,

framework.

On the other hand, Brazil has a keen interest in expanding its control globally over

natural resources - mineral, petroleum and biomass – and Africa is a prime target.

Mining investments in particular are often accompanied by the displacement of local

28

populations and Brazilian firms, particularly Vale, have been implicated. As regards

investments for biofuels/bioenergy, Brazil has taken the welcome step of premising

investments on the elaboration of feasibility studies which draw on its expertise in

agro-ecological zoning studies. In the case of the Nacala corridor, however, civil society

organizations have complained that effective consultation with local communities has

not been conducted.

In the case of biofuels, the EU is proposing to freeze its targets to around the existing

levels which is likely, along with the failure of expectations associated with jatropha, to

cool down the bio-fuel component of land-grabbing. Brazil´s earlier aggressive

promotion of biofuels has been negatively affected by the crisis which the sector has

suffered in the wake of the 2008 global crisis, the rapid transnationalization of its

leading firms, and the “pre-sal” petroleum discoveries which seem to have lowered

priorities with regard to biofuels. Given the dependence on energy imports of many

African countries, biofuels//bioenergy will likely remain an attractive option, but the

drive to create a global market, and the levels of investments associated with this, is at

present less in evidence.

On the other hand, global food security concerns are likely to maintain their centrality.

As African countries continue their economic growth domestic demand will be an

important investment driver and Brazil´s food security and family farm cooperation

programmes will become increasingly important.

The global agricultural commodity market, and the demand of the major emerging

economies, particularly in Asia will, however, remain the most important driver of

investments in African agriculture. Brazil, here, is in a particularly favourable position

given the recent development of its “cerrado”-based agribusiness model, highly

adapted to African conditions. As infrastructure is put into place, the competitiveness

of exporting grains/oils and other agricultural commodities to Asia from Africa will

provide a powerful stimulus to Brazilian farmers, faced with increasing costs and

regulatory requirements associated with the incorporation of new lands domestically.

Optimists suggest that that the proposed occupation of Africa´s savannah lands will be

able to take on board all that Brazil and Japan have learned from the experience of

29

opening up the Brazilian “cerrado” region, including in particular the negative

environmental consequences. Pessimists, or perhaps realists, would argue that this

scenario requires a broad mobilization to ensure that recent conventions on

responsible agricultural investments are fully implemented and that local communities

are helped to organize to ensure that their rights are fully respected.

More fundamentally, perhaps, what is at stake is the appropriate model for developing

Africa´s agriculture. Brazil has presented its cooperation for development within a

naturalistic dualist framework in which family farming is associated with domestic food

security and large-scale farming with agricultural exports. This dualism, as we have

discussed above, is strongly questioned on both sides of the spectrum in Brazil, and

will certainly emerge as a central concern given that African countries have become

increasingly committed to agricultural development policies and strategies.

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