beyond coalitions of the willing: assessing u.s. multilateralism

Since the end of the Cold War, both thewisdom and the appropriateness ofmultilateral action have been subjects

of fierce disagreement within the U.S. foreignpolicy community. In practice, the UnitedStates has oscillated between going it aloneand joining with others.1 While making use ofsome multilateral institutions, it has periodi-cally opted out of international conventions,sought exemptions from global regimes, andacted alone in the face of global problems.2

Subsequently, debates about the appropriatebalance between unilateralism and multilat-eralism in American global engagement havebeen highly contentious. The intensity of thedebate is due, at least in part, to the fact thatparticipants disagree about both the effec-tiveness of the two strategies for achievingU.S. aims and their legitimacy.

These arguments are a predictable responseto the practical challenges and ethical dilem-mas generated by globalization. Global inte-gration has engendered a growing number of transnational problems and opportunitiesunlikely to be addressed successfully by the independent actions of any one state.3

Cooperation with other governments andinternational organizations is essential. Yetmultilateralism can be costly and constrain-ing, sometimes limiting freedom of action andinfringing on national sovereignty.The UnitedStates is particularly sensitive to these trade-offs since it has formidable unilateral andbilateral options.The question of whether U.S.interests are best served by going it alone or

with others has no general answer: it dependson the issue and the stakes, the policies of oth-ers, and the feasibility of collective action.

In addition to raising prudential dilem-mas, globalization carries moral implica-tions. In order to manage common problems,countries have created a growing frameworkof international institutions and law, accept-ing an expanding array of mutual obligationsand binding commitments among states.Simultaneously, the rise of cross-borderexchanges is fast eroding the boundarybetween national and international, whilereinforcing the connections between dis-parate and distant human communities. Inadvocating particular responses to theseglobal concerns, policy-makers and analystscouch their positions in normative language,invoking U.S. rights and duties and high-lighting the legitimacy or illegitimacy of U.S.policy choices. Because unilateralism raisesethical red flags in world politics, the UnitedStates typically offers public explanations for

37

Beyond Coalitions of the Willing:Assessing U.S. Multilateralism

Stewart Patrick*

* This article was written in a purely personal capacityprior to the author’s current employment with the U.S.Department of State, and the views it contains shouldnot be taken as a statement of official U.S. policy.1 Robert W. Tucker, “Alone or With Others,” ForeignAffairs 78 (November/December 1999), pp. 15–20.2 For a recent survey, with case studies, see StewartPatrick and Shepard Forman, eds., Multilateralism andU.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002).3 P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., Man-aging Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).

Repinted from Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1.© 2003 by Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

its decisions to act alone. Such justificationsare sometimes prudential, citing threats toU.S. national security and core interests. ButU.S. officials also defend unilateralism in eth-ical terms, depicting it as a moral imperativetranscending secondary international obliga-tions; as the only means to remain true to U.S.identity and values; as a last resort, taken afterexhaustive efforts to reach consensus; as acontribution to the general welfare ratherthan narrow U.S. interests; or as a form ofleadership to overcome inertia, mobilize acoalition, create an international standard, orenforce an international agreement. Thiscompulsion to justify departures from multi-lateral cooperation suggests that there arerecognized norms of international behaviorand legitimacy that require invocation, evenin the breach.4

So far the discussion of these questionshas been more polemical than analytical.Because the practical and ethical terrain hasnot been clearly demarcated, it is easy toconfuse prudential assessments about costsand benefits with ethical arguments aboutfairness, justice, legitimacy, and obligation.Each side has claimed the moral high ground,bundling distinct normative assertions intorival prudential arguments while failing toacknowledge the principled nature of theopposition’s arguments. Greater clarity maybe possible by classifying U.S. foreign policyinto analytical categories based on whetherthe strategies adopted are unilateral or mul-tilateral and whether the aims pursued arenationalist, internationalist, or cosmopoli-tan. Each set of aims has different ethicaljustifications, which generate and help toexplain divergent attitudes and judgmentsabout the appropriate role of multilateralcooperation in U.S. foreign policy. Thesethree lenses all bring into focus particularcircumstances that warrant unilateral action,

and each reveals distinctive rationalizationsfor going it alone.

ONLY WHEN WE MUST?

In 1993, its first year in office, the Clintonadministration espoused the slogan of“assertive multilateralism.” Internationalinstitutions and multilateral partnerships, itargued, were effective instruments to shareburdens and risks, win broad global supportfor U.S. goals, and attain otherwise impossi-ble objectives. This policy soon came underdomestic criticism following setbacks in UNpeacekeeping ventures. Conservative criticsattacked multilateral institutions for reduc-ing U.S. freedom of action and threateningits sovereignty. As former senator RobertDole complained, “International organiza-tions—whether the United Nations, theWorld Trade Organization, or any others . . .[t]oo often . . . reflect a consensus thatopposes American interests or does notreflect American principles and ideals.”5 TheClinton administration thus retreated to amore conditional stance, encapsulated inthe phrase, “Multilateral when we can, uni-lateral when we must.”6

The second Bush administration tookoffice far more skeptical about multilateral-ism.7 It quickly repudiated certain interna-tional commitments made by its predecessor,including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on cli-mate change and the 1998 Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court (ICC),

38 Stewart Patrick

4 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy amongNations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).5 Robert Dole, “Shaping America’s Global Future,” For-eign Policy 98 (Spring 1995), p. 36.6 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “American Power Plays,” Wash-ington Post, December 26, 1997, p. A29.7 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,”Foreign Affairs 79 (January/February 2000), pp. 45–62.

and it asserted America’s right to act aloneon matters such as national missile defense.The administration justified its à la carteapproach to multilateral cooperation as amature response to global complexity.8 Butthe resulting impression was that it regardedinternational alliances, treaties, and organi-zations as sometimes inimical to U.S.national interests and often more troublethan they were worth.9

This stance persisted after the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001. Despite pre-dictions that the terrorist threat would spura more multilateral outlook,10 the continu-ities in U.S. policy overshadowed the dis-continuities.11 Among other positions, theadministration continued to reject the 1996Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT); abrogated the 1972 AntiballisticMissile Treaty; blocked a verification proto-col to the 1972 Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention; rebuffed an international cam-paign to double global foreign assistance;abdicated leadership on global warming;and unsigned the Rome Statute of the ICC.As for the antiterrorism coalition, its earlyevolution was less a multilateral undertak-ing requiring common, reciprocal obliga-tions than a hub-and-spoke arrangementfounded on bilateral deals struck with a het-erogeneous group of countries. This assurescomplete U.S. control over initiatives andmilitary operations.

Most controversial of all was the Bushadministration’s decision to extend theantiterrorism campaign to Iraq, defined bythe president as part of a global “axis of evil.”This prospect generated hyperventilatingcriticism from some of America’s closestallies, fearful that the United States was mov-ing into “unilateralist overdrive.”12 Theseanxieties increased during the summer of2002, when the administration unveiled anew doctrine of “preemption” against rogue

states that support terrorism or pursueweapons of mass destruction, as part of abroader national security strategy that aimsexplicitly to perpetuate American primacy.13

When President George W. Bush agreed inSeptember to give the United Nations one finalchance to disarm Iraq, the international com-munity breathed a collective sigh of relief. ButPresident Bush made clear that if the UnitedNations failed to enforce its own resolutions,the United States was prepared to act alone.

AIMS AND STRATEGIES

Before assessing the ethical dimensions ofthe debate over U.S. unilateralism, one mustmake a conceptual distinction between U.S.aims and strategies. Multilateralism and uni-

beyond coalitions of the willing: assessing u.s. multilateralism 39

8 Thom Shanker, “White House Says the U.S. Is Not aLoner, Just Choosy,” New York Times, July 31, 2001, p. A1.9 Stewart Patrick, “Don’t Fence Me In: The Perils ofGoing it Alone,” World Policy Journal 18 (Fall 2001),pp. 2–14.10 According to former president George H. W. Bush,the attacks erased “the concept . . . that America cansomehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism, or inanything else for that matter.” William Drozdiak, “Cri-sis Forces Shift in Policy As Bush Assembles Coalition,”Washington Post, September 17, 2001, p. A9. See alsoJoseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Whythe World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2002).11 Charles Krauthammer, “Unilateral? Yes, Indeed,”Washington Post, December 14, 2001, p. A45; and Ivo H.Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Unilateralism is Aliveand Well in Washington,” International Herald Tribune,December 21, 2001.12 Christopher Patten, “Jaw-Jaw, not War-War: Mili-tary Success in Afghanistan Has Encouraged the USTo Ignore European Doubts about Confronting the‘Axis of Evil,’” Financial Times, February 15, 2002, p.16; and Steven Erlanger, “Europe Seethes as the U.S.Flies Solo in World Affairs,” New York Times, February23, 2002, p. A8.13 Norman Podhoretz,“In Praise of the Bush Doctrine,”Commentary 114 (September 2002), pp. 19–28. See also“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002”; available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

lateralism are alternative strategies to achieveforeign policy objectives, one involvingaction by the United States alone, the otherby a group of states. In either case, the aimsthat the United States is pursuing may benationalist, intended to advance the narrowinterests of compatriots; internationalist,intended to advance the broader interests ofall states; or cosmopolitan, intended toadvance the interests of humanity at large.

Both sets of distinctions are important.Liberals tend to link multilateral strategieswith internationalist or cosmopolitanaims, unilateral strategies with nationalistones. Typically, they also accord multilat-eralism greater normative value, consider-ing unilateralism prima facie morallysuspect and bemoaning departures fromcollective action. In fact, the relationshipbetween aims and strategies is not sostraightforward. A state may act alone toadvance cosmopolitan goals, for instance,just as it may exploit cooperation for nar-row national objectives. Likewise, the ethi-cal status of unilateralism cannot bejudged without additional informationabout the nature of the foreign policy chal-lenge, the aims being pursued, and theprospects for collective action.

Multilateralism can be defined eitherthinly or thickly, depending on whetherone is referring to actions or institutions.At its most basic level, multilateralismrefers to coordinated action among three ormore countries in a given internationalactivity; a state acts multilaterally when itcooperates with others rather than actingon its own or through narrower bilateralarrangements. Such collaboration may be atemporary response to a fleeting congru-ence of interests, like the ad hoc coalitioncreated in 1990 in response to Iraq’s inva-sion of Kuwait. Alternatively, it may implya deeper, rule-bound form of cooperation,

whereby independent countries agree tocoordinate their conduct in a particularrealm according to certain principles,norms, and procedures. For example, statesmay consent to abide by common restric-tions on the export of missile technology orthe emission of greenhouse gases; to sub-mit all commercial disputes to bindingarbitration; to promote and conform touniversal principles of civil and politicalrights; or to restrict the use of military forceto the authority of a competent interna-tional organization. As multilateralismbecomes more institutionalized, it placesgreater demands on participants to relin-quish flexibility in foreign policy decisionsand to resist temptations for immediategratification in return for the promise oflong-term gain.14

Unilateralism, by contrast, is independentaction taken without coordination withother states or international institutions. Itcan be expressed either as acting alone or asopting out of an existing or proposed collec-tive framework. State policies frequently fallalong a broad spectrum between the twopoles of pure unilateralism and multilateral-ism. A state may act unilaterally within amultilateral forum, donning the cloak ofcollective legitimation while tailoring groupobjectives to its own narrow purposes.15 Itmay also defect from multilateralism at var-ious phases of a cooperation process, forinstance during the negotiation, signature,ratification, implementation, or enforce-ment of an international agreement.

40 Stewart Patrick

14 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomyof an Institution,” in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilat-eralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institu-tional Form (New York: Columbia University Press,1993), pp. 3–47.15 Charles Krauthammer dismisses the U.S.-led GulfWar coalition as a case of “pseudo-multilateralism” in“The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter1990/1991), pp. 23–33.

Similarly, we can contrast three types ofaims: actions taken on a narrowly national-ist basis to advance the concerns of a partic-ular state and its citizens; actions taken onan internationalist basis to advance theinterests of all states; and actions taken on acosmopolitan basis to advance the concernsof all human beings. At a normative level,these three sets of aims imply different con-ceptions of the nature of political obligationin a world of sovereign states.

Those advocating the pursuit of national-ist aims take their guidance from the tradi-tion of realism. In this view, the world is ananarchical, self-help system, in whichautonomous states seek national securitythrough the pursuit of self-interest definedin terms of power and wealth. Within such aHobbesian state of nature, the highest dutyof the statesman is to ensure the physicalsecurity and material well-being of thenation and its citizens. This position can bejustified inasmuch as the state, whether con-ceived as something organic, a historical arti-fact, or the product of a social contract, isviewed as a discrete and self-contained polit-ical community, possessing a unique identityand distinct values that are fundamentallyprior to any larger grouping of states orindeed of humanity at large.16 The statesmanhas an overriding obligation to defend therights of compatriots above those of inhabi-tants of other countries and a responsibilityto advance the narrow interests of the nationrather than those of an illusory internationalcommunity. Moreover, a country cannot butdo this, and to the extent that it wishes toadvance altruistic goals such as humanrights, for example, it really seeks only toexpand its influence and spread its own val-ues. Applied to American foreign policy, thenationalist position acknowledges only lim-ited international obligations. Skeptical offoreign entanglements, nationalists advocate

only the instrumental use of multilateralinstitutions to the degree that these advancenarrow U.S. interests and values. In early2002, Undersecretary of State John Boltondefended the Bush administration’s selectiveattitude toward arms control agreementswith impeccable nationalist logic. “Trying tocharacterize our policy as unilateralist or multilateralist is a futile exercise,” hedeclared. “Our policy is, quite simply, pro-American, as you would expect.”17

An internationalist policy, by contrast, isone that seeks to advance objectives that aresought not only by the nation and its citizensbut more broadly by all states. Whereasnationalists view world politics as an arenaof conflict in which states owe obligationsonly to themselves, internationalists recog-nize ample room for interstate cooperationand believe that states possess mutual obli-gations by virtue of their membership in aninternational society, conceived as a com-munity of states sharing certain basic inter-ests, values, rules, and institutions.18 Thesociety of states confers duties as well asrights and benefits on its members. Amongother things, they are required to recognizeeach other’s sovereignty, to act in good faith,to exercise self-restraint in respecting theconventions of diplomacy, and to observeinternational law. Beyond these fundamen-tal obligations, states create wider layers ofresponsibility by engaging in negotiations


16 Robert H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of Interna-tional Society,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds.,International Relations Theory Today (University Park,Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp.110–28.17 Quoted in Peter Slevin, “U.S. Backs Rules AgainstArms Spread,” Washington Post, January 25, 2002, p. A15.18 Hedley Bull, “Society and Anarchy in InternationalRelations,” in Herbert Butterfield and M. Wight, eds.,Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of Inter-national Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1966), pp. 35–50.

Table 1. Aims and Strategies of Foreign Policy

over the specific principles, norms, and legalrules that should govern their relations inparticular spheres.

This internationalist outlook occupies amiddle ground between the nationalist viewof state aims and a third view that recognizeshuman beings as the fundamental agentsand holders of rights in world politics. Inthis cosmopolitan perspective, it is the com-munity of humankind, rather than the com-munity of states, that provides the basis forinternational morality. Where internation-alists see a society of states linked by inter-national institutions and agreements,cosmopolitans conceive of a world societycomposed of all members of the humanrace. The essence of ethical U.S. statecraftfrom this perspective is to advance anddefend the rights, security, and welfare of allthe earth’s inhabitants, regardless of wherethey reside. According to cosmopolitans,U.S. foreign policy objectives should includepromoting human security and sustainabledevelopment, managing the global com-mons for the use of all peoples, arresting thedeterioration of the natural environment,ameliorating global health crises and human-

itarian catastrophes, and intervening to stopgross violations of human rights—as well asstrengthening and expanding fair multilat-eral institutions19 (see table 1).

Each set of foreign policy aims outlinedabove—the nationalist, the internationalist,and the cosmopolitan—provides a uniquenormative lens to consider the appropriatebalance between unilateralism and multilat-eralism in U.S. global engagement. In decid-ing whether to act alone or with others,American policy-makers frequently mustchoose among perceived duties to fellow cit-izens, other states, and humanity.

BETTER TO BE FEARED

From a nationalist perspective, the principalcriterion in judging a U.S. foreign policy ini-tiative is whether it advances America’s ownnarrow interests. The precise content ofthese interests may vary, reflecting a shiftingbalance of material considerations and nor-mative concerns. Because the world system

42 Stewart Patrick

19 See Thomas W. Pogge, ed., Global Justice (London:Blackwell, 2001).

STRATEGIESMultilateral

Nationalist Multilateralism

Act with others to advance narrow

national interests

Internationalist Multilateralism

Act with others to advance interests

of all states

Cosmopolitan Multilateralism

Act with others to advance interests

of humanity

Unilateral

Nationalist Unilateralism

Act alone to advance narrow

national interests

Internationalist Unilateralism

Act alone to advance interests of

all states

Cosmopolitan Unilateralism

Act alone to advance interests

of humanity

Nationalist

Internationalist

Cosmopolitan

AIMS

is an anarchical, asocial realm, where coun-tries are locked in zero-sum competition forpower and influence, U.S. policy-makersmust be ever vigilant to improve their coun-try’s position relative to actual or potentialadversaries and must take steps to preserveand promote America’s distinctive nationalvalues. In considering whether to participatein any international institution or ad hocmultilateral arrangement, the relevant ques-tion is not whether the United States will gainfrom such cooperation but whether it willgain more than other players, in terms ofadvancing its national power and purposes.20

Such self-regard is neither immoral noramoral in the nationalist view but ethicallyjustifiable since the state is a privileged moralcommunity, the product of a unique socialcontract and the embodiment of the distinc-tive national identities, aspirations, and val-ues of its inhabitants. To the modest degreethat any aspects of community can be said toexist among collections of states, these linksderive from the fundamental duties eachstate owes to its own citizens. Accordingly,any obligations that states owe to oneanother are imperfect, and they can only bemade robust through explicit state consent.21

Assuming that the United States seeksnationalist aims, it should participate inmultilateral endeavors only if it anticipatesreaping a disproportionate share of jointbenefits from collective action. Such nation-alist multilateralism may help explainAmerican support for an indefinite exten-sion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) during the 1995and 2000 multilateral review conferences.For the United States, one of the attractionsof the NPT is that it codifies and preservesAmerica’s privileged position as one of fivedeclared nuclear powers, creating a systemof differentiated state obligations on thisbasis.22 The same logic helps to explain

long-standing U.S. support for the Interna-tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank.Thanks to a system of weighted voting thatprivileges the largest shareholders on thegoverning boards of both institutions,Washington continues to enjoy decisiveinfluence over the lending activities of theBretton Woods institutions and their neolib-eral economic policies.

The United States has also attempted toshape the content of the global trade regimeand the agenda of multilateral trade liberal-ization in ways that advance its purely nar-row interests. One such instance arguablycame at the World Trade Organization(WTO) summit in Seattle in autumn 1999 when President Bill Clinton proposedexpanding trade rules to provide for sanc-tions against countries that fail to meet cer-tain labor and environmental standards.Although he couched this gambit in the cos-mopolitan language of human rights and theglobal commons, many delegations from thedeveloping world perceived it as rank pro-tectionism, aimed at insulating U.S. indus-tries and unskilled workers from foreigncompetition.23 The logic of relative gainsmay also explain strong U.S. support for amultilateral agreement on trade-relatedintellectual property issues and a multilater-al agreement on investment. Given its mas-sive lead in technological innovation and


20 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Coop-eration: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Insti-tutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3(1988), pp. 485–507.21 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory ofInternational Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,1982), pp. 80–96.22 Kanti Bajpai, “U.S. Nonproliferation Policy after theCold War,” in David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong,eds., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Interna-tional Perspectives (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,2003), pp. 217–47.23 John Burgess,“Clinton’s Remarks on Sanctions OpenRift,” Washington Post, December 3, 1999, p. A30.

entertainment exports, the United Statesstands to gain the most from improvedenforcement of copyrights and patents, justas the global dominance of the Americanfinancial services industry places U.S. com-panies in the best position to benefit from aliberalized global investment regime.

In the event that a multilateral institutionor partnership does not promise to advanceits narrow interests and relative position,one would expect the United States to optout and act alone, adopting a posture ofnationalist unilateralism. A particularlynaked instance, in the field of internationaltrade, was the Bush administration’s deci-sion in February 2002 to impose high tariffson imported steel in order to protect a belea-guered but politically influential domesticindustry from stiff foreign competition.Another case would be the strong opposi-tion of both the Bush administration andthe U.S. Senate to the Kyoto Protocol onglobal warming, based above all on a con-cern that the treaty, as currently drafted,would impose a disproportionate burden ofadjustment on the United States while fail-ing to compel any meaningful participationfrom developing countries. Indeed, a com-mon source of American discomfort withmultilateral cooperation generally is the sus-picion that it permits others to hitch a freeride on U.S. efforts. During the long UNfinancing crisis of the 1990s, for example,Congress insisted that any calculations ofU.S. financial support to UN peacekeepingmust take into account America’s other con-tributions to international security, such asenforcement pursuant to Security Councilresolutions of the no-fly zones in Iraq.

Concerns about relative gains tend to beparticularly strong in the military arena,given the implications of shifting poweramong states for national security. Senate

rejection of the CTBT in October 1999, forinstance, reflected the fears of many legisla-tors that the treaty would not discouragecheating and might jeopardize the reliabilityof the U.S. nuclear stockpile.24 Rather thanachieve a false sense of security against thenation’s potential enemies by banning tests,the argument went, the United States shouldreserve the option to test its nuclearweapons. American conservatives tend to be skeptical of nonproliferation and arms control agreements generally, based on the reasonable position that if treaties areunverifiable and unenforceable, only foolswill obey them, while rogues will fail tocomply. Given the likelihood that othercountries will continue to act unilaterally, anationalist would argue, the United Statesmay be released from any moral responsibil-ity to approve or even comply with multilat-eral agreements.The fact that an internationalcontract exists is irrelevant if others are notwilling to abide by it.

As the above discussion suggests, nation-alist unilateralism is often justified on thegrounds that the United States must pre-serve its international freedom of action.This logic applies to U.S. participation notonly in formal treaties and organizations butalso in ad hoc coalitions. As Secretary ofState Colin Powell noted in congressionaltestimony on the global antiterrorist cam-paign,“There may be times when we have toact alone. We can’t have our national inter-est constrained by the coalition.”25

If nationalists worry about losing freedomof action abroad, they are also anxious about

44 Stewart Patrick

24 Thomas Graham and Damien LaVera, “NuclearWeapons: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty andNational Missile Defense,” in Patrick and Forman, eds.,Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 225–45.25 David E. Sanger,“U.S. Goal Seems Clear,And the TeamComplete,” New York Times, February 13, 2002, p. A18.

compromises to sovereignty at home.26 Asinternational institutions grow and becomemore active, some Americans perceive U.S.political institutions, domestic law, and constitutional traditions to be besieged byundemocratic and unaccountable organs ofglobal governance. They worry that interna-tional rules and bodies will lack domesticstandards of transparency, usurp the author-ity of the people’s elected representatives, andopen domestic institutions and private enter-prises to unwarranted external scrutiny.27

Defenders of U.S. sovereignty espouse a doc-trine of American exceptionalism; taking arosy view of America’s past, they argue thatits unique tradition of democracy andequality means that it does not have to besubject to international law. This positionasserts the supremacy of national over inter-national law and implies that the UnitedStates must opt out of some global initiatives. In January 2000, Senator JesseHelms, a vigilant guardian of constitutionalsupremacy, warned the UN Security Coun-cil, “A United Nations that seeks to imposeits presumed authority on the Americanpeople, without their consent, begs for con-frontation and—I want to be candid withyou—eventual withdrawal.”28

The United States, as Edward Luck notes,often finds it difficult to reconcile the struc-ture and processes of international organi-zations with its own domestically generatedconception of political legitimacy. Usingcontemporary polling data from 1980 to2000, he has found that Americans havebeen more influenced by congressionalthan UN concerns. When these two sets ofstandards have clashed, most Americans feltthat domestic standards should trumpinternational ones.29 This factor helps toexplain America’s long-standing resistanceto submit to global human rights regimesand international legal bodies.30 The

United States, for example, is the onlyindustrialized democracy not to have rati-fied the Convention on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women and one ofonly two countries (the other is Somalia)that has failed to ratify the Convention onthe Rights of the Child. Similar calculationscontribute to U.S. skepticism toward theICC. For American critics, one of the prin-cipal defects of the Rome Statute is “theprospect that a panel of internationaljudges might sit in judgment of determina-tions made by the U.S. legal system.”31

Although U.S. political leaders frequentlydepict American values and institutions aspossessing universal validity, the UnitedStates frequently discovers that the peopleof other countries do not share its citizens’self-conceptions and moral convictions. Insuch circumstances, the pursuit of national-ist aims may justify opting out of multilat-eral initiatives that are perceived by aparticular administration or congress tocontradict fundamental American values,as well as acting alone in pursuit of theseconvictions. Although there is a livelydebate over what constitutes American


26 Peter J. Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists: AmericanExceptionalism and Its False Prophets,” Foreign Affairs79 (November/December 2000), pp. 9–15.27 John R. Bolton, “Should We Take Global GovernanceSeriously?” (paper presented at the American Enter-prise Institute conference, “Trends in Global Gover-nance: Do They Threaten American Sovereignty?”Washington, D.C., April 4–5, 2000).28 Barbara Crossette, “Helms, in Visit to U.N., OffersHarsh Message,” New York Times, January 21, 2000, p. A1.29 Edward C. Luck, “The United States, InternationalOrganizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy,” inPatrick and Forman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. For-eign Policy, pp. 47–74.30 Andrew Moravcsik, “Why Is U.S. Human Rights Pol-icy So Unilateralist?” in Patrick and Forman, eds., Mul-tilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 345–76.31 Bartram S. Brown,“Unilateralism, Multilateralism, andthe International Criminal Court,”in Patrick and Forman,eds., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 323–44.

political values, the country’s long-standingattachment to Lockean liberalism and itspolitical conservatism relative to otheradvanced democracies helps to explain itsambivalence toward certain internationalinstitutions. For example, while the UnitedStates has ratified and strongly supports the1966 International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, it has long resisted the 1966Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights. The relative conservatism of theU.S. polity is especially apt to make itself feltwhen Republicans control the WhiteHouse. In August 2001 the Bush adminis-tration stood alone in opposing a draft UNconvention to reduce illicit trafficking insmall arms and light weapons on thegrounds that the resulting treaty mightinfringe on U.S. citizens’ “constitutionalright to keep and bear arms.”32 A similar setof powerful domestic dynamics were at playin May 2002, when the U.S. delegation to theUN Special Session on Children blockedagreement on a final document containingclauses on family planning out of a princi-pled opposition to abortion and to avoidalienating the pro-life voters who hadhelped to elect President Bush. While pro-choice advocates bemoaned this stance, itreflected the reality that U.S. participationin multilateral endeavors requires anyadministration to play a two-level game,seeking agreements that can win approvalfrom both foreign negotiating partners anddomestic constituencies.

TAMING INTERNATIONALANARCHY

Compared to nationalists, internationalistsare more sanguine about prospects forinterstate cooperation and more cognizantof the normative bonds linking indepen-dent states. Because world politics is a posi-

tive-sum game, self-interested actors arecontent to pursue absolute gains fromcooperation without being overly preoccu-pied with the relative distribution of thosebenefits. In addition, states collectively con-stitute an international society whose mem-bers possess mutual rights and obligationsand a shared conception of internationallegitimacy. As moral agents with recognizedprivileges and responsibilities, they can beheld to—and influenced by—common eth-ical standards.33

In this view, support for internationalinstitutions is motivated by a combinationof prudential calculations and ethical con-siderations. At a functional level, institu-tions help states to overcome obstacles tocollective action by providing frameworksto reduce uncertainty, gain access to infor-mation, consult and resolve differences,design appropriate solutions, share burdensand risks, and monitor and enforce compli-ance with commitments. Support for multi-lateral cooperation is thus enlightenedself-interest, permitting the pursuit of col-lective gains. At a deeper, normative level,the commitments made to internationalinstitutions exert a pull toward complianceby virtue of their perceived legitimacy, as theproducts of fair processes.34

One example of internationalist multi-lateralism was the U.S. push for the creationof the World Trade Organization in 1994.Although American officials were confidentthat the United States would benefit froman open international economy, there was

46 Stewart Patrick

32 John R. Bolton, “Address” (speech given at the UNConference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects, New York, N.Y., July 9,2001); available at www.un.int/usa/01_104.htm.33 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Orderin World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).34 On the “compliance pull” of international rules, seeFranck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations.

little assurance that it would reap dispro-portionate gains from trade liberalization.Rather,Washington promoted the new regimeas a way to create a level playing field onwhich all could compete on equal terms,and as a means to increase aggregate levelsof world trade and prospects for growth inall countries. In championing the transfor-mation of the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade into the WTO, moreover, Wash-ington agreed to a new binding dispute-set-tlement mechanism to adjudicate tradedisputes. By agreeing to submit to thisexternal tribunal, regardless of its decisions,the United States voluntarily renounced itscapacity to impose liberalization on tradepartners unilaterally.

From an internationalist perspective, thedecision about whether to act alone or withothers is informed by two ethical consider-ations. The first is whether there exists alegitimate institution or law governingstate conduct in the relevant sphere. Thereis nothing inherently objectionable, in theinternationalist view, about a state’s choiceto formulate and pursue an independentpolicy initiative without consultation orcoordination with other countries. In aworld of independent states, such actionconstitutes a large proportion of foreignpolicy. Where unilateral action becomesproblematic, even illegitimate, is when itdeviates from established norms as embod-ied in an existing multilateral institutionwith recognized competence or authorityover a particular policy sphere, such asrules governing the use of force, the impo-sition of trade quotas, or the protection ofhuman rights, threatening to impose sig-nificant costs on others without their con-sent. Such a situation may arise when a statebypasses a relevant convention, regime, ororganization, holds itself above bindingrules, or fails to consult with other states

before taking unilateral actions impingingon their interests.

The second ethical consideration from aninternationalist perspective is whether multi-lateral action will do more to advance theinterests of all states. U.S. unilateralism mightbe justified when collective action would bedetrimental to the common interests of thecommunity of states, or when relevant insti-tutions are inadequate to cope with the chal-lenges they confront. In opting out of theKyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute, and othermultilateral treaties, for example, the Bushadministration did not reject the principle ofinternational cooperation but rather arguedthat these particular treaties were fatallyflawed. As National Security Advisor Con-doleezza Rice explained in January 2002,these were “bad treaties . . . lowest commondenominator treaties,” which “the UnitedStates should not have been involved [in]because they were not going to solve theproblems they were supposed to solve.”35 Inrejecting these conventions, the White Houseargued, the United States was showing lead-ership and laying the groundwork for a morerealistic approach to global problems. In thiscase explicit statements of intent are avail-able, and they express a motive of interna-tionalist unilateralism.

U.S. officials are often skeptical that inter-national bodies and conventions canaccomplish the tasks with which they arecharged. Multilateral institutions are vul-nerable to numerous pathologies, such asfree riding, buck passing, glacial decision-making, and lowest common denominatorpolicy-making. These shortcomings areespecially problematic in military opera-tions, which demand decisiveness and flexibility. American skepticism about inter-


35 Quoted in David E. Sanger, “Another Bush’s ‘VisionThing,’” New York Times, January 20, 2002, sec. 4, p. 3.

national institutions has been reinforced byqualitative changes in the nature of multi-lateral cooperation, not least the rise of con-ference diplomacy, which complicates U.S.efforts to determine the outcome and courseof international negotiations.

U.S. decisions about whether to act aloneor with others may also vary with the antici-pated consequences for the common inter-ests of all states. This consideration isespecially important in the current, unipolarenvironment. Given the shortcomings ofmultilateral institutions, as well as the grossasymmetries of power in the contemporaryinternational system, robust American uni-lateral action may be ethically preferable toflaccid multilateralism, even when it violatesinternational norms. At times, unilateralismmay actually advance the cause of multilater-alism. During the late 1980s and early 1990s,for example, the United States resorted toaggressive unilateralism to pry open foreignmarkets by applying the Super 301 provisionsof the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive-ness Act, which allowed retaliation againstcountries pursuing unfair trade policies.Although critics warned that U.S. unilateral-ism might fragment the world trading sys-tem, in retrospect it helped generate renewedmomentum for multilateral liberalization,providing a powerful impetus for a successfulconclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994.The lesson, according to Kimberly Elliott andGary Hufbauer, is that America must some-times “break crockery” to get commercialmultilateralism moving.36

ETHICS WITHOUT BORDERS

There remains a third perspective on theethics of U.S. multilateralism and unilateral-ism: cosmopolitanism. It starts from thepremise that moral obligations in world pol-itics flow from the intrinsic value and dig-

nity of all human beings. Because the worldcan be viewed as a single moral community,the standard on which U.S. foreign policyshould be judged is whether the orientationadopted promises to advance human wel-fare. The strategy selected may reflect theoperation of a moral imperative or rule,such as the requirement to protect funda-mental human rights, or it may involve util-itarian calculations of costs and benefits ofthe chosen strategy for the well-being ofindividuals worldwide.

Most closely associated with the writings ofImmanuel Kant, the cosmopolitan approachto international ethics has long been regardedas a utopian vision. It has gained renewed rel-evance in recent years, however, as global inte-gration draws individuals from distant placescloser together, as transnational forces gener-ate global problems affecting all members ofhumanity, and as nongovernmental organiza-tions and civil society movements emerge aspowerful participants in world politics.

To begin with, the growing velocity andvolume of international flows of capital,goods, information, and people has increasedthe prudential rationale for multilateralism bycreating a host of global problems that areimpervious to resolution by single states, eventhe most powerful in the world. Inasmuch asmany of today’s foreign policy challenges—such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons,the spread of deadly epidemics, the disruptionof financial markets, and the loss of biodiver-sity—have transnational causes and carryconsequences for human populations aroundthe globe, they become a matter not only ofnational but global public policy, requiringcollective responses from sovereign countries,

48 Stewart Patrick

36 Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer,“Ambivalent Multilateralism and the Emerging Back-lash: The IMF and the WTO,” in Patrick and Forman,eds., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 408.

international organizations, and, increasingly,nonstate actors.37 Collaboration to mitigateglobal “bads”and enhance global goods is noteasy, however, given the incentive to avoidcontributing national and private resources tocommon endeavors and the temptation todefect to achieve narrow, short-term gain. Forthese reasons, so-called global public goods—like international security, public health,financial stability, and a clean environment—tend to be undersupplied.38

Besides posing practical dilemmas, glob-alization carries ethical implications forrelations among human beings. As nationalcommunities become less self-contained,and as the boundary between foreign anddomestic becomes porous, increasing num-bers of people have begun to regard theworld as a single moral community, tran-scending national borders. As they do so,conventional distinctions between the per-fect obligations owed to one’s fellow citizensand the imperfect obligations owed tohumanity at large begin to erode. To thedegree that interdependence increasesactual or potential levels of reciprocityamong human beings, it becomes easier toconceive of world society as a realm in whichprinciples of social and political justice canbe applied as a voluntary social contract.39

In this regard, the duties owed to othermembers of humanity are not static, butincrease as connections between humangroups grow and as it becomes more practi-cable to alleviate global suffering and injus-tice. The normative focus of world politicsthus shifts from a preoccupation with mat-ters of international justice and equity—pertaining to relations among states—tomatters of global justice and equity—basedon the idea of person-to-person relations.40

At times, such cosmopolitan considera-tions have led the United States to collabo-rate with other countries and international

institutions in order to fulfill a moral imper-ative or to advance an ethical standard ofuniversal validity. In late 1992, the Bushadministration sought UN authorizationfor a U.S.-led multinational intervention inSomalia, where a famine exacerbated by clanwarfare had raised the specter of mass star-vation. The U.S. initiative was apparentlyinspired purely by humanitarian motives,given the lack of any significant U.S. strate-gic, diplomatic, or economic interests atstake in the region. One might describe thisposture as one of cosmopolitan multilater-alism. The same label might also describethe Clinton administration’s decision tosupport the Kyoto Protocol, a politicallycostly choice reflecting a conviction that any effective response to global warmingrequired a binding commitment fromindustrialized states, as well as an awarenessthat the United States would face a hefty—even disproportionate—burden of adjust-ment under the terms of the treaty.

A similar set of calculations explains U.S.support for a variety of international humanrights instruments, from the 1948 UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights to the 1966International Covenant on Civil and Politi-cal Rights, as well as President Clinton’sbelated signature of the Rome Statute of theICC in December 2000. The primary aim of


37 Wolfgang Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governingwithout Government? (Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution Press, 1997).38 See Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern,eds., Global Public Goods: International Cooperation inthe 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999).39 David R. Mapel, “The Contractarian Tradition andInternational Ethics,” in Terry Nardin and David R.Mapel, eds., Traditions of International Ethics (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 180–200.40Amartya Sen, “Global Justice: Beyond InternationalEquity,” in Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, eds., Global Pub-lic Goods, p. 116.

U.S. policy in each of these instances was topromote universal principles of humanrights and justice.

From a cosmopolitan perspective, ethicaljudgments about the appropriateness ofmultilateral or unilateral action depend onwhether the particular policy challengeevokes a fundamental human duty andwhether the envisioned path is likely toadvance human welfare. At times, moralimperatives or utilitarian considerationsmay require the United States to adopt aposture of cosmopolitan unilateralism.

Consider the challenge of humanitarianintervention. Because international institu-tions are subject to blockage and inertia, theUnited States, when faced with a complexemergency, gross human rights violations, orgenocide may sometimes be confronted withthe choice between an ineffective but legiti-mate multilateral response and an effectivebut illegitimate unilateral action. At times,moreover, the requirement that all militaryaction be authorized by the UN SecurityCouncil may collide with moral imperatives.The U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo inspring 1999 provides a case in point. HadWashington attempted to secure councilauthorization for enforcement action, itwould have been stymied by a Russian andperhaps a Chinese veto. In this instance, atleast, bowing to the procedural norms of col-lective security would have permitted thecontinuation of the Serb policy of ethniccleansing, endangering the fundamentalhuman rights of Kosovar Albanians guaran-teed under the UN Charter and codified ininternational law. The Clinton administra-tion thus chose to bypass the Security Coun-cil and act through NATO—which at leastoffered surrogate legitimacy in the form of acoalition of democratic nations.41

The cosmopolitan perspective on inter-national obligation has been buttressed by a

growing trend in international law to recog-nize human beings as legal persons possess-ing significant rights in world politics,including claims against their own states. Itis also reinforced by an emerging doctrine ofqualified sovereignty—propounded by,among others, UN secretary-general KofiAnnan—to justify humanitarian interven-tion in cases in which a state either makeswar on its own citizens or proves unable tomeet certain basic obligations to them.42

Among other policy prescriptions, a cos-mopolitan view of U.S. global obligationswould demand that the United States dra-matically increase its current levels of inter-national assistance. Although the UnitedStates remains the world’s largest aid donorin aggregate terms, it ranks last in per capitaterms among countries of the Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (OECD), contributing only $35 perAmerican annually, or one-tenth of one per-cent of GDP.43 The European Union on aver-age contributes more than three times asmuch. A second, related, prescription wouldbe for the United States to redouble its sup-port for UN specialized agencies and pro-grams, which are directly involved in savingthe lives and sustaining the livelihoods of the50 percent of the world’s population thatattempts to survive on an income of $2 perday or less. The U.S. share of global contribu-tions to UN funds and programs is just

50 Stewart Patrick

41 Ruth Wedgwood, “Unilateral Action in a MultilateralWorld,” in Patrick and Forman, eds., Multilateralismand U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 167–89.42 International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:International Development Research Centre, 2001).43 This figure will rise to 0.13 percent of GDP when theUnited States implements President Bush’s pledge inMarch 2002 to create a Millennium Challenge Account,which will increase U.S. foreign aid by $5 billion, or 50percent, over three years.

one-third of the level provided by the EU,which has an economy of comparable size.

In some cases, it must be noted, U.S. skep-ticism about foreign aid signals not a lack ofconcern for fellow human beings but skepti-cism about its effectiveness in accomplishingits stated aim. In early 2002, for example, Trea-sury Secretary Paul O’Neill rebuffed a WorldBank–led campaign to double annual assis-tance from OECD countries on the utilitariangrounds that foreign aid had a miserable trackrecord. While acknowledging the cosmopoli-tan imperative of reducing world poverty andsupporting sustainable development, heargued that increased loans (as opposed togrants) from national governments, interna-tional financial institutions, and UN agencieswould simply increase indebtedness and mis-ery in the less developed countries.44

If the United States is truly interested incontributing to sustainable development, aneven more effective contribution thanincreased aid would be to open the domes-tic American market to the commerce of lessdeveloped countries. Unfortunately, despitethe Bush administration’s rhetorical com-mitment to trade liberalization and Con-gress’s oft-stated preference for “trade notaid,” the two branches of government com-bined in 2002 to pass a trade bill imposingsteep tariffs on textile imports from thedeveloping world and an agricultural billincreasing subsidies to U.S. farmers by 80percent. These protectionist measuresthreaten to undercut any benefits of plannedincreases in levels of U.S. foreign assistance.

HIGH NOON

Although world politics remains unevenlyinstitutionalized, the scope of internationallaw and institutions has expanded pro-foundly over the last hundred years.45 Suchexplicit state commitments have been sup-

plemented by a continually evolving body ofcustomary international law. Over time, thismovement to institutions has altered thenormative as well as strategic context inwhich countries formulate their nationalinterests and pursue their policy preferences,creating standards by which their behaviorcan be judged and deepening the obligationto behave multilaterally. The transformationis analogous to the evolution of a Wild Westtown from a lawless locale—where vigilantegroups dispense frontier justice—to anorganized municipality—where police andjudges enforce the rule of law. As effectivegovernance increases, it becomes less justifi-able to take the law into your own hands.46

Yet this transition is incomplete, and eth-ical judgments of U.S. unilateralism arelikely to vary according to whether robustmultilateral institutions exist or can be cre-ated to govern the sphere in question. Wheresuch institutions do not exist or are inade-quate to address vital challenges, states willremain tempted to act alone, and their deci-sions to do so may be tolerated. In such cir-cumstances, U.S. behavior may be regardedas more legitimate if it sponsors a less for-mal, and perhaps less encompassing, formof collective action as a proxy for institu-tionalized cooperation. This might justifyacting with others in a coalition, pressingothers to get on board, particularly in theface of an urgent threat. Over the long term,however, the most legitimate course would


44 Joseph Kahn,“Treasury Chief Accuses World Bank ofHarming Poor Countries,” New York Times, February21, 2002, p. A11.45 Dorothy V. Jones, “The Declaratory Tradition inModern International Law,” in Nardin and Mapel, eds.,Traditions of International Ethics, pp. 42–61.46 W. Michael Reisman, “Unilateral Action and theTransformations of the World Constitutive Process:The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention,”European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000),pp. 3–18.

be for the United States to take the lead infilling such institutional gaps, sponsoringthe creation of new regulatory frameworks.

Within international institutions, themultilateral principles of equal rights andequal treatment are often in tension with theunique U.S. role in providing public goodsand ensuring effective collective action. Evenin NATO, the ideal of collective security ishard to square with the immense disparity,so evident in Kosovo and Afghanistan,between U.S. defense expenditures and mili-tary capacities and those of its closest allies.The United States and its foreign partnershave long debated whether differential rightsand obligations should flow from these hier-archical differences. Throughout the 1960s,for example, French president Charles deGaulle objected to America’s “exorbitantprivilege” as leader of the Western allianceand the world economy.

One possible response is that gross asym-metries in power create special rights andobligations in international society. After all,since the origins of the modern state systemin 1648, the society of states has recognizedthe unique role of great powers in maintain-ing a stable and predictable world, and thisstatus has been accompanied by real privi-leges. A similar logic may obtain when theworld is dominated by one superpower.Were there no significant differences in thestatus and roles of states, they would possesssymmetrical obligations. But, as legalscholar Lea Brilmayer observes, “Hierarchychanges the moral picture.”47

In recent years, U.S. government officialshave sometimes justified unilateral Ameri-can action by invoking the country’s will-ingness to subsidize international securityand run disproportionate risks for globalstability. In discharging its obligations as theultimate custodian or guarantor of globalorder, they argue, the United States cannot

afford to be hamstrung by rules and institu-tions binding on others.48 The Clintonadministration invoked this unique Ameri-can vocation in opting out of the 1997Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnellandmines, noting U.S. responsibilities tosafeguard stability on the Korean Peninsula.Such concerns also provide one of the statedrationales for U.S. opposition to the ICC. AsDavid Sheffer, the chief U.S. negotiator atthe Rome ICC conference, explained in1998, “The United States has special respon-sibilities and special exposure to politicalcontroversy over our actions.” BecauseAmerica was “called upon to act, sometimesat great risk, far more than any othernation,” it required assurances that the newjudicial instrument would not be used as apolitical weapon.49 After failing to securesuch exemptions, the Bush administrationin spring 2002 took the highly unusual stepof repudiating the Rome Statute, warningother governments not to expect U.S. coop-eration with the court.50

The assertion that the United States pos-sesses special rights and obligations is prob-lematic, however, since it presumes theexistence of a justified hierarchy, wherebyother countries have consented to the rolethe United States has chosen to play. In fact,America’s hegemonic role is neither codified

52 Stewart Patrick

47 Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Moral-ity in a One-Superpower World (New Haven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1994), p. 26.48 Robert B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs 79 (January/February 2000), pp. 63–78;and W. Michael Reisman,“The United States and Inter-national Institutions,” Survival 41 (Winter 1999/2000),pp. 70–72.49 Peter Malanczuk,“The International Criminal Courtand Landmines: What Are the Consequences of Leav-ing the U.S. Behind?” European Journal of InternationalLaw 11, no. 1 (2000), p. 5.50 Neil A.Lewis,“U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact forWorld Tribunal,” New York Times, May 5, 2002, sec. 1, p. 18.

in international law nor recognized by allcountries. Nor is there any global consensuson what constitutes “world order”or a threatto it, nor any clear criteria to distinguishbetween U.S. behavior that is disinterestedand that which is narrowly self-interested.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, U.S. officials aremore inclined to stress the privileges inher-ent in American power than its accompany-ing obligations. From an internationalistperspective, the United States has an ethicalduty to exercise its might on the basis of con-sent rather than imposing its will on theweak and to work to ensure that multilateralinstitutions embody procedural fairness andsubstantive justice. Specifically, the UnitedStates should promote international bodiesthat give a voice to all actors, including theleast powerful, and try to ensure that the out-comes of multilateral processes give satisfac-tion to all players. The values of fairness andjustice, besides being desirable for their ownsake, are essential for the cohesion of inter-national society. At the same time, paradoxi-cally, it is the United States that may gain thegreatest practical benefit by choosing toweigh the interests of others heavily in itsdeliberations. By providing weaker countrieswith a voice and reassuring them againstexploitation or abandonment, Washingtoncan increase the legitimacy of its global lead-ership.51 By contrast, a policy of total self-interest may end up being self-defeating.

Globally, one of the most common criti-cisms of the U.S. approach to internationalrules and institutions is the selectivity withwhich the United States propounds andagrees to be bound by multilateral frame-works. Particularly problematic, in the sphereof international law, is the apparent pre-sumption that the United States has the rightto set rules for other countries while reserv-ing for itself the right to opt out of these sameobligations. According to the German jurist

Nico Krisch, the U.S. government frequentlytakes the lead in creating and shaping inter-national law for other states, while itselfinsisting on remaining “exempt from or even,as far as possible, above” these rules. Theimplication is that the United States shouldbe able to use international law to disciplineothers but not be disciplined by it. To thisend, Krisch argues, the U.S. government hassought to keep the international legal order ina fragmented state.52

More generally, the United States hasadopted a number of strategies to insulateitself from the force of international conventions, most notably by including extensive reservations, declarations, andunderstandings in its instruments of treatyratification. Prior to ratifying the ChemicalWeapons Convention in 1997, for example,the Clinton administration and Congressinserted controversial provisions permittingthe president to deny inspections and pro-hibiting the removal of samples from theUnited States. Such clauses, one criticargues,“made a mockery of the treaty’s mul-tilateral foundations” by suggesting that theUnited States should be “able to play by adifferent set of rules” than other countries.53

In the case of the Rome Statute, which doesnot permit reservations, and which theUnited States has not ratified, the Bushadministration insisted in June 2002 that theUN Security Council guarantee that Ameri-cans participating in peacekeeping missionsbe granted immunity from ICC prosecu-


51 On the “binding” value of international institutions,see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strate-gic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after MajorWars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).52 Nico Krisch,“Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: ThePlace of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Malone andKhong, eds., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 62.53 Amy E. Smithson, “Chemical Weapons,” in Patrickand Forman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. ForeignPolicy, pp. 247–65.

tion. European diplomats perceived thisdemand for a privileged status as a blow tothe very concept of a universal internationallegal system.54

Hegemony, which gives the United Statesan unmatched capacity to act alone in itsparochial interests, coexists uneasily with thegrowing presumption that decisions affectingall states should be taken in egalitarian, mul-tilateral forums, and that national foreignpolicy decisions should take into account theneeds of the entire human race. Americanpreponderance generates a heavy demand forAmerican leadership to address shared globalproblems, while feeding anxiety that there arefew restraints on the uses to which U.S. poweris put. Because power carries responsibility aswell as privilege, unipolarity raises acute eth-ical dilemmas for the United States. In choos-ing among aims and strategies, U.S. leadersmust weigh their obligations to fellow citi-zens against America’s wider internationaland global obligations—and assess whethermultilateral or unilateral action is the beststrategy to discharge these responsibilities.

If other countries and peoples are toregard American leadership as legitimate,the United States must resist the temptationto define its interests in overly narrow,nationalist terms, at the expense of interna-tionalist and cosmopolitan objectives. Andwhen it acts unilaterally, it must be able todefend this action as a contribution to thegeneral welfare. In this regard, the Bushadministration’s recent National SecurityStrategy offers grounds for both hope and

concern. On the positive side, the documentreaffirms a U.S. commitment to multilateralalliances and institutions and a predisposi-tion to engage in international consulta-tions, declaring: “There is little of lastingconsequence that the United States canaccomplish without the sustained coopera-tion of its allies and friends.” Similarly, itidentifies the defense of human dignityworldwide as the touchstone of Americanengagement, arguing that “including all ofthe world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is amoral imperative and one of the top priori-ties of U.S. international policy.”55 Yet thestrategy’s internationalist and cosmopolitanelements have been overshadowed in publicdebate by more controversial, apparentlynationalist-inspired sections committingthe nation to defend American primacy inperpetuity and articulating a new doctrineof unilateral preemption. Pushed too far, apolicy of nationalist unilateralism is likely tobe self-defeating—not only for the causes ofinternationalism and cosmopolitanism, butalso for American national interests, nar-rowly defined. President Bush appeared torecognize this in September 2002, when hecommitted the United States to seeking anew UN resolution to impose disarmamenton Iraq, rather than acting alone.

54 Stewart Patrick

54 Serge Schmemann, “U.S. Links Peacekeeping toImmunity From New Court,” New York Times, June 19,2002, p. A3.55 “National Security Strategy,” pp. 3, 21, 25.

beyond coalitions of the willing: assessing u.s. multilateralism

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