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Army reconstruction in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo 2003–2009Colin Robinson aa Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK

Version of record first published: 11 Jun 2012

To cite this article: Colin Robinson (2012): Army reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of theCongo 2003–2009, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:3, 474-499

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Army reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo2003–2009

Colin Robinson*

Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK

Since the peace agreements of 2002–2003 which ended the second war in theDemocratic Republic of Congo, reconstruction of the army has been aninherently political process, in common with other attempts to carry out securitysector reform (SSR). This article briefly sketches out the Congolese army’shistory, then attempts to fill a gap in the literature on Congolese SSR by detailingwhat can be found of the actual structure and shape of the present army. Theefforts that have been made to reform the army are then examined, followed bya conclusion which examines the major issues and possible ways forward.

Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo; security sector reform; FARDC;European Union; United Nations; army reconstruction; defence reform;Second Congo War; Kabila; post-conflict reconstruction; disarmament;demobilisation; reintegration

An Army is a mirror of society and suffers from all its ills – usually at a highertemperature. (Leon Trotsky)

Efforts to improve the security sector and its agencies in Africa suffer from

a much greater lack of information than perhaps any other continent in the world.

Achieving SSR can only reliably take place, arguably, when change agents have

sufficient information. Currently the situation in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC) is one of the most critical in the world where an unreconstructed

army foments security problems. Among other problems, reconstruction of the

army is hampered by a lack of reliable information. SSR analysts have previously

lamented the absence of focus on detailed empirical case studies of country

security sectors.1 More widely available knowledge on the security sector and the

army within it would aid security sector reform in two ways. Firstly, it would aid

the process of citizen debate on security, and secondly because it would aid the

process of military historical analysis.

The most recent unhappy chapters in Congo/Zaire’s history have been the two

Congo Wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003. Since the Global Agreement was

signed in Sun City, South Africa, in December 2002, a renewed effort, the most

promising since independence, has been made to establish governmental structures

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

q 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.661612

http://www.tandfonline.com

*Email: colinrobinson1@gmail.com

Small Wars & Insurgencies

Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2012, 474–499

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across the country and lay the foundations for further progress. However the absence

of security holds this process back, along with many other factors, and unfortunately

in many areas the ‘security forces’ are significant parties to the rampant looting,

robbery, rapes, and other crimes which have helped to prevent to a great degree many

well meaning parties from being able to make developmental progress.

Currently the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, MONUSCO, with

19,500 soldiers, is stationed in the DRC. Establishment of reliable armed forces

and police structures is critical if the UN is to be able to withdraw and the process

is to transition to full Congolese control. However NGO reports have repeatedly

made recommendations that the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique

au Congo (FARDC) – the ramshackle armed forces pulled together from the

former warring factions – must be reformed.2 The FARDC should vet its current

and prospective soldiers much better in order to carry out their responsibilities to

protect, rather than exploit, the population. In order to make possible a wider

debate on transformation of the army, relevant information on it should be much

more widely available.

But human rights training alone will not induce the FARDC to act like

Western professional soldiers. The sad truth is that the Congo/Zaire has never had

any military tradition of its soldiers behaving properly, because its ethos has

always been one of exploitation, not protection. The task of the original Belgian

Congo’s Force publique was ‘to break all resistance to the economic exploitation

of the . . . state’3 so that Leopold and his agents could plunder the territory.

As described below, Mobutu’s regime continued the pattern of living by

economic exploitation which benefited only the elites. Some academics have

traced this style of rule further back, comparing Mobutu’s personal rule by

resources to the pre-colonial Kingdom of the Kongo.4 Today, the political

purposes of the armed forces in the DRC reflect that historical pattern. A key

reason for their current structure and deployment is to facilitate the extraction,

export, and sale of valuable resources, particularly in the east. This ties into their

status as assemblages of different patronage networks, some of which are only

loosely integrated into the central state patronage network.5 It should thus be very

clear that army reconstruction in the Congo is an inherently political issue, and

thus primarily technical approaches to the problem are unsuited.

The Congo’s armed forces have never been intrinsically orientated toward

national defence or security: rather to regime security with a strong historical

bent toward resource extraction. When all levels of the chain of command expect

nothing from the state but the opportunity to benefit from their positions, there is

no fundamental reason why military training or effectiveness along Western lines

is necessary. The mere fact that the troops are armed is enough to overawe the

populace; little more is required. Many of the problems that Westerners perceive

in the armed forces today – their commercial orientation, their rapacious

behaviour toward the general population, the continuing culture of impunity for

military personnel, bad conditions, lack of pay, lack of training and education,

stem from this heritage. They are not necessarily seen as significant issues by the

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Congolese hierarchy. Since 1960 these types of behaviour have been common.

The other factor is that since December 2003, when the Presidential Decree

declared all the combatants of the former warring parties as members of the new

armed forces,6 the ‘armed forces’ are composed to a great degree of former

militias without particular regular military attributes at all.

This article will describe the current status and future prospects for the Land

Forces of the Congo by:

(1) Sketching the relevant historical background.

(2) Investigating the current size and shape of the force: just how many

fighters and soldiers are there in the Congo, where are they, and how are

they organised? While numerous reports in the last several years have

repeated the usual figure of 14 or so integrated brigades, the number and

status of non-integrated brigades and other units cannot be readily found

in any available public source. This article will do so, based primarily on

consultation with international sources and local news reports. While the

information is incomplete and not fully up to date, it represents the first

attempted comprehensive listing of the country’s army since 1993.

(3) Recounting the reasons for the force’s behaviour, and reasons for it.

(4) Examining proposed and potential remedies, and prospects; some thoughts on

what reforms and progress will be possible in the future will be sketched out.

Historical background

The first Congolese army was the Belgian colony’s Force publique, formed in

August 1888 when the Congo was still the private enclave of King Leopold II.

The Force publique was a European-officered army with native soldiers, in line

with other similar forces of the time such as the King’s African Rifles. No effort

was made to train Congolese commissioned officers until the very end of the

colonial period. Independence came relatively suddenly, and, as a result, the

military preparations made were few.

Due to this policy, after independence on 30 June 1960, the FP was vulnerable

to dissatisfaction within its enlisted ranks.7 An ill-advised speech by the army’s

Belgian commanding officer, Lt. Gen. Emile Janssen, led to an enlisted ranks’

rebellion five days later, on 5 July 1960. In an effort to assuage army discontent,

the new prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, promised to grant a one-grade

increase to all personnel, but this had little effect. Panic spread, and faced with an

exodus of white residents, Belgium decided it had to act unilaterally, deploying

troops to restore order. While this was effective in some areas, it also convinced

the new Congolese leadership that Belgium was attempting to regain control over

the country. So Lumumba dismissed the more than 1000 European officers still

present, although a few remained as advisors, and replaced them with Congolese

non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The FP was renamed the Armee Nationale

Congolaise (ANC), or Congolese National Army, but quickly degenerated into

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‘armed gangs of renegades’ often loyal to local ethnic leaders or secessionist

regions rather than the central government.

After five years of turbulence, in 1965, the army chief of staff, Joseph-Desire

Mobutu, used his position to seize power in the Congo (for the second time; he had

also mounted a coup in 1960). After gaining power, Mobutu gradually let state

institutions deteriorate, preferring to control the country instead through ‘domination

of an archipelago of resources used to generate income and attract allies’.8

Rapacious looting of state institutions – up to 40% of government revenues

were being diverted into the hands of the ruling class – coupled with programmes

like centralisation of governance functions within Mobutu’s new party structure

and ill-judged nationalisations of education and foreign-owned businesses had

a shattering effect on social and economic life. Mobutu’s Zaire, as it became in

October 1971, became a state where the rich and well connected lived grandly

while for the rest, ‘fending for oneself’ became a national byword.

These events had a catastrophic effect on the effectiveness and

professionalism of the armed forces. The Congolese National Army, which

was renamed the Zairean Armed Forces when the country’s name was changed,

were wracked by constant reorganisation, splitting the national police away,

then having them reabsorbed, explicit politicisation of the Armed Forces

under Mobutu’s political party’s banner, and periodic purges.9 The armed forces

effectively became divided, like the country as a whole, into haves and have-nots.

Mobutu would favour a privileged formation for a while which would then be

superseded by another: the privileged included the Parachute Division (late

1960s), the Kamanyola Division (mid 1970s), and then the Special Presidential

Division from 1985. These formations were funded well and staffed by members

of Mobutu’s ethnic group or other closely related ethnic groups from the northern

part of Equateur Province in the north-east. They were usually held close to the

capital to protect the regime. The remaining part of the army was left, in some

cases, to forage on its own,10 so poorly maintained that officers stole their

soldiers’ pay, and in turn, the soldiers extorted money from civilians.

The Congolese Armed Forces under whatever name never really attained any

significant indigenous logistical capability. The British military attache’s reports

from Kinshasa in 1972 paint a picture of armed forces maintained in their very

essentials by foreign advisors – ‘foreign missions provide most of the advanced

training, the staff work, and the logistics’.11 Furthermore, Mobutu had different

foreign armies train different parts of the armed forces, which had a negative

effect on any remaining cohesion and effectiveness. The Belgians had 300

personnel throughout the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces HQ, and at the

basic training centre, officer schools, and specialist schools. The Italians and the

United States supported the air force, the Israelis ran the parachute school, and the

British supported the engineers. Later North Koreans trained the Kamanyola

Division, another praetorian formation that held favour for a period. The writers of

the US military Country Study, writing in 1993, said of this practice: ‘it produced a

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kaleidoscope of military education that at times made it difficult for officers in the

same unit to interact effectively.’12

The ineffective state of the Zairean Armed Forces was well shown in their

response when faced with real combat in Katanga/Shaba in the early 1970s. After

an ineffectual incursion into Angola in 1975, two invasions of Zaire were

mounted in March 1977 and May 1978, and in neither did the FAZ perform at all

well, having to be rescued by Moroccan troops, with French logistical support in

the first conflict and French and Belgian paratroops in the second.

The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in

1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire had petered out following the end of the

Cold War, more because of the country’s decrease in importance to its Western

backers than the regime’s human rights record. Mobutu then deliberately allowed

the military’s condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on

power.13 Protesting low wages and lack of pay, paratroopers began looting the

capital in September 1991 and were only stopped after intervention by French and

Belgian forces. The same long-term weaknesses apparent since independence led

to the collapse of the Zairean Armed Forces in the face of Laurent Kabila’s assault

in 1997, and the newly renamed Congolese Armed Forces, in the face of the

Rwandan/Ugandan invasion in 1998. Kabila’s government was only saved by the

intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The second war finally ended

through a series of agreements culminating with the Global and All-inclusive

Agreement in December 2002. The negotiations which led to the accords proposed

that the new armed forces be built through integration of the six warring factions,

the government’s former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the Rassemblement

Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD)’s two parts, the RCD-Goma and the RCD-

Movement for Liberation, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo or MLC,

the Ituri militias, and the Mai-Mai.

Numbers and units

Personnel numbers

Consistent, verifiable personnel numbers for the FARDC are very difficult to

obtain. At the signing of the Sun City Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, in

South Africa in December 2002, the various factions declared their collective

strength at 220,000 fighters. Later amendments resulted in a 240,000 strong

figure by February 2004, though most impartial observers, including the South

African team attempting to conduct a military census, estimated that the true

figure was 130,000 or less.14

Examining the various figures, that total of around 130,000–135,000 held

until 2006–2007. The International Crisis Group in December 2006 estimated

non-integrated fighters at around 80,000.15 MONUC reported in March 2007 that

the number of newly integrated army personnel had risen to 51,500. That figure of

51,000 was also matched by the IISS estimate in the Military Balance 2007,

which gives a total of 51,000 including an estimated 46,000-strong army

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(which seems to have been assessed by counting the 46,000 soldiers of the

December 2006 total of 14 integrated brigades),16 1000 navy, and an estimated

4000 air force.17 It is not clear whether the naval and air force personnel were

counted in the other totals.

The strength of the armed forces was reported as greater by European sources

dating from September 2007 and December 2006. The total force was assessed to

be some 133,000–143,000 strong. September 2007 figures for central units gave

3000– 5000 personnel assigned to the Ministry of National Defence,

Demobilisation & Veterans staff, plus up to 15,000 Republican Guard, while

the General Staff and attached units counted some 5000–9000, and there was an

approximate 2000-strong central logistics base. The Land Forces were estimated

to include a 1500–2500-strong central staff (September 2007), 43,800 personnel

in the Integrated Brigades, and 64,300 in the military regions (December 2006),

for a total of about 110,000. The Air Force and Navy were reported to be 2500

and 7000 strong respectively. Mark Malan reported a total figure of 134,000 plus

30,000 ‘ghosts’ in July 2008.18 Given the chaotic administration of the country,

and the existence of numerous ‘ghost’ soldiers (up to 60,000 have been

estimated), the above figures should be treated as estimates.

The final result of the European-supported biometric census appeared to be

129,395 as of late 2008, and this figure was considered reasonably accurate until the

‘new integration’ or ‘accelerated integration’ process for the CNDP began in March

2009. This process, which will be further explained below, appeared to raise the

numbers within the armed forces by at least 12,000. Yet since the census concluded,

there have suspicions that many soldiers have deserted, while others have been

recruited, including children.19 A figure of 17,587 added personnel was reported as

the result of an additional census by EUSEC DR Congo in the UN Secretary

General’s report of December 2009.20 However, a close reading of the World

Bank’s September 2009 programme update suggests that a number of that 17,000

may already have been included in the previous 129,000 strong figure. Thus a ‘best

guess’ on the strength of the armed forces as of December 2009 might be around

141,000, being the 129,000 strong figure plus the World Bank’s reported 12,000.

Command structure and formations

In 1999 the DRC was divided into eight military regions. In 2003 the regions were

expanded to 10 and apportioned between the government and opposition groups.

Research to identify a detailed listing of FARDC formations and units was

conducted to establish the FARDC portion of the military situation in the country.

Initial research data gathered for this article presented a confusing mix of non-

integrated formations, spread across the country. Over 40 non-integrated brigades

had been reported in the press and in other sources since the December 2002 Sun

City agreement.

However, a reasonably clear picture has now become available from varied

sources. The following listings, which are as of December 2008 with some 2009

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clarifications, focus on the official chain of command of the FARDC Land Forces

(‘Forces Terrestres’). They delineate integrated brigades, the ‘non-integrated’

brigades, and what is known as the new ‘accelerated integration’ formations

formed in 2009. Strength figures have varied a great deal. Late 2008 data

indicates that the former integrated brigades can reach 5000 personnel, but the

non-integrated brigades range from 2500 to 3000 personnel. The strength of

formations after the reorganisations for Kimia II remains unknown.

Effectiveness of the force is low, as can be seen from the repeated defeats in

battle against the CNDP and FDLR. There are ‘nearly 20,000’ FARDC soldiers

that are over 60 years old in the ranks.21 The chain of command is weak and

misused at best, with politicians, primarily the president, having been known to

direct battalion commanders directly, without going through the prescribed

chain.22 Communications are usually lacking, except for cell phones and a few

Thuraya satellite phones. Planning capability is weak, as the staff and

commanders are usually ex-warlord fighters with little education, and supplies

are lacking, with limited food, water, ammunition, and no accountability through

the command chain. Pay is inconsistently delivered at best.

1st Military Region (Bandundu Province)

The region is headquartered at Kikwit and, according to international data, in

December 2006 it had 2600 personnel assigned. As of December 2008 there was

a military police battalion, the 104th Armoured Squadron, the 105th Artillery

Battalion, and another battalion in the region.

2nd Military Region (Bas-Congo)

The regional headquarters is at Matadi. According to international data, in

December 2006 it had 1500 personnel assigned, including only 240 soldiers with

the rest being NCOs and officers, a grossly distorted ratio. There was a non-

integrated brigade based at Boma active in May 2005, which now seems to have

been disbanded.23 Today the forces in the region include a brigade of the

Republican Guard, a light armoured regiment, and the armoured school, all at

Mbanza Ngungu, which has been the centre for Congo/Zaire’s armoured forces

since 1969.24

3rd Military Region (Equateur)

The regional headquarters is at Mbandaka. According to international data, in

December 2006 it had 4300 personnel assigned: 900 officers, 1700 NCOs, and

1700 soldiers.

The 10th Brigade (integrated) had previously been stationed at Gemena for

some time, but in 2008–2009 was moved to North Kivu.25 It has been replaced

by a provisional headquarters, the FARDC Intervention Force. There are reports

of at least two non-integrated brigades, the 36th and 37th (an MLC grouping),

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disbanding in April and March 2006 respectively, as part of the ‘brassage’

process. In addition to the Intervention Force headquarters, there are also three

independent battalions in the province (42, 43, and 44 Battalions).

However, after the Enyele rebellion began, the area was reinforced.26 Units

that may have been despatched there include the Belgian-trained rapid reaction

battalion, the 41st Battalion (South African trained), elements of the 2nd

(integrated) Brigade, and elements of the Republican Guard.

4th Military Region (Kasai Occidental)

The regional headquarters is at Kananga along with the headquarters of the 5th

(integrated) Brigade. The region had 3600 personnel assigned in 2006. The non-

integrated 44th Brigade, previously based at Tshikapa, was disbanded around

April–May 2006 as its personnel went to brassage. Lack of interested soldiers

meant that a planned battalion to be formed from the former brigade, to be sent to

Katanga, was not established.27 The 51st Battalion, part of the 5th Brigade, is

now based at Tshikapa. Two more battalions of the 5th Brigade were as of

December 2008 in formation at the training centre of Mura in Katanga.

5th Military Region (Kasai Orientale)

East Kasai contains only a regional headquarters, at Mbuji Mayi, and the

FARDC’s regional logistics base. However, there were some 4200 personnel

reported to be assigned to the region in December 2006: 700 officers, 2000

NCOs, and 1500 soldiers. Three non-integrated brigades were previously in the

province, but now appear to have all disbanded.

6th Military Region (Katanga)

The regional HQ is at Lubumbashi. According to international data, in December

2006 it had 13,800 personnel assigned: 2500 officers, 3500 NCOs, and 8000

soldiers.

There are three non-integrated infantry brigades present: the 62nd at

Pweto/Dubie, the 63rd at Mitwaba, and the 67th at Manono.28 There are also two

development brigades – the 1st at Likasi and the 2nd at Kaniama – and the

Engineer School (Ecole de Genie) at Likasi. At the former Belgian facility at

Kamina there is a training centre, reserve base, and a commando regiment that

may actually be deployed in the Kivus. Finally there is a Republican Guard

brigade in Lubumbashi and a further training centre at Mura.

In addition, Ruben de Koning of SIPRI has researched details of another

grouping in northern Katanga. The Kongolo brigade is a non-integrated grouping,

which appears to have previously designated the 69th Brigade. De Koning’s

paper provides a detailed case study of the activities of formal and informal

structures around a specific mining area.29 Figure 1.

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7th Military Region (Maniema)

The regional HQ is at Kindu. According to international data, in December 2006 it

had 1450 personnel assigned: 200 officers, 480 NCOs, and 800 soldiers. In

December 2008 units in this region included the 701st Military Police Battalion,

704th Armoured Battalion, 705th Field Artillery Battalion, and a further battalion.

8th Military Region (North Kivu)

With headquarters at Goma, the region, covering North Kivu, has together with

the South Kivu military region been at the epicentre of the Congo’s problems

since before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Locals’ grievances, including those of

the Banyawanda, originally introduced into the area by the Belgians in 1937, date

back to the Congo Crisis of the 1960s.30 Since the first war in the east began in

Figure 1. The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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1996, all the forces involved, first the Rwandans and Ugandans and the AFDL,

and then the varied armed groups of the second war, have profited from the

administrative chaos to extract the bountiful mineral resources of the area. There

are ethnic, land apportion, and other issues which contribute to the locals’

grievances, but the mineral wealth of the area makes the whole area a much richer

prize. Today both the FARDC and the FDLR are ‘embedded in highly

mineralised areas where they employ similar patterns of extortion to benefit from

mineral production and trade’. The ‘taxes’ that the forces extort are placed low

enough not to jeopardise the overall trade. The forces are ‘best understood as

parasites feeding off a trade that tries its best to function’.31 ‘Informed guesses’

by Garrett and Mitchell placed the percentage of revenues raised from minerals

for the various groups as up to 15% for the CNDP, up to 75% for the FDLR,

mostly from gold mining and trade, and up to 95% for the FARDC’s non-

integrated 85th Brigade.32 The 85th Brigade up to early 2009 controlled the

DRC’s largest tin mine, at Bisie in Walikale territory.33

Kabila’s government has tried repeatedly to address the problems in the Kivus,

represented for some time prominently by Laurent Nkunda’s faction, in an almost

purely military fashion, and has equally repeatedly failed. Nkunda, a Congolese

Tutsi from Nord Kivu, formerly of RCD-Goma, originally controlled two brigades

in the province. The central government’s efforts have included the mixage

initiative of 2006–2007,34 then the deployment of weak integrated brigades which

broke in combat in December 2007,35 another offensive in late 2008, and more

recently Rwandan moves against Nkunda in return for authorisation for a Rwandan

intervention against the FDLR in January 2009.

In May 2007 MONUC was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution

1756 to assist the training of the FARDC. The three-month programmes planned

to encompass 33 battalions was presented as focusing on discipline and conduct,

but the wording of the November 2007 report of the Secretary General on

MONUC gives a better clue: ‘enhancing operational capacity and cohesion’.36 As

implied but not explicitly spelled out by that report, these units, known as IE for

Integre Entraine (Integrated and Trained), were destined for use against the

FDLR. Eventually 12 battalions were trained by the end of August 2008, and the

programme continued into 2009 with officer, instructor, and mentor training.37

The region has been commanded by Brigadier General Vainqueur Mayala

since May 2008.38 However the official chain of command appears to be less

important than directions from President Kabila to trusted key associates. Major

General John Numbi handled many aspects of the Congolese side of the early

2009 ‘Umoja Wetu’ military operation,39 and, while air force chief of staff, acted

as Kabila’s personal representative to negotiate the 2007 mixage agreement.

However by mid 2011 he personally had fallen out of favour, at least temporarily.

Given the information available to the author on the situation in the two

Kivu provinces, the situation in the region as of December 2008 and earlier will

be first laid out to give a complete picture of the countrywide military situation

as of that date (Table 1). Then the available information on Kimia II will be

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presented separately. The 8th MR had over 12,000 personnel, including 1700

officers, 4000 NCOs, and 6500 soldiers in December 2006. As of December

2008, the forces in the region included HQ Axis North, a FARDC headquarters

responsible for the tactical conduct of North Kivu operations, a company of the

Republican Guard, ten of the integrated brigades, and about eight independent

battalions which had been trying to prosecute offensives against the CNDP.40

There were also four non-integrated brigades.

Listing four non-integrated formations in North Kivu in December 2008

somewhat overstates the problem of rogue formations whose leaders did not wish

to enter brassage. Only one of the four, the 85th Brigade, appeared to be

exploiting the Kivus’ resources while resisting integration into the state army.

Part of its revenue benefited senior officers in the FARDC hierarchy. The other

three formations appeared to be under Kabila’s control and had played a part in

the several fruitless offensives against the CNDP.

The 85th Brigade was induced to surrender control of the Bisie mine in early

2009. It was reportedly redeployed to Hombo, on the North Kivu/South Kivu

border south of Walikale itself.41 Control over the Bisie mine was as of December

2009 split between FARDC commanders appointed by Kinshasa before January

2009 and elements loyal to an ex-CNDP commander now part of a unit commonly

known as the ‘1st Accelerated Integration Brigade’, or the 212th Brigade.42

Table 1. December 2008 situation.

Formation Location

HQ Axis North

Company (Republican Guard)Special Battalion Shingamitwe802nd Field Artillery Battalion GomaMilitary Police Battalion2nd (Integrated) Brigade HQ Kaseye, between Kirumba – Lubero6th (Integrated) Brigade Kamandi (reorganising)7th (Integrated) Brigade Rwindi9th (Integrated) Brigade Butalungola north of Rutshuru10th (Integrated) Brigade Elements Beni15th (Integrated) Brigade HQ Kbasha, battalions at Kbasha And Lubwe18th (Integrated) Brigade Between Kibati and Kilimanyoka20th Brigade Vicinity of Homba – mix of ex CNDP and FARDC.

This brigade was formed around February 2009.Non-Integrated Formations

81st Infantry Brigade (1500) Katale/Masisi82nd Infantry Brigade (2200) Mobambiro83rd Infantry Brigade (1900) Rumangabo85th Brigade (1500) Bisie, Walikale (Colonel Samy Matumo)

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9th Military Region (Orientale Province)

Headquartered at Kisangani, the region had 4600 personnel assigned as at

December 2006. In late 2008 and early 2009, the 1st, 4th, and 13th integrated

Brigades were in Ituri, the 1st with headquarters at Aru and battalions at Dungu,

Mahagi, and Kumuru, the 4th north of Bunia, and the 13th at Komanda, about 50

kilometres west of Bunia. Five independent battalions are present, which may

be detached from other integrated brigades. There was also a brigade grouping

in Haut Uele operating against the Lord’s Resistance Army, including six

battalions, the Commando, Dragon, Tiger (at Kiliwa, 45 kilometres north of

Dungu), Panther, Bear, and Cobra Battalions.

Information that became available in October 2009 appears to show a new

brigade, the 93rd, formed from ex-CNDP fighters and 1600 strong, having been

deployed in the Dungu area. They were reported to have been relieving elements

of the Republican Guard who had formerly been operating in the area.43

10th Military Region (South Kivu)

This region has its HQ at Bukavu. In December 2006 it had just over 16,000

personnel, including 1600 officers, 5800 NCOs, and 8800 soldiers. In late 2008 it

consisted of two integrated and MONUC trained infantry battalions (the 12th and

13th), five integrated brigades, the training centre at Luberizi, and five non-

integrated brigades including a brigade group at Mutuga (Table 2). As of

November 2009 the commander was General Pacifique Masunzu.44

Operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II

In February 2009 the joint Rwandan–Congolese operation ‘Umoja Wetu’ was

launched against the FDLR,45 followed by Laurent Nkunda’s capture by

Table 2. December 2008 situation in South Kivu

Formation Location, December 2008

3rd (Integrated) Brigade Bukavu.8th (Integrated) Brigade Luvungi11th (Integrated) Brigade Nyangezi12th (Integrated) Brigade Baraka14th (Integrated) Brigade Kalahe

Non-Integrated Formations

Infantry Brigade (Combat Group) Mutuga103rd Brigade Kalahe109th Brigade Uvira112 Brigade (1500–2000 cadres) Minembwe (series of plateaux in the

territories of Uvira and Fizi)*115th Brigade Kilembwe. May now be 433 Brigade

* ICG, ‘Congo: Consolidating the Peace’, 13–14. This grouping is ‘an almost exclusivelyBanyamulenge brigade under the direct command of the 10th Military Region, [which] considersGeneral Masunzu as its leader’. (United Nations, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009, p. 17).

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Rwandan authorities. At the same time, CNDP troops, along with PARECO

Mai-Mai and other Mai-Mai groups, were integrated into FARDC formations.

They were broken down to company level or even platoon level and spread across

the integrated brigades, non-integrated brigades, and very recent new units such

as the 20th Brigade, which had been formed only in January–February 2009.

Some integrated brigades, like the 18th Brigade, were broken up entirely with

elements become part of new, CNDP-majority brigades (such as the 131st,

132nd, and 133rd in the Rutshuru area).46 ‘CNDP soldiers who integrated in

many cases received better benefits than other soldiers, including soldiers already

in the FARDC, which created immense tensions.’47 The government also failed

to place the new soldiers on the salary lists immediately, which led to delays in

the disbursement of salaries. Consequently, there was a spate of robbing and

looting by FARDC across North Kivu.48 Many CNDP-affiliated Hutu soldiers

who integrated subsequently parted company with the integrated forces. The

reasons why CNDP-affiliated Hutu left the integrated forces were complex: in

part because the FARDC has not been able to effectively feed and garrison

them;49 but also because of what might be described as a total breakdown of the

chain of command due to the parallel command structures.50

In June 2009, with the support of MONUC, the government launched

Operation Kimia II against the FDLR. Major General Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa

was named as chief of the Operational Command for Kimia II, separate to the

region commanders for North and South Kivu.51 Since that time the available

information appears to indicate that units have been reorganised, redesignated,

and redeployed over and over again. Part of the reason for the reorganisations

appears to have been the hope by the Congolese that the reshuffle of personnel

would induce the UN to restart logistical support where previous FARDC acts

had led to support being terminated. For example, reports indicate that the 33rd

Brigade, reported to be committing crimes against the population in South Kivu,

appear to have now been redesignated as the 411th Brigade. However the general

pattern of the Kimia II operational structure has now become clear. There appears

to be two sub-Kimia II headquarters (HQ), for North Kivu and South Kivu

respectively. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that such separate headquarters,

which effectively duplicate the 8th and 10th Military Region headquarters, were

introduced because the president feels he can trust the separate Kimia II

commanders more. The North Kivu Kimia II HQ appears to direct Operational

Zones 1 and 2, and the South Kivu HQ Zones 3 and 4. Below the Zones are

‘Sectors’, with a variable number of brigades (usually two to three).52 The use of

multi-brigade sectors appears to echo Federal Nigerian practice during the

Nigerian Civil War of 1966–1969.53 Given the uncertainties of the situation, the

attached diagrams at Figures 2 and 3 should thus be treated with some care.54

The troops in these brigades include units which have gone through brassage,

but been renumbered, non-brassaged troops. They also include CNDP fighters

other militias that have entered the FARDC through the ‘accelerated integration’

process, and a number of Rwandan citizens (of which the last group entered,

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KIMIA IINorth Kivu

Goma?

Other identified units include 5 Sector25, 101 Brigades

11 Sector(Lubero)111 Brigade112 Brigade(Kasugho)

12 Sector(Lubero)121 Brigade123 Brigade

21 Sector212 Brigade213 Brigade(Ngungu)

22 Sector221 Brigade222 Brigade

23 Sector231 Brigade232 Brigade(Remeka)

Operations Zone 1Grand Nord?

Operations Zone 2Petite Nord?

Figure 2. KIMIA II, North Kivu, mid–late 2009. This diagram draws upon multiplesources.

KIMIA IISouthKivu

Bukavu

Operational Zone 3Mugugu, SK

24 Sector241 Brigade242 Brigade

51 Sector511 Brigade512 Brigade

Operational Zone 4Baraka, SK

31 Sector311 Brigade312 Brigade313 Brigade

32 Sector321 Brigade322 Brigade323 Brigade

33 Sector331 Brigade332 Brigade

41 Sector411 Brigade412 Brigade

42 Sector421 Brigade422 Brigade

43 Sector431 Brigade432 Brigade433 Brigade

Figure 3. KIMIA II in South Kivu.

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most, as ex-CNDP). The UN Group of Experts’ May 2009 report specifically

indicates that one particular brigade, the 231st Brigade under Lt. Col. Innocent

Zimurinda which was stationed at Ngungu when the group’s research was

ongoing, was ‘mostly comprised of Rwandan citizens’.55

The 30th Report of the Secretary General on MONUC, as well as the

aforementioned JMAC report, makes it clear that the overall troop quality is

low.56 Former CNDP members maintain a parallel chain of command (seemingly

responsive to Bosco Ntaganda) and control over a number of mining areas; there

are severe disagreements over rank and status of newly integrated fighters, and

there has been looting and crimes against the civilian population.

In 2011 the troops in the Kivus were again reorganised. In both North and

South Kivu there were to be created 13 regiments, designed 101st–113th and

801st–813th, whose formation was begun from about April 2011.57 However by

mid October 2011 the deployment of the whole of the 26 regiments had not been

completed.

However, it appears that the level of FARDC misbehaviour due to

indiscipline may tend to be overestimated. Scholars may tend to overstate the

effect indiscipline has because they inappropriately over-apply rational-legal

military norms. These norms are not always appropriate for the eastern Congo.

Looting may be ordered by commanders, and a lot of extortion is actually part of

the rapportage system.58 Military units gain some of their logistical support by

preying on the civilian population, and human rights abuses, in some cases, may

be inflicted to induce cooperation with the unit through terror.59

The level of chaos prevailing in the forces in the Kivus was summed up in late

2009 by experienced Africa analyst Caty Clement: ‘ . . . Today, the strength,

the composition, and in some cases the very existence of some Congolese

brigades, which disintegrated during the fighting and regrouped locally, at times

integrating CNDP elements without supervision from the chief of staff, are

anyone’s guess.’60 The likelihood of adequate solutions to these command and

control problems is very low, at least in the short to medium term.

Kinshasa and the Republican Guard

Republican Guard presidential forces, the former Presidential Special Security

Group, selected to protect the president against mutiny, dominate the military

presence in Kinshasa and in the major provincial capitals where Kabila travels to.

He does not trust other forces. The Guard’s numbers have been estimated at

10,000–15,000 in January 2007 by the International Crisis Group, and some

14,000 by international sources in December 2006.

September 2007 data revealed that the Republican Guard’s structure included

a headquarters including HQ, logistics, and engineer battalions, an armoured and

an artillery regiment each around 700 strong, a special regiment which may be

some sort of honour guard (1800 strong), and three special infantry brigades: the

10th in Kinshasa, one in Mbanza Ngungu in Bas-Congo, and the third in

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Lubumbashi in Katanga. With two brigades deployed elsewhere, the Guard’s

strength in Kinshasa appears to be on the order of 6000–8000.

There is a plethora of headquarters, service, and base units around Kinshasa.

Apart from the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and the Land Forces Staff

maintain a number of separate school, base, and training units. The city’s non-

Guard garrison seems to be designated Defence Ville de Kinshasa, DVK,

sometimes being referred to as RM DVK. It may be formally known as the 11th

Military Region, and appears to be 1500–2000 strong. It includes a headquarters,

an artillery regiment of four batteries, and a small military police battalion.

The 7th (integrated) Brigade was moved from outside the capital at Maluku, to

North Kivu, before being drawn into the greater Kimia II reorganisation described

above.

Planned army reconstruction and continuing ill-discipline

The FARDC today is composed of a mix of former irregular fighters from the six

former warring factions, plus those of the CNDP and other factions integrated in

2009. For a start, the average Congolese fighter has received grossly inadequate

education (by Western standards) from a barely present government, and has

grown up in a deprived and turbulent environment which has seen much violence.

This is not a good preparation for any vocation, including soldiery. After the First

Congo War began, the warring factions were not well trained nor well organised.

Fighters received a minimum of training – ‘little more than basic infantry drills

and the firing of an AK-47’61 – and when the varied groups were brought under

the FARDC banner very little improved.

The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of 18 integrated

brigades through the ‘brassage’ process as its first of three stages.62 The process

consisted firstly of regroupment, where fighters were disarmed. Then they were

sent to orientation centres, run by the National Commission for Demobilisation

and Reinsertion (CONADER), where fighters take the choice of either returning

to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who chose

demobilisation received an initial cash payment of US$110. Those who chose to

stay within the FARDC were then transferred to one of six integration centres

for a 45-day training course. The centres are spread out around the country at

Kitona (Bas-Congo, on the coast), Kamina (Katanga), Kisangani (Orientale),

Rumangabo and Nyaleke in South Kivu, and Luberizi in South Kivu. A different

donor country, including South Africa, Angola, and Belgium, took responsibility

for running each centre. The process has suffered severe delays and difficulty due

to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former

combatants have to do, as the three stages’ centres are widely separated.

A National Strategic Plan for the Integration of the Armed Forces was

published in August 2005 and served as an initial guideline for the reconstruction

process.63 The plan called first for the establishment of 18 integrated light infantry

brigades, following a 45-day training course, before the 2006 elections. The

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second and third stages foresaw a three brigade mobile force established in 2007,

then a three division heavy force, including armoured units, built up, respectively,

leading theoretically to a force capable of defending the country after MONUC

withdrew in 2010. Due to the delays referred to above, of the 18 brigades, only 17

were declared operational, even by mid 2008. Responding to the situation, the

Congolese Minister of Defence presented a new defence reform master plan to the

international community in February 2008.64 This plan effectively set new dates

for development of the three tiered force. Firstly, a Territorial Force, to be created

from 2008 to 2012 through DDR and army integration, would play a key role in

countrywide infrastructure recovery, building hospitals, roads, and schools.

Secondly, a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) would be established from 2008 to

2010, which would take over many of MONUC’s tasks in due course. Thirdly,

a Main Defence Force would be established by 2015 to secure the borders of the

country. The plan received a ‘lukewarm welcome’ from donors, as it was felt that

it did show how a basic level of capability would be created.65 A further revised

plan was thus developed, importantly, in conjunction with donors, MONUC, and

EUSEC DR Congo in early 2009. The revised plan was then approved by

President Kabila in late May 2009, bringing ‘an end to two years of intense

muscle flexing’ between various top Congolese factions and bridging the gap

between the government and some of the main donors.66 However the specific

details of the plan do not appear to have been made public as of November 2009.

As of December 2009, efforts were underway to create the RRF, a component

seemingly still part of the May 2009 plan. One of two battalions initially planned

had been declared operational at Kindu, but the overall shape of the armed forces

was still under discussion in parliament.67 However while the RRF as a separate

formation does not appear to exist as of December 2009, many battalions and even

brigades without any appearance of special training have been described as RRF.

No consistent all-embracing programme of training the former fighters has

been undertaken, as the training programme has been restricted to the new

integrated brigades. The other non-integrated brigades, previously made up each

from one of the former warring factions, have received no FARDC formal

training whatsoever. The melding of both integrated and non-integrated brigades

in the 2009 reorganisation for Kimia II has lowered the overall standard of

training and cohesion.

The training programme for the integrated brigades, which began in January

2004, was restricted to a 45-day training course.68 For the 1st Integrated Brigade

at Kisangani, the Belgian trainers had initially planned a cascade-type ‘train the

trainers’ approach in which they would progressively transfer greater

responsibilities to new Congolese army training personnel. However, they

found the quality of the planned Congolese trainers so low that they had to

lengthen the planned course to 90 days and conduct the bulk of the training

themselves. The same was found by the Angolan personnel who ran the training

programme for the 2nd Integrated Brigade at Kitona. The first two integrated

brigades were judged to be significantly better trained than those trained directly

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by the FARDC.69 Following the training of the first three integrated brigades by

international personnel, the other 14 and the other now beginning the process

were trained, it seems, for the 45-day period only, by the same Congolese

personnel that had been assessed as inadequate. In any case, the Congolese

trainers, of whatever quality, have no experience other than the historic

exploitative, rapacious ethos of the Congolese military.

The FARDC’s lack of discipline is only to be expected, as the troops are badly

paid, badly housed, and have their wages stolen. Indeed Eriksson Baaz and

Stein’s group interviews of FARDC personnel in October 2005 and November

2006 found that much of the military’s violent behaviour seemed to be the result

of poverty, suffering, and frustration rather than innate violent tendencies.70

However, such frustrations may more easily be taken out on locals when the

troops in question come from a different region: Bunia (Ituri) inhabitants

interviewed in 2006–2007 said troops commit crimes ‘because they are not from

here . . . it would be better to send soldiers from our own ethnic group who will be

able to protect us’.71 (This was being said of the Belgian-trained 1st Integrated

Brigade; not a good omen for less well-trained troops.) Meanwhile Amnesty

International has also found in interviews with FARDC personnel that they are

afraid of being sent to places where they will not be accepted by the local

population.72

However the arrival of an official EU SSR assistance mission, EUSEC DR

Congo, was meant to help alleviate some of these difficulties. The concept of an

EU advisory mission on SSR was launched, at the end of 2004, by France and

Belgium in a joint paper (non-attibutable submission) to the EU’s Political and

Security Committee.73 Effectively the EU has deployed numerous advisors in

the various defence bodies in Kinshasa, as well as personnel in the military

regions beyond the capital, including in the east. Frequent field visits have been

made to ascertain the operational status of the FARDC and to set up the

payments chain project. A separate military payments chain, to ensure soldiers’

pay actually was received, was the first major project the mission focused on.

The other two EUSEC priorities were the biometric census of all FARDC

personnel, now checked through the distribution of a biometric military ID card,

and helping to draw up a military legal statute.74 The final project currently

underway focuses on the military legal system – the construction of a military

statute. The EU mission has made some progress, but has been forced to

supplement its Congolese partner officers’ pay in order for them to be able to

physically complete a full day’s work. Other Congolese personnel have been

severely punished for giving information to the mission. Despite the fact that

EUSEC has managed to complete the biometric census and increase soldiers’

pay, informed commentators differ on their actual worth. Some believe that their

presence is only ‘tolerated’ and that they are not likely to have significant

influence on government policy.75

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Remedies and prospects

The persistence of numerous armed groupings, both FARDC formations (now

including ex-CNDP elements) and rebels such as the FDLR which aim to

continue living from the mineral resources of North and South Kivu, intertwined

with ethnic and land rights rivalries form the most immediate obstacle to

effective reconstruction of the army.

President Joseph Kabila has attempted to resolve the conflict almost

exclusively through military means, with the attempt at mixage in late 2006 and

early 2007; then the deployment of weak integrated brigades which broke in

combat in December 2007, another offensive in late 2008,76 and in January 2009

the authorisation of a Rwandan incursion against the FDLR. However, it has

been well documented that the Kivu issue is more than just a warlord one,77 with

Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP faction having been only the military face of

a multifaceted dispute which has land, ethnic, and economic elements.

Willingness to negotiate politically on deep-seated grievances is the missing

link in the elusive package which might resolve the difficulties in the Kivus.

Yet even if the immediate Kivus issue was removed, reconstruction of the

army would still face a host of problems. The author’s doctoral review of

literature on army reconstruction in post-conflict environments uncovered three

major issues that often hobble such security sector transformation efforts. These

are the difficulties of institutional development in neo-patrimonial states,

nationally inspired reforms, rather than ones designed more by outsiders, and the

enormous resources involved to carry out thorough transformation. All these

issues are present in the DRC, with the addition of the coordination problems

inherent in a number of powerful national and international assisting actors.

There are a range of competing donor strategic, political, and institutional

interests in the country which makes it very difficult to achieve a coherent

international army assistance approach. Currently, many donors are working

bilaterally, often in secrecy, with little coordination.78 For example, China is

training trainers at Kamina with no coordination with EUSEC DR Congo or

MONUC, and, separate to other training efforts, the United States committed to

train one battalion at Kisangani in 2009–2010.79 Former Defence Minister

Chikez Diemu insisted on dealing with donors bilaterally and thus being able to

play them off against each other. Meanwhile the question of leadership between

the two most important foreign assistance efforts, EUSEC DR Congo and the

United Nations, has not been resolved. The scale of the donor coordination

morass cannot be overemphasised.

The greatest impediment to reform of the FARDC is the nature of the DRC’s

state administration. The Congo has never had a functional rational-bureaucratic

state structure, and the heritage of the generation of kleptocracy, which Mobutu

actively encouraged, means there is no fertile ground whatsoever for maintaining

existing administrative-bureaucratic capability, let alone improving it. Most

levels of the command structure are benefiting from their positions improperly.

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At a lower level, Joseph Kabila’s distrust of the FARDC’s hierarchy appears

to make any effective military-bureaucratic reform exceedingly unlikely for the

foreseeable future. In late 2008 and early 2009, the extensive command staff of

the armed forces was left impotent as military operations in the east were run

directly by the president; not only has he given deployment orders to brigade

commanders by satellite phone, but has directed individual battalion

commanders in some cases, making a mockery of the chain of command.80

During January 2009, the chief of defence staff and key operations staff were

only made aware of Ugandan and Rwandan movements into the country the day

they crossed the borders. Hobbling any military administration still further was

the destruction or removal of all ministry records when Defence Minister

Adolphe Onusumba Yemba left in February 2007, probably repeated in

ministerial transitions since.

The second major issue is the lack of Congolese ownership of military

improvement programmes. Sebastian Melmot describes military change in the

Congo as ‘a classic problem of development policies devised in the North and

applied in the South’.81 He also says that the programmes, reflecting problems

elsewhere, seems more induced by supply than by demand. The 18 integrated

brigade scheme was originally intended to provide security for the 2006 national

elections (a potential enabler of international community exit themselves), and

the rest of the three-tier scheme was also mostly imposed by donors. The

Congolese administration does not view with favour the shape of the army and its

missions. Congolese priorities are instead to equip the army (and police) and to

create the RRF, ‘rais[ing] the capability to act in ways far removed from the

“democratic use of force”’.82 The government has very little interest in

parliamentary supervision of the armed forces, improving financial management,

or improving the ‘total lack of military administration’.83 In sum, the Congolese

government has no interest in Western visions of efficient and accountable

security forces. What they want is more weaponry and a useable RRF. The RRF

may even be envisaged as a tool to eventually bolster the personal power of

particular politicians.

The third major obstacle to army reconstruction worldwide has been the

enormous resources required for the establishment of an effective army. Problems

with funding the creation of armies have been especially visible in Afghanistan.84

In the Congo, the cost of rebuilding the army and police, as well as SSR overall,

‘are taboo topics’ in discussion between donors and the government.85 Donors do

not wish to fund the government because the financial system does not meet basic

standards to receive budget aid and the malfeasance inherent in the system (both

connected to the first major issue regarding the nature of the state). Additionally,

the fact that real defence financial requirements are largely managed outside the

budgetary process does not inspire further confidence.86 Finally, foreign donors in

any case cannot mobilise sufficient funds.

Given these overwhelming obstacles, what are the chances for success and

what is the way forward? First, any hope of effective security forces operating

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under democratic civilian control must be set aside. Such visions merely obstruct

clear perceptions of the reality of the situation. What may be achievable is a rise in

the level of real security provided, through a combination of all the efforts being

made. A more achievable agenda would aim instead at beginning to prepare the

political terrain for security sector transformation.87 This would include continuing

efforts to end the war in the east, efforts to bring the various fighters under more

control, which would improve basic security, and beginning the process of

developing a national Congolese vision of SSR. This would necessarily involve a

greater role for both parliament and civil society actors in both ‘demanding’ reform

and helping to define a workable plan. However, with the hostility of government

towards parliament and civil society involvement in SSR,88 and the intractable

issues in the Kivus, which have defied effective solutions since 1994, none of these

measures appear likely to eventuate in the short or medium term.

The saga of the Congo has wider implications for army reconstruction and

security sector transformation elsewhere. It certainly underlines the grave

difficulties inherent in developmental efforts in states and societies which

privilege informal networks over formal bureaucracies. The Western conception

of SSR is ill-equipped to change the security structures of a state whose central

ethos does not reflect the rational-bureaucratic modus operandi of the states

where the concept originated. In the absence of a prior evolution into a rational-

bureaucratic state structure, the prospects of effective and thoroughgoing SSR

appear dim. What appears more likely is an enormous imbalance between the

enormous effort and resources expended, and the small, fragile, and transient

gains in real security – a conclusion supported by the history of developmental

effort since 1945.

Acknowledgements

Many people in several continents helped greatly with this article. Among those who canbe named are Dylan Hendrickson; Anneke Van Woudenberg, Judith Verweijen of theUniversity of Utrecht, Claire Morclette and her team at Amnesty International in London,David Chuter, and Sylvia Sergiou.

Notes

1. Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization, and Democratisation in Africa’, 34. Hanggiand Chanaa in Egnell and Halden, ‘Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious’, 33.

2. Examples include Amnesty International, ‘DRC DDR and the Reform of the Army’.The most easily available sources for the human rights violations committed by theFARDC are MONUC’s monthly human rights reports, available via http://www.reliefweb.int. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘You Will Be Punished’ ‘Soldiers WhoRape, Commanders Who Condone’.

3. Ebenga and N’Landu, ‘The Congolese National Army’, 64.4. Callaghy, ‘Life and Death in the Congo’, 144.5. Comments of regional SSR expert on draft paper, 12 January 2011.6. Garrett et al. ‘Negotiated Peace for Extortion’, 9.7. Meditz and Merrill, ‘Zaire, Evolution of the Armed Forces’.

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8. Reno, ‘Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire’.9. Ebenga and N’Landu, ‘The Congolese National Army’, 68–9.

10. Reno, ‘Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire’.11. Colonel S.C. Davies (Defence Attache, Kinshasa), ‘Report on the Zairean Armed

Forces’.12. Meditz and Merrill, Library of Congress Country Study: Zaire13. Ibid.14. International Crisis Group (hereafter ICG) interviews with SA and other diplomatic

representatives in Kinshasa, November 2005, cited in ICG, ‘Security Sector Reformin the Congo’, 16.

15. ICG, ‘Congo: Staying Engaged After the Elections’, 4.16. Ibid.17. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2007, 270.18. Malan, ‘U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance’, 29.19. World Bank, ‘DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 5.20. United Nations, ‘30th Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in the

Congo’, para. 75.21. Malan, ‘U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance’, quoted 30,000. The ‘nearly 20,000’ figure

draws on the result of the first EUSEC biometric census.22. Contacts with confidential sources, and regional SSR expert, 12 January 2011.23. ‘Boma’.24. De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 74.25. In December 2006, the 10th Brigade had 3200 personnel assigned, with over 1,000

fewer soldiers than it should have had, but over 200 more officers and NCOs thanrequired.

26. Comments from regional SSR expert, 12 January 2011.27. Kambidi, ‘Des militaires de Tshikapa boudent le brassage’.28. Human Rights Watch, ‘Crimes de guerre qu’auraient commis les troupes des

FARDC au Katanga’.29. De Koning, ‘Demilitarizing Mining Areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo’.30. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, 46–58.31. Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 17.32. Ibid.33. Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Congo Rebels Cash in on Demand for Tin’, cited in Garrett

et al., ‘Negotiated Peace for Extortion’, 2.34. Nkunda initiated the ‘mixage’ process by agreement with the FARDC after

December 2006 talks in Kigali. The process was not actively supported by MONUCor the international community. The 81st and 83rd Brigades were ‘mixed’ with threeFARDC brigades to form five to six lettered brigades, designated A–F. It appearsthat despite possible ideas by officials in Kinshasa that they would separate Nkunda’ssoldiers from him through the mixage process, what actually happened is thatNkunda has retained control of his fighters and thus came to direct five brigades,rather than the two he controlled before. The actual mixage process was limited;battalions were shuffled between brigades but there was no integration at a lowerlevel. These formations attacked the FDLR, displacing 230,000 people andheightening inter-communal tensions. These offensives prompted the collapse of themixage process and the break-up of the mixed brigades, leading to the regrouping ofgovernment troops.

35. See also ICG, ‘Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu’.36. United Nations, ‘24th Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in the

Congo’, para. 33, and ‘25th Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in theCongo’, paras 40–3.

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37. Comments by regional SSR expert, 12 January 2011.38. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, 324 note 186.39. BBC News, ‘Rwandan troops withdraw from Congo’. Numbi was previously

reported as being one of Kabila’s inner circle responsible for running aspects ofinternal affairs. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, 315.

40. The independent battalions, which were integrated and trained by MONUC, were the15th (888 strong), 31st, 23rd, 22nd, 21st, 14th, and 11th. See also ICG, ‘Congo: AComprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR’, 21.

41. Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 17.42. United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic

of the Congo’, 10, and consultation with regional SSR expert 12 January 2011.43. MONUC JMAC, ‘Weekly Threat Assessment’.44. United Nations, ‘Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’ (23 November

2009), 61.45. It should be noted that Operation Umoja Wetu, though publicly described as a joint

Congolese–Rwandan operation, was not jointly controlled. While there was anostensible joint headquarters in Goma, in actuality, the operation was being directedfrom inside Rwanda and FARDC forces played little part. Interview with Britishformer UN staff officer, 5 October 2011.

46. Comments by regional SSR expert on draft paper, 12 January 2011.47. Discussion with Dylan Hendrickson, King’s College London, December 2009.48. United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo’, para. 30.49. ICG, ‘Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR’, 18.50. Comments by regional SSR expert on draft paper, 12 January 2011.51. Human Rights Watch, ‘You Will Be Punished’.52. Human Rights Watch, ‘Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone’.53. See Obasanjo, My Command.54. These figures draw on the Group of Experts’ reports, the APARECO communique,

and varied news sources.55. United Nations. ‘Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic

of the Congo’, 10, para. 37. The Group of Experts alleges that Lt. Col. Zimurinda isguilty of child recruitment and has some responsibility for the Kiwanja massacre inNovember 2008 (paras 98–9).

56. United Nations, ‘30th Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in theCongo’, 4, para. 15.

57. EUSEC DR Congo political office, Kinshasa, 3 October 2011.58. Comments by regional SSR expert on draft paper, 12 January 2011.59. Conversation with former United Nations official, 5 November 2010 (EC).60. Clement, ‘Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 96.61. ICG, ‘Security Sector Reform in the Congo’, 1.62. Ibid., 17–18.63. Ibid., 17, n. 91.64. Internal UN Security Sector Reform mission report, September 2008, p. 2.65. Clement, ‘Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 97.66. Ibid., 96–7.67. The Kindu training report is ‘FARDC: le 321e bataillon operationnel,’ Radio Okapi,

18 October 2009, and the parliamentary discussion, on three draft organic laws, isrecorded in United Nations, ‘Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’, 16, para.76. Other battalion may be the 391st at Kisangani (USAFRICOM trained).

68. ICG, ‘Security Sector Reform in the Congo’, 17, 19, 21.69. Ibid., 28.70. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, ‘Making Sense of Violence’, 75–6.

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71. Marie-Claude (Bunia inhabitant) quoted in Amnesty International, ‘DRC DDR andthe Reform of the Army’, 10.

72. Amnesty International, ‘DRC – North Kivu: civilians pay the price for political andpolitical rivalries’, AI AFR 62/013/2005, September 2005, quoted in AI, ‘DRC DDRand the Reform of the Army’, 10.

73. Hoebeke et al., ‘EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 10.74. European Union, ‘The EUSEC RD Congo Mission’.75. European university SSR expert, December 2009.76. Woodside, ‘General Disorder’, 15–16.77. ICG, ‘Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu’ and Prunier, From Genocide to

Continental War, 324–7.78. Good summaries of donor involvement in army reconstruction are available in

Melmot, ‘Candide in Congo’ and Africa Confidential, ‘A Multinational Road toArmy Reform’, 9.

79. Personal conversation with Julie Chalfin, Africa Bureau, State Department,Washington DC, 18 December 2009.

80. Interviews and email contacts with confidential sources, September 2007 andDecember 2008.

81. Melmot, ‘Candide in Congo’.82. Ibid., 22.83. Ibid.84. Giustozzi, ‘Shadow Ownership of SSR in Afghanistan’, 223.85. Melmot, ‘Candide in Congo’, 18–19.86. DRC Court of Accounts, Audit of Public Spending from 1 December 2006 to 28

February 2007, cited in Ibid., 19.87. These ideas are Dylan Hendrickson’s, as communicated to the author in December

2009.88. Melmot, ‘Candide in Congo’, 21.

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