PyrrhicProgress–

AntibioticsandWesternFoodProduction(1949–2013)

ClaasKirchhelleThesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyintheFacultyofHistoryattheUniversityof

Oxford

UniversityCollege,UniversityofOxfordTrinityTerm2015

PyrrhicProgress–AntibioticsandWesternFoodProduction(1949-2013)

ClaasKirchhelle

(UniversityCollege,Oxford)

ThesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyintheFacultyofHistoryattheUniversityofOxfordTrinityTerm

2015

ShortAbstract

Thisdissertationaddresses thehistoryof antibioticuse inBritishandUS foodproduction between 1950 and 2013. Introduced to agriculture in the 1950s,antibioticsunderpinnedthe20th-centuryrevolutioninWesternfoodproduction.However,fromthelate1950sonwards,controversiesoverantibioticresistance,residuesandanimalwelfarebegantotarnishantibiotics’image. By mapping both the enthusiasm and the controversies surroundingantibioticuse, thisdissertation showshowdistinct civic epistemologiesof riskinfluenced consumers’, producers’ and officials’ attitudes towards antibiotics.These differing risk perceptions did not emerge by chance: in Britain, popularanimalwelfare concerns fusedwith new scenarios of antibiotic resistance anddrovereform.Following1969,Britainpioneeredantibioticresistanceregulationby banning certain feed antibiotics. However, subsequent reforms were onlypartially implemented, and total antibiotic consumption failed to sink.Meanwhile,scandalsandpublicpressureforcedtheAmericanFDAtoinstallthefirst comprehensive monitoring program for antibiotic residues. However,differingpublicprioritiesandindustrialoppositionmeantthattheFDAfailedtoconvinceCongressofresistance-inspiredbans.Thetransatlanticregulatorygaphas since widened: following the BSE crisis, the EU phased out growth-promoting antibiotic feeds in 2006. The US proclaimed only a voluntary andpartialbanofantibioticfeedsinDecember2013.

In the face of contemporary warnings about failing antibiotics, thedissertationshowshowonegroupofsubstancesacquireddifferentmeaningsfordifferentcommunities.Italsorevealsthatthedilemmaofantibioticregulationishardlynew.Despiteknowingaboutantibioticallergiesandresistancesincethe1940s,nocountryhasmanagedtosolvethedilemmaofpreservingantibiotics’economic benefits whilst containing their medical risks. Historically, effectiveantibiotic regulation emerged only when differing perceptions of antibioticswerebrokendowneitherbysustainedregulatoryreformorlargecrises.

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PyrrhicProgress–AntibioticsandWesternFoodProduction(1949-2013)ClaasKirchhelle

(UniversityCollege,Oxford)

ThesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyintheFacultyofHistoryattheUniversityofOxfordTrinityTerm2015

LongAbstract

This dissertation examines the history of antibiotic use in British and US food

production between 1950 and 2013. Introduced in the 1950s, antibiotics

underpinned the 20th-century revolution inWestern agriculture and enabled an

unprecedentedriseofmeatproductionandconsumption.However,fromthelate

1950s onwards, controversies over antibiotic resistance, residues in food and

animalwelfarebegantotarnishantibiotics’ image.Withabouthalfoftheworld’s

antibiotics currently used in agriculture and levels of bacterial resistance rising,

thisdissertationisnotonlyahistoryof20th-centuryagricultureandconsumerism;

it also provides an historical analysis of the unsolved dilemma of antibiotic

regulation.

Inordertohighlightthedistinctdevelopmentofconsumer,agriculturaland

regulatory perceptions of agricultural antibiotics, the dissertation analyses

antibioticdiscoursesinBritishandUSnewspapers,consumerbestsellers,fashion

andfarmingmagazinesandgovernmentarchives.Thedissertationisdividedinto

fourparts,eachconsistingofthreechapters.Ofthesethreechapters,onestudies

the development of consumer discourse concerning antibiotics, another

agriculturaldiscourse,andanother thestatediscourse.The first twopartsof the

dissertationanalysethetimebetweenagriculturalantibiotics’mass-adventinthe

early1950sandthefirstwaveofantibioticregulationfollowing1965.Thelasttwo

partsof thedissertationhighlight theemergenceandwideningofa transatlantic

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divideregardingtheregulation,perceptionanduseofagriculturalantibioticsfrom

the1970stothepresent.

The dissertation places a special emphasis on farmers’ perception of

antibiotics. As producers and consumers, farmers were exposed to conflicting

assessmentsofantibiotics’relativerisksandbenefits.Aslaypersons,theyalsohad

thefinaldecisiononwhetherornottopurchaseantibioticsandhowtousethem.

In contrast to existing accounts’ focus on physicians and veterinarians, the

dissertation’sconsumer-anduse-centredperspectivereveals the interactionand

influenceofeconomic,politicalandcultural factorson the trajectoryofpost-war

antibiotic use and its concomitant problems. The dissertation highlights that

attitudes towards antibiotics differed both intra- and internationally. Directly

affectingantibiotics’regulation,thesedifferingriskperceptionsdidnotemergeby

chance.

IntheUS,apre-existingculturalfocusontoxichazardsallowedagricultural

antibiotics to evadeadditional regulatory scrutiny following thediscoveryof the

antibioticgrowtheffect in1949.Becauseof theirnon-toxicandnon-carcinogenic

properties, few objections were raised to antibiotics’ increasingly common

presence in all aspects of US food production. On farms, antibiotics’ tripartite

function of combatting and preventing bacterial disease and promoting animals’

growthturnedthemintokeystonesholdingtogetherincreasinglyintensiveanimal

productionsystems.However,bythemid-1950s,arisingpopularbacklashagainst

the invisible contamination of food, bodies and the environment also affected

attitudes towards antibiotics, which were culturally associated with unrelated

hazardous chemicals. As a result of a 1956 milk scandal and on-going residue

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problems,theUSpioneeredanationalmonitoringprogramforantibioticresidues

inmilkintheearly1960s.

While US authorities were under significant public pressure to address

residues in food, antibiotic-associated hazards like the selection for bacterial

resistanceandtheneglectofanimalwelfareattractedlessattention.Evenafterthe

publicationofUSreportson‘horizontal’resistanceproliferationin1966,theFDA

continuedtofocuspoliciesonlimitingAmericans’exposuretoantibioticresidues

by banning food preservatives and pioneering a further residue monitoring

program for meat. Officials considered problems of bacterial resistance to be

limitedtoantibiotics’immediatepresenceinfeeds,animalsandfood.

In contrast to the residue-centred discourses of the US, British concerns

aboutagriculturalantibioticsweremorediverse.Althoughmanyconsumerswere

also concerned about residues, a media analysis shows that there were equally

strongconcernsaboutagriculturalantibiotics’roleinenablingbadanimalwelfare

conditionsandselecting forbacterial resistance. Initially,noneof theseconcerns

was strong enough to prevent Britain’smass-licensing of agricultural antibiotics

via the Therapeutic Substances Act of 1953. However, from the late 1950s

onwards, the fusionof formerlydistinctwelfare,residueandresistanceconcerns

turned agricultural antibiotics into common denominators of popular protest.

Resistancedataprovidedby theBritishPublicHealthLaboratoryService (PHLS)

playedasignificantroleindirectingpublicconcernstowardsantibioticresistance

andprovokedofficialaction.Duringthe1960s,threeexpertreviewsaddressedthe

agricultural selection for antibiotic resistance and established a regulatory

distinction between therapeutic antibiotics valuable to human medicine and

irrelevantnontherapeuticantibiotics.In1969,theso-calledSwannreportreferred

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to this division when it pioneered resistance-inspired antibiotic regulations by

calling for a ban of low-dosed antibiotic growth promoter feeds containing

‘therapeutic’antibiotics.

AfterpartialantibioticbanswereadoptedbyBritainandmemberstatesof

the European Economic Community (EEC), antibiotics lost their status as a

common denominator of agricultural reform demands. With public attention

fading, bureaucratic rivalries and agro-industrial opposition resulted in a

significantwateringdownofmanyoftheSwannreport’srecommendations.Italso

emerged that the so-called Swann bans did not adequately address veterinary

prescription practices and cross-resistance to different antibiotics. As a

consequence,agriculturalantibioticuseandresistancecontinuedtorise.Lagging

behind other nations in terms of residue monitoring, external pressures and

scandals turned into the driving force of British antibiotic reform in the 1980s.

With antibiotics re-emerging as a common denominator of concerns about

agriculture in thewakeof the1996BSEcrisis,Britainre-joinedreformersat the

Europeanlevelandsupportedaphase-outofantibioticgrowthpromotersin1998

and2003.

Similar resistance-based reforms did not occur in the US where public

concerns aboutbacterial resistance remained subordinate to those involving the

chemical contamination of food and bodies. Although Europeanmeasures led to

the creation of an FDA Task Force and the endorsement of growth promoter

restrictions in 1972, significant industry pressure, lacklustre public support and

the successful applicationof counter-sciencemadesubsequentbanattempts fail.

In1975,concernsaboutbacterialresistancepromptedtheFDAtolaunchasecond

circuitousattempttobanantibioticfeedsviaitsNationalAdvisoryFoodAndDrug

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Committee(NAFDC).However,theFDAfailedtosecureafullNAFDCendorsement

of European-style bans. Although Commissioner Donald Kennedy decided to

withdraw antibiotics without further expert reviews in April 1977, industrial

opposition, an economic slow-down, diminishing public support for substance

restrictions and the legal system’s insistence on proof of harm led to the bans’

renewed failure. In1978,Congress imposedamoratoriumonFDAaction,which

wasprolongedbyanNASstudyin1980.1970sbanattemptsfinallyendedin1985,

whentheUSDepartmentofHumanandHealthServicesrejectedapetitionbythe

NationalResourcesDefenceCouncil to ban antibiotic feedsbecause of imminent

harm.

Meanwhile, both European and US farmers remained opposed to

restrictions thatmight threaten antibiotic-dependent production systems during

timesofincreasingeconomicinsecurity.Thisdidnotmeanthatfarmerswerenot

concerned about the hazards of controversial agricultural technologies. Most

farmers simply sawno alternative to thepost-war logic of intensification,which

reliedonantibiotics andother chemicals tomaintainprofits and controldisease

pressure.Betweenthe1970sand1990s,farmers’rejectionsofexternallyimposed

substance restrictions resulted in increasing tensions between farmers and

environmentalists and consumers. Fears amongst the latter group contributed

substantially to the rise of theorganic sector and its promises of antibiotic- and

chemical-purity,whichwerenotbeingguaranteedbythestate.However,residue-

free food would not protect consumers from an increasingly ‘resistant

environment’.

WithAmericanantibioticreformstagnating,theregulatorydividebetween

theUSandEuropewidenedrapidlybetweenthe1980sand2000s.Underpolitical

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pressureasaresultofEUbansonantibioticgrowthpromotion,theAmericanFDA

proclaimedonlyavoluntaryandpartialbanofantibioticfeedsinDecember2013.

The absence of statutory antibiotic restrictions in the US is partially due to the

fundamental weakening of the FDA under the Reagan administration, the

increasing prominence of cost-benefit risk assessments and divided national

opinions toward agricultural risks. In the absence of a macro-crisis like BSE,

agricultural antibioticsnever emerged as a commondenominator of agricultural

protestandremainsubjectedtocounter-scienceandcontroversiesovertheextent

oftheirhazardtohumans.

By tracing agricultural antibiotics’ different fates on both sides of the

Atlantic, thisdissertation showshowonegroupof substancesacquireddifferent

meaningsfordifferentcommunitiesandnations.Significantly, italsorevealsthat

the dilemma of antibiotic regulation is hardly new. Despite knowing about

antibiotic allergies and resistance since the 1950s, no country has managed to

satisfactorily solve the agricultural dilemma of preserving antibiotics’ economic

benefits whilst containing their medical risks. Historically, effective antibiotic

regulation emerged only when differing perceptions of antibiotics were broken

down by either sustained regulatory reform or large crises. By analysing the

foundations of fragmented antibiotic perceptions, this dissertation hopes to

contribute to a unified understanding of agricultural antibiotics and their

challenges.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I

LISTOFABBREVIATIONS II

INTRODUCTION 1

PARTONE–USA:FROMINDUSTRIALISEDAGRICULTURETOMANUFACTUREDHAZARDS(1949-1966) 15CHAPTERONE:PICKINGONE’SPOISONS–ANTIBIOTICSANDTHEPUBLIC 15CHAPTERTWO:ABUNDANTIAEXMACHINA–ANTIBIOTICSANDTHEFARMER 40CHAPTERTHREE:REGULATION–PROTECTINGPRODUCERSFROMCONSUMERS 60

PARTTWO–BRITAIN:FROMRATIONINGTOGLUTTONY(1945-1969) 90CHAPTERFOUR:GREATBRITISHANTIBIOTICS 90CHAPTERFIVE:BIGGER,BETTER,FASTER–ANTIBIOTICSANDBRITISHFARMING 107CHAPTERSIX:TYPINGRESISTANCE–ANTIBIOTICREGULATIONINBRITAIN 126

PARTTHREE–BRITAIN:FROMGLUTTONYTOFEAR(1970–2006) 147CHAPTERSEVEN:YEARNINGFORPURITY 147CHAPTEREIGHT:BRITISHFARMINGANDTHEENVIRONMENTALTURN 167CHAPTERNINE:SWANNSONG 189

PARTFOUR–USA:THEPROBLEMOFPLENTY(1967-2013) 221CHAPTERTEN–THEPUBLIC–ANTIBIOTICS,FAILEDBANSANDGROWINGFEARS 221CHAPTERELEVEN–USFARMERS–HOSTILITYINSINKINGNUMBERS 251CHAPTERTWELVE–THEGOVERNMENT–FAILINGTOREGULATE 274

CONCLUSION 321

BIBLIOGRAPHY 337

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AcknowledgementsAfter five years of thinking andwriting about antibiotics, every sentence of thisdissertation is rooted in countless discussions and suggestions from friends andcolleagues on both sides of theAtlantic. Sincemoving toOxford in 2012, I havebenefitedfromthegenerousacademicandpersonalsupportoftheWellcomeUnitfortheHistoryofMedicine.IwouldparticularlyliketothankMarkHarrisonforhisexcellent supervision and ceaseless efforts on my behalf. Pietro Corsi has alsoplayed a major role in shaping the trajectory of my doctoral research as anexaminer and with his kind advice. In the course of my studies, I was alsoprivileged to discuss my research with Thomas Le Roux, Ulrike Thoms, ScottPodolsky, Christoph Gradmann and the late Mark Finlay, who all generouslysharedtheirfindingswithme.Thecontentandtoneofthisdissertationarearesultoftheircollegialityandinvaluableadvice.IwouldalsoliketothankJavierLezaun,AnneKveimLee,AbigailWoods,AnneHardyandKendraSmith-Howardfortheirhelp and comments.Valuable impulses formywork came fromattendeesof theDRUGS-conferencesinZurich(2012)andOslo(2013),the2014WorldVeterinaryHistoryCongressandthe2015ToxicWorldsworkshopinMenorca.In the course of my dissertation, I have profited immensely from the generoussupport of the Wellcome Trust. In 2014, the German Historical Institute inWashington provided a congenial base formy exploration of the US library andarchivesystem.Inthiscontext,IwouldliketothankJohnSwann(notarelativeofMichael) forhishelp inaccessing theFDA’s collections.At theNationalArchivesandRecordAdministrationinCollegePark,theLibraryofCongress,theCountwayLibrary,theBodleianLibrary,theBritishLibraryandtheBritishNationalArchives,Iprofitedfromthehelpofnumerousknowledgeablelibrariansandresearchers.In Oxford, it has been a privilege to be a member of University College. As amemberoftheCollegeandaninhabitantofPercyHouse,IhavebenefitedfromthesupportofmycollegetutorCatherineHolmesandcountlessseminarsandeveningdiscussionswithscholarsfromallovertheworld.IwouldliketoespeciallythankAshleyMahlerforherhelpincorrectingthelastdraftofthedissertation–andmyEnglish. All remaining mistakes are entirely my own. For nearly a year, I alsoenjoyed the uniquewriting environment generously provided by the IanMooreLabatOxford’sDepartmentofPlantSciences.Finally, I also want to thank my family for their support and advice. CharlotteKirchhellehasguidedmeovertheruggedscientificandemotional terrainof thisresearchproject.Withoutherunwavering support andwisdom, thisdissertationanditsauthorwouldstillbecomingtothemselvesinadarkwood.

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ListofabbreviationsAAA AgriculturalAdjustmentAct

AAFC AntibioticsinAnimalFeedsSubcommittee(NAFDC)

ACMSF AdvisoryCommitteeontheMicrobiologicalSafetyofFood

AGP AntibioticGrowthPromotion

AGPs AntibioticGrowthPromoterFeeds

AHI AnimalHealthInstitute

APF AnimalProteinFactor

ARC AgriculturalResearchCouncil

BEUC TheEuropeanConsumerOrganisation

BF BritishFarmer

BFS BritishFarmer&Stockbreeder

BMJ BritishMedicalJournal

BPA BritishPigAssociation

BSE BovineSpongiformEncephalopathy

BuFo BureauofFood

BVA BritishVeterinaryAssociation

BVM BureauofVeterinaryMedicine

CAP CommonAgriculturalPolicy

CAST CouncilforAgriculturalScienceandTechnology

CCC CommodityCreditCooperation

CIA CriticallyImportantAntibiotic

CLM CountwayLibraryofMedicine

CSM CommitteeonSafetyofMedicines

CVM CenterforVeterinaryMedicine

DARC DEFRAAntimicrobialResistanceCoordination

DEFRA DepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs

DESI DrugEfficacyStudyImplementation

DQA DataQualityAct

DRB DrugResearchBoard(NRC-NAS)

EARSS EuropeanAntimicrobialResistanceSurveillanceSystem

iii

EC EuropeanCommittee

EEC EuropeanEconomicCommunity

EPA EnvironmentalProtectionAgency

EPHLS EmergencyPublicHealthLaboratoryService

EU EuropeanUnion

FAIR FederalAgricultureImprovementandReformAct

FBNews FarmBureauNews

FEDESA EuropeanFederationofAnimalHealth

FedReg FederalRegister

FDA FoodandDrugAdministration

FDAMA FoodandDrugAdministrationModernizationAct

FDC FederalFood,Drug,andCosmeticAct

FOR ForumonRegulation

FQPA FoodQualityProtectionAct

FSA FoodStandardsAgency

FW FarmersWeekly

GATT GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrades

GFI GuidanceForIndustry(FDA)

GRAS GenerallyRecognizedasSafe

HEW DepartmentofHealthEducationandWelfare

HHS DepartmentofHumanandHealthServices

HPLC High-PerformanceLiquidChromatography

IoM InstituteofMedicine

ITFAR InteragencyTaskForceonAntimicrobialResistance

JSC JointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances

LIN LondonIllustratedNews

MAFF MinistryofAgriculturalFisheriesandForestry

MH MinistryofHealth

MLC MeatandLivestockCommission

MMB MilkMarketingBoard

MoF MinistryofFood

MRC MedicalResearchCouncil

NAAS NationalAgriculturalAdvisoryService

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NAFDC NationalAdvisoryFoodandDrugCommittee

NARA NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration,CollegePark

NARMS NationalAntimicrobialResistance

NAS NationalAcademyofSciences

NCA NationalCattlemen’sAssociation

NDA NewDrugApplication

NEJM NewEnglandJournalofMedicine

NFU NationalFarmersUnion(UK)

NOAH NationalOrganisationforAnimalHealth

NOP NationalOrganicProgram

NPPC NationalPorkProducersCouncil

NR NationalReview

NRC NationalResearchCouncil(NAS)

NRDC NationalResourcesDefenceCouncil

NSS NationalSamplingScheme

NYT NewYorkTimes

OMB OfficeofManagementandBudget

OTA OfficeofTechnologyAssessment

OTC Over-The-Counter

PAMTA PreservationofAntibioticsforMedicalTreatmentAct

PF ProgressiveFarmer

PHLS PublicHealthLaboratoryService

PHIA PublicHealthImprovementAct

POM PrescriptionOnlyMedication

PPM PartsPerMillion

PrFa PrairieFarmer

IPrFa IndianaPrairieFarmer

PSAC President’sScienceAdvisoryCommittee

RCVS RoyalCollegeofVeterinarySurgeons

RSPCA RoyalSocietyforthePreventionofCrueltytoAnimals

RUMA ResponsibleUseofMedicinesinAgricultureAlliance

SAP ScientificAdvisoryPanel(MAFF)

SCAN ScientificCommitteeforAnimalNutrition

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SciAm ScientificAmerican

SGFS SteeringGrouponFoodSurveillance

SMAC StandingMedicalAdvisoryCommittee

SMZ Sulfamethazine

SVS StateVeterinaryService

TNA TheBritishNationalArchives

TSA TherapeuticSubstancesAct

TTIP TransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership

UN UnitedNations

vCJD variantCreutzfeldt-JakobDisease

VETU Veterinarians’Union

VMD VeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate

VMR VeterinaryMedicinesRegulations

VPC VeterinaryProductsCommittee

VRC VeterinaryResiduesCommittee

WAEC WarAgriculturalExecutiveCommittees

WF WallacesFarmer

WHO WorldHealthOrganisation

WP WashingtonPost

YBL YaleBeineckeLibrary

1

Hosegoinpugnavicivictusquesumabisdem.

(Pyrrhus,PaulusOrosiusHistoriarumAdversumPaganosLiberIV,1,14.)

Introduction

The last 70 years have seen an unprecedented shift in the way the West

produces its food. Transported from the 1930s to the 21st century, a time

travelling farmerwouldhavegreatdifficulty recognizing the landscapearound

him. Field sizes have increased, machines have mostly substituted manual

labour,andadecliningnumberof farmsarerunbynuclear familiesenjoyinga

high standard of living.However, themost dramatic change our time traveller

will observe is that animals have virtually disappeared from common sight.

Insteadofthedirtyfarmyardsandlittlepaddocksofthepast,thedenselypacked

herdsof thepresenthavemostly vanished into vast, gleaming, air-conditioned

buildingswherefeedingisdoneatthepushofabuttonandmanureisremoved

viaingeniouswastesystems.Formostconsumers,foodproductionhasbecome

completely abstract. Moreover, animals themselves have changed. Perhaps

familiarwithAldousHuxley’sfictionalInternalandExternalSecretionTrust,the

time travellerwillnote thatanimalsare relatively standardisedandhavebeen

bred to fit into the factory-likeproductionsystemsof thepresent.1Andall this

hadbeenachievedwithin the spanof a fewdecades. It is indeedaBraveNew

Worldthetimetravelleriswitnessing.

However,ourexperttimetravellerwillsoonwonderwhytheseconfined

animalsaresoproductive.Afterall,previousgenerationshadalsoattemptedto

increase herd densities in the name of productivity but infectious disease

1AldousHuxley,BraveNewWorld(LondonVintage,2007[1932]),p.62.

2

continuously thwarted overly ambitious attempts. Our time traveller will find

the answer to his question both in animals’ water and feed and in a nearby

refrigerator,where syringes are stored for the convenience of husbandrymen.

Contained inall theseagricultural implementsareantibiotics.Theireffectsare

profound.Wereour timetravellerable toanalyse themicrobialecology inand

on animals, farms, food and the surrounding countryside, he would find that

bacterialdiseasesofthepasthavebeencheckedandtransformedbytheliberal

use of antibiotics. In theBraveNewWorld of the present, themacrobiological

revolution of food production has been achieved in no small part by a mass-

modificationofthemicrobialecology.

The significant role that antibiotics play in modern food production is

often underappreciated. In schools, children learn the story of Alexander

Fleming’s ‘accidental’ discovery of penicillin, museums feature exhibitions on

‘yellowmagic’ andpatients routinely ask their doctors to prescribe antibiotics

for various ailments. So common and important have antibiotics become in

human medicine that recent books even talk about an “Antibiotic Era”.2

However, with some estimates claiming that over fifty percent of antibiotic

production is not destined for human use,3it is important not to forget that

antibiotics constitute one of the keystones holding together modern food

production.

After1945,theso-calledsecondagriculturalrevolutionbroughtdramatic

changes toWestern livestockproduction:herdsizesgrewrapidlyandall-year-

2ScottH.Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress,2015).3ForanoverviewofthemanyestimatesoftotalantibioticuseseeTimothyF.Landersetal.,'AReviewofAntibioticUseinFoodAnimals:Perspective,Policy,andPotential',PublicHealthReports,127/1(2012),p.6.

3

roundproductionsystemsmeant thatanimalsdisappeared intoclosedhousing

systems.However,thenewintensiveindoorsystemsfacedsignificantobstacles

intheformofinfectiousdisease.Inthissituation,antibiotics’tripartitefunction

of combating bacterial infections, preventing new infections and increasing

animals’ feed efficiency turned them into ‘panaceas’ for intensive livestock

production.Similartohumanmedicine,farmersandveterinarianssoonbecame

dependent on routine antibiotic use to sustain their herds’ health and

productivity.

Unfortunately, agriculture’s antimicrobial blessing came at a price:

antibioticscouldmaskbadanimalwelfareconditions,andresiduesinfoodand

theenvironmentcouldcreateortriggerallergiestoantibiotics.Moreover,inan

almostpyrrhicfashion,everyuseofantibioticstoachieveimmediateproduction

gainscouldselectforbacterialresistanceandimpairfutureantibioticefficacy.4

Western consumers, farmers and officials faced a dilemma: whereas

residue and welfare problems could be contained by allowing drugs to clear

animals’systemsandbyupgradinghousing,theproblemofbacterialresistance

would be solved only by banning or restricting agricultural antibiotic use.

Unsurprisingly, opinionsonwhich antibiotic benefits to keep andatwhat cost

variedwidely.

Following initial euphoria, some consumers and media commentators

begantoregardagriculturalantibioticsasdangerousandunnatural.Antibiotics’

presenceonfarmsandinfoodsseemedtosymbolizeworryingdevelopmentsin

anincreasinglyabstract,industrialisedand‘chemicalised’agriculturalworld.As

4TonyLawrence,VernonFowler,andJanNovakofski,GrowthofFarmAnimals(3rdeditionedn.;WallingfordandCambridge(MA):CABI,2012),pp.325-27.

4

in thecaseof thedubiouspigssalesmanAntibiotixinAsterixandtheCauldron,5

consumersoftenblamedfarmersforexcessiveantibioticuseinfoodproduction

whilecontinuingtodemandcheapmeat.

In contrast to such allegations, farmers themselves frequently had an

ambivalent relationshipwith antibiotics. As producers and consumers of food,

farmers were forced to weigh societal and personal health concerns against

economic and socio-political pressures favouring antibiotic-dependent

productionsystems.Aftertheirearlierinvestments,amajorityoffarmersfound

thescalestippedinfavourofcontinuedantibioticuse.

The growing divide between consumer and agricultural demands left

regulators facing a difficult decision. Whose fears and concerns should they

prioritise? Whose expertise should they listen to? Whereas agro-industrial

interestsfavouredacompromisesolutionallowingforcontinuedantibioticuse,

concerns about bacterial resistance made consumer and environmental

advocates call for substantial antibiotic restrictions. In the course of the 20th

century, regulators’ situation was further complicated by the increasingly

globalised nature of agricultural commodity flows, bacterial ecologies and

antibiotic resistance. Although America’s new system of intensive agriculture

engendered an unprecedented standardisation of Western agriculture, pre-

existing national regulatory and consumer cultures fragmented international

responsestointensiveagriculture’sproblemsandantibiotics’pyrrhicdilemma.

Using agricultural antibiotics as a leitmotiv, this dissertation links the

distinct stories of consumers, farmers and regulators into a unified account of

5R.GoscinnyandA.Uderzo,AsterixandtheCauldron,trans.AntheaBellandDerekHockridge(OrionChildren'sBooks:London,2005[1969]).

5

20thand21stcenturyfoodproduction,consumerculturesandriskregulation.In

ordertodoso,itanalysesthehistoryofagriculturalantibioticuseandregulation

in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Because of the

contemporarychallengesposedbybacterial resistance, thisdissertation isalso

anattempttoanswerwhybothAmericansandEuropeanshaveso far failedto

establishacoordinatedandeffectivepolicyregardingagriculturalantibioticuse.

In accordance with the 2014 HistoryManifesto,6the dissertation’s analysis of

overhalf-a-centuryofnon-humanantibioticuseisexplicitlymeanttoprovidea

helpfultoolforcontemporarypolitics.

Acentralconcept informingthedissertation’sanalysis is thenotionthat

therearefewmorepowerfulmotivatorsforhumanactionthanasharedsenseof

riskandhealthfears.IfRoyPorter’sdictumof“health”as“thebackboneofsocial

history”7istrue,thenhealthfearswerethemusclesdrivingsomeofthebiggest

changes in modern agriculture, consumption and governance. It is therefore

necessarytoanalysethedifferentprocessesbywhichactorsframedantibiotics

ashealthrisks.8However, individualdefinitionsofriskwouldbe insufficient to

explain the reshaping of larger attitudes towards industrial agriculture.

FollowingthelateUlrichBeck,notionsofriskarepowerfulsocialbindingagents

when sharedby larger groups.Moreover, it isunimportantwhether risks turn

6JoGuldiandDavidArmitage,TheHistoryManifesto(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014).7RoyPorter,'DoingMedicalHistoryfromBelow',TheoryandSociety,14/2(1985),p.192.8FortheprocessofmakingfearmanageablebynarrowingittodefinableareasseeGeorgKrücken,Risikotransformation.DiePolitischeRegulierungTechnisch-ÖkologischerGefahreninDerRisikogesellschaft(Opladen/Wiesbaden:WestdeutscherVerlag,1997).

6

out to be exaggerated or false. The virtual presence of risk suffices to exert

powerovergroupsandsocieties.9

Potent fears of invisible contamination made agricultural antibiotics

appear risky in certain sectors of society. In turn, shared definitions of

antimicrobial risk became essential to critical groups’ identities and allowed

them to distinguish themselves from other groups via the conspicuous

consumption of food fromorganic sources. In the case of residues and animal

welfare,societieshadtoaskthemselveswhether‘pure’andethicallysoundfood

wasarightoraprivilegetobepurchasedfromspecialistsuppliers.10

However, as already mentioned, the outcomes of such risk evaluations

could vary strongly. On both sides of the Atlantic, pre-existing risk cultures

shaped antibiotic regulation in different ways and constituted what Sheila

Jasanoff has termed distinct “civic epistemologies” 11 . However, these

epistemologies were not unchangeable. During the past 70 years, hegemonic

powerstrugglesoverdefinitionsofriskandsafetyhaveplayedanimportantrole

in agricultural antibiotics’ national and transnational history.12Operating on

bothsidesoftheAtlantic,pharmaceuticalcorporationsandagriculturallobbyists

were well aware of the need to frame public concepts of risk and repeatedly

9UlrichBeck,Risikogesellschaft.AufDemWeginEineAndereModerne(Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1986),pp.29-31and35,UlrichBeck,Weltrisikogesellschaft.AufDerSucheNachDerVerlorenenSicherheit(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,2007),pp.22-23and36.Otherauthors,whohavedealtwiththepowerofriskandriskdistributionareMaryDouglasandAaronWilavsky,RiskandCulture.AnEssayontheSelectionofTechnicalandEnvironmentalDangers(Berkeley,LosAngelesandLondon:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1982),StephenHilgartner,'OverflowandContainmentintheAftermathofDisaster',SocialStudiesofScience,37(2007).10Beck,Risikogesellschaft.AufDemWeginEineAndereModerne,pp.14;17-19;29-31&35.11SheilaJasanoff,DesignsonNature:ScienceandDemocracyinEurope&theUnitedStates.(2edn.;PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007),p.8.12ThetermhegemonyisbasedonAntonioGramsci’sconceptofculturalhegemonyseeAlexDemirovic,'PolitischeGesellschaft–ZivileGesellschaft.ZurTheorieDesIntegralenStaatesBeiAntonioGramsci',inSonjaBuckelandAndreasFischer-Lescano(eds.),HegemonieGepanzertMitZwang.ZivilgesellschaftUndPolitikImStaatsverständnisAntonioGramscis(Baden-Baden,2007).

7

acted as “merchants of doubt”13by financing counter-expertise and othering

opponents. Some organic farmers also framed conventional competitors as

irresponsible and dangerous in order to boost trust in their own goods.

Ultimately, all sides employed strategies of agnogenesis14– the conscious

creationofignoranceanddoubt–todiscreditopponents’expertiseandintegrity

inpublicdiscourse,courtsandparliaments.

However,whendiscussing the roleof risk culturesandagnotology, it is

important to remember thatmost farmers and consumers were by nomeans

passive recipients of external expert discourses. Instead, they repeatedly

asserted independent grassroots agency.Whereas consumers chose to boycott

productstheydeemedrisky,farmersalwayshadthefinalsayaboutwhetherto

purchase and use antibiotics or not. In the case of farmers, to write a “use-

centred”15history of agricultural antibiotics is towrite a history of the insitu

appropriation of pharmaceutical high-technology by lay-users far away from

sitesofpharmaceuticalpower,universityexpertiseorgovernmentalcontrol.

Inordertoprovideacomprehensivehistoryofagriculturalantibioticuse

intheUKandUSwhilstleavingthefunctionaldifferentiationbetweenconsumer,

agricultural and official discourses intact, the dissertation is divided into four

parts. Each part is composed of three chapters analysing the development of

public, agricultural and official relations with agricultural antibiotics. The

13NaomiOreskesandErikM.Conway,MerchantsofDoubt.HowaHandfulofScientistsObscuredtheTruthonIssuesfromTobaccoSmoketoGlobalWarming(NewYorketal.:BloomsburyPress,2010).14RobertN.Proctor,'Agnotology.AMissingTermtoDescribetheCulturalProductionofIgnorance(andItsStudy)',inRobertN.ProctorandLindaSchiebinger(eds.),Agnotology.TheMakingandUnmakingofIgnorance(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2008),p.27.;theuseofscandalwasanotherpopularwaytodiscreditopponentsandresembleswhatAriAdutdescribesforpoliticsandartinAriAdut,OnScandal.MoralDisturbancesinSociety,Politics,andArt(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008).15DavidEdgerton,TheShockoftheOld.TechnologyandGlobalHistorysince1900(London:ProfileBooks,2006),p.xii.

8

dissertation’s structure is inspired by Bruno Latour’s network theory16and

Niklas Luhman’s concept of society as a unified macro system integrating

multitudes of smaller autonomous social systems.17As a result, readers can

eitherreadthedissertationasacomprehensivehistoryofagriculturalantibiotics

oreclecticallyfocusonindividualcommunities’antibioticrelations.

The first two parts of the dissertation cover the time from antibiotics’

mass-introduction to agriculture in the early 1950s to 1969 when the UK

pioneeredanewkindofresistance-basedantibioticregulationwiththeso-called

SwannReport.PartOnefocusesonthehistoryofUSagriculturalantibioticuse,

while Part Two covers the UK. The following two parts analyse the growing

divergencebetweenUSandBritishantibioticregulationafter1969.Whereasthe

EUultimatelyphasedoutcertainso-calledsubtherapeutic formsofagricultural

antibioticusein2006,theAmericanFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)isstill

struggling to implement antibiotic restrictions in 2015. Part Three traces

developments in Britain and Europe from Swann onwards and Part Four

analysesthecomplicationsofUSantibioticregulation.

In order to provide the desired macro and micro narratives, the

dissertation utilizes awide range of sources between1945 and 2015. Sources

includegovernmentaldocumentsonantibioticpolicy;nationalnewspapersand

magazines;scientificpublicationsinthefieldsofagriculture,biology,veterinary

andhumanmedicine;farmingmagazinesandconsumerpublications.

Althoughnewspapersareanotoriouslydifficultgroupofsourcesdueto

their overlapping descriptive and normative functions, they are an invaluable16BrunoLatour,ScienceinAction(Cambridge(Ma.):HarvardUniversityPress,1987),BrunoLatour,ReassemblingtheSocial.AnIntroductiontoActor-Network-Theory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),pp.249-61.17NiklasLuhmann,DieGesellschaftDerGesellschaft(Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1997),p.78.

9

trove of agricultural risk and societal mobilisation discourses. The analysed

newspaperscoverawiderangeofpoliticalspectraintheUSandBritain.Among

the British newspapers analysed are The Times, Guardian, Observer, Daily

Telegraph, London Illustrated News and Daily Mirror. In the US, the analysis

comprises theNewYorkTimes,TimeMagazine,Newsweek,TheWashingtonPost,

ScientificAmerican,TheNationalReviewandVogue.

Duetothisstudy’semphasisonlay-actors’agency,nichepublicationsfor

specific milieus are of particular interest. Despite their reputation for being

somewhat dry, farmers’ magazines are fascinating sources. Frank Uekötter’s

workonGermanagriculturaljournalismhasshownthatfarmmagazinesprovide

a central forum for establishing a common agricultural identity. 18 Farm

magazines are also the place where negotiations about the adoption of

technologieslikeantibioticstakeplacebetweenfarmersandtheagriculturaland

industrial expert system through articles, advertisements and letters to the

editor. Magazines likewise reveal the changing status of organic agriculture

within the farming community. The British publications studied are Farmers’

Weekly and British Farmer. In the US, the dissertation’s media analysis

encompasses Progressive Farmer, Feedstuffs,Wallaces Farmer, Prairie Farmer,

IndianaPrairieFarmer,FarmJournalandFarmBureauNews.

Lifestyleguidesand fashionmagazinesalsoprovide invaluableglimpses

intothetransientworldofWesternfoodconsumptionandvaluesystems.Inthe

late 1960s, the advent of pro-organic restaurant recommendations in

18FrankUekötter,'LandwirtschaftlicheZeitschriftenAlsMedienDerVerwissenschaftlichungDerLandwirtschaftUndDerVergesellschaftungDerAgrarwissenschaften',inSigridStockel,WiebkeLisner,andGerlindRüve(eds.),DasMediumWissenschaftszeitschriftSeitDem19.Jahrhundert.VerwissenschaftlichungDerGesellschaft–VergesellschaftungDerWissenschaft(Stuttgart:FranzSteinerVerlag,2009).

10

publicationslikeVogueindicateshiftsinthefashionablenessoffoodchoicesand

growing fears of antibiotic residues and bacterial resistance in the upper and

middleclasses.Changingattitudestowardsantibioticsandintensiveagriculture

also become apparent in bestsellers and nutritional campaigns by journalists,

intellectuals and activists. Ruth Harrison, Rachel Carson, Ralph Nader, Jeremy

Rifkin,OrvilleSchell,MichaelPollanandJonathanSafranFoer19arejustafewof

thebestsellingauthorscriticisingconventionalagriculturesincethe1950s.

Givenagriculturalantibiotics’prominenceinthehistoryofWesternfood

production,itissurprisingthatfewhistorianshavechosentocoverthissubject.

Many general histories of agriculture tend to treat antibiotics enpassant and

instead focus on other chemicals like fertilisers, insecticides and pesticides.20

Meanwhile,therearenumerousmonographsdevotedtoothercontroversial20th

century substances likeDDT,DES, BPA andAgentOrange.21Historians of food

19RuthHarrison,AnimalMachines(London:VincentStuartLtd,1964),RachelCarson,SilentSpring(NewYork:FirstMarinerBooks,2002),JeremyRifkin,BeyondBeef.TheRiseandFalloftheCattleCulture(LondonandNewYork:PenguinBooks,1992),OrvilleSchell,ModernMeat.Antibiotics,HormonesandthePharmaceuticalFarm(NewYorkRandomHouse,1985),MichaelPollan,TheOmnivore’sDilemma.ANaturalHistoryofFourMeals(LondonandNewYork:PenguinBooks,2006),JonathanSafranFoer,EatingAnimals(LondonandNewYork:PenguinBooks,2010).20B.A.Holderness,BritishAgriculturesince1945(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1985),JohnMartin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931(Londonetal.:MacMillan&St.Martin'sPress,2000),DouglasR.Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury(Chicago:IvanR.Dee,2002),DeborahFitzgerald,EveryFarmaFactory.TheIndustrialIdealinAmericanAgriculture(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2003),AlanL.OlmsteadandPaulW.Rhode,CreatingAbundance.BiologicalInnovationandAmericanAgriculturalDevelopment(Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),FrankUekötter,DieWahrheitIstAufDemFeld.EineWissensgeschichteDerDeutschenLandwirtschaft(Göttingen:Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht,2010),pp.340-44,ErnstLangthaler,'LandwirtschaftVorUndinDerGlobalisierung',inErnstLangthalerandReinhartSiedler(eds.),Globalgeschichte1800-2000(Wienetal.:BöhlauVerlag,2010).21ChristianSimon,Ddt.KulturgeschichteEinerChemischenVerbindung(Basel:ChristianMerianVerlag,1999),NicolasRasmussen,'PlantHormonesinWarandPeace:Science,Industry,andGovernmentintheDevelopmentofHerbicidesin1940sAmerica',Isis,92/2(June)(2001),NancyLangston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2010),SarahA.Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals(Berkeleyatal.:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2013),SorayaBoudiaandNathalieJas(eds.),PowerlessScience?ScienceandPoliticsinaToxicWorld(NewYorkandOxford:Berghahn,2014).

11

havealsogiven the subjectof agricultural antibioticsawideberthand instead

focus on changes in 20th century diets and nutritional standards.22Similarly,

environmentalhistorianshavenotlinkedhistoriesofmodernchemicaluse,food

productionandconsumption.Althoughtransnationalflowsoflabour,chemicals

andcommoditieshavebeenstudied in the contextof colonial andpostcolonial

history,23there are no comparable studies of Western agriculture and food

consumptionfollowing1950.Whenitcomestothehistoryofmedicine,thereare

numerous works dealing with antibiotics in the context of human medicine,

regulation and the pharmaceutical industry, but hardly any addressing non-

humanantibioticuse.24

22Jean-LouisFlandrinandHansJürgenTeuteberg,'TheTransformationoftheEuropeanDiet',inJean-LouisFlandrinandMassimoMontanari(eds.),Food.ACulinaryHistoryfromAntiquitytothePresent(2edn.,EuropeanPerspectives:ASeriesinSocialThoughtandCulturalCriticism;NewYorkandChichester:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1999),ClaudeFischler,'The‘Mcdonaldization’ofCulture',ibid,HarveyLevenstein,'ThePerilsofAbundance.Food,Health,andMoralityinAmericanHistory',inJean-LouisFlandrinandMassimoMontanari(eds.),Food.ACulinaryHistoryfromAntiquitytothePresent(2edn.,EuropeanPerspectives:ASeriesinSocialThoughtandCulturalCriticism;NewYorkandChichester:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1999),SidneyW.Mintz,'FoodandEating:SomePersistingQuestions',inWarrenBelascoandPhilipScranton(eds.),FoodNations.SellingTasteinConsumerSocieties(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2002),HansJ.Teuteberg,'TheBirthoftheModernConsumerAge.FoodInnovationsfrom1800',inPaulFreedman(ed.),TheHistoryofTaste(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2007),PeterScholliers,'NoveltyandTradition.TheNewLandscapeforGastronomy',inPaulFreedman(ed.),Food.TheHistoryofTaste(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2007),WarrenJ.Belasco,AppetiteforChange.HowtheCountercultureTookontheFoodIndustry(2ndedn.;IthacaandNewYork:CornellUniversityPress2007).23JudithA.Carney,BlackRice.TheAfricanOriginsofRiceCultivationintheAmericas(CambridgeM.A.andLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),JohnSoluri,BananaCultures:Agriculture,ConsumptionandEnvironmentalChangeinHondurasandtheUnitedStates(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,2005).24AllanM.Brandt,NoMagicBullet.ASocialHistoryofVenerealDiseaseintheUnitedStatessince1880(NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1985),PeterNeushul,'Science,Government,andtheMassProductionofPenicillin',JournaloftheHistoryofMedicineandAlliedSciences,48(1993),RockBrynnerandTrentStephens,DarkRemedy.TheImpactofThalidomideandItsRevivalasaVitalMedicine(NewYork:PerseusBooks,2001),KathrynHillier,'BabiesandBacteria:PhageTypingBacteriologists,andtheBirthofInfectionControl',BulletinoftheHistoryofMedicine,80/4(2006),AngelaN.H.Creager,'AdaptationorSelection?OldIssuesandNewStakesinthePostwarDebatesoverBacterialDrugResistance',StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyofBiologyandBiomedicalSciences,38(2007),ScottH.Podolsky,'AntibioticsandtheSocialHistoryoftheControlledClinicalTrial.1950-1970',JournaloftheHistoryofMedicineandAlliedSciences,65/3(2010),ChristophGradmann,'SensitiveMatters:TheWorldHealthOrganisationandAntibioticResistanceTesting,1945-1975',SocialHistoryofMedicine,26/3(2013),Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,Christoph

12

However, over the past decade, the historiographic gap regarding

agricultural antibioticshasgraduallydiminished: in2004, the lateMarkFinlay

publishedapioneeringessayonHogs,AntibioticsandtheIndustrialEnvironments

of Post War Agriculture.25Published in the same volume, Roger Horowitz’s

MakingTheChickenofTomorrow26traced thehistoryof theUSpoultry sectors’

antibiotic-dependent development. In 2009, Robert Bud’s seminal Penicillin:

TriumphandTragedy27devotedanentirechaptertoagriculturalantibioticsand

linkedtheirhistorytoageneralhistoryofantibioticuseanditschallenges.Inthe

sameyear,J.L.Anderson’sIndustrializingtheCornBelt28alsocontainedachapter

studyingagriculturalusesofantibioticsandhormonesintheUSbetween1942

and1972. In 2010 and2015 respectively,Kendra SmithHowardpublished an

essayandamonographonthehistoryofUSmilkproductionandpurityuptothe

1970s.29Both her essay and book dealt extensively with issues relating to

antibiotic use and problems in dairy farming and also focussed on farmers’

perception of technological risk. In 2011, Andrew Godley and T.A.B. Corley

publishedausefuloverviewofthehistoryoftheveterinarymedicinesindustryGradmann,'Re-InventingInfectiousDisease:AntibioticResistanceandDrugDevelopmentattheBayerCompany1945-1980',MedicalHistory,60/2(2016(inprint)).25MarkR.Finlay,'Hogs,Antibiotics,andtheIndustrialEnvironmentsofPostwarAgriculture',inPhilipScrantonandSusanR.Schrepfer(eds.),IndustrializingOrganisms.IntroducingEvolutionaryHistory(HagleyPerspectivesonBusinessandCulture;London:Routledge,2004).;Finlay’slateressaysonthesubjectremainunpublishedseeMarkR.Finlay,''ConsumeristTerrorists':BattlesoverAgriculturalAntibioticsintheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope',inChristophGradmannandFlurinCondrau(eds.),(Upcoming).26RogerHorowitz,'MakingtheChickenofTomorrow.ReworkingPoultryasCommoditiesandasCreatures,1945-1990',inSusanR.SchrepferandScrantonPhilip(eds.),IndustrializingOrganisms.IntroducingEvolutionaryHistory(NewYorketal.,2004).;alsoseeRogerHorowitz,PuttingMeatontheAmericanTable.Taste,Technology,Transformation(Baltimore,2006).27RobertBud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).28J.L.Anderson,IndustrializingtheCornBelt.Agriculture,TechnologyandEnvironment,1942-1972(Dekalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress,2009).29KendraSmith-Howard,'AntibioticsandAgriculturalChange:PurifyingMilkandProtectingHealthinthePostwarEra',AgriculturalHistorySociety,84/3(2010),KendraSmith-Howard,PureandModernMilk.AnEnvironmentalHistorysince1900(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013);seealsoKendraSmith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970(Wisconsin:UniversityofWisconsin-Madison(Dissertation),2007).

13

in Britain.30In 2012, Ulrike Thoms published an expert-centred overview of

agricultural antibiotics’ history inWest-Germany.31Agricultural antibiotics and

disease problems in modern agriculture have also featured in Abigail Wood’s

workonanimalhealthregimesandtherelationsbetweenveterinarians,farmers

andgovernmentalofficialsin20thcenturyBritain.32In2015,HannahLandecker

published an intriguing essay on the long-term consequences of antibiotics’

mass-introduction to the environment for human and non-human history.33In

the same year, AnneHardy’sSalmonellaInfections,NetworksofKnowledge,and

Public Health in Britain 1880-197534analysed the development of foodborne

infections and British scientific and official responses. Currently, Delphine

BerdahisworkingonacomparativehistoryofagriculturalantibioticsinFrance

andtheUKbetweenthe1940sand1970s.

Whilealloftheabove-mentionedstudieshaveplayedanimportantrolein

the development of this dissertation, none address the history of the use,

perceptionandregulationofnon-humanantibioticuseinatransatlanticcontext.

In the face of currentWHOwarnings about failing antibiotics,my dissertation

aims to go a step further and provide an integrated account of differing risk

30T.A.BCorleyandAndrewGodley,'TheVeterinaryMedicinesIndustryinBritain,1900-2000',EconomicHistoryReview,64(2011).31UlrikeThoms,'BetweenPromiseandThreat.AntibioticsinFoodsinWestGermany1950-1980',NTM,20(2012);seealsoUlrikeThoms,'AntibioticsinFoods:PrecariousMattersunderDiscussion',inViolaBalz,AlexanderVonSchwerin,andBettinaWahrig(eds.),PrecariousMatters/PrekäreStoffe.TheHistoryofDangerousandEndangeredSubstancesinthe19thand20thCenturies(Berlin:Max-Planck-InstitutfürWissenschaftsgeschichte(Preprint),2008).32AbigailWoods,'WhySlaughter?TheCulturalDimensionsofBritain'sFootandMouthDiseaseControlPolicy,1892-2001',JournalofAgriculturalandEnvironmentalEthics,17(2004),AbigailWoods,'TheFarmasClinic:VeterinaryExpertiseandtheTransformationofDairyFarming,1930–1950',StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyofBiologicalandBiomedicalSciences,38(2007),AbigailWoods,'‚Partnership’inAction:ContagiousAbortionandtheGovernanceofLivestockDiseaseinBritain,1885-1921',Minerva,47(2009),AbigailWoods,'IsPreventionBetterThanCure?TheRiseandFallofVeterinaryPreventiveMedicine,C.1950-1980',SocialHistoryofMedicine,26/1(2012).33HannahLandecker,'AntibioticResistanceandtheBiologyofHistory',Body&Society(2015).34AnneHardy,SalmonellaInfections,NetworksofKnowledge,andPublicHealthinBritain1880-1975(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015).

14

perceptions and antibiotic regulations. Only by understanding antibiotics’

different meanings for different groups will regulators on both sides of the

Atlantic be able to formulate and institute a coherent policy to maintain

antibiotics’efficacy.

15

PartOne–USA:Fromindustrialisedagriculturetomanufacturedhazards(1949-1966)

ChapterOne:PickingOne’sPoisons–AntibioticsandthePublicAlthoughtheuseofantibacterialremediesisprobablyasoldashumanityitself,

the firsthalfof the20th centurysaw the revolutionary introductionofawhole

seriesofeffective,industriallyproducedantimicrobialdrugs.Intheearly1900s,

German scientist Paul Ehrlich triggered a large-scale hunt for so-called magic

bullets.During a timeof rapidly growingknowledge aboutbacterial taxonomy

anddiseases, scientists subsequently began searching for substances that only

targeted prokaryotic bacteria cells while leaving eukaryotic animal cells

unharmed. By the 1930s, the discovery and mass-production of chemically

synthesisedsulphadrugslikeProntosilseeminglyansweredEhrlich’schallenge.

However, toxicity problems and the rapid development of bacterial resistance

soontriggeredasecondroundofresearch.1

Researchers now grew interested in the antibacterial substances

produced by certainmicroorganisms, which Rutgers Universitymicrobiologist

Selman Waksman termed ‘anti-biotic’ (‘against-life’) in 1941.2Of this second

generation of antibacterials, penicillin is undoubtedly themost iconic. Isolated

and refined from the fungus Pencillium notatum in Oxford and subsequently

purified and mass-produced in the US, penicillin cured many sulphonamide-

1Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.13-17,Gradmann,'SensitiveMatters:TheWorldHealthOrganisationandAntibioticResistanceTesting,1945-1975',p.558.2'HistoryoftheWord'Antibiotic'/DiscussionbetweenDr.S.A.WaksmanandDr.J.E.Flynnon19January1962',JournaloftheHistoryofMedicineandAlliedSciences,XXVIII/3(1973).

16

resistantbacterialinfections.3ThevastresourcesdeployedbytheAlliestoturn

penicillinintoamass-medicinealsomadeitexemplaryofanewkindofplanned

‘BigScience’.4

With production of unpatented penicillin expanding rapidly after 1945,

prices collapsed and pharmaceutical companies began to search for new,

patentable antibiotics. They did not have to look for long: employing mass-

screeningtechniques,companiesexperiencedaveritableantibioticgoldrush.In

1943, a team surrounding Selman Waksman had already discovered

streptomycin.In1946,Parke-Davisisolatedtheantibioticchloramphenicol.Two

years later, the Lederle Laboratories branch of American Cyanamid patented

Aureomycin (chlortetracycline). In 1949, Pfizer isolated Terramycin

(oxytetracycline) and Selman Waksman discovered neomycin. Between 1952

and1953,PfizerandLederleracedtopatent tetracycline.5Meanwhile,Dorothy

Hodgkin’s decryption of penicillin’s molecular structure indicated that a

bountifulageofsyntheticantibioticsmightbeforthcoming.6

1950sphysicianswere thusable tochoose fromawiderangeofpotent

antibacterials: inhibiting bacterial cell wall synthesis by binding important

enzymes, so-called β-lactam antibiotics like penicillin G and V were mostly

effective against single-walled gram-positive bacteria. By contrast, so-called

broad-spectrumantibioticslikethetetracyclinespreventthedockingoftRNAat

the ribosomeandpreventprotein synthesis inbothgram-positiveanddouble-

3Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.28-44,Neushul,'Science,Government,andtheMassProductionofPenicillin',EricLax,TheMouldinDrFlorey'sCoat.TheRemarkableTrueStoryofthePenicillinMiracle(London:Abacus,2011).4Forotherexamplesof‘BigScience’seePeterGalisonandBruceHevly,BigScience.TheGrowthofLarge-ScaleResearch(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1992).5Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.107-08.6Methicillin,thefirstsemi-syntheticantibiotic,wasdevelopedin1959;ibid.,pp.120-28.

17

walled gram–negative bacteria. 7 Defeating old scourges like tuberculosis,

gonorrhoea,syphilisandtyphoid,second-generationantibioticswerecelebrated

astruepanaceas.

However,thefloodofnewantibioticsalsoincreasedcompetitionamongst

pharmaceuticalcompanies.Keentomaximiseprofits,companieslookedfornew

markets. The economic potential of the veterinary market was particularly

promising. Although antibiotics like gramicidin had already been used against

bacterial udder infections in cows (mastitis) during the 1940s, the post-war

pricedeclinemeantthatpet-ownersandfarmerscouldaffordroutineantibiotic

treatmentforanimals.8Insteadofcallingaveterinarian,farmerscouldmedicate

entireherdsbymixingantibioticconcentratesintofeedsandwater.

Non-therapeutic antibiotic applications soon also proved lucrative. In

1948,researchersdiscoveredandlinkedvitaminB12tothehithertomysterious

Animal Protein Factor (APF), which stimulated growth and was present in

animal products but absent in cheaper and less efficient plant-based feeds.9

Merck researchers also discovered that culture broths for streptomycin

producedvitaminB12–therebyturningfermentationwastesintovaluablefeed

components. In 1949, American Cyanamid Lederle Laboratories researchers

Thomas Jukes and E.L. Stockstad found that chicks fed chlortetracycline

(Aureomycin) fermentation wastes grew faster than chicks fed crystalline

7JasonC.GallagherandConanMacdougall,AntibioticsSimplified(Bostonetal.:JonesandBartlettPublishers,2009).8Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.165-66.;GeorgeA.Woods,‘PotionsForPets’,NewYorkTimes[Inthefollowing:NYT],25.07.1954,p.SM20.9Finlay,'Hogs,Antibiotics,andtheIndustrialEnvironmentsofPostwarAgriculture',p.243.

18

vitamin B12. Jukes and Stockstad soon discovered that animals’ ‘additional

growth’wascausedbychlortetracyclineresiduesinthefermentationwastes.10

AnnouncedinApril1950,theso-calledantibioticgrowtheffectwasgood

news for antibiotic manufacturers11and received glowing coverage in the US

press.12Whereashumansreceivedantibioticstherapeuticallyforlimitedperiods

oftime,long-termantibioticgrowthpromotion(AGP)openedalargenewoutlet

for the oversupplied antibiotic market. ‘Subtherapeutic’ antibiotic growth

promoter feeds (AGPs) initially contained doses 30 to 100 timesweaker than

doses for therapeutic treatment and significantly improved animals’ rate of

gain.13Foratime,itseemedasthoughantibioticscouldnotonlycurethesickbut

alsosolveglobalnutritionalproblems.14

Whileearlyresearchersbelievedthatantibioticsoptimisedthemicrobial

flora inanimals’digestivesystems,15theexactmechanismsbehindAGPremain

unclear. There are several competing theories: (1) that by inhibiting bacterial

digestion, antibioticsmaximise the amount of available sugar; (2) that feeding

antibiotics favours the presence of vitamin-producing bacteria and combats

toxin-producing bacteria; (3) that antibiotics favourably change the acidity of

animals’stomachs.16

10ThomasH.Jukes,AntibioticsinNutrition(NewYork:MedicalEncyclopedia,1955),pp.17-18,E.L.R.Stokstadetal.,'TheMultipleNatureoftheAnimalProteinFactor',JournalofBiologicalChemistry,180/2(1949).11Finlay,'Hogs,Antibiotics,andtheIndustrialEnvironmentsofPostwarAgriculture',p.244.12Ibid.;WaldemarKaempffert,‘ScienceinReview’,NYT,16.04.1950,p.E9.13Jukes,AntibioticsinNutrition,p.57,R.Braude,H.D.Wallace,andT.J.Cunha,'TheValueofAntibioticsintheNutritionofSwine:AReview',AntibioticsandChemotherapy,3(1953).14‘AntibioticsAttainBigMedicalField’,NYT,13.05.1950,p.19;‘AnimalFeedSupplementHasTerramycinFactor’,NYT,30.10.1950,p.38;‘Business:HowtoGrowFaster’,Time,26.02.1951[TimeMagazinearticleshavebeentakenfromTIMEOnlineArchives,whichdonotprovidepagenumbersuntil1980];‘AntibioticsGivePigsAFastStartInLife’,NYT,08.06.1952,p.F4.15Jukes,AntibioticsinNutrition,p.41.16Lawrence,Fowler,andNovakofski,GrowthofFarmAnimals,p.327.

19

However,thislackofknowledgedidnotpreventAGPs’mass-introduction

toUSagricultureor theiruse in feed trialsonprison inmates andGuatemalan

schoolchildren. According to the director of the International Institute of

NutritionofCentralAmericaandPanama,malnourished“childrenmaysomeday

beeatingaureomycincandytoimprovetheirdiets.”17Referringtothesignificant

changeswroughtbyantibiotics,theWashingtonPostenthused:

Each week 80,000 chicks are produced and moved to [Armour &Co’s]Ches-Peakefarm,(…).Byscientificfeeding,controlledtemperatures,germ-killing rays, water treated with such drugs as terramycin,aureomycin, and antibiotics [sic], the birds are ready for slaughter inthree-fourthsthetimebyordinarymethods.18

EmployingHuxleyianrhetoric,TimemagazinedescribedhowPfizerwasshaking

up conservative farmers with the help of “synthetic sow’s milk spiked with

terramycin.”19Thankstoantibiotics,“platoonsoflittlepigswereenjoyingaperil-

freeinfancy(…)nonearetrampledoreaten;nolucklessruntsareleftteatless.”20

On Pfizer farms, pigletmortality had declined from between 21-33% to 5%.21

Sows could be “put back towork” immediately instead “of (…) performing no

other service than can be performed by the milking machine at the nearest

dairy.”22By1954,penicillinco-discovererSirAlexanderFlemingpredicted that

penicillin’suseasagrowthpromotermightsomedayexceedtherapeuticuses.23

17MiltonLevenson,‘SixLatinNationsStudyNutrition’,NYT,11.05.1951,p.27;trialswithstreptomycinwerealsoconsidered;‘VitaminB-12SpursGrowth,Dietitians[sic]Told’,WP,19.10.1950,p.14.18JohnW.Ball,‘NewChickenProceduresLikeFactory’,WP,22.05.1951,p.B2.19‘Science:PigsWithoutMoms’,Time,03.12.1951.20Ibid.21Ibid.22‘AntibioticsUsedonLivestockbyHormelToClearBacteriaforFullEffectofFodder’,NYT,13.12.1951,p.53.23FosterHailey,‘MoreCareUrgedInAntibioticsUse’,NYT,25.03.1954,p.59.

20

Trustinthenew‘miracledrugs’wassuchthatjournalistsdidnotobjectto

antibiotics’ planned use as food preservatives or plant sprays either.24 There

really seemed to be no area of human health and food production in which

antibiotics couldnotworkmiracles. In1953, thePost rejoiced: “antibiotics are

becomingwonderdrugstosavefoodcrops(…),giveusmoreandtastiermeats,

evenaidinmakingbeerandwhisky.”25

Nowhere was early antibiotic-enthusiasm greater than in Scientific

American:proclaimingan“antibioticage”26in1951,KennethB.Rapersurveyed

antibiotics’overallimpact:thewholesalemarketvalueofantibioticandvitamin

B12 feed supplements was already estimated to be worth ca. $40-50 million.

Withproductioncostsofantibioticslikepenicillinfallingfromca.$20to4¢per

100,000 units between 1943 and 1951, it was obvious that agricultural

antibiotic-use would continue to expand. 27 According to another article,

antibioticsandotherchemicalswouldadvance“agriculturalefficiencyatleastas

much asmachines have in the past 150 years.”28By taming capricious nature,

agriculture’s chemical revolution was finally allowing humans “to free

[them]selvesfromthedismalphilosophyofRobertMalthus.”29

Scientific American’s attack on Malthus supported a central tenet of

American political discourse. According to Malthus, the human population’s

exponential growth would always exceed the linear growth of agricultural

productivity. As a consequence, population growthwould inevitably be halted24N.S.Haseltine,‘DrugFoundtoSealinFlavorOfFoodasItIsBeingCanned’,WP,18.05.1950,p.B8;Idem,‘WhaleMeatKeptbyAntibioticsReportedComingtoUSKitchens’,WP,20.10.1956,p.C11;‘FoodNews:PreservationProcess’,NYT,29.11.1955,p.26.25‘AntibioticsNowFightingPlantDiseases’,WP,11.09.1953,p.19.26KennethB.Raper,‘TheProgressOfAntibiotics’,ScientificAmerican[inthefollowingSciAm],1864/1952,p.49.27Ibid.,p.54.28FrancisJosephWeiss,‘ChemicalAgriculture’,SciAm,18708/1952,p.1829Ibid.

21

eitherbypreventivecheckson fertilityorpositivechecks– i.e.risingmortality

through famine. 30 However, following 1945, unprecedented agricultural

productivitynotonlypromised todefeatMalthus’ lawbutwasalso seenasan

effectivewaytocontaincommunism.Inhis1949‘FourPointSpeech’,President

Truman equated global economic and agricultural development with victory

overcommunism.ForpatrioticUSresearchers,thepromulgationofagricultural

efficiencybecameamoralduty.Over thenext twentyyears, theUSdoctrineof

scientific plenty resulted in a surge of foreign aid and investment in US

agriculturalintensification.31

The Cold War paradigm of Western plenty also influenced other US

newspapers’ on-going support of agricultural antibiotics. For the NYT, rising

antibiotic use andmeat consumption symbolised American progressivism.32In

1955, the Post reported that agricultural progress was allowing the average

American to consume 13% more food than in pre-war years.33Increased

chemicalanddrugusewasseenasanecessarypre-conditionofUSplenty:

Nowadays the doctor arrives with a station wagon full of hypos,stimulators,pillsandpenicillinandButtercupgetsthebenefitofmodernmedicine.(…),ahigh-producingpurebrednowadaysisashamedtoshowupatmilkingtimewithouttwicetheloadhergrandmothercarried.34

In 1959, theNYT celebrated the “chemical revolution on the farm” for “all but

[wiping] out the Malthusian fear”: “… [it] has gone too far to be halted or

30IrmiSeidlandClemA.Tisdell,'CarryingCapacityReconsidered:FromMalthus'PopulationTheorytoCulturalCarryingCapacity',EcologicalEconomics,30/3(1999).31NickCullather,TheHungryWorld.America'sColdWarBattleagainstPovertyinAsia(Cambridge(Ma.)andLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,2010),pp.2-10.32JohnStuart,‘AmericanFarmerStillMaking‘Hay’’,NYT,13.12.1953,p.F1.33JackRyan,‘FarmersReapingBumperCropofChemicals’,WP,20.03.1955,p.F1.34AubreyGraves,‘EverTrytoStuffaHeiferwithKing-SizeAntibiotics?’,WP,04.01.1953,p.B2.

22

reversed.TodayitisanAge,notanevent–anAgethatoffersgreatopportunities

forthefutureforthosewhocanharnessandexploitthem.”35

However, agriculture’s chemical abundance also exacted a price.

Following1945,environmentalcancerresearchheightenedAmericans’wariness

of long-term exposure to minute doses of invisible chemicals.36Chemical

residues in food seemed particularly problematic. In 1949, Republican

Representative Frank B. Keefe successfully lobbied for the installation of a

CongressionalSelectCommitteetoInvestigatetheUseofChemicalsinFoodand

Cosmetics. Following Keefe’s death, Democrat Representative James J. Delaney

took over the Committee’s chair.37In 1951, the Select Committee’s report

attackedtheuseofinadequatelytestedsyntheticsubstancesanddemandednew

legislationtoprotectthepublicfromcarcinogensandlatentpoisoning.38Having

losthiswifetocancer,Delaneycontinuedtocrusadeforstricterregulationsfor

thenexttwodecades.39

Many of Delaney’s efforts were, however, weakened by a concerted

counter-campaign. Attempting to ward off public criticism, the Manufacturing

Chemists’AssociationhiredHillandKnowlton,apublicrelationsfirmrenowned

for defending the tobacco industry against cancer allegations.40Supporters of

agriculturalchemicalsusedsimilarstrategiestoweakennewlegislation:in1954,

35WilliamBurryFurlong,‘ChemicalRevolutionontheFarm’,NYT,04.10.1959,p.37;seealso‘Agriculture:ThePushbuttonCornucopia’,Time,09.03.1959.36ChristopherC.Sellers,HazardsoftheJob.FromIndustrialDiseasetoEnvironmentalHealthScience(ChapelHill&London:NorthCarolinaPress,1997),pp.221-24.37WallaceF.Janssen,'Fdasince1938:TheMajorTrendsandDevelopments',JournalofPublicLaw,13/1(1964).38‘InvestigationOfTheUseOfChemicalsInFoodProducts.Report’,UnionCalendar,No.1139,Report3254,03.01.1951,pp.1-11.Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,pp.80-81.39DavidVogel,ThePoliticsofPrecaution.RegulatingHealth,SafetyandEnvironmentalRisksinEuropeandtheUnitedStates(PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2012),pp.45-46.40Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,p.81.

23

the so-called Miller Act (Pesticide Chemicals Act) attempted to reconcile

chemical use with consumer safety by mandating the establishment of ‘safe’

tolerance levels for chemical residues.41 In 1958, industry lobbying also

influencedthenewFoodAdditivesAmendmenttothe1938FederalFood,Drug,

andCosmeticAct (FDC). Insteadof theproposedmandatory testingregime for

new substances, Congress passed a weaker bill, which merely required

unspecifiedproofofadditives’safety.42Similartothe1954MillerAct,the1958

Amendment also tolerated residues of legal additives if they remained within

pre-defined levels. According to historian Sarah Vogel, the 1958 Amendment

weakenedconsumers’protectionagainsthazardouschemicalsperse andmade

riskdependentontheamountofchemicalexposure.43

The only exception to the dose-response dominated 1958 Amendment

wastheso-calledDelaneyClause.AdirectresultofJamesDelaney’slobbying,the

Delaney Clause established a zero-tolerance policy for carcinogens in food. By

stating that carcinogens were unacceptable regardless of their dosage, the

Delaney Clause epitomised Americans’ growing preoccupation with cancer.

However, by focussing precautionary risk policy on carcinogens alone, the

Delaney Clause indirectly legitimised threshold models for non-carcinogenic

substanceslikeantibioticsandlimiteddiscussionsofchemicalrisktotheissueof

residues.44

Despite the watering-down of many chemical guidelines, the debates

triggeredbyDelaneyandhissupportersleftastrongimpressiononthepublic’s

41Janssen,'Fdasince1938:TheMajorTrendsandDevelopments',p.208.42Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,p.81.43Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,pp.15-42,Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,p.81.44Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,p.82.

24

mind:evensupposedly‘safe’chemicalscouldprovedangerousinthelong-term.

Agriculturalantibiotics’reputationsufferedaccordingly.

Duringthesecondhalfofthe1950s,mediareportsonfood-bornecancer

hazards began to mention non-carcinogenic antibiotics alongside suspect

carcinogens like DDT and food dyes. In 1956, the NYT reported on the

International Union Against Cancer’s symposium in Rome. During the

symposium, scientists warned that inadequately tested food additives were

creatinga“seriouspublichealthproblem.”45AccordingtoWilliamHueper,head

of the US National Cancer Institute’s Environmental Cancer Section, suspected

carcinogens included: dyes, thickeners, synthetic sweeteners, preservatives,

bleaches, fat substitutes, pesticide residues, chemical sterilizers, wrapping

materials,oestrogensandantibiotics.46

Publicsuspicionofagriculturalantibioticsalsogrewbecauseofincreased

knowledge about antibiotic allergies. During the 1940s, it emerged that some

peoplewereallergic to certainantibiotics.Allergies toβ-lactamantibiotics like

penicillinwereparticularlyfrequent.Allergicreactionstopenicillincouldrange

from mild skin irritations to painful hives or a lethal anaphylactic shock.

Meanwhile, studies onnurses revealed that constant antibiotic-exposure could

foster the development of such hypersensitivity.47In 1957, the US Food and

Drugs Administration (FDA) published a survey of severe reactions to

antibiotics. Between 1953 and early 1957, 1070 ‘life-threatening’ allergic

reactionshadbeenreportedtotheFDA.Thecasesincluded72penicillin-related

45ArnaldoCortesi,‘CancerIsTracedToFoodAdditives’,NYT,21.08.1956,p.31.46Ibid.47TheNationalArchives[inthefollowingTNA]PIN20/216(SensitisationofNursingStaffstoAntibiotics,ExtractfromTheLancet,4Jul,1953),pp.1-3;‘Medicine:HoldThatPenicillin’,Time,30.10.1950.

25

deaths.During the same time, physicians had reported a further 1925 ‘severe’

reactions.48

Initially,commentatorsfailedtomaketheconnectionbetweenantibiotic

exposure in medical and agricultural settings.49Reporting on modern dairy

production in1951,NYTjournalistJaneNickersonregardedantibiotic residues

in milk as an “interestin[g], if not too seriou[s]”50annoyance, which merely

complicatedtheproductionofcheesebyinhibitingessentialbacteria.

Suchcomplacencybegantochangefollowingthe1956publicationofan

FDAsurveyofantibiotic residues inmilk.USconsumerswerealarmed tohear

thatupto10%ofmilkmightbecontaminatedwithpenicillin.Althoughofficials

claimed that detected residues were insufficient to create new allergies, they

could trigger existing allergies.51The fact that thepenicillin residueshadbeen

found in milk made the scandal particularly poignant. As recently shown by

historian Kendra Smith-Howard, milk held a special place in the minds of

Americanconsumers.Afundamentalsymbolofhealth,milkwasassociatedwith

feeding the young, infirm and vulnerable.52Prior to the Second World War,

measurestosecuremilkpurityhadcentredontheeradicationofpathogenslike

Salmonella and tuberculosis.53However, after 1945, the detection of chemical

and radioactive residues inmilk challenged pre-existing notions of purity and

48NateHaseltine,’72DeathsLaidToPenicillinUse’,WP,04.10.1957,p.B1.49RobertK.Plumb,‘Antibiotics’UseinRawFoodCited’,NYT,14.09.1957,p.20;arareexceptionisLoulyBaer,‘KeepingFoodsPure’,NYT,09.02.1952,p.12.50JaneNickerson,‘NewsofFood:MilkPlantDoublesOutput’,NYT,25.04.1951,p.45.51NateHaseltine,‘MilkSamplingsYieldTracesofPenicllin’,WP,22.02.1956,p.3.52Smith-Howard,'AntibioticsandAgriculturalChange:PurifyingMilkandProtectingHealthinthePostwarEra'.53PeterAtkins,LiquidMaterialities.AHistoryofMilk,ScienceandtheLaw(FarnhamandBurlington:Ashgate,2010),pp.225-45.

26

safety. As a consequence, definitions of milk purity began to encompass the

absenceofchemicaladulterants.54

Changing definitions of purity also challenged laypersons’ unrestricted

accesstopotenttherapeutics.Bythelate1950s,cancerfearsandconcernsabout

theinvisiblecontaminationof foodstuffs ledtoanewambivalenceofUSmedia

reportsonagriculture’s‘chemicalrevolution’:continuingtocelebrate‘synthetic’

chemicalsforharnessingcapriciousnature,reportsalsodemandedthatfarmers

containtheverysame‘synthetic’substancessoasnottoadulterate‘natural’food

andbodies.

Publicconcernswerefurtherheightenedin1959whenthenewDelaney

Clause forced theFDA to take action againstmillionsof poundsof cranberries

produced with the herbicide aminotriazole ahead of Thanksgiving, the most

importantdate in cranberrygrowers’ year.55Hitting theUS cranberry industry

hard,thescandalreinforcedpublicfearsthatfarmerswereabusingchemicalsfor

the sake of profit. The FDA’s nearly simultaneous disclosure that 3% of milk

samples contained “substantial residues”56of pesticides and 3.7% contained

penicillinresiduesdidnotreassureconsumers.57

One year later, journalist and future Pulitzer Prize winner William

LonggoodstokedconcernswithhisbestsellingbookThePoisonsInYourFood.In

hisintroduction,Longgoodinvitedconsumerstoinspecttheirshoppingbaskets:

Then there’s themilk you give the children (…). But did you know theoddsare(…)onetotenitcontainsantibiotics?(…).Sunday’schickenmayhave traces of antibiotics, arsenic and artificial sex hormones (…). The

54Smith-Howard,'AntibioticsandAgriculturalChange:PurifyingMilkandProtectingHealthinthePostwarEra',pp.329-30;32-33.55Janssen,'Fdasince1938:TheMajorTrendsandDevelopments',p.209.56‘TraceofDDTFoundin1958TestsOfMilkinWashington,OtherCities’,WP,22.12.1959,p.A1.57‘USPushesFighttoRidMilkofPenicillinDregs’,WP,03.12.1959,p.B2.

27

roasts or steaks probably have traces of hormones, antibiotics and theinevitablepoisonsthatwentintothecattle’sdiet.58

Referring to the 1958 Amendment, Longgood accused Congress of having

legalised“masspoisoning(…)bygrantingFDAtherighttodeterminehowmuch

poison residue may remain on marketed food.”59For Longgood, agricultural

antibiotics were no longer miracle substances but sinister contaminants. In

contrast toofficial assurances, cookingdidnotdestroyantibioticpreservatives

andthemilkscandalhadshown“howprecariousthepublic’smarginofsafetyis

whenadangerousdrugisplacedinthehandsoflaymen(…)whoareexpectedto

exercisetheirsenseofresponsibilityattheriskoflosingmoney.”60Linkingthem

to rising allergic reactions, Longgood claimed that antibiotic residues acted as

‘vitaminantagonists’andmaskeddiseaseinslaughteredanimals.61

Unsurprisingly, Longgood’s book provoked angry reactions. In Science,

WilliamJDarby,an influentialnutritionist fromVanderbiltUniversity,attacked

thebookas“anall-timehighin‘bloodthirstypen-pushing’”fromthe“biasofthe

non-scientific, natural food-organic cult.”62Longgood’s “authorities” were “the

cult leaders (…)ora few truescientistswhoseworkorexpressionshavebeen

takeneitheroutofcontextoroutoftime….”63

Dispensingwithabibliography,someofLonggood’sclaimswere indeed

sketchy. However, the fact that The Poisons in Your Foodmanaged to elicit a

review in Scienceshowed that the days of wholesale chemical optimismwere

58WilliamLonggood,ThePoisonsinYourFood(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1960),p.2.59Ibid.,pp.72-73.60Ibid.,p.152.61Ibid.,p.154&56.62WilliamJ.Darby,'Review,thePoisonsinYourFoodbyWilliamLonggood',Science,131/3405(1960).63Ibid.

28

over.Inthepublic’smind,thepromisedchemicalcornucopiawasacquiringthe

bitteraftertasteofinvisibleandpotentiallycarcinogenicresidues.

In contrast to residues, the growing occurrence of bacterial resistance

caused far lessnegativepublicity foragriculturalantibiotics.Althoughmanyof

theexactmechanismswerestillunknownatthetime,64expertswerewellaware

of the general phenomenon of bacterial resistance. As early as the 1930s,

physicianshadnotedthatcertainbacteriaspeciesbecameresistantagainstfirst

generation sulpha drugs.65In the case of fungal antibiotics, the penicillin-

developingOxfordteamnoticedtheoccurrenceofpenicillinresistanceasearly

as1940.66Fiveyearslater,SirAlexanderFlemingwarnedaboutthedevelopment

ofbacterialresistanceuponreceivingtheNobelPrize.67

In order to prevent bacterial resistance, physicians were cautioned to

prescribe combinations of different antibiotics and reserve antibiotics for

essential treatments.68However, with some hospitals spending up to 40% of

theirpharmacybillonantibiotics,itwasclearthatmedicalantibioticusewasfar

from targeted.69Struggling to keep up with 4,562 new prescription products

between1951and1961,manyphysiciansalsoprovedsusceptibletoaggressive

pharmaceutical marketing. Although they often lacked proof of efficacy and

discouraged a proper diagnosis of infections, ‘shotgun’ courses of fixed-dose

antibiotic combinations proved particularly popular. Prominent US infectious

64FCTenover,'MechanismsofAntimicrobialResistanceinBacteria',AmericanJournalofInfectionControl,/June34(5Suppl1)(2006).65ChristophGradmann,'MagicBulletsandMovingTargets:AntibioticResistanceandExperimentalChemotherapy,1900-1940',Dynamis,31/2(2001).66GeorgeW.Gray,‘TheAntibiotics’,SciAm,08/1949,p.33.67AlexanderFleming,'NobelLecture',nobelprize.org(http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1945/fleming-lecture.html[accessed:14.08.2014]).68GeorgeW.Gray,‘TheAntibiotics’,SciAm,08/1949,p.34.69‘SurgeonsWarnedAboutAntibiotics’,NYT,02.11.1951,p.22.

29

diseaseexperts likeMaxwellFinlandfromBoston’sCityHospitalsoonattacked

what they saw as irresponsible marketing practices and physicians’

accommodativeness.70

Further contributing to lax prescription practiceswas the predominant

view of bacterial resistance as a relatively static phenomenon.71The ‘vertical’

view of hereditary resistance proliferation held that antibiotic-resistance was

either already present or resulted from spontaneous mutations in previously

susceptible bacterial strains. Often benefiting from an antibiotic environment,

resistant strains then passed on their resistance to subsequent generations.72

However,withaconstantstreamofnewantibioticsenteringthemarketduring

the 1950s, American commentators deemed the random emergence of local

bacterial resistance containable. SurprisedbyBritish concerns about antibiotic

resistance in 1953, theNYT noted: “The British are probably too pessimistic.

Thereisnoreasontothinkantibioticsareonthewayout.”73

Bythelate1950s,outbreaksofresistantpathogensmadesuchoptimism

wear thin. In 1958, US Surgeon General Leroy Burney categorized resistant

staphylococci as a “problem of national significance.”74Speaking at the 1959

meeting of the Association of American Physicians, Maxwell Finland warned:

“physicianswhoareoverconfidentofgerm-killingwonderdrugsare living ina

fool’sparadisewheretheirpatientsmaydie.”75

70JeremyA.GreeneandScottH.Podolsky,'AHistoricalPerspectiveofPharmaceuticalPromotionandPhysicianEducation',JAMA,30/7(2008),p.831,Podolsky,'AntibioticsandtheSocialHistoryoftheControlledClinicalTrial.1950-1970',p.327.71Gradmann,'SensitiveMatters:TheWorldHealthOrganisationandAntibioticResistanceTesting,1945-1975',pp.556-60.72GeorgeW.Gray,‘TheAntibiotics’,SciAm,08/1949,p.33-34;FrancisJ.Ryan,‘EvolutionObserved’,SciAm,10/1953,pp.79-80&82.73W.K.,‘WillAntibioticsBeAbandoned’,NYT,26.07.1953,p.E7.74NateHaseltine,‘Hospital-BredGermsTargetOfDriveHere’,WP,29.10.1958,p.B1.75‘Medicine:MixedBlessing’,Time,18.05.1959.

30

Similartofearsofantibioticallergies,concernsaboutbacterialresistance

failed to spread from the hospital to the farm. Throughout the 1950s, public

perceptionsofantibioticresistanceinmedicalandagriculturalsettingsremained

curiouslydivorced.NoneoftheanalysedUSnewspapersaddressedthefactthat

bacterialresistancecouldjustaseasilyemergeinanimalsandspreadtohumans.

The only exception to this epistemic dividewas a letter to thePost in August

1952, which criticised veterinary antibiotic overuse and briefly alluded to the

dangerofresistanceselection.AGPswerenotmentioned.76

By theendof the1950s,USperceptionsofagriculturalantibioticswere

thus characterised by a double-rift. The first rift separated anti-Malthusian

promoters of chemical abundance from a growing group of consumers

concernedabout‘unnatural’andpotentiallycarcinogenicresiduesintheirfood.

Thesecondriftdivorceddiscussionsofantibioticrisk inhumanmedicine from

thoseinagriculturalsettings.

The1960ssawAmericansnotonlygrowmoresuspiciousofagricultural

antibiotics but also of the companies producing them.Previously venerated as

“merchantsoflife,”77thevalueofAmericanpharmaceuticalcompanieshadmore

than quadrupled from $500,000,000 after the Second World War to

$2,200,000,000 in 1958.78However, companies’ behaviour had occasionally

been questionable. Between 1959 and 1962, investigations by the Senate’s

Antitrust andMonopoly Subcommittee shed a harsh light ondubiousmark-up

76H.C.Newman,‘UsingAntibiotics’,WP,21.08.1952,p.8.77TomMahoney,TheMerchantsofLife.AnAccountoftheAmericanPharmaceuticalIndustry(NewYork:Harper&Brothers,1959).78JohnW.Finney,‘TheDrugIndustry:WhatItIsAndHowItOperates’,NYT,13.12.1959,p.E8.

31

prices, questionable marketing practices and attempts to drive generic drug

producersoutofbusiness.79

Themostdamagingfindingscameto light inMay1960,whenDemocrat

Senator Carey Estes Kefauver’s Subcommittee announced that it was

investigatingextraincomereceivedbytheheadoftheFDA’sAntibioticsDivision,

HenryWelch.Between1953and1960,Welchhadreceived$287,142forhisrole

as editor-in-chief of the journals Antibiotics and Chemotherapy and Antibiotic

Medicine and Clinical Therapy. Financed by industry, the widely distributed

journals contained articles designed to advertise a whole range of antibiotic

products – sometimes prior to their licensing by Welch’s division.80Industry

representativeshadeveneditedsomeofWelch’sofficialspeeches–inonecase,a

Pfizersloganhadbeenwrittenintoaspeechto“jazzitup.”81AdefiantWelchwas

forcedtoresignfromtheFDAinmid-May1960.82RepublicanSecretaryofHealth

Arthur Flemming subsequently ordered a review of all of Welch’s licensing

decisions.83

Only one year later, the thalidomide scandal struck a second blow to

publictrustinthepharmaceuticalindustry.In1957,theWestGermancompany

ChemieGrünenthalhadbeguntomarketanewsubstancecalledthalidomideasa

sedative and soporific suitable for pregnant women. Despite early evidence

linking thalidomide to neural damage and foetal malformation, Chemie

Grünenthal continued to market its teratogen until November 1961. By then,

79ForacollectionofcontemporaryaccountsoftheinvestigationsandsubsequentlegislationseeRichardHarris,TheRealVoice(Macmillan,1964).80Podolsky,'AntibioticsandtheSocialHistoryoftheControlledClinicalTrial.1950-1970',pp.360-65.81‘FDAAide’sTalkEditedByAdMan’,NYT,02.06.1960,p.25.82‘DrugAideQuits;BlamesPolitics’,NYT,20.05.1960,p.12.83Podolsky,'AntibioticsandtheSocialHistoryoftheControlledClinicalTrial.1950-1970',p.364.

32

exposure to thalidomide was believed to have caused an estimated 10,000

malformations and several hundreddeaths.84Fortunately, thalidomide hadnot

beenlicensedforUSmarkets.Despiterepeatedlicensingrequests,FDAreviewer

Frances Oldham Kelsey had deemed industry data insufficient and demanded

further trials. Kelsey’s heroic story, however, also highlighted how lucky

Americanshadbeen.Withnorequirementsformanufacturerstosubmitclinical

trialsorreportadverseeffects,Kelsey’sdoubtshadbeentheonlythingstanding

betweenthalidomideandtheUSmarket.85

Theearly1960swerethusextremelydamagingforbothpharmaceutical

producersand theFDA: theKefauverHearingsand theWelchand thalidomide

scandals had revealed immoral business practices and gaping holes in US

consumer protection. Reacting to this combined crisis in 1962, President

Kennedy awarded Kelsey the President’s Award for Distinguished Federal

Civilian Service86and signed the FDC’s so-called Kefauver-Harris Amendment.

Whilethe1962Amendmentmandatedpre-licensingefficacytestsofnewdrugs

viacontrolledclinicaltrials,drugmanufacturerswererequiredtoreportadverse

reactionsoneyearlater.87

However, by 1962, consumer distrust was rapidly encompassing the

entirechemicalindustry.Publishedabouttwoweeksaheadofthesigningofthe

Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Silent Spring, the iconic environmentalist

bestseller by marine biologist and conservationist Rachel Carson, launched a

84BrynnerandStephens,DarkRemedy.TheImpactofThalidomideandItsRevivalasaVitalMedicine,pp.ix;5-20;32-35.85DanielCarpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda(PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),pp.238-56.86BridgetM.Kuehn,'FrancesKelseyHonoredforFdaLegacy',JAMA,304/19(2010).87Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,p.229;592.

33

frontal attack on chemical polluters and on DDT in particular.88Similar to

antibiotics, the insecticide DDT was widely regarded as a success story of

wartime science. Liberally used by the Allies during the war, DDT’s post-war

introduction to civilian life was a major commercial success.89Unfortunately,

DDT’ssimilaritytoantibioticsdidnotendhere.ItquicklybecameclearthatDDT

usecouldselectforresistanceininsectpopulationsandresultinresidues,which

accumulated in animal tissues because of DDT’s high fat solubility. DDT

concentrations were especially high towards the top of the food chain. In the

case of America’s heraldic animal, the bald eagle, DDT resulted in thinner

eggshells, which were unable to support the weight of brooding parents. In

additiontosilencingnature,CarsonaccusedDDTandotherchemicalsofcausing

cancer.OfSilentSpring’sseventeenchapters,fiveweredevotedtopesticides’and

herbicides’potentialcarcinogenicity.90

AlthoughitprofitedfromearlierbestsellerslikeThePoisonsinYourFood

and anarchist Murray Bookchin’s nearly contemporaneous bestseller Our

Synthetic Environment, 91 Silent Spring’s successful fusion of environmental

concerns and health concerns triggered a whole series of environmentalist

bestsellersandmediareports. Itsprestigeheightened followingCarson’sdeath

from cancer two years later.92By December 1962, the Post noted that Silent

88Carson,SilentSpring.89Simon,Ddt.KulturgeschichteEinerChemischenVerbindung,EdmundRussell,WarandNature:FightingHumansandInsectswithChemicalsfromWorldWarIto"Silentspring"(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).90Carson,SilentSpring.91UsingthepseudonymLewisHerber,theanarchistBookchinmadesimilarclaims;Lewis[PseudonymforMurrayBookchin]Herber,OurSyntheticEnvironment(NewYork:Knopf,1962).92Amongstothers:RalphH.Lutts,'ChemicalFallout:RachelCarson’sSilentSpring,RadioactiveFallout,andtheEnvironmentalMovement',EnvironmentalReview,9/3(1985),Simon,Ddt.KulturgeschichteEinerChemischenVerbindung,GarryKroll,'The'SilentSprings'ofRachelCarson:MassMediaandtheOriginsofModernEnvironmentalism',PublicUnderstandingofScience10(2001),Russell,WarandNature:FightingHumansandInsectswithChemicalsfromWorldWarIto

34

Springhadturnedchemicaluseinto“themostcontroversialnon-politicalsubject

inAmericanagriculture.”93

Significantly,SilentSpringfixatedUSand–byextension–Westernpublic

attentionfirmlyonthedangersofinvisibleandcarcinogenicchemicalresidues.94

Whilethisattentionwasundoubtedlyimportantandresultedinthe1972USban

of DDT, it could also detract from other important issues. In the case of

agricultural antibiotics, residue and cancer fears overshadowed a meaningful

public discussion of bacterial resistance. Despite very brief warnings in

Longgood’s and Herber’s books,95most articles in the US media upheld the

epistemologicaldividebetweenbacterialresistanceinhumansandanimals.96

It was only in August 1966 that bacterial resistance resulting from

agricultural antibiotic use turned into a major concern for the US media. On

August 4th, 1966, the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM)

warned about a new theory of antibiotic resistance proliferation: instead of

merelypassingonresistanceverticallytosubsequentgenerations,bacteriacould

exchangeblueprintsforantibioticresistance–so-calledRFactors–horizontally

across species borders. 97 Discovered by Japanese researchers, horizontal

resistance transfer was possible via the exchange of tiny fragments of extra-

"Silentspring",DavidKinkela,DdtandtheAmericanCentury:GlobalHealth,EnvironmentalPolitics,andthePesticideThatChangedtheWorld(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolina,2011).93‘DairymenWarnedonPestPoisons’,WP,11.12.1962,p.A4.94Simon,Ddt.KulturgeschichteEinerChemischenVerbindung,pp.14-21,Russell,WarandNature:FightingHumansandInsectswithChemicalsfromWorldWarIto"Silentspring",pp.204-23.95Longgood,ThePoisonsinYourFood,p.154.;Herber,OurSyntheticEnvironment.96TheodoreR.VanDellen:‘HowtoKeepWell’,WP,18.03.1960,p.B8;JohnA.Osmundsen,‘ResistantGermsReportedOnRise’,NYT,12.03.1961,p.55;seealsotellingcommentsbyanimalhealthcolumnistFrankMiller;FrankMiller,‘TheWonderfulWorldofAnimals’,WP,26.04.1962,p.D18;Idem,‘TheWonderfulWorldofAnimals’,WP,14.04.1964,p.D9.97E.S.AndersonandNaomiDatta,'ResistancetoPencillinsandItsTransferinEnterobacteriaceae',TheLancet,285/7382(1965).

35

chromosomal DNA called plasmids. 98 With one bacteria strain able to

communicate resistance to another strain, locally emerging resistance could

spread throughout the regional, national and ultimately global microbial

environment. Resistance could no longer be treated as an isolated and

containable problem. Bacterial resistance selection on farms could be just as

dangerousasresistanceselectioninhospitals.99

Although ScientificAmericanhad already reported on British studies of

“transferable resistance”100in February 1966, it was not until the prestigious

NEJMreport thatmajor US newspapers reassessed the hazards of agricultural

antibioticuse.ReferringtoR-factortransferas“infectiousdrugresistance”, the

NEJM’s editorial blamed the “precipitous rise in frequency ofR factors” on the

“increasinguseofantibioticsnotonlyinclinicalpracticebutalsointhecareand

feeding of livestock.”101According to the editorial, AGPs were “providing a

constantselectionpressureonRfactorsthatcanreadilybetransferredtoman”:

“unless drasticmeasures are taken very soon, physiciansmay find themselves

backinthepreantibioticMiddleAges.”102

Making an intuitive connection between the NEJM’swarnings and the

establishedgenreofchemicalcriticism,theNYTnoted:

The ‘Silent Spring’ dispute over agricultural use of pesticides is beingmatchedbyasomewhatsimilarcontroversyoverthepracticeofroutinelyincluding antibiotics in animal feed. If the conclusion suggested by agrowingvolumeofmedicalevidenceiscorrect,suchfeedingmaygravely

98Creager,'AdaptationorSelection?OldIssuesandNewStakesinthePostwarDebatesoverBacterialDrugResistance',p.180.99Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.175-76.100‘TransferableDrugResistance’,SciAm,02/1966,p.53.101'InfectiousDrugResistance',NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,275/5(1966).102Ibid.

36

reduce the effectiveness of the antibiotics on which physicians rely soheavilyintreatinginfectiousdiseasesinhumans.103

According to the newspaper, “the available evidence suggests that the

development of such hardy microbes is greatly facilitated by the widespread

feeding of antibiotics (…). Put bluntly, people may be paying for cheaper and

bettermeatbysufferingmoreandgraverinfectiousdiseases.”104

Three weeks later, agricultural antibiotic use received further negative

publicity when the FDA released a report from an ad hoc committee on

veterinarymedicalandnon-medicalusesofantibiotics.FormedinMay1965asa

resultofpenicillinresiduesinAmericanredmeat,105thecommitteehadassessed

whether current agricultural antibiotic use was safe and efficacious. The

committee’s report confirmed fears that agricultural antibiotics were being

misused and leaving residues in US meat.106The ad hoc committee, however,

failed to comprehensively address ‘infectious resistance’ and instead called for

anendofantibioticfoodpreservation,stricterpunishmentofresidueoffenders

andmoreresearchonantibiotics’ecologicaleffects.TheFDAannouncedthat it

wouldimplementtheserecommendations.107

Althoughmedia reactions were mixed, theymostly shared the report’s

emphasis on residue over resistance hazards. Despite describing “contagious

cuddling” between bacteria,Timerelativizedwarnings of pre-antibioticMiddle

Agesandnoted thatsomeexpertswere “calmlyargu[ing] that laboratoriesare

producingnewantibioticstoofastforgermstocatchup.”108Livestockcouldalso

103‘New‘SilentSpring’?’,NYT,12.08.1966,p.30.104Ibid.105JaneE.Brody,‘FDASeeksCurbOnDrugsInFood’,NYT,23.08.1966,p.36.106Ibid.107‘ExcerptsFromReportonAntibioticsPreparedfortheFoodandDrugAgency’,NYT,22.08.1966,p.28.108‘Bacteria:HowGermsLearntoLive’,Time,26.08.1966.

37

be fed therapeutically irrelevant antibiotics. Drawing an analogy to Upton

Sinclair’s 1906 bestseller, the Post criticised the FDA for having allowed an

“antibioticjungle”tospreadbutfocussedmostlyonfoodpreservation:

Old truths must sometimes be rediscovered. Prior to 1955 the [FDA]enforced a rigid prohibition against the use of antibiotics in theprocessing of food. The reasons were as obvious then (…) as they arenow.109

In theNYT, journalist JaneBrody also rehashed analogies between antibiotics,

Silent Spring and the scandals of 1906.110One reader encouraged farmers to

profitfromgrowingconsumerdemandforpuremeat:“Therearequiteafewof

uswhogooutofourwaytobuysuchpurefoods(…)–ataprice.”111

Meanwhile, positive reports on agricultural antibiotics refused to

disappear. Throughout the 1960s, the development of new antibiotics and on-

going fears of global overpopulation engendered support for antibiotic-fuelled

agriculturalintensification.In1962,theNYT’sLawrenceGaltonclaimedthatthe

ability to compile synthetic antibiotics would provide “potent compounds for

fighting wasteful diseases of agriculture.” 112 In 1963, Scientific American

informedreadersthatunderdevelopedcountriesdependedon“moreandbetter

food.” 113 In contrast to inefficient Soviet collectives, Western livestock

production’ssuccesswasbuilton“finelycalculateddietsandrations,synthetic

hormones, pesticides and sanitary stalls, drugs and vaccines to control

disease.”114Fearful of communism and global overpopulation, anti-Malthusians

would fighthardbattles for continuedchemicalaccess.ForScientificAmerican,

109‘TheAntibioticJungle’,WP,23.08.1966,p.A12.110JaneBrody,‘Medicine.ToomanyAntibiotics?’,NYT,28.08.1966,p.178.111JamesLavelle,‘LettertotheEditor’,WP,19.09.1966,p.A16.112LawrenceGalton,‘ScienceStandsatAwesomeThresholds’,NYT,02.12.1962,pp.39and90;seealso:TomStevenson,‘FireBlightIsHardOnFruits’,WP,06.08.1961,p.G7.113NevinS.Scrimshaw,‘Food’,SciAm,09/1963,p.73.114Ibid.,p.75.

38

harmless substances did not exist: “there are only harmless ways of using

them.”115

The 1960s were thus an extremely confusing time for American

consumers: their sense of risk heightened by the Kefauver Hearings, Silent

Spring,thalidomideandvariousresiduescandals,consumerswerealsoexposed

to an un-attenuated stream of optimistic anti-Malthusian reports. Newspaper

subscribers could read about chemical dangers in one issue only to encounter

praise for “pushbutton farming”116and“coddledswine”getting “plentyof food,

shots,pills [and]antibiotics´”117in thenext. In termsofagriculturalantibiotics,

pervasive fears of invisible contamination made consumers and the media

prioritise risk scenarios, which focussed on residues. During the early 1960s,

fears of antibiotic resistance remained mostly limited to human medicine.

Newspapersonlygraduallyconnectedthetwospheresofresistanceselectionin

human and agricultural settings following theNEJM’spopularisation of British

researchontransferableresistanceinAugust1966.However,asmediareactions

tothe1966FDAreportshow,fearsofbacterialresistanceremainedsubordinate

to fears of antibiotic residues. Meanwhile, USmeat consumption continued to

grow.Whereasannualmeatconsumptionperpersonaveraged138.2poundsin

the 1950s, it rose to 161.7 pounds in the 1960s.118Frustrated by her

compatriots,PostjournalistSue Cronk noted: “the biggestworry theAmerican

115Ibid.,p.79.116‘LifeontheFarm’,NYT,21.10.1961,p.20.117‘Agriculture:PhrenologicalPickers&Such’,Time,02.10.1964.118'‘ProfilingFoodConsumptioninAmerica’',USDAFactbook(www.usda.gov/factobook/chapter2.pdf[accessed:01.07.2015]).

39

housewifehaswhensheshopsformeatislikelytobehowmuchitwillcost–not

whetheritwillbesafeforherfamilytoeat.”119

119SueCronk,‘HowSafeIstheNation’sMeatSupply?’,WP,10.02.1964,p.B5.

40

ChapterTwo:AbundantiaexMachina–antibioticsandthefarmerFor American farmers, the insecurity caused by the growing criticism of

agricultural chemicals was even worse. As producers, they had become

dependent on continued access to chemicals like antibiotics, DDT or DES.

However,asconsumers,farmerswerealsoconcernedaboutthepotentialhealth

impactof theverysamechemicals.Havingpioneered ‘chemical-agriculture’,US

farmers’reactiontochemicalriskswouldhaveasignificantimpactonfarmersin

othercountries.

American farmers’ chemical leadership had not emerged by chance.

During the interwar period, the Taylorian logic of Henry Ford’s factories had

begun to pervade the American countryside. A new generation of agricultural

experts,officialsandproducerswantedtoapplytheprinciplesofquantification

andmechanizationtoUSfarms.Alreadyfarminglargeracreagesandproducing

more animals than their European counterparts, American interwar farmers

furtherexpandedandbegantorationalisetheirfarms.Thenewfarmsemployed

improved accounting techniques alongside modern technologies like tractors,

hybridseedsandpesticidestomaximiseproductionandincome.1

So successful were these newmethods that US agricultural production

exceededdomesticand internationaldemandby1921.Attempting tomaintain

their incomes despite sinking commodity prices, US farmers increased their

production by a further 13% between 1917 and 1929. Unsurprisingly,

commodity prices continued to sink. By the end of the 1920s, the average US

farmerwasearninganindexpriceof125forcommoditiesbutpayinganindex

1Fitzgerald,EveryFarmaFactory.TheIndustrialIdealinAmericanAgriculture,pp.2-8.

41

priceof151forallotherpurchases.Unabletoservicetheirdebts,manyfarmers

sufferedbankruptcy and theUS farmpopulationdeclined from32.5million in

pre-war years to 30million in 1930.2Because of lower production costs, only

extremelyefficientorverylargefarmingoperationsremainedprofitable.When

commoditypricesdeclinedbyanother37%during theGreatDepression, even

themostefficientproducersstruggledforeconomicsurvival.3

In this situation, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s new administration

launched a comprehensive federal program of agricultural aid and planning.

Passed in May 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was designed to

reduce surpluses, stabilise prices and enhance farmers’ purchasing power.4In

concrete terms, the AAA allowed the USDA to administer a program of

adjustmentpaymentstofarmers,whointurnagreedtoreducetheirproduction

of surplus commodities. Together with compensated slaughter programs, the

AAAwas supposed to shift the balance – or parity – between agricultural and

non-agriculturalcommoditypricesbacktotheleveloftheperiodbetween1909

and 1914.5It was this logic of parity levels that would dominate American

agriculturalpolicyfortherestofthecentury.

As a result of two AAAs and the introduction of the Commodity Credit

Cooperation (CCC) and its price-supporting loans, US farmers’ subsidy-

dependence grew rapidly: by 1941, one third of US gross farm income was

derivedfromdirector indirectfederalpayments.6TheNewDealmeasuresalso

increased thepressure to intensifyproduction.Bypaying farmers to take land

2Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.46.3Ibid.,p.63.4Ibid.,p.69.5Ibid.,pp.70-78.6Ibid.,p.81;83;94.

42

outofproduction, federalprogramscreatedanincentivetoproducemorewith

theremainingassets–therebyputtinglargerfarmersatadistinctadvantage.By

the early 1940s, the farms that had survived the Great Depression were

culturallyandeconomicallygearedtostriveforfactory-likeefficiency,scaleand

technologicalsophistication.7

When commodity prices began to recover during the 1940s, the

industrialisedmotorofUSagriculture roared.Reacting toAmerica’s entry into

the SecondWorldWar, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act and

the so-called Steagall Amendment in 1942. By guaranteeing agricultural

commodity prices at around full parity for the duration of hostilities and two

yearsafterwards,legislatorsactivelyencouragedUSfarmerstoproduceasmuch

astheycouldandinvestinfurtherproductivityincreases.8

In the field of meat production, the ensuing transformations were

particularly dramatic: whereas New Dealers had ordered the compensated

slaughter of ca. six million excess hogs in 1934, wartime price guarantees

encouragedamassiveriseinUSmeatproduction.9However,war-inducedgrain

andlabourshortagessoonthreatenedagriculturalproductivity.Workingforthe

Work Simplification Laboratory at Purdue University, agricultural scientist

DamonCatronlaunchedasystematicattempttoovercometheseshortageswith

regards to US pork production. For Catron, existing animal production was

riddled with inefficiency.10Pig production was still characterised by animals’

biologicalandseasonalrhythms.Farrowed inspring,animalswere fattenedon

pasturesduringsummerandautumnandmass-slaughteredaheadofwinter.The7Fitzgerald,EveryFarmaFactory.TheIndustrialIdealinAmericanAgriculture,p.184.8Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,pp.99-100.9Finlay,'Hogs,Antibiotics,andtheIndustrialEnvironmentsofPostwarAgriculture',pp.240-41.10Ibid.,p.237&39.

43

resulting pork glut often overwhelmed processing facilities and depressed

prices. Meanwhile, high mortality rates and lack of standardisation further

depressedanimals’productivity.11

Breaking radically with traditional farming, Catron’s vision for animal

production resembled an integrated car assembly plant. Catron and his

colleaguesdividedapig’slifeintodistinctstages:breeding,farrowing,weaning,

rebreeding and finishing. Removed from pastures into large indoor housing

facilities, animals were to be grown in optimised artificial environments.

Followingtheprincipleof life-cyclefeeding,scientificallyassembledfeedswere

to replace inefficient existing nutrition.12Prior to their final disassembly,

animals’assemblystagesshouldbeasefficientaspossible.13Farmersthemselves

would also have to transform from independent all-rounders into specialised

workers capable of mastering the investments and technologies of life-cycle

production.

However, there were significant obstacles to overcome on the road to

Fordist animal production. One of themost dauntingwas posed by infectious

disease.Manypreviousattemptstoincreaseherddensitieshadbeenstuntedby

theparallelgrowthofdiseasepressure:infectiousdiseaseshadwipedoutentire

herdsandchronicinfectionshadseverelydecreasedanimalproductivity.14

Fortunately for Catron, sulphonamides andnewantibiotics promised to

reducethethreatofbacterialdisease.Initially,antibioticslikepenicillinweretoo

expensiveforroutinefarm-use.However, in1950,sinkingantibioticpricesand

11Ibid.,pp.237-41.12Ibid.,pp.247-49.13Ibid.,pp.252-53.14AbigailWoods,'RethinkingtheHistoryofModernAgriculture:BritishPigProduction,C.1910-65',TwentiethCenturyBritishHistory,23/2(2012),pp.176-77.

44

theannouncementoftheantibioticgrowtheffectmarkedaturningpoint.Curing

and preventing infections in cramped housing conditions whilst promoting

growth, antibiotic feeds became the keystone holding together Catron’s

cathedralofbioefficiency.15

Economically,antibiotics’mass-introductiontoagriculturecouldnothave

comeatabettertime.Between1940and1945,farmers’averagepercapitanet

incomehadincreasedfrom$706to$2,063.16FeedingtheUSandlargepartsof

Europe throughout the1940sandencouragedby theKoreanWar’spromiseof

stablecommodityprices,Americanfarmerspaidofftheirdebtsandwereeager

toinvestinnewagriculturaltechnologies.17

Industry was happy to oblige. During the second half of the 1940s, US

farmingmagazineswerefullofarticlesandadvertscelebratingthelatestmiracle

technologiesandsubstances.Interestedbuyerscouldchoosefromavastarrayof

‘growth factors’ and ‘miracle additives’.18By 1949, magazines were advising

farmersto“lickmastitis”19withpenicillin-sulphaorstreptomycininfusionsand

pharmaceuticalproducers likeAmericanCyanamidadvertisedsulpha-premixes

and Aureomycin tubes for disease control.20In the same year, vitamin B12’s

equation with the Animal Protein Factor (APF) led to a surge of commercials

advertisingenrichedfeeds.21

15Finlay,'Hogs,Antibiotics,andtheIndustrialEnvironmentsofPostwarAgriculture',pp.243-51.16Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.100.17PaulK.Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929(Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky,2009),p.123.18‘CommercialNutrena’,WallacesFarmer[inthefollowingWF],16.04.1949,p.499-15;JewelShasteenFrench,‘Furfural–WonderProductsofFarmWaste’,ProgressiveFarmer[inthefollowingPF],Apr1950,p.65.19‘DrugsPlusSenseLickMastitis’,WF,01.10.1949,p.1143.20‘CommercialLederle’,WF,19.03.1949,p.379-47;‘CommercialLederle’,WF,19.11.1949,1243-15.21‘CommercialSargent’,WF,02.04.1949,p.463-55;‘CommercialStaleyMilling’,WF,07.05.1949,pp.599-13.

45

Followingtheannouncementoftheantibioticgrowtheffectinearly1950,

feed and pharmaceutical manufacturers hastily incorporated antibiotics into

theirestablishedmarketingrepertoire.Earlyantibioticcommercialswerenearly

identicaltopreviousAPFandsulphacommercials.

InJune1950,WallacesFarmerprinteditsfirstAGPcommercial:featuring

aproud farmerholdinga feistypigletandcaptioned“AlwaysALeader”,Gooch

Feeds’ advertisement reported that State Colleges and “other experimental

institutions” had achieved “amazing results” with the “Aureomycin APF”

“wonder-worker”.22However, it soon emerged that Gooch Feeds’ “Genuine

Lederle Aureomycin APF” 23 did not contain standardised antibiotic

concentrations. Two weeks after it had printed Gooch’s commercial,Wallaces

Farmerwarned: “crystallineaureomycin isnotavailableat thepresent time to

either the feed industry or the farmer.”24Attempting to satisfy consumer

demand prior to FDA AGP-licensing, producers like Gooch were simply

rebranding existing vitamin-B12 feeds, which had been produced using

antibiotic fermentation wastes. Quoting the organisation of American Feed

Control Officials, a competitor complained: “no statement should bemade (…)

concerning the presence of the antibiotic since it is naturally inherent in the

ingredient.”25Despite the confusion about early growth promoters, antibiotic-

enthusiasmintheagriculturalpresscontinuedunabated.26

22‘CommercialGoochFeeds’,WF,03.06.1950,p.45.23Ibid.24‘What’sLowdownOnAureomycin’,WF,17.06.1950,p.16.25‘CommercialAmesReliableProductsCo.’,WF,17.06.1950,p.20.26JRCouch,‘MoreChickenWithLessFeed’,PF,Sept1950,p.63;’Wonder’DrugsSpeedGrowth’,WF,06.05.1960,p.20;TJCunha,‘AureomycinDoublesGrowthofPigs’,PF,Jun1950,p.110;HomerHush,‘FindCureForRunts’,WF,20.05.1960,p.8.

46

Even after the FDA’s licensing of AGPs in 1951, the agriculturalmarket

remained characterised by a remarkable degree of ignorance regarding

efficacious antibiotic use. For awhile, it seemed as though farmerswould buy

any feed as long as it contained preferably large doses of many different

antibiotics: while companies like Ful-O-Pep or Kraft advertised their own

antibioticsupplements,27AlliedMillspromisedthatitsantibioticfeedwouldturn

a“scrawnyrunt”intoa“huskyhog”in“just81days.”28Forfarmersunwillingto

trust onlyone antibiotic, a company calledOccident advertisedMultimycin, an

unspecified “combination of miracle antibiotics” offering “up to 18% greater

gains than with single antibiotic feeds.”29Meanwhile, Lederle Laboratories

claimed that aureomycinwas “the only antibiotic that has been proved highly

effectiveforswine,poultry,calvesandseveralkindsofsmallanimals”[emphasis

intheoriginal].30

In the dairy sector, farmers were equally optimistic about the mass-

application of antibiotics against mastitis. Caused by many different bacteria,

mastitis could taint the flavour of milk and cause human health problems

rangingfromsepticsorethroattofoodpoisoning.31InIllinois,mastitis-incurred

losses were estimated to amount to $7.5 million in 1951.32Reacting to

agricultural demand, companies like Cyanamid increased commercials for

‘ready-to-use-one-treatmenttube[s]’ofantibioticagainstmastitis.33

27‘CommercialFul-O-Pep’,WF,17.02.1951,p.25;‘CommercialKraft’,WF,20.10.1951,p.36.28‘CommercialAlliedMills’,WF,16.06.1951,p.20.29‘CommercialOccident’,WF,17.02.1951,p.56;seealso:‘CommercialNutrena’,WF,16.06.1951,pp.24-25.30‘CommercialLederle’,WF,01.09.1951,p.14.31Smith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970,p.218.32‘MastitisRuinsMilkCows’,WF,15.09.1951,p.75.33‘CommercialLederle’,WF,20.01.1951,p.14;‘CommercialLederle’,WF,03.02.1951,p.14.

47

Themass-useofmastitis-ointmentssoonprovedsopopular thatdairies

and creameries began to complain about antibiotic residues in raw milk.

AccordingtoWallacesFarmer,“antibioticsnotonlykillmastitisgerms,butalso

kill bacteriawhich fermentmilk.”34In April 1951, the ‘cheese state’Wisconsin

issuedarulingrequiringmastitisointmentstocarrylabelsonwithdrawaltimes

toallowantibioticstoclearcows’udders.35Comingwellaheadofsimilarreports

in the national media,Wallaces Farmerwarned in May 1951 that antibiotics

mightresultinbacterialresistanceifconsumedbyhumansviamilk.36However,

residueandresistancewarningswerenotenoughtodampengeneralantibiotic-

enthusiasm. By 1956, US dairy farmers used 75 tons of antibiotics like

streptomycin, chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline, neomycin, polymyxin, subtilin,

supromycetin,andchloramphenicolagainstmastitis.37

Meanwhile,agriculturalexpertsstronglyendorsedbroadeningthescope

of antibiotic use.38In an interview from 1951, Damon Catron conceded: “we

don’tknowwhyantibioticsdowhattheexperiments indicate.Butwedoknow

thattheypreventscours,increaserateofgainsandreducefeedrequirements.”39

Reactingtogrowingantibioticuseandaplethoraofnewproducts,other

articles attempted to prevent farmers from using antibiotics incorrectly.

According to one expert from the University of Illinois, it was important that

farmers “follow-through”40with antibiotic treatments – “careless insertion of

34‘MastitisDrugLabeling’,WF,07.04.1951,p.45.35Ibid.36‘ServiceBureau–ThrowAwayMilkAfter‘Treating’’,WF,05.05.1951,p.40;fortheriseofsimilarwarningsinthenationalpressseeChapterOne,pp.27and34.37Smith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970,p.220.38‘Don’tNeedSows’Milk’,WF,01.12.1951,p.8.39HomerHush,‘MakesHogsOfRunts’,WF,05.05.1951,p.8.40‘ControlMastitis’,WF,02.06.1951,p.50.

48

medication may do more harm than good.”41Significantly, farmers were

reminded that antibiotics would only reveal their true potential on hygienic

intensive farms. Using antibiotics to maintain outmoded or unhygienic

husbandry systems would not pay off: “drugs can’t whip old lots.”42As such

advice indicates, agricultural commentators had already integrated antibiotics

intoanoverarchingvisionofmodernproduction.FrequentlyreferringtoDamon

Catron,commentatorshopedthatrationalantibioticusewouldallowfarmersto

stepintoanewagriculturalage.

Duringthe1950s,thepoultrysectorseemedtoapproximatetheidealsof

this new farming age most closely. 43 Using new breeds and employing

mechanization,business integrationandantibioticsonanunprecedentedscale,

the broiler industry managed to turn chicken meat into Americans’ favourite

animal protein. According to historian William Boyd, the US broiler industry

experienced growth rates of ca. “7 percent per year between 1950 and 1999,

while real prices of chickens declined by almost a third”.44In agricultural

magazines, enthralledarticlespraised the ruthlessapplicationof technology to

overcome biological inefficiency. In 1951,Wallaces Farmer informed readers

aboutantibioticfeedsandnewmethodsrequiringonly“tensecondsperbirdper

day”andraising“flockprofitsby110percent.“45

Although poultry production is an extreme example, modernisation

enthusiasm also exerted considerable pressure on other livestock sectors.

41Ibid.42JohnB.Herrick,‘DrugsCan’tWhipOldLots’,WF,18.08.1951,p.32.43WilliamBoyd,'MakingMeat:Science,Technology,andAmericanPoultryProduction',42,TechnologyandCulture/4(2001),Horowitz,'MakingtheChickenofTomorrow.ReworkingPoultryasCommoditiesandasCreatures,1945-1990'.44Boyd,'MakingMeat:Science,Technology,andAmericanPoultryProduction',p.634.45W.R.Whitfield,‘TenSecondsPerBirdPerDay’,WF,21.07.1951,p.36.

49

Sponsored by meat packer Swift & Company in 1951, a full-page advert in

WallacesFarmer calledon farmerstothrowaside fearsofover-productionand

produce asmuchmeat as possible.While prices could vary, the newABC’s of

Animal Nutrition – A standing for antibiotics – would continue to guarantee

rising production and profits: “all of this adds to the supply of meat for our

people, and is the farmers’ and ranchers’ contribution to our country’s

strength.”46According to Swift: “Theproblem’s never surplusmeat – you can’t

raisemorethanwecaneat.”47

However,Swift’strustintheever-expandinggirthofAmericanstomachs

provedmisguided.FollowingtheendoftheKoreanWar,agriculturalcommodity

prices began to sink and the Eisenhower administration became concerned

aboutexpensiveagriculturalsubsidies.Between1953and1954alone, theCCC

purchased$1.5billionof agricultural surpluses.However,CCCpurchaseswere

nolongerenoughtoshieldfarmersfromaso-calledcost-pricesqueeze:between

1950andthemid-1950s,USfarmers’averagepercapitadisposableincomefell

fromca.58 to48%ofnon-agriculturaldisposable incomes.Forced tomaintain

price subsidies, the Eisenhower administration attempted to dispose of

surpluseswith the1954Food forPeaceprogram–anopportunesideeffectof

prevalent anti-Malthusian sentiments.48The1956AgriculturalAct recycled the

NewDealideaofpayingfarmerstoreduceproduction.However,USagricultural

production continued to grow by an annual average of 2.1% throughout the

46‘CommercialSwift&Company–NewABC’sofAnimalNutrition’,WF,01.09.1951,p.2547‘CommercialSwift&Company–AMeatyMouthful’,Ibid.48Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.111.

50

1950s.49Its granaries overflowing and costs exploding, the US government

abandonedallproductioncontrolsin1959.50

In agricultural magazines, commentators reacted to the growing cost-

price squeeze by stressing the prevailing gospel of intensification. Oncemore,

thereseemedtobenoalternativetothesurvivalofthelargestandmostefficient.

WritingfortheFarmJournalandCountryGentlemanin1956,M.B.Russellmused

that it was only a matter of time before the “food factory”51 replaced

conventionalfarmsaltogether.Thepoultrysectorseemedtobeasignofthings

tocome:by theearly1960s,vertically integratedagribusiness firmscontrolled

ca.90%ofUSbroilerproduction.52

Interestingly, many agricultural commentators did not blame farmers’

overproduction for the cost-price squeeze. Instead, they accused the federal

governmentofeitherartificiallyrestricting theagriculturalmarketorof failing

tosufficientlysubsidiseandmarketUSproduce.53

This tendency todisplaceblame shows thatmany farmers continued to

see the ‘factory farm’ as a u- rather than a dys-topia. Throughout the 1950s,

agricultural magazines celebrated farmers beating the squeeze through

ingenuity and efficiency.54Being able to invest in technological intensification

turned into a fundamental criterion for long-term agricultural survival.

AccordingtoFarmJournalandCountryGentleman, thefarmerHughFussellwas

gettingeverythingright:49Ibid.,p.121.50Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,p.130.51M.B.Russell,‘FoodFactoryReplaceTheFarm?’,FarmJournalandCountryGentleman[InthefollowingFJ],Jan1956,p.13;seealso:LoradD.Reiter,‘EndofAWayofLife?’,FJ,Nov1956,p.133.52Boyd,'MakingMeat:Science,Technology,andAmericanPoultryProduction',p.635.53‘TimeToBeAggressive’,FJ,May1956,p.210;‘AllofUs–Mr.McMillen’,FJ,Sept.1956,p.30.54DickBraun,‘Thishogmanisgearedtomeetthesqueeze’,FJ,May1956,p.43.

51

Detroit’sautomobilefactorieshavenothingonHughFussell.ThisGeorgiafarmer raises hogs on a truly assembly-line basis. Every two weeksFussellisonthemarketwith50to60headofNo.1hogs.55

Significantly,Fussellwasalsoa “fanaticondiseasecontrol”: everyday,eachof

his finishing barn pens was cleaned and disinfected; Fussell’s pigs were

vaccinated,their“feeds[were]welllacedwithvitaminsandantibiotics.”56

As well as highlighting the unrelenting doctrine of technological

intensification,thedescriptionofFussell’shogfarmrevealstheextenttowhich

antibiotics were underpinning further intensification. No longer an expensive

miracle technology, antibiotics’ inclusion into animal feeds was taken for

granted. Of the 2 million pounds of antibiotics produced in the US in 1954,

490,000were fed to livestock and poultry. By 1960, ca. 1.2million pounds of

antibioticswere annually fed to livestock and poultry.57Inmagazines, farmers

wereregularlyinformedabout“mightynewgermkiller[s].”58

Asignifierandenablerofagriculturalintensification,antibiotics’diffusion

to further areas of food production fuelled the dilemma at the heart of US

farming.In1956,agriculturalcommentatorsinterpretedtheadventofantibiotic

food preservation as a further step down the road to universal low-cost

competition: “Acronize is doing it. The cheaper broiler areas can now sell

anywhere. (…) It’snowonebignationalmarketwithbroilerprices, likewater,

seeking one level.”59However, growing economic pressuremeant that farmers

could hardly afford to stop and consider potential alternatives to the state-

subsidisedlogicofintensificationandthetechnologiesandsubstancestheywere

employing.Asaconsequence,apathdependencydeveloped:fallingpricesledto55HenryM.Simons,‘Hesellshogs24timesayear’,FJ,Apr1956,p.56.56Ibid.,p.56.57Boyd,'MakingMeat:Science,Technology,andAmericanPoultryProduction',p.248.58‘MightyNewGermKiller’,FJ,Feb1956,p.160.59RayDankenbringandOvidBay,‘Newboostforbroilers’,FJ,Sept1956,p.41.

52

greater herd densities, which led to greater antibiotic-use. The resulting

overproductionthenre-triggeredthesamesequenceofevents.

Worryingly, agriculture’s antibiotic dependency developed without

anybody – least of all farmers – really understanding antibiotics’ basic

mechanisms or potential hazards. When the American public became more

concerned about agricultural antibiotic use towards the end of the 1950s, US

farmers’ on-going antibiotic enthusiasm acquired an undercurrent of

desperationanddependency.

Inthecaseofthe1956milkscandal,farmerswereeagertopreventpublic

challenges to agricultural antibiotic access. As a consequence, articles and

advertisements in agriculturalmagazines exhorted dairy farmers to adhere to

withdrawal times and identify bacterial strains prior to using antibiotics. Not

only would cows recover more quickly, farmers would also stop paying for

ineffectiveantibiotics:“…scientistssaythereareasmanyas22differentkindsof

‘bugs’ that causemastitis.”60Significantly,onearticlewarned that theFDAwas

merelyasking“farmerstocooperate”:“Ifthatdoesn’twork,(…)theymayeither

orderthatdrugcompaniesputdyes inmastitistreatments(…)orputabanon

penicillin.”61Bolstered by sinking residue findings62and blaming black sheep,

dairyfarmersultimatelymanagedtoavertantibioticrestrictionsandmagazines’

residue-awarenesscampaignssoondeclined.

However,magazines’renewedantibioticendorsementcouldnotdisguise

thefactthatastormwasbeginningtobrew.Duringthelate1950s,agrowingrift

began to separate agricultural and non-agricultural communities. Initially60‘Isthistheonlywaytowhipmastitis?’,FJ,Aug1956,p.35.61‘FingerIsPointedAtPenicillinInMilk’,FJ,Sept1956,p.48.62Smith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970,pp.222-24.

53

controversies focussed on the cost of agricultural subsidies. In this situation,

American farmers reacted with extreme hostility to criticism from supposed

outsiders. In1959,WallacesFarmercomplained: “…viciousattackson farmers

andfarmprogramshavebecomeapopularpastimewithsomecitypeople.”63As

furtherarticlesexhortingfarmersto“helptell thetruestory”64andend“myths

about farming”65show,USfarmersremainedproudoftheirproductionsystem.

Althoughoverproductionmightbeaproblem,commentatorsagreedthathard-

working farmers would survive the cost-price squeeze.66Reporting on Soviet

leaderNikitaKhrushchev’s1959tourofIowanfarms,onearticlenoted:

The Russians are generally short of meat and oils. It’s likely thatKhrushchevalsoseesarealopportunityforuseofsurplusfoodinthecoldwar. That’s why he wanted to come to Iowa. He was particularlyinterestedinseeinghow10to12percentofourpopulationcanfeedtheentire nation and produce a surplus besides. If Khrushchev could trimsize of the food-producing group in Russia to a similar percentage, hewouldhavemorepeoplefreefromfoodproductiontobuildfactoriesandmissles[sic]–perhapsevenwashingmachinesandautomobiles.67Alreadyfeelingmisunderstoodbysubsidy-hostile“cityfolks,”68American

farmers were further irritated by external attacks on agricultural chemicals.

Commentingonthe1959cranberryscare,WallacesFarmeraccusedconsumers

andofficialsofstirringa“BigRuckus”andpublicizingthe“incidententirelyout

ofproportion to thedangers involved.”69According toProgressiveFarmer,FDA

officialswereguiltyofspreading“fearanddisfavourfortheentireproductionof

an industry.”70Aware of intensive agriculture’s chemical dependency, other

63‘Let’sAnswerCityCritics’,WF,20.06.1959,p.12.64‘Farm-CityWeek’,WF,21.11.1959,p.12.65‘Mythsaboutfarming’,WF,19.09.1959,p.82.66DickAlbrecht,‘Canwesavethefamilyfarm?’,WF,17.01.1959,p.13;ClarencePoe,‘Shouldyourfamilymovetotown?’,PF,Mar1960,p.144.67‘KhrushchevseesIowaagriculture’,WF,03.10.1959,p.8.68‘LearnaboutCityFolks–TellThemAboutFarming’,PF,Nov1960,p.110.69‘ChemicalsandFood’,WF,21.11.1959,p.12.70‘CranberriesanExample’,PF,Jan1960,p.98.

54

articleswereapprehensiveaboutpoliticalreactionstoon-goingresideproblems.

InDecember1959,WallacesFarmerwassurethatabigger“clampdownonall

farm chemicals”71was only a question of time. Referring to antibiotic residue

detections, the magazine warned: “a small army of FDA inspectors (…) have

orders from Washington to go from farm to farm, if necessary, to find

violators.”72Another report cautioned: “congressional investigators are quietly

probingthewholequestionofagriculturalchemicals.”73

Even after the end of the cranberry scare, agriculturalmagazineswere

concerned about the persistence of public chemical fears. In 1960,Progressive

Farmerwarned:“thenation isbeingharassedbyanumberof foodcrankswho

insist that a food is good only if no chemicals were used in growing it.”74

Equatingpatriotismwithnutritionalplenty,themagazineasserted:

No nation in the world has a more abundant food supply, one that iscleaner,safer,ormorenutritiousthanours.(…)unlessfarmerslookout,the ‘food cranks’ andothermisinformedpeoplemaypressureCongressintopassingunreasonablerestrictions–restrictionsthatmaydoseriousdamagetoourfoodsupplyandtonationalwelfare...75

Reacting to the growing number of environmentalist bestsellers in 1962,

Wallaces Farmer proclaimed a “new battle for farmers.”76According to the

magazine’s editor, “a worrisome new movement appears to be gathering

steam.”77Nolongerlimitedtocranks,themovementincludedordinary“people,

well-meaningforthemostpart,whohavebecomeoverlyalarmedatourgrowing

use of chemicals in food production.”78On-going productivity depended on

71‘Toclampdownonallfarmchemicals’,WF,05.12.1959,p.8.72Ibid.73‘WashingtonReport’,WF,19.12.1959,p.4.74‘FoodCranksCanHurtUs’,PF,Nov1960,p.110.75Ibid.76‘NewBattleforFarmers’,WF,21.07.1962,p.10.77Ibid.78Ibid.

55

farmersstayingaheadofunpredictablenature: “It looks likeacaseofwhether

weeatorthebugseat.”79

However,USfarmers’angeragainst‘cranks’didnotmeanthattheytook

chemical hazards lightly. Exposed to the national media’s cancer and residue

warnings, the agricultural community embraced strategies to reduce personal

health riskswithout foregoing chemicals’ benefits.80During the 1960s, articles

exhortedfarmerstofollowlabellinginstructionsandprotecttheirproduceand

health. Coupled with the on-going push for chemical intensification, these

warnings could lead to curious results. In June 1960, an issue of Progressive

Farmer contained two very different articles: whereas one commentator

advocated using various chemicals to fight “yard pests”81on page 76, page 78

containedanarticlewarningabout“harmfulresidues”82ofsimilarchemicalson

home-grown fruits and vegetables. In 1961, Wallaces Farmer described the

poisoning of 50 Iowan cattle as “a grim reminder of the danger of using farm

chemicalsimproperly.”83Threeyearslater,themagazineconductedapolltosee

whether chemical warnings had changed farmers’ habits: half of the farmers’

regularly using pesticides and insecticides reported having taken more

precautions because of hazards to crop, livestock and personal health.84One

intervieweeconfessed:‘ThesechemicalsarebeginningtoscaremetodeathandI

wouldn’tbesurprisedifonlyexpertswillbeallowedtoapplytheminthenear

future.’”85

79Ibid.80‘ISUexhibit:Thesafeandprofitableuseoffarmchemicals’,WF,04.09.1965,p.64.81JohnH.Harris,‘FightYardPestsWithChemicals’,PF,Jun1960,p.76.82‘OnFruitsAndVegetables–AvoidHarmfulResidues’,Ibid.,p.78.83‘Readthelabel’,WF,Aug1961,p.10.84‘WallacesFarmersPoll–Howfarmershandlechemicals’,WF,20.03.1965,p.71.85Ibid.

56

Despite such individual concerns, an overwhelmingmajority of farmers

continuedtorelyonchemicalhelpers.ThirtyyearsaftertheGreatDepression,a

mental trajectory of unconditional intensification had taken root in farmers’

heads. Although a limited amount of environmentalist self-criticism was

possible,thecommunitywouldnottoleratecriticismoftheintensivesystemas

such. Increasingly, the telos of the farm-as-factory deprived the agricultural

community of the opportunity tomodify a system that was leavingmore and

morefarmersbehind.

During the 1960s, US agriculture experienced another wave of

intensification. Although the 1960 election had been fought around ‘family

farmers’, the Kennedy administration did little to protect smaller farmers.

ConcernedaboutannualCCCexpenditureof$4billionanddailystoragecostsof

ca.$1million,86KennedyestablishedtheUSfoodstampprogramandexpanded

theFoodforPeaceandschools’lunchandmilkprograms.Inadditiontoreducing

theexistingsurplus,theKennedyadministrationreducedbothtotalUSacreage

and thequantityofmarketedproduce.87Onceagain, largeproducersbenefited

mostfromfederalmeasures.88Withpollsshowingthatfarmersthemselveswere

upsizing their definition of a ‘family farm’89the total number of US farms

decreased from 3,710,503 to 2,730,250 and average farm size increased from

302.8to389.5acresbetween1959and1969.90

86Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.123.87Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.130-31.88Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,pp.125-32.89‘Question:Howbigarefamilyfarms?’,WF,16.01.1965,p.9.90UnitedStatesDepartmentOfCommerce,SocialandEconomicStatisticsAdministration,andBureauOfCensus(eds.),1969CensusofAgriculture.VolumeIiGeneralReport:UseofLand,SizeofFarm(2,1973),p.11.

57

Propagating unconditional intensification,91US agricultural magazines

continued to feature numerous commercials praising AGPs and therapeutic

antibioticmixes.Increasingly,antibioticsweresoldasriskinsurance.Intimesof

toughcompetitionandshrinkingprofitmargins,herdproductivitywasvitaland

disease-induced losses potentially crippling.Who could blame farmers if – for

their peace of mind – they paid a little extra for the prophylactic, continuous

medication of their herds with antibiotics? According to American Cyanamid

commercials, ‘Aureomycin crumbles’ helped farmers profit “on Hogs Expected

To Be Losses”92and worked “on any kind of ration” to “help keep your cows

healthy.”93Producing both hormones and antibiotics, Pfizer began to advertise

combinationfeedscontainingTerramycinandthecarcinogenichormoneDES.94

Companies like Merck, Elanco, Kraft, Quaker Oats, Gooch’s Best, Nutrena and

Murphy’s marketed antibiotic “Hog Spotlights,” “Pig Starting Package[s]”95to

“slashfarrowing-to-weaningcost4ways”96and“Pro-Strep”to“promotegrowth

andprotecthealthatlowercost.”97

With herd sizes increasing further, the logic of antibiotics as a profit

guarantee also became a prominent theme in agricultural reporting.98Articles

reiteratedDamonCatron’smessagethatantibioticsworkedbestforspecialised

modernproducers,whofedtherightdrugmixduringeverystageofanimals’life

cycle.AccordingtoWallacesFarmer,topfarmershadfeedcostsaslowas$13.50

91DickHumphrey,‘AutomaticFeedingboostsProfits’,PF,Apr1960,pp.104-105;‘Hunger:greaterproblemthanthebomb’,WF,02.10.1965,p.12.92‘CommercialCyanamid’,PF,Jan1960,p.7.93‘CommericalCyanamid’,WF,21.01.1961,p.8.94‘Hormone-antibioticcombination’,WF,04.03.1961,p.86.95‘CommercialNutrena’,WF,04.02.1961,p.4.96‘CommercialMurphy’s’,WF,04.02.1961,p.10.97‘CommercialMerck’,WF,18.03.1961,p.68.98CyWatkins,‘Iwasjustfiguring’,PF,Feb1960,p.10;‘Creepfeedingbabypigs’,WF,20.03.1965,p.97.

58

per 100 pounds of hogs whereas “poorer” producers had costs of $18.60.99

Increasingly,suchacostdifferencewasdecisiveforproducers’survival.

Givenfarmers’growingantibioticdependency,agriculturaldiscussionsof

antibiotic hazards remained rare. Most critical articles focussed on antibiotic

residues. Remembering the milk and cranberry scares, the agricultural

communitywaskeen toavoid furtherresiduescandalsbutcriticizedsupposed

federal paternalism. 100 In 1962, Wallaces Farmer complained about the

“’ridiculous’(…)Delaneyroadblockinthecaseofdrugswhichneitherharmthe

animalnorleavearesidue.”101Articlesaddressingbacterialresistanceremained

rareandcontinued touphold theepistemicdividebetweenhumanandanimal

medicine.In1961,WallacesFarmerreportedonantibioticresistanceinhospitals

andhopedthattheintroductionof“anewpenicillin,Staphicillin,”woulddefeat

“resistant bugs.” 102 One year later, the journal had similar hopes for

“Prostaphilin”103. Agricultural contributions to antibiotic resistance were not

discussed.

Awareness of microbiological hazards resulting from agricultural

antibioticusegraduallyroseduringthesecondhalfofthe1960s.However,even

then, resistant bacteria were seen more as a management problem than a

phenomenon that might challenge agricultural antibiotic use. In August 1965,

Wallaces Farmer reported on Salmonella problems in the egg industry and

recommended amongst other measures “preventive medication at all three

99‘Feedcosts’,WF,20.02.1965,p.48;seealso:‘Tipsforstartingpigbusiness–Number8’,WF,04.02.1961,p.16;‘CommercialCyanamid–CoordinatedFeed-HealthProgram’,WF,04.03.1961,p.39;NewtHawkinson,‘Managementtipstohelpyou.Getcattleofftoagoodstart’,WF,02.09.1961,p.26;‘Antibioticsatbreedingboostspignumbers’,WF,18.11.1961,p.36.100‘CanYouGuaranteeMilkHasNoResidue?’,PF,Aug1960,p.8.101‘NewFDAruleswillaffectyou!’,WF,01.09.1962,p.8.102‘Newsofnewpenicillin’,WF,04.03.1961,p.37.103‘StaphPill’,WF,03.11.1962,p.43.

59

levels of production.”104Farmerswere assured thatmedicated feedsproduced

“littleornoresistance,evenwhenusedover longperiodsof time.”105Potential

implications of resistant Salmonella for human health were not discussed. In

other articles, bacterial resistance arising from agricultural antibiotic-use was

onlymentioned indirectly.106In November 1965, Iowa State University animal

nutritionistVirgilHayswasconvincedthat“antibioticsaredefinitelyofvaluein

98percentofourfarmsituations.”107Althoughhenotedthatmanyfarmerswere

using higher-dosed AGPs, Hays explained rising dosages not with bacterial

resistancebutwithsinkingantibioticprices.

Hays’ sanguine attitude seemed justified following the FDA’s ad hoc

reportonveterinaryandnon-veterinaryantibiotics,published inAugust1966.

Commentatorswerehappytoreport:“scientificdatanowavailabledonotshow

any reason for alarm.” 108 Mostly unaffected by the ban of antibiotic

preservatives,109commentators were confident that the FDA would not ban

other formsofantibioticuse.Despite increasingpubliccriticismofagricultural

chemicals, theFDA’sreportmadefarmersconfidentthatexistingantibioticuse

was safe. The trajectory of antibiotic-fuelled intensification remained

unchallengedbyfarmersorregulators.Achanceforreformwasmissedandthe

selectionforbacterialresistancecontinuedunchecked.

104‘SalmonellathreatenIowaeggindustry’,WF,21.08.1965,p.51.105Ibid.106‘Visitwithyourvet’,WF,04.09.1965,p.30;‘Visitwithyourvet’,WF,18.09.1965,p.75.107‘Antibiotics’,WF,20.11.1965,p.24.108‘FDAGetsCalls,ButDataShowNoNeedforAlarm’,Feedstuffs,27.08.1966,p.1.109‘LittleorNoUseOfAntibioticsasPreservativesNoted’,Ibid.,p.8.

60

ChapterThree:Regulation–protectingproducersfromconsumersWith its1966reportonveterinaryandnon-veterinaryantibiotics, theFDAnot

only indicated that the risksofUSagriculture’s growingantibioticdependency

could be contained. By emphasizing antibiotic residues at the expense of

bacterial resistance, the FDA also confirmed concerns about the chemical

contaminationoffoodandbodies.

In many ways, this emphasis on residues came naturally to an agency

whose history had been strongly influenced by the fight against toxic

adulterants.1Sincetheearly20thcentury,USregulatoryeffortswereincreasingly

influenced by a philosophy of threshold models. Drawing analogies with

bacteriology, industrialhygienistsassertedthathumans’ inevitableexposureto

chemicals only became dangerous once it toppled the body’s ‘natural

homeostasis’. If it remained below this threshold, chemical exposure was

acceptable. Competing against industry-sponsored research, officials tried to

establishthepointatwhich ‘natural’chemicalexposureturnedinto ‘unnatural’

exposure.2

In1938,officialsintherecentlyrenamedFoodandDrugAdministration

were significantly strengthened by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

(FDC).Passedinthewakeofthe1937sulphanilamidetragedy,theFDCrequired

manufacturerstofileso-calledNewDrugApplications(NDAs)priortomarketing

drugs. NDAswould contain information on drugs’ composition,manufacturing

process, intended use and evidence of safety. Upon receiving NDAs, the FDA1Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,p.75and80.;Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,pp.19-21.2Sellers,HazardsoftheJob.FromIndustrialDiseasetoEnvironmentalHealthScience,pp.194-95;198-201;211-20,Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,pp.21-27.

61

wouldhaveatleastsixtydaystoevaluatethesubmittedevidenceandapproveor

denyNDAs.3TransferredfromtheUSDAtotheFederalSecurityAgencyin1940,

theFDAwould thusactasagatekeeper forUSdrugs.Although theFDC’sNDA

requirements did not cover pesticides and chemical food additives,4the FDA

usedlegalgreyareastoissueguidelinesforanimalteststoevaluatedrugs’and

chemicals’long-termeffects.5

Fromthe1940s,Americanswerethusprotectedbyauniqueorganisation

whoseunified responsibilities for consumerprotection, food securityanddrug

regulationcontrastedstronglywiththefragmentationofresponsibilitiesinother

countries.Initiallyfocussingonpreventingorminimizingexposuretotoxic–and

later carcinogenic – substances, the FDA’s regulatory framework, however,

provedself-confiningwhenitcametoaddressingthehazardsofsupposedlynon-

toxicornon-carcinogenicsubstances.6

TheFDA’searlyemphasisontoxichazardsbecomesevidentinitspolicies

regarding sulphonamide and antibiotic feeds. In the case of potentially toxic

sulphonamide feeds, the FDA was not only eager to prevent farmers from

accidentally poisoning animals and consumers but alsowanted to prevent the

misuse of agricultural drugs for human self-medication. Concerns about

resistance selection were not expressed. In mid-1949, the FDA restricted

farmers’ access to pure sulphonamides, established compulsory sulpha

concentrations for pre-mixed feeds andmashes to prevent toxic residues and3Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,pp.26-27.Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,pp.73-75.4Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,p.27.5Sellers,HazardsoftheJob.FromIndustrialDiseasetoEnvironmentalHealthScience,pp.216-20.Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,pp.156-75.6NancyLangstonandSarahVogelhavehighlightedtheFDA’sselectivefocusforothersubstances;seealso:Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals.

62

attempted to educate farmers on the proper use of sulpha products via

mandatory safety labels. 7 FDA officials soon applied virtually the same

regulatory mould to antibiotic feeds. As the near absence of documents

discussing antibiotic allergies and bacterial resistance shows,8the regulatory

focus on toxic residues allowed non-toxic, non-carcinogenic AGPs to fly under

FDAofficials’hazardradar.

AsimilarprioritisationofhazardscharacteriseddiscussionsinCongress.

Despite hearing evidence on bacterial resistance selection and the allergenic

effects of antibiotic residues in 1950,9James Delaney’s Select Committee on

chemicals in food production did not include agricultural antibiotic use in its

finalreport.10

Asaconsequence,theFDA’slicensingofAGPswentahead.InApril1951,

the FDA legalised the already booming market for antibiotic/APF-feeds by

publishing guidelines for the inclusion of penicillin, streptomycin, di-hydro-

streptomycin,chlortetracycline,chloramphenicolandbacitracinintofeedsinthe

Federal Register. If used solely as feed supplements and not as therapeutics,

antibiotics were exempted from both NDA and batch certification

requirements.11

7FDAStateCooperationInformationLetterNo.16,Jul27,1949,Folder432.73-11-432.97-.10,Box1160,FDAGeneralSubjectFiles[InthefollowingGS],DecimalFiles[DF]A1/Entry5,RecordGroup[RG]88,NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration,CollegePark[NARA].8MarkFinlayalsocommentedontheFDA’s“moderatescrutiny”towardsagriculturalantibiotics;MarkR.Finlay,'BattlesoverAgriculturalAntibioticsintheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope',inChristophGradmannandFlurinCondrau(eds.),Antibiotics(Upcoming),p.14.9'ChemicalsinFoodProducts',HouseSelectCommitteeToInvestigateTheUseOfChemicalsInFoodProducts(HouseofRepresentatives;WashingtonDC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1951),pp.129,31,496.10SelectCommitteetoInvestigatetheUseofChemicalsinFoodProducts,'InvestigationoftheUseofChemicalsinFoodProducts',UnionCalendar(WashingonDC,1951).1116FederalRegister[inthefollowingFed.Reg.],3647-3648(Apr.28,1951);alsoseeLisaHeinzerling,'UndueProcessattheFda',GeorgetownPublicLawandLegalTheoryResearchPaperNo.13-016,(2013).

63

Althoughtheyhadalreadybeenforcedtoreformlabellingrequirements

for mastitis treatments because of residues in 1951,12FDA officials actively

supportedfurtherwideningfarmers’accesstoantibioticsin1952.Reactingtoa

“movement on the part of veterinarians” to restrict laypersons’ access to

antibiotics, officials noted: “this Administration has always insisted that drugs

for veterinary use, to the extent practicable, be not restricted to professional

use.”13AccordingtotheFDA’sDeputyCommissionerGeorgeP.Larrick:

Wehave consistently followed the courseof placingnoobstacles in thewayof self-medicationwhen themedicines employed canbe safely andintelligently used by lay persons. The same principles apply to ourregulationoflivestockremedies.14

In addition to reducing veterinarians’ control over the animalhealthmarket,15

the FDA also attempted to remove regulatory barriers for feedmanufacturers.

Initially,eachbatchofanantibioticfeed“containingtherapeutic levelsofdrugs

fortherapeuticpurposesasanewdrug”16hadtobecertifiedindividuallybythe

DivisionofAntibiotics.Because suchaprocedure “wouldbe impracticable and

(…) the cost to each feedmanufacturerwouldmake it prohibitive”17, the FDA

exempted low-dosed feeds for therapeutic purposes from NDA and batch

certificationrequirementsin1953.18

While its licensingdecisions led toa rapidexpansionof theagricultural

antibioticmarketduringthe1950s,theFDAhadhardlyanycontroloveractual

12J.H.Collins,'TheProblemofDrugsforFood-ProducingAnimalsandPoultry',FoodDrugCosmeticLawJournal6/November(1951),pp.876-77.;Smith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970,pp.223-24.13H.E.MoskeytoGeorgeP.Larrick,Oct2,1952,Box1560,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.14GeoP.LarricktoWPBomar,Oct3,1952,Ibid.15Susan.D.Jones,ValuingAnimals.VeterinariansandTheirPatientsinModernAmerica(LondonandBaltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2003),p.104.16HEMoskeytoCELee,Jul16,1952,Folder432.97.10-435,Box1560,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.17Ibid.1818Fed.Reg.,2335-2336(Apr22,1953);Heinzerling,'UndueProcessattheFda'.

64

antibioticuseandcoulddolittlemorethanhopethatmanufacturersandfarmers

would follow official guidelines and labels. Even if officials had evidence of

feedstuff violations, US attorneys could be reluctant to prosecute offenders.19

Securing voluntary compliancewas not easy either and FDA officials could be

forcedtocompromiserules.20

TheFDA’sregulatorypositionwasparticularlycomplicatedinthecaseof

antibiotic residues. Although itwas neither able tomonitor the nationalmeat

supply or enforce guidelines, the FDA reacted to an increasing number of

licensing requests andnew legislationbydelineating boundarieswithinwhich

antibiotic riskswereproverbially ‘tolerated’andbecame ‘safe’.21Because there

wasnoobjectiveway todefine theexactboundarybetween tolerable riskand

intolerable hazard, FDA officials had to strike a delicate balance between

industrial demands, consumer concerns and the cultural values attached to

differentagriculturalproducts.AsevidencedbydivergentFDAtolerancepolicies

for milk as opposed to meat, fish and plants, such negotiations could lead to

paradoxicalresults.

Initially,theFDAhadopposedresiduetolerances.In1953,healthofficials

had warned that the direct or indirect addition of antibiotics to human food

could be deemed an adulteration under section 402 of the FDC. However, the

HEW announcementwas almost immediatelyweakened by the passage of the

1954 Miller Pesticides Chemical Amendment. According to the Miller

19AERayfieldtoAtlantaDistrict,Jul8,1949,Folder432.10-432.4,Box1160,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;LDElliotttoSt.LouisDistrictAdministration,Oct11,1949,ibid.20HEMoskey,‘MemorandumofInterview’,Apr08,1949,Folder432.73-.11–432.97-.10,Box1160,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;MosekytoCELee,Jul16,1952,Folder432.97.10-435,Box1560,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.21Forsimilarprocessesinother‘riskindustries’seeBoudiaandJas(eds.),PowerlessScience?ScienceandPoliticsinaToxicWorld.

65

Amendment, officials had to distinguish between antibiotic residues resulting

from the use of antibiotics as pesticides (i.e. to control bacteria on raw

agriculturalcommodities)andtheuseofantibioticsinoronprocessedfood.In

the case of raw food, antibiotics fell under the Miller Amendment and

manufacturerswereallowedtoapplyforofficialresiduetolerances.Inthecase

of processed foods, tolerance applicationsweremore difficult because section

406 of the FDC required proof that an added chemical was necessary in the

productionofacertainfood.22

By ‘tolerating’ residues on raw food, theMillerAmendment opened the

door for antibiotic food preservation. Following a series of studies, the FDA

legalised the preservation of poultry meat with chlortetracycline (American

Cyanamid’s ‘Acronize’) in November 1955 and with oxytetracycline (Pfizer’s

‘Biostat’) in October 1956.23Tolerances of 7 parts per million (ppm) were

established forboth substanceson rawpoultry.Convinced that cookingwould

destroy residues,24regulators no longer guaranteed ‘pure’ meat but made

consumersresponsibleforpreparingpoultryinawaythatwoulddestroylegal,

yet undesirable residues. In 1959, the FDA legalised similar tolerances for the

preservationoffishviaantibioticiceordippingsolutions.25Scallopsandshrimp

22WilliamA.Randall,'AntibioticResidues',ProceedingsFirstInternationalConferenceOnTheUseOfAntibioticsInAgriculture(WashingtonDC:NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,1956),pp.262-63.2320FedReg.,8776(Nov30,1955);21Fed.Reg.,8104(Oct23,1956).24Ibid.25‘ExcerptsFromReportonAntibioticsPreparedfortheFDA’,NYT,22.08.1966,p.28;'ProceedingsFirstInternationalConferenceontheUseofAntibioticsinAgriculture',FirstInternationalConferenceOnAntibioticsInAgriculture(NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,1955),p.199.

66

could also be preserved via antibiotics.26Preservation trials formilk, beef and

eggswereultimatelyabandoned.27

Following the Miller Amendment, the FDA also licensed mostly

streptomycin-based antibiotic sprays andpaints foruse against bacterial plant

infections. Once again, the licensing-process was rapid. Following reports on

potentialusesofantibioticsagainstplantpathogensin1952,1953sawthefirst

use of streptomycin to control bacterial infections of apples and pears in

Missouri.28By 1955, antibiotic sprays had been licensed to combat bacterial

blight in apples, pears, walnuts, peaches and beans and for use against other

bacterialdiseasesaffectingtobacco,tomatoes,peppers,cherries,spinach,lettuce

andpotatoes.29

Retrospectively,perhapsthemostbizarreexpansionofantibioticusewas

thepreservationofwhalemeatviaantibioticinjectionsandexplodingharpoons.

TestedbyPfizer inNorwayandIceland,harpoons loadedwithoxytetracycline-

based ‘Biostat’ were supposed to explode and release antibiotics into whales’

circulatory system and preserve their meat. It was hoped that antibiotic-

preservatives would allow whale meat to “become plentiful in [American]

grocerystores.”30

26‘ExcerptsFromReportonAntibioticsPreparedfortheFDA’,NYT,22.08.1966,p.28.27F.E.Deatherage,'TheUseofAntibioticsinthePreservationofFoodsOtherThanFish',ProceedingsFirstInternationalConferenceOnTheUseOfAntibioticsInAgriculture(WashingtonDC:NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,1956),p.221.28W.J.Zaumeyer,'ImprovingPlantHealthwithAntibiotics',ibid.,pp.172-73.29WilliamA.Randall,'AntibioticResidues',ibid.,p.260.30TrialswereconductedattheNorwegianwhalingstationinSteinchman;‘AntibioticsUsedToPreserveFood’,NYT,20.10.1956,p.29;alsosee:WHO,'ThePublicHealthAspectsoftheUseofAntibioticsinFoodandFeedstuffs',WorldHealthOrganizationTechnicalReportSeries(Geneva:WHO,1963),p.9,JohanNicolayTønnessenandArneOddJohnsen,TheHistoryofModernWhaling,trans.R.I.Christophersen(BerkeleyAndLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1982),p.694.

67

Increasingly‘tolerated’onrawplants,fishandpoultry,antibiotics’illegal

presence in other foodstuffs also grew. Running on 1940’s budgetary and

manpower levels in 1955,31the FDA was unable to effectively combat illegal

antibiotic residues. Bad licensing decisions compounded residue problems. In

late 1955, an official from the FDA’s Division of Antibiotics warned about the

possible “exposure of large segments of the population to a multiplicity of

antibiotics”:

…itwasdiscoveredthattensofthousandsofchickenswerebeinginjectedin thenecktissueswithapreparationwhich leftan insolubleresidueofactivedrug.(…).Itwasfurtherfoundthatwhensuchantibioticcontainingtissuewasbakedorfriedtheconcentrationofdrugwasnotappreciablydiminished...32ChallengingtheFDA’sphilosophyofactingasalicensinggatekeeperand

trusting in compliance with labels and guidelines, early reports on illegal

residues inmeat failed to cause an uproar because of the on-going belief that

health hazards resulting from exposure to low antibiotic concentrations were

negligible.33AsaresultoftheMillerAmendment,theyearsfollowing1953saw

the gradual normalisation of ‘safe’ amounts of antibiotics in or on American

meat, fish and plants. As long as antibiotics degraded before being consumed,

officialssawnoreasontodenyindustryapplicationsforantibioticpreservatives

andsprays.IllegalresidueswerenotperceivedtochallengeFDApolicies.

In striking contrast to thegradualnormalisationof residues inUSmeat

andfish,antibioticresiduesinraworpasteurizedmilkremainedculturallyand

officially taboo. The FDA had been aware of antibiotic residues in milk since

1948 and began to sample a variety of milk products for residues in 1954.31'Fda's1967Lookafter60YearsofReoganization',FDAPapers,1/1(1967),p.10.32Randall,'AntibioticResidues',p.262.33'ProceedingsFirstInternationalConferenceontheUseofAntibioticsinAgriculture',pp.277-78.

68

Initially,3.2%ofsamplestestedpositiveforpenicillinresidues.34Oneyearlater,

11.6%ofsamplestestedpositive.Alarmed,theFDAaskedmedicalexpertsforan

assessment of possible dangers. 35 In contrast to contemporary opinions

regardingresiduesinmeat,theexpertswarned:“theingestionoftheamountsof

penicillin found in milk might conceivably cause a reaction in an extremely

sensitive individual.”36By 1957, the FDA mandated that labels on withdrawal

times be printed on drug containers and limited mastitis medications to a

maximumof 100,000units perdose – insteadof the1,500,000units perdose

used by some veterinarians and farmers.Although residue detections sunk to

3.7%ofsamplesin1958,37theFDAwasforcedtoconcedethateducationaland

labellingmeasures alonewould not suffice and decided to pioneer a sanction-

based interstatemonitoring program for penicillin residues inmilk in 1959.38

TheFDA’spenicillintestingprogramwassosuccessfulthatdetectionratesfellto

0.5%oftestedsamplesinthelate1960s.39

Resultingintheinstallationofactiveenforcementandresiduemonitoring

wellaheadofotherfoodstuffs,theexampleofmilkshowshowculturalnotionsof

purity strongly affected official antibiotic regulation. US scientists, consumers

andfarmersallagreedthatantibioticresidues inmilkweretaboo.Bycontrast,

residuesofthesamesubstanceswere‘tolerable’inmeat,fishandplantsbecause

these foodstuffs were not hedged by the same cultural taboo. Far from

34Randall,'AntibioticResidues',p.261.35HenryWelch,'AntibioticsinFoodPreservation.PublicHealthandRegulatoryAspects',Science,126/3284(1957),p.1160.36Randall,'AntibioticResidues',p.262.37Smith-Howard,PerfectingNature'sFood:ACulturalandEnvironmentalHistoryofMilkintheUnitedStates,1900-1970,pp.224-26.38Smith-Howard,'AntibioticsandAgriculturalChange:PurifyingMilkandProtectingHealthinthePostwarEra',pp.339-40.39W.G.Huber,'TheImpactofAntibioticDrugsandTheirResidues',AdvancesInVeterinaryScienceandComparativeMedicine,15(1971),p.107.

69

‘rationally’ weighing substances’ risks and benefits, regulatory decisions

mirrored–andoftenstrengthened–societalriskcultures.

Significantly, bacterial resistance did not fit into established cultural

narratives of chemical risk andFDAofficials remainedunder little pressure to

addresstheselectionforresistanceviaagriculturalantibioticuse.Contemporary

expert opinion did little to challenge this complacency. Speaking at the 1955

International Conference on Agricultural Antibiotic Use, the already familiar

infectious disease expert and critic of fixed-dose antibiotic combinations,

MaxwellFinland,upheldanepistemologicaldividebetweenbacterialresistance

inhumansandanimals:“Incontrasttothehumanexperience,disease-producing

strains have not been found to emerge among the types of animals that are

raised primarily for market on antibiotic-supplemented feeds.”40According to

Finland,AGPsweretoolowdosedtocreateharmfulresistance.41

Inviewofhisinfluentialcontemporaneousattackson‘irrational’medical

antibiotic use, Finland’s uncritical view of agricultural antibiotic-use seems

strange.42However, it can be explainedby his close contacts to industry. After

beingasked topresent a “critical reviewon ‘EmergenceofResistant Strains in

Chronic Intake of Antibiotics”43at the upcoming NAS conference, Finland had

contacted AGP-co-discoverer Thomas (Tom) Jukes at Cyanamid’s Pearl River

facilities. ‘Tom’ was only too happy to supply ‘Max’ with published and

40MaxwellFinland,'EmergenceofResistantStrainsinChronicIntakeofAntibiotics.AReview.',FirstInternationalConferenceOnAntibioticsInAgriculture.19-21October1955(NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,1956),p.251.41'ProceedingsFirstInternationalConferenceontheUseofAntibioticsinAgriculture',pp.265-78.42ScottPodolskyhaspublishedanexcellentaccountofFinland’sregulatoryimpact;ScottH.Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra:Reform,Resistance,andthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics(2015(forthcoming)),p.283.43CountwayLibraryofMedicine[inthefollowingCLM]MaxwellFinlandPapers[inthefollowingFP],SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,PaulWeisstoMaxwellFinland(Jun10,1955).

70

unpublished data, slides and a copy of his unpublished book Antibiotics in

Nutrition,44which subsequently provided the “main source”45for Finland’s

bibliography. Driven from New York to Pearl River via company limousine,46

Finlandalso talked tootherCyanamidresearchersandwasallowed toborrow

companyfiguresandslides,whichhesubsequentlyfailedtoreturn.47Speakingat

theconferenceafewweekslater,FinlandineffectpresentedaCyanamid-review

ofantibiotichazards.

Finland’scasewasnotunique.Assemblingtheinternationalcrème-de-la-

crème of antibiotic expertise, the entire 1955 conference had been lavishly

financed by the pharmaceutical industry: companies sponsored cocktail

receptions, hotel expenses and a seven day post-conference tour of theUS for

speakers with diverse recreational activities.48The first – and for a long time

only – conference of its kind, the 1955 NAS meeting had lasting effects on

perceptions of antibiotic risk and forged a community of industry-friendly

experts.

With the exception of milk, the FDA was thus under little pressure to

rethink agricultural antibiotic policies. In September 1958, the new Food

Additives Amendment further normalised the presence of ‘safe’ chemical

residuesinAmericanmeat.Althoughitprohibitedtheuseofinadequatelytested

or carcinogenic additives, the Amendment specifically charged the FDA with

44CLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,ThomasHughesJukestoMaxwellFinland(Jul1,1955);JukestoFinland(Jul11,1955).45CLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,FinlandtoJukes(Jul14,1955);alsoseeCLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,FinlandtoDamonCatron(Aug22,1955).46CLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,Margarete[Framel](SecretarytoDr.Jukes)toMaxwellFinland(Aug9,1955).47CLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,HPBroquesttoFinland(Aug31,1955);FinlandtoJukes(undated),enclosedin:Margarete[Framel](SecretarytoDr.Jukes)toFinland(Aug9,1955).48CLMFP,SeriesVIII,Box13,Folder51,InternationalConferenceontheUseofAntibioticsinAgriculture.InformationforInvitedParticipants;alsosee[Booklet]‘InHonorofTheParticipantsinTheInternationalConferenceOntheUseofAntibioticsinAgriculture’.

71

establishingsafeconditionsofuseandresiduetolerancesforapprovedadditives.

Anyveterinarydrugleavingresiduesinfoodwastobetreatedasanadditive.49

FDAofficialswere also taskedwith compiling a list of substances,whichwere

GenerallyRecognizedAsSafe(GRAS)viascientificconsensusorlongexperience.

GRASsubstanceswouldnotrequireNDAcertification.50Aso-called‘Grandfather

Clause’ also exempted NDAs licensed prior to 1958 from toxicity and residue

reviews.51Regulations for agricultural antibiotics remained unchanged with

7ppmtolerancesexistingforchlortetracyclineandoxytetracyclineresidues.52

Although it changed little regarding agricultural antibiotics, the 1958

Amendment’sattempttocreateacomprehensiveframeworkfortheevaluation

and regulation of food additives pushed the FDA to its organisational limits.

NDAsweregenerallyapprovedonacase-by-casebasisandmanufacturershadto

filecumbersomesupplementalNDAsiftheychangedanycomponentofaccepted

NDAs.Facedwithrapidpharmaceuticalandchemical innovation,officialswere

alreadystrugglingtokeepupwithlicensingapplications.Asaconsequence,the

additional pre-licensing data on the occurrence and harmfulness of drug

residuesandefficacyreviewsofdrugsaddedtofoodandwater53threatenedto

breakthebackofanalreadyoverstrainedlicensingsystem.

49WalterMosestoConstanceWinslade,Jun21,1961,Folder432.1-10Jan-Dec,Box3041,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.50‘'SignificantDatesinUsFoodandDrugLawHistory’',FDAHistory(http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm[accessed:26.09.2014]),Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.35.51WalterMosestoConstanceWinslade,Jun21,1961,Folder432.1-10Jan-Dec,Box3041,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.2.52DonaldC.GrovetoJohnA.Foster,Oct2,1961,Folder432.1June-Dec,Box3040,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;detailedresidueconcentrationsindifferenttissuesarelistedin:§121.1014Tolerancesforresiduesofchlortetracycline,SubpartD–FoodAdditivesPermittedinAnimalFeedorAnimal-FeedSupplements,ReissuedMar20,1962,FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.7.53BillV.McFarlandtoRobertE.Rust,Dec2,1959,ibid;requireddatawaslistedinFormFD-356;HomerR.SmithtoEmilLienert,[undated],ibid.,p.1;JFRobenstoAntonioSantosOcampo,Oct

72

The1958DelaneyClausefurthercomplicatedmatters:althoughNDAsfor

the carcinogen DES were no longer approved, FDA officials were unable to

revoke existing DES NDAs, which fell under the ‘Grandfather Clause’.54As a

consequence,manufacturerswith old NDAs continued to sell DES feeds.55The

already confused situation was not made easier by the growing divergence

betweenfederalandstatelaws.Priortothe1958Amendment,individualstates

had based their feed laws on the federal Uniform Feed Bill. However,

controversies overDESmade theUniformFeedBill Committee reject updated

federalprovisionsinOctober1959.Asaconsequence,statelawsbegantodiffer

from federal laws. This in turn increased the bureaucratic pressure on FDA

officials because many local feed merchants were now forced to clear their

productsdirectlywithWashington.56

Inthecaseofagriculturalantibiotics,thecombinationofstricterlicensing

requirements, GRAS exceptions and the flood of new products resulted in a

byzantinenightmare,whichwasfurthercomplicatedbytheabsenceofanofficial

compendium of medicated feed rules.57Following antibiotics’ advent, the FDA

hadmandatedindividualbatchcertificationsforso-calledcertifiableantibiotics

like penicillin, chloramphenicol, bacitracin, chlortetracycline and streptomycin.

Batchcertificationrequirementshadbeenwaivedformostlowlevelfeedsbelow

02,1961,Folder432.1June-Dec,Box3040,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;efficacyreviewshadalreadybeenrequiredforsomeantibioticsunderthepre-existingantibioticregulations.54WalterR.MosestoConstanceWinslade,Jun21,1961,Folder432.1-10Jan-Dec,Box3041,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.2.55FWQuackenbushtoCharlesDurbin,July15,1959,Folder432.1-432.1-11,Box2668,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.56FWQuackenbush,‘WillNewRegistrationsBeAcceptedNextYearForFeedsWhichContainArsenicalsAndHormones?’,enclosedin:FWQuackenbushtoHowardJ.Benson,Oct23,1959,ibid.;HomerR.SmithtoEmilLienert,[undated],FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,pp.1&3.57HubertS.SpungentoBrandenburgBrothers,Apr12,1966,Folder88-75-1,Box3846,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.

73

50 grams/ton in 1951 and 1953.58Where requirements had not beenwaived,

manufacturershadtofileaso-calledForm10withtheFDA,whichwasidentical

toanNDAbutrequiredadditionalproofofefficacy.However,adifferentsetof

regulationsappliedtopreparationscontainingnon-certifiableantibiotics,which

had to be licensed via an NDA. This continued to be the case for tylosin,

hygromycin, novobiocin, oleandomycin and nystatin. However, in the case of

oxytetracycline,neomycinandseveralsulphonamides,long-standingexperience

turned them into GRAS drugs after 1958. Producers could use these drugs

accordingtoGRASguidelineswithoutfilingextraForm10orNDAapplications.59

For ordinary mortals, the distinctions between certifiable, non-certifiable and

GRASantibioticswereconfusingtosaytheleast.60

AGPlabellingrulesprovedevenmorearcane:inordertostopproducers

from advertising excessive amounts of antibiotics, the FDA had banned

quantitativeantibioticlistingsonAGPlabelsinOctober1953.61However,many

manufacturers did not knowhowAGP labels should look62and someused the

absenceofquantitativelabellingtoselldeficientfeeds.63

Naturally, frustration soon ran high. After a meeting of the

PharmaceuticalManufacturersAssociationinApril1959,arepresentativenoted:5816Fed.Reg.,3647-3648(Apr.28,1951);18Fed.Reg.,2335-2336(Apr22,1953);alsosee:HomerR.SmithtoEmilLienert,[undated],FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.59Enclosure:‘DrugsandFeedAdditives’,in,LaVerneC.Harold,‘Memo’,enclosedin:HomerRSmithtoPEPoss,Oct29,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,pp.2&43.60PaulM.Sanders,‘SummaryofsomeDifferencesandSourcesofConfusionWithinthe[FDA]andtheirJurisdictionoverMedicatedFeeds’,Apr08,1959,enclosedin:SFKerntoCommissionerFDA,Apr14,1959,Folder432.1-432.1-11,Box2668,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.2.61WilliamE.JestertoRobertS.Roe,‘OfficeMemorandum–MedicatedFeeds’,Jul10,1959,ibid,p.3.62PaulM.Sanders,‘SummaryofsomeDifferencesandSourcesofConfusionWithinthe[FDA]andtheirJurisdictionoverMedicatedFeeds’,Apr08,1959,enclosedin:SFKerntoCommissionerFDA,Apr14,1959,Folder432.1-432.1-11,Box2668,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.63CharlesG.DurbintoOfficeoftheCommissioner,Jul5,1960,Folder432.1Dec.-432.1July,Box2843,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.

74

“…onefeelsthat,perhaps,theproblemofmedicatedfeedshasbeenregardedas

astepchild.(…)[andthe]administrationapproach(…)hasbeenoneof‘flyingby

the seat of your pants.”64Manufacturers also complained about fragmented

bureaucraticresponsibilities:

…wenowhavethefollowinggroupsoftheadministration(…)concernedwith the medicated feeds: Front Office (Ralph Kneeland’s office),Veterinary Medical Branch, New Drug Branch, Division of Antibiotics,Division of Pharmacology, State Relations Division, and, now where atolerance in a meat product might be concerned, the Food AdditivesDivision.65

According to the pharmaceutical industry, processing speeds for similar NDAs

couldvarybyuptofourweeks.Withnobodybuta fewoverworkedofficials in

Washingtonabletonavigatethebyzantineveterinarydrugandmedicatedfeed

rules,a1959FDAmemodreadednewregulationsbecausetherewasalready“so

much confusion andmisinformation.”66Given the lack of controls, itwas often

easierfor localmanufacturersto ignoreFDAguidelinesthantopayforandfile

cumbersomeNDAs.

Under pressure to streamline procedures, officials were occasionally

temptedtoappeaseindustrybysacrificingconsumerprotection.InJuly1959,a

memofromtheFDA’sDivisionofPharmacologywarnedGeorgeP.Larrick,who

hadbeenpromotedtoFDACommissionerin1954,thatareductionofnewdrugs

wouldleadtomisuseofexistingveterinaryandhumandrugs:itdidnot“takea

greatdealofforesighttopredict(…)thataveterinariancan(andnodoubtwill)

prescribe new drugs currently marketed for human use … ” 67 Mail

64Ibid.65Ibid.66DurbintoQuackenbush,Jul13,1959,Folder432.1-432.1-11,Box2668,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.67DivisionofPharmacologyandBureauofMedicinetoOfficeoftheCommissioner,‘VeterinaryDrugsUndertheFoodAdditivesAmendment’,Jul14,1959,Ibid,p.1

75

advertisementsandreportson“uncontrolledstudies”wouldresultinveterinary

misuseofpotentpharmaceuticals–“misuseoverwhichwe(FDA)haveverylittle

(orno) control.”68Significantly, thememodidnot call for stricter enforcement

but for the ability to grant exceptions from the 1958 Amendment.69Although

penaltiesforfeedviolationsremainedrelativelylow,70FDAofficialsalsostressed

that they would not intensify prosecutions of feed violations. In 1959,

Commissioner Larrick reassured readers of Successful Farming that new

regulationswere“definitely(…)nota‘crackdown”.71

Behind the scenes, FDA officials were, however, well aware that

inadequate testing and enforcement had allowed feedstuff abuse to become

rampant.In1959,Massachusetts’OfficialChemist,JohnW.Kuzmeski,warned:

Itisawellknownfact(…)that[withdrawalwarningsare]largelyignored.(…). If a farmer feeds amedicated feed tohis chickensup to thedayofslaughter,andundesirableresiduesremaininthefleshasaconsequence,you,Iandahostofotherpeoplewillbeeatingthoseresidues.72

Because it was impossible for officials to “stand over every farmer”, it was

necessary “to assume that many farmers will not heed”73guidelines. Before

licensingdrugs,FDAofficialsshouldthereforealwaysconsider“whatdangerto

public health exists when widespread disregard of necessary warning

statementshasbeenestablished.”74Officialsshouldalsoinsistontheavailability

ofreliableassaymethodstodetectdruglevels.75In1957,anofficialreviewof30

drugshadshownthat“reliablemethodsforanalysisinthefinishedfeeds[were]68Ibid.69Ibid.,pp.2-3.70W.E.GlennontoRalphF.Kneeland,Oct19,1959,Ibid.71‘SuccessfulFarming–DecemberIssue(interviewGeorgeP.Larrick)’,enclosedin:Wallacef.Jensen,‘MemorandumforFile–InterviewwithG.P.Larrick’,Oct15,1959,ibid.72JohnW.KuzmeskitoWEGlennon,Jun10,1959,enclosedin:JohnW.KuzmeskitoGeorgeP.Larrick,Jun23,1959,ibid.73Ibid.74Ibid.75Ibid.

76

only available for less than half of them.”76Because industry opposition had

prevented the mandatory inclusion of assay methods in NDAs,77FDA officials

wereforcedtoaskforvoluntaryindustryparticipationinaprogramtoprovide

pre-licensingassaymethods.78

By the late 1950s, it was increasingly obvious that the FDA’s policy of

gatekeeper licensing, voluntary industry compliance, producer education and

labelguidelineswasfailing.Withtheexceptionofmilk,inadequatecontrols,lack

of foresight, complicated rules, ignorance and wilful abuse resulted in

widespreadnoncompliancewithFDAguidelines.

Attempting to redress noncompliance and salmonellosis problems in

1960, the FDA decided to establish regular controls of feed mills.79However,

initial surveys revealed severe problems. In 1961, 69 major violations were

detected in 1,100medicated feedstuff samples and “a large number”80of AGP

feeds was found to be deficient in antibiotics. Another entirely accidental

discovery was that antibiotics were being fed to species such as rabbits and

game birds for which they had never been licensed.81During a 1962meeting

withindustryrepresentatives,FDAofficialsblamedthehighvolumeofviolations

onignoranceandwilfulnon-compliance:

76QuackenbushtoAbbottLaboratories,Feb07,1959,enclosedin:BillV.McFarlandtoEugeneH.Holeman,Dec29,1959,Folder432.1-20-433.10,Box2669,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.77RalphKneelandtoOllieMichael,Mar13,1958,ibid.78QuackenbushtoAbbottLaboratories,Feb07,1959,enclosedin:BillMcFarlandtoEugeneHoleman,Dec29,1959,ibid.79WEGlennontoGeorgeLarrick,Dec6,1960,enclosedin:WEGlennontoMorrisYakowitz,December7,1960,Folder432.1Dec.-432.1July,Box2843,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.3;CAArmstrongtoDallasDistrict,Jan29,1962,Folder70A190#96,Box3246,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.80TheoB.BenjamintoAdministration,Nov28,1961,Folder432-432.80,Box3040,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.81ParksA.YeatstoFDA,Apr04,1961,enclosedin:BillMcFarlandtoParksA.Yeats[undated],Folder432.1June-Dec,Box3040,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;BillMcFarlandtoParksA.Yeats[undated]ibid.

77

Alargeproportionoftoday’scomplexfeedindustryconsistsofsmallmilloperationswithlimitedpersonnelandmanagementsharingtheburdenofmany responsibilities. (…). Their time is limited and often theircapabilities to interpret the regulations (…) are also. (…), they havelookeduponinspectionprogramswithfearanddistaste...82Already facing widespread ignorance about antibiotics amongst

professionalmillowners,FDAofficialswerealsoconcernedaboutthegrowthof

individual custommixing operations. In 1962, an FDA inspector described the

breakdownofFDAguidelinesonintegratedturkeybusinesses:

Fieldmen,mostofwhomarenottrainedveterinarians,areemployedtocheck the flocks [of ca. 300,000 birds] daily and diagnose diseaseconditions, (…), the field men prescribe drugs and/or antibiotics forcontrol or prevention. As the medicated feeds are not resold, the firmdoes not apparently feel it comes under the scope of the new drug orantibioticregulations.Theusualamountsofmedicationarenotadheredto.83

Drugswere“frequentlypurchasedin[as]largeamountsas25kgs.penicillin.”84

Itwasnotuncommonfor“acoccidostat,blackheadpreventive,andantibiotic(…)

all [to]be fedat thesame time”85and theoccurrenceofdrugresidues inmeat

waslikely.

Meanwhile, FDA enforcement remained hampered by patchy legislation

and bad coordination.86When proactive officials tried to take action against

violativenewdrugpremixes,theFDA’sGeneralCounselwarnedthattheFDA:

… w[as] not on sound legal ground to take equal enforcement actionagainstthemajorityoftheviolativeshipmentsofnewdrugpremixesand(…)advised(…)not[to]approveanymoreactions inthisareauntil theproblemcouldberesolved.87

82‘MemorandumofInterview’,Dec4,1962,Folder432-432.80,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.83RobertV.MarrstoA.HarrisKenyon,Sep26,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.2.84Ibid.85Ibid.86CAArmstrongtoBureauofFieldAdministration,Sep24,1962,Folder70A190#96,Box3246,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.87KLMilsteadtoJLHarvey,May28,1962,FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.

78

Considering enforcement and voluntary compliance unlikely, one memo from

1962 suggested legalising residues in order to improve FDA statistics:

“consideration for requiring tolerances for drugs in meat by food additive

regulations in lieu thereof, may be the only way of preventing illegal tissue

residues.”88

IneffectiveFDAlicensingandenforcementpoliciesdidnotremainhidden

fromthepubliceye.Exacerbatedby theWelchscandalandKefauverHearings,

theFDAandCommissionerLarrickwereaccusedofkowtowingtoindustryand

criticisedforthe‘revolvingdoor’betweenFDAandindustrypersonnel.89Inearly

1962,CommissionerLarrickalsomadetheproblematicdecisiontosupportthe

looseningoftheDelaneyClause.FailingtomentionthattheFDAwasnotactively

monitoringfordrugresiduesinmeat,seniorofficialsclaimed“itwouldbeinthe

public interest to amend the [Delaney Clause]” so that carcinogenic additives

couldbeusediftheydidnotharmanimals’healthandleftnoresiduesin“edible

products”90. For an organisationwhose powerwas built on reputation, such a

carelessmanagementofpublicrelationswasdangerous.91

Frustrationaboutoverlyfriendlyrelationswithindustryalsogrewwithin

the FDA. In April 1962, Charles Durbin, director of the FDA’s Division of

VeterinaryMedicine, expressed concern about the close ties between an FDA-

contractedantibioticsinvestigatorandEliLillybutwas“unawareofanyaction”

the FDA could take against the researcher “or any other ‘legitimate’88DanielDeCamptoCharlesDurbin,‘Memorandum–CurrentPoultryFeedingPractices(FeedSuppliesattheFarm),Sep18,1962,Folder70A190#96,Box3246,GS,DFEntryA1,RG88,NARA,p.3.89Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,pp.119-20,347.90JohnHarveytoPeterDominick(HouseofRepresentatives),May25,1962,FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,91Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,pp.9-11.

79

investigator.”92Afewmonthslater,theFDA’sDivisionofPharmacologyreacted

furiouslytowhatitsawasweakleadershipwhenanAFMAbulletinannounced

an imminent agreement to legalise higher-dosed therapeutic or prophylactic

AGPs for mature animals.93Exasperated with the tendency to retrospectively

legalise noncompliance, experts within the FDA’s Division of Pharmacology

complainedthatthe“proposedrevisionofguidelinessoundslikeacompromised

committee report (…) designed “to ‘overlook’ certain violations of the present

antibioticregulations.”94TheDivision’sprotestprovedeffective:theuseofAGPS

for mature animals remained banned and the wording of regulations was

improved.95

However, internal FDA criticism and reform attempts remained

spasmodic and Congressional pressure for Larrick’s resignation increased

steadily.96The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment exacerbated enforcement

problems by requiring the FDA to establish a distinct licensing process for

veterinarydrugsandmandatingtheofficialcertification–andregularcontrol–

of veterinary drugmanufacturers and feedmills producingmedicated feeds.97

Stillstrugglingtofulfiltherequirementsofthe1958FoodAdditivesAmendment,

theFDA’sanimaldrugpolicyenteredathree-yearstageofregulatoryatrophy.92CharlesDurbintoBureauofEnforcement(Atten:C.Armstrong),Apr27,1962,FolderPA190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.93LevintoGeorgeLarrick,Nov29,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GSDFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1;contemporaryFDAregulationsallowedtheuseofAGPsforgrowingandmatureanimals,butnotsolelyformatureanimals.94KJDavis,AANelsonandBJVostoBureauofEnforcement,AttentionofMrArmstrong,‘Re-Guideline44–AnimalFeedsContainingCertifiableAntibioticsatGrowthPromotingLevels’,[undated],ibid.95JFRobens,‘MemorandumofConference’,Dec6,1962,ibid,p.2.96'GeorgeP.Larrick-FdaCommissionersPage',FDAHistory.FDALeaders&TheirDeputies.Commissioners(http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Leaders/Commissioners/ucm093755.htm[accessed:22.10.2014]).97CLM,FP,SeriesII,A.ProfessionalCorrespondence,1929-1984,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,CharlesG.Durbin,‘VeterinaryDrugs’,in:Proceedings.FDAConferenceontheKefauver-HarrisDrugAmendmentsandProposedRegulations,Feb15,1963,pp.8-9.

80

Meanwhile, inspection reports remained dismal: some feed

manufacturerswerenot labelling their feeds, someweresellingdeficient feeds

andothersdidnotevenownscaleswithwhichtomeasuretheamountofdrugs

theyweremixing into their feeds.Becausemanyproducersdidnotclean their

equipment between batches, feeds were often cross-contaminated with old

medicationresidues.98Onfarms,thesituationwasjustasbad.Concernedabout

DES misuse, the FDA conducted several surveys between 1960 and 1964.

Initially,12.7%of138beefproducerswerefoundtomisusemedicatedfeeds.99

BetweenFebruary1964andFebruary1965, 247 further inspectionsdisclosed

that 8.5% of inspected livestock producersweremisusingmedicated feeds.100

Although Commissioner Larrick discussed further voluntary compliance

measureswithindustryinMarch1965,101thedetectedfeedviolationsindicated

that the FDA’s gatekeeper approach regarding medicated feeds had failed. In

additiontotheirlegalpresence,theoccurrenceofillegalantibioticresiduesinUS

foodwaslikely.

All the while, the official attention paid to the selection for bacterial

resistanceon farmsremainedminimal. In1961,Dr.AntonioSantosOcampoJr.

fromtheArenataUniversityinthePhilippinesaskedtheFDAforadvice:

Forinstance,peopleherearejustplaincrazyabouttheuseofantibioticstostimulateeggproductionandtopreventCRD.Weareliterallyflooded

98ArthurM.Sommer,‘EstablishmentInspectionReport’,Oct07,1963,Folder71A-24-74,Box3516,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.99JAKedziortoAERayfield,‘Memorandum–MedicatedFeedsCompliancebyBeefFeeders’,Mar26,1965,enclosedin:GeorgeLarrick,‘MemorandumofConference’,Mar26,1965,Folder88-73-5#42,Box3701,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.100Ibid.101GeorgeLarrick,‘MemorandumofConference’,Mar26,1965,ibid.

81

with literatures (of course by Pfizer people) regarding the efficacy. TheTerramycineggformulaandtheanti-germ77sellslikehotcakehere.102

However, Ocampo had “always entertained doubts as to the wisdom of the

indiscriminateuseofantibiotics”:“Ifearthatthemicrobialflorainanimalsmight

becomeresistanttoantibioticsandwhenthetimecomesthisantibioticwillno

longerhaveanyvalue.”103Inresponse,theFDAassuredOcampo:“Thefearthat

indiscriminateuseofantibioticswillresultinresistantstrainsoforganismshas

been expressed in this country. So far no one has produced any conclusive

evidencethatthisisthecaseinpoultry.”104

Thespectreofantibioticresistancewasraisedagainduringa1962FDA

meeting.DebatingthealreadyfamiliarquestionofAGPsformatureanimals,an

officialfromtheFDA’sDivisionofVeterinaryMedicinementionedareportfrom

the British Netherthorpe committee: “… there may be a build-up of resistant

organisms when adult animals are fed low levels of antibiotics continuously,

GreatBritaindoesnotallowtheiruseforthisreason.”105Whilethisinformation

did not provoke further discussions, the Division of Pharmacology expressed

concern about pets’ treatment with inadequately dosed antibiotics and “the

possible danger toman fromdevelopment of transmissible antibiotic-resistant

strainsofbacteria(particularlystaphylococci) inhouseholdpetswhoserations

contain low-level antibiotics.”106It was thought advisable to increase “activity

(…) against those rations containing certifiable antibioticswhich aremarketed

102AntonioSantosOcampo,Jr.toGVPeacock,Aug30,1961,enclosedin:JFRobenstoAntonioSantosOcampo,Jr.,Oct2,1961,Folder432.1June-Dec,Box3040,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.103Ibid.104JFRobenstoAntonioSantosOcampo,Jr.,Oct2,1961,ibid.105JFRobens,‘MemorandumofConference’,Dec6,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.2.106KJDavis,AANelson,BJVostoBureauofEnforcement,[undated],ibid.

82

for continuous feeding to household pets.” 107 Farm animals’ long-term

consumptionoflow-dosedAGPswasnotchallenged.108

In September 1962, the FDA elaborated on its benign assessment of

bacterialresistanceselectioninagriculturalsettingsinresponsetoaconstituent

enquirysubmittedbyDemocratSenatorHubertH.Humphrey.109Thelatervice-

presidentwasoneofthemaincriticsofCommissionerLarrickandco-authorof

the FDC’s 1951 Durham-Humphrey Amendment, which introduced the

distinction between so-called over-the-counter (OTC) drugs and prescription

onlymedicines(POM).110Humphrey’sconstituentenquiryhadbeenauthoredby

James S. Collins, a PhD in animal breeding and former employee of the feed

companyNutrena(Cargill Inc.).Whilehewasworking forNutrena,Collinshad

actively campaigned against AGPs and discovered that “our animals are now

carrying a heavy infection of antibiotic resistant pathogens.”111Criticising the

FDA’sresidue-centredviewthatproductsweresafe“ifnoantibioticturnsupin

[animals’]tissue,”112Collinswarned:

Itwould seem tome thatwearenotonly layingour animalpopulationwide open for disaster as well as providing reservoirs of pathogens toinvademan.113

In his response to Senator Humphrey, Deputy Commissioner Harvey

defended FDA policies: “… experts regard use of drugs and chemicals (…) as

107Ibid.108TheFDA’sbenignassessmentofantibioticresistancewasstrengthenedbythe1963publicationofaWHOreportonagriculturalantibiotics;Who,'ThePublicHealthAspectsoftheUseofAntibioticsinFoodandFeedstuffs',pp.12-14.109JohnL.HarveytoHubertH.Humphrey(USSenate),Sep5,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.110'GeorgeP.Larrick-FdaCommissionersPage'.111JamesS.CollinstoSenatorHumphrey,Aug8,1962,enclosedin:JohnL.HarveytoHubertH.Humphrey(USSenate),Sep5,1962,Folder70A190#95,Box3245,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,pp.1-2.112Ibid.113Ibid.,p.4.

83

necessary in order to (…) assure adequate food as the Nation’s population

increaseswhile the acreage of productive farmland decreases.”114Referring to

the“indirecthazard”ofantibioticresistance,HarveyclaimedthatFDA“scientists

arekeepingabreastofdevelopmentsinthisfield.”115TheFDAhadalsocontacted

theBritishNetherthorpecommittee,whichhad“concluded thatalthough there

areproblemsresultingfromtheuseof(…)antibioticsinanimalfeeds,suchuse

shouldbeallowedtocontinue.”116RegardingOTCsalesofmastitistubes,which

hadbeencriticisedbyCollins,HarveywaspishlyremindedSenatorHumphreyof

hisown1951FDCAmendment:

…thereisnothingintheActitselfdealingspecificallywiththequestionofwhether a veterinary drugmay be restricted to veterinary prescriptiondispensing.117

TheFDA’sregulatorydeadlockregardinganimaldruguseonlybeganto

changein1965whenGeorgeLarrickendedhistenureasFDACommissioner.118

Larrick’s successor, James L. Goddard, fulfilled Congressional demands for a

medically qualified FDA Commissioner and had previously headed the

CommunicableDiseaseCenter(CDC).StartingasCommissionerinJanuary1966

and soonknownas “Go-GoGoddard,”119Goddard contrasted radicallywithhis

predecessorandembarkedonafundamentalrestructuringoftheFDA,whichled

totheexitofmanyseniorofficials.120UnderGoddard,FDAdrugrecallsgrewby

114JohnL.HarveytoHubertH.Humphrey(USSenate),Sep5,1962,ibid.,p.1.115Ibid.116Ibid.,pp.2-3.117Ibid.,p.2.118'GeorgeP.Larrick-FdaCommissionersPage'.119'JamesL.Goddard-FdaCommissionersPage',FDAHistory.FDALeaders&TheirDeputies.Commissioners(http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Leaders/Commissioners/ucm093750.htm[accessed:22.10.2014]).120‘AnotherTopLevelOfficialtoLeaveFDANextWeek’,Feedstuffs,11.12.1965,pp.2and75.

84

ca. 75% and the NAS was contracted for an efficacy review of drugs licensed

priorto1962(theso-calledDrugEfficacyStudyImplementation(DESI)).121

The FDA’s leadership change also affected the regulation of agricultural

antibiotics. In February 1965, the FDA had decided to install an ad hoc

Committee on the Veterinary Medical and Nonmedical Uses of Antibiotics.122

Despite an infuriating archival gap and an elusive final report, circumstantial

evidence makes it possible to reconstruct the proceedings of the ad hoc

committee. According to industry sources, the committee had been formed

becauseoftheabove-mentionedFDAsurveysonmedicatedfeedstuffcompliance

andparallelUSDAdetectionsofpenicillininAmericanredmeat.123FDAofficials

were alsobecoming concernedabout existing antibiotic toleranceson fish and

poultry.124As a consequence, the FDA ad hoc committee’s focuswas primarily

residue-oriented and members initially referred to it as the “Committee to

ConsiderthePublicHealthImplicationsofthePresenceofAntibioticResiduesin

FoodandtheUseofAntibioticsasFoodPreservatives.”125

Headed by Mark Lepper, Professor of Preventive Medicine at the

UniversityofIllinois,126andcountingMaxwellFinlandamongstitsmembers,the

adhoccommitteemetforthefirsttimeinearlyMay1965andsubmitteditsfinal

reportoneyearlater.127Betweenthesetwodates,majorchangeshadoccurred:

121'JamesL.Goddard-FdaCommissionersPage'.12231FedReg.,11141(Aug23,1966).123RogerBerglund,‘IndustryCautionedonPossibleSalmonella,ChemicalResidueProblems’,Feedstuffs,13.02.1965,pp.8&73;‘ResiduesinSwineNotCauseforAlarm’,Feedstuffs,13.11.1965,pp.6&87.124CLM,FP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,ClemO.MillertoFinland(Feb11,1965).125CLM,FP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,FinlandtoClemO.Miller(Feb18,1965).126CLM,FP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,WilliamW.WrighttoFinland(Mar15,1965)127Ibid.,seealso31FedReg.,11141(Aug23,1966).

85

in addition to Commissioner Larrick’s resignation, British publications on

‘infectious’ resistance had greatly altered general preceptions of antibiotic

risk.128

Because of the ad hoc committee’s residue-oriented focus, British

concerns about ‘infectious’ resistance initially had little effect on its

deliberations.Although the first of theBritish articles onhorizontal resistance

had appeared three months ahead of their inaugural meeting,129committee

membersdidnotincludeitintheirpreparatoryreadinglist130butdiscussedthe

matter later on.131In August 1966, the ad hoc committee’s report expressed

“concern” about the “possibility of microorganisms in animals developing

resistanceorofstrainsbeingselectedthatareresistant”andcalledforstudiesof

“the long-termecologicaleffects”132ofagriculturalantibioticuse.However, the

report limited immediate resistance warnings to antibiotic residues.

Preservativesshouldnolongerconsistoforgiverisetocross-resistanceagainst

therapeutically relevantantibiotics. Ideally, antibiotic foodpreservation should

bebannedcompletely.TheFDAshouldalsoincreaseeffortstopreventantibiotic

residues inedible tissues, re-evaluatedosagesandwithdrawal timesandmake

128WatanabehadalreadypublishedonR-factortransferinthe1950sandpublishedareviewinEnglishin1963;T.Watanabe,'InfectiveHeredityofMultipleDrugResistanceinBacteria',BacteriologicalReviews,27/1(1963);fortheUSpressimpactofthe1966warningsseeChapterOne,pp.34-36:fortheriseofBritishwarningsseeChapterFour,pp.101-103.129AndersonandDatta,'ResistancetoPencillinsandItsTransferinEnterobacteriaceae'.130ThelistdidnotincludeJapanesepublicationsonR-factorseither;CLMFP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,WilliamW.WrighttoFinland(Apr19,1965);Finland’sunchangedviewsbecomeevidentinhisproposedreadingcontributionsseeFinlandtoClemO.Miller(Feb18,1965);onFinland’sinfluencealsoseePodolsky,TheAntibioticEra:Reform,Resistance,andthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,pp.17-18;79;127-29,32-202.131CLMFP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder25:FDA1961-1965,WilliamW.WrighttoFinland,(Jul26,1965).132‘ExcerptsFromReportonAntibioticsPreparedfortheFDA’,NYT,22.08.1966,p.28.

86

“’warning’ statement[s] used in veterinary chloramphenicol labelling (...)more

emphatic”133sothatitwasnotusedinfood-producinganimals.

TheFDA subsequently committed to implement the adhoc committee’s

reportandusedittoassuagepublicconcernsaboutagriculturalantibiotics.Only

fivedaysafter theappearanceof the1966NEJM editorialonR-factor transfer,

the Federal Register announced the following policy measures: producers of

licensedantibioticproductswere to submitnewdataon “whetherornot such

antibioticsandtheirmetabolitesarepresentasresiduesinedibletissues,milk,

and eggs from treated animals.”134Should they fail to submit data within 180

days, producers could lose their product licenses.135Citing resistance and

hygiene concerns, the FDA also banned the preservation of poultry, fish and

shellfish with antibiotics in September 1966 and commissioned the NAS to

organiseascientificconferenceonagriculturalantibiotics.136

Takingplacein1967,theNASsymposiumon“theuseofdrugsinanimal

feeds”137gatheredmanywell-known antibiotic supporters. In his presentation,

AGP co-discoverer Thomas Jukes attacked the “emotional phraseology used in

[theNEJMeditorial](…)thatledtheNYTto(…)threatenuswiththepropaganda

device of a new SilentSpring”.138Meanwhile, Maxwell Finlandmaintained that

therewas “littleevidence to implicate foodasa sourceof infections causedby

organisms resistant to antimicrobial agents.”139Moreover, it was “difficult to

133Ibid.13431FedReg.11141(Aug23,1966).135Ibid.,pp.11141-11142.136WNSwaintoRobertW.Kastenmeier(HouseofRepresentatives),Dec12,1966,Folder88-75-1,Box3846,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;RobertA.BaldwinandLaverneC.Harold,'EcologicEffectsofAntibiotics',FDAPapers,1/1(February)(1967),pp.23-24.137'TheUseofDrugsinAnimalFeeds',(WashingtonDC:NationalAcademyofSciences,1967).138Ibid.,p.60.139Ibid.,p.346.

87

implicate”140AGPs in reports on enteric ‘infective resistance’. Also seeing no

need for antibiotic restrictions, former ad hoc committee head Mark Lepper,

however,warned that current drug evaluation and antibiotic studieswere too

crude.Whileno“majorcatastrophe”seemedtobe“aroundthecorner”,“theuse

of drugs in feeds could be influencing (…) the background level of organism

resistance,withoutanyofusbeingawareofthefact.”141

Such a wait-and-see attitude was criticised by other attendees. In his

presentation, British veterinary researcher Herbert Williams Smith noted:

“There isnoessentialdifferencebetween theemergenceof resistant strainsof

bacteriaasaresultoftheuseofdrugsinthetreatmentofclinicaldiseaseandas

a result of the use of drugs as feed additives.”142According toWilliams Smith,

prolonged exposure to low-dosed AGPswas especially conducive to antibiotic

resistanceproliferation:“Astrongcase,therefore,existsforlimitingthenumber

of different kinds of drugs that can be used for ‘nutritional’ purposes.”143

However, the mostly European criticism was of no avail and the majority of

attendees remained convinced that the spectre of globalmalnutrition justified

AGPs’continueduse.

Also speaking at the symposium, FDA Commissioner James Goddard

statedthattheFDAwastakingtheadhoccommittee’sreportseriouslyandwas

committedtoanalysingpotentialecologicalhazards.However,Goddarddidnot

dwell long on resistance and instead stressed FDA progress against antibiotic

residues. Although past inaction and a lack of reliable data was hampering

progress,Goddardwasproudof recentFDA recallsof residue-proneantibiotic140Ibid.,p.349.141Ibid.,p.375.142Ibid.,p.304.143Ibid.,pp.315-16.;seealsooppositionbyDutchresearcherE.H.Kampelmacher;ibid.,p.324.

88

products and “the denial of certification for oil-based injectable penicillin

products, which required an unrealistic withholding time”.144Goddard also

remainedsanguineaboutantibiotics’generalfutureinUSagriculture.Becauseit

was “vital tokeep the industrymovingahead (…)and toprotect the supplyof

food,”145the FDA would “eliminate, wherever possible, purely administrative

delaysintheintroductionofnewdrugsforanimaluse…”146

Withmore-or-lessoverttieslinkinginfluentialUSexpertstoindustry,itis

unsurprising that FDA regulators were reluctant to endorse the resistance

warningspurportedbymostlyEuropeanscientists. Intheend,the1966report

re-confirmed the FDA’s existing focus on antibiotic residues but also justified

expanding FDA enforcement. Motivated by its new Commissioner and public

concerns about food purity, the FDA therefore decided to establish a national

surveillanceprogrammeforantibioticresiduesinmeat incooperationwiththe

USDA in 1967.147Supported by the USDA, a mixture of targeted and random

meatsamplingandtestingforantibioticresidueswouldallowtheFDAtogainan

overview of contamination levels. In a further step, FDA inspectors would

randomly sample meat at the retail level. The FDA also launched a national

educationalcampaignwarningfarmersto:

… use medicated feeds carefully and wisely (…). Federal law prohibitsharmfuldrugresidues.Protectthepublichealth…avoideconomicloss.148

Comingwell aheadof similarprograms inother countries, theenvisagedFDA-

USDAantibioticmonitoringprogrammarkedadecisivebreakfromUSagencies’

144Ibid.,p.7.145Ibid.146Ibid.,p.8.147FredJ.Kingma,'EstablishingandMonitoringDrugResidueLevels',FDAPapers,1/6(July-August)(1967),p.33.148'UseMedicatedFeedsCarefullyandWisely',ibid.

89

pasthesitancytoaddressproblemsinthemedicatedfeedstuffsectorandresidue

offences. However, it remained unclear whether existing tests and statutory

powers would allow the effective prosecution of offenders. Moreover, the

installationof theprogramwithoutsimilarmonitoringmeasures forresistance

proliferation threatened to distract public and official attention from the

proliferationofbacterialresistanceonUSfarms.

In public, the FDA continued to claim that reducing antibiotic residues

would also contain bacterial resistance. In 1967, the head of the FDA’s

restructured Bureau of Veterinary Medicine (BVM), CD Van Houweling,

estimatedthatUSfarmerswereannuallyusing2.7millionpoundsofantibiotics

inanimalfeeds.149Notingthat“somebacteriahaveresistancetoasmanyasnine

antibioticsatonce”150andcouldtransmitresistancetootherstrainsandspecies,

VanHouweling reassured consumers: “FDA hasmoved to bar frommarketing

almostallproductswithantibioticresiduesattimeofmarketing.”151Intheface

ofscientificuncertainty,theFDAwouldfinancefurtherresearch:“Weseemtobe

at a stagewhere reasons can be advanced that therewill be, orwill not be, a

publichealthhazardwithcontinueduseofmedicatedfeeds.”152AccordingtoVan

Houweling,decisionswouldbemade“onthebasisofthebestscientificevidence

available.”153Should FDA officials err, theywould do so “on the side of public

protection.”154PublictrustinFDAjudgmentwouldsoonbeputtothetest.

149C.D.VanHouweling,'DrugsinAnimalFeed?AQuestionwithoutanAnswer.',ibid./7(September),p.12.150Ibid.,p.13.151Ibid.,p.14.152Ibid.,p.15.153Ibid.154Ibid.

90

PartTwo–Britain:Fromrationingtogluttony(1945-1969)

ChapterFour:GreatBritishAntibiotics

Following thedeprivationsof theSecondWorldWar,Britainstruggled tostem

the costs of decommissioning large parts of her military while rebuilding the

national industry.Trying topreventa rise inexpensive food imports following

badharvests,theBritishgovernmentembarkedonaprogramofsubsidizedand

state-controlledagriculturalexpansion.Atthesametime,nationalconsumption

washeld in checkbymaintaining thewartime systemof rationing.Ultimately,

the prolonged disruption of international trade and colonial campaigns,

combined with the KoreanWarmade post-war rationing last longer than the

entireSecondWorldWarandfoodavailabilityactuallydecreasedbetween1946

and 1948.1It was only in 1954 that the British Ministry of Food (MoF) was

dismantled along with its rationing system.2By this time, consumers were

craving meat: between 1950 and 1970 UK meat consumption increased by

33.1%.3

The decision to end rationing coincided with the liberalisation of

antibiotic use in Britain. Fearing antibiotic resistance, the British government

hadinitiallylimitedantibioticusewiththePenicillinActof1947.Inaccordance

1InaZweiniger-Bargielowska,AusterityinBritain:Rationing,ControlandConsumption1939-1955(OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),p.37.2Ibid.,p.73.3H.J.H.MacFieandH.L.Meiselman,FoodChoice,AcceptanceandConsumption(London:BlackieAcademic&Professional1996),p.377.

91

with the act, antibiotics were turned into POMs.4However, in 1953, the

Therapeutic Substances (PreventionofMisuse)Act (TSA) exempted theuse of

antibioticsforfeedpurposesfromprescriptionrequirements.

Similar to the US, most domestic observers welcomed agricultural

antibioticsasaprogressivewayofsatisfyingrising levelsofmeatconsumption

and enhancingBritish nutritional independence. Prior to their legalisation, the

politically conservative Times stressed agricultural antibiotics’ benefits: titled

“Twentieth-CenturyHen”, one article described subtherapeutic antibiotics as a

“strange nutrition” with the potential to solve the “world-wide shortage of

protein”.5Threeyearsafter theTSA, thenewspaper’soptimism foragricultural

antibioticshadnotabated.Reportingonantibioticfoodpreservation,onearticle

describeditas“’thegreatestadvanceinthefieldofprocessingperishablefoods

sincetheadventofrefrigeration.’”6

Written during a time of great technological enthusiasm, the British

media’s optimism regarding agricultural antibiotics is not surprising. After all,

prospects of using radioactive wastes for food preservation and breeding

receivedequallygushingmedia-coverage.7AsshownbyRobertBud,partsofthe

British public and the media also saw antibiotics as a quintessentially British

contribution to progress.8When Pfizer opened a new terramycin-plant in

Sandwich in 1955, Pfizer’s vice-president was quick to stress the plant’s

4StuartAnderson,MakingMedicines:ABriefHistoryofPharmacyandPharmaceuticals(LondonandGrayslake:PharmaceuticalPress,2005),p.248.5G.R.H.Nugent,‘TheTwentieth-CenturyHen’,Times,30.07.1951,p.5;alsosee‘PigsFattenedByAntibiotics’,Times,01.12.1952,p.3;‘Feeding-StuffExperiments’,Times,08.07.1952,p.3;‘AnimalNutrition’,Times,10.09.1952,p.7.6‘NewMethodOfFoodPreservation’,Times,11.04.1956,p.13.7‘NewsfromIndustries’,Times,15.06.1955,p.5.8Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.67-72.

92

Britishness: “although the installationwas financedby theUnited States itwas

partlydesignedandwhollybuiltandoperatedbytheBritish.”9

Occasionally,somevoicedoppositiontoantibiotics’mass-introductionto

Britishfoodproduction.Criticswereconcernedabouteverythingfromantibiotic

residues in food to potential resistance and growing industry influence over

farmers. In 1951, the former Labour Parliamentary Secretary Lord Douglas of

Barloch warned against the use of “poisonous chemicals in the growing and

preparation of foodstuffs.”10Focusing on antibiotics, DDT and hormones, the

Barlochcalled“forstrictcontroloverallprocesseswhichmightaffectthenatural

quality of food.”11In February 1953, Conservative MP Mr. Dodds asked the

ConservativeMinisterofAgricultureThomasDugdalehowconsumerscouldbe

protectedwhen“famousexperts(…)havedeclaredthatmoreharmthangood”12

would result from theTSA. Seconding such concerns,ConservativeMPColonel

Gomme-Duncanasked“whetherwehaveallgonemadtowanttogivepenicillin

topigstofattenthem?”13FollowingareportontheTSA,14readersofthesocial-

liberalObserveralsoengagedinaheatedexchangeonAGPs.15

However, earlypublic criticismofagricultural antibiotics remained rare

andmediacoveragetendedtobeoptimistic.Respondingtoreaders’criticismof

AGPs in theObserver, J. A. Wakelam from the pharmaceutical manufacturer J.

Bibby&Sonsnoted:

9‘NewAntibioticPlantOpened’,Times,01.10.1955,p.4.10‘Parliament.HouseofLordsWednesday,July4’,Times,05.07.1951,p.4.11Ibid.12TNAMAF287/299,Extract,HouseofCommons(P.Q.3355),Questionputon19thFeb,1953.13Ibid.14‘FatterPigsonPenicillin’,Observer,30.11.1952,p.3.15OliveWhicher,‘PenicillinforPigs’,Observer,28.11.1952,p.2;G.PelhamReid,‘GuidanceRequired’,Observer,04.01.1953,p.3.

93

Theinternationalfoodsituationissodesperatethatwemustbepreparedtoaccepttheassistancewhichmodernscienceoffersusandnotseekbyquoting individual contrary opinions to discredit the conclusion ofreputablebodiessuchastheAgriculturalResearchCouncil,…16

Meanwhile, American pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer and American

Cyanamid raced to satisfy growingBritish demand and establish factories and

salesdepartments inBritain. Incontrast to theirBritishcompetitors,American

companiescourtedpotentialclientsbothin-andoutsidetraditionalagricultural

circlesandplacedexpensiveadvertisementsforfeedsinnationalnewspapers.In

1953,LederlepurchasedanentirepageofTheTimesaheadof the launchof its

chlortetracycline-based feed AUROFAC 2A.17Experienced sales personnel was

also in high demand: in 1956, a Pfizer-advertisement announced that the

“world’s largest producer of antibiotics” was “expanding its Agricultural Sales

Force”and looking formaleBritishpersonnelwithanagriculturalbackground

and experience in “modern sales techniques.”18Only three days later, Lederle

announcedthatit,too,waslookingfor“top-classSalesRepresentativeswhowill

sellAnimal Feedadditives such asAurofac.”19Celebrating the establishmentof

itsGosportplantin1958,CyanamidclaimedthatAUROFACandotherproducts

were “bringing untold benefits to almost every sphere of life”: “Cyanamid

contrives tomakeanewdiscoveryalmosteveryday, transmutingthehopesof

yesterdayintotherealitiesoftoday.”20

Similar to the US, the late 1950s also saw antibiotic optimism begin to

wearthininBritain.Britishantibioticcriticismwas,however,morenuancedand

can roughlybedivided into three strandsof interrelatedyetdistinct concerns.

16J.A.Wakelam,‘PenicillinforPigs’,Observer,04.01.1953,p.3.17‘CommercialCyanamid’,Times,17.07.1953,p.5.18‘CommercialPfizer’,Times,26.06.1956,p.2.19‘CommercialCyanamid‘,Times,29.06.1956,p.2.20‘CommercialCyanamid‘,Times,16.04.1958,p.7.

94

Similar to the US, one group of critics became increasingly concerned about

antibioticsadulteratingpresenceinbasicfoodstuffs.However,incontrasttothe

USmedia’sfocusonresidues,asecondgroupofBritishcriticsbegantoexpress

concern about the spread of antibiotic resistance on farms, and a third group

condemnedantibioticsasaccomplicestothedeplorableconditionsofanimalsin

intensivemodernhousingunits.Dependingonone’spositionwithinthevarious

British opposition camps, agricultural antibiotics’ image could thus vary from

dangerousadulteratortoendangeredmiraclesubstanceorpartnerincruelty.

During the second half of the 1950s, a series of scandals involving the

contaminationoffoodandtheenvironmenthadalsoaffectedBritishtrustinthe

safety of agricultural antibiotic use.21Much like in the US, the adulteration of

milkwas seen as particularly problematic. In 1957, concernswere heightened

whenasevereaccidentatWindscalenuclearpowerplantcontaminatedca.200

squaremilesoflandwithsignificantamountsofradionuclidesandresultedina

month-long ban of milk production in affected areas.22By the early 1960s,

farmers and veterinarianswere being publicly exhorted to protect consumers

fromdrinking“dilutedpuswithnoxiousadditionssuchaspenicillin.”23However,

warningswentunheard.In1963,theMilkandMilkProductsTechnicalAdvisory

Committee reported that 14% of English and 11.6% of Scottish milk tested

positive for antibiotics.24The report receivedwidespreadmedia attention and

21D.T.Lewis,‘ComplexChemicalControl’,Times,20.09.1960,p.xvi.22‘FarmersGivenAssuranceOnReactorEffects’,Times,23.10.1957,p.6.23‘FarmHealthProblemsInNewMethods’,Times,11.09.1961,p.7;onveterinarians’shifttowards‘preventivemedicine’seeWoods,'IsPreventionBetterThanCure?TheRiseandFallofVeterinaryPreventiveMedicine,C.1950-1980'.24‘Drughazardindairymilk’,Guardian,30.05.1963,p.1.

95

triggeredbothcriticismofintensiveagriculturalpracticesandfurtherreportson

milksecurityandantibioticresiduesthroughoutthe1960s.25

While consumersonboth sidesof theAtlantic shared residue concerns,

Britishdebatesonagriculturalantibioticsweredistinguishedbyanearly focus

on bacterial resistance proliferation. In newspapers, British veterinarians

blamedrisingresistanceonfarmers’unsuperviseduseofAGPsandtherapeutic

antibiotics–eventhoughveterinariansthemselveshadprescribedandsoldthe

latter drugs. 26 Speaking at the 1959 congress of the British Veterinary

Association (BVA), the deputy director of the government’s Veterinary

Laboratory inWeybridge, E. L. Taylor, warned that subtherapeutic antibiotics

eliminated competing microorganisms and enabled resistant pathogens to

spreadrapidly.27Fourmonths later–andwellbeforesimilarconcernsarosein

theUS–theAgriculturalResearchCouncil(ARC)suggestedageneralreviewof

medical feed additives such as antibiotics andhormones.28As a result of these

warnings, the British government launched a joint inquiry into agricultural

antibioticuse.ChairedbytherecentlyretiredpresidentoftheNationalFarmers’

Union (NFU), James Turner – now Lord Netherthorpe – the committee sat

between1960and1962.29

Inadditiontoantibioticresiduesandresistantpathogens,animalwelfare

concerns constituted a third strand of distinctly British antibiotic-criticism. By

the late 1950s, numerous aspects of industrialised agriculturewere provoking

25‘KeepingMilkFreeOfAntibiotics’,Times,30.05.1963,p.18;MichaelWinstanley,‘CowPunch’,Guardian,25.06.1963,p.6;‘DangerOfDrugsInMilk’,Times,04.12.1964,p.6;‘Whatcurescowcanharmmilk’,Guardian,12.02.1965,p.17.26‘FarmHealthProblemsInNewMethods’,Times,11.09.1961,p.7.27‘WorkingOutPolicyForDiseaseControl’,Times,14.09.1959,p.19.28‘FarmingNotesAndComments’,Times,18.01.1960,p.21.29Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.174-75.

96

theireofanimalwelfareadvocates.30Antibioticsfeaturedprominently.In1959,

the Observer journalistClifford Selly described in shocking detail the “highly

artificial conditions” inwhichmodern “ill-fated chickens” lived.31Never seeing

daylight,broilerswere“heavilydruggedtokeepthemalive”andwerevictimsof

a system “more akin to the factory than the farm.”32Over thenext twoweeks,

Selly’s article provoked passionate reader responses. Whereas G. B. Houston

accused the “poor, deluded city dweller” of consuming “drugged andmisused

broiler fowls”33, F. A. Dorris Smith recommended visits to broiler houses by

women’sorganizationsto“bringthisabominationtoanend.”34Inanotherletter,

JohnArcherspecificallyblamedantibioticsforenablingharmfulpractices.35

Bythemid-1960s,thethreedistinctstrandsofBritishantibiotic-criticism

–resistance,residuesandanimalcruelty–werewellestablished.However,with

criticismrarelyoverlapping,nosingleissuewasstrongenoughtochallengethe

well-entrenched use of agricultural antibiotics. For change to occur, antibiotic

oppositionneededcommontexts,scandalsandfigurestoidentifywith.In1964,

Ruth Harrison’s whistle-blower bestsellerAnimalMachinesprovided all of the

above.36

AQuakerandvegetarian,Harrisonwas familiarwith theworkofHenry

Salt, knew prominent animal rights activist George Bernard Shaw and had

attendedtheRoyalAcademyofDramaticArt.However,itwasaletterbox-leaflet

againstanimalcrueltythatturnedHarrisonintoanactivecampaignerforanimal

30‘ConcernAboutToxicSpraysPersists’,Times,10.03.1961,p.18;‘Editorial:TechniquesinQuestion’,FarmersWeekly[inthefollowingFW],13.03.1964,p.43.31CliffordSelly,‘BroilersUnderFire’,Observer,08.03.1959,p.3.32Ibid.33G.B.Houston,‘LetterstotheEditor:BroilerFowls’,Observer,15.03.1959,p.4.34F.A.DorrisSmith,‘LetterstotheEditor:BroilerFowls’,Observer,15.03.1959,p.4.35JohnArcher,‘LetterstotheEditor:BroilerFowls’,Observer,22.03.1959,p.4.36Harrison,AnimalMachines.

97

welfare.37In Animal Machines, Harrison combined easy-to-read summaries of

scientific findingswith vivid descriptions to alert readers to animals’ plight in

factory-likeproductionsystems.AppearingoneyearaftertheBritishpublication

of Rachel Carson’s SilentSpringand containing a foreword by Carson herself,

AnimalMachines successfully linked the topics of animal welfare, agricultural

antibiotics and dangerous food residues. Harrison’s authority was further

strengthened by a preface from Sydney Jennings, a former BVA-president.

Claimingthat“meateatinghasbecomeahazard”38,Harrisonrepeatedlypointed

to the connection between modern farmers’ antibiotic-dependency, animal

cruelty, antibiotic residues in foodstuffs and the selection for resistance on

farms.39ForHarrison,itwas

…ironictothinkthatwhileauthoritiesaresteadilyurgingthatantibioticsbe used only with great discrimination on the grounds of dangerousresistancebuildingup, theagriculturalauthoritiesareencouragingevenwideruse.Perhaps, these twoshouldget together some time todiscussthematters,beforeitistoolate.40Building on SilentSpring’ssuccessand profiting from the contemporary

milkscandal,Harrisonsuccessfullyfusedwelfarecriticism41andconcernsabout

human health in away that no publication hadmanaged before. AfterAnimal

Machines, agricultural antibiotics were publicly associated with residues,

resistanceand‘factoryfarming’.42

37RichardD.Ryder,'Harrison,Ruth(1920-2000)',OxfordDictionaryofNationalBiography(http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/artcilde/74285[accessed16.02.2013]:OxfordUniversityPress,2004[onlineeditionMay2005]).38Harrison,AnimalMachines,p.7.39Ibid.,pp.116-20.40Ibid.,p.120.41AbigailWoodshasanalysedtheriseoftheterm‘welfare’inBritishdiscourseinthewakeoftheBrambellCommittee;AbigailWoods,'FromCrueltytoWelfare:TheEmergenceofFarmAnimalWelfareinBritain,1964-71',Endeavour36/1(2012).42AccordingtoKarenSayer,Harrison’s‘factoryfarm’portrayalignoredthefactthatintensificationwasnotauniversalreality;KarenSayer,'AnimalMachines:ThePublicResponsetoIntensificationinGreatBritain,C.1960-C.1973',AgriculturalHistory,87/4(2013).

98

While protracted negotiations prevented its publication in the US,43the

British and European attention paid to Animal Machineswas impressive. In

Britain, the Observer printed excerpts of Animal Machines. Titled “Inside the

animal factories”44and“FedToDeath”45,Harrison’sarticles introducedreaders

tothemainaspectsofherbook.Inherfirstarticle,Harrisonaccusedthe“factory

farmer and the agri-industrial world behind him”46of acknowledging cruelty

only when profitability ceased. As long as growth remained stable, rearing

systemswerenotquestioned.Antibioticswere“incorporated in[animals’] feed

and heavier doses of drugs given at the least sign of flagging.”47Focussing on

poultry, Harrison claimed that it was common for young birds suffering from

respiratory diseases or cancer to end up on consumers’ tables – the birds’ ill

health masked by antibiotics.48In her second article, Harrison focused on the

intensive rearing of calves in darkened sties. Calves’ diets consisted almost

“exclusively of barley, with added minerals and vitamins, antibiotics,

tranquilisers and hormones.”49Living in these conditions, some calves became

blind and many suffered from liver-damage and pneumonia: “their muscles

becomeflabbyandtheyputonweightrapidly,buttheyarenothealthy.”50Using

moreantibioticstokeepanimalsalive,farmersandveterinarianscontributedto

arace“betweendiseaseandnewdrugs.”51Quotingveterinarypractitionersand

43YaleBeineckeLibrary,RachelCarsonPapers,YCAL,MSS46,SeriesII,GeneralCorrespondence,Box103,Folder1952,RuthHarrisontoRachelCarson(10.07.1963);HarrisontoCarson(14.10.1963).44RuthHarrison,‘Insidetheanimalfactories’,Observer,01.03.1964,p.21.45RuthHarrison,‘FedToDeath’,Observer,08.03.1964,p.21.46Harrison,‘Insidetheanimalfactories’,p.21.47Ibid.48Ibid.49Harrison,‘FedtoDeath’,p.21.50Ibid.51Ibid.

99

the Netherthorpe committee, Harrisonwarned about antibiotic resistance and

residue-laden“tastelessmeat”52fromfactoryfarms.

Reactions to Harrison’s claims ranged from furious denial to emphatic

support. Seven days after publishing the second article, the Observer had

received around 320 letters from readers.53Many readers were outraged by

Harrison’s revelations: one reader comparedanimals’ suffering to19th century

child labour;54a second reader demanded labelling products from intensive

farms;55and a third reader asked her fellow readers to imagine their pets

incarceratedinfactoryfarms.56WhileJohnHall,theChiefSecretaryoftheRoyal

SocietyforthePreventionofCrueltytoAnimals(RSPCA),praisedHarrison,57the

animal health lecturer David Sainsbury accused her of presenting a “grossly

distorted picture of what is actually happening.”58Meanwhile, the Dean of

Llandaff in Wales compared factory farms to Nazi concentration camps and

embarkedonapubliccampaignagainst them: inaspeechcoveredbyboth the

DailyMirrorand theGuardian, the Deanwarned his congregation about food-

contamination with residues of antibiotics, hormones and other drugs.59

Subsequently, similar appeals called for an end of antibiotic-abuse on “farm

Belsens”60 – thereby ‘othering’ factory farms as barbaric and anti-British. In

parliament,theLabourMPJoyceButlerlaunchedaninquiryintotheagricultural

useofchemicalsandresiduesinfood.61

52Ibid.53‘Viewsonanimalfactories’,Observer,15.03.1964,p.30.54HelenM.Simpson,‘Viewsonanimalfactories:Polesapart’,Observer,15.03.1964,p.30.55SheilaM.Mitchell,‘Viewsonanimalfactories:Labelthem’,Ibid.56BarbaraWillard,‘Viewsonanimalfactories:Tryitonthedog’,Ibid.57JohnHall,‘Viewsonanimalfactories:changingthelaw’,Ibid.58DavidSainsbury,‘Viewsonanimalfactories:distorted’,Ibid.59‘CrueltyWarByChurchleader’,DailyMirror,10.08.1964,p.3.60‘GetridoffarmBelsen’,Observer,24.10.1965,p.9.61‘Hazardtohealthinfood?’,Guardian,28.03.1964,p.28.

100

ReactingtopublicoutrageinJune1964,theBritishgovernmentlaunched

a committee toanalyseanimalwelfareunder thedirectionofmedical scientist

Professor Francis W. Rogers Brambell, whose 1965 report had a significant

influenceonsubsequentBritishandEuropeanwelfarepolicies.62

However,notallBritishnewspapersjoinedthecampaignagainst‘factory

farming’ and agricultural antibiotics. While left-wing newspapers like the

Observerbecameplatformsof criticism, theconservativeTimesdidnot takeup

thecauseagainst ‘factory farms’whole-heartedly.Stillpublishingarticles titled

“Feeding The World”63, The Times remained influenced by the Malthusian

outlook of the 1950s and stressed Britain’s responsibility for feeding and

improving the developing world. Published during a time of rapid

decolonization, these articles mixed technological optimism with an obvious

desiretofindlegitimatewaysofmaintainingBritishinfluenceinthepostcolonial

world. Although the Guardianand theDailyMirror featured similar reports,64

TheTimeswasuniqueastotheirfrequency.

Regarding agricultural antibiotics, The Times maintained an equally

positiveattitudeandpraisedtheirroleinimprovingandstandardizinganimals’

growth.65Criticalof residues inmilk,TheTimes still printed theviewsofW.R.

Trehane,chairmanofthemonopolistMilkMarketingBoard(MMB),whoclaimed

that public criticism was out of proportion and that the risks resulting from

tainted milk were “extremely small.”66Five months after the appearance of

62Woods,'FromCrueltytoWelfare:TheEmergenceofFarmAnimalWelfareinBritain,1964-71',pp.18-20.63‘FeedingTheWorld’,Times,19.09.1962,p.ii.64ArthurSmith,‘ThisMeansHopeForMillions’,DailyMirror,06.11.1964,p.13;‘Growingroleforthechemistinfeeding6,000m.byAD2,000’,Guardian,03.11.1965,p.5.65‘PigRecordsAsPointersToDefects’,Times,25.09.1961,p.6.66VerbatimspeechrecordbyW.R.Trehanein:‘MilkMarketingBoard’,Times,19.07.1965,p.16.

101

Animal Machines, The Times’ farming section reported favourably on new

preventiveantibioticsforstressduringlivestocktransports.67In1965,TheTimes

published an article titled “Why The American Farmer Can Cope Single-

Handed.”68ReportingonarecentvisittotheAmericanMidwest,thenewspaper’s

agriculturalcorrespondententhusiasticallydescribedfarmsofasizethat“wein

Englandwould consider impossible”69– antibiotics featuredprominently as an

enablingtechnology.

Throughoutthe1960s,TheTimesalsoremainedapreferredplaceforthe

antibioticcommercialsofPfizerandCyanamid.Oblivioustoreportsonantibiotic

resistance, companies stressed their products’ dual application in humans and

animals.70In1961,Cyanamidstartedanaggressiveadvertisementcampaignfor

aureomycin. Printed in April, one advertisement for Cyanamid’s Aurofac-feed

showed a laughing pig exclaiming “Yes, I’m A Scientific Pig” and presented

agricultural antibiotics as a progressive way of improving animals’ well-being

andfarmers’profits:“Indeed,toquotethevernacular,pigsinBritain‘neverhad

itsogood’…”71Furthercommercialsfeaturedgratefulcowscuredofmastitisand

praised aureomycin’s prevention of any “disastrous rise of mortality”72in

poultryproduction.

Retrospectively,thepublicationofAnimalMachinesnonethelessmarkeda

watershedinBritishdiscussionsofagriculturalantibiotics.Inthesameyearthat

RuthHarrison linked antibiotic resistance, residues and cruelty in the public’s

67‘FarmingNotesandComments’,Times,17.08.1964,p.6.68‘WhyTheAmericanFarmerCanCopeSingle-Handed’,Times,28.06.1965,p.14.69Ibid.70‘CommercialCyanamid’,Times,12.01.1961,p.5.71‘CommercialCyanamid’,Times,14.04.1961,p.5.72‘CommercialCyanamid’,Times,13.10.1961,p.5;alsosee:‘CommercialCyanamid’,Times,22.06.1961,p.5.

102

mind, the last major British outbreak of typhoid brought home the

microbiological hazards of globalised food production. Occurring in Aberdeen,

the 1964 Salmonella typhi outbreak was caused by contaminated Argentinian

meat.73While the Aberdeen S. typhi strain responded to chloramphenicol,74

expertswereconcernedthatfutureoutbreaksmightproveresistant.

One of the concerned expertswas thePublicHealth Laboratory Service

(PHLS)bacteriologistEphraimSaul(E.S.)Anderson,whohadprovidedexpertise

both for the 1960 ARC review and the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak.75In 1965,

AndersonandBritishgeneticistNaomiDattapublishedapapertitledResistance

toPencillinsAndItsTransferInEnterobacteriaceae in theLancet.76Popularising

the dangers of R-factor transfer in the West, the authors discussed the

‘horizontal’ communicationofresistanceviaplasmids in thecaseofSalmonella

typhimuriumand warned about the possible transfer of resistance between S.

typhimurium and Escherichia coli. For the authors, it was clear that feeding

antibiotics to animals could lead to human infections with resistant S.

typhimurium, a close relative of typhoid-causing S.typhi.77Threemonths later,

Anderson followed up his findingswith a paper published togetherwithM. J.

Lewis in Nature.78Reporting a dramatic rise in S. typhimurium resistance

73DavidF.Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s(Woodbridge:TheBoydellPress,2005),LesleyDiacketal.,'Departmental,Professional,andPoliticalAgendasintheImplementationoftheRecommendationsofaFoodCrisisEnquiry:TheMilneReportandInspectionofOverseasMeatPlants',inDavidF.SmithandJimPhilips(eds.),Food,Science,PolicyandRegulationintheTwentiethCentury.InternationalandComparativePerspectives(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2000),Hardy,SalmonellaInfections,NetworksofKnowledge,andPublicHealthinBritain1880-1975,pp.217-18.74Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s,p.22.75Ibid.,pp.85-87;132.76AndersonandDatta,'ResistancetoPencillinsandItsTransferinEnterobacteriaceae'.77Ibid.78E.S.AndersonandM.J.Lewis,'DrugResistanceandItsTransferinSalmonellaTyphimurium',Nature,206/4984(1965).

103

between 1963 and 1964, the authors specifically focused on the particularly

resistanttype29ofthebacterium.Linkingthespreadoftype29S.typhimurium

tocalftransports,theauthorswarnedagainstthe“infectivehazardsofintensive

farming.”79By the end of the year, Anderson published an even more direct

attack on agricultural antibiotics in theBritishMedicalJournal(BMJ): between

December1964andNovember1965,Andersonhadcollectedover1,200animal

(mainly calf) and 500 human samples of type 29 S. typhimurium. Of these

samples, 97.6% were drug-resistant.80In contrast to earlier papers, Anderson

was also able to demonstrate a case of resistance transfer from animals to

humans: human and animalS.typhimuriumsamples showed similar resistance

levelstofurazolidone,adrugusedexclusivelyinveterinarymedicine.Resistance

hadclearlycrossedoverfromanimalstohumans.Andersonwascertainthatof

the analysed samples “most human infections of undetermined source were

bovineinorigin.”81

Incontrast toUSreactions tosimilarNEJMwarningsoneyear later, the

impact of Anderson’s papers on the British media was impressive. Published

only one year after the publication of AnimalMachines, Anderson’s warnings

seemed to validate RuthHarrison’s criticism of intensive farming. In February

1965,aTimesreportonAnderson’spaperssuggested“thatantibioticsshouldbe

keptwellawayfromlivestockfood.”82InNovember,theObserverblamed“super-

farms”83for new cases of bacterial resistance. Following Anderson’s 1966BMJ

79Ibid.,p.583.80E.S.Anderson,'OriginofTransferableDrug-ResistanceFactorsintheEnterobacteriaceae',BritishMedicalJournal,2/5473(1965),p.1289.81Ibid.82‘GermSurvivalinFaceofAntibiotics’,Times,26.02.1965,p.15.83JohnDavy,‘Newhealthfearonsuper-farms’,Observer,28.11.1965,p.5.

104

paper, TheTimesdemanded a “reappraisal of the use of antibiotics”84and the

Observer published an appeal by the Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Association

criticizing intensive agriculture’s chemical dependency. 85 Warning against

“factory farm bacteria”86, the Observer explicitly linked the discussion about

‘infective’resistancetotherhetoricofAnimalMachines.

Responding to Anderson’s findings, the British government reconvened

its Netherthorpe committee. However, in January 1966, the Netherthorpe

committee simply called for a new committee to re-evaluate agricultural

antibiotics in general.87While the government was slow to react, British

headlines and parliamentary inquiries88kept the issue of ‘infective resistance’

emerging on farms alive. The enduringmedia attentionwas partly due to the

effortsof theGuardian journalistAnthonyTuckerandBernardDixon from the

New Scientist.89Dixon in particular attacked “the irritating British habit of

seekingexpertguidanceonatechnicalmatterandthenpigeon-holingtheadvice

when it comes.”90CitingAnderson’swork,Dixonalso referred to thedangerof

multi-resistant E. coli strains causing neonatal diarrhoea in babies. 91 By

December 1967, Dixon’s warnings sounded tragically prophetic. Described by

Robert Bud in chilling detail, multi-resistant E. coli0119 and 0128 caused a

severeoutbreakofgastroenteritisamongstinfantsinthenorth-easterntownof

84‘ReconsideringUseOfAntibiotics’,Times,28.02.1966,p.13.85‘Stopuseofhormones’,Observer,30.01.1966,p.4.86‘Warningonfactory-farmbacteria’,Observer,30.01.1966,p.4;alsosee:ValerieCrofts&MargaretCooper,‘LetterstotheEditor:FactoryFarming’,Observer,06.02.1966,p.30.87R.Braude,'AntibioticsinAnimalFeedsinGreatBritain',JournalofAnimalScience,46(1978),p.1427,Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.177-81.88TNAMAF284/282(P.Q.Mr.JohnHarr(Harborough),Oral,26Jul,1967);TNAMAF287/450(HouseofCommons,WrittenAnswer,TreatmentofHumanInfections,ExclusiveUseofCertainAntibiotics,No.84/1967/68,13Nov,1967)89Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.177-81.90BernhardDixon,‘Antibioticsonthefarm–majorthreattohumanhealth’,NewScientist(05.10.1967),p.33.91Ibid.,p.34.

105

Middlesbrough.Poorhospitalhygieneandtransferringinfectedinfantstoother

hospitalsspreadtheinfection.Intheend,15infantsdied.92

Although there were no proven links, pre-conditioned British readers

nonetheless linked the multi-resistant Teesside strains to ‘factory farms’ and

agricultural antibioticuse.Writing toTheIllustratedLondonNewsin late1967,

the well-known animal welfare activist Gwendolen Barter declared that one

shouldforegofactoryfarmmeatif“onevaluesone’shealth.”93Followingheated

letterexchangesbetweenveterinaryscience lecturersandSoilAssociationand

Farm&Food Societymembers,94an article in theLondonIllustratedNews also

linkedtheTeessideepidemictoagriculturalantibioticuse:

…onecannothelpwonderingwhymanshouldtakethechanceofplacinghimself in danger of returning to conditions of the pre-antibiotic erawhen, for example, the death of fourteen babies from gastro-enteritiswouldcertainlynothavemadenewsheadlines.95TheTeessideepidemicputimmensepressureontheBritishgovernment

to implement the Netherthorpe-suggestions and combat bacterial resistance.96

AppointedinJuly1968andannouncingitsfindingsinNovember1969,theJoint

Committee on the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary

Medicine – the so-called Swann-Committee – divided antimicrobial substances

into therapeuticandnontherapeuticantibiotics.97While therapeuticantibiotics

92Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.178-81.;forfatalitynumbers;HouseofCommonsDebate11.04.1968vol.762cc1619-30,'Gastro-Enteritis(Tees-Side)HcDeb11April1968Vol762Cc1619-30',DigitisededitionsofCommonsandLordsHansard,theOfficialReportofdebatesinParliament(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1968/apr/11/gastro-enteritis-tees-side[accessed:24.02.2013],1968).93GwendolenBarter,‘LetterstotheEditor:Ethicsandcruelty’,LondonIllustratedNews[inthefollowingLIN],18.11.1967,p.6.94N.S.Barron,‘LetterstotheEditor’,LIN,09.12.1967,p.6;RobertWaller,‘LetterstotheEditor‘,LIN,30.12.1967,p.4;J.Bower,‘LetterstotheEditor’,LIN,20.01.1968,p.31;F.Belsham,‘LetterstotheEditor’,LIN,03.02.1968,p.6.95TonyLoftas,‘HowDoGermsLearnToResistDrugs’,LIN,27.01.1968,p.17.96Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.181.97Braude,'AntibioticsinAnimalFeedsinGreatBritain',p.1427.

106

were relevant to humanmedicine, nontherapeutic antibioticswere considered

irrelevant. Only nontherapeutic antibiotics below certain doses were to be

allowed in standard animal rations. Therapeutically relevant penicillin,

chlortetracyclineandoxytetracyclinewere tobebanned from feedsaltogether.

The Swann committee, however, merely cautioned against the use of

chloramphenicolAGPs and did not address veterinarians’ power to prescribe

therapeuticantibioticsonaprophylacticormetaphylacticbasis.98

British media reactions to the Swann report were nonetheless mostly

favourable. Although theGuardian’sAnthonyTuckerworried about the Swann

committee’snarrowfocus,99aTimes-editorial titled“Whatarewegoingto feed

‘em?” 100 lauded the decision to limit laypersons’ access to therapeutic

substances. However, in a further article, Times agricultural correspondent

Leonard Amey expressed criticism of veterinarians’ increased power.101While

agreeingwiththeSwannreportinprincipal,Ameysagelynotedthatacomplete

banofagriculturalantibioticswouldhaveputanendtoBritishintensiveanimal

production.102Indoingso,heacknowlegedthedramaticchangesthathadtaken

placesincethewar.

98LeonardAmey,‘Threeantibioticsbannedfromanimalfood’,Times,21.11.1969,p.2.99AnthonyTucker,‘Antibioticstobebannedfromanimalfeeds’,Guardian,21.11.1969,p.20.100‘WhatAreWeGoingToFeed‘Em?’,Times,21.11.1969,p.11.101LeonardAmey,‘Aweekofmanymoves’,Times,24.11.1969,p.18;theincreaseofveterinarians’powercoincidedwithabeginningslumpofpreventivemedicine;seeWoods,'IsPreventionBetterThanCure?TheRiseandFallofVeterinaryPreventiveMedicine,C.1950-1980',pp.124-28.102LeonardAmey,‘Rapidactiononfarmantibiotics’,Times,10.11.1969,p.1.

107

ChapterFive:Bigger,Better,Faster–AntibioticsandBritishFarmingDuring the early 1930s, the outlook for British farming had been bleak: as

inhabitants of the largest agricultural free-trade market in the world, British

farmerswereexposedtosinkingfoodpricesandafloodofcheapimportsduring

theglobalagriculturalcrisis.1Unabletocompete,employmentintheagricultural

sector fell and productivity decreased until 60% of British food had to be

imported.2

Faced with the rural plight, the British government only gradually

abandoned laissez-faire agricultural policies: theAgricultural Acts of 1931 and

1933sawthecreationoftariffwallsandcorporatistMarketingBoardsforfarm

products.3Reacting to developments in Europe, the UK established a Food

Department in 1936 and began stockpiling food and agricultural supplies. By

1939, British officials were actively propagating agricultural expansion to

provide additional calories.4Following the outbreak of war, the new alliance

between farmers and officials grew even closer: farmers were integrated into

WarAgriculturalExecutiveCommittees (WAEC),whichwere controlledby the

Ministries of Agriculture and Food. At the local level, the WAECs enforced

ministry directives but also advised and graded farmers’ productivity.

Unproductive or recalcitrant farmers could even have their land expropriated.

Attempting tomaximizecaloricoutput,5thewartimeadministrationprioritised

plant production and introduced guaranteed prices by purchasing farmers’

1Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.6-8.2Ibid.,p.10.3Ibid.,p.23.4Ibid.,pp.29and33-35.5Ibid.,p.51.

108

produce.6While pig and poultry stocks plummeted, British farmers increased

caloricoutputby50%.7

After thewarended,British farmerswere creditedwithhaving ‘fed the

nation’. However, the wartime doctrine of growth and efficiency had led to

changesintheveryfabricofBritishfarming.AccordingtohistorianJohnMartin,

traditional rural values had been abandoned “for short term economic

advantages andunquestioning compliance.”8Nonetheless, themajorityofpost-

war farmersandtheir lobby, theNationalFarmersUnion(NFU),wereeagerto

continue the profitable corporatist alliance with the state. In contrast to the

poverty-strickeninter-waryears,mostfarmers’coffershadbeenflushedbyfixed

wartimepricesandsubsidisedruraldevelopment.

The post-war economic situationmade the Labour government equally

willing to continue the alliance. In August 1945, the USA’s termination of the

Lend-Lease agreement necessitated the repayment of Americanwartime loans

and left Britain desperately short of foreign currency. Attempting to reduce

imports,theBritishgovernmentembarkedonaprogramofsubsidizedandstate-

controlledagriculturalexpansionwiththeAgriculturalActof1947.Perpetuating

annualprice reviewsand interventionpurchases, theActwasdesigned togive

farmers and farmworkers fair returns and stimulate agricultural investment.9

The government also attempted to boost efficiency by founding the National

AgriculturalAdvisoryService(NAAS)andprovidingimprovementgrants.10

6Ibid.,p.38.7Ibid.,p.54.8Ibid.,p.61.9Holderness,BritishAgriculturesince1945,pp.12-16.10Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.91-92.

109

Despitegrowinginternationalfoodavailabilityandtheendofrationingin

1954,state-involvementinagriculturecontinued.Ignoringaccusationsoffeather

bedding farmers,11successive governments supported a system of deficiency

payments, which replaced former direct intervention purchases: once market

prices fell below guaranteed prices defined by annual price reviews, the state

paid farmers thedifferencebetweenguaranteedand realprices. Similar to the

US,sinkinginternationalfoodpricesanddomesticsurplusessoonmadethecost

of state intervention rise dramatically. Attempting to curb expenditure, the

Conservative government’s 1957 Agricultural Act allowed limited annual

reductions of price guarantees and shifted the emphasis from subsidies to

improvement grants. 12 However, the underlying corporatist principle of

fosteringagriculturalgrowthremainedunchallenged.13

Trusting official subsidy promises, farmers throughout Britain invested

wartime earnings and borrowed heavily to expand and improve their farms.14

Agriculturalmagazines addressing ‘ordinary farmers’ like FarmersWeekly and

theNFU’sBritishFarmerwerefullofexpertadviceonnewhusbandrymethods

andbasiceconomicsforexpandingfarmers.15Servingasanimportantforumfor

campaigns against bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis,16the magazines also

promotedtheuseofnewtechnologieslikeartificialinsemination,airbornecrop

11FrancisMichaelLongstrethThompson(ed.),TheCambridgeSocialHistoryofBritain1750-1950.Volume1:RegionsandCommunities(Cambridge:CambridgeUnviersityPress,1990),pp.148-49.12Holderness,BritishAgriculturesince1945,p.21.13OncorporatisminBritishfarmingGrahamCox,PhilipLowe,andMichaelWinter,'FromStateDirectiontoSelfRegulation:TheHistoricalDevelopmentofCorporatisminBritishAgriculture',PolicyandPolitics,14/4(1986),pp.480-88.14‘HeavyBorrowingFromBanks’,FW,06.10.1950,p.40;alsosee:‘MillionsMoreSpentOnBuildings’,FW,13.10.1950,p.36.15‘MenandMachines’,FW,10.11.1950,p.31;‘Cowskeptinallyear’,FW,20.05.1955,p.93.16‘Non-T.T.FarmersMayPayDearly’,FW,25.12.1950,p.28;onBritishanimalhealthanderadicationcampaigns;Woods,'WhySlaughter?TheCulturalDimensionsofBritain'sFootandMouthDiseaseControlPolicy,1892-2001',Woods,'‚Partnership’inAction:ContagiousAbortionandtheGovernanceofLivestockDiseaseinBritain,1885-1921'.

110

dustingandchemicalgrowthpromotion.17Inmagazines,thetropeofhaving‘fed

thenationatwar’wasoftenintermixedwithscenariosofglobaloverpopulation

tojustifythecontinuationofsubsidisedagriculturalexpansion.18Declareddead

around1930,Britishagricultureseemedgearedtotakeonthechallengesofthe

atomicage.Technologicalsophisticationbecameanagriculturalbadgeofpride.19

Profiting from soaring demand, intensification was a particularly

importantthemeforBritish livestockfarmers–evenif thismeant less ‘”fuss”20

about individualanimals.Similar to theUS, themottoofmostarticlescouldbe

summarisedas“neverfarmbackwards.”21Onearticleclaimedthatwhile“nature

intendedabirdtolayonly24eggsaseason”,scientificnutritionandhusbandry

meant that “there [was]no reasonwhy she shouldnot reach the300mark.”22

Frequently reminded to treat an animal “as a manufacturing unit,”23livestock

producers found it hard to resist “the urge to E-X-P-A-N-D”:24While Britain

produced 762.000 tonnes of meat in 1947, it produced 1,713,000 tonnes in

1960.25

Not all British livestock producers were immediately won over to

American-style intensification. Despite the ever-increasing prominence of

intensive indoor ‘life-cycle’ systems, British livestock production remained

characterisedbyagreaterdiversityofindoorandoutdoorhusbandrystylesthan

17‘AIProgress’,FW,22.12.1950,p.23;‘QuickerFattening’,FW,01.12.1950,p.34;C.S.Smith,‘PilotversusPest’,FW,20.04.1951,p.59.18‘FillingtheMeatGap’,FW,01.12.1950,p.33;‘WorldOutputofFoodisUpByaQuarter’,FW,16.09.1955,p.76.19‘TributetoBritain’,FW,17.11.1950,p.28;‘BritishTractorsWorkHardest’,ibid.,p.36.20H.L.Blackwell,‘Poultry‘Sense’’,FW,20.10.1950,p.77.21JackHargreaves,‘NeverFarmBackwards’,FW,01.07.1955,pp.118-119and121-122.22AlexanderTomey,‘NotAllHerOwnWork’,FW,27.10.1950,p.65.23A.Stewart,‘TreattheCowasManufacturingUnit’,FW,30.09.1955,p.48.24‘TheUrgetoE-X-P-A-N-D’,FW,02.09.1960,p.48.25Europe:MeatOutputStatistics,in:'InternationalHistoricalStatistics',(PalgraveMacmillan,April2013).

111

in the US.26In part, this diversity had ideological reasons.While some British

commentatorsfearedthatimprovedefficiencywouldincreasetheculturaldivide

betweenashrinkingnumberof farmersandthegeneralpublic,27others feared

technological alienation from animals and nature. 28 At the 1955 British

Veterinary Congress, the deputy director ofWeybridge Veterinary Laboratory,

E.L.Taylor,warned“thatmanhasinitiatedawholehostofmajortroubles.”29In

accordance to these troubles, Taylor divided his talk into five sections:

“’Unnatural Foods’, ‘Unnatural Environment’, ‘Unnatural Concentration of

GrazingAnimals’, ‘UnnaturalGeographicalPosition’and ‘UnnaturalAnimals’.”30

InthesameeditionofFarmersWeekly,Tayloralsoclaimedthatmodernhygiene

and“superciliousdislikeofsomecreaturesandconditions(…)upsetthewhole

delicatecompensatorymechanismofnature.”31

Despitesuchinternalnavel-gazing,BritishfarmerssharedtheirAmerican

colleagues’hostilitytowardsnon-agriculturalcritics.Asoneletterputitin1955:

“Weas farmersare toldwhat todoandwhen todo itbyeveryTom,Dickand

Harry.”32InBritain,animalwelfarewasaparticularlysensitivetopic.Whilemost

farmers defined welfare as animals’ continued productivity, the British public

was extending its definition of welfare to animals’ mental wellbeing.33Titled

26Woods,'RethinkingtheHistoryofModernAgriculture:BritishPigProduction,C.1910-65'.27A.G.Street,‘RisesWithoutStrikes’,FW,13.10.1950,p.49.28AnthonyPhelps,‘There’sStillMoneyinFreeRange’,FW,05.08.1955,p.85.29‘BritishVeterinaryCongress–HasManPutAnimals’HealthInTheBalance?’,FW,16.09.1955,p.76.30Ibid.31‘AnimalCrackers’,FW,16.09.1955,p.46;thesecondhalfofthe1950swascharacterisedbyaveterinaryfocusonpreventivehealth;Woods,'IsPreventionBetterThanCure?TheRiseandFallofVeterinaryPreventiveMedicine,C.1950-1980',pp.117-20.32D.W.Murrell,‘LettertotheEditor’,FW,02.09.1955,p.39.33Woods,'FromCrueltytoWelfare:TheEmergenceofFarmAnimalWelfareinBritain,1964-71',p.21.

112

“Broiler Veal Not Cruel – Says NFU”34, “Calves don’t suffer – Mr. Hare”35and

“Cruel to their Kind?”36, agricultural articles attempted to defend intensive

systemswiththehelpofexpertstudiesandreferencestohighBritishstandards.

Incomparisontothe"pot-bellied”pre-waranimals“withstaringcoats,housedin

filthy hovels,”37agricultural commentators asserted that intensive systems

offeredmodernanimalsamuchbetterlife.

Thrown into themaelstrom of post-war intensification, British farmers

were tornbetween thepromise of progress and an idealised rural past.While

reports about technological risks made farmers wary, they also felt

misunderstoodbythepublic.Asaconsequence,mostfarmersadoptedahybrid

positionsomewherebetweenthepolarextremesofintensificationandtradition

–modernisationwasalwaysnegotiation.

Antibioticswereacaseinpoint.Sparedmanywartimeconstraints,dairy

farmersbelongedtothevanguardofBritishantibioticusers.Bytheearly1950s,

manyBritishdairy farmershad followed the leadof theirAmericancolleagues

and relied on so-called dry-cow therapy inwhich sulphanilamide or penicillin

udder-injections were given prophylactically at the end of cows’ lactation

periods.38However, similar to the US, problems soon emerged when residues

interfered with sour milk cheese production. Whereas farmers were told to

discard a minimum of two milkings following antibiotic treatment,39British

veterinariansalsoreporteda“changing‘clinicalpicture’whichmightfollowthe

34‘BroilerVealNotCruel–saysNFU’,FW,22.07.1960,p.38.35‘Calvesdon’tsuffer–MrHare’,FW,29.07.1960,p.40.36A.G.Street,‘CrueltotheirKind?’,FW,30.09.1960,p.83.37Ibid.38‘QuestionsSection:SummerMastitis’,FW,27.10.1950,p.69.39‘PenicillinSpoilsMilkForCheese-Making’,FW,05.01.1951,p.32.

113

extensive use of penicillin”40in 1951. Indicating a far greater awareness of

bacterialresistance than in theUS,Britishveterinariansnoted, “Thetime[has]

comeformoreresearchintothedevelopmentofresistantstrainsandhowthey

[can] be avoided.”41Whereas Streptococcus agalactiae had caused 44% of

mastitis-outbreaksin1944,itssuccessfultreatmentwithpenicillinhadenabled

resistant haemolytic Staphylococci to take over. Between 1944 and 1955, the

percentageofmastitisoutbreakscausedbyStaphylococcirosefrom10to30%.42

Usingresistance to legitimize theirprofitablecontrolovereasy-to-usedry-cow

preparations, British veterinarians also lambasted US farmers’ “indiscriminate

useofantibiotics(…)withoutanyveterinarysupervision.”43

Faced with reports on residues and resistance, some farmers were

reluctanttoallowdrugsneartheircowsatall.44However,themajorityofBritish

dairyfarmersbelievedthatantibiotics’benefitscontinuedtooutweighpotential

risksandcouldberenderedmanageablebytechnologicalsafeguards,improved

hygiene,veterinarysupervisionandpractitioners’education.45

TrustinaposteriorifixesalsocharacterisedtheadoptionofAGPs.Ahead

of the1953TSA, theNFUwasmostly concernedwith lobbying for guaranteed

minimumantibiotic concentrationsandofficial guidelines for safeandefficient

antibioticuse.46Withnointernalexpertiseonantibiotics,theNFUreliedheavily

on information supplied by the state. As a consequence, government experts

40‘CanStockmanshipReplaceDairyHygiene?’,FW,09.03.1951,p.41.41Ibid.42‘IsthereanewMastitisMenace’,FW,08.07.1955,p.47.43T.CornellGreen,‘MoreMilk–MoreMastitis’,FW,21.10.1955,p.99.44GrahamBrooks,‘BalancePreventsMastitis’,FW,21.10.1960,p.50.45‘OurDairymen’sHygieneShocksanAustralian’,FW,16.09.1955,p.57;‘BritishVeterinaryCongress’,FW,16.09.1955,p.76.46TNAMAF287/299(DugdaletoTurner,29Jul,1953),p.1;(DraftRegulationTherapeuticSubstancesBill,Meeting,3rdJul,1953).

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played a crucial role in convincing initially cautious farmers to use antibiotics.

Followinga1953meeting,theNFUrepresentativethankedofficials:

Thesubjectwasoneaboutwhichheandmanyotherfarmerswererelativelyignorantandhewasgratefulfortheinformationandadvicegiven.Hewasingeneralagreement(…),butfeltthatcautioninpropagandaandintheuseofantibioticswasnecessary...47Followingtheirintroductioninlate1953,AGPsalesskyrocketed:in1954,

an estimated 69,439 tons of supplemented feeds were sold directly from

manufacturers to farmers. By 1959, the number had grown by over 600% to

445,706 tons.48On farms,AGPs’ impactwas equally dramatic and changed the

biologicalrhythmsattheveryheartoftraditionalhusbandry:insteadofweaning

piglets56daysafterbirth,Britishfarmerswerenowadvisedtowean24-28hour

old piglets with penicillin-enriched milk powder. This way, even runts would

surviveandpigletswouldweighca.40lb.attheirtraditionalweaningage.49

Celebrating progress, Farmers Weekly invoked an ideal of optimised

nature. According to the magazine, agricultural antibiotics were a “boon to

mankind.”50Titled“OurdebttotheChemist,”51anotherarticlelistedantibiotics,

hormones, pesticides and insecticides amongst the great triumphs of 20th-

century science.52According to the generalmanager of Pfizer’s new factory in

Kent,AGPsenabledBritishfarmerstomarketpigsthreeweekssooner.Withpigs

requiring ca. 10% less feed, 300,000 acres could be freed for growing other

crops.53

47TNAMAF287/299(G.Hedley,MeetingatSaughtontodiscussTSAdraftregulations,4Feb1953),p.4.48TNAFD1/8226(OfficeNoteobservationsonaspectsoftheuseofantibioticssuppliedbytheCAFSMNA(ARC574/60)),p.1.49‘ArtificialRearingofPigs’,FW,13.05.1955,p.91.50‘Antibiotics’,FW,20.05.1955,p.45.51‘OurdebttotheChemist’,FW,01.07.1955,p.101.52Ibid.53‘AntibioticsCouldCutPigCostsByPound5mAYear’,FW,07.10.1955,p.44.

115

Similar to theUS,pharmaceutical companiesusedaggressivemarketing

to promote their products. Despite British companies’ patriotically themed

commercials,54Americandominanceofthefeedmarketwassoonundeniable.By

theendofthe1950s,mostfarmerswouldhavebeenfamiliarwithUSbrandslike

AUROFACandTerramycin.In1955,aCyanamidcommercialboasted:

Last year, 1 in every 10 pigs in the United Kingdom had AUROFAC 2AFeedSupplementthroughoutitslife(…).Thisyear,1inevery7pigsintheUnitedKingdomisbeingfedonAUROFAC2AFeedSupplementfrombirthtoslaughter.55In contrast to mastitis medications, agricultural concerns about AGPs’

safety emerged slowly. Surprised by the ARC’s 1960 review announcement,

FarmersWeekly was irritated that the report “condemns thosewilling to take

risks for what it admits can be considerable gains.”56However, farmers were

mostly content to wait for the Netherthorpe committee’s decision. In the

meantime,itwasbusinessasusual.Althoughwaystoreduceantibioticusewere

addressed,57most articles continued to propagate generous antibiotic use and

ignoredindicationsofgrowingresistance.58In1960,onearticleadvisedafarmer

facing resistant coccidiosis to “complain to your feed merchants of the poor

results you are getting and perhaps change to some other kind of medicated

food.”59ManyveterinariansalsoremainedunperturbedaboutAGPs.Interviewed

by Farmers Weekly, J.D. Blaxland from the Central Veterinary Laboratory in

Weybridge admitted that “the almost universal use of drugs and antibiotics”60

was causing problems but did not condemn their use. Similar to the US,most54‘ICICommercial’,FW,15.07.1955,p.96;‘GlaxoCommercial’,FW,20.07.1962,pp.66-67.55‘CyanamidCommercial’,FW,21.10.1955,p.76.56‘ARC’,FW,08.07.1960,p.46.57NormanLGoodland,‘One-up–onedown’,FW,12.08.1960,p.87.58‘CommonColdCure’,FW,08.07.1960,p.109;‘Shepherd’spocketvet’,FW,22.07.1960,pp.xi-xiii;‘ColdorWorse’,FW,16.09.1960,p.133.59‘BugsandDrugs’,FW,Ibid.,p.131.60‘Poultrytroublesmultiplywithexpansion’,FW,09.09.1960,p.57.

116

British farmers sawantibiotic resistanceand residuesasnecessaryevils lining

theroadofagriculturalprogress.

In the course of the1960s, such a viewbecame increasinglydifficult to

uphold.Memoriesofwartimefarmers’“distinguishedservice”61werefadingfast

andtheformerlycohesivemodernisationidealofthe1950swasgivingwaytoa

cacophonyofagriculturalboosterrhetoric,hostilitytowardscritics,melancholic

reflexivityandoccasionalenvironmentalism.

Amajorreasonforfarmers’newinsecuritywasthecrumblingpromiseof

universal rural prosperity. Although many commentators continued to

propagate agricultural expansion and intensive technologies throughout the

1960s,62a growing number of articles warned that small farmers would not

survivetheon-goingcost-pricesqueeze.63Between1951and1971,thenumber

ofpeopleworkinginBritishagriculturedecreasedfrom1,142,000to740,000.64

PointingtoparalleldevelopmentsintheUSin1962,anarticleinFarmersWeekly

predicted an “end in sight for the family farms.”65Two years later, delegates

clashedover a resolution to limit the sizeofBritish farmsat theNFU’s annual

generalmeeting.Accordingtotheresolution,theNFUshouldnegotiateforways

to “ensur[e] that production of agricultural commodities remains with the

farmingindustry”and“drawalinebetween[agriculturalfactories]andwhatis

61‘PutagricultureinthefrontlinesaysSirJohn’,BF,10.05.1969,p.7.62‘MassProduction’,BF,20.10.1962,p.3;AnthonyLisle,‘UntouchedbyHand’,FW,06.07.1962,p.99;‘ANew‘GoldenAge’’,FW,17.07.1964,p.31;‘UKsurplusforFAOfooddrive’,FW,07.09.1962,p.51;‘WorldFamineDanger’,BF,11.02.1967,p.15;‘WorldFoodDeficit’,BF,12.02.1966,p.82;W.G.R.Weeks,‘Gearupforthesupermarketage’,FW,07.09.1962,p.91.63RupertColes,‘PointsofSurvival’,FW,17.08.1962,p.101;PaulAtlee,’Nobody’sTooSmall’,FW,19.10.1962,pp.119and121.64‘EconomicallyActivePopulationByMajorIndustrialGroupsUK’,InternationalHistoricalStatistics,p.28.65‘Endinsightforthefamilyfarms?’,FW,10.08.1962,p.41.

117

traditional agriculture.”66However, opposition was strong: according to W.

Greenhow, “the resolution was in direct opposition to progress. Hens did not

needgreenfields torun in thesedays. Itwas important thatsomeproductsbe

producedintensively.”67Afteraheateddiscussion,whatwouldhavebeenasmall

revolutionforBritishfarmingwasdefeatedby174to128votes.68

Inaddition toeconomicconcerns,British farmerswereconfrontedwith

criticismfromthebuddingenvironmentalistmovement,whichlooselycombined

concerns about animal welfare, human health and conservationism. Farmers’

reactions varied considerably. During the 1950s, FarmersWeekly had already

featuredreportsontheideologicalbattlesbetweenconventionalexpertsandthe

fledgling organic community.69Although the majority of farmers remained

hostiletowardsexternalcriticism,thechangingeconomicandculturallandscape

resulted in more articles sympathetic to potentially divisive topics like

vegetarianismandorganicproductionmethods.70

Mixed agricultural reactions to Silent Spring and Animal Machines are

telling.WhereasfarmingmagazineshaddownplayedSilentSpring’simplications

for British as opposed to US farming,71Ruth Harrison’s AnimalMachineswas

immediately seen as a far greater challenge. In March 1964, British Farmer

complained that theObserver had joined the “anti-land lobby” by presenting a

66‘’Factory’Farming’,BF,15.02.1964,p.31.67Ibid.68Ibid.69H.R.Gray,‘Theartificialnightmare’,FW,14.10.1955,p.93;ViscountNewport,‘ArtificialNightmare’,FW,21.10.1955,p.49.70KathleenThomas,‘MealswithoutMeat’,FW,02.11.1962,p.105;PaulAtlee,‘NoMysteryAboutHisMuckMethod’,FW,03.08.1962,p.65;DavidCampbell,‘ManofAgandFish’,FW,12.12.1969,p.78.71‘KillerChemicals’,FW,12.04.1963,p.82.

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“grosslydistortedpictureofBritishagriculture”72andrefusing toprintanNFU

counter-statement.AFarmersWeeklyeditorialbemoaned:

Townspeople (…) have been given a horrifying picture of the ‘animalfactories’ (…). They are given a chilling picture of broiler houseconcentration camps and packing station Ausschwitzen [sic], of pig‘sweat-boxes’; of darkened torture-chambers for calves, and of animalsgoingblindinintensivebeeflots.73

Ifanimalsweretrulysuffering,theywoulddieandnotthrive.

However,AnimalMachinesand SilentSpringalso struck a nerve among

somefarmers.WritingtoFarmersWeeklyinMarch1964,onereaderchallenged

battery systems.Whywasan industry suffering fromoverproductionso intent

on sustaining technologies producing these surpluses?74Titled “Obituary of a

calf,”75a Farmers Weekly article by A.H. Harris described the short, sad and

painful life of a male bobby calf from a first-person perspective. Once

established, a steady trickle of internal criticism continued to challenge the

orthodoxyofconventionalintensificationthroughoutthe1960s.76

Reactingtotheincreaseofpublicenvironmentalismandinternaldissent,

proponents of intensive agriculture gradually moderated their rhetoric and

stressed the necessity of an “informed climate”77. By the late 1960s, the NFU

actively tried towin critics over. Building on itsmarketing expertise, theNFU

produceddocumentariestitled“PressButtonFarms”78and“LooktotheLand”79

72‘FeatherHeads’,BF,28.03.1964,p.1.73‘TechniquesinQuestion’,FW,13.03.1964,p.43.74K.M.PetterRopewind,‘BatteryBirds’,FW,27.03.1964,p.41.75A.H.Harris,‘Obituaryofacalf’,FWLXI/3,supplement,17.07.1964,p.vii.76ColinTudge,‘VetsWarnofRisingPollutionHazards’,FW,19.12.1969,p.27;‘Payingforpollution’,FW,26.12.1969,p.18;‘Thepesticidedangersthatlingerinthesoil’,FW,26.12.1969,p.22;seealsoadvertsfor‘safe’or‘natural’products;‘BiddleSawyer&Co.Commercial’,FW,supplement,14.06.1963,p.ii;WalterStrong,‘What’sintheMarket’,FW,05.12.1969,p.99.77‘InformedClimateNeededonFarmPoisonRisks’,FW,20.03.1964,p.64.78‘NFUhelpedonfarmingfilm’,BF,10.06.1967,p.5.79‘TheUnionmakesafilm’,BF,04.05.1968,p.22.

119

and organised joint-conferences for farmers and environmentalists.80In 1969,

BritishFarmerinvited“12,000urbanhousewivestomeetfarmer[s].”81Following

a joint-conference with conservationists, themagazine rejoiced: “Farmers and

conservationists are on the same side.”82Another article exhorted farmers to

“out-conservetheconservators.”83

Controversies about agricultural antibiotics accompanied many of the

above-mentioned developments. Strengthened by the 1962 Netherthorpe

report,84most farmers remained confident in agricultural antibiotics and even

demanded expanded access to POMs. 85 The 1963 milk scandal did not

fundamentallychallengeagriculturalantibioticuseeither.Blamingproblemson

black sheep, the agricultural community endorsed the establishment of official

controls and residuepenalties. Similar to theUS, only aminority of producers

complained about “iniquitous penalties” and unnecessary “panic measures.”86

Magazines also supported government education campaigns and informed

farmersaboutmastitispreventionandwithdrawaltimes.87AccordingtoFarmers

Weekly:

Dairy farmers have little ground to complain over the row caused byantibiotic content of milk supplies. (…). It is obvious that the principalcustomersforudderantibiotics,thosemilkproducerswithchronicuddertroublesintheirherds,havebeenignoringthequiteclearinstructionontheuseofthesedrugs.88

80‘Countryconservationandthefarmer’,BF,15.03.1969,p.9;‘AreFarmersRapingTheCountryside’,BF,05.04.1969,p.21;‘BirdDamageConference’,BF,18.05.1968,p.3.81’12,000UrbanHousewivesToMeetFarmer’,BF,04.10.1969,p.20.82‘TheBattleoftheHedgerows’,BF,02.08.1969,p.24.83‘Out-conservetheconservators,saysMichaelDrake’,BF,22.11.1969,p.6.84Thereportwassoinkeepingwiththeprevailingviewofantibioticsthatitwentunnoticedbytheanalysedagriculturalpress.85‘DrugsWithoutVets’MoveByGlosNFU’,FW,19.10.1962,p.77.86G.F.Robinson,‘AppallingPenalty’,FW,17.07.1964,p.33.87‘Axewillfallon‘antibiotic’milk’,FW,31.05.1963,p.41;‘MMBsendsoutwarningsonantibiotics’,FW,07.06.1963,p.42;‘VeterinarySafety’,BF,22.02.1964,p.5.88‘TubeTrouble’,FW,07.06.1963,p.40.

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Together with the BVA, the magazine also warned that quick antibiotic cures

would not solve the national mastitis-problem.89Meanwhile, commentators in

British Farmer stressed that any antibiotic bans would be counterproductive.

According toK.C.Sellers fromtheBritishAnimalHealthTrust, thegovernment

should improve veterinary preventive medicine before considering antibiotic

bans.90

In1964and1965,thepublicationsofAnimalMachinesandAnderson’sR-

factor warnings posed far graver challenges for agricultural antibiotic use.

Concernsaboutantibioticsafetywerealsoaddressedinagriculturalmagazines.

In March 1964, veterinary investigation officer R.M. Loosmore seemingly

confirmed some of AnimalMachines’allegations to readers of FarmersWeekly

whenhecomplained that “indiscriminate”antibioticusecouldmaskdisease in

livinganddeadanimals,whosecarcasseswere“soddenwithantibiotics”91.While

commentatorscondemned“selfishandcareless”92antibioticabuse foron-going

residuedetectionsinmilk,aremarkablearticleinBritishFarmerlinkedconcerns

abouthorizontalresistancetransfertoagriculturalantibioticusein1965:

Toomanydoctorsandfarmersaredosinghumanbeings,pigs,calvesandpoultrywith antibiotics forminor illnesses or as animal food additives.(…).Thiscanmeanthathumanbeingsandlivestockarelesseasilytreatedformoreseriousepidemics,includingtyphoidinhumanbeings.Inshort,theuseofantibioticshasbeenoverdone.93

AccordingtoveterinarianJamesWentworthDay,therewasan“urgentneedfor

reappraisaloftheuseofantibioticsbothinhumanbeingsandanimals.”94

89‘DairyPlague’,FW,07.06.1963,p.40;‘Drugs‘nosubstituteforhygiene’,FW,07.06.1963,p.42;Glaxomarketing‘approved’productsforthedurationofthescandal;‘GlaxoCommercial’,FW,07.06.1963,p.54.90‘AntibioticsInMilk’,BF,14.03.1964,p.45.91‘Misuseddrugsmaskdisease’,FW,06.03.1964,p.71.92‘Milkclean-up’,FW,21.08.1964,p.39.93JamesWentworthDay,‘MisuseofAntibiotics’,BF,09.07.1966,p.3.94Ibid.

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However, suchoutright criticism remained an exception.Between1965

and 1967, BritishFarmer’s only other reference to resistance problems was a

report on a new AGP: containing nontherapeutic virginiamycin, ‘Eskalin’ was

praised for answering “criticisms that continuous low level feeding of an

antibiotic(…)caninducebacterialresistance.”95Atthesametime,themagazine

continued to print antibiotic commercials. Titled “Have Aureomycin – Will

Travel,”96Cyanamid commercials depicted calves and pigs in front of small

travelling crates and praised reductions of transport-induced scouring and

mortalitythroughprophylacticantibioticuse.Linkingantibiotic-criticismtothe

“anti-factory farming lobby”, which “always appears to get the headlines,”97

Farmers Weekly complained about claims “that antibiotics such as

chloramphenicolareincludedinthefeedoflayingbirdsasamatterofroutine.”98

Concerned about on-going attacks on agricultural antibiotic use, many

farmers hoped that the Swann committee would provide clear guidelines and

dissolvepublicandpersonaldoubtsaboutantibiotics’ safety.ByOctober1969,

growing apprehension aboutpossible antibiotic bansbecamenoticeable in the

agriculturalmedia.InformingfarmersabouttheadvantagesofnumerousAGPs,

FarmersWeekly cautioned, “confident guesses rule out many antibiotics now

used.”99Titled“DrugsandBugs,”100anotherarticleanalysedantibioticresistance

inmoredetail: ifpreventing thespreadof resistantbacteria toconsumerswas

the main concern, then resistance transmission via meat and eggs and not

95‘Growthonlyfromthisantibiotic’,BF,08.04.1967,p.47.96‘CommercialCyanamid’,BF,04.12.1965,p.46;alsosee:‘CommercialCyanamid’,BF,04.09.1965,p.39.97‘SentimentsandFacts’,FW,21.11.1969,p.82.98Ibid.99‘Puttingonweight’,FWsupplement,03.10.1969,p.27.100‘DrugsandBugs’,FW,17.10.1969,p.110.

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selectiononfarmswastheproblem.Betterhygieneandcleanerpackingstations

wouldthusbemoreeffectivethanAGPbans.101

Veterinariansweremoreoutspoken in their criticismofAGPs.Asked to

providerecommendationstotheSwanncommittee,theRCVScalledforstricter

controls, theVeterinarians’Union(VETU)advocatedabanofallantibiotic feed

supplements and the BVA supported a ban of chloramphenicol, tylosin and

broad-spectrum AGPs.102Although out-going BVA president Peter Storie-Pugh

looked forwardtoa time“whenhisprofessioncouldoffer farmersanadvisory

service which could cost far less than a shelffull of drugs”103, veterinarians’

criticismoffarmers’antibioticusewasfarfromself-reflexive.In1969,thenew

BVA president John Parsons excluded a reform of veterinary prescription

practicesfromdemandsformorestatecontroloverpharmaceuticals.104

ByearlyNovember1969,speculationsabouttheSwannreporthadbeen

replaced by “inspired ‘leaks.”105Complaining about “alarmist” press coverage,

FarmersWeeklyexplainedthatthe“talkofa‘newperilinfood’isanexaggeration

of the scientific problems presented by the increased use of these generally

beneficialsubstances,…”106Theeditorialcommiseratedwith intensive farmers,

who felt “harassed a bit too much” about methods “which have not yet been

proved to be seriously at fault.”107Concurring, British Farmer claimed that

potentialantibioticbanswerebasedon“littleconvincingevidence”108andmight

cost farmers up to £10 million. Referring to the Manchester and Teesside101Ibid.102TNAAJ3/183(CecilSchwartz,‘VetsadviseSwann’,NewScientist,13.02.1969),pp.348-349.103‘Drugs:GoodServants,BadMasters’,BF,04.10.1969,p.45.104Ibid.;forcontemporarydevelopmentswithintheprofessionseeWoods,'IsPreventionBetterThanCure?TheRiseandFallofVeterinaryPreventiveMedicine,C.1950-1980',pp.119-25.105‘Clamponantibiotics’,FW,14.11.1969,p.30.106Ibid.107Ibid.;‘CharterForAntibioticsProposed’,FW,14.11.1969,p.33.108‘LikelyCurbonFeedDrugsWorth£10m’,BF,01.11.1969,p.18.

123

outbreaks, another article reaffirmed that there was no evidence linking

resistantgastroenteritistofarms.109Farmershopedthatofficialswould“impose

areasonablemeasureofcontrolratherthan(…)stopthepracticealtogether.”110

Eventhoughtheycomplainedabout“purelycircumstantialevidence”and

lack of “real facts”111, farmers were nonetheless convinced of the Swann

committee’s trustworthiness. In contrast to US farmers’ later attacks on FDA

expertise,112British farmers’ post-war integration into official decision-making

had allowed them to develop a thorough knowledge of and trust in the

corporatist system.113Although the Swann decisions would also influence the

pendingregulationofpesticides likeDDT,114farmersand their representatives

knew that agricultural expertise would be present and heard in official

committees. Fromexperience, theyalsoknew that compromise solutionswere

more likely to occur in discreet committees than during polarizing public

hearingsordebates.Shieldedfrompublicscrutiny,friendlyexpertscouldmodify

scenarios of risk without risking their prestige. Once publicly announced, a

committee’s findings would then profit from experts’ united ‘trustworthiness’

andreducethelikelihoodoffurthercontroversy.115

109‘Whatproof?’,FW,14.11.1969,p.30.110Ibid.111‘Littleevidence’,FW,05.12.1969,p.77.112ChapterEleven.113WhereasEuropeantraditionsofcorporatismshieldedindividualsfrompublicscrutiny,Americanpoliticalculturereliedonexperts’publicpresentationofevidence–thusmakingthestrengthofevidencedependentonexperts’‘moral’authority,Krücken,Risikotransformation.DiePolitischeRegulierungTechnisch-ÖkologischerGefahreninDerRisikogesellschaft,pp.94&99-109;Jasanoff,DesignsonNature:ScienceandDemocracyinEurope&theUnitedStates.,pp.288-89,SheilaJasanoff,TheFifthBranch.ScienceAdvisersasPolicymakers(Cambridge(Ma.)andLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,1994).114PeterBell,‘TheMonth’,BF,06.12.1969,p.12.115TheconceptofaconfinedandepistemologicallyfluidspaceinwhichriskmodelscompetewitheachotherandaresubsequentlycommunicatedtoabroaderexternalpublicisbasedonLudwikFleck,GenesisandDevelopmentofaScientificFact(ChicagoandLondon:UniversityofChicagoPress,1979),p.124.

124

Following its publication in November 1969, British farmerswere thus

relieved to find little radicalism in theSwannreport.116Even though it lobbied

forfinancialcompensation,FarmersWeeklyadmitted,“nosensiblefarmerwould

wish to [continue] using a drug which (…) could be a later risk to public

health.”117InaremarkabledifferencetoUSdebates,themagazinewarned:

Bymassuseoflow-doseantibioticsinfarmanimalswearecreatingareservoirofdrug-resistantbacteria.(…).Alreadysomepeoplehavediedthroughinfectionwithsalmonellaeacquiredfromanimalsthatresistedallattemptsatdrugtherapy.(…).Therangeofusefulantibioticsislimited:wecannotaffordtodevaluethem.118

This1969 concessionof a linkbetweenAGPs andharmful bacterial resistance

notonlyreflectedBritishfarmers’trustinthecorporatistexpertsystembutalso

thepowerofanationaldebate,whichhadfocusedonthedangersofresistance

selectionfarearlierthaninothercountries.

Intheend,BritishfarmerswereonlygrazedbytheSwannbans.119AGPs

werephasedoutslowlyandsubstituteswereeitheralreadyavailableor in the

final stages of licensing.120Attempting to profit from the situation, some

producerswelcomedtheopportunitytomarketBritishpoultryas“thebestand

safestintheworld”121and“turningthesituationto[farmers’]advantagebysuch

asloganas ‘Britishfoodissafefood’.”122AlthoughBritishFarmerjokedthatthe

“rows of bottles on some farm office shelves will be seriously depleted”123,

Swanndidnotchallengeagriculturalantibioticuseassuch.Instead,itshiftedthe

116‘BlowtoAntibioticsInFeed’,BF,22.11.1969,p.3.117‘DrugWorry’,FW,21.11.1969,p.33.118CollinTudge,‘Antibiotics–FarmDrugsWithADoubleEdge’,FW,21.11.1969,p.41;seealso:‘Opinion.SwannSong’,BF,06.12.1969,p.11;BillMessage,‘Antibioticsafety’,FW,23.01.1970,p.31.119‘Watchdogplanforfarmdrugs’,FW,21.11.1969,p.38.120‘Samepriceforadditives’,FW,28.11.1969,p.40;BrianChester,‘DrugChangesWillBeMadeInEasyStages’,Ibid.121Ibid.122R.J.T.Holland,‘’Safefood’promotion’,FW,05.12.1969,p.49.123‘NeverADullMoment,WithDrugsAndSheepAndCripplingTax’,BF,29.11.1969,p.1.

125

balanceof‘antibioticpower’inveterinarians’favour.InFarmersWeekly,farmer

G.Armstrongdrilynoted:“Myvetseemsmorepleasedtosellproductshimself.I

feelitisnotinfarmers’bestinterestsfora‘closedshop’todevelop.”124

124G.Armstrong,‘’Closedshop’drugs’,FW,05.12.1969,p.49.

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ChapterSix:TypingResistance–AntibioticRegulationinBritain Just like farmers, British officials hoped that the 1969 Swann report

wouldsolvetheescalatingconflictbetweenagriculturalinterestsandconsumer

andenvironmentalconcerns.

Withinofficialcircles,AGPshadbeencontroversialevenbeforetheywere

licensedin1953.In1951,theARChadembarkedonaseriesoffeedexperiments

ongovernmentfarms.1WhileUSpublicationsandpositivetrialresultsbolstered

support forAGPs,2someofficials remainedapprehensive: “Thedifficulty seems

tobe thatnooneapparentlyknowswhat the antibioticsdoes [sic] andhow it

acts.”3In July 1953, Thomas Dugdale, Conservative Minister for Agriculture,

confidedtoNFUpresidentSirJamesTurner–thelaterLordNetherthorpe–that

heconsideredthemass-introductionofantibioticstobeamedicalexperiment.4

A particularly contentious decision was to allow farmers to purchase diluted

antibiotic substrates for home-mixing. Ministry of Health (MH) officials

repeatedly warned against a possible rise of antibiotic allergies and bacterial

resistance:“thewholepurposeofthePenicillinActwastopreventpenicillinand

other antibiotics being used indiscriminately with a consequent danger of

producingpenicillinresistantstrainsofpathogens.”5

However, critics’ concerns had little force. During relevant ministerial

meetings, medical experts asserted that any “risk to health was negligible.”6

Antibiotic supporters also claimed that AGPs would reduce expensive feed

1TNAFD9/1458(E.M.B.ClementstoA.A.Miles,28Mar,1960),p.1.2TNAMAF119/23(ARC,Meeting19September,1952),p.1.3TNA,MAF119/23(MinuteHilltoCroxford,19April,1952).4TNA,MAF287/299(DugdaletoTurner,29July,1953),p.2.5TNA,MAF119/23(Mr.Honnor,ARC,meeting19September,1952),p.3.6TNAMAF119/23(Dr.Magee;ARC,meeting,25Feb,1952),p.2.

127

importsduringtimesofcurrencyproblemsandnotedthatthediscoveryofnew

antibiotics would surely outpace bacterial resistance development.7Although

theywereoffendedbytheirlateconsultation,theBVAandtheRoyalCollegeof

VeterinarySurgeons(RCVS)didnotopposeAGPseither.8

In early 1953, British officials’ main fear was being unable to supply

projected demand. As a consequence, the British government approached US

pharmaceuticalcompaniestoensuresufficientstocksofantibiotics.Pouncingon

the opportunity to extend sales of chlortetracycline, American Cyanamid’s

Lederle LaboratoriesDivision offered freeAureomycinMagnasol Cake and the

expertise of AGP co-discoverer Thomas Jukes. Concluding his letter, O. N.

Williams,LederleLaboratories’director,hopedthatthiswould“bethebeginning

ofanassociationwhichwillbeofmutualbenefit.”9

TwoyearsaftertheFDA’slicensingofAGPs,theBritish1953Therapeutic

Substances (Prevention ofMisuse) Act (TSA) exempted ready-mixed penicillin

andchlortetracyclinefeedsandself-mixsupplementsforpigsandpoultryfrom

POM scheduling. However, many of the TSA’s provisions came back to haunt

Whitehall.Alreadyrecognisedbycontemporaries,oneof theTSA’sweaknesses

wasBritain’s lackofanalytical facilities fordetectingantibioticsanddiscerning

their concentration.10For data on residues and assays, British officials relied

heavily on academic publications and foreign enforcement agencies – most

notably theFDA.Meanwhile,enforcementof theTSAremainedconfined to the

retail level andofficialshadno controlover theuseof legallypurchased feeds

7TNAMAF119/23(W.G.Alexander;ARC,meeting,25Feb,1952),p.2;TNAMAF287/299(R.Braude;MeetingatSaughtontodiscussTSAdraftregulations,4Feb,1953),p.3.8TNAMAF287/299(VeterinaryInterests,MeetingRCVSandBVAwithMHandMAF,12Feb,1953).9TNAMAF287/299(WilliamstoMoss,5February1953),p.2.10TNAMAF119/23(Sgd.A.EdentoO.A.Robertson,2Nov,1953),p.2.

128

andsubstrates.11Inhindsight,the1953TSAopenedthelegislativefloodgatesfor

a public health experiment of national proportions. Unfortunately, the

authoritiestaskedwithcontrollingthisexperimentwereflyingblind.

Thereformed1956TSAdidnotimprovethesituation.WhilePartIofthe

TSA dealt with the licensing, manufacture and importation of medications to

ensure their purity, Part II once again exempted low-dosed AGPs from POM

scheduling.12More worryingly, the absence of mandatory POM-scheduling for

newsubstancesmeantthatrecentlydiscoveredantibiotics–liketylosin–could

theoretically be sold and usedwithout any government control.13Officials and

manufacturers remained surprisingly sanguine about this loophole: as Glaxo’s

ex-chiefexecutivescientificofficerAlfredLouisBacharachputit,a“gentleman’s

agreement”14between manufacturers and the MAFF was sure to prevent any

misuse. Until 1968, an aptly named voluntary Veterinary Products Safety

PrecautionsSchememerelysuggestedguidelinesforunscheduledsubstances.15

While antibiotic enforcement withered, expert committees bloomed:

because antibiotics’ numerous applications transcended traditional

responsibilities, a veritable jungle of committees became concernedwith their

use.Originally, theMedicalandAgriculturalResearchCouncils (MRCandARC)

hadbeenresponsibleforadvisingministersonagriculturalantibiotics.However,

by 1956, further committees became involved. Amongst them were the

Preservatives Sub-Committee of the Food Standards Committee, the Scientific

Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee on Poisonous Substances Used in

11TNAMAF287/299(MeetingatSaughtontodiscussTSAdraftregulations,4Feb,1953),p.1.12TNAMAF119/23(Draft:FGRaymondtoGLGray,26Nov,1968).13TNAMAF284/281(Minute27,ABBartlett,10Apr,1956).14A.L.Bacharach,'UkPositiononUseofAntibioticFoodAdditives',ChemicalAge78(1957).15TNAMAF284/281(ControlofAntibiotics,Feb,1969),p.1.

129

Agriculture and Food Storage, and the joint Antibiotics Panel.16The numerous

committees vied for influence and frequently disagreed with each other. As a

result, departmental and expert responsibilities blurred and there was no

guiding principle driving British antibiotic policy. In 1967 one official

complained: “Ihavebeenquiteunable tounderstand the relationshipbetween

these bodies.”17Sharing his colleague’s exasperation, another official admitted:

“Thesituationisnowsocomplicatedthatitisalmostun-understandable.”18

Meanwhile, the list of licensed antibiotic applications grew rapidly. In

1954, the Therapeutic Substances (Supply of Oxytetracycline for Agricultural

Purposes) Regulations legalised oxytetracycline AGPs. 19 Streptomycin and

oxytetracyclinespraysandpaintsforplantproductionwerelicensedfouryears

later.Despitetheendorsementofspraysbypenicillinco-developerSirHoward

Florey,20their licensing was criticised by MRC researcher Brandon Lush, who

wasconcernedthatantibioticresiduesmightalterthehumangutfloraandselect

for resistance.However, similar to theUS, official equanimityprevailed: in the

caseofLush, theabsenceofabacteriologiston theScientificSubcommitteeon

Poisonous Substances Used in Agriculture prevented further deliberations.21

Concerned about residues rather than resistance, the recently instituted

Antibiotics Panel debatedwhetherworkers’ tough skinwouldmake them less

sensitive to antibiotic allergies than soft-skinned nurses.22In 1958, MAFF’s

proposed labels for antibiotic sprays and paints only recommended washing16TNAMAF101/643(NoteofMeetingheldon13.09.1956,todiscussthesettingupofaWorkingGroupontheuseofAntibioticsinAgricultureandinFoodPreservation).17TNAMAF287/450(Minute,J.HensleytoMr.Bott,9Jan,1967).18TNAMAF287/450(Minute,WDMacraetoMr.Field,18Jan,1967),p.2.19TNAMAF284/282(ControlofAntibiotics,AppendixIII:ListofrelaxingregulationsmadeunderPartIIofthetherapeuticSubstancesAct1956,Feb,1959)20TNAMAF284/281(Minute30,GOLace,30May,1956).21TNAMAF284/281(BrandonLushtoGOLace,4Jul,1956).22TNAMAF260/82(AntibioticsPanel,Meeting,20Dec,1956),p.2.

130

contaminated skin. Astonished, Murphy’s, the manufacturer applying for the

spray’slegalisation,rejectedMAFFlabelsandrecommendedfull-bodycoverand

face-shieldsforworkers.23

USpharmaceuticalmanufacturersalsopressedtheBritishgovernmentto

licenseantibioticfoodpreservation.24Lederleevensponsoredpreservativetrials

aboard the government trawler SirWilliam Hardy.25Manufacturers were only

partiallysuccessful.Whiletheabsenceofspoilage-indicatingbacteria,resistance

build-up and enforcement concerns prevented antibiotic poultry preservation,

the same caveatswerenot applied to ice anddipping solutions for fish,which

werebrieflylicensedin1964.26

AlthoughBritishofficialsweremorehesitantthantheirUScolleaguesand

voiced concerns about antibiotic resistance, a limited understanding of

resistance proliferation, a lack of analytical facilities and the absence of clear

bureaucratic responsibilities and policy directives resulted in the seemingly

haphazardlicensingofnumerousantibioticapplications.

With residue problems remaining invisible, British officialswere under

littlepressuretoexpandmonitoringandenforcementandwereproudofthelow

costsof theBritish foodsecurity system. Ina1956submission to theWestern

EuropeanUnion Sub-Committee onHealth Control of Foodstuffs, UK delegates

explainedtheirrefusaltoestablishresiduetolerances:

23TNAMAF284/281(EJMillertoRSMills,18Mar,1958).24TNAMAF101/643(DepartmentofScientificandIndustrialResearch.PreliminaryreportofthevisitofDr.EllaM.BarnestotheUSAtoinvestigatetheuseofantibioticsforfoodpreservation,1956),p.1;TNAMAF260/82(ReportsoftheAntibioticPanel,09Apr,1958),p.1.25TNAMAF101/643(Note:AntibioticsforFishPreservation.PilotScaleSeaTrials,undated)–thelaterRainbowWarrior.26TNAMAF284/282(ControlofAntibiotics,AppendixIII:ListofrelaxingregulationsmadeunderPartIIofthetherapeuticSubstancesAct1956,Feb,1959)

131

TheUnitedKingdom feels that the problemof consumer hazard can betackled in more than one way. (…). The successful application of theAmerican system is dependent upon the existence of the necessarygovernmentalmachinery. (…).TheUnitedKingdomdelegation feels thatcostandscientificmanagementproblemsmakeitimpossibleforthemtoadvocateasystemofcontrolofresiduesonprescribedtolerances.27

Discussing penicillin finds in US milk during its first meeting in 1956, the

Antibiotics Panel noted the unfortunate lack of British residue data28but

attemptedtotakeapositiveviewofthesituation:

InviewoftheenormousamountofuncookedmilkconsumeddailybytheAmericanpopulationandthepropensityofpenicillintoproduceallergicreactions, itwould appear that theyhavehere a large scale experimentalreadycompleted…29

Withonlyoneprovennon-fatalreactiontopenicillin,officialsarguedthattheUS

findingsjustifiedanextensionofantibioticusetofoodpreservation.30

In contrast to the US, British officials’ antibiotic complacency was not

shakenbyresiduesbutbynewdataonbacterialresistance.In1959,anarticlein

The Veterinary Record presented uncomfortable findings. In their study,

bacteriophageandveterinaryresearchersHerbertWilliamsSmithandW.E.Crab

fromBritain’sAnimalHealthTrustinHoughtoncomparednasalandskinisolates

of160tetracycline-fedpigstothosetakenfromanantibiotic-freecontrolgroup.

Of the72%ofpigs in the tetracycline-groupcarryingStaphylococcusaureus,an

impressive67%carriedStaph.aureusresistanttotetracyclines.Interestedinthe

spread of resistance, Williams Smith and Crab also examined pigs’ human

attendants: of 35 men caring for tetracycline-fed pigs, 54% carried strains of

Staph.aureus,11%carriedstrainsresistanttopenicillinand34%carriedstrains

27TNAMAF260/82(WesternEuropeanUnionSub-CommitteeonHealthControlofFoodstuffs.WorkingPartyonPoisonousSubstancesUsedinAgriculture;DraftPaperbyUKDelegation,1956),pp.6-7.28TNAMAF260/82(AntibioticsPanel,Meeting,20Dec,1956),p.1.29TNAMAF101/643(H.H.TaylortoWTCBerry,9Oct,1957),p.4.30Ibid.

132

resistant to tetracyclines. An analysis of 50 additional attendants caring for

tetracycline- and penicillin-fed chickens found that 48% of attendants carried

Staph.aureus,30%penicillin-resistantStaph.aureus,14%tetracycline-resistant

Staph.aureusand4%penicillin-andtetracycline-resistantStaph.aureus.Inmost

cases,thestrainsisolatedfromattendantsandanimalswereidentical.31

Oneyearlater,ateamofgovernmentscientistsunderthedirectionofthe

alreadyfamiliarPHLSbacteriologistEphraimSaulAndersonfoundthatstrainsof

S.typhimuriumisolatedfromBritishpoultrywereresistanttoantibioticsusedin

feeds.Referringtothestudybeforeitsofficialpublication,32theARCdemandeda

general reassessment of antibiotic feeds safety.33The review was to be

undertaken ahead of potential expansion of AGPs to calves and layer hens.34

TakenabackbytheARC’srequest,theMRCmarvelled:“Infacttheyareseriously

consideringwithdrawingapprovalof theaddingof antibiotics; inotherwords,

theyareconsideringputtingtheclockback.”35

Britain’spioneeringfocusonantibioticresistancewasnocoincidenceand

canbeexplainedbythecountry’s leadership inresistanceresearchandphage-

typing.Expandingrapidlyduringthe1940s,phage-typingwasatechniqueused

to identify individual strains of bacteria with the help of bacteria-infecting

virusescalledbacteriophages.Becauseeachbacteriastrainisonlysusceptibleto

31ReprintinTNAMAF260/82(H.WilliamsSmithandW.E.Crab,‘TheEffectoftheContinuousAdministrationofDietsContainingLowLevelsofTetracyclinesontheIncidenceofDrug-resistantBacteriumcoliintheFaecesofPigsandChickens:TheSensitivityoftheBact.colitoOtherChemotherapeuticAgents,TheVeterinaryRecord69(1959)),p.24;inthesameyear,environmentalpenicillininfactoriesandhospitalswasidentifiedasasignificantcontributortoresistantStaphylococcuspyogenes;J.C.Gould,'OriginofAntibiotic-ResistantStaphylococci',Nature,180/4580(Aug101957).32B.C.Hobbsetal.,'AntibioticTreatmentofPoultryinRelationtoSalmonellaTyphi-Murium',MonBullMinistHealthPublicHealthLabServ,19(Oct1960);AndersonappearsasPrincipalInvestigator.33TNAFD9/1458(L.S.PortertoDr.Clements,17Jul,1959)34Ibid.35TNAFD9/1458(Noteonfile,A.83/4,9Sept,1959).

133

a limitedamountofphages, infectingbacteriaandthen ‘typing’phage-infection

patternsisanefficientwayofdiscerningindividualstrains.36

Originallydeveloped inCanada,phage-typingwasadopted inBritainby

thebacteriologistArthurFelix.37During theSecondWorldWar,Felixhadbeen

seconded to theEmergencyPublicHealthLaboratoryService (EPHLS).38Based

inLondon,theEPHLS’unprecedentedcentralisationoflaboratoryresourcesand

health information39allowed Felix to use phage-typing to establish a national

“finger-print bureau”40of chronic typhoid carriers and trace sporadicwartime

outbreaks. Following the transformation of the EPHLS into the PHLS in 1945,

Felix stayed on as Director of the Central Enteric Reference Laboratory and

furtherdevelopedBritishphagetypingcapacities.41BythetimeFelix’successor

–E.S.Anderson–tookover,thePHLSwasaglobal leaderinphage-typingand

InternationalReferenceLaboratoryforentericphagetyping.42

Crucially,phage-typingallowedpostwarPHLSresearcherstodiscernthe

threatposedbyantibioticresistance.In1954,Britishphage-typinghadrevealed

the “chains of infection”43behind the first identified pandemic of resistant

bacteria (Staphylococcus 80/81).44By the late 1950s, phage-typing enabled

researcherslikeE.S.Andersontolinkspreadingbacterialresistancetoantibiotic

36Hillier,'BabiesandBacteria:PhageTypingBacteriologists,andtheBirthofInfectionControl',p.735.37Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s,pp.15-20.38J.Craigie,'ArthurFelix1887-1956',BiographicalMemoirsofFellowsoftheRoyalSociety,3(1957),pp.55-56.39Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s,pp.16-17.40Ibid.,p.17.41Ibid.,p.18.42Ibid.,pp.18-20,Hardy,SalmonellaInfections,NetworksofKnowledge,andPublicHealthinBritain1880-1975,pp.123-33.43Hillier,'BabiesandBacteria:PhageTypingBacteriologists,andtheBirthofInfectionControl',p.736.44Ibid.,pp.737-41;51-52;60.

134

use on British farms.45The importance and advanced state of British phage-

typing was later also acknowledged in a 1980 NAS-report on subtherapeutic

antibioticuseintheUS.46

Taskedwithundertakingacomprehensivereviewofantibioticsinanimal

feeding,aJointARC/MRCcommitteestartedworkinApril1960.47However,the

so-calledNetherthorpe committee’smain body onlymet twice. During its first

meeting in 1960, it installed a scientific subcommittee. Two years later, it

endorsed the subcommittee’s report.48The subcommittee itself met five times

between1960and1962.However,itsoonbecameapparentthatafundamental

rift divided members. While one faction consisting mostly of physicians and

veterinarians attacked antibiotic feeds on the grounds of resistance, the other

faction consisting of agricultural scientists and officials fiercely defended their

use.Invirtuallyeverymeeting,Drs.RobertFraserGordon(aveterinarianatthe

Houghton Poultry Trust) and R. Braude (an animal nutritionist at Reading’s

National Institute for Research in Dairying) clashed on the relative costs and

benefitsofantibioticfeeds.

Whenveterinary researcherHerbertWilliamsSmithwas invited togive

evidence in June 1960, he presented new data on the spread of antibiotic

resistance from animals to workers: in one survey, 88.3% of Staphylococcus

45Anderson’sco-publisheronhorizontalresistance,NaomiDatta,hadalsoworkedatColindalepriortomovingtoHammersmithhospital;PostPenicillinAntibiotics:FromAcceptacetoResistance?AWitnessSeminarHeldattheWellcomeInstitutefortheHistoryofMedicine,London,on12May1998(6;London:WellcomeTrust,2000),p.46.46'TheEffectsonHumanHealthofSubtherapeuticUseofAntimicrobialsinAnimalFeeds',(WashingtonDC:CommitteetoStudytheHumanHealthEffectsofSubtherapeuticAntibioticUseinAnimalFeeds(NRC),1980),p.23.47Initially,theNetherthorpeCommitteewassupposedtositsecretly;TNAFD9/1458(MinuteDr.Faulkner,7Mar,1960);Bayersentalettertothesupposedlyconfidentialcommitteeadvertisinganon-therapeuticAGP;TNAFD1/8226((ARC/MRCJointCommitteeonAntibiotics,Scient.Sub-Committee.AntibioticforAnimalFeedingUseonly,SuggestionbyBayerProductsLtd.,[undated]).48TNAFD23/1936(ReportoftheJointCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeding,1962).

135

aureusstrainsisolatedfromthenosesofveterinarysurgeonsandfarmerswere

penicillin-resistant–14.7%ofisolatesfromveterinarianswerealsoresistantto

chloramphenicol.49Referringto theseresults,WilliamsSmithwarnedthateven

the smallest level of agricultural antibiotic use could produce resistant

pathogens.50In response, Dr Braude asked for conclusive evidence of harm

resulting from resistant farm strains. Williams Smith conceded that he was

unable tosupplysuchproof.Thesubcommittee thereforecompromisedon the

followingstatement:“therapeuticusesofantibioticscouldleadtotheproduction

of resistant strains, (…) thedangers of uncontrolled therapeutic use shouldbe

borninmind.”51

Remarkably, evidence submitted by the NFU showed that uncontrolled

use was taking place on British farms. Directly contradicting antibiotic

supporters, the NFU submission contained three farmers’ statements: one

farmer confessed having illegally fed antibiotics to breeding pigs,52a second

farmer stated that he used penicillin but had ignored “fashionable and

extravagantclaimsof thebroad-spectrummanufacturers”53,andathirdfarmer

reported“certaininstanceswherehigh-leveldosesofantibioticshavebeenused

inanattempttooffsetbadhusbandrypractices.”54Attheendofthemeeting,the

subcommittee’sminutes noted “the difference of opinion between the farming

49TNAFD1/8226(ARC/MRCJointCommitteeonAntibiotics,TheAntibioticSensitivityofStrainsofStaphylococcusaureusIsolatedfromtheNosesofVeterinarySurgeonsandFarmers,H.WilliamsSmith&W.E.Crabb)50TNAFD1/8226(ARC/MRCJointCommitteeonAntibiotics,2ndmeetingScient.Sub-Committee,27Jun,1960),p.2.51Ibid.,p.3.52TNAFD1/8226(InformationprovidedbytheNFU,ARC558/60),p.1.53Ibid.54Ibid.,p.2.

136

membersof the JointCommitteeand the farmerswhoseopinionhadbeenput

forwardasrepresentativebytheNFU.”55

In view of its division between medical and agricultural members, the

scientific sub-committee found it hard to agree on anything except the most

commonplace facts. Acknowledging the subcommittee’s impasse, Prof James

HowiefromtheUniversityofGlasgowpresentedthreechoices:

i. Completeprohibitionoftheadditionofantibioticstofeedingstuffs(i.e. a reversion to the earlier situation, which would be verydifficult)

ii. Maintenance of the present position (on the ground that theconflictingevidencedidnotprovideanybasisforachange)

iii. General permission to add antibiotics to feedingstuffs (on theground that there was insufficient evidence to justify thewithholdingofsuchpermission).56

Howie’s phrasing was significant. By presenting only three choices – two of

whichwere extremes – he transformed the statusquoante into an acceptable

compromise.Bothfactionscouldsubsequentlyclaimtohavepreventedworse.

Yielding to Dr Braude’s objections, the subcommittee agreed that

evidencewasinsufficienttowarrantrestrictingexistingAGPs.Acknowledgingan

alreadycommonpractice, it also recommendedpermittingAGPs for calvesbut

didnotendorseAGPs for layerbirdsandadultstock.Bothsidesagreedon the

necessityof furtherresearch.Significantly, themedical factionalsomanagedto

pushthrougharecommendationthatnewAGPsshouldbelicensedonthebasis

of their irrelevance to human and animal therapy.57The suggested distinction

between therapeutic and non-therapeutic antibiotics was not new: the

55TNAFD1/8226(ARC/MRCJointCommitteeonAntibiotics,3rdmeetingScient.Sub-Committee,18Oct,1960),p.4.56Ibid.,p.5.57TNAFD1/8227(ARCandMRC.JointCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeding.ReportoftheScientificSub-Committee).

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AntibioticsPanelhaddiscussedsuchaseparationasearlyas1956.58However,

byinsertingtheconceptoftwo-tierlicensingintothesubcommittee’sreport,the

medicalfactionscoredamajorlong-termvictory.Changedlicensingprocedures

would promote the development of non-therapeutic AGPs. Once established,

non-therapeutic AGPs would make penicillin and tetracycline-based feeds

expendable. The medical faction’s recommendation played a major role in

reshapingBritishantibioticpolicy.59

TheNetherthorpereport’s1962publicationcoincidedwiththeunfolding

milkresiduescandal.Conductedin1961andavailabletoofficialsbymid-1962,

the report of the Milk and Milk Products Technical Advisory Committee on

penicillinresiduesinBritishmilkwasnotpublishedfornearlyayear.60Closely

followed by a critical WHO report, the existence of hard residue data forced

BritishauthoritiestofollowtheleadoftheUSandimposeapenalty-basedzero-

tolerance policy for penicillin inmilk.61One year later, even graver challenges

arose. As a result of Animal Machines, Minister for Agriculture Christopher

Soameswas forced to establish the Brambell committee in April 1964. Giving

evidence to the Brambell Committee in June, the BVA warned “that the

limitations (…)of controllingnon-nutritional additives to animal feeding-stuffs

58TNAMAF284/281(AdvisoryCommitteeonPoisonousSubstances,Meeting,13Nov,1956;minutesAntibioticsPanel,commentDr.Barnes).59EuropeanmanufacturersofnontherapeuticAGPssawawaytoreduceUScompanies’dominanceonthesaturatedAGPmarket;TNAFD1/8226((ARC/MRCJointCommitteeonAntibiotics,Scient.Sub-Committee.AntibioticforAnimalFeedingUseonly,SuggestionbyBayerProductsLtd.,[undated]).60‘KeepingMilkFreeOfAntibiotics’,Times,30.05.1963,p.18;TNAMAF251/369(Minute11,C.E.Coffin,20thJuly,1962).61Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.171-76.

138

constituted a threat to human health.”62Meanwhile, typhoid was spreading in

Aberdeen.

Nodoubtpromptedbythetyphoidoutbreak,E.S.Andersonembarkedon

his study of animal and human resistance transmission in the same year.As

RobertBudhasshown,EphraimSaul–alias‘Andy’–Andersonembodiedanew

typeofopinionatedandmedia-savvypublicexpert,whochallengedthediscreet

clubroom atmosphere of previous expert consultation. 63 Anderson had

succeededArthurFelixastheheadofthePHLSEntericReferenceLaboratoryin

1953. Described in his obituary as “a hard taskmaster”with an “abrasive and

perfectionist approach,” 64 Anderson cultivated useful friendships with

journalists like Anthony Tucker and Bernard Dixon.65Anderson’s personality

and determination to restrict agricultural antibiotics would have a significant,

yetambivalentinfluenceonBritishantibioticpolicy.

Intheshortterm,Anderson’sfindingsresultedinthe1965reinstallation

of the Netherthorpe committee. Called upon to give evidence twice and later

accusedof‘instigating’thewholecommittee,66Andersonpassionatelyarguedfor

a complete ban of AGPs. However, his lobbying had an unforeseen effect.

Although the Netherthorpe committee still considered evidence insufficient to

warrantAGPbans,67Anderson’s research on resistantS.typhimurium in calves

enabled thecommittee tomovebeyond its impasse.BecauseAGPshadnotyet

been legalised for calves, penicillin and tetracycline resistance logically either

62TNAAJ3/183(AnEnquiryintotheeffectonHumanHealthontheuseofAntibioticsforIntensivelyRearedAnimalswithspecialreferencetotheSwannCommittee’sReportofDecember1969,March1970),p.1.63Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.176-83.64AnthonyTucker,‘ESAnderson’,Guardian,22.03.2006.65Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.177-78.66TNAMAF287/450(Minute4,WDMacraetoMr.Field,18Jan,1967),p.1.67Ibid.

139

resulted from illegal AGP-use or veterinary over-prescription. Unable or

unwilling to readdress AGP restrictions, committee members turned their

attentiontowardsveterinaryprescriptions.Intheirdraftreport,memberscalled

for anewexpert committee to investigate therapeutic antibiotic use inhuman

and veterinary medicine. Further recommendations included rationalising

bureaucratic antibiotic responsibilities and turning salmonellosis into a

notifiabledisease.68

However,reviewingallaspectsofantibioticuseprovedcontentious:not

only would a review infringe on the jealously guarded legislative boundaries

between theMinistries of Agriculture and Health, it also threatened theMH’s

almost finalised 1968 Medicines Act.69In view of the fragile situation, MH

officialsandtheinfluentialantibioticexpertProf.LawrencePaulGarrodpressed

for a deletion of all references to human medicine during the Netherthorpe

committee’sfinalmeetinginApril1966.70SubmittedinearlyJanuary1967,the

final Netherthorpe report merely recommended a review of “the use of

antibioticsinanimalhusbandryandveterinarymedicineanditsimplicationsin

the field of public health.”71However, the subcommittee’s attached report

stressed that evidence for AGP restrictionswas inadequate.72In sum, the only

areatobereviewedwasveterinarymedicine.

68TNAMAF287/450(Annexe,ARC22B/66,ARCandMRC.JointCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeding.SecondReportoftheScientificSub-Committee),pp.1-2.69Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.181.70TNAMAF287/450(Minute4,WDMacraetoMr.Field,18Jan,1967),p.2;TNAFD7/899(NotetoDr.Bunje,NoteofaMeetingwiththeMAFF,February13th,1968).71TNAMAF287/450(Annexe,ARC2546/66,ARCandMRC.JointCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeding)p.1.72TNAMAF287/450(Annexe,ARC22B/66,AgriculturalResearchCouncilandMedicalResearchCouncil.JointCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeding.SecondReportoftheScientificSub-Committee),p.2.

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Unsurprisingly,Britishveterinariansdidnottakekindlytosuchareview.

Complainingabout theNetherthorpereport’sone-sided focus, theARCblocked

itspublicationinJanuary1967.73MAFFopinionsweremorenuanced:whileone

officialdownplayedthereportasanuncomfortable“storminateacup,”74others

anticipated “a first-class rowwith the Royal College and the BVA.”75However,

MAFF officials agreed thatwithholding publicationwas unwise.76Powerless to

override theARC,MAFF officials lobbied theMH to extend the review to both

agriculturalandmedicalaspectsofantibioticuse.

Indoingso,officialscitedaparallelreportbyMAFF’sScientificAdvisory

Panel (SAP). Apparently anticipating problems with the Netherthorpe report,

MAFFhadcommissionedtheSAPwithaseparatereviewin1965.TheSAPwas

headedbyAlastairFrazer,a foodadditivesexpertwithclose ties to industry,77

andadvisedbyNobellaureateandpenicillinco-discovererSirErnstBorisChain.

Citing falling incidences of resistant salmonellosis, 78 the SAP endorsed

agriculturalantibioticsbutrecommendedanationalresistancestudy,areviewof

control measures, and more research cooperation between medical and

veterinaryauthorities.79

Followingfurtherdelaysregardingtheestablishmentofanewantibiotic

reviewbody,Labour’sMinisterofAgriculture,Frederick– ‘Fred,’ laterBaron–

Peart became involved in July 1967. During ameetingwith Frazer and senior

advisers,PeartagreedthattheNetherthorpereport“createdsomeunnecessary73TNAMAF287/450(Minute,J.HensleytoMr.Bott,9Jan,1967).74TNAMAF287/450(Minute,J.HensleytoMr.Bott,22May,1967).75TNAMAF287/450(Minute,EHBotttoJ.Hensley,23May,1967).76TNAMAF287/450(Minute,J.HensleytoMr.Bott,22May,1967).77D.W.Kent-Jones,'Obituary.AlastairCampbellFrazer',ProceedingsoftheSocietyforAnalyticalChemistry,6(1969).78TNAMAF284/282(MAFF,ScientificAdvisoryPanel.TheUseofAntibioticsinAgricultureandFood,Jan,1967),pp.3-8.79Ibid,p.12.

141

alarm,andthat[it]pickedoutveterinarians”80andconsentedtopressuretheMH

toextendtheplannedreviewtohumanmedicine.81However,thisonlyincreased

tensions. Referring to allegations of antibiotic overuse, an agricultural

bureaucrat complained: “there has been a good deal of sniping from certain

medicalquarters(…),althoughIseemtorecallsomethingabout‘peoplewholive

in glass houses.’”82In September 1967, all involved parties published a joint

press statement acknowledging and accepting most of the Netherthorpe

recommendations but rejectingmonitoring plans for resistant salmonellosis.83

However,despitepressure fromtheMRC,anactualantibioticreviewremained

unforthcoming.84

Intheend,ittookthetragicTeessidedeathstoshockofficialsintoaction.

Exchangedminutesreveal thatconcern firstarosewhentheBBC’sTwenty-four

Hours linked fatalities to antibiotic overuse in agriculture ahead of Christmas

1967.85PreviouslypostponedbyanoutbreakofFoot&Mouthdisease,anintra-

ministerialmeetingwashastilyscheduledfor13thFebruary1968.Accordingto

an internal letter, “ministers are becoming increasingly vulnerable in this

business andwe ought quickly to settle our lines onNetherthorpe.”86AMAFF

minutewarned:“[MH]havebeenpreparingforthe‘battle’.Ithinkwetooshould

gatherourforces.”87However,theMHdidnotgiveway.Withthesupportofthe

80TNAMAF287/450(Minute,BHBDickinsontoMr.Hensley,24Jul,1967).81Ibid.82TNAMAF287/450(Minute,MacraetoMr.Field,4Oct,1967).83TNAMAF284/282(PressNotice,1Sept,1967).84TNAFD7/899(Note:HaroldHimsworth,AntibioticsinAnimalFoodstuffs,20Oct,1967)85TNAMAF287/450(Minute,C.H.M.WilcoxtoMr.Hensley,22Dec,1967;Minute,J.HensleytoTBWilliamson,29Dec,1967);E.S.Andersoncreatedadditionalpressurebyclaimingthattheresistantstrainsmighthavehumanoranimalorigins;TNAMAF287/450(Minute,TBWilliamsontoJ.Hensley,25Jan,1968).86TNAFD7/899(TBWilliamsontoJ.Hensley,25Jan,1968)87TNAMAF287/450(Minute,FCParkertoMr.Bott,Mr.Field,Mr.Macrae,1Feb,1968)

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PHLS,88MH representatives argued that antibiotic overuse in humanmedicine

was the sole concern of their ministry89and referred to the joint press

statement’s previous endorsement of the Netherthorpe report’s review terms.

MAFFofficials later complained that theMHhad treated the review’s termsof

referenceas“asacredcowwhichwouldnotbesacrificedatanycost.”90

Following the antibiotic review’s limitation to agriculture, the next

difficultquestiontosettlewasthefuturecommittee’smembership.Feelingthat

the Netherthorpe committee had been “over-weighted scientifically on the

medicalandparamedicalsides,”91MAFFwaskeentopreventthesituationfrom

reoccurring.AnotherpointofcontentionwasE.S.Anderson’srole:shouldhebea

committeemember,or shouldhe functionasanadviser?Bothministrieswere

awareofAnderson’spublicandscientificstandingbutequallywaryofhisvocal

support of AGP restrictions and temperamental character. In order to control

Anderson, the MH suggested co-nominating Sir James Howie, Anderson’s

superior at the PHLS.92However, in his eagerness to be appointed, Anderson

overshothisgoal:inApril1968,hepubliclyannouncedthathewouldrefuseto

give evidence should he not be appointed to the committee.93Anderson’s

attempttopressurehiswayintotheconfidentialworldofofficialBritishexpert

consultationwasboundtobackfire.MAFFcouldnowarguethatAndersonwould

endangerthecommittee’sobjectivityandpublicstanding:

88TNAFD7/899(NotetoDr.Bunje,NoteofMeetingwiththeMAFF,21Feb,1968).89TNAMAF287/450(NoteofMeeting‘ToDiscusstheSecondReportoftheJointARC/MRCCommitteeonAntibioticsinAnimalFeedingStuffs’,13Feb,1968).90TNAMAF287/450(Minute,WDMacrae,Inter-DepartmentalMeetingontheNetherthorpeCommitteeReport,19Feb,1968).91Ibid.92TNAMAF287/450(Minute,G.J.L.Avery,JointCommitteeonAntibiotics,25April,1968).93TNAMAF287/450(Minute,W.C.TametoSecretary,29Apr,1968).

143

If the committee’s conclusions were in line with Dr. Anderson’s views,there would be the charge that we had biased it with prejudicedmembers;ifitwenttheotherway,Dr.Andersonwouldnodoubtissueaminorityreport.94

Even JamesHowie,whohadpreviouslyrefusedtoacceptacommitteeposition

without Anderson’s co-nomination, now changed his mind. A minute

triumphantly noted: “Dr. Howie has become impatient of the Prima Donna

approach of his colleague Dr. Anderson and is no longer prepared to support

him.”95

ByMay 1968, allmembership decisions had beenmade: Anderson had

been substituted with a public health expert from Birmingham, and the

molecularbiologistandvice-chancelloroftheUniversityofEdinburgh,Michael–

later Baron and BBC chairman – Swann, had accepted chairmanship of the

committee. Fearing attacks by Anderson, MAFF had, however, withdrawn its

nominationofAlastairFrazer. Ina smartmove,agriculturalofficials convinced

the MH to nominate two veterinarians in Frazer’s stead. Comprised of two

agriculturalists, three veterinarians and two medical scientists, the review

committeewasweightedslightlyinfavourofagriculturalinterests.96Oneofficial

mused:

Imustconfessthatthereisnoadequatereasonforthefactthatittookussomeninemonths to decide to accept the report of the JointARC/MRCCommitteetosetupaCommitteetogofurtherintothematter.97Commencing work in July 1968, the Joint Committee on the Use of

Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine had to strike a

94TNAMAF287/450(G.J.L.AverytoMr.Tame,02May,1968);AndersonsubsequentlyapproachedMPDavidKerrtolobbyforhisnominationtothecommittee;seeTNAMAF287/450(Dr.DavidKerr(MP)toCledwynHughes(MAFF),22May,1968).95TNAMAF287/450(Minute,J.G.CarnochantoMr.Tame,3May,1968).96TNAMAF287/450(CommitteeontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalHusbandryandVeterinaryMedicine.ProposedMembers).97TNAMAF287/450(Minute,W.C.TametoMr.Williamson,6May,1968).

144

compromise between agricultural interests and public and scientific concerns

andreconcileitsproposalswiththe1968MedicinesAct.Incontrasttoprevious

committees, the exit-strategyofmaintaining the statusquo by calling formore

research was no longer available. Between December 1968 and April 1969,

publicpressureforantibioticreformincreasedfurtherwhen30babiesdiedfrom

resistant gastroenteritis in Manchester in a grotesque repeat of the Teesside

outbreak.98

Submitted in November 1969, the so-called Swann report advised the

Britishgovernmenttoreduceantibioticadvisorybodiesandinstallapermanent

committee taskedwithassessingbothhumanandagriculturalantibioticuse. It

alsocalledforabanonantibioticadvertisingtolaypersons,furtherresearchand

more funding of preventive veterinarymedicine.Most significantly, the Swann

committee recommended a separation of therapeutic and nontherapeutic

antibioticsandabanofpenicillinandtetracyclineAGPs.Italsocautionedagainst

agriculturalusesofchloramphenicolbutdidnotrecommendaban.99

While the Swann report resulted in pioneering resistance-based

legislation, its proposals remained far behind critics’ demands. Given its well-

chosentermsofreferenceandmembership,ithadalwaysbeenunlikelythatthe

Swanncommitteewouldgoagainstvestedinterests.

The Swann report’s call for a permanent committee on antibiotics was

neither new nor revolutionary. The 1968Medicines Act had already replaced

informal‘gentleman’sagreements’withdrugmanufacturers’statutoryobligation

to apply to the newly founded Veterinary Products Committee (VPC) and the

98‘Actionsoughtonantibioticsafterbabies’deaths’,Times,14.04.1969,p.2.99'ReportoftheJointCommitteeontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalHusbandryandVeterinaryMedicine,1969-1970.',(London,1969).

145

CommitteeonSafetyofMedicines(CSM)forproductlicences.100Theenvisioned

newantibiotics committeewould thus situncomfortablybetween theVPCand

CSM. Moreover, it remained unclear what the new committee’s priorities and

competenceswouldbe:theSwannreportcalledneitherfortheestablishmentof

enforceable residue limits, nor for a strengthening of drug enforcement at the

farmlevel.

FailingtoendorseE.S.Anderson’scallsforatotalbanofAGPs,theSwann

report’srecommendationtorestricttherapeuticantibioticswasmoreinkeeping

with the first Netherthorpe report. Although the Netherthorpe report had not

endorsedAGPbans,itsrecommendationshadensuredthatnontherapeuticAGPs

werereadilyavailableby1969.Banning therapeuticAGPswould thereforenot

restrict general AGP use101and opposition to the Swann banswas likely to be

voiced only by the mostly American firms dominating the therapeutic AGP

market.102Forallotherparties,antibioticbusiness-as-usualremainedintact.

Most significantly, the Swann committee missed its chance to push for

stricterregulationsofveterinarydrugprescriptionsandtoregulatenon-human

antibioticuseholistically.EndorsedbyveterinariansandtheBVA,103restrictions

onpenicillinandtetracyclineAGPsincreasedBritishveterinarians’controlover

the lucrativemedicated feedmarket. Due to theirmonopoly 50%mark-up on

prescribed drugs, British veterinarians made a sound profit from selling

previously deregulated drugs. Even though the Swann report mentioned “ill-

100TNAMAF284/281(ControlofAntibiotics,Feb,1969),p.1;TNAMAF461/34(NoteofMeetingontheFutureoftheJointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,28Sep,1979),pp.1-2.101PeterBell,‘Neveradullmoment,withDrugsandSheepandCripplingTax’,BF,29.11.1969,pp.1-2.102‘Antibioticcurbs‘willhitfarmers’’,Guardian,06.01.1970,p.4.103AnthonyTucker,‘Antibioticstobebannedfromanimalfeeds’,Guardian,21.11.1969,p.20.

146

informed prescription in man and in animals”, the BVA claimed that lacking

evidence of malpractice, veterinarians “need not, then, be ashamed of [their]

record in using antibiotics.”104Discussing veterinarians’ continued access to

chloramphenicol, one official noted that “issues other than the purely

scientific”105hadinfluencedtheSwanncommittee.

Although it did not challenge the problematic antibiotic-dependency at

the heart of intensive animal husbandry, the Swann report marked the first

attempttoredresstheselectionforbacterialresistance inagriculturalsettings.

Following the report’s release in late 1969, the question was whether Britain

woulduseSwannasa startingpoint for further resistance-inspiredreformsor

restonthereport’sinternationalprestige.

104TNAAJ3/183(JointStatementbytheBritishVeterinaryAssociation(July1970)),p.1.105TNAFD7/900(Noteonfile:BLtoDr.BunjeandDr.Clements,27Sep,1968);alsoseeTNAFD7/899(Note:10Oct,1969).

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PartThree–Britain:FromGluttonytoFear(1970–2006)

ChapterSeven:YearningforPurityThe media pressure driving late 1960s British antibiotic reform quickly died

down. Reassured by the Swann report, newspapers shifted their attention to

issues other than antibiotics. Of these there was no lack: following the 1968

student protests, the early 1970s were characterised by an explosion of new

activism. Dismissive of the “’softly-softly’ reformism of the 1960s,”1a younger

generation of activists operated outside traditional structures and favoured

symbolic protest designed to provoke media interest.2Regarding intensive

farming, the1970salso saw the riseof radical andoccasionally violentBritish

animalrightsactivism.3

Meanwhile, fears of global overpopulation and environmental

degradationgaverise toanumberof internationalBritishbestsellers. Inspired

byPaul Ehrlich’sPopulationBomb, BarbaraWardpublishedSpaceshipEarthin

1966. In her book, Ward argued for a fundamental ecological reform of

developmentalandtechnologicalpolitics.RespondingtoWard,theeditorsofThe

Ecologist published ABlueprint for Survivalahead of the 1972 United Nations

Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. Blueprint’s fundamental

message was that the doctrine of unlimited economic growth had failed.4In

1AdamLent,BritishSocialMovementssince1945.Sex,Colour,PeaceandPower(BasingstokeandNewYork:Palgrave,2001),p.97,MeredithVeldman,Fantasy,theBombandtheGreeningofBritain.RomanticProtest,1945-1980(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),p.205.2Lent,BritishSocialMovementssince1945.Sex,Colour,PeaceandPower,p.100.3Ibid.,p.103.4Veldman,Fantasy,theBombandtheGreeningofBritain.RomanticProtest,1945-1980,p.228.

148

1973,SoilAssociationpresidentandformerKeynesianE.F.Schumacher’sstoked

furtherdoubtsabouteconomicgrowthinSmallisBeautiful.5

Agricultural antibiotics were neither high on activists’ agendas nor a

central issue in environmentalist bestsellers. Far from profiting from the

environmentalist boom, agricultural antibiotics’ status as a common

denominatorofprotestfellvictimtovarioussingle-issuecampaigns.

The fragmentation of environmentalist agendas was mirrored in the

British media. Previously uniting antibiotic activism, the Guardian and the

Observerprintedasmallnumberofarticlesaddressingagriculturalantibioticsin

theearly1970sandseemedsatisfiedwiththepost-Swannsituation.6TheTimes

expressed similar sentiments and reverted to the pre-Swann paradigm of

distinguishing between medical and agricultural antibiotic use. Limiting

resistance reporting to human medicine, 7 The Times continued to print

commercials for agricultural antibiotics8and criticised foreign nations like

Ireland or Mexico for failing to implement Swann-type legislation. When

chloramphenicol-resistant typhoid emerged in Mexico, The Times self-

righteously condemned “indiscriminate” Mexican antibiotic use and reminded

readers that “few other countries”9had introduced Swann standards. In 1974,

5Ibid.,p.299.6WaylandYoung,‘Pollutiona‘Guardian’specialreport’,Guardian,06.10.1970,p.14;forcriticismsee:AlanLong,‘Food’,Observer,19.07.1970,p.8;Idem.,‘FarmersandFood’,Observer,08.02.1970,p.23.7‘Thedrugsdoctorsarereluctanttoprescribe’,Times,02.02.1972,p.8;‘Bacteriology:Antibioticresistance’,Times,30.05.1974,p.18;‘Publichealth:Resistantbacteria’,Times,02.09.1974,p.14.8‘CommercialHindustanAntibioticsLTD’,Times,30.11.1970,p.XVIII;‘CommercialICI’,Times,22.09.1972,p.III.9‘Antibiotics:Resistanttyphoidstrain’,Times,04.08.1972,p.14;alsosee:‘Antibiotics:‘Farmcontrolneeded’,Times,03.03.1972,p.14.

149

The Times, however, remained remarkably sanguine when BVA opposition

preventedthepassingofBritishchloramphenicolrestrictions.10

Public complacency regarding agricultural antibiotics only faded when

studies began to indicate that the Swann bans were ineffective. Published in

Naturein1975,aBritishstudyofantibioticresistanceshowedthatallanalysed

pigscarriedresistantorganisms.In41%ofanimals,allsampledorganismswere

resistanttorestrictedtetracyclines.11Inthesameyear,anotherstudyintheBMJ

blamed resistance on “indiscriminate use of antibiotics, mainly in animal

husbandry”.12One year later, former Netherthorpe committee member R.

BraudeclaimedthatSwann’s“onlypositiveachievement(…)wasthatitremoved

the public anxiety.”13Rising British antibiotic consumption and resistance

showedthatSwannhadfailed.AmajorreasonforthiswasthatSwannhadnot

addressedveterinaryprescriptionpractices.14

Inadditiontobacterialresistance,antibioticresiduesgarneredrenewed

attention.WritingforTheTimesinNovember1974,Frenchjournalistandauthor

JoséeDoyèredemanded“sound[safety]guarantees”15forfeedadditives,warned

about farmyard pharmaceutical trading and hoped for common EEC residue

limits. One year later, the British Consumers’ Committee called for improved

antibiotic residue monitoring of British milk. Committee members were

concernedthatofficialtestsweretooslowtostopcontaminatedmilkfrombeing

10PearceWright,‘Curbonuseofanantibioticisquestioned’,Times01.08.1974,p.2.11H.WSmith,'PersistenceofTetracyclineResistanceinPigE.Coli',Nature,258/5536(1975),pp.628-30.12C.L.HartleyandM.H.Richmond,'AntibioticResistanceandSurvivalofEColiintheAlimentaryTract',BritishMedicalJournal,4/5988(1975),p.71.13Braude,'AntibioticsinAnimalFeedsinGreatBritain',p.1434.14Ibid.,p.1428.15JoséeDoyère,‘Soundguaranteesneededonadditivesandhygiene’,Times,07.11.1974,p.VI.

150

sold.16A more radical generation of animal rights activists also used residue

fears to draw attention to animal welfare problems by calling for bans of

“antibiotics, hormones, arsenic or ‘any other substance to promote unnatural

development.’”17Adopting strategies pioneered by Greenpeace, the National

Society for the Abolition of Factory Farming hired a public relations firm and

usedprivateinvestigatorsandlitigationtogeneratepublicity.18

However, antibioticwarnings’ resurgence failed to provokewidespread

protest.Inadditiontothefragmentationofantibioticprotestalongdistincttopic

lines,manyveterancampaignerswereeithergenuinelysatisfiedwithSwannor

unwillingtojeopardizethehard-woncompromisebycallingforfurtherreforms.

Onceagain,ittookexternaleventstobreakantibioticlethargy.

Following the late 1970s, a seemingly endless series of scandals

reactivated general concern about agricultural antibiotics. In May 1979, the

cover of the Radio Times showed a friendly piglet lying on straw. While the

headlineasked“Should this littlepiggygo tomarket?”,a secondcaption in the

styleofcigarettepacksread:“HealthWarning.MeatAndPoultryMaySeriously

AffectYourHealth.”19ThehealthwarningreferredtoapopularBBCprogramme

calledBrassTacks,whoseupcomingepisodewastitled“ItShouldn’tHappenToA

Pig.”20Asking “whether it is time to choose between safe meat and cheap

meat,”21BrassTacksfeaturedaPharmaceuticalSocietyspokesman,whoclaimed:

“there is a substantial black market involving at least £500,000 worth of16HughClayton,‘Reportsaysdrugsgiventocowsmaybeinmilk’,Times,13.02.1975),p.3;alsosee:MichaelDenny,‘Themilkofkindness’,Observer(SundayPlus),27.05.1979,p.40.17HughClayton,’Animalloverskeeptheireyesonfarmers’,Times,17.11.1975,p.18.18HughClayton,‘Publicrelationsandprivateeyestakeonthefactoryfarmers’,Times,24.05.1976,p.17.19‘Shouldthislittlepiggygotomarket?’,RadioTimes,05.-11.05.1979,coverpage.20'BrassTacks:ItShouldn’tHappentoaPig',BritishFilmInstituteNationalArchive(http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/title/154746[12.08.2013]).21Ibid.

151

antibiotics, compared with the estimated £20 million worth used by farmers

eachyear.”22

Threemonths later, theGovernmentChemist’sannual reportseemed to

confirm BrassTacks’allegations. According to the Guardian’s Anthony Tucker,

“itinerant ‘conmen’”23were endangering public health. Often operating out of

plain vans, dealers sold pharmaceuticals with forged brand labels. Using

mislabelleddrugscouldresultinanimals’death,residuesinmeatandantibiotic

resistance. In 1978, antibiotics including chloramphenicol had been found in

two-thirdsof350confiscatedsamplesofillegalmerchandise.24

Duringthe1980s, theextentof theBritishpharmaceuticalblackmarket

onlyseemedto increase.25Ina1983interviewfortheDailyMirror, theheadof

the Pharmaceutical Society’s law department, Gordon Applebe, described the

challenges of monitoring the black market with only 20 inspectors and 12

additional staff from MAFF.26In Applebe’s opinion, British authorities were

“probably only scratching the surface of the problem.”27In 1984, theGuardian

estimatedthattheBritishpharmaceuticalblackmarketwasworthca.£3million

with the bulk of supplies coming from Ireland.28One year later, British

veterinarianswere embroiled in amajor scandal. Suspectedof extending from

theWestCountrytoCheshire,araideddrugsringwasaccusedoffloodingfarms

with “illegal supplies of antibiotics amounting tomore than £1,000 aweek.”29

According to the Pharmaceutical Society’s prosecutor, stopping the drugs ring22RichardNortonTaylor,‘Furiousfarmersreadyfordrugsphone-in’,Guardian,08.05.1979,p.2.23AnthonyTucker,‘Illicitdrugsalestofarmersposethreattopublichealth’,Guardian,09.08.1979,p.2.24Ibid.25‘PressuretocurbIrishfarmdrugs’,Observer,02.05.1982,p.2.26DeniseWinn,‘Scandalofillegalfarmdrugs’,DailyMirror,11.01.1983,p.8.27Ibid.28RosemaryCollins,‘Dairyfarmersoverdoquotas’,Guardian,30.11.1984,p.6.29AndrewVeitch,‘Cattledrugringbrokeninraids’,Guardian,26.07.1985,p.28.

152

was the “biggest operation in the society’s 140-year history.”30The operation

hadinvolvedhalfoftheSociety’snowonly14inspectorsforoversixmonths.By

October,inspectorswereinvestigating54farmersandfourfeedmerchants.31

Facingoldandnewantibioticresistantdiseases,physiciansalsorenewed

their assault on agricultural antibiotics. In 1980, a BMJ paper by PHLS

microbiologist and geneticist Eric John Threlfall traced the spread of

multiresistant S. typhimurium types 204 and 193 from cattle to humans.32In

1979, the strains had caused 290 cases of salmonellosis and killed an elderly

patientanda3-year-old.According toThrelfall andhis colleagues, agricultural

advertisements had increased both veterinary antibiotic prescriptions and

concomitant resistance: “current regulations have failed.” 33 Referring to

Threlfall,ananonymousBMJeditorialblamed“over-enthusiasticrepresentatives

of pharmaceutical firms”, “black market operators” 34 and farmers for S.

typhimuriumresistanceproblems.Swannwasfailingbecauseitleftveterinarians

andpharmaceuticaladvertisementsunregulated.

Unsurprisingly, the BMJ’s assault provoked angry reactions.35In 1980,

earlyantibioticreformcampaignerHerbertWilliamsSmithaccusedThrelfallof

unfaircriticism.Becauseresistantsalmonellosishadneverbeenat theheartof

the Swann deliberations, it was misguided to accuse the report of failing to

preventit.AstheadoptionofSwannby“manyothercountries”showed,Britain

30‘Animaldrugsringexposed’,Times,29.10.1985,p.3.31Ibid.;seealso:‘Huntforanimaldrugswidens’,Guardian,27.07.1985,p.2.32E.J.Threlfalletal.,'Plasmid-EncodedTrimethoprimResistanceinMultiresistantEpidemicSalmonellaTyphimuriumPhageTypes204and193inBritain',BritishMedicalJournal,280/6225(1980).33Ibid.,p.1211.34Anon.,'WhyHasSwannFailed?',ibid.,p.1195.35‘Vetsblamedforspreadofbacteria’,Times,28.05.1980,p.1.

153

should“takesomepleasure inhaving initiated it.”36In1981,AdamLintontook

up the discussion in the Veterinary Record. Admitting that the “absence of

simultaneousrestriction[s]ontheprophylacticandtherapeuticuseofantibiotics

in both animals and man”37weakened Swann, Linton nonetheless considered

any kind of prescription ban “unacceptable.”38Instead of limiting prescription

rights, regulators should focus on the spread of Salmonella via animal

transports.39

While veterinarians and physicians accused each other of antibiotic

overuse,resistantbacterialfoodpoisoningincreased.InOctober1981,Bernard

Rowe, director of the Central PHLS’ Enteric Pathogens Division, warned that

“Britain ‘[was] threatened by [a] food super germ’.”40S.typhimurium type 204

had reached “a disgraceful level of drug resistance.”41In 1984, The Times

reported that notified salmonellosis cases had risen from 10,000 in 1977 to

17,000 in 1983with resulting deaths rising from 25 in 1972 to 65 in 1982.42

Accordingtothenewspaper,agriculturalandveterinaryantibioticabusewasto

blameforsomeofthesedeaths.

Becauseofficialswereslowtoimprovemeathygiene,expandcontrolsor

restrictadditives,Britishpublicfoodfearsgrew.In1985,theGuardianclaimed:

“foodadditivesandresiduesfrompesticides,hormonesandantibioticsnowrival

AIDSasthenumberonehealthissue.”43AccordingtoGuardianjournalistJames

Erlichman,Britishconsumershadthe“gut feeling(…) thatwethrowtoomany36H.Williams-Smith,'WhyHasSwannFailed?',BritishMedicalJournal,280/6230(1980).37A.H.Linton,'HasSwannFailed?',VetRec,108/15(Apr111981),p.331.38Ibid.,p.330.39Ibid.,p.331,JohnR.Walton,'AdvisingonAntimicrobials',TheVeterinaryRecord,108/16(1981),p.366.40HughClayton,‘Britainis‘threatenedbyfoodsupergerm’’,Times,28.10.1981,p.3.41Ibid.42‘Salmonellablamedonantibiotics’,Times,13.09.1984,p.3.43JamesErlichman,‘UKmakesmincemeatofbanonhormones’,Guardian,15.11.1985,p.21.

154

drugsandchemicalsintothefoodweeat.”44Inasimilarvein,JanWalsh’s1986

bestseller The Meat Machine attacked intensive agriculture’s health balance

sheet.Claimingthat“ourgrandmotherswouldnothavetouchedsuchrubbish”,45

Walsh blamed antibiotic overuse on “the unnatural conditions of intensive

rearingunits”wherediseasespread“likewildfire.”46

In response to growing food fears, British newspapers also increased

reportsabout‘safe’organicproduce,whichwasincreasinglydiscardingitsimage

of“dirndl,beads,sandalsandanatmosphereoffolkloricguitarstrumming”47.In

1986, the Guardian described Wholefood Butchers in London’s Paddington

Street, which, until recently, had been “a lonely outpost (…), sustaining a

network of small farmers whose methods seemed laughably anachronistic.”48

Now, therewereat least fouradditional shopsservingLondonersanddemand

was outstripping supply. Vendors’ common denominator was ‘antibiotic-free’

meat.

By themid-1980s,TheTimes joined the chorus of organic praise.49In a

significantarticlefrom1985,agriculturalcorrespondentJohnYounghadclaimed

that an alliance of “doom-mongers”50had exaggerated Malthusian scenarios.

Citing a report by the UN World Food Council, Young noted that population

growth had not outpaced cereal production. With global carryover of cereal

stocks projected to reach 358million tons in 1986, Young argued that global

44JamesErlichman,‘It’sallverywelltokeephormonesoutofourfood–butwhataboutpesticides?’,Guardian,21.12.1985,p.17.45JanWalsh,TheMeatMachine(London:ColumbusBooks,1986),p.13.46Ibid.,p.10.47MichaelDineen,‘Theanswerliesinpreservingthesoil’,Observer,01.11.1981,p.21.48SheilaDillon,‘Realmeat,realmoney’,Guardian,07.11.1986,p.19;alsosee:‘Bringinghomethebacon:GoodFoodGuide’,Guardian,15.11.1985,p.19.49LibbyPurves,‘Thecaseforanalternativecure’,Times,16.05.1986,p.9;JohnYoung,‘Bacteriaisclaimedtoaidgrowthinanimals’,Times,14.06.1986,p.15.50JohnYoung,‘Malthusno:malnutritionyes’,Times,20.11.1985,p.14.

155

hungerwas“political,noteconomic.”51Followingthisconceptualshiftawayfrom

productivity-oriented Malthusian scenarios, The Times intensified criticism of

conventional agriculture. In 1986, the newspaper printed a positive review of

Peter Cox’sWhyYouDon’tNeedMeat.52According to the Vegetarian Society’s

former chief executive, farmers were illegally marketing so-called casualty

animals:“Dose[d](…)upwithastrongantibiotictokeepitonitsfeetforthenext

fewhours”53,sickanimalsweresoldtoinadequatelycontrolledslaughterhouses.

According to an anonymous veterinarian, antibiotics had changed his entire

profession:“…oncevetswerepeoplewholookedafterthewell-beingofanimals,

bothfarmanddomestic.Butnow,wejustsupressthediseaseuntilit’stimefor

the animal to be killed.”54Focussing on bacterial resistance, The Times also

printedathree-partserieson“TheGlobalOverdose”55in1987.Titled“Thebitter

harvest,”56thethirdpartoftheseriesshowedapiggybankbeingfilledwithpills

and accused doctors and veterinarians of shunning responsibility by blaming

eachotherratherthantacklingrisingresistance.

As if on cue, 1987 also saw further unappetizing revelations about

antibiotics in British milk. According to the Guardian, British farmers were

adding the penicillin-neutralising enzyme penicillinase to milk in order to

obscure residues. Hard-hit by recent EEC quota cuts, an interviewed West

Countryfarmernoted,“Ican’taffordtothrowawaya250gallontankofmilkat

51Ibid;onthediminishingpowerofglobalgapscenariosseeJohnRuxin,'TheUnitedNationsProteinAdvisoryGroup',inDavidF.SmithandJimPhilips(eds.),Food,Science,PolicyandRegulationintheTwentiethCentury.InternationalandComparativePerspectives(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2000).52DeniseWinn,‘Oneman’smeatmaybeeveryone’spoison’,Times,28.07.1986,p.11.53PeterCox,WhyYouDon'tNeedMeat(WeelingboroughandNewYork:ThorsonsPublishingGroup,1986),p.109.54Ibid.,p.110;inasequel,antibioticsnolongerfeaturedasprominently;PeterCox,TheNew.WhyYouDon'tNeedMeat(London:Bloomsbury,1994).55‘Fromwonderdrugtobitterpill’,Times,02.03.1987,p.10.56GeorgeHilletal,‘Thebitterharvest’,Times,04.03.1987,p.12.

156

80pagallon.Enoughpenicillinasetoneutralisetheproblemonlycostsme£8.”57

AlthoughtheNFUandMMBclaimedthatpenicillinasewasharmless,JoeCollier,

a clinical pharmacologist at St George’s Hospital in London, warned that

neutralised penicillin residues could still trigger allergic reactions.Meanwhile,

the chairman of the Agriculture Select Committee called for a crackdown on

farmersanddairiesusingpenicillinase.58

Fearsaboutinvisibleanddangerousfoodcontaminationpeakedin1988.

Earlythatyear,healthinspectorsfoundantibioticresiduesin16of88carcasses

ataBradfordabattoir.59Alarmed,supermarketsMarks&SpencerandWaitrose

announced that theywouldstopbuyingmeatproducedwithantibiotic feeds.60

Onemonth later, theDailyMirrorasked, “what has gonewrongwith our food

laws”61and referred to resistant pathogens and inadequate hygiene controls

beforecallingforacompletereviewoffoodlaws.

The stage was set for a perfect storm when, on December 3rd1988, a

Salmonella outbreak prompted JuniorHealthMinister, Edwina Currie, towarn

BritishTV-viewerstoavoid“allraweggproducts likemayonnaise,home-made

ice cream, andeven lightly cookedeggs.”62Reacting toCurrie’s announcement,

RichardLaceyfromtheVPCconfirmed450recentcasesofSalmonellaenteriditis-

induced food poisoning.63However, following another televised warning by

Currie, Lacey corrected the number to ca. 3,000 infections with one resulting

57JamesErlichman,‘Superbugriskfromchemicaluseinmilk’,Guardian,03.04.1987,pp.1andbackpage.58Idem.,‘Cover-upthatmayhelpthesuperbugs’,Guardian,07.04.1987,p.29.59Idem.,‘Drugtracesfoundinabattoircarcases’,Guardian,18.01.1988,p.4.60Idem.,‘Public‘keptindarkonadditives’’,Guardian,28.01.1988,p.2;bythe1990s,bothsupermarketshadrevertedtoconventionallyproducedmeat;‘Supermarketsmovetobangrowth-drugmeatfromshelves’,Guardian,24.04.1998,p.4.61JanWalsh,‘RecipeforDanger’,DailyMirror,04.02.1988,p.6.62‘Hencullcouldhaltsalmonella’,Guardian,05.12.1988,p.24.63Ibid.

157

fatalityeveryweek.64Witheggsalesdroppingnearly15%aheadofChristmas,

theNFUannouncedthatitwasgoingtosueCurrie.65Dubbed“Eggwina”66bythe

Britishmedia,Curriewas forced to resignonDecember16th,1988.67However,

documentsreleasedin2001revealedthataparallelcontemporaryinvestigation

confirmed“asalmonellaepidemicofconsiderableproportions.”68

Foodsafetyconcernscarriedoverinto1989.Inparliament,Conservative

MP Sir Richard Body accused MAFF of “turning a blind eye”69on pesticides,

antibioticsandhormones inagriculture.DespiteapromisedFoodSafetyAct,70

reportson“fooddanger[s]from‘barbaric’ factoryfarms”71continuedtoappear

andantibioticsandsalmonellosisfeaturedprominently.Titled“NotEvenFitFor

Our Pigs”72and “Cages of cruelty,”73the Daily Mirror reported on intensively

rearedanimals:

Theyarebornandrearedinthedarkandthedirt.Theyarepumpedfullof hormones and antibiotics. (…). They are the next potential foodpoisoning timebomb [sic]. (…). And no Tory Government has dared totakeonitsmasters,theagriculturelobby.74However,Britishagriculture’sbiggestscandalwasyettocome:duringthe

secondhalfofthe1980s,anewdiseasecalledBovineSpongiformEncephalopathy

(BSE)begantocauseconcern.Officiallyidentifiedin1986,BSEisbelievedtobe

caused by misfolded proteins – so-called prions – that accumulate as plaque64Idem,‘Salmonellaeggs‘killoneaweek’’,Guardian,19.12.1988,p.1.65PABarton,‘Scrambledstatisticsandpoachedplatitudes’,Guardian,06.12.1988,p.22.66Ibid.67Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s,pp.303-04.68DavidMilward,'Currie'WasRight'onSalmonella',TheTelegraph,26.12.2001[accessed13Aug2013].69PhilipWebsterandSheilaGunn,‘Biggestfoodsafetyreformfor50years’,Times,25.01.1989,p.1.70'TheMicrobiologicalSafetyofFood.PartIi.',(London:CommitteeontheMicrobiologicalSafetyofFood(RichmondCommittee),1990),p.6.71‘PigSick’,DailyMirror,13.02.1989,p.1.72FrankThorneandAnnaTreacher,‘NotEvenFitForOurPigs’,DailyMirror,13.02.1989,p.5.73‘Cagesofcruelty’,DailyMirror,13.02.1989,p.2.74Ibid.

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fibres in brain tissues and cause death.75Significantly, BSE is transmissible to

humansintheformoftheequallyfatalvariantCreutzfeldt-JakobDisease(vCJD).

While there are competing theories on the origins of BSE, the disease was

probably spreadby feedingmeat andbonemeal toherbivore cattle.76Inother

words,thespreadofBSEwasinherentlylinkedtointensiveagriculture’sfactory-

like(re-)processinglogic.

With theThatchergovernment reactingslowly to thenewdisease,77the

early1990s sawBSE fearsmergewith antibiotic-centred criticismof intensive

agriculture. Writing for the Guardian in 1990, Lucy Ellmann complained that

intensive farming had “given a newmeaning to the term, fast food: the cattle

themselves grow unnaturally fast on their diet of pig’s blood, sheep offal,

decayingchickens,chickenshit,hormonesandantibiotics”:

Writing this piece has given me such a headache, I think I’ll take anaspirin. (…). Oh, what the hell, might as well finish myself off with achickensandwich.78

Empowered by the return of significant public fears, critics intensified

theirassaultonconventionalagriculture.In1992,CompassioninWorldFarming

organised awell-publicised conferenceon “factory farming”79duringwhich six

veterinarians including a formerRCVS president and a formerMAFF assistant

chief veterinary officer criticised the BVA’s acquiescence to intensive farming.

75S.Poser,I.Zerr,andK.Felgenhauer,'DieNeueVarianteDerCreutzfeldt-Jakob-Krankheit',DeutscheMedizinischeWochenschrift,127(2002),pp.331-34.76MarkHarrison,Contagion.HowCommerceHasSpreadDisease(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2012),p.249.77'TheReportoftheExpertGrouponAnimalFeedingstuffstotheMinisterofAgriculture,FisheriesandFood,theSecretaryofStateforHealthandtheSecretariesofStateforWales,ScotlandandNorthernIreland(LammingReport)',(London,1992),pp.5-15,Alain-JacquesValleron,'EstimationofEpidemicSizeandIncubationTimeBasedonAgeCharacteristicsofVcjdintheUnitedKingdom',Science,294(2001),p.1726.78LucyEllmann,‘Offwealltraipselikethosemadcowstotheslaughter’,Guardian,05.02.1990,p.20.79AlisonJohnson,‘Kindfood’,Times,18.01.1992,p.44.

159

AccordingtoTheTimes,“thebestwaytosqueezefactoryfarmingistorefuseto

buy its products.”80On-going problems in British slaughterhouses were also

criticised. In 1991, health inspectors found nearly 150 hygiene faults in two

Welshabattoirs.Publicisedviolations included, “flies in thecuttingroom,birds

flyingabout in theslaughterhall,dirtonhangingmeat,wallssmeared indried

bloodandmuck,andslaughtermenwithunwashedhands.”81

Meanwhile,thecomebackofscourgesliketuberculosiscausedasurgeof

articles addressing antibiotic resistance. According to the Guardian, strains of

resistant “TB [had] acquired the sort of mythic quality Aids had in the mid-

eighties.”82Plans to introduce the genetically modified ‘Flavr Savr’ tomato

sparked further controversies over ‘artificially’ induced antibiotic-resistance.83

Althoughsomereporterssoontiredofthe“mediahype”surroundingthe“same

old story with the ‘killer bug,’”84Hollywood movies and bestsellers fuelled

generalanxiety.85

With trust in intensive animal husbandry wearing thin, agricultural

antibiotics once again functioned as a common denominator of various

consumer, animal welfare, environmental and medical protest movements.

Whileorganic farmersusedresidue fears topromote theirproduce,physicians

blamedagriculturalantibioticsforfatalinfectionsandactivistsattackedthemfor

80Ibid.;alsosee:‘Doyouknowwhereyournextmealcamefrom?’,Times,03.10.1992,p.10.81‘ABritishsideofbeef’,Times,03.10.1992,p.12.82HenryPorter,‘TBinNY’,Guardian,27.04.1993,p.5;alsosee:TimRadford,‘OldEnemies–Bacteria’,Guardian,25.05.1994,p.2;ChristopherThomas,‘IndiansbattletopreventplaguesweepingBombay’,Times,27.09.1994,p.15;NigelHawkes,‘Bacteriathateattheflesh’,Times,24.05.1994,p.15.83BernardDixon,‘WeSayTomato,TheySayFlavrSavr’,Guardian,21.05.1994,p.24;PollyGhazi,‘Friedgenetomatoes’,Observer,25.09.1994,p.D68;JavierLezaun,'GeneticallyModifiedFoodsandConsumerMobilizationintheUk',Technikfolgenabschätzung–TheorieundPraxis,13/3(2004).84ThomasStuttaford,‘It’sthesameoldstorywiththe‘killerbug’’,Times,31.05.1994,p.15.85Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.199-200.

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facilitatinganimalabuse.Similartothepre-Swannyears,agriculturalantibiotics’

symbolic embodiment of controversial agricultural practices made them

vulnerabletounrelatedagriculturalscandals.

SuchascandaloccurredonMarch20th,1996,when theUKgovernment

confirmedapossiblelinkbetweenBSEandhumanvCJD.Inthefollowingweeks

and months, British officials and farmers faced unprecedented outrage and

embargoes that threatened to destroy the entire beef sector.86Writing for the

Guardian, Patrick Holden, president of the organic Soil Association, described

BSE as “testimony to the breathtaking arrogance of 20th century western

agricultural science,...”87Significantly,Holden’s subsequent criticismcentredon

agricultural antibiotics: “When, inevitably, the animals get sick, farmers use

antibioticstopreventinfectiousdiseasestakinghold.Thisisliketryingtoputa

cork in a bottle that is actively fermenting – it cannot possiblywork for very

long.”88 In the Observer, journalists Judy Jones and Anthony Bevins also

interpretedBSEasafundamentalfailureofconventionalanimalhusbandryand

attacked the antibiotics at theheart of the intensive system.Problems like the

riseofEnglishandWelshfoodpoisoningcasesfrom19,242in1985to83,346in

1995 were the logical consequence of a farming system that “force fed

antibiotics”. 89 According to the Daily Mirror, Britons had “mad farming

disease.”90BSEwasdescribedasthetipofanagro-industrialicebergkeptafloat

by the extensive use of antibiotics. According to theMirror,cases of resistant

86JavierLezaunandMartijnGroenleer,'FoodControlEmergenciesandtheTerritorializationoftheEuropeanUnion',EuropeanIntegration,28/5(2006),pp.439-40.87PatrickHolden,‘SacrificedontheHi-TechAltar’,Guardian,27.03.1996,p.4.88Ibid.89Ibid.90AndrewPenman,‘CowthatProvesWe’veGotMadFarmingDisease’,DailyMirror,21.08.1996,p.6.

161

foodpoisoninghad “trebled since1993 tomore than3,500 lastyear.”91InThe

Times,Clive Aslet, editor of CountryLife, criticised official culling programmes

andnoted that consumerswere justified in turning to the “readily identifiable

alternative to intensive agriculture – the organic movement.”92Although the

movement’s focus on homeopathy was “a bit loony”,93organic farmers had

managedtoreduceantibioticusetoaminimum.FromtheruinsofBSE,“Britain

mustbuildasystemofagriculturethat isacknowledgedasthesafestandmost

humaneintheworld.”94

TheBSEcrisisthusledtothenearlyunanimousopinionthatagricultural

reformwouldhavetogofarbeyondbanningmeatandbonemealfeeds.Inthis

situation, agricultural antibiotics presented an easily identifiable target for

activistsandruefulproducersalike.TheoutbreakofresistantpathogenslikeE.

coli0157seeminglyunderlinedtheurgencyofsweepingantibioticreform.95

Winning a landslide victory in May 1997, Tony Blair’s New Labour

government wanted to avoid agricultural conflicts, which had damaged the

previous administration, and supported EU antibiotic reform initiatives.96The

newEUinitiativeshadbeentriggeredbySweden.HavingbannedAGPsin1986,

Sweden initially negotiated a three-year exemption frommandatory antibiotic

compliance following its 1995 EU accession. With the three-year exemption

abouttoexpire,theSwedishgovernmentannouncedthatitwouldnotabolishits

91Ibid.92CliveAslet,‘HowtorescueBritishbeef’,Times,03.05.1996,p.16.93Ibid.94Ibid.95NigelHawkes,‘Scientistsfear‘ominous’spreadofmutantbacteria’,Times,29.11.1996,p.4;HelenNowicka,‘WorldWarningOverAntibiotics’,Guardian,14.10.1996,p.3;‘Beware:mother’slittlehelperisdefecting…’,Observer,08.12.1996,p.21.96Inits1997electionmanifesto,LabourreferredtotheBSEscandalthreetimes;''NewLabour–BecauseBritainDeservesBetter’',FriedrichEbertStiftung(http://www.fes.de/fulltext/ialhi/90057/90057toc.htm[accessed16.09.2013]).

162

AGP ban.97Following Sweden’s announcement, German, Danish and Finnish

ministers expressed grave concerns over AGPs during a meeting of the EU

CouncilofAgricultureMinistersinNovember1997.98

InBritain,pressureforantibioticreformincreasedconsiderablyfollowing

thepublicationof influential reports on antibiotics and antibiotic resistance in

1998.99Sensitive to consumeropinion,Tesco, Sainsbury’sandAsdaannounced

that theywere prohibiting suppliers from using AGPs in April 1998.100In late

1998,theEUdecidedtobanfouroftheremainingeightAGPs.101

Justified with reference to bacterial resistance, the AGP bans also bore

testament to EU consumers’ increasing power over agricultural policy. One

reason for this development was wealthy consumers’ ability to vote against

controversialproductionmethodswiththeirwalletsandbuyagrowingselection

oforganicproduce.Followingeveryagriculturalcrisis,thepopularityoforganic

farming grew.102Profiting from unified labelling, Britain’s organic foodmarket

grew from £40million in 1987 to £267million in 1997 andwas projected to

growtoover£1billionby2000.103Stillonlyaccountingforca.1%oftotalBritish

foodanddrinkexpenditurein2000,104organicproducts’cultural influencewas

significant:in1999,allanalysedBritishnewspapersfeaturedpositivereportson

97Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.205.98'AntibioticResistance.TheRisktoHumanHealthandSafetyfromtheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalProduction(Ceg98/2)',(ConsumersinEuropeGroup,1998),p.11.99ChapterNine,pp.212-216.100PaulBrown,‘Supermarketsmovetobangrowth-drugmeatfromshelves’,Guardian,24.04.1998,p.4.101MichaelHornsby,‘Pigfeedrulesmaybanuseofanimalremains’,Times,13.11.1998,p.7.102PaulHeiney,‘Asonofthesoilinthemaking’,Times,17.03.1990,p.17;MichaelHornsby,‘Organicfarmerleadstheway’,Times,11.08.1992,p.5;FrancesBissell,‘TheTimesCook’,Times,03.06.1995,p.51.103‘Planetorganic’,ObserverMagazine,27.06.1999,p.G14.104FAOEconomicandSocialDevelopmentDepartment,'WorldMarketsforOrganicFruitandVegetables',FAOCorporateDocumentRepository(http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y1669e/y1669e0f.htm[accessed12.09.2013]).

163

organic produce. InTheTimes, radio presenter Libby Purves smugly reflected,

“In about 1992, we had John Gummer, then Agriculture Minister, in this very

kitchen, laughingcharminglyandpooh-poohingourorganicattitudes.”105Seven

years later, “there [were], (…) signs of a genuinepopular rebellion against the

culture of ghastly farming and ghastly food.”106WithWaitrose and Sainsbury’s

stocking over 400 organic product lines in 1999, the organic boom had

transformed the Soil Association from an “insignificant charity with a staff of

five”toaninfluentialorganisationwithastaffof80within“afewshortyears.”107

Boostedbythe1998ban,antibioticcriticssoonbegantoattackthefour

remainingAGPs.Similartoearlieryears,reformers’endeavourswereaidedbya

series of scandals and official reports.108In July 1999, British and Irish

authorities crackeddownon illegal Irishpharmaceutical imports.According to

theSundayTimes, price differencesmeant that “Irish pharmacies [were] being

bombarded with requests for antibiotics from farmers in Britain.”109The

newspaper also referred to a recent BBC CountryFile episode in which an

undercover team had purchased therapeutic antibiotics over the counter in

Britain and via mail order from an Irish pharmacist. According to the Soil

Association, “asmany as 10,000 farms in Britain”110could be using antibiotics

illegally. Amidst continuing concern about failing antibiotics, the Guardian

claimedthatabouthalfofBritishantibioticsweregiventoanimals.111

105LibbyPurves,‘Calledtoordure’,Times,26.10.1999,p.24.106Ibid.107‘Planetorganic’,ObserverMagazine,27.06.1999,p.G14.108FortheACMSFreportseeChapterNine,pp.215-216.109‘PoliceprobeIrishfarmdrugsracket’,SundayTimes,04.07.1999.110Ibid;alsosee:JamesMeikle,‘Crackdownonanimaldrugsscam’,Guardian,07.09.1999,p.6.111‘Useandabuse’,Guardian,06.09.1999,p.3.

164

Probably anticipating further bans, the Grampian Country Food Group,

the UK’s biggest chicken producer, announced that it would stop AGP use in

September1999.Havingconductedsecret trials, thecompanyclaimed that the

withdrawalwouldnot leadtoprice increases.112TheGuardiancommentedthat

Grampian’sinitiativecould“signalthebiggestrevolutioninyearsinthewaythat

animalsarereared(…),andchalkupamajorvictoryinthebattletoreducethe

use of antibiotics in agriculture.”113In November 1999, Marks & Spencer

announcedthatitwouldbanallpoultryproductsproducedwithAGPs.114

Thenewmillenniumdidnotaltermediaattitudes.Referringtoantibiotic

overuse andBSE,TheTimes’GrahamHarvey reckoned that public opinionhad

turnedforgood“againstdestructiveindustrialfarming.”115Juxtaposingthelives

of the “convenience” and the “organic family”, the Daily Mirror claimed that

“organic food is lessprocessed(…)andorganicmeatdoesn’tcontainantibiotic

residues.”116Meanwhile,MPsfromallpoliticalpartiesbacked‘greentopics’and

the conspicuous consumption of ‘antibiotic-free’ organic food became an

acceptedwayofshowing‘progressive’credentials.117

However, once again, the seeming success of the 1998 AGP bansmade

agricultural antibiotics lose their status as a common denominator of protest.

Although antibiotic-related scandals continued to occur and organic food’s

112ValerieElliott,‘Chickenfirmaxesgrowthpromoter’,Times,02.09.1999,p.10;industry’s2000AssuredChickenProductionscheme(LittleRedTractorLogo)changeditsguaranteein2002toallowpreventivedosesofgrowthpromotersunderveterinarysupervision;thecompaniesaccountedfor85%ofBritishpoultryproductionin2003;see:AndrewPurvis,‘IfMaxeatsupallhischicken,he’llgrowtobeabig,strongboy’,Observer,10.08.2003,p.F25.113JamesMeikle,‘Shockatfooddrugsban’,Guardian,02.09.1999,p.1.114Idem.,‘M&Sphasesoutantibioticsinchicken’,Guardian,19.09.1999,p.6.115GrahamHarvey,‘Goodfoodneedsgreenfarms’,Times,01.01.2000,p.16.116HilaryFreeman,‘Who’shealthier?’,DailyMirror,28.12.2000,p.25;the‘conveniencefamily’wascalled“TheDudleys”;alsosee:TraceyHarrison,‘Sodidyouenjoyyourantibioticadditivewithchemicaltrimming?’,DailyMirror,26.12.2000,p.6.117StuartJeffries,‘True-bluegreen’,Guardian,03.12.2005,p.31.

165

‘purity’ remained a major selling point,118other controversial issues became

moreprominent.OnlytheGuardianinitiallymaintaineditsroleasaplatformfor

antibioticprotest.In2000,thenewspaperwarned,“farfromreceding,thegaping

abyss [of antibiotic resistance] now looks evenmore threatening.”119Claiming

that “one-off campaigns achieve little”120, the newspaper noted that the 1998

bans were insufficient by themselves and reported on therapeutic antibiotic

overuse in agriculture. However, by 2004, the Guardian’s 20-point list of

chemicalthreatsmentionedantibioticsonlyinplace16.121

Becauseofre-emergingcomplacency,theEU’s2003decisiontophaseout

the four remaining AGPs received little media attention.122Only the Observer

publishedanarticletitled,“IfMaxeatsupallhischicken,he’llgrowtobeabig,

strongboy.Unless it killshim first.”123Revealing that largepartsof theBritish

poultry industry had reverted to ‘prophylactic’ growth promotion, the article

reconstructedMax’scontaminationwithresistantpathogens:

As thechickenoozesunappetisinglyonthetopshelfofyour fridge, (…),blood drips on to the cheddar cheese below – the classic ‘crosscontamination’ sequence (…). Making yourself a cheese sandwich nextday,youdon’tnotice thebacteriologicalaccompaniment–butyouhaveinadvertentlyeatenuncookedenterococci.124

118JamesMeikle,‘Dangerwarningafterincreaseindrugresiduesfoundineggs’,Guardian,14.04.2004,p.2;ValerieElliott,‘Shoppersdupedinorganicmeatscam’,Times,15.05.2006,pp.1-2;‘There’salittleplaceIknow…WheredoNigella,JamieandNigelreallyshopandeat’,Observer,08.06.2003,p.F49;PaulJohnson,‘Organic..Faborfad?’,DailyMirror,02.09.2004,p.40.119MalcolmDean,‘Staringintotheabyss’,Guardian,22.11.2000,p.7.120Ibid.;alsosee:Dishingthedirt’,Guardian,28.11.2000,p.8;JamesMeikle,‘’Wonderdrug’losingwarwithsuperbugs’,Guardian,13.04.2001,p.1.121‘ChemicalWorld’,Guardian,15.05.2004,SpecialSupplement,p.32.122(EC)No.1831/2003.123AndrewPurvis,‘IfMaxeatsupallhischicken,he’llgrowtobeabig,strongboy.Unlessitkillshimfirst’,Observer,10.08.2003,p.F25.124Ibid.

166

Constituting 43 of the 463 tonnes of antibiotics used on British farm animals,

“growth promoters” were “only the tip of the antibiotic iceberg.”125Banning

AGPswithoutaccompanyingreformsoftherapeuticuseandhusbandrysystems

wouldhavelittleeffectonoverallresistance.

TheObserver’swarningsdidnothaveastrongimpact.WhentheEUAGP

phase-out ended in 2006, none of the analysed newspapers reported. With

agriculturalantibioticusecontinuing–albeit in therapeuticdoses–andpublic

interest in antibiotic reformdyingdown, theEU’s2006AGPban risks sharing

thefateofthe1971Swannbans.

.

125Ibid.

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ChapterEight:BritishFarmingandtheEnvironmentalTurnIn the wake of Swann, British farmers initially saw few reasons to abandon

regularantibioticuse.Throughoutthe1970s,farmersfacedthedualchallengeof

fending off cheapEuropean imports – especially in thewake of Britain’s 1973

EECmembership–and justifying rising subsidy costs.1Meanwhile, agricultural

surpluses continued to grow:between1970and1980, totalmeat output from

cattle, pigs and sheep increased from 2,100,000 tons to 2,305,000 tons.2

However, the increasing oversaturation of meat markets depressed farm

incomes3andforcedmembersoftheEEC’sCommonAgriculturalPolicy(CAP)to

make so-called intervention purchases, which produced the notoriously

expensive ‘butter and meat mountains’. By 1983, Britain alone was storing

177,000 tons of intervention butter stocks.4Trapped in a buyers’ market of

expanding production and lower prices, the farmerwith the cheapest product

had a sales advantage. As a consequence, yield-maximizing technologies like

antibioticsremainedverypopularamongstBritishfarmers.5

It would, however, be wrong to speak of resulting chemical abandon.

Despite popular stereotypes, many British farmers were torn between the

technological requirements of intensification and environmentalist values.

During the 1970s, both Farmers’Weekly and the NFU organ BritishFarmer&

Stockbreeder(BFS) containeda surprisingamountof self-critical contributions.

1Holderness,BritishAgriculturesince1945,pp.37-40.2'C8-Europe:MeatOutput',inPalgraveMacmillan(ed.),InternationalHistoricalStatistics(Volume3;DOI:10.1057/9781137305688.0626[accessed02.07.2015]).3BerkeleyHill,FarmIncomes,WealthandAgriculturalPolicy:FillingtheCap'sCoreInformationGap.(4edn.;Wallingford,CambridgeMA:CABI,2012),p.119.4Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,p.109.5Ibid.,p.103.

168

Titled“LookAhead inSearchofaRoadoutofFarming’sCrisis,”6a1975article

portrayed small farmers’ demise and environmental problems as two sides of

thesamecoin.Afewweekslater,DavidStickland,managingdirectorofOrganic

Farmers&Growers,attackedconventionalagriculture’sfocusoncheapfoodand

presented organic methods as a cheap alternative to expensive chemicals in

FarmersWeekly.7Articles on fashionable “rural self-sufficiency”8in magazines’

household& familysections indicate thatenvironmentalistvaluesalsoentered

farmers’homes.

However, there were limits to farmers’ environmental enthusiasm.

Throughout the 1970s,most commentators continued to see no alternative to

further intensification and technologies like antibiotics.9According to Farmers

Weekly commentator Michael Joughin, 1975 would see British farmers doing

whattheyhadalwaysdone:“getafewmoregallonsoutofafewmorecowson

fewer acres.”10Should the logic of intensification clash with environmental

interests,mostcommentators’greensentimentsprovedskin-deep.Referringto

criticism of intensive dairy farming, BFS’Dunstan Court “tremble[d] to think

whatmighthappen if theanimalwelfare lobbygets itsclaws into thepoorold

milk producer”: farmers would likely face a “Brambellised set of regulations

abolishingthevacuumteatcupandreinstatingthebucketandfingersera.”11Ina

similarvein,farmersreactedfuriouslytoBrassTacks’1979attackonagricultural

druguse.TheNFUconsideredtakingoutan injunctionagainst theRadioTimes6‘LookAheadinSearchofaRoadoutofFarming’sCrisis’,FW,17.01.1975,p.72.7DavidStickland,‘Goodbyechemicals–hello,goodhusbandry’,FW,31.01.1975,p.77;Idem.,‘Organicfarminghastheanswers’,BFS,15.03.1975,p.8;ESPRaymond,‘Chemicalsdon’treplacethehoe’,BFS,02.08.1975,p.3;A.M.Allen,‘Don’tignorethe‘WelfareLobby’,BFS,12.10.1974,p.5.8SheilaJenner,‘It’sbacktonatureforsmarttownees’,BFS,24.05.1975,p.41.9JohnP.Mackintosh,‘Talkfoodandhealthtogainsupport’,FW,10.01.1975,p.80;DLort-Philips,‘Worldfoodlagsbehinddemand’,BFS,21.06.1975,p.5.10MichaelJoughin,‘TherealwealthofBritain’,FW,10.01.1975,p.75.11DunstanCourt,‘Teatcupstorm’,BFS,15.03.1975,p.32.

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and promised “to send ‘hot missiles’ to the BBC’s chairman and director-

general,”12theformerofwhomwasnoneotherthanMichaelSwann,theformer

headoftheSwannCommittee.

Shouldinterestsalign,Britishfarmerswere,however,adeptatmobilising

consumer and environmentalist concerns. In 1973, the British Poultry

Federation used residue concerns to pressure supermarkets to reject

consignmentsofDutchpoultryfedwiththerapeuticantibiotics.13Oneyearlater,

FrenchAGPusefeaturedprominentlyinatradewarbetweenBritishandFrench

egg producers.14Putting it bluntly, Farmers’Weeklycommented: “The point at

issue is not that French eggs are a health hazard to consumers. It is that the

French have a way of shipping unprofitability to Britain in an unfair trading

package.”15With emotions running high, the United Kingdom Egg Producers’

Association gathered money for court action against MAFF and farmers

organisedpicketsandboycottsagainstFrenchproduce.16WhennewEECrulings

threatened the loss of a quarter of UK milk output due to mastitis, British

commentators, however, had no problem advocating increased antibiotic dry

cow therapy alongside improvedhygiene.17Farmers’Weeklyevenpublished an

educationalsongtitled“Mastitis,yeh,yeh,yeh”[sic]:

TreatallyourudderswithadrycowtubeAndsmile,smile,smile,Maybeyouthinkthecostisprettyrude,Butitreallyisworthwhile.

12RichardNorton-Taylor,‘Furiousfarmersreadyfordrugsphone-in’,Guardian,08.05.1979,p.2.13JoanSmith,‘HealthBanOnChickenSales’,DailyMirror,08.05.1973,p.3.14DennisBarker,‘Producerspredict£1adozeneggs’,Guardian,05.08.1974,backpagecol3.15‘NewRulesWantedForEggImports’,FW,31.01.1975,p.35.16Ibid;J.W.Murray,‘AcrackatFrencheggs’,Observer,02.02.1975,p.1.17‘Mastitis.Wecandomuchbetterthanthis’,BFS,04.01.1975,p.19;‘MilkHygiene.Superdairymenareneeded’,BFS,29.03.1975,p.25.

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Bugscancausemastitis,Theyalwaysrunsowild,SotreatallyourudderswithadrycowtubeAndsmile,smile,smile.18

Withtheeconomicclimatecoolingtowardstheendofthe1970s,pressure

for agricultural intensification increased further. Once more, many producers

blamedproblemsonCAPandprotectionistsentimentsincreased.19Angryabout

Frenchimportbansin1980,Britishfarmersattemptedtodeliver“aBritishlamb

to the firmly closed French embassy” while singing “jingle jangle, Giscard

dangle.”20

ThenewThatchergovernmentdidlittletoredressthesituation.Despite

halvingBritishCAP contributions in1984, it favoured lowconsumerpricesby

overvaluing the ‘green pound’, one of a number of artificial EEC currencies

created to determine CAP prices in relation to national currencies.21As a

consequence, CAP payments to British farmers were worth less. Once again,

thingswereworst for small farmers:by1983,13%ofBritish farmsaccounted

for 50%of the industry’s net output. Three years earlier, average real income

hadfallentoanadirof£4894incomparisonto£12,058in1973.22Furiousabout

the parallel “axing”23of lucrative school meals, agricultural commentators

warnedthatBritishfarmershadbecome“victimsofthepawngame”24between

ThatcherandtheEEC.

18‘Mastitis,yeh,yeh,yeh’,FW,17.01.1975,p.100.19Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.142-43;alsosee:‘Reviewdecisionsstillgovernourfate’,BFS,01.02.1975,p.3;‘AngerasIrishexploittheirEECadvantage’,BFS,26.10.1974,p.7;‘Hundredsjoinportpickets’,BFS,09.11.1974,pp.8-9.20‘ACaningFromTheirLordships’,BFS,26.04.1980,p.10.21Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.138-39;42-44.22Ibid.,p.149.23‘Schoolmealabolitionangersfarmworkers’,BFS,16.08.1980,p.27.24‘Victimsofthepawngame’,BFS,10.05.1980,p.3.

171

In the faceofeconomicpressure, farmers reactedparticularlyhostile to

rising environmentalism and animal rights activism. In 1980,BFSproclaimed,

“Animalwelfare:NFUdeclareswar.”25Warningthat“extremists”had“takenover

the RSPCA” and “were attempting to do the same in the political parties”,

speakers at theNFU’sAnnualGeneralMeeting calledon theunion to “counter

‘emotional, misleading and inaccurate attacks (…) by the welfare lobby.”26

Criticism by environmentalists could trigger similar reactions. In 1980, BFS’s

MontyKeenattackedTheTheftoftheCountryside,anewbookbyconservationist

Marion Shoard. Titled “Bitching about the countryside,”27Keen’s article urged

farmers to be wary of activists’ influence. Livestock producers had become

particularlyvulnerableto“anyoutcryovera foodmanufacturingprocessusing

allegedly objectionable substances or treatments.” 28 According to Keen,

European activists were importing Ralph Nader’s style “as a windmill-tilting

warrior”:

It’s pretty easy to seewhat couldhappen if a person claiming scientificexpertiseweretodeclaresomeadditivepreviouslyconsideredinnocuousto have definite carcinogenic associations, (…). Generally the reportscome from America, where the authorities have more than once beenpressured into acting prematurely and (as subsequently transpire)unwisely,inbanningsubstanceswhichdidmoregoodthanharm.29

Regarding re-emerging criticism of antibiotic overuse, agricultural

attitudes were more nuanced. As astute observers, farmers took note of

physicians’andveterinarians’differentevaluationofagriculturalantibioticuse.

Reportingon the1980BVAcongress,BFSnoted that “despite anattackby the

25‘NFUAnnualMeeting:Issuesofconcern’,BFS,01.03.1980,p.25.26Ibid.;alsosee:‘Raisingtheanimalwelfareprofile’,BFS,06.09.1980,[sic],p.3;‘Welfaristssubduedbyfactoryfarmvisit’,BFS,19.07.1980,p.14;p.41.27MontyKeen,‘Bitchingaboutthecountryside’,BFS,22.11.1980.28Ibid.29Ibid.

172

medicalprofessionrepresentedby[PHLS]DrThrelfall,”the“useofantibioticsin

agriculture received strong support” 30 from veterinarians. According to

veterinarian Dr John Walton, “the medicos [were] wrong.”31While Walton

criticised “farmers’useof sub-standardblackmarketdrugs,”32hedoubted that

furtherantibioticrestrictionswouldpreventsalmonellosis.Nonetheless,Walton

cautionedveterinariansagainstover-prescriptionandleavinglargequantitiesof

antibioticsonfarms.

Aware that continued pharmaceutical access depended on farmers’

image,theagriculturalmediadidnotopposenewregulationsgoverningthesale

of veterinary medicines in 1980. According to the new regulations, only

authorisedmerchantswereallowedtosellmedicinesnamedontheFarmersList

(orMerchantsList).Theregulationsweredesignedtotarget“itinerantvansales”

anddubious“salesmenwhocall‘onspec’.”33Attemptingtorallyfarmersagainst

restrictions, S. Bootland from the British Distributors of Animal Medicines

Association claimed that “restrictive distribution would increase [farmers’

expenses]bymorethan30%.”34Itwas“muchbetterthatthefarmercontinuesto

benefitbypurchasingfromwhateverqualifiedsuppliergivesthebestservice.”35

Fortunately,Bootland’scausedidnotfindmanysupporters.

Meanwhile,mastitis and antibiotic residues continued to plague British

milk production. Although new technologies such as anti-blowback devices

helped reduce mastitis,36tougher testing revealed on-going residue problems.

30‘Conflictoverantibiotics’,BFS,04.10.1980,p.14.31Ibid.32Ibid.33‘Strictercontrolsovermedicine’,BFS,02.02.1980,p.25.34SBootland,‘Lettertotheeditor’,BFS,06.09.1980,p.5.35Ibid.36‘Anti-blowbackdevicecouldhelpcontrolmastitis’,BFS,12.01.1980,p.37.

173

During the late 1970s, testing sensitivity had increased from 0.05 to 0.02

internationalunitsofpenicillinperml. InNovember1979,MMBdata revealed

that 900 to 1,000 of 47,000 dairy farmers regularly produced milk with

excessive antibiotic residues.37While someproducersblamedproblemson the

“oddcow”getting“milkedbymistake”38,BFSwarned:

WhatisdisturbingaboutthesefiguresisthattheincidenceoftestfailuresintheUKis20timesthatinothercountries,apartfromEire,despitethefact that most use a more sensitive test: And equally most (againexcludingEire)imposemoreseverepenalties.39

Reacting to antibiotic-problems, the MMB increased penalties for antibiotic

residues. According to the new system, first-time offenders would be fined 5

penceperlitre,second-timeoffenders7penceperlitreandthird-timeoffenders

wouldhavetopaya“swingeingrate”40of9penceperlitre.However,thepenalty

increasewasunsuccessful.Receiving11pforeverylitreofuncontaminatedmilk,

farmerscontinued to sell contaminatedmilkbecause thechanceof incurringa

finewaslessproblematicthanforegoingearningscompletely.41In1982,British

milk continued to contain the highest level of antibiotic residues in Europe.42

Resistanceconcernswerenotoftendiscussed.

Meanwhile,overproductionanddecliningagriculturalincomescontinued

to increase intensification pressures.43Attempting to curb overproduction, the

EuropeanCommunity(EC)introduceddairyquotasin1984andforcedfarmers

toletlandliefallowin1986.44Worndownbythelongeconomiccrisisandpublic

37HughClayton,‘Milkpenaltiesincreased’,Times,14.11.1979,p.3.38WFGilkes,‘Obsesseswithpenalties’,BFS,16.08.1980,p.6.39‘Mastitismedicine’,BFS,10.05.1980,p.23.40‘Tougherantibiotictestsformilkarecoming’,BFS,19.07.1980,p.14.41HughClayton,‘Milkpenaltiesincreased’,Times,14.11.1979,p.3.42RosemaryCollins,‘BritishmilkhashighestantibioticlevelinEurope’,Guardian,27.01.1982,p.4.43GaryCorsley,‘Recordmargins–butsmallmenlosingout’,FW,02.05.1986,p.31.44RhyddianJones,‘’Fallowing’–whatanicewayofputtingit’,FW,28.02.1986,p.41.

174

criticism, many British farmers became more willing to consider alternative

production methods. Following its 1984 annual general meeting, the NFU

announced:

Therehasbeenaparticularly importantpublicreactiontothe impactofagricultureontheenvironment.Againstthisbackgrounditseemsrighttoconclude that we are now at a watershed and that the era whenagricultural expansion was widely accepted as a desirable goal haspassed.45Because of its on-going growth, organic agriculture turned into an

attractive market niche for a growing number of struggling conventional

producers.In1986,Sainsbury’sandSafewaystartedofferingorganicproduce.46

According to Farmers Weekly, dairy farms supplying the UK’s first mass-

producedorganicsoftcheeseweresellingtheirmilkat1.5penceperlitreabove

market price.47Other articles advised beef producers to profit from consumer

insecurityabouthormonesandsellhormone-freebeefatapremiumprice.48

Farmers unwilling to transition to organic agriculture also sensed that

timeswerechanging.WhenBritainchallengedtheEEC’sbanofhormonalgrowth

promoters in 1986, the conventional beef industry cautioned that unilateral

action might provoke import bans and stoke consumer fears: “Privately, they

believe it might be better to face the ban.”49According to another article,

environmentalismand intensive farmingwerenotmutuallyexclusive: “there is

noreasonwhyweshouldnotcompete in theworld’sagriculturalmarkets, (…)

45QuotedaccordingtoMartin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,p.178.46JohnHarvey,‘Ministryburiesorganicreport’,FW,28.02.1986,p.11.47RobertDavies,‘Organicmilkwinspremium’,FW,09.05.1986,p.34.48‘Registerforhormone-freebeef’,FW,21.02.1986,p.14;MichaelGaisford,‘Cuttingouthormoneswinspremiumprices’,ibid,p.16;JohnHarvey,‘Ministryburiesorganicreport’,FW,28.02.1986,p.11;‘Organicopportunity’,FW,14.03.1986,p.1349‘Hormonesprocedurechallenged’,FW,14.03.1986,p.32.

175

andstillhaveacountryfitforRobinHoodorRupertBear.”50WritingtoFarmers

WeeklyinFebruary1986,“suburbanhousewife”AudreyCurrancomplained:

Iamfedupofbeingtold,asaconsumer,thatitismyfaultifanimalsarebeingrearedintheseintensiveunitstosupplymewithcheapfood.Idon’twantitandIdon’tknowofanyonewhodoeswhenmadeawareofwhatisinvolved.And,whoaskedmeifitwasOKtostuffthemwithantibiotics?51

One year later, Farmers Weekly commentator Robert Gair described the

fundamental dilemma he shared with many conventional farmers: criticising

attacks by “Greenpeacers” [sic] and “the anti-farming, anti-chemical brigade”,

Gair confessed that he, too, had “no desire to see a countrysidewithout birds,

mammals, frogs, butterflies, orchids, and the rest.” 52 In order to arrest

“detrimental changes in the environment”, all parties should engage in a

“rationalexamination”offactorslikelytodisturbthe“balanceofnature.”53

The dilemma described by Gair was similar regarding agricultural

antibiotics.Unwillingtoforsakeantibiotics,conventionalfarmersknewthatthey

would eventually have tomake concessions.While some experts continued to

attack the “inane agitation of the lunatic fringe of the animal welfare

movement,”54other commentators warned that “the public will buy what it

wants, and not what some scientist thinks it should buy.”55According to one

contribution,agricultureexistedtofeedconsumersandfarmersandnot“forthe

benefit of the chemical industry.”56During the mid-1980s, articles in British

agricultural magazines began advertising “no-additive feed”57and antibiotic-

50‘AnutterwasteofMerrieEngland’,FW,14.03.1986,p.41.51AudreyCurran,‘Don’tblamebuyersforyourmethods’,FW,28.02.1986,p.52.52RobertGair,‘Hopesrisefornotsosilentspring’,FW,30.10.1987,p.37.53Ibid.54BillWeeks,‘Publicmustbegiventhefullfarmingfacts’,FW,23.05.1986,p.47.55StephenRWharfe,‘Satisfythepublic–notscientists’,ibid,p.48.56Ibid.57‘No-additivefeed’,FW,23.05.1986,p.55.

176

reducing probiotics.58Concerned about resistant Salmonella and E. coli, Sheila

Furniss advised farmers against feeding antibiotic-laden milk to calves.59

Regardingmastitis, the residue-conscious advisers of the late 1980s no longer

propagated extensive use of antibiotic ointments but called on farmers to use

antibioticsmorecautiouslyandkeeprecords.60Accordingtoonereader,thepast

decadeshadshownthat“scientistsarenotGodandhaveprovedveryfallible”61,

farmersshouldremainsuspiciousofchemicalhelpers.

Attemptingtowinbackconsumertrust,theagriculturalmediahailedthe

results of the 1987 national meat surveillance scheme. According to Farmers

Weekly, “health-conscious consumers who worry without foundation about

chemical and drug contamination in meat can take comfort.”62Nonetheless,

farmers should not forget that residue fears had created a veritable testing

industry“hell-bentonprovingthatwholesomefoodispositivelydangerous”and

capable “of sniffingdown topartsperbillion.”63Itwas therefore important “to

spread the gospel [ofmeat safety] before political pressures remove yetmore

usefulpharmaceuticalsfromthemarketandrestrictresearch.”64

Meandering between hostility and insecurity, the controversies

surroundingantibioticresiduesandAGPsalsoprimedinitialreactionstoBSE.In

October 1987, MAFF veterinarians announced that BSE “is not of epidemic

proportions, (…) and is not very significant when compared with losses from

58‘Probioticssoothestressfulcalves’,FW,02.05.1986,p.26.59‘TaintedMilk’,FW,28.02.1986,p.21.60‘Monitoringmastitis’,FW,07.03.1986,p.24;‘£30millionbillformastitis’,FW,06.11.1987,p.35.61JoseMacDonald,‘BSTshouldnotbecomeendresult’,FW,25.12.1987,p.5.62‘DrugResiduesinMeatareatAbsoluteRock-Bottom’,FW,20.11.1987,p.3.63Ibid.64‘Noevidenceforfoodscaremongers’,FW,25.12.1987,p.4.

177

other nervous disorders.”65Meanwhile, Farmers Weekly warned that “BSE

thrivesonrumours”:“Thankgoodnesswitchcraftisoutoffashion,otherwisethe

old ladywho lives in the cottage down the lanewith a black cat for company

wouldbeaccusedandduckedinthevillagepond...”66

However,behinda façadeofprescribedcalm,British farmersknewthat

the1988Salmonellascandal,BSEandantibioticresidueandresistanceproblems

posed grave challenges.With environmentalism and consumer power growing

throughout Europe and trust in British food safety eroding, it was likely that

intensiveagriculturewasgoingtofacemajorchanges.

In1992,theso-calledMacSharryreformsprovidedaglimpseofthingsto

come.Attemptingtocontrolexpensesandoverproduction,thereformsmarked

the most significant modification of CAP since its inception.67Instead of

subsidisingproductprices,EuropeanAgricultureCommissionerRayMacSharry

wantedtoreduceintensiveoverproductionwithdirectsubsidieslinkedtofarms’

sizes and animals’ age.68MacSharry also introduced quotas and set-aside

schemes, reduced intervention prices and attempted to promote eco-friendly

farming.69Amongstother things, regulation2078/92/ECprovidedpayments to

reduce pollution and encourage extensification and conservation efforts.70

Together with the 1992 EU Flora-Fauna-Habitat guidelines, the MacSharry

reformsfirmlyembeddedenvironmentalistprinciplesinEUagriculture.71

65AlanBarker,‘Don’tPanicOverBSE’,FW,30.10.1987,p.24.66‘BSEthrivesonrumours’,FW,20.11.1987,p.7.67Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.163-66.68AloisSeidl,DeutscheAgrargeschichte(Frankfurta.M.:DLGVerlag,2006),pp.311-14.69Martin,TheDevelopmentofModernAgriculture.BritishFarmingsince1931,pp.161-63.70Ibid.,p.181.71CouncilDirective92/43/EEC

178

British farmers only gradually warmed to the MacSharry reforms72but

were soon preoccupied by domestic issues: following the Salmonella-inspired

1990FoodSafetyAct,Britishproducerswereexposedtoanunprecedentedscale

of monitoring. Animals could now be inspected for forbidden substances on

farmsandfarmershadtokeepdetailedmedicationrecords.Meanwhile,BSEand

Salmonella slaughtering clauses placed enormous psychological pressure on

farmerstokeepherdsdisease-free.73

Althoughfarmorganisationslaunchedsupportivecampaignsforlivestock

producers,74the changing socio-cultural landscape of the 1990s meant that

agricultural values themselves began to change. In British Farmer, a ‘Candid

Friend’ feature regularly confronted farmerswith their public image. In 1991,

CarolineWaldegrave,wifeofConservativeMPWilliamWaldegraveandprinciple

ofLeithsSchoolofFoodandWine,was“delightedbytheconsumerlobbythatis

presently in full swing”75and expressed concern about animal welfare. One

month later, Times agricultural correspondent Michael Hornsby related his

experiencesamongsttheagriculturalcommunity:

One thing that struckme at oncewas the extent towhich farmers as agroupoftenseemtolivein[an](…)insulatedworldoftheirown.Itwasastonishingatthelast[NFUAnnualGeneralMeeting]tohearfarmers(…)accusingaleadingfoodmanufactureroflackofpatriotismbecausehehaddaredtobuymeatfromabroad.76

72‘ApositiveanswertoMacSharry’,BF,Feb1991,p.5;SeanRickard,‘SupplyManagement–therightwaytorighttheCAP’,BF,Mar1991,pp.11-12.73‘On-farmmixerstobelisted’,BF,Aug1992,p.20;‘ResiduesinMeat’,BF,Mar1992,p.20;mixingruleswerereformedwithVeterinaryWrittenDirections(VWD)in1995;‘Newvetrulesaffectfeedrations’,BFJul/Aug1995,p.5.74‘Salmonellapayouts’,BF,Feb1991,pp.18-19;‘Levytoboostmeatsales’,BF,Apr1995,p.4;‘HealthandWealth’,BF,Dec1994/Jan1995,p.5;‘NFUPolicy’,BFIbid,p.6;‘FromthePresident:Caringforouranimals’,BF,Nov1991,p.5;‘Winningheartsandminds’,BF,Jun1995,p.13.75CarolineWaldegrave,‘Loveme,lovemysupermarket’,BF,Apr1991,p.31.76MichaelHornsby,‘Atwo-tierfuture’,BF,May1991,p.31.

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Ahead of the 1992 general elections, NFU president David Naish announced a

new programme called Farming for the environment. 77 Although some

commentatorsremainedhostiletowards“thegreenies”,78theagriculturalmedia

increasinglyfosteredenvironmentalismamongstfarmersandtheirfamilies.79

Changing agricultural sentiments were accompanied by the on-going

growthoftheBritishorganicsector.FollowingECregulation2092/91,theUK’s

Register of Organic Food Standards limited the use of the term ‘organic’ to

certifiedproductslistedontheregister.80Itwasnowabundantlyclearthatbeing

able to labelone’sproduceas ‘organic’, ‘natural’or ‘antibiotic-free’wasa sales

advantage. In June1991,BritishFarmer announced thatEastAnglianDalehead

Foodswas lookingfor“pigs from ‘welfare-conscious’systems”raisedoncereal-

based feeds with “no antibiotic growth promoters or probiotics.”81 The only

exception was medicated “creep feeds”82for weaners. Delivering ‘green pig’

productstoa“southern-basedsupermarketchain,”Daleheadofferedsuppliersa

“generous premium.” 83 In the same issue, British Farmer printed an

advertisement for Daisy Hill Feeds’ “Headstart Challenge.” 84 Targeting

conventionalfarmers,thecompanyclaimedthatitsantibiotic-freefeedwasjust

asgoodorevenbetterthanantibioticfeeds:

Pleaseyourcustomersand[get]aheadofanyministryorEC legislation,(…).Give theHeadstartrangeofpigletdietsa trialagainstyourexistingsupplies – (…) once you have removed the fear factor of not using

77DavidNaish,‘Farmingfortheenvironment’,BF,Apr1992,p.5.78RBarrow,‘Forgetthegreenies’,BF,Jun1992,p.6.79TessaGates,‘Carvinganicheinlandscape’,FW,24.07.1992,p.18;‘FarmingandNatureLivingSidebySide’,FW,07.08.1992,pp.66-67;Craftywaysofrecyclingwaste’,FW,07.09.1992,Farmlifesupplement,p.7.80‘Neworganicstandards’,BF,May1992,p.21.81‘AGrowingNichefor‘GreenPigs’,BF,Jun1991,p.13.82Ibid.83Ibid.84‘TheHeadstartChallenge’,BF,Jun1991,p.12.

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antibioticgrowthpromotersyouwillhavetheconfidencetoremovethemfrom your other pig feed diets. In our opinion you will not bedisappointed and youwill be helping dislodge an area of criticism andconcernlevelledattheBritishPigIndustry.85

However,in1991,manyconventionallivestockproducerswerestillalongway

fromcompletingtheDaisyHillFeeds’challengeandrelinquishingdruguse.

Meanwhile,theshadowofBSEloomedeverlargeroverBritishfarmers.In

1992,BritishFarmers’AndrewGordonclaimedthat“abillionpounds[hadbeen]

wipedoffthevalueofthenation’scattle”86and70,000cowsculledfollowingthe

BSE-relateddeathofaBristolcatin1990.However,Gordonremainedoptimistic

thatthe“crescendo”of“unjustifiedpublicanxiety”87wouldebb.Fouryearslater,

hopesforarecoveryfromtheBSE-crisisweredashedbytheannouncementofa

possiblelinkbetweenBSEandvCJDonMarch20th,1996.Onedaylater,several

EU countries issued unilateral bans on British beef and refused to lift them

despiteimmediatediplomaticactionbytheBritishgovernment.OnMarch22nd,

theConsumerAssociationrecommendedremovingbeeffrompersonaldiets.At

this point, some voices began calling for a complete cull of the national cattle

herd.88Whereasdomesticbeefconsumption fellby50% in the firstweekafter

the announcement, it recovered to 25% below average in the second week.

Meanwhile,thelossofexportmarketsresultedinafurther30%dropofsales.89

In theagriculturalmedia,reactionsrangedfromshockand insecurity to

anti-Europeanoutrage.InBritishFarmer,NFUpresidentSirDavidNaishassured

farmers thathewas “deeplyawareof the immenseuncertaintiesandanxieties

85Ibid.86AndrewGordon,‘Itmusthavebeenstaggers’,BF,Aug1992,p.13.87Ibid.;alsosee:‘BSEcasesdecline’,BF,Mar1995,p.4.88‘Consumerconfidence’,BF,Apr1996,pp.12-13.89PhilipClarke,‘Supermarketpricecutstemptbackbeefbuyers’,FW,05.04.-11.04.1996,p.21.

181

facingyouandyourfamilies.”90AccordingtoNaish,“theNFU[would]notrestin

itsefforts torestoreourcustomers’confidence inourproduct.”91Contradicting

European demands, Naish announced that culling would “cause everlasting

damage to theUKand itsdairy andbeef industries.”92WithBSE triggering the

“blackest day at mart since [the] ‘60s,”93agricultural magazines warned that

Britain did not have enough incinerators to cope with the proposed cull and

advertisedsuicidehelplinesforstrugglingfarmers.94

Ordinaryfarmers’reactionstoBSEweremixed.AccordingtoJohnPidsley

from Cheshire, “media hysteria” was leading to the unnecessary “wholesale

slaughter of complete herds.”95In the opinion of a “worried farmer from

Gloucestershire,”“feed-makers”were“therealvillains:”

Theyincludedthemeatandbonemealintherations.Wedidnotaskforit. Now they must pay for the damage suffered. (…). Just like the oildisasters, BaringBank, lead in feed and thalidomide, the firms involvedshouldbemadetopaythepriceandsuffertheconsequences.96

According to Anthony Carter from West Sussex, “BSE must teach us all that

current perceptions of safe are wrong.”97Instead of relying on technological

artifice, farmers should accept that “nature works very well on its own.”98

Followingdevelopmentsclosely, JohnNewmanpredictedthatBSEwouldboost

salesof‘safe’andtraceableorganicproducts.99

90DavidNaish,‘LettertoReaders’,BF,Apr1996,p.3.91Ibid.92Ibid.93‘Blackestdayatmartsince‘60s’,FW,ibid.,p.8.94‘UKincineratorscannotcope’,FW,05.04.-11.04.1996,p.8;‘Suicidefeargrows’,FW,29.03.-04.04.1996,p.10;RichardKerkham,‘Sharingadversity’,BF,Jun1996,p.30.95JohnPidsley,‘Totalslaughterisunnecessary’,FW,05.04.-11.04.1996,p.84.96WorriedfarmerfromGloucestershire,‘Feed-makerstherealvillains’,ibid.97AnthonyCarter,‘Don’ttamperwithnature’,ibid.,p.87.98Ibid.99‘Settingstandards’,BF,Apr1996,p.15.

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With consumers exercising their power and turning away from British

beef, critical voices within agriculture were strengthened and a window for

inner-agricultural reform opened. Mirroring the immediate attention paid to

antibioticsinthenationalpress,farmers’changeddemeanourisbestexemplified

by their reaction to theEU’s1997 avoparcinban.Up to1997, avoparcinAGPs

hadbeenusedbyca.80%ofBritishpoultryproducersandca.30%ofpigand

cattleproducers.100Insteadofcriticisingtheban,FarmersWeeklylimiteditselfto

preparing farmers for losing access to avoparcin. According to the magazine,

SwedishfarmershadbeenabletophaseoutAGPswithimproveddiets,hygiene

andso-calledall-in,all-outhousing.101

ConcernedaboutBritishsupportforfurtherAGPbansinthewakeofthe

1997generalelections,pharmaceuticaland feedcompaniesattempted towhip

up support for agricultural antibiotics amongst farmers. Representing animal

health firms, theNationalOrganisation forAnimalHealth (NOAH)warned that

criticswere“confusedoverthefactsbehindfarming’sroleinfoodbornedisease,

antibiotic resistance and growth promoters.”102According to NOAH director

Roger Cook, antibiotics increased food safety and were “a major factor in

reducing salmonella.” 103 Demanding that “all sides of the argument” be

“represented accurately”104, NOAH also mobilised counter-expertise. During a

NOAHpressbriefing,ex-BVApresidentKarlLinklaterreiteratedthatagricultural

antibiotics brought “significant economic benefits”, made “enormous

contributionstoanimalwelfare”andhadbeen“usedinagriculturalproduction

100‘Avoparcinfeedban’,FW,10.01.-16.01.1997,p.34.101JessicaBuss,‘BalancedpigdietsovercomeeffectsofSwedes’GPban’,FW,10.01.-16.01.1997,p.34;‘Effectivestockmanshiphalvesvetcosts’,FW,28.03.-03.04.1997,p.44.102JonathanRiley,‘LeadersRejectConsumerAttackOnIntensiveArea’,FW,13.03.1998,p.7.103Idem.,‘NOAHRoundsonSweden’,FW,19.06.1998,p.14;104Ibid.

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for 40 years without difficulty.”105While NOAH chairman Bill Hird accused

Scandinavians of exporting AGP bans to maintain “their own high cost

agriculturalproduction”106,RogerCookusedidenticalargumentsagainsttheSoil

Association:

It is importanttorememberthattheSoilAssociationrepresentsorganicfarmerswho,foryears,havesoughttojustifythehighpricestheydemandfortheirproducts(…).TheyhaveavestedinterestinmaintainingpublicanxietyaboutBritishfood.107

At theEuropean level, theFederationofAnimalHealth(FEDESA)presentedan

“independent survey”108showing that AGPs accounted for only 15% of total

antibioticuseandclaimedthatpowerfulmedicalinterestsweredisplacingblame

forbacterialresistanceonagriculture.109

Significantly, both the NFU and the Meat and Livestock Commission

(MLC)joinedindustrycampaignsagainstAGPbans.110Comparingantibioticfears

to “the hysteria that surrounded BSE,” Grenville Welsh from the British Pig

Association (BPA) called on “both industry and retailers” to “work together to

educate the consumer.” 111 In siding with NOAH, the NFU, however,

overestimated agricultural opposition to AGP bans. According to Jim Reed,

director of the United KingdomAgricultural Supply Trade Association, “itwas

timefortheindustrytofindoutexactlywhattheconsumerwanted.Andifthat

meant a ban on certain in-feed antibiotics then so be it.”112Meanwhile,

magazines likeFarmersWeeklybeganpromoting antibiotic alternatives aswell105Ibid.106Ibid.;alsoseePhilipClarke,‘AntibioticUseAsGrowthPromotersSetToBeBanned’,FW,20.11.1998,p.8.107ShelleyWright,‘MAFF’sAntibiotic‘Smokescreen’’,FW,31.07.1998,p.13.108PhilipClarke,‘FEDSARefutesAntibioticClaim’,FW,11.09.1998,p.10.109Idem.,alsosee:‘AntibioticsForGrowthAttack’,FW,18.09.1998,p.14.110JonathanRiley,‘LeadersRejectConsumerAttackOnIntensiveArea’,FW,13.03.1998,p.7;‘IndustrySaysYesToUseOfAntibioticsForGrowth’,FW,22.03.1998,p.42.111SimonWragg,‘IndustrySaysYesToUseOfAntibioticsForGrowth’,FW,22.05.1998,p.42.112Ibid.

184

as improved husbandry systems. With supermarkets like Waitrose and Tesco

demanding pigs produced without AGPs, particular attention was paid to

farmersalreadyemployingalternativerearingsystems.113

However, even the most open discussions about AGP-bans did not

address potential reductions of therapeutic antibiotic use. Throughout 1998,

articles continued to recommend generous antibiotic regimes for infected

animals and herds. 114 Despite sharing general concerns about antibiotic

resistance,most commentatorsdidnotaim toconvert conventional farmers to

organic agriculture. Wedged between the positions of NOAH and the Soil

Association, themajorityofconventionalBritish farmerscommittedtoa ‘Third

Way’ by reducing antibiotic usebutmaintaining intensiveproduction systems.

Asaconsequence,NOAH’sstrategyofraisinganagriculturalstormagainstAGP

bans failed. Despite rebranding AGPs as environmentally friendly “digestive

enhancers,”115pharmaceutical interestswereunable toprevent theEU’sbanof

virginiamycin, tylosin, zincbacitracin and spiramycinAGPs inDecember1998.

Together, these substances accounted for ca. 80%ofAGPs used in EUpig and

poultryrations.116

Following the announcement of the 1998 bans, MAFF and the MLC

commenced feeding trials with alternative growth promoters.117In Farmers

Weekly,nutritionistMartinOwersestimatedthatAGPbanswouldcostbetween

113SimonWragg,‘ConversionIsNowNameOfTheGame’,FW,04.09.1998,p.47;EmmaPenny,‘Pre-EmptingAntibioticCut’,FW,18.09.1998,p.14;EmmaPenny,‘WaitroseInDiscussionWithSuppliers’,FW,08.05.1998,p.42;JeremyHunt,‘HomeopathyLendsAHandAtBirthTime’,FW,23.01.1998,p.53;EmmaPenny,‘TeatsealscanTargetDisease’,FW,22.05.1998,p.16;JessicaBuss,‘You’veAlreadyMissedTheBoatIfYouHaveToCullForLameness’,FW,13.02.1998,p.12.114EmmaPenny,‘BewareVirulentFoot-Rot’,FW,06.02.1998,p.40;JessicaBuss,‘SummerMastitis’,FW,14.08.1998,p.37;‘JohnAlpe’,FW,06.03.1998,p.2115JonathanRiley,‘AntibioticRestrictionsAreUrged’,FW,11.12.1998,p.6.116PhilipClarke,‘AntibioticUseAsGrowthPromotersSetToBeBanned’,FW,20.11.1998,p.8.117‘Go-AheadForWorkOnFermentedFeed’,FW,25.12.1998,p.27;JamesGarner,‘MLCToSpellOutAdviceOnAGPReplacements’,FW,23.04.1999,p.39.

185

50 pence and £1 per pig: “we hope to claw at least half of that back.”118More

radically, Jasper Renold, pig unit manager on Easton Lodge Farm – Farmers

Weekly’sexperimentalfarm–questionedtheentireeconomicreasoningbehind

AGPs:

I thinkweseethemasnecessarytosafeguardperformance,particularlyin weaners. But if you were to ask me how much benefit they give, Icouldn’ttellyou.(…).Ithinkwe’recontinuingtousethembecausethey’reseenasarelativelycheapformofinsurance.119

Not only did Renold’s statement contradict NOAH and NFU claims, it also

revealedhowcredulousexpertsattheveryheartoftheagriculturalknowledge

systemhadbeenregardingindustryefficacyclaims.WhileFarmersWeeklybegan

to test remaining AGPs’ economic value, Easton Lodge’s veterinarian Richard

Potterclaimedthathe“wouldn’tbeatallsurprisediftherewasnodipingrower

performance following AGP removal, given the right management and

hygiene.”120

Even though some farmers and industry representatives remained

opposedtothe1998bans,121mostagriculturalobserversacknowledgedthatthe

endofOTCantibioticaccesswasnigh.122SpeakingtoFarmersWeeklyduringthe

1999PigandPoultryFairatStoneleigh,Tesco’sagriculturalmanagerChrisLing

announced:“it’snolongeraquestionofifthere’satotalbanonuseofAGP’sfor

pigproductionbutwhen.”123Tesco therefore encouraged suppliers to “remove

118SueRider,‘Don’tLookForOneAlternative.AGPs’,FW,21.05.1999,p.52.119SimonWragg,‘QuestioningTheNeedForAGPsWarningAboutWeaners’,FW,05.02.1999,p.38.120Ibid.121TeddyMaufe,‘Farmerfocus’,FW,25.06.1999,p.66;PhilipClarke,‘EU’sAntibioticRulingRemains’,FW,09.07.1999,p.12.122Jonathon[sic]Riley,‘ActiononAntibioticsExpected’,FW,28.05.1998,p.7;PhilipClarke,‘EUScientistsPushForEndOfAGPUse’,FW,04.06.1999,p.8;123‘Don’tLookforOneAlternativeAGPs’,FW,21.05.1999,p.52.

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prophylacticuseofAGPs”,“thequickerthebetter.”124ForpigconsultantVernon

Fowler, it was “prudent to assume that only prescription antibiotics will be

permittedinthelong-run.”125

Fowler’s guess came true. In April 2002, the EU Commission proposed

phasing out the remaining monensin sodium, salinomycin, avilamycin and

flavophospholipol AGPs.126Weakened by the European Court’s confirmation of

existingbansinSeptember2002,pharmaceuticalcompanies–noworganisedin

the Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture Alliance (RUMA), which also

listedtheBVAandNFUasmembers–continuedtheiropposition.127However,in

2003, EU AgricultureMinisters confirmed the phasing out of the last AGPs by

January1st,2006withregulation1831/2003/EC.128

WithAGPs’fatesealedbutresistancelevelscontinuingtorise,theuseof

therapeutic antibiotics in agriculture attracted a growing amount of public

criticism. Unsurprisingly, conventional farmers were reluctant to address this

issueandtheagriculturalpressonlyprintedafewarticlesaddressingitduring

the early 2000s.129In 2004, FarmersWeekly offered a brief glimpse into the

reality of agricultural antibiotic use when veterinarian Sam Leadley comically

addressedcommonmistakesonthefarminafeatureforthemagazine:

124Ibid.125Ibid.126HannahVelten,‘GPBanCouldCostDear’,FW,05.04.2002,p.43.127PhilipClarke,‘EuroBriefs’,FW,13.09.2002,p.8.128'BanonAntibioticsasGrowthPromotersinAnimalFeedEntersintoEffect',EUPressreleasesdatabase(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-1687_en.htm[accessed:02.10.2013],2006).129HannahVelten,‘AntimicrobialSalesRiseSeenAsAWarning’,FW,15.03.2002,p.39;JonathanLong,‘LoopholeInLawMakesMockeryOfBanOnAGPs’,FW,05.09.2003,p.3;RichardAllison,‘UsingAntibioticsForTheRoutineTreatmentOfMastitisInCowsDoesNotLeadToIncreasesInAntibioticResistance’,FW,10.10.2003,p.2;‘Growingthreatofantibioticresistance’,FW,11.-17.02.2005,p.31.

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Pickup-itisWhen after purchase, antibiotic remains in the pickup and was nevergiventothesickanimals.Too-much-water-itisDirections for reconstituting a powder were not followed – allowingtreatmentof threecalves insteadof two.Buteach injection thencarriestoolittleactivedrugtodothejob.Store-the-syringe-in-thebottle-itisYou always need a needle handy, so just stab the contaminated needlebackintothebottle.(…).Under-dosing-itis(…).Windowsill-itisExposure to strongsunlightandheatdestroyedmuchof theantibiotic’spotencywhenitwasleftonthebarnwindowsill.Quit-treating-too-soon-itis(…).130

Other‘itis'-typesincluded“one-drug-fits-all-itis"and“virus-itis”,131whichmeant

squanderingantibioticsagainstviral infections.Occurringfrequentlyenoughto

be addressed in comic form, the described practices were the logical

consequence of a system that entrusted therapeutic substances to laypersons,

whoseeconomicinterestsdidnotnecessarilyalignwiththoseofpublichealth.

Meanwhile,pharmaceuticalcompaniesdidtheirbesttopromotesalesof

therapeuticantibiotics.In2001,Schering-Ploughsponsoredaprizequizoncalf

pneumoniainFarmersWeekly.Winnerswereawarded£1250worthofweighing

equipment.132In its three ‘quiz’ articles, Schering-Plough stressed that farmers

shouldtreatcalfpneumoniaearlyand“trustanantibioticthatiseffectiveagainst

all three main pneumonia-causing bacteria.”133Fortunately, Schering-Plough’s

Nuflor was just such a “proven first-line antibiotic for pneumonia”, “effective

against all major bacterial causes of pneumonia,” with “no recorded

130Leadley,Sam,‘Understandingwhyantibioticsfail’,FW,24.-30.12.2004,Livestock,p.27.131Ibid.132‘YourPneumoniaKnow-HowCouldWinWeighingKit’,FW,16.11.2001,p.44.133Ibid.

188

resistance”134and “now available in extra-value 250ml bottles.”135Winners of

the prize weighing-kit could use it to “monitor how well cattle recover after

treatment with Nuflor.”136In 2005, pharmaceutical companies also sponsored

‘Farmers Weekly Academy’, a feature ‘educating’ farmers about treatments

against mastitis, metritis and other conditions. Antibiotics produced by the

sponsorwereconvenientlymentionedbelowthearticle.137

Thecommercialsseemtoindicateon-goingagriculturaldemandforeasy-

to-usetherapeuticantibioticsamongstBritishfarmers.AlthoughBSEweakened

farmers’ opposition to AGP bans, their on-going reliance on therapeutic

antibioticshassofarescapedeffectivereform.

134Ibid.135‘YourPneumoniaKnow-HowCouldWinWeighingKit’,FW,23.11.2001,p.38.136‘YourPneumoniaKnow-HowCouldWinWeighingKit’,FW,30.11.2001,p.43.137AndrewBradley,‘FarmersWeeklyAcademy:LearningForYourFarmingFuture’,FW,16.09.2005,pp.52-53.

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ChapterNine:SwannSongIn late 1969, public pressure and an upcoming election had forced Cledwyn

Hughes, Labour’sMinisterofAgriculture, to commithisministry to the Swann

report’simplementation.

Asaconsequence,MAFFofficialsweresurprisedwhenthreeweeksahead

ofthe1970generalelectionsaminutesuddenlyannouncedthatthedecisionto

bantetracyclineandpenicillinAGPsbyJuly1stwas“off.”1Officialshadspentthe

pastmonthsnegotiating the Julydeadlinewithall interestedparties.However,

behind closed doors, industry opposition to elements of the Swann report

remained strong and the NFU insisted on the “need to use antibiotics for

‘stress.”2WritingtoParliamentarySecretaryJohnMackieinMay1970,Cyanamid

International President Ernest G. Hesse warned that Britain had taken on a

“heavyresponsibilityinintroducinglegislativecontrols.”3Having“pioneeredthe

concept of antibiotics in animal husbandry,”4Cyanamid considered resulting

resistanceinsignificant.

Cyanamid also decided to generate public pressure against Swann. In

early 1970, the company sponsored a symposium at the Royal Society for

Medicineandflewintwoloyalex-CyanamidemployeesfromtheUS.Havingboth

cut their teeth in campaigns against Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,5Thomas

1TNAMAF416/67(Minute,EDolingtoMrCruickshank,28May,1970).2TNAMAF416/67(SubmissiontoMinister,SwannReport–CurrentPositionandFurtherAction,AppendixIII:ConsultationsAboutWithdrawalDateForPenicillinAndTheTetracyclines,13Jul,1970),p.2.3TNAMAF416/67(ErnestG.HessetoJohnMackie,20May,1970),p.1.4Ibid.5BothscientistshadalreadycuttheirteethbattlingtheclaimsofSilentSpring;Kroll,'The'SilentSprings'ofRachelCarson:MassMediaandtheOriginsofModernEnvironmentalism',pp.414-15.;ThomasH.Jukes,'TheRighttoBeHeard',BioScience,18/4(1968),ThomasH.Jukes,'Ddt

190

Jukes, the discoverer of the antibiotic growth effect and now a molecular

biologistatUCBerkeley,andRutgersbiochemistRobertWhite-Stevensactedas

proverbial bio-chemical ‘merchants of doubt’6by campaigning against any

perceived public or scientific threat to technologies safeguarding intensive

agriculturalabundance.

Following the symposium, Cyanamid distributed summaries of both

scientists’ statements to the press. Claiming to speak for large parts of “the

scientific community,” “British-born”White-Stevensattacked theSwann report

as the most recent manifestation of a “tendency to provoke pessimism over

scientific progress” and “‘loudly [bewail] the usually quite insignificant side-

effectsoftechnology.’”7Convincedthat“scientificagriculturemust‘holdafinger

in the dike’ against starvation,”8White-Stevens urged authorities to “maintain

meat production at its highest level.”9In a similar vein, Thomas Jukes “flatly

rejected”10Swann.Referringto“anexplodinghumanpopulation”,Jukesclaimed

thatthereportwasnotbasedon“facts”:

1) Antibiotics have retained their effectiveness for the production ofgrowthoffarmanimalsaftercontinuoususefornearly18years’.2)Thereisnoevidencethattheuseofantibioticsinanimalfeedshasledtoanincreaseinresistanceeitherinanimalorhumanpathogens.11

AffluentEnemyorBeneficialFriend',BioScience,19/7(1969),ThomasH.Jukes,'JukesinDefenseofBorlaug',BioScience,22/11(1972).6Theconceptof‘MerchantsofDoubt’wasoriginallycreatedtodescribethecampaigningofasmallgroupofColdWarphysicistsagainstindustry-hostilesciencefromtobaccotoclimatechange;OreskesandConway,MerchantsofDoubt.HowaHandfulofScientistsObscuredtheTruthonIssuesfromTobaccoSmoketoGlobalWarming.7TNAMAF284/283(PressInformation.CyanamidofGreatBritainLimited,‘ScientistsDeplore‘InstantDecision’ByGovernments’,20Jan,1970),p.1.8Ibid.9Ibid,p.2.10TNAMAF284/283(PressInformation,CyanamidofGreatBritainLimited,‘NewEvidenceCastsDoubtOnLinkBetweenFarmAntibioticsandHumanDisease’,20Jan,1970),p.1.11Ibid.

191

However,the1970campaignbyCyanamid’sPRfirm,theGrahamCherry

Organisation, backfired. Both Cyanamid and the Graham Cherry Organisation

had underestimated Whitehall’s corporatist abhorrence of public controversy

and the fact that largepartsof theBritishpublicandmediawereproudof the

Swann report. Having attended Cyanamid’s press briefing, a MAFF official

reported that the “press representatives present” had been “surprisingly

hostile.”12Journalists had wanted to know “why they should believe what the

two doctors had said in preference to Swann’s report.”13In the end, “only the

Guardian (…) covered [the] story.”14Referring to Cyanamid’s failed campaign,

MAFF’s Animal Health Divisionwas relieved to note that othermanufacturers

were“notpreparedtousethepublicitymethodsadoptedbyCyanamid.”15

Nonetheless,MAFF’spositionremaineddifficult.Officialscomplained,“it

is not possible to produce conclusive scientific evidence to justify fully either

acceptingtheproposalsorrejectingthem.”16An internalreportnoted, “inview

of the uncertainties we cannot afford to wait until [the debate is over] – if

ever.”17Publicly committed to the Swann report, MAFF officials, however,

attempted tomaintaina good relationshipwith farmersandmanufacturersby

offering “as smooth a transition as possible” 18 and thus postponed

implementationdeadlines,firsttoOctober197019andthentoJanuary1971.20

12TNAMAF284/283(Minute,IArmstrongtoMrDawes,21Jan,1970).13Ibid.14Ibid.15TNAMAF416/67(SubmissiontoMinister,SwannReport–CurrentPositionandFurtherAction,Appendix:Background(AnimalHealthDivisionII,8Jul,1970),p.3.16Ibid.,p.13.17Ibid.,p.7.18Ibid.,p.12.19TNAMAF284/283(Minute,EDolingtoDEvans,26May,1970).20TNAMAF416/67(SubmissiontotheMinister,SwannReport–CurrentPositionandFurtherAction,13Jul,1970),p.2.

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Following the general elections of July 1970, implementing the Swann

reportbecameevenmorecomplicated.AsaresultoftheConservatives’victory,

James–laterBaron–PriorwasappointedMinisterofAgriculture.Initially,Prior

“agreed that failure to implement the Swann recommendationswould be very

difficult to defend politically.”21 However, despite officials’ warning that “too

manydeadlineshadbeenbreachedinthepast,”22Priorsoonbegantowaver.Six

days after meeting his officials in August 1970, MAFF further postponed the

implementationdateoftheSwannbanstoMarchandfinallytoAugust1971.23

Thedecisiontopostponebansmighthavebeenduetoindustryinfluence.

Three days before the Augustmeeting, Prior received a letter from Cyanamid

Britain’s Keith P. Grainger. The intimate tone of Grainger’s letter to Prior is

striking.After congratulating “dear Jim” for “[getting]off to a verygood start!!

[sic],”24GraingerimmediatelybroachedthetopicoftheSwannbans:“Obviously,

I would be considered to be biased, but there is little doubt that this Report

causedconsiderablecommentinscientificcirclesandsomeoutstandingfigures

have taken issuewith Professor Swann.”25Furthermore, Graingerwarned that

the “practical problems and the cost of fully implementing ‘Swann’ would be

immense.”26CastingdoubtonexistingR-factorexpertise,Graingerwassurethat

Prior would not “wish farmers and veterinary surgeons to be made the

scapegoats for a subjectwhichhasmuchwider implications.”27WhileGrainger

21TNAMAF416/67(Minute,PWMurphytoMr.Doling,14Aug,1970).22Ibid.23TNAMAF416/67(PressNotice,Antibiotics,FurtherImplementationofRecommendationsoftheSwannCommittee,20Aug,1970),p.1.24TNAMAF416/67(K.P.GraingertoJimM.L.Prior[sic],10Aug,1970),p.1.25Ibid.26Ibid.,p.2.27Ibid.

193

appreciated that “Jim” had “inherited this particular ‘hot potato’ from [his]

predecessor,”28hewaseagertoprovidePriorwithfurtherinformation.

Signing with his first name, Keith also invited MAFF to send

representatives to an upcoming symposium on the “The Problems of Drug

Resistant Pathogenic Bacteria”29in New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. After a

brief discussion, MAFF decided to send A.B. Paterson, director of the Central

VeterinaryLaboratoryinWeybridge.Aministryofficialnoted:

First,andthisisasitwereapublicrelationsreason,inviewofthestrongattackwhichhasbeenmadeontheSwannCommitteerecommendationsweoughttomakeitabundantlyclearthatwearepreparedtolistentoalltheviewswhicharebeingputforward;(…).Second,(…),weoughtinfactmakesurethatweareintouchwiththelatestdevelopments.30

However,insteadofpromotingclarity,theNewYorksymposiumexposed

on-going divisions between European and US attendees. Contradicting recent

European warnings,31scientists associated with the pharmaceutical industry

downplayedthedangersofresistancetransfer.While theomnipresentThomas

Jukes repeated familiar arguments, 32 Harold Jarolmen from Cyanamid’s

Agricultural Division claimed that R-factor transfer in live animals was

negligible. In the rare cases that in vivo transfer did occur, bacterial strains

supposedly lost their “virulence” and the bacteriumwas put “at a competitive

disadvantagewithitsdrug-sensitiveparent.”33

28Ibid.29Ibid.,attachment,p.1.30TNAMAF416/67(Minute,E.DolingtoMr.Carnochan,15Jun,1970).31ChapterThree,pp.86-87;ChapterFour,pp.102-103;ChapterSix,pp.132-13432ThomasH.Jukes,'ThePresentStatusandBackgroundofAntibioticsintheFeedingofDomesticAnimals',AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademyofSciences,182(1971),pp.362-64;76.33HowardJarolmen,'ExperimentalTransferofAntibioticResistanceinSwine',ibid.,p.79.

194

The New York symposium also gave British and US officials the

opportunitytodiscusspolicystrategies.Presentingatthesymposium,thehead

oftheFDA’sBureauofVeterinaryMedicine(BVM),C.D.VanHouwelingnoted:

There are important differences in the uses of antibiotics in animals inGreatBritainand in theUnitedStates.Webelieve that throughournewdrug approvals (…), we have controls that they do not have in GreatBritain.However,wedorecognizethatthecontinuousorprolongeduseof antibiotics in feed does cause gramnegative organisms to developresistance.34

Writing toVanHouwelingoneweek later,Weybridge-directorPaterson looked

forwardtoreadingthereportofacontemporaryFDATaskForceonAntibiotics

inFeeds,“whichcanperhapsbedescribedasthe‘U.S.Swann’.”35Havinglearnt“a

good deal”while in theUS, Paterson promised to sendVanHouweling British

material on the development of resistance under “feedlot conditions.” 36

However, Paterson also warned Van Houweling that containing bacterial

resistancewasdistinctfromregulatoryeffortsagainstresidues:

AttheConferenceitselfIfeltthatquiteunwittinglyweweretalkingratherat cross-purposes in that theFDAhasconcerned itselfvery largelywiththeproblemof residuesand thepossibleeffectof these residueson thehuman population, whilst Swann is almost entirely concernedwith thepossibledevelopmentofantibioticresistantstrainsandtheirsignificanceinoutbreaksofdiseaseinbothanimalsandhumans.37CommittedtoAGPbansbyCledwynHughes,MAFFfinallybannedtheuse

of penicillin and tetracycline AGPs in August 1971. However, official reform

effortsquicklyebbedwhenitcametootheraspectsofthe1969Swannreport.

In the case of the proposed expert committee on all uses of antibiotics,

official inaction was partially due to internal power struggles. It had already

34C.D.VanHouweling,'TheFood,Drug,andCosmeticAct,AnimalDrugs,andtheConsumer',ibid.,p.412.35TNAMAF416/67(ABPatersontoDr.vanHouweling,22Oct,1970).36Ibid.37Ibid.;forthe1970-1972FDATaskForceseeChapterTwelve,pp.278-281.

195

beenclearin1969thatthenewcommitteewouldsituncomfortablybetweenthe

recently foundedVeterinaryProducts Committee (VPC) and theCommittee on

SafetyofMedicines(CSM).38DespiteMAFFandDHSSpressure,39strongVPCand

CSM opposition to the new committee even led to a temporary breakdown of

Britishantibiotic licensing.Followingthedissolutionof theAntibioticsPanel in

1970,40ittookinvolvedpartiestwoyearstodecidetoestablishajointadvisory

committee, whose advice would be non-binding.41Action was delayed even

furtheruntilcompaniesthatcouldnot licensenewproductsexertedsignificant

pressureontheVPC.42In1973,aVPCofficial informedtheCSM:“…becauseof

the number of antibiotic applications awaiting scrutiny (…) I should be most

grateful if everything possible could be done (…) to save any further

embarrassment.”43

The Joint Sub-Committee On Antimicrobial Substances (JSC) finally

startedworkonJuly2nd,1973andwaschairedbyPHLSdirectorJamesHowie.44

The JSC also included other familiar names: officially reconciledwithMAFF in

1972,45E.S.AndersonservedalongsideUniversityofLiverpoolveterinarian J.R.

WaltonandthealreadyfamiliarHoughtonveterinarianandearlyantibioticcritic

38TNAMAF260/678(NWTaylortoDepartments–MAFF,24Aug,1971),p.1;ChapterSix,pp.144-145.39TNAMH149/2484(DHSSMedicinesDivision,PaperA:MedicinesAct–ProposedOrdersAsToAntibiotics,FirstDraft,16May,1972),pp.3-4.40TNAMH149/2484(ANoteofAmeetingHeldtoDiscusstheEstablishmentofaCommitteeonAntibioticsHeldinFinburySquare,20Mar,1972).41TNAMAF260/678(NWTaylortoDepartments–MAFF,24Aug,1971),p.2;TNAMAF461/34(NoteofMeetingontheFutureoftheJointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,28Sep,1979),pp.1-2;TNAMH149/2484(CSGRussell(VPC)andEFScowen(CSM)toSirJamesHowie,12Dec,1972);(MedicinesCommission:Antibiotics,SecondDraft,9Jun,1972),p.4.42TNAMH149/2484(AMRNelsontoCSGGrunsell,14Mar,1973).43TNAMH149/2484(RJBlaketoJBBrown,27Mar,1973).44TNABN116/71(JointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,1stmeeting,2Jul,1973);TNAMAF461/34(Minute,PamelaGreentomembersofmeetingbetweenMAFFandMH,Sep,1979),p.1.45Onlyin1972didMAFFbreakitspolicyofsilencetowardsE.S.Anderson;cf.TNAMAF416/85(Minute,Mr.Barker,3Feb,1972).

196

HerbertWilliamsSmith.46However,JSCmemberssoonnoticedthattheylacked

real powerwhenpharmaceuticalmanufacturers repeatedly refused to provide

basicsalesdata.47RelationswiththeCSMandVPCalsoproveddifficult.Because

theCSMpreferredtoconsultitsownexperts,JSCmembersgraduallyturnedinto

VPClicensingconsultantswithoutaccesstoconfidentiallicensinginformation.In

September1979,memberssenta listofgrievances to theVPCandCSM.While

some distinguished members had simply stopped attending JSC meetings,

remainingmemberswerefrustratedbytheirinabilitytoproperlyexamineoften

poorly submitted licensing applications. JSC members “not unreasonably

consider[ed] that theyare toooftenbeing invited [toVPCmeetings]merely to

hazardaguessaboutthevalueorsafetyoftheproductsunderconsideration.”48

Referringtoparallelreportsonthepharmaceuticalblackmarket,theJSCnoted

that its attempts to “secure rational use of anti-microbial substances”49had

failed.

AlthoughsomeofficialsconsidereditunwisetodisbandtheJSCduetothe

“emotivearea”50itdealtwith,theVPCandCSMwereunwillingtostrengthenit.

According to the CSM and DHSS, “little would be lost if [the JSC] were

disbanded.”51Unwillingto fundthe JSCby itself, theVPCagreedtodisbandthe

committee.52Althoughmembersdeploredtheirdismissal,theJSCwasdisbanded

46TNAMH149/2484(TermsofReferenceoftheJointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances).47TNABN116/71(AppendixA,ML11,ExtractfromthereportoftheJointCommitteeontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalHusbandryandVeterinaryMedicine).48TNAMAF461/34(JamesHowietoChairmenofCommitteeonSafetyofMedicines(CSM)andVeterinaryProductsCommittee(VPC),7Aug,1979,p.2.49Ibid.,p.2.50TNAMAF461/34(Minute,PaulDitchfieldtoMr.Lawson(14Apr,1980).51TNAMAF461/34(NoteofMeetingontheFutureoftheJointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,28Sep,1979),p.2.52Ibid.,pp.2-4.

197

on December 31st, 198053and Britain returned to the pre-1969 separation of

officialresponsibilitiesforagriculturalandmedicalantibioticuse.

The JSC was not the only Swann recommendation to suffer from

lacklustreofficialsupport.MAFFandDHSSwerealsoreluctanttocommitfunds

to antibiotic resistance monitoring. While farmers supported protectionist

monitoring,54officials feared that it might necessitate the “drastic step”55of

importrejections.AccordingtoMAFF,resistancemonitoringwouldsurelyreveal

“majordifficulties”56withcontinentalandIrishimports.Constrainedbyfunding

andtradeconsiderations,officialsdecidedtoappeasefarmerswithapilotsurvey

of meat imports. The survey was to be evaluated by an interdepartmental

committeeandconductedbyE.S.Anderson,who–withcharacteristicbluntness

–hadalreadystatedthatitwas“eyewash”57.UnperturbedbyAnderson’sviews,

officials planed to use the survey to dissuade other countries from using

therapeutic AGPs for British-bound animals and to avoid an expensive

permanent domestic monitoring programme.58By September 1970, Britain’s

programme of “spreading the Swann gospel”59was, however, officially put on

hold.60BecauseofrenewedEECmembershipnegotiations,61officialsarguedthat

Britainshouldputits“ownhouseinorder”62insteadofmonitoringimports.

53TNABN116/119(JointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,MinutesofMeetingonDecember3rd,1980),p.7;alsosee:JohnHarveyandLizMason,TheUseandMisuseofAntibioticsinUkAgriculture.Part1:CurrentUsage(Bristol:SoilAssociation,1998),p.10;(JointSub-CommitteeonAntimicrobialSubstances,MinutesofMeetingon3Dec,1980),p.3.54TNAMAF416/85(Minute,E.Doling,24Apr,1970),p.1.55TNAMAF416/85(Minute,F.C.ParkertoMr.Doling,23Feb,1970).56TNAMAF416/85(Minute,E.Doling,24Apr,1970),p.2.57TNAMAF416/85(Minute,J.G.Carnochan,30Apr,1970).58TNAMAF416/85(Minute,R.J.Blake,27Aug,1970).59TNAMAF416/85(Minute,E.Doling,1Sep,1970).60TNAMAF416/85(Minute,E.Doling,18Nov,1970),pp.1-2.61TNAMAF416/85(Minute,E.Doling,24Apr,1970),p.4.62TNAMAF416/85(Minute,D.Stoker,16Jun,1971).

198

Behind the scenes, E.S. Anderson was, however, allowed to conduct a

limited survey. Following EEC membership, officials wanted “to confront

countrieswithavestedinterestinantibioticswithscientificfactsbutwewould

prefer to keep quiet until such data are available.”63Reporting in April 1972,

Anderson confirmed ministerial suspicions. Between February and October

1971,a teamofveterinarianshadcollectedsamplesof Irishbeefandporkand

USsheepandlambliversatBritishports.64InthecaseofUSsamples,29of32

lamb livers and two of seven sheep livers contained resistantE.coli.65Despite

cleansing by high-pressure hosing, 57.8% of Irish beef samples and 75.6% of

IrishporksampleswerecontaminatedwithE.coli.25.2%ofisolatedE.colifrom

beef and 94.9% of isolated E. coli from pork were antibiotic resistant.66

Furthermore,itwas“relativelycommon”forisolatedIrishE.colitobe“resistant

to combinations of the ‘therapeutic’ drugs ampicillin, chloramphenicol,

neomycin-kanamycin, streptomycin and sulphonamides.” 67 According to

Anderson,theresultswerenotsurprising,“sincetheIrishfarmerhasfreeaccess

toalltherapeuticantibiotics.”68

Anderson’s confidential studywas receivedwith interest byBritish and

US regulators.69Writing inMay1972, aMAFFofficial believed thatAnderson’s

studywouldhelppressuretheRepublicof Irelandtoblockantibioticsales into

63TNA416/86(Minute,JNJotchan,20Sep,1972).64TNAMAF416/86(E.S.AndersontoJ.Jotcham,17Apr,1972;attached,InterdepartmentalWorkingPartyontheimplementationoftheSwannReport.Examinationofimportedmeatforcontaminationwithdrug-resistantEscherichiacoli),pp.2-3.65Ibid.,p.8;attached,Table1:E.colifromIrishbeefandporkcarcasses.66TNAMAF416/86(E.S.AndersontoJ.Jotcham,17Apr,1972;attached,InterdepartmentalWorkingPartyontheimplementationoftheSwannReport.Examinationofimportedmeatforcontaminationwithdrug-resistantEscherichiacoli),p.3.67Ibid.,p.9.68Ibid.69TNAMAF416/86(Minute,ARMKiddtoWTBarker,1Jun,1972;WTBarkertoESAnderson,20Jun,1974).

199

Northern Ireland.70Onemonth later, theWorking Group on theMonitoring of

Imported Meat for Antibiotic Resistant Enterobacteria pressed for further

studiesofFrenchandDutchimports,asbothcountrieshad“avestedinterestin

theuseofantibioticsinanimalhusbandry.”71

However,monitoringaspirationsreceivedablowin January1973when

internal studies indicated problems with Britain’s own meat supply. Between

1971 and 1972, streptomycin resistance amongst isolated E. coli strains had

risen from 47 to 50%, tetracycline resistance from 44 to 50% and ampicillin

resistance from 49 to 56%.72 The results contradicted projected Swann

outcomes. Afraid of jeopardizing the ‘Swann gospel’, British officials stopped

commissioningresistancestudies.In1973,aMAFFofficialnotedthatlarge-scale

resistance surveys could “only be done on the basis of a free exchange of

information.”73However,“thismightrobusofsomeofouradvantageduringthe

5-yearderogationfromEECpractice(…),inthecourseofwhichwehopethatthe

Communitywillalignwithus.”74Additionalsurveysmightfurtherunderminethe

“SwannDoctrine.”75

Following themid-1970s, there were only sporadic British attempts to

monitorbacterialantibioticresistanceinfoodproduction.Inthesameyearthat

farmersprotestedagainstFrencheggimports,asurveycomparedresistancein

70TNAMAF416/86(RWMcQuistontoWTBarker,8May,1972).71TNAMAF416/86(WorkingGroupontheMonitoringofImportedMeatforAntibioticResistantEnterobacteria,Meeting,13Jun,1972),p.2.72TNAMAF416/86(ARMMidd,AntibioticResistanceintheUKandBelgium,13Jan,1973),p.1.73TNAMAF416/86(JNJotchamtoABPaterson,9Apr,1973).74Ibid.75Ibid.

200

FrenchandBritisheggs.However, the1975comparisonrevealednodifference

ofresistancelevelsandfurtherunderminedSwann-inspiredprotectionism.76

WithBritishofficialsstoppingstudiesratherthanendangeringanossified

and ineffective doctrine, the Swann report’s raison-d’être of curbing antibiotic

resistance was effectively forsaken within four years of its publication. An

effective adaptation of British antibiotic policy to an increasingly resistant

microbialecologyrecededintothedistantfuture.

In addition to resistancemonitoring, British officials failed to enact the

Swannreport’sproposedbanofantibioticadvertisementstofarmers.Ina1972

recommendation,MAFF’sAnimalHealthDivisionnotedthattheBVA,RCVSand

PharmaceuticalSocietyallfavouredsuchaban:

They argue that [veterinarians’] (…) task should not be made moredifficultbyuninformedpressuresfromclientsrespondingtoadvertising.Alsotheythinkthat(…)thereisadangerthatsomeclientswhoseinteresthasbeenarousedwillobtainsuppliesillicitly.77

However, the ABPI, the NFU and the British Poultry Federation opposed

advertisingbans:“Theyarguethattheprescriptionrequirementgivescontrolto

veterinarians and that the Government should not ‘molly-coddle’ them...”78

Following several inconclusivemeetings,MAFF’sAnimalHealthDivisionnoted

that the “proper course would be to accept the logic of the Swann

recommendation” and announce “the intention to make regulations in the

absenceofaneffectivevoluntaryscheme.”79

76TNAMAF282/186(SteeringGrouponFoodSurveillance,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood,Secretariat,Jun1975).77TNAMAF416/70(SubmissiontoMinister,SwannReport–RecommendationonAdvertising,January1972).78Ibid.79TNAMAF416/70(SubmissiontoMinister,SwannReport–RecommendationonAdvertising,Jan1972).

201

Onceagain,ConservativeMinisterofAgricultureJamesPriordidnotheed

officials’advice.DespiteappealsbyJuniorHealthMinisterLordAberdare,Prior

referred the matter to the still non-existent JSC. In a draft letter to Lord

Aberdare,Priorstated:

Asyouknow,Idonotsubscribetotheviewthattheveterinaryprofessionis not strong enough to resist pressure from its farmer clients; andalthoughthedrugmanufacturersareobviouslykeentosellIamnotsurethatadvertisingnecessarilyincreasesoveralldemand.80

A savvy politician, Prior was, however, “glad to accept [Aberdare’s] proposals

thatweleaveittoofficialstonotifytheinterestedorganisations.”81

Following Prior’s promotion to Leader of the House of Commons, the

issue resurfaced in1974whenboth the JSCandVPCsupportedadvertisement

bans.82However, Prior’s successor failed to address the matter ahead of the

1974 general elections. Following the Conservatives’ defeat, officials duly

resubmitted the proposed restrictions to their new Labour ministers.83A

frustratedofficialnoted:

Myownviewisthat,whileinmattersofthissortthereisoftenmuchtobesaidfor leavingwellalone, inthiscasewecannot ignoretheadviceof3official committeesnor swallow theassertionof themanufacturers thattheydonotseektoenlistthesupportofthefarmerinbuildingupanevenbiggermarketintherapeuticantibiotics,regardlessoftrueneed.84

However, the politically opportune moment had passed and the matter was

quietlydroppedaftertechnicalitiesfurtherdelayedrestrictions.85

80TNAMAF416/70(DraftfortheMinister’sSignaturetoLordAberdare(DHSS));alsoseeAberdare’scorroborationofthecorrespondence;TNAMAF416/70(LordAberdaretoJamesPrior,21Mar,1972).81TNAMAF416/70(DraftfortheMinister’sSignaturetoLordAberdare(DHSS)).82TNAMAF416/71(MinuteJohnHDrurytoMrNelson,23Jan,1974);TNAMAF416/71(MinuteRJBlaketoMrWTBarker,17Apr,1974).83Ibid.;TNAMAF416/71(SubmissiontotheMinister,SwannReport–RecommendationOnAdvertising,20Jun,1974),p.5.84TNAMAF416/71(Minute,CHShillitotoMissEvans,9Jul,1974).85TNAMAF416/71(Minute,MrNelsontoRJBlake,9Jan,1975).

202

Initially, it looked as though Swann proposals for antibiotic residue

regulation would also share the fate of resistance monitoring and advertising

bans. Even though the VPC supported residue monitoring in April 1971,86

residue tests remainedunstandardizedand results couldvarybyup to50%.87

Theonlyexceptionwas the standardised test forpenicillin inmilk.Testing for

rather generous penicillin residues, the MMB’s penalty scheme had reduced

residue finds in milk from 10% in 1960/61 to ca. 1% in the mid-1970s.88

However, British authorities remained blissfully ignorant regarding the

contamination of produce other thanmilk.With no data forcing authorities to

act,consumerprotectionremainedbasedonthe1955FoodandDrugsActand

the Preservatives in Food Regulations, which prohibited adding antibiotics to

food,except inthetemporarycaseofnisinandoxytetracyclinepreservatives.89

However, there was no legislation outlawing the sale of produce in which

antibioticswere‘present’asopposedto‘added’.90

As a consequence, consumers’ only protection from residues lay in the

wordingofSectionTwoofthe1955FoodandDrugsAct.Accordingtothe1955

Act,itwasanoffence“toselltotheprejudiceofthepurchaseranyfoodwhichis

notof thenature, substanceorqualitydemanded.”91Ina fewcases, localFood

and Drug Authorities used Section Two to exert pressure on producers and

86TNAMAF416/85(D.StokertoDr.B.A.Rose,28May,1971).87TNAMAF284/282(CommitteeonMedicalAspectsofFoodPolicy,meeting,4Mar,1968).88TNAMAF461/67(SteeringGrouponFoodSurveillance,Sub-GroupAntibioticResiduesinFood,AntibioticsPriceDeductionScheme,Jan,1976).89Thepracticeofpreservingfoodwithantibioticsotherthannisinwasnolongerendorsedin1975;TNAMAF282/186(SGFS,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood.Minutesofthe1stmeetingoftheSub-Groupheldon30Apr,1976),p.3.90TNAMAF284/282(L.C.GaskelltoMr.J.G.Kelsey,19Sep,1968).91TNAMAF260/678(E.J.MehentoNWTaylor,2Sep,1971).

203

MAFFtoreduceresiduesandrestrictantibioticsforculturallysensitiveproducts

likeeggsandmilk.92

However, from the mid-1970s onwards, lax British residue regulations

came under significant pressure. Reacting to the increasing international

emphasisonlaboratory-basedresiduetests,93officialsdecidedtoconductapilot

survey of residues in British meat via a Steering Group on Food Surveillance

(SGFS). 94 Between October and December 1975, the Laboratory of the

Government Chemist analysed 789 pig kidney and chicken liver samples. Of

these, 25.5% tested positive for antimicrobial residues.95However, testing

methodsprovedunreliable:only27.8%ofpositivekidneyand44.5%ofpositive

liversamplesshowedinhibitionzonesmatchingthoseofspikedcontrolsamples.

Becausenobodyhad told thegovernmentchemistwhichantibiotics to test for,

residuetestshadbeendesignedonlyforpenicillinandtetracyclinesanddidnot

reliably detect other antibiotic residues.96Moreover, limited electrophoresis

capacitiesallowedtheprocessingofonly15-20samplesperweekeventhough

residues’antimicrobialactivitydecreasedduringstorage.97Seeninthislight,the

five samples conclusively testing positive for penicillin or tetracycline via

electrophoresissaidlittleabouttheoverallcontaminationofBritishmeat.98

92TNAMAF260/678(S.SimmonstoWJDWilliams,9Aug,1971);(LRMaddocktoWJDWilliams,4Feb,1971.93ForthepioneeringroleoftheUSregardingantibioticsinthe1960sseeChapterFour,pp.66-67;87-88;ChapterTwelve,pp.297-298);alsoseePeterA.Koolmes,'VeterinaryInspectionandFoodHygieneintheTwentiethCentury',inDavidF.SmithandJimPhilips(eds.),Food,Science,PolicyandRegulationintheTwentiethCentury.InternationalandComparativePerspectives(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2000),pp.60and62.94TNAMAF461/67(D.Tingle/JohnFitzgeraldtoR.J.Blake,31Oct,1975;attachednote),pp.1-2.95TNAMAF461/67(SGFSSub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood:FurtherResultsontheSurveyOfResiduesinPoultryandPigmeat,March,1976),pp.1-6.96TNAMAF461/67(SGFSSub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood,1stMeeting,20Apr,1976),p.5;(Secretariat,IncidenceofAntibioticResiduesinFood,Mar,1976),p.2.97Ibid.,p.1[handwrittennote]-2and6.98TNAMAF461/67(SGFS,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood,1stMeeting,20Apr,1976),p.5.

204

Pressure for further surveys soon increased. Following Britain’s EEC-

accession, Directive 64/433/EEC initially allowed national food safety rules to

differ.99However, by the mid-1970s, several EEC members were calling for

unified monitoring. According to EEC Draft Directive 72/462, residue

contaminated non-EEC meat imports were to be banned.100Similar demands

werealsovoiced for the intra-EECtradeandWest-Germanauthoritiesrejected

three consignments of residue-tainted British meat in 1975 and 1976.101

Following further rejections by US, Dutch and Scandinavian authorities,MAFF

scrambledtorestoretrustin£150millionofannualBritishmeatexports:

If we are to avoid placing our export meat trade in jeopardy, and onecouldarguethatitisalreadyonthebrink,(…),itisimperativethatamorepositivepolicyon‘residuesinmeat’beformulated...102

SGFS subsequently tasked a Sub-Group on Antibiotic Residues to establish a

national meat-monitoring programme. 103 In April 1976, SGFS Sub-Group

memberslaunchedasecondlimitedsurvey:meatsamplesweretobescreened

using standard EEC bacterial inhibitor tests – so-called ‘frontier post tests’.

Should bacterial growth be inhibited on test dishes, electrophoresis screening

wouldidentifyinhibitingsubstances.104

However, by 1977, the Sub-Group had managed to establish only a

preliminaryexport-monitoringprogrammeoffoursamplesperweek.Thegroup99TNAMAF461/67(J.A.DaviestoJ.E.Tugwell,16Nov,1977),p.1.100TNAMAF282/186(SGFS,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood,Secretariat,March1976),p.19;adoptionwasplannedforJanuary1977.101TNAMAF461/67(SGFS,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood,1stMeeting,20Apr,1976),pp.5and7;TNAMAF282/186(NormanDBairdtoRVBlamaire,‘ResiduesinMeat–SomePertinentFacts’,4Aug,1976),p.2.102TNAMAF282/186(NormanDBairdtoRVBlamaire,‘ResiduesinMeat–SomePertinentFacts’,4Aug,1976),p.4;alsosee:TNAMAF461/67(J.A.DaviestoJ.E.Tugwell,16Nov,1977),p.1.103TNAMAF461/67(SGFS,Sub-GrouponAntibioticResiduesinFood.DraftTermsofReference,Mar,1976);thesub-grouplaterseemstohavemergedwiththeWorkingPartyonVeterinaryResiduesinMeatandMeatProductsoftheSGFS;MAF461/68(Minute,A.W.HubbardtoW.Barker,1978),p.2.104Ibid.,p.7.

205

wasdeniedstatutoryaccesstoabattoirsandthePortandAirHealthAuthorities

sent only 40 samples in four months instead of the promised 50 weekly

samples.105Unable to trace residues back to producers,106analysts were also

deniedaccesstoconfidentialVPCinformationonresidueassays.107Inmid-1978,

therenamedWorkingPartyonVeterinaryResiduesinMeatandMeatProducts

presented results: between July1977andMarch1978, scientistshadanalysed

933 samples. Voluntarily selected and sent by 23 of theUK’s export abattoirs,

sampleshadbeen testedusingEEC frontierpost tests.According to the study,

the incidence of positive tests was below 0.3%.108However, an attached note

warned that resultswere compromised. In the case of 153 samples sent from

Smithfield,analystsreported:

Many liver and a proportion of the kidney and beef samples were ofextremelypoorquality(…).Certainliversweregreenandstrongsmelling,andreallyshouldnothavebeentested.109

Othersampleshadthawedbeforereachinganalystsanddidnotincludekidneys

orlivers–keyorgansforresiduetests.110

Despite the questionable nature of the second survey’s results, MAFF

representatives used them to reassure trade partners. During a meeting with

American and Canadian representatives in 1978, MAFF officials admitted that

there“wasthepossibilityofcertainunauthoriseduseofantibiotics”111.However,

105TNAMAF461/67(Notesofmeeting,UKDrugResidueMonitoringProgramme,1977),p.1.106Ibid.,p.2;alsosee:MAF461/69(Minute,A.W.HubbardtoW.Barker,1978),p.2-3.107TNAMAF461/68(SGFS,WorkingPartyonVeterinaryResiduesinMeatandMeatProducts,1stMeeting,29Jul,1977),p.3.108TNAMAF461/68(WorkingPartyonVeterinaryResiduesinMeatandMeatProducts.AntibioticResiduesinMeatTakenfromExport-LicensedAbattoirsinUK)109Ibid.;Annexe:AntibioticResiduesinImportedMeat),p.1.110TNAMAF461/68(WorkingPartyonVeterinaryResidues,DraftReporttotheSGFS,Noteof2ndmeeting,17Jul,1978).111TNAMAF461/67(Minute,J.MoreytoMr.Giles,30Jan,1978),p.1.

206

“the industrywas a closely integrated one [and] anywidespread abusewould

(…)bequicklypublicised.”112Withsurprisingconfidence,oneofficiallaternoted:

ItclearlycameassomethingofasurprisetotheAmericanandCanadiandelegates torealise theextent towhichacombinationofadministrativeandlegalprovisionscouldbeeffective.Theyhadclearlyheard,althoughtheydidnotsay(…)thattheso-calledloop-holesinthelaw,pluggedonlybyadministrativerecommendations,werelessthaneffective.113

Suchattitudeswere,however,not sharedbyEECpartner states.During

the secondhalf of the 1970s,WestGermany andDenmarkpressed for unified

EECresiduemonitoring,whichwouldanalyseafixedpercentageofmeatimports

andintra-communitytrading.114Meanwhile,BritishofficialsfavouredtheUSDA’s

contemporary residue-monitoring program, which was based on binominal

probability theory and used a much smaller number of supposedly random

samplestoextrapolatetheprobabledegreeoftotalmeatcontamination.Should

residues be found, a second stage of intensive sampling would reveal local

offenders. 115 For British authorities, this meant that instead of annually

analysing 5,200 samples under the proposed percentage scheme, they would

havetoanalyseonlyca.1,800samplesanddeployfarlesspersonnel.116

Reporting on ameeting of the residue sub group of the EEC’s working

partyonveterinarylegislationinMay1978,117aBritishdelegatenotedthatthe

idea of probability-based sampling had led to a “good deal of acrimonious

112Ibid.,p.1-2.113Ibid.,p.2.114TNAMAF282/198/1(SubmissiontotheParliamentarySecretary,MAFFNationalMeatResidueMonitoringProgramme,FoodScienceDivision,AppendixC,February1980);alsoseedraftdirectives4850/VI/77(1977)and728/VI/78(1978).115TNAMAF461/67(Notesofmeeting,UKDrugResidueMonitoringProgramme,1977),p.1;alsosee:ChapterTwelve,pp.297-298.116TNAMAF461/67(Minute,E.OwentoJ.Morey,16Dec,1977),p.1;cf.also(Minute(undated),MonitoringofDrugResidues,FCN228);TNAMAF461/68(MeatResidueMonitoringProgramme),p.3.117TheUK’spositionhadbeenpre-determinedbyMAFFinApril1978;TNAMAF461/68(Minute,J.ArdleytoR.D.Martin,April1978).

207

discussion with the German representative proving the most vocal.” 118

Continental opponents had talked “a good deal of nonsense (…) about the

willingness of consumers to pay for extra protection.”119During the meeting,

Britainalsolobbiedtopreventmandatorydrugwithdrawalperiods,monitoring

ofmeatproducts–asopposedtofreshmeat–andtestsforpesticideandheavy

metal residues.120While Britain successfully toppled pesticide monitoring and

residue limit proposals, delegates compromised by mandating preliminary

probability–based residue surveys, which would indicate whether more

extensive testing was necessary. Unilaterally, member states could, however,

monitormoreextensively.121

Britishpilot testing inpre-selectedslaughterhousesbegan in1980.122In

the absence of statutory regulations, voluntarily participating slaughterhouses

could theoreticallymanipulateresultsbypreselectinguncontaminatedsamples

for testing by Reading’s Veterinary Investigation Centre.123Meanwhile, MAFF

reassured industry that monitoring was “simply an attempt to gain

representativedatawithwhichtonegotiateeffectivelyandensurethatthereare

no more controls than are absolutely necessary.”124In total, measures were

projectedtocost£20,000p.a.withadditionalresourcesrequiredforexportsto

countrieswith tougher requirements such asWest-Germany, Italy, Cyprus and

118TNAMAF461/68(EEC,SummaryReportofMeetingwithRepresentativesofCommunityInstitutionsorOfMemberGovernments,‚WorkingParty‚VeterinaryLegislation’Sub-Group‚Residues’(25-26.05.1978),‘DraftDirectivesonUndesirableResiduesinFreshMeat’,30May,1978),p.2.119Ibid.120Ibid.,pp.1-4.121TNAMAF282/198/1(SubmissiontotheParliamentarySecretary,MAFFNationalMeatResidueMonitoringProgramme,FoodScienceDivision,AppendixC,February1980).122TNAMAF282/198/1(SubmissiontotheParliamentarySecretary,MAFFNationalMeatResidueMonitoringProgramme,FoodScienceDivision,February1980),p.2.123Ibid.124TNAMAF282/198/1(SamplingofmeatforResidueInvestigations).

208

theNetherlands.125AdecadeafterSwann,meatdestined for foreign tableswas

subjecttostrictercontrolsthanmeatdestinedforBritishtables.

Submitted in 1982, the first national residue survey claimedwith 95%

certitude that less than 1% of cattle, calf, sheep and pig kidneys and meat

containedantimicrobialagentsabovepermittedtolerancelimits.Sulphadimidine

wasprobablypresentinlessthan4%ofBritishmeat.Antimicrobialresiduesin

poultryproductswerenotmeasured.126However,thereport’sprojectionshadto

betakenwithagrainofsalt.InaparallelstudyofGerman-boundmeatexports,

19of61samples(31.2%)testedpositiveforantibiotics.Aprevioussurveyof88

sampleshadfound7positiveresults(ca.8%).127

Withsubsequentnationalresiduesurveysrevealinghighercontamination

rates and media reports disclosing illegal drug trading on farmyards,128the

performance of British monitoring and enforcement was subjected to greater

public scrutiny. However, state-employed MAFF veterinarians, who were

responsible for sampling, were often afraid of jeopardizing relationships with

local farmers and slaughterhouses.129In 1983, a veterinary officer complained

about“fielddonkeywork”130andhavingtoreport“lotnumbers,sizeofbatches,

125TNAMAF282/199(Minute,LGMitchelltoMrFry,Attached:MeatInspectionReview.StateVeterinaryServiceNationalSurveillanceSchemeforResiduesinMeat,10Aug,1984),p.3.126TNAMAF461/70(WorkingPartyOnVeterinaryResiduesInMeatAndMeatProducts,NationalMeatMonitoringProgrammeYear1Results,13Oct,1982),p.7127TNAMAF461/70(WorkingPartyonVeterinaryResiduesinMeatAndMeatProducts,AntimicrobialAgentsinMuscleandKidney,resultsfromAbattoirsexportingtoWestGermany);alsoseeTNAMAF461/70(LaboratoryReportNo.82/11),p.2.128TNAMAF282/199(AntimicrobialandHormoneResiduesinmeat,SubmissiontotheParliamentarySecretary,FoodScienceDivision,MeatHygieneDivision,Sep1983);ChapterSeven,pp.150-152.129TNAMAF282/199(Memorandum:FromDVOMAFFtoMrJAGrisedale,DRVO(Reading)andMrJMThrelkeld,RVO(Reading),9Feb,1983).130TNAMAF282/199(RSBeynontoMrJenkinson,18Feb,1983),p.1.

209

informationonfarmoforigin,etc.”131Afraidofstraining“existingrelations,”the

officialwantedtopayforsamplesandthreatenedsabotage:

IfIsampleapigandI(…)knowthatantibioticswillbepresent,canIhaveaguaranteethattherewillbenorequestforanapproachtothefarmer?Ifnot,Iamgoingtobeselectiveinmysamples.Ifaguaranteecanbegiven,thenthereisnopointingivingtheoriginofthesample.132

However, such protest was of no avail and 1983 brought new EEC

directives for intra-communitymeatmonitoring.133Startingwork in 1984, the

State Veterinary Service’s (SVS) National Sampling Scheme (NSS) initially

continued to relyon randomsampling and thevoluntaryprovisionof samples

and product information.134However, by the end of the year, new EEC

requirements mandated traceable samples, follow-up sampling and the

outlawingof theslaughteringof residue-ladenanimals.135For theSVS, thenew

EECproposalswere“excessive”,“costlytooperate”andmight“causeproblems

forourexporttrade.”136AlthoughtheUKsuccessfullydelayedtheirintroduction

for four years, the new EEC regulations ultimately forced Britain to expand

mandatorymeat sampling to 28,000 samples in 1989.137In the same year, the

newVeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate(VMD)wasplacedinchargeofveterinary

licensing,enforcementandmeatsurveillance.138Criticslaterbemoanedthatthe

VMDwasfinancedbytheveryindustryitwassupposedtomonitor.139

131Ibid.132Ibid.,p.2.133TNAMAF282/199(Minute,LGMitchelltoMrFry,10Aug,1984;attached,MeatInspectionReview,EECproposalstoControlResiduesinMeatforIntra-CommunityTrade),pp.1-2.134Ibid.;attached,MeatInspectionReview,SVSNationalSurveillanceSchemeforResiduesinMeat),pp.1-4.135Ibid.;attached,MeatInspectionReview,EECproposalstoControlResiduesinMeatforIntra-CommunityTrade),pp.1-3.136Ibid.,p.4.137JamesErlichman,‘Drugtracesfoundinabattoircarcases’,Guardian,18.01.1988,p.4.138'ReportonMicrobialAntibioticResistanceinRelationtoFoodSafety',(London:AdvisoryCommitteeontheMicrobiologicalSafetyofFood,1999),p.146.;RichardYoungetal.,TheUseandMisuseofAntibioticsinUkAgriculture.Part2:AntibioticResistanceandHumanHealth(Bristol:SoilAssociation,1999),p.42;'TheReportoftheExpertGrouponAnimalFeedingstuffstothe

210

While domestic scandals and international pressure gradually forced

themtoaddressresidueproblems,1980sUKofficialsrarelydebatedthefailure

of Swann-style AGP restrictions to curb overall agricultural antibiotic use or

resistanceproliferation.

By contrast, the 1990s saw pressure for resistance-focussed antibiotic

reform increase again.Whereas a comparative paucity of data had previously

made it easy to downplay problems, the 1990s saw improved residue and

resistance data increase the cost of political inaction: themore one knew, the

moreonehadtodo.Initiallyopposingratherthanshapingthem,Britishofficials

soonfoundthemselvesforcedtoenactEuropeanantibioticreforms.

InBritain, theExpertGrouponAnimalFeedingstuffshadalready called

foragriculturalantibiotic reform in1992.HeadedbyUniversityofNottingham

animal physiologist Prof. George Eric Lamming, the so-called Lamming

committee identified “gaps in legislation and its enforcement.”140Regarding

antibiotic residues, the Lamming committee criticised insufficient official

oversight and assay methods. 141 Although EC Directive 70/524 obliged

manufacturers to publicize information on the detection of antibiotic feed

additives, similar regulationsdidnot exist for POMs. InBritain,manufacturers

were obliged to inform the VPC about POM assays but this confidential

MinisterofAgriculture,FisheriesandFood,theSecretaryofStateforHealthandtheSecretariesofStateforWales,ScotlandandNorthernIreland(LammingReport)',p.43.139Youngetal.,TheUseandMisuseofAntibioticsinUkAgriculture.Part2:AntibioticResistanceandHumanHealth,pp.42-43.140'TheReportoftheExpertGrouponAnimalFeedingstuffstotheMinisterofAgriculture,FisheriesandFood,theSecretaryofStateforHealthandtheSecretariesofStateforWales,ScotlandandNorthernIreland(LammingReport)',p.3.141Ibid.,p.75.

211

information was not communicated to enforcement authorities, a problem

alreadyencounteredbytheJSCinthe1970s.142

Significantly,theLammingcommitteealsowarnedaboutrisingantibiotic

resistanceinbacterialisolatesofanimalorigin.Between1981and1990,multi-

resistanceamongstisolatedS.typhimuriumstrainshadrisenfrom15to66%in

the case of cattle and from 2 to 8% in the case of poultry.143Alarmed by this

increase, the Lamming Committee recommended expanding routine resistance

monitoring to human E. coli isolates.144In conjunction with the VPC, the

Lamming committee also recommended discouraging the “prophylactic use of

antibioticswith cross-resistance to thoseused in humanmedicine.”145Another

recommendation was the changing of rules allowing manufacturers to send

diluteddrugsubstratestofarmersforhome-mixing.146

Published prior to the 1996 BSE crisis, the Lamming report failed to

arouse significant public or political interest. In 1993, officials ignored the

committee’s concernsabout cross-resistanceandapprovedagriculturalusesof

the fluoroquinolone antibiotic enrofloxacin (Baytril), which could select for

resistance against important reserve antibiotics.147The risks of agricultural

fluoroquinolone use were already known. After their introduction to German

agriculture in 1988, fluoroquinolone-resistant variants of S. typhimurium

DT204c reached “a prevalence of 50%”148in calf isolates in certain areas. As

142Ibid.,p.70.143Ibid.,p.47.144Ibid.,p.48.145Ibid.146Ibid.,pp.45-47.147'ThePathofLeastResistance',(StandingMedicalAdvisoryCommittee.SubgrouponAntimicrobialResistance,1998),p.78;forenrofloxacin’sfateintheUSseeChapterTen,pp.244-246;andChapterTwelve,pp.309-313.148'UseofQuinolonesinFoodAnimalsandPotentialImpactonHumanHealth.ReportofaWhoMeeting,Geneva,Switzerland,2-5June1998',(1998),p.7.

212

primary causes of bacterial gastroenteritis, fluoroquinolone resistant S.

typhimurium DT104 and Campylobacter soon emerged as public health

threats.149

However,timeswerechanging.Inasignofcritics’growinginfluence,the

EU established a Commission to reassess agricultural antibiotics in 1992.150

Following EU measures against agricultural chloramphenicol use in 1994,151

reports of cross-resistance between avoparcin and the reserve antibiotic

vancomycinpromptedGermany,DenmarkandtheNetherlandstovetoaBritish

licensingrequestforavoparcinindairycowfeeds.WithDenmarkandGermany

subsequently banning all avoparcin AGPs in 1996, other EU states began to

supportEU-wideavoparcinrestrictions.152

But Britain did not follow suit. Unable to lift EuropeanBSE embargoes,

the Major government was reluctant to commit itself to EU-driven antibiotic

reform just ahead of the general elections on May 1st, 1997. Within the EU,

Britain’s position was supported by the Scientific Committee for Animal

Nutrition(SCAN),whichcalledformoreresearchaheadofbans.Bycontrast,the

CommitteeofExpertsonFeedAdditivesandtheEUCommissionbothsupported

a ban and considered evidence linking avoparcin to vancomycin resistance

149Ibid.,pp.6-7.150UwePetersen,'EntwicklungenImDeutschenFuttermittelrecht',inBundesforschungsanstaltFürLandwirtschaft(Fal)(ed.),MeilensteineFürDieFuttermittelsicherheit:VortragsveranstaltungImForumDerFalAm16./17.November2006(Braunschweig:Petersen,Uweetal.,2007),p.6.151AckermannDettenkofer,M.;EikenbergM.;MerkelH.,AuswirkungenDesEinsatzesVonAntibiotikaUndSubstanzenMitAntibiotischerWirkunginDerLandwirtschaftUndImLebensmittelsektor.EinLiteratur-Review(ErnährungsWendeProdukte,MaterialienbandNr.4;Freiburg:InstitutfürUmweltmedizinundKrankenhaushygieneamUniversitätsklinikumFreiburg,2004),p.24.152Petersen,'EntwicklungenImDeutschenFuttermittelrecht',p.6.;'WrittenAnswerstoQuestions(10.06.1996)',CommonsHansardWrittenAnswers(London,1996),p.Column10.

213

sufficient.153In a far cry from its post-Swann pioneering role, Britain was

overruledandtheEUbannedavoparcinAGPsonApril1st,1997.154

AfterMay1st,theNewLabourgovernmenttookactiontorestoretrustin

BritishregulationsandfoodbyendingMAFF’sinstitutionalisedconflictbetween

business and consumer interests. Responsible to theDepartment ofHealth, an

independentFoodStandardsAgency(FSA)startedworkinApril2000.In2001,

MAFF itself was dissolved and turned into the Department for Environment,

Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). While the VMD retained responsibility for

residue monitoring, DEFRA was responsible for the control of food-borne

zoonosis.155

Meanwhile, a proliferation of high profile international and domestic

reportsreinforcedcalls forantibioticreform. In1997,aWHOmeetingon“The

MedicalImpactofAntimicrobialUseinFoodAnimals”156calledforimprovedand

standardized international resistance monitoring and specified monitoring

requirements for Salmonella, E. coli, Campylobacter jejuni and Enterococcus.157

After a second WHO meeting expressed concern about “non-medical uses of

antimicrobials”158inApril1998,athirdWHOmeetingonagriculturalquinolone

useadmonishedveterinarianstoreduceprescriptionsandwarnedagainstusing

quinolones“forperformanceenhancement”159inJune1998.

153'ThePathofLeastResistance',p.78.154Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.205.155Smithetal.,FoodPoisoning,PolicyandPolitics.CornedBeefandTyphoidinBritaininthe1960s,pp.307-08.156'TheMedicalImpactofAntimicrobialUseinFoodAnimals.ReportofaWhoMeeting.Berlin,Germany,13-17October1997.',(1997).157Ibid.,p.13.158'AntimicrobialResistanceMonitoring:InformationExchangeandOpportunitiesforCollaboration.ReportoftheSecondJointWho/IfpmaMeeting,Geneva2-3April1998',(1998),p.1.159'UseofQuinolonesinFoodAnimalsandPotentialImpactonHumanHealth.ReportofaWhoMeeting,Geneva,Switzerland,2-5June1998',p.17.

214

InBritain,theHouseofLordsalsopublishedaninfluentialreportin1998.

Mostlyconcernedwithhumanmedicine,theLordsacknowledged“acontinuing

threat to human health from imprudent use of antibiotics in animals.”160The

sections of the Lords’ report that did discuss agricultural antibiotics bore a

strong resemblance to the 1969 Swann report. This was no coincidence.

VeterinarianLordSoulsby,thecommittee’sleader,hadbeenaclosefriendofthe

lateMichaelSwann.161AccordingtotheLords,Britainhadonce“ledtheworldin

addressing the threat to human health posed by antibiotic use in farming

practiceswiththeSwannReportin1969.”162However,importantpartsofSwann

had been watered down. Criticising the JSC’s dissolution and inadequate

monitoring, theLordswarned, “departmental andagencyboundariesmustnot

beallowedtopreventtheGovernment fromgettingagriponthewholeof this

issue.”163TheLordsalsorecommendedphasingoutvirginiamycinAGPsbecause

of cross-resistance to the new antibiotic dalfopristin/quinupristin (Synercid)

andnotedthatthe“mass-treatmentofherds(…)andflocks(…)with[antibiotic]

agents cannot bebest practice...”164Veterinarians should reduce antibiotic use:

“werecommendself-regulationinpreferencetolegislation.”165

The Lords’ attack on agricultural antibiotic use was just the beginning.

Shortlyafterwards,theHouseofCommonsSelectCommitteeonAgriculturewas

moresevereinitsassessmentofthesituationandrecommended:

… a ban on the use of antibiotics in farming as growth promoters, andtighter restrictions on their use for subtherapeutic or prophylactic

160'ResistancetoAntibioticsandOtherAntimicrobialAgents',(London:HouseofLords-SelectCommitteeappointedtoconsiderScienceandTechnology1998),p.11.18.161Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.203.162'ResistancetoAntibioticsandOtherAntimicrobialAgents',p.11.19.163Ibid.,p.11.23.164Ibid.,p.11.21.165Ibid.

215

purposes.Everyeffortshouldbemadetodevelopvaccinesasalternativestoantibioticsfortherapeuticpurposes.166

Commissioned by the UK’s Chief Medical Officer Sir Kenneth Calman in July

1997,theStandingMedicalAdvisoryCommittee(SMAC)alsopublishedareport

titled“ThePathofLeastResistance”167describingAGPsas“amajorconcern(…)

underminingnewantibiotics (…)evenbefore theseenterhumanuse.”168SMAC

also criticised veterinary prescription practices: “…‘fire-brigade’ responses

without consideration of preventive measures are no longer acceptable.”169

According to a parallel Soil Association report, British tetracycline use had

increased 1500% and penicillin use 600% in the past 30 years whereas the

incidenceoftetracycline-resistantSalmonellahadrisentoover80%in1998.170

Reacting to resistance concerns, theEUorganiseda conferenceon “The

Microbial Threat”171in Copenhagen in September 1998.With European CMOs

attending, the over 400 participants stressed the necessity of reliable data on

antibiotic consumption and bacterial resistance.172Fourteen days after the

conference, the EU passed Decision No 2119/98/EC,173which established the

EuropeanAntimicrobialResistance Surveillance System (EARSS) for resistance

in humans and animals.174On December 17th, 1998 – three months after the

166SelectCommitteeOnAgriculture,'FourthReport.FoodSafety',(London:HouseofCommons,1998),p.IV.123.m.167'ThePathofLeastResistance',p.7.168Ibid.,p.8.169Ibid.,p.80.170HarveyandMason,TheUseandMisuseofAntibioticsinUkAgriculture.Part1:CurrentUsage,p.3&8.;AGPbansandreductionsofantibiotic-prophylaxiswerealsorecommendedin'AntibioticResistance.TheRisktoHumanHealthandSafetyfromtheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalProduction(Ceg98/2)',p.4.171ToreMidtvedt,'TheMicrobialThreat.TheCopenhagenRecommendation',MicrobialEcologyinHealthandDisease,10(1998),p.66.172Ibid.,p.67.173'DecisionNo2119/98/Ec',OfficialJournalL298(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998D2119:EN:HTML[accessed:25.10.2013],03.10.1998).174TheorganisationisnowresponsibletotheEuropeanCentreforDiseaseControl(ECDC)andisknownasEARS-Net;‘AboutEars-Net',

216

Copenhagen conference – the EU Commissionmade the evenmore significant

decision to ban four of themost popular AGPs (virginiamycin, zinc bacitracin,

spiramycin and tylosin phosphate) with Directive (EC)2821/98. Britain

endorsedtheban.

Inits1999“ReportonMicrobialAntibioticResistanceinRelationtoFood

Safety”175, the UK’s Advisory Committee on theMicrobiological Safety of Food

(ACMSF)upheldthe1998AGPbans.AlthoughtheyopposedfurtherAGPbans,176

committee members recommended monitoring the transmission of antibiotic

resistance between animals and humans177and drew attention to veterinary

prescriptionpractices:

Thesourcesof incomeinveterinarypracticehavechangedconsiderablysince World War II. (…), veterinary charges were skewed so that thedecline in income from professional fees was offset by an increase inincomefromdrugsales.(…).Drugsalesaccountforpossiblysome40percentofincome.178

WhiletheACMSFhadno“evidencethatUKveterinariansareabusingprescribing

practices,”179it noted that Swedish veterinarians were prohibited from selling

whattheyhadprescribed.However,aSwedishsystemmightleadtotheclosure

ofBritishveterinarypractices.Inadequatecontrolsandrecordkeepingonfarms

werealsocriticisedbyACMSF:

Despitethestatutoryobligations(…),unpublished1994MAFFdatathrowseriousdoubtsupon theeffectivenessof the currentarrangements. (…).In all, only 25 per cent of the total farms visited had livestock farmmedicinebooksthatwerecompletedanduptodate.180

(http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/surveillance/EARS-Net/about_network/Pages/history.aspx[accessed:02.07.2015]).175'ReportonMicrobialAntibioticResistanceinRelationtoFoodSafety'.176Ibid.,pp.172-73.177Ibid.,p.132.178Ibid.,p.151.179Ibid.,p.152.180Ibid.,p.147.

217

TheACMSFalsocriticisedon-farmmixers’exemptionfrommedicatedfeedstuff

provisionsandtheillegalrecyclingofmedicatedfeedmaterials.181

Stimulated by such reports, the Labour administration founded DEFRA

AntimicrobialResistanceCoordination (DARC) in 1999.Working alongside the

ACMSF and the Advisory Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance and Health

Care Associated Infections, DARC was tasked with encouraging prudent

antibiotic use and reviewing expanded resistance monitoring.182After 1998,

Britain commenced susceptibility testing of veterinary pathogens and

commensal organisms. Since then, EU Council Directives 2003/99/EC and

2007/407/EC have mandated resistance monitoring of Salmonella and

Campylobacter isolated from food and animals, and the European Food Safety

Authorityregularlycontrolsnational reports.TheUKalsoprovidesmonitoring

dataonE.coliandEnterococciresistance.183

Readdressing antibiotic residues in 2001, the British government

installed an independent Veterinary Residues Committee (VRC) to advise the

VMDandFSA.Inthesameyear,theEU’sVeterinaryMedicinalProductsDirective

(2001/82/EC)fosteredharmonisedcontrolsforthemanufacture,authorisation,

marketinganddistributionofveterinarymedicinesand laid the foundation for

the British Veterinary Medicines Regulations (VMR). Coming into force in

October 2005, the VMR consolidated the plethora of controls previously

181Ibid.,pp.163-64.182'DefraAntimicrobialResistanceCoordination(Darc)Group',(http://www.vmd.defra.gov.uk/public/antimicrobial_darc.aspx[accessed:27.10.2013]).;responsibilityforanimalantimicrobialresistancepolicypassedtotheVMDin2011.183IamindebtedtotheVMDforansweringmyquestionsregardingcurrentantibioticlegislationfollowingmycorrespondencewiththemonSeptember2nd,2013.

218

contained in the 1968 Medicines Act and over 50 amending Statutory

Instruments.184

Since 1999, the VMD has also compiled antibiotic sales data. Initially,

industryfigureswerecollectedviavoluntaryarrangements.However,following

2005,statutorydatasubmissionrequirementswereintroduced.185Accordingto

theVMD,salesofveterinaryantimicrobialproductsrosesharplyfrom475tons

in1993to629tonsin1996.Followingtheavoparcinban,salesfellto522tonsin

1998. 186 Between 1993 and 1998, 83-90% of antibiotics were sold for

therapeuticpurposesand10-17%forgrowthpromotion.187After1998,AGP-use

sunk from 67 tonnes in 1999 to 36 tonnes in 2003.188Initially, therapeutic

antibiotic sales also decreased: In 1998, ca. 433 tonnes of active therapeutic

antibioticshadbeensold.189By2006,saleshaddecreasedto356tonnes.190Since

then,salesofagriculturaltherapeuticantibioticshavefluctuatedandaccounted

for355tonnesin2013.191

By establishing regular and independent monitoring and by granting

statutory powers to enforce compliance and access industry data, the British

governmenthas fulfilledkeydemandsofantibiotic critics. In2003, theLabour

184PersonalcorrespondencewithVMD.185'SalesofAntimicrobialProductsAuthorisedforUseasVeterinaryMedicinesintheUkin2011',(VeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate,2012),p.8.186'SalesofAntimicrobialProductsUsedasVeterinaryMedicines,GrowthPromotersandCoccidiostatsintheUkfrom1993-1998',(http://www.vmd.defra.gov.uk/vet/antimicrobial_pubs.aspx[accessed:21.10.2013]:VeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate).187Ibid.188'RevisedFiguresforSalesofAntimicrobialProductsUsedasGrowthPromotesintheUk',(http://www.vmd.defra.gov.uk/vet/antimicrobial_pubs.aspx[accessed:20.10.2013]:VeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate).189'SalesofAntimicrobialProductsUsedasVeterinaryMedicines,GrowthPromotersandCoccidiostatsintheUkfrom1993-1998'.190'SalesofAntimicrobialProductsAuthorisedforUseasVeterinaryMedicinesintheUkin2011',p.11.191'UkVeterinaryAntibioticResistanceandSalesSurveillance(Uk-Varss2013)',(Addlestone(Surrey):VeterinaryMedicinesDirectorate,2014),p.10.

219

government also supported the EU’s decision to ban the remaining four AGPs

withRegulation (EC)No1831/2003. Because of the regular supply of data on

antibioticresistance,residuesandusageandclearbureaucraticresponsibilities,

ithasbecomefareasiertoidentifyandresolveantibiotic-relatedproblemsboth

withinagricultureandcorrespondingbureaucracies.

However, inotherrespects,Britainhasremained tardy. In2011, theEU

CommissioncriticisedBritainforinfringingDirective2001/82/ECbycontinuing

topermitantibioticadvertisementstofarmers.Whilethepracticehassincebeen

banned and farmers are more regulated than ever,192veterinarians remain

surprisingly immune to tighter regulations and there exists no national data

collectionandevaluationsystemofveterinaryprescriptionpractices.Initiatives

to separate veterinarians’ prescription rights from the right to sell drugs –

something long-since achieved in humanmedicine – have so far failed towin

politicalsupport.

Meanwhile, bacterial antibiotic resistance remains a major problem. In

Spring2013, theUK’sCMO,DameSallyDavies,warned thatresistancewas“as

big a risk as terrorism”193and shouldbe added to thenational registerof civil

emergencies. Unfortunately, Davies’s warnings may well prove Cassandra-like

shouldtheyfailtorouseinterestoutsideofexpertcircles.

As this study has shown, British antibiotic reform resulted from two

periods of upheaval during the 1960s and 1990swhen agricultural antibiotics

turnedintofocalpointsattractingandbundlingpublic fears.Withmemoriesof

192'VeterinaryMedicinesRegulations',(http://www.vmd.defra.gov.uk/public/vmr.aspx[accessed:27.10.2013]),'VeterinaryMedicinesRegulations-ChangestoAdvertisingRules',(http://www.vmd.defra.gov.uk/pdf/vmr_letter1012.pdf[accessed:27.10.2013],11.10.2012).193FergusWalsh,'AntibioticsResistance'asBigasTerrorism'-MedicalChief',BBCNews(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-21737844[accessed:24.09.2014],11.03.2013).

220

BSE fading, it is easy to forget that some of the most dangerous aspects of

agriculturalsubstanceuseremainunsolved.

221

PartFour–USA:TheProblemofPlenty(1967-2013)

ChapterTen–ThePublic–Antibiotics,FailedBansandGrowingFearsWhereasacombinationofresiduescandals,animalwelfareissuesandbacterial

resistancewarningsledtoapartialphasingoutofAGPsinBritainandtheEEC,

the same was not true in the US. In 1965, long-standing fears of chemical

residues had resulted in the formation of the FDA’s ad hoc committee on

veterinary and non-veterinary antibiotics. However, the committee’s 1966

report did not lead to a Swann-like ban of therapeutic antibiotics. Despite

contemporary British publications on ‘infectious resistance’, the American ad

hoccommittee’sreportfocussedmainlyonthepreventionofantibioticresidues

in food rather than on resistance proliferation. Having banned antibiotic

preservativesandestablishedanationalantibioticresidue-monitoringprogram,

the FDA publicly equated combatting antibiotic residues with combating

bacterial resistance. In doing so, officials avoided challengingUS farmers,who

mightbeconcernedaboutriskstotheirpersonalhealthbutfeltunabletobreak

the antibiotic-fuelled cycle of agricultural intensification. The US media also

remaineddividedinitsassessmentofagriculturalantibiotics.

In the case of medical antibiotic use, the popularisation of horizontal

resistance transfer by NEJM and pre-existing criticism of antibiotic overuse

meant that all major US newspapers agreed that excessive antibiotic use by

physiciansandpatientshadtoend.1Similar toBritain,particularattentionwas

1‘InfectiousDiseases:TryingTooHardForTheFastKnockout’,Time,06.01.1967;‘GermResistanceToDrugsStudied’,NYT,26.03.1967,p.23;onthe1960sfightagainst‘irrational’prescriptionsinhumanmedicineseePodolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,pp.112-19.

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paid to the emergence of methicillin-resistant Staph aureus and resistant

Venereal Diseases like syphilis and gonorrhoea.2However, the extent of the

health threat posed by transferable resistance remained contested. While

Vernon Knight of Baylor University claimed that there “was no compelling

evidencethatadarkageofmedicine,bereftofantibiotics,liesahead”3,R-factor

discovererTsutomuWatanabepredicteda“pre-antibiotic”4era.

Disagreeing about the threat posed by antibiotic resistance in medical

settings, commentators were even more divided about the threat posed by

bacterialresistanceinagriculturalsettings.Followingthe1967NASsymposium,

thePostreferredtoAGPs’economicbenefitsbeforenotingthatregulatorswould

have toproveconcreteharmresulting fromagriculturalantibioticuseprior to

restricting substances.5The NYT published a more sceptical summary of the

symposium.Although thearticle endedbyquoting ex-Cyanamidemployeeand

outspoken antibiotic supporter Thomas Jukes, it noted the international

disagreement regarding AGPs: “Scientists from Britain and the Netherlands

reportedspecificcasesoftheemergenceofdrug-resistantstrainsofbacteriain

animalsreceivinglowlevelsofantibioticsintheirfeeds.”6InScientificAmerican,

TsutomuWatanabeexplicitlyblamedagriculturalantibioticsforcontributingto

bacterialresistance.7In1968,theNYTlistedresistantbacteriaasamajorthreat

to “Spaceship Earth”8and David H. Smith from Boston’s Children’s Hospital

2‘PublicHealth:VDDetectives’,Time,01.09.1967;‘UNAgencyWarnsDrugsAloneCan’tWipeOutVD’,NYT,25.01.1968,p.13;IanMacleanSmith,‘DeathfromStaphylococci’,SciAm(02/1968),pp.84-94.3HaroldM.Schmeck,‘Medicine:NowBacteriaFightBack’,NYT,28.05.1967,p.E8.4MartinWeil,‘NewChemicalIsSaidtoBreedResistancetoPotentDrugs’,WP,10.12.1967,p.A10.5OvidA.Martin,‘USStudiesAdditivesinAnimalFeeds’,WP,09.07.1967,p.A13.6HaroldM.SchmeckJr.,‘ScientistsStudyFeedAntibiotics’,NYT,11.06.1967,p.54.7TsutomuWatanabe,‘InfectiousDrugResistance’,SciAm(12/1967),pp.26-27.8‘ToSaveSpaceshipEarth’,NYT,02.06.1968,p.E10.

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Medical Center warned about low-dosed AGPs’ ‘infectious hazard’ for human

health.9

However,oneyearlater,theNYTwastheonlymajornewspapertoreport

extensively on the British Swann report. Criticising the FDA for its lack of

action,10theNYTcitedBritain’sMinisterofAgricultureCledwynHughes:“Weare

thefirstcountryintheworldtotacklethisproblem.(…).Wedonotaccept(…)

that20yearsofexperiencegoestoshowthattherearenoseriousill-effectsfrom

giving antibiotics to animals’…”11According to another article: “the British are

takingagiantstepforwardinacontroversialarea.”12Noothernewspapertook

upthisrallyingcry.

By the end of the decade, individualwarnings by Anderson,Watanabe,

David Smith and British officials had thus failed to provoke a prolonged US

public campaign for antibiotic reform. In the media, concerns about bacterial

resistance remained mostly limited to human medicine. In the Post, animal

health columnist Dr. Frank Miller remained remarkably unperturbed when

readerswantedtofeedAGPstokittensorenquiredwhetherantibioticoveruse

forpetscouldcontributetoresistance.13

Althoughtheydisagreedabout therisksofbacterial resistanceselection

on farms,Americanmedia commentators remainedunited in their criticismof

chemical residues in food.14Fitting the description of ‘unnatural’ additives,

agriculturalantibioticswereaffectedbywhathistorianSarahVogeltermstheUS9‘AnimalsEatIntoAntibiotics’,WP,06.10.1968,p.F5;SmithwasadeveloperofthemeningitisvaccineandlaterboardmemberoftheEnvironmentalDefenseFund;KarenFreeman,‘DavidH.Smith,67,DeveloperofVaccineAgainstMeningitis,NYT,01.03.1999.10‘USHasOneRestriction’,NYT,21.11.1969,p.17.11AlvinShuster,‘BritaintoCurbAntibioticFeed’,NYT,21.11.1969,p.17.12LawrenceK.Altman,‘DrugUseinFeedArousesConcern’,NYT,23.11.1969,p.81.13FrankMiller,‘TheWonderfulWorldofAnimals’,WP,12.09.1970,p.C10;Idem,‘TheWonderfulWorldofAnimals’,WP,30.09.1970,p.B10.14SandraBlakeslee,‘FoodSafetyaWorryInEraofAdditives’,NYT,09.11.1969,p.1.

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“toxicity crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.”15In newspapers, commentatorswere

particularlyconcernedaboutthelackofresiduecontrolsforAmericanmeat.In

July1967,thePostwarnedthatthe“meatlobby”wasattempting“tosidetrackor

modify a bill providing for the inspection ofmeat, some of it unfit for human

consumption, which has been peddled off on unsuspecting housewives for a

goodmanyyears.”16Accordingto thePost, this ‘peddling’waspossiblebecause

federalinspectionsdidnottargetmeatsoldwithinstateborderswhereofficials

wereworking“handinglovewiththemeatpackinginterests”:

[Meat] has been processed with such extras as hog’s blood, which isprohibitedinFederallyinspectedmeat.Eveneyeballs,lungs,andchoppedhides have been used in processed ham to increase its protein content.Detergents have also been used to freshen up the meat, while suchantibiotics as aureomycin have been injected as a substitute forsanitation.17

Media concerns about drug residues in food soonmergedwith general

allegationsofFDAkowtowingto industry. In1967,PostreporterMortonMintz

warnedthata“thunderingsilenceofdrugconsumers”wasenablingindustryto

subvertconsumerprotection:

Whospeaksforthefetus,whoseconcernwithchemicalsextendsbeyonddrugstofoodadditivesandpesticidesamongotherthings?Inatechnicalareaascomplexastheadvertisingofprescriptiondrugs,howmuchvoicedoconsumershave?18

Mintzwasespeciallyconcernedaboutphysicians’overuseofchloramphenicol.19

Althoughthelinkhadbeenknownsincethe1950s,201960sdatasuggestedthat

aplasticanaemiaoccurredtentimesmorefrequentlyafterchloramphenicoluse

15Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.43.16DrewPearsonandJackAnderson,‘LobbyBattlingUSMeatInspection’,WP,18.07.1967,p.B11.17Ibid.18MortonMintz,‘TheThunderingSilenceofDrugConsumers’,WP,26.11.1967,p.B2.19‘SenateWitnessesChargeAntibioticKilledChildren’,NYT,29.02.1968,p.39.20JEB,‘WhenaCureisaKiller’,NYT,03.03.1968,p.E8.

225

than previously thought.21Worryingly, the FDA seemed powerless to effect

change. After the FDA’s failure to ban chloramphenicol in early 1968,22FDA

Commissioner Goddard claimed to be at his “wit’s end”23and was widely

criticised.

Succeeding Goddard in July 1968, Commissioner Herbert Ley launched

withdrawal procedures against 49 fixed drug combinations includingUpjohn’s

Panalba.24However, in themidst of Ley’s battle against inefficacious antibiotic

combinations,theFDAwasseverelycompromisedbyamemoallegingthatithad

manipulated and overlooked data on cyclamate sweeteners’ carcinogenicity.25

ThememoseeminglyconfirmedsuspicionsaboutcompromisedFDAconsumer

protection. Despite his campaign against Panalba, Ley’s initial hesitancy to

proceed against cyclamates provoked further ire and resulted in his effective

sacking by HEW Secretary Robert Finch.26Ley later claimed that he had been

under “constant, tremendous, sometimes unmerciful pressure”, sometimes

spending “as many as six hours fending off representatives of the drug

industry.”27

Responding to the FDA’s crisis, the Republican Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare, Robert Finch, appointed former Booz Allen Hamilton

consultantCharlesD.EdwardsasFDACommissioner.Edwardswasexperienced

21MortonMintz,‘Antibiotic’sDangerSeenasUnderrated’,WP,12.11.1967,p.F7.22‘FDABarsAntibioticFromMarket,AsksRecall’,WP,20.01.1968,p.E17.23MortonMintz,‘FDAConcedesDrugCurbMayFail’,WP,01.03.1968,p.A3;onchloramphenicolseeThomasMaeder,AdverseReactions(WilliamMorrow&Co,1994).24Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,pp.105-11.25Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.51.26BarbaraResnickTroetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s(NewYork:CityUniversityofNewYork(Dissertation),1996),pp.31-52.27RichardD.Lyons,‘OustedFDAChiefCharges‘Pressure’FromDrugIndustry’,NYT,31.12.1969,p.1;Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.53.

226

inpublicrelationsandannouncedarevitalisationoftheFDA:drugrecallswould

be accelerated, consumer involvement increased, bad advertising and

prescriptionhabitstargetedandinner-agencysciencestrengthened.28However,

thecrisisofpublictrustinFDAconsumerprotectionwasnotover.

In 1970, newspapers reported the results of the USDA’s survey for

antibiotic residues in American meat. While overall statistical monitoring

seemedtoindicatelowcontaminationrates,moretargetedtestinghadrevealed

antibiotic residues of sufficient concentration to trigger allergic reactions. The

Postwarned:“Atthepresenttimeafarmeroranylaypersoncanpurchasemany

ofthesedrugsinanyquantityandwithoutanyrestrictions.”29However,C.D.Van

Houweling, the head of the FDA’s Bureau of Veterinary Medicine (BVM),

cautioned, “You can’t put an inspector at the shoulder of every farmer,

veterinarian andmeat packer in the country.”30Only fivemonths later, media

commentatorsreactedagainsttheannouncementthatmonitoringprogramsfor

antibioticresiduesweretobecutby74%andthoseforDESby50%.31In1971,

theNYTsummarised consumer feelings: “Thesedays [theFDA is]just lurching

fromcrisistocrisis”:

In the last year, headlineshaveproclaimedmercury in fish, botulism inpizzas, pesticides in turkeys, arsenic in chickens, antibiotics in cheese,hormonesinmeat,salmonellainsoup,cyclamatesinsoftdrinksandDDTinpracticallyeverything.32

28MortonMintz,‘NewCommissionerDeterminedToRemaketheTroubledFDA’,WP,22.02.1970,p.F1.29DavidWallace,‘AntibioticsUsedinMeatsSpurStudy:EnoughRegulation?’,WP,14.06.1970,p.K3.30Ibid.31Idem.,‘MonitoringofMeatIsReducedSharply’,WP,22.11.1970,p.A2.32RichardD.Lyons,‘FDA:TheseDaysIt’sJustLurchingFromCrisistoCrisis’,NYT,10.01.1971,p.E2.

227

AccordingtoconsumeractivistRalphNader’s‘Raiders’,the“foodsideoftheFDA

wasashambles.”33TheFDAwasseekingthe“adviceofgroups,suchasthe[NAS]

(…).Yet(…)someoftheadvisersinvolvedarethemselveseitheremployedbyor

consultantstothefoodindustry,…”34Ina491-pagereport,the‘Raiders’warned

thatdiseasedorcontaminatedmeatwasstillreachingconsumers:

Stuffedwithchemicalsthatmakethemfattenfast,animalsendtheirlivesinoverpackedfeedlots.(…).Sinceovercrowdingpromotesstress(….),theoperators pour tranquilizers and antibiotics into feed troughs. Theproblemisthatresiduesofmanyinvisiblechemicalsremaininthemeat,…35

Inthesameyear,thePost’sRuthWinterdescribedhowheryoungdaughterhad

“suffered from a severe, intractable case of the hives”36because of antibiotic-

taintedmilk.Twoyearslater,thePostreportedrisingresiduedetections:

Illegaldrugresidueswerefoundin2.7percentof themeatandpoultryproduct samples tested in a nationwide (…) sampling program in thesecondquarterof thisyear. (…).Antibiotic residues in3percentof thecowsand9percentofthecalvestested.37Rising residue detections in US meat coincided with a further public

relationscrisisfortheFDA,whichwasbeingforcedtobancarcinogenicDESasa

result of Congressional investigations. Media reports highlighted that the FDA

had earlier supported exempting DES from the 1958 Delaney Clause and

describedtheagency’sgatekeeperpolicyforfeedadditivesasa“debacle”:

WhentheFDAinsistedthatDESresidueswouldn’tendupinthemeat(…)itmeant that tests showed that therewouldbeno residuesof thedrug

33Ibid.34Ibid.35‘Environment:NaderonFood’,Time,02.08.1971;alsosee:JamesTurner,TheChemicalFeast.RalphNader'sStudyGroupReportontheFoodandDrugAdministration(NewYorkGrossmanPublishers,1970).Althoughthereportdealtextensivelywithresiduesandfood-bornepathogens,itdidnotdealwithantibioticresistance.36RuthWinter,‘WhateverHappenedToNaturalFood?’,WP,21.03.1971,p.B2.37‘DrugTracesinMeatRise’,WP,12.08.1973,p.B8.

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accordingtodirections‘reasonablycertaintobefollowedinpractice.’(…).It’sthesamestorywithSynovex,orthenitrofurans,oranyotherdrug.38

Meanwhile,veterinarianspaintedadisturbingpictureofdruguseonUSfarms:

‘Over60percentoftheanimaldrugsarenotusedinthetrained,skilledhandsofvetsbutbylayfarmers,(…).Hell,justrecentlyafarmeroutheregotDDTinhiscattle–thedamnfoolsuseditforlice.39Similar to the UK, the US organic market was the main profiteer of

regulatoryagencies’failuretoguaranteefood‘safety’and–moreimportantly–

‘purity’.DescribedbyhistorianWarrenBelasco,thelate1960ssawthefusionof

theestablishedorganicsectorwithyoungcounter-culturalandenvironmentalist

movements.ThroughouttheUS,co-opsandcommuneswithnameslikethe“Hip

Salvation Army”40began producing and selling ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ food. Like

theirBritish counterparts,Americanproducers and consumersof ‘natural’ and

‘organic’ food were united in their concern about the denaturation and

‘poisoning’ of food, bodies and the environment by ‘unnatural’ chemicals.

However,intheUS,organicfood’sexnegativoidentitywasfurtherstrengthened

by a Jeffersonian dimension, which united older organic followers and young

counter-culturalelements.41

Inmajornewspapers,articlesexploredthephenomenonoforganic food

anditsalleged ‘purity’.42Commentatorswerealsointriguedbythemovement’s

eclecticcompositionandoccasional‘weirdness’.Ina1971articleonthe“Guruof

the Organic Food Cult” and founder of the Rodale Press, Jerome I. Rodale, the

NYT described the many groups “loosely clustered under the organic

movement’santichemicalumbrella”:38DanielZwerdling,‘TheMeatRisks’,WP,13.05.1973,p.C5;onthehistoryofDESseeLangston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes.39DanielZwerdling,‘TheMeatRisks’,WP,13.05.1973,p.C5.40Belasco,AppetiteforChange.HowtheCountercultureTookontheFoodIndustry,p.18.41Ibid.,pp.18-28;41;76;93-108.42JacquinSanders,‘OrganicFood:AGrowingMarket’,WP,28.06.1970,p.H3.

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… food cultists, from old-line vegetarians to youthful Orient-oriented‘macrobiotic’ dieters (…), plus reactionaries yearning to turn back allclocks,urbandropouts(…),ecologists(…),Dr.Strangeloveparanoidswhoread poison plots on ingredient labels (…) and, increasingly, ratherordinary[people]towhompronouncementsabout[chemicalperils](…),havestirredawarinessaboutallman-madechemicals…43

In 1973, the newspaper printed a similar feature on 69-year old nutritionist

Adelle Davis, “chief showwoman for health foods, a $1-billion-a-year business

catering (…) to a rapidly growing ‘organic nation’ of health-food devotees.”44

AccordingtotheNYT,Davis’shealthfoodsvisionof‘purefood’andcontroversial

emphasisonvitaminswasincreasinglyrepresentativeofthe“twoarchetypesof

South California, the little old lady in tennis shoes and the young, barefoot,

beardedex-radical.”45

Anothersuresignthatconcernsaboutchemicalresiduesand‘unnatural’

lifestyles were becoming mainstream was that they also appeared in Vogue.

Proving that the organic movement was by no means only a ‘hip’ movement

driven‘frombelow’,the1960ssawVoguebegintofeatureagrowingnumberof

reports on ‘organic’ products.46Celebrity organic devotees featured by Vogue

included the Marchesa Alessandro di Montezemolo, Yehudi Menuhin, the

Marquess of Londonderry, Habib Bourguiba, BrunoWalter and Adelle Davis.47

Ordering meat only from a farm “where they use no sprays and chemicals”,

performerCarolChanningnoted,“PrincessMargaretwasdyingtohavemyplain

roastlamb(…),andIthinktheKennedysinvitedmetotheWhiteHousejustto

see what I would bring.”48According to Vogue and large parts of the US

43WadeGreene,‘GuruoftheOrganicFoodCult’,NYT,06.06.1971,p.SM30.44DanielYergin,‘Supernutritionist’,NYT,20.05.1973,p.286.45Ibid.46‘Beauty:FoodBeautifulFood–PurelyPersonalRegimes’,Vogue,01.06.1965,pp.108-109.47Ibid.,pp.160-161,164.48‘Beautyandhealth:TheHealthEaters’,Vogue,01.05.1971,p.168.

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mainstream media, organic was healthy, rejuvenating, fashionable – and

antibiotic-free.49

Unsurprisingly,supportersofintensiveagriculturewerenotpreparedto

accept organic supporters’ criticism without opposition. While Scientific

Americanremained optimistic about agricultural antibiotics andWestern food

production,50USSecretaryofAgricultureEarlButz launchedanotoriousattack

onorganicproducersin1971:

Without the modern input of chemicals of pesticides, antibiotics, ofherbicides,we simply couldn’t do the job. (…).Beforewegoback to anorganic agriculture in this country somebody must decide which 50million Americans we are going to let starve or go hungry and I don’twanttomakethatdecision.51

Despitemourning thedemiseof Jeffersonian family farmers,52theconservative

NationalReviewwasequallysceptical:

The Topsy-Turvy labors of theWhole Earth Catalog [sic] brigade go onandon,withnoapparentendinsight.Wehavebecomeaccustomed(…)totheeffortsofecologistsandtheirfriendsingovernmenttoslapeveryconceivable sort of regulation on American business in the name ofpreserving the environment. (…). Some of the horror stories previouslynoted(…)includethebanonleadedgasolines[sic],theholywaragainstDDT,andaratherimprobableattackonpenicillin...53

Influential within the budding neoconservative movement, the magazine’s

equationofenvironmentalismwithleftistregulation-excessdidnotbodewellfor

abipartisangreeningoftheUS.

Significantly,USclashesoverorganicfoodremainedfocussedoninvisible

contaminantsinfood.IncontrasttoBritain,USnewspapersshowedlittlesignsof

49NancyL.Ross,‘ItTastesLikeMeatShould’,WP,14.12.1972,p.M1;RoyReed,‘LittleSpringFarm’,WP,05.03.1972,p.H2;LeoLerman,‘Food:Wheretoeatnow–Healthworks’,Vogue,01.06.1977,p.24.50SterlingWortman,‘AgricultureinChina’,SciAm(06/1975),p.18;RogerRevelle,‘TheResourcesAvailableforAgriculture’,SciAm(09/1976),pp.164-178.51HedleyBurrell,‘ButzhopesforSalestoChina’,WP,13.12.1971,p.A3.52GeorgeF.Will,‘EmbattledFarmers’,NationalReview[inthefollowingNR](03/1973),p.302.53M.StantonEvans,‘AtHome’,NR(02/1973).

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usingagriculturalantibiotics tomergeconcernsaboutresidues,animalwelfare

andbacterialresistance.

The lull in the media’s attention to bacterial resistance selection in

agriculturalsettingscoincidedwiththepublicationofanFDATaskForcereport

on agricultural antibiotics. On January 31st, 1972, the FDA announced that it

would install a “program that should lead to removing some antibiotics from

animal feeds as dangers to human beings.”54Amidst rumours that the 16-

memberTaskForcehadarguedbitterlyaboutagriculturalantibiotics’risksand

benefits, manufacturers were given two years to prove that drugs were safe.

Speaking at a press conference together with Commissioner Edwards, BVM

director C.D. Van Houweling announced that these deadlines could also “be

extendeddependingonthedriftofsafetyresearchinprogress.”55Commissioner

Edwards himself cautioned that “the agency had no information that would

warrant calling the feeds an ‘imminent’ hazard.”56Senior officials’ hesitancy to

endorseTaskForcebansatthepressconferencewasnotedbythePost:

The task force’s formal conclusions sound more definite. They say:Humanillnessesanddeathhavebeenreportedduetoantibiotic-resistantbacteriaofanimalorigin,andfoodanimalsareamajorreservoirofsomebacteriadangeroustoman.57Hesitancy to endorse the Task Force report also characterised many

media reactions. In theNYT, the president of the pro-industry Animal Health

Institute (AHI), James G. Affleck, maintained that the AHI did not know of “a

54VictorCohn,‘FDAProposesAntibioticBaninAnimalFeed’,WP,01.02.1972,p.A6;‘UseofAntibioticsonFarmsStudied’,NYT,04.06.1970,p.36.55VictorCohn,‘FDAProposesAntibioticBaninAnimalFeed’,WP,01.02.1972,p.A6.56HaroldM.SchmeckJr.,‘LimitationonAntibioticsinFeedForLivestockUrgedbyFDA’,NYT,01.02.1972,p.19.57Cohn,‘FDAProposesAntibioticBaninAnimalFeed’,WP,01.02.1972,p.A6.

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single case of untreatable bacterial disease inman”58caused by AGPs. A short

whilelater,anotherarticleinthenewspapercomparedtheagriculturalselection

of resistant bacteria to the pandemics recently conjured inMichael Crichton’s

bestsellingthriller,TheAndromedaStrain:

Lastweek,the[FDA]constructedareal-lifescenarioinwhichthegermsthat live in the intestines of cows, pigs and chickens play the potentialman-killers. And it is the human quest for cheapmeat thatmade themso.59

Quotingindustryestimatesofca.$500millionannuallysavedthroughantibiotic

use, theNYT, however, failed to reach a definite verdict on antibiotic bans.60

Casting further doubt on Task Force warnings, Thomas Jukes repeated well-

knownassertionsthatAGPsremainedeffective,profitableandsafe.61

ThejuryonAGPbansremainedoutandmediainterestfadedfast.Bythe

endof theyear,articlesonR-factor transferandantibioticoverusereverted to

ignoring the agricultural dimension of resistance selection62, and the 1973

announcement of an unspecified delay of FDA antibiotic bans received little

media attention. During the FDA’s 1973 press conference, Van Houweling

announcedthatdatasubmittedsofar“ha[d]notbeendevelopedeithertoprove

or disprove the existence of a serious threat.”63Ignoring WHO and European

warnings, the famous fourth estate seemed content with FDA assurances and

58Schmeck.,‘LimitationonAntibioticsinFeedForLivestockUrgedbyFDA’,NYT,01.02.1972,p.19.59EarlUbell,‘AreWeBreedingan‘AndromedaStrain?’’,NYT,06.02.1972,p.E7.60Ibid.61ThomasH.Jukes,‘AntibioticsandMeat’,NYT,02.10.1972,p.37.62MortonMintz,‘PhysiciansAccusedOfAntibioticMisuse’,WP,08.12.1972,p.A1;RoystonC.Clowes,‘TheMoleculeofInfectiousDrugResistance’,SciAm(04/1973),pp.18-27.63MortonMintz,‘SafetyTestOrderedOnAnimalFeedDrug’,WP,19.04.1973,p.A4.

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reinstatedthefamiliarepistemologicaldividebetweenagriculturalandmedical

antibioticuse.64

Media interest in ‘infectious’ bacterial resistance reawakened only after

the1975AsilomarconferenceonrecombinantDNA.65Usingrestrictionenzymes

andplasmids,researcherswerenowable to insert foreignDNAintobacteria.66

Whileantibioticresistanceturnedintoavaluabletoolinthelaboratory,framing

it as a potentially uncontainable environmental risk allowed activists to stoke

publicconcernsbothabout‘mutantlabbacteria’andagriculturalantibioticuse.67

Reporting on Asilomar in March 1975, the Post’s Stuart Auerbach quoted E.S.

Anderson: “the normal pickup of antibiotic-resistant strains of germs is more

dangerous than the possibility that genetic engineering will create new

strains.”68 Anderson repeated that the “widespread use of antibiotics in

agriculture, where they are used in fertilizer and food to protect plants and

livestockfrominfection”69wasparticularlydangerous.

Three months later, the Post reported alarming findings by a team of

researchersundermicrobiologistStuartLevyatTuftsUniversity.Levy,whohad

trained under Tsutomu Watanabe, 70 had traced the spread of bacterial

tetracycline resistance from animals to a farm family with the help of

biochemical markers. Initially funded by Pfizer, the experiment had ended in

64‘Medicine:TheDiseaseDetectives’,Time,11.02.1974;‘PenicillinDoesNotCure12NewGonorrheaCases’,WP,03.10.1976,p.8.65ThischronologyroughlyfitsroughlyPodolsky’sdescriptionofthelinkofbacterialresistancewithenvironmentalconcernsduringthe1970s;Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,pp.155-60.66VictorK.McElheny,‘WorldBiologistsTightenRulesOn‘GeneticEngineering’Work’,NYT,28.02.1975,pp.1and38.67LiebeF.Cavalieri,‘Newstrainsoflife–ordeath’,NYT,22.08.1976,p.173.68StuartAuerbach,‘DrugResistantBacteriaMakingInroads’,WP,02.03.1975,p.3.69Ibid.70Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,p.162.

234

spring1975, and the studied familyhadbeen invited to abarbecue “using the

chickensraisedduringtheproject.”71Someneighbourshad,however,“balkedat

eating the chickens because they feared they would develop a resistance to

antibiotics.”72

Amidst a fresh burst of reports on resistant pathogens andGMOs,73the

FDA’s new Commissioner Donald Kennedy announced a ban of penicillin and

tetracyclineAGPsinApril1977.Significantly,Kennedyannouncedthatthebans

“shouldbeviewedasa firststeptowardsFDA’sultimategoalofeliminating, to

the extent possible, the nontherapeutic use in animals of any drugs needed to

treatdiseaseinman.”74AccordingtothePost’sMortonMintz,thebansreflected

“a stricter regulatory stancebrought to the FDAbyCommissionerKennedy.”75

The FDA estimated that switching from therapeutic to nontherapeutic AGPs

wouldannuallycost5¢perpersonbutcautionedthatindustryoppositionmight

delaybans.

The prediction of opposition was correct. Since the early 1970s,

supportersofderegulationhadblamedexcessiveFDAregulation forcreatinga

so-called ‘druglag’ intheUS.AccordingtotheNationalReview, thethalidomide

andDDTscareshadproduced“somethingakintohysteria”intheFDA:

ProfessorMiltonFriedmanrecentlycalledattentiontoacostanalysisofthe FDA’s program done by Professor Sam Peltzman of UCLA, (…).[Peltzman] insists that there is at least a two-year time lag directlytraceabletotheFDA’sfanaticism.76

71StuartAuerbach,‘DrugInChickenFeedIsTracedInHumans’,WP,01.06.1975,p.10.72Ibid.73HaroldSchmeckJr.‘ALeapfrogWarBetweenDrugsandTheirTargets’,NYT,23.01.1977,p.145;VictorCohn,‘GeneticExperimentRaisesQuestionsofAFederalLoophole’,WP,12.06.1977,p.44.74‘FDAtoorderBigCutsInPenicillinforAnimals’,NYT,16.04.1977,p.12.75MortonMintz,‘FDAtoForbidPenicillinUseInFarmFeed’,WP,30.08.1977,p.A3.76‘TheNeedForNewDrugs’,NR(08/1973),p.859;alsosee:M.StantonEvans,‘TamingtheFDA’,NR,17.02.1978,p.219.

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Stagnatingeconomicgrowthandrising inflation–so-called ‘stagflation–made

criticism of ‘stifling’ FDA regulations spread to more liberal publications.77

ForcedbytheDelaneyClausetoproceedagainstsaccharinsweetenersandDES,

whichhadbeenrelicensedfollowinga1974courtdecision,Kennedy’sAGPbans

wonhimfewfriendswithintheincreasinglyregulation-wearyUSpublic.78

The FDA’s loss of public support was exacerbated by a coordinated

industry campaign of casting doubt on the risks posed by bacterial resistance

selection on farms. In the US, the campaign was led by the Council for

Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST). Founded in 1972, CAST supplied

industry-friendly research to counter regulatory threats to conventional

agriculture. With two-thirds of its $265,000 budget consisting of industry

donations,CASTorganizedpanelsofexternalexperts,whosereportswerethen

submittedtoasmallgroupofcorestaffforfinaleditingandpublishing.79

However, in the case of AGPs, CAST’s approach backfired after the six

microbiologistsinvitedtoa1977panelonAGPsnoticedthatCAST’suseoftheir

findingsandprestigewasbiased.80Followingacritical1978ABCdocumentary

on AGPs, CAST’s vice-president Charles Black published a “rambling white

paper”81attacking the broadcaster without clarifying that CAST’s expert panel

didnotsharehisviews.Whilethisincidentalreadyledtotensions,afull-blown

éclat occurred one year later when an edited version of the panel’s report

containedmisleadinginformationthathadbeenaddedwithoutexperts’consent.77‘Medicine:TheDrugLag’,Time,29.09.1975;cf.also:Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,pp.64-68.78Ibid.,pp.57;66-68.79EliotMarshall,'ScientistsQuitAntibioticsPanelatCast',Science,203/4382(1979),p.733.80ThegroupconsistedofRoyCurtiss3rd;JulianE.Davies;RichardNovick;MichaelJ.Haas;RaulGoldschmidtandVickersHershfield;cf.BayardWebster,‘6ScientistsQuitPanelinDisputeOverLivestockDrugs’,NYT,23.01.1979,p.C2.81Finlay,''ConsumeristTerrorists':BattlesoverAgriculturalAntibioticsintheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope',p.22.

236

Alarmedbythemisuseoftheirfindings,themicrobiologistsresignedanddrew

attentiontoCAST’sdubiouspracticesinnationalandscientificpublications.82A

resulting high-profile controversy between CAST-member Thomas Jukes and

Richard Novick, one of the six microbiologists on the CAST panel, further

damagedCAST.83

However, rifts amongst US experts and skilful lobbying meant that

sufficientdoubthadbeen castonFDAscience to convinceCongress thatmore

researchonAGPs’ effectswasnecessary. In1978,aCongressionalmoratorium

stalled Kennedy’s AGP bans and the NAS was commissioned with a new AGP

review. Noting Kennedy’s loss of political momentum in June 1979, the Post

reported that “many farm state congressmen”were questioning “the need for

anyFDAaction”84atall.Inthesamemonth,afrustratedCommissionerKennedy

announced his resignation. According to the NYT, the FDA had “lost its best

commissionerinalongtime.”85WhenKennedyhadcometotheFDAin1977,the

“agency was torn by internal dissension and charges (…) that it had become

chummywiththe industries itregulates.MoralehasbeenraisedandtheFDA’s

reputation is decidedly one of independence.”86However, such independence

hadcomeataprice:

[Kennedy]lostsomebigbattlesofregulation.Congressrefusedtolethimban saccharin. It impeded his drive against the indiscriminate use ofantibiotics in animal feeds. [HEW] Secretary Califano (…) blocked (…)

82Marshall,'ScientistsQuitAntibioticsPanelatCast',pp.732-33,J.F.Carteretal.,'CastProfileEvokesAvidResponses',BioScience,29/5(1979);whileVirgilHayswasresponsiblefortheeditingprocess,thereisevidencethatMaxwellFinlandwaseitherdirectlyinvolvedintheeditingorhadpriorknowledgeofitalongsideCyanamidrepresentatives;CLMFP,SeriesVI,B.Veterans’AdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,Folder9,FinlandtoThomasH.Jukes(13.12.1977);JSKisertoFinland(12.12.1977);FinlandtoVirgilW.Hays(18.12.1978).83ThomasH.Jukes,'AntibioticsinFeeds',Science,204/4388(1979),p.8,RichardNovick,'UseinAnimalFeed',ibid./4396,p.908,Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.186.84VictorCohn,‘AntibioticsinFeedsFoundHealthRisk’,WP,25.06.1979,p.A2.85‘TwohandsforDonaldKennedy’,NYT,02.07.1979,p.A16.86Ibid.

237

effortstophaseoutnitrites inmeat.Severalstates ignoredhiswarningsagainstlaetrile(…).[Kennedy]wasprobablyrightonalltheseissues.87Yet,being rightwasnot thesameasbeingpoliticallyeffective.Kennedy

had attempted toomuch in too short a time. Hurt by the failed saccharin and

nitrite bans and ‘stagflation’ fears, the FDA had been unable to transform

concern about antibiotic and chemical residues into concern about bacterial

resistance. Coming to power in 1981, the neoconservative Reagan

Administrationdousedhopes forAGPbans. Inacompletechangeofpolicy, the

new FDA leadership reverted to expanding agricultural antibiotic use “for the

firsttimeinadecade”88inFebruary1982.

However,theregulatoryrollbackdidnotmeanthatthepubliccampaign

for antibiotic reform was over. Instead of the weakened FDA,89campaigning

increasinglyoriginatedfromnon-governmentalcirclesandpublicationslikethe

NYTandTime.90Outspoken scientists like Stuart Levy andRichardNovick also

continued to campaign against medical and agricultural antibiotic overuse. In

August 1981, Stuart Levy organised a conference and multi-national press

conference duringwhich 150 doctors from25 nationswarned about bacterial

resistancedevelopmentwithAGPcriticismfeaturingprominently.91Noteventhe

discovery of new antibiotics could rekindle the liberalmedia’s enthusiasm for

unrestrictedantibioticuse. In1982, theNYT’sLawrenceAltmanremarkedthat

87Ibid.88CassPeterson,‘BanUrgedon2AntibioticsinAnimalFeed’,WP,25.10.1983,p.A17.89Idem.,‘FDAMovingtoShutAntibioticTestingLab’,WP,16.07.1982,p.A13;Carpenter,ReputationandPower.OrganizationalImageandPharmaceuticalRegulationattheFda,pp.380-82.90‘Medicine:DruggedCows’,Time,10.09.1979;RobertReinhold,‘NewWorryOverDrugsinAnimals’,NYT,17.06.1980,p.C1.91Bud,Penicillin:TriumphandTragedy,p.189;VictorCohn,‘WorldwideAbuseofAntibioticsPosesThreat’,WP,05.08.1981,p.A2.

238

without effective restrictions even cephalosporin antibiotics would eventually

succumbtoresistance“intheoldbacteriawar”.92

Signedby300governmentalandnon-governmentalexperts,theNational

ResourcesDefenceCouncil(NRDC)sentapetitiontoPresidentReaganin1983

requestingtheenactmentoftheFDA’sproposedAGPbansbecauseofimminent

harm.93Ties between resistance selection on farms and human health hazards

finally seemed confirmed in 1984 when Centres for Disease Control (CDC)

epidemiologistScottHolmbergpublishedtwopapersinScienceandtheNEJM.94

WhereashisSciencepaperpresenteda long-termepidemiological investigation

of US Salmonella outbreaks, 95 Holmberg’s NEJM article linked resistance

selectiononfarmstoaconcretecaseofhumanharm.Inearly1983,Holmberg’s

team had identified 18 persons infected with a multi-resistant strain of

Salmonella Newport. 11 patients had been hospitalized and one had died.

Holmberg’s team then compared plasmid profiles of all human S. newport

isolatesfromthesix-stateareaandUSanimalisolatesfor18monthsandlinked

infectionstohamburgersmadefromSouthDakotabeefcattlethathadbeenfed

AGPs.96In theNEJM,StuartLevyusedHolmberg’s findings torenewcallsofUS

AGPbans:

Every animal or person taking an antibiotic (…) becomes a factoryproducing resistant strains (…). Since thereare twoor three timemorelivestock than people in the United States, the number of animals fed

92LawrenceAltman,‘NewAntibioticWeaponsIntheOldBacteriaWar’,NYT,10.01.1982,p.E9.93CassPeterson,‘BanUrgedon2AntibioticsinAnimalFeed’,WP,25.10.1983,p.A17.94ScottD.Holmbergetal.,'Drug-ResistantSalmonellafromAnimalsFedAntimicrobials',NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,311/10(1984),ScottD.Holmberg,JoyG.Wells,andMitchellL.Cohen,'Animal-to-ManTransmissionofAntimicrobial-ResistantSalmonella:InvestigationsofUsOutbreaks,1971-1983',Science,225/4664(1984).95Holmberg,Wells,andCohen,'Animal-to-ManTransmissionofAntimicrobial-ResistantSalmonella:InvestigationsofUsOutbreaks,1971-1983',p.833.96Holmbergetal.,'Drug-ResistantSalmonellafromAnimalsFedAntimicrobials',p.617;‘PoisoningLinkedToCattleGerms’,NYT,06.09.1984,p.A20;‘BewaretheBeef’,SciAm(11/1984),pp.74-75.

239

antibiotics at subtherapeutic levels (…) is enormously greater than thenumberofpeopletakingantibioticsintherapeuticamounts(<1percent).(…).Wemustreservetheseresourcesforfightingmicrobialdisease.97Despite media pressure, a bestselling attack on the FDA and industry

science by activist andwriter Orville Shell’sModernMeat,98and Congressional

Hearings on antibiotic resistance,99the US Secretary of Health and Human

Services (HHS) Margaret M. Heckler rejected the NRDC petition in November

1985. According toHeckler, studies had failed to reveal an “imminent hazard”

requiring “emergency action.”100Seemingly confirming fears that the Reagan

administration was allowing industry to subvert consumer protection,101

Heckler’sdecisiondidnotendtheAGPcontroversy.PublishedinNEJMin1987,a

CDCstudyprovidedafurtherlinkbetweenhumanillnessandAGPs’selectionfor

multiple resistance inS.Newport. Having detected chloramphenicol resistance,

thestudyalsociteddataaccordingtowhich“less than1percentof the28,987

kg” of oral chloramphenicol solutions sold had been “used for the intended

species”102 in 1981. The study triggered new – ultimately abortive – bills by

RepublicanSenatorJohnH.ChafeeandthealreadyfamiliarJohnD.Dingell.103

AlthoughtheperceivedweaknessofFDAconsumerprotectionmadefood

safetyconcernsgrow,USconsumers remainedmoreconcernedabout residues

thanaboutbacterialresistance.Accordingtoa1985surveyof500householdsby

theNationalLiveStockandMeatBoard,mostconsumersstated“eitheramildor

stronghealthconcernaboutantibioticsinmeat”:

97StuartLevy,'PlayingAntibioticPool:TimetoTallytheScore',ibid.,p.664.98Schell,ModernMeat.Antibiotics,HormonesandthePharmaceuticalFarm,pp.18-118.99Finlay,''ConsumeristTerrorists':BattlesoverAgriculturalAntibioticsintheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope',pp.1&22-27;ChapterTwelve,p.302.100‘DecisiononFeedAdditivesAngersEnvironmentalGroup’,WP,22.11.1985,p.A21.101MartinBurros,‘SagaofaFoodRule:25Years,NoDecision’,NYT,13.02.1985,p.C1.102JohnS.Spikaetal.,'Chloramphenicol-ResistantSalmonellaNewportTracedthroughHamburgertoDairyFarms.',NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,316/10(1987),p.568.103IrvinMolotsky,‘AnimalAntibioticsTiedToIllnessesinHumans’,NYT,22.02.1987,p.22.

240

[Antibiotics]rankednearthemiddleof13concerns.(…).Sixtypercentoftherespondentssaidtheyhadastronghealthconcernaboutantibiotics.However, only 15% were concerned about the bacteria developingresistance. Other facts uncovered include: 17% mentioned no specificconcern, 9% were concerned about transfer of antibiotics to humansthrough meat, and 17% wanted more information. Only 21% reportedsomefamiliaritywiththeissue.104Reacting to on-going reports on food hazards,105 more residue-wary

consumers turned to organic food and soon stretched the US organic supply

chain to its limits.106During the 1970s, organic food had been a hip lifestyle

choice. By the 1980s, going organicwas not only conspicuously chique, it also

seemed like a wise response to dubious regulatory protection. Whereas the

Reagan Administration used free market arguments to reduce ‘restrictive’

pharmaceutical and agricultural regulations, free consumers were deciding to

financean‘organic’marketinwhichhighly‘restrictive’rulesguidedproduction.

However,incontrasttoofficialaction,whichwouldhaveallowedallconsumers

toprofitfromstricterfoodregulations,accessto‘pure’foodwasnowdependent

onconsumers’wallets.

In 1990, a large residue scandal further damaged trust in official food

safety guarantees. In 1988, investigations by theWallStreetJournalhad found

38%of50milksamplestaintedwithantibioticsandsulphonamides.Inresponse,

theFDAhadmadelimiteduseofanewtestcalledCHARMII,whichcoulddetect

awiderangeofantibioticsat levelsas lowas5ppb.107Of70supermarketmilk

104LuAnneMetzger,‘Cattlemenstillopposeantibioticsban’,WF,23.03.1985,p.2.105Cf.KeithSchneider,‘FDAFaultedinThreatFromAnimalDrugs’,NYT,13.01.1986,pp.A1&13;‘What’sWrongWithThanksgivingDinner’,WP,26.11.1987,p.G9;MarjorieWilliams,‘Don’tTouchThatFork!’,WP,23.03.1989,pp.D1andD6.106NancyHarmonJenkins,‘NutritionAndtheYoungChefs’,NYT,16.04.1989,pp.SMA50-51;KeithSchneider,‘MaineFairPromotesPureFoodandRuralValues’,NYT,25.09.1989,p.B6;CaroleSugarman,‘Giant’sNaturalBeefOnHold’,WP,11.02.1987,p.E12;alsosee:Belasco,AppetiteforChange.HowtheCountercultureTookontheFoodIndustry,p.180&201.107ColmanMcCarthy,‘Don’tDrinkYourMilk!’,WP,17.02.1990,p.A29.

241

samples, the FDA found over 50% to be contaminated.108A further FDA study

revealed that 74% of 49 milk samples were contaminated with potentially

carcinogenic sulfamethazine (SMZ),which had been illegally given to lactating

cows. Problematically, the FDA then decided to revaluate CHARM II positives

usingHigh-Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC),109which could detect

only a limited amount of sulphas between 5 and 20 ppb – thereby negating

CHARMIIpositivesandpresentingUSmilkaspure.110

Both the residue detections and subsequent FDA actions led to public

criticism. During Congressional hearings, it emerged that standard residue

testing was not good at detecting antibiotics other than penicillin. In his

statement, FDA chemist Joseph Settepani accused his agency of obscuring the

truthand“ignor[ing]reliabletests”111.TrustinFDAsinceritywasfurthershaken

byamemorandumfromtheAssociateDirectorforSurveillanceandCompliance

to theDirectorof theFDA’sCenter forVeterinaryMedicine ((CVM) the former

BVM):“TheHHSgoalsaretoendmediainterestindrug-residuetaintedmilkas

soonaspossibleandavoidcriticismofHHSoranyotherGovernmentagency.”112

Although commentators were uncertain whether detected residue

concentrationsposedahealthhazard,113officials’handlingoftheaffairfailedto

reassureconsumers.114

108PhilipJ.Hilts,‘FDAChemistAssertsAgencyIsStallingonTestsforMilkPurity’,NYT,07.02.1990,p.A22;109'Fda'sRegulationofAnimalDrugResiduesinMilk',HumanResourcesAndIntergovernmentalRelationsSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonGovernmentOperations(HouseOfRepresentatives;WashingtonUSGovernmentPrintingOffice,1990),pp.117-27.110Ibid.,pp.133-34.;cf.FDAclaimsaboutCHARMIIfalsepositives;‘USCallsMilkFreeofAntibiotics’,NYT,06.02.1990,p.C13.111‘FDAChemistAssertsAgencyIsStallingonTestsforMilkPurity’,NYT,07.02.1990,p.A22.112Quotedaccordingto:Ibid.;cf.also:ChapterTwelve,pp.306-307.113MalcolmGladwell,‘HouseProbesMilk’sSafetyAfterContaminationIsAlleged’,WP,07.02.1990,p.A2.114ColmanMcCarthy,‘Don’tDrinkYourMilk!’,WP,17.02.1990,p.A29.

242

Facedwithdozensofreportsonchemicalresidues,115consumertrust in

US food safety plummeted further. In 1992, the Food Marketing Institute’s

annual Trends Survey found that only 12% of consumers were completely

confident that food was safe: while consumers were most concerned about

pesticideandherbicideresiduesinfood,theseconcernswerecloselyfollowedby

concernsaboutantibioticandhormoneresiduesinpoultryandlivestock,ahead

ofnitrites,irradiatedfoods,preservativesandartificialcolouring.116

Onceagain,theorganicsectorprofitedfromtheinsecurityaboutUSfood

safety and divisive new biotech products.117 Although ‘organic’ and ‘natural’

remained ill-defined categories, organic producers were overcoming their

teethingtroubles:inadditiontoestablishingreliablesuppliesforsupermarkets,

production was increasingly consolidated in larger firms or cooperatives, and

prices fororganic food fell.118Between thebeginningofUSDAefforts todefine

‘organic’in1990andalegallybindingdefinitionin1997,salesoforganicfoodin

theUSgrewby250%fromca.$1billionin1990to$3.5billionin1996.119

Trusting the ‘purity’ promises of organic food, many US consumers

reacted warily to attempts to water down ‘organic’ definitions. In 1997, the

USDA’sneworganic standardspermitted theuse of biotechnology, irradiation,

sludgeandalimitedamountofantibiotics;organiclabelswouldalsocontainno

115‘TestsforDrugsinMilkStillLag,GAOSays’,NYT,06.08.1992,p.D20;‘Dr.SpockJoinsMilk’sDetractors’,WP,30.09.1992,p.A3;CaroleSugarman,‘CattleBattle’,WP,23.06.1993,pp.E1&E12-13;SharonWalsh,‘Va.CattleSellerinCourtCaseOverAdulteratedBeef’,WP,22.04.1996,p.A8.116CaroleSurgarman,‘ParadoxOverProduceSafety’,WP,12.05.1992,p.20.117‘UdderInsanity’,Time,17.05.1993,p.52;‘TheMilkBrouhaha’,NYT,10.02.1994,p.A22;KathleenDay,‘HormoneHubbubHindersHindersProgram’,WP,15.03.1994,pp.D1andD5.118CandySagon,‘StoreWars:AHealthyCompetition’,WP,31.01.1996,pp.E1&E10;PennySinger,‘HealthFoodStoresExpandWithDemand’,NYT,12.10.1997,p.WE10.119CaroleSugarman,‘Organic?IndustryIsWayAheadofGovernment’,WP,31.12.1997,p.E1.

243

information on the actual production methods employed.120The USDA was

surprised by the resulting protest: during a four-month comment period,

150,000 consumers sent letters and cards to the USDA, forcing Secretary of

AgricultureDanGlickmantopromisearevisionoforganicstandards.121By2000,

sustainedpublic opposition led to theNationalOrganicProgram (NOP),which

bannedtheuseofgeneticengineering,irradiationandsewagesludgeinorganic

food production. The new regulations also banned organic livestock from

receivingantibioticsof anykind. Shouldananimal fall sick, it couldbe treated

withantibioticsbutcouldnolongerbesoldasorganic.Following2013,atleast

5%oforganicproducers’productshadtobetestedforresidues.122Guaranteeing

thatmeatandmilkwerefreeofGMOs,hormones,pesticides,andantibiotics,the

2000 NOP assuaged traditional residue fears. For people wealthy enough to

afford it,officiallyguaranteedpuritycouldnowbepurchasedintheabsenceof

similarregulationsforconventionalproduce.However,aspublichealthexperts

likeStuartLevynoted,“Theresiduesinmeatshouldbeofleastconcerntomost

people.”123

While US residue fears were instrumental to the success of the NOP,

warningsaboutbacterialresistancedidnotleadtoaregulatorysuccess.Similar

to Britain, the 1990s saw a surge ofUS newspaper articleswarning about the

spread of deadly infections by homeless people, postal workers and flight

attendants, with frequent references to the death of Muppets-inventor Jim

Henson from a resistant ‘flesh eating’ Streptococcus infection (necrotizing

120PeterHoffman,‘GoingOrganic,Clumsily’,NYT,24.03.1998,p.A23;MarrianBurros,‘UStoSubjectOrganicFoods,LongIgnored,toFederalRules’,NYT,15.12.1997,pp.A1andA14.121RickWeiss,‘’Organic’LabelRuledOutForBiotech,IrradiatedFood’,WP,01.05.1998,p.A02.122'NationalOrganicProgram',(http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/NOPOrganicStandards[accessed:13.03.2015]).123MarrianBurros,‘ShoppingforAntibiotic-FreeMeat’,NYT,17.01.2001,p.F2.

244

fasciitis).124Many articles also focussed on resistance proliferation resulting

from agricultural antibiotic use. According to Newsweek, farmers were the

biggestantibioticabusersintheUS:

For sheer over prescription, no doctor can touch the American farmer.Farm animals receive 30 timesmore antibiotics (mostly penicillins andtetracyclines) thanpeopledo. (…).Resistant strainsemerge just as theydo in humans taking antibiotics- and remain in the animal’s flesh evenafteritwindsupinthemeatcase.125Fearsofagriculturalresistanceselectionwerefurtherheightenedbyfatal

foodborne outbreaks of E. coli 0157:H7. The outbreaks not only highlighted

hygieneproblemsinUSmeatproductionbutalsorevealedlegislativegaps(e.g.it

was unclear whether pathogens in meat were a ‘natural occurrence’ or

constituted adulteration).126Undercooked meat at Jack-in-the-Box restaurants

caused a 1993 outbreak ofE.coli0157:H7making 600 people become ill and

killingseveralchildren.127Oneyearlater,thePostreportedthatE.coli0157:H7

wasresponsibleforatleast20,000annualinfectionsintheUS.128By1995,new

concernsaboutfoodbornepathogensemergedfollowingthespreadofresistant

S.typhimuriumDT104 fromBritain to theUS.129With resistant pathogens also

spreading in hospitals and reserve antibiotics failing, American media

124AndrewPurvisandDickThompson,‘TBTakesaDeadlyTurn’,Time,02.12.1991,p.85;SevgiO.AralandKingK.Holmes,‘SexuallyTransmittedDiseasesintheAIDSEra’,SciAm(02/1991),pp.62-68;LeefSmith,‘114PostalWorkersTestPositiveforTB’,WP,06.05.1993,p.CVA_9;WilliamH.McNeill,‘TheKillerThatDidn’tGoAway’,WP,06.06.1993,pp.1and14;SandraBoodman,’45InfectedWithTBByHomelessMan’,WP,15.08.1995,p.11.125SharonBegleyandMarthaBrant,‘TheEndOfAntibiotics’,NW,28.03.1994,pp.46-52;alsosee:CaroleSugarman,‘TheArgumentOverAntibiotics’,WP,23.06.1993,p.E13;DickThompsonandMadeleineNash,‘AttackOfTheSuperbugs’,Time,31.08.1992,p62.126MarrianBurros,‘AgricultureDept.PolicyBlamedforTaintedFood’,NYT,03.03.1993,pp.C1andC4.127CaroleSugarman,‘ADiseaseThat’saBiteAway’,WP,13.02.1994,pp.A1andA23.128Ibid.;Jones,ValuingAnimals.VeterinariansandTheirPatientsinModernAmerica,pp.151-52.129‘ResistantSalmonellaReachesUnitedStates’,NYT,11.04.1997,p.A18.

245

commentatorswere just as concerned about a predictedpost-antibiotic age as

theirBritishcolleagues.130

However,USpublicpressureforagriculturalantibioticrestrictionsnever

reached the fever pitch that gripped European newspapers following the BSE

crisis. Whereas residue, resistance and occasional animal welfare131concerns

wereallpresentinUSnewspapersthroughoutthe1990s,theynevercongealed

intothewholesalecriticismofintensiveagriculturethatconfrontedBSE-stricken

Europeanfarmersin1996.

Resistance-focusedUS critics’ lack of powerwas put into stark relief in

the mid-1990s, when the FDA followed European countries in licensing the

fluoroquinolones sarafloxacin and enrofloxacin (Baytril) for E.coli-affected

chickens despite known cross-resistance to vancomycin. 132 Although it

announcedthatresistancewouldbemonitoredandfluoroquinolonesbannedif

necessary,133the FDA’s licensing decision provokedmedia criticism. According

to theNYT, officials’ focus on humanmedicine and neglect of the agricultural

dimension of resistance proliferation was foolhardy.134By late 1997, the

MinnesotaDepartmentofHealthreportedthat70-90%ofrawpoultrysamples

from supermarkets were contaminated with Campylobacter strains, 25% of

whichwereresistanttofluoroquinolones.135

130NicholasWade,‘PaxAntibiotica’,NYT,15.10.1995,p.SM30;PaulR.EpsteinandRossGelbspan,‘ShouldWeFearAGlobalPlague?’,WP,19.03.1995,p.C1.131RebeccaReisner,‘ALeaderintheBattleforAnimalRights’,NYT,22.03.1992,p.3;MatthewScully,‘AnimalSpirit.RespectforGod’screaturesshouldbeaconservativeimpulse’,NR,09.11.1998,p.36.132ChapterTwelve,pp.309-311;enrofloxacinwaslicensedintheUKin1993;ChapterNine,p.211.133DickThompson,‘DruggedChicksHatchAMenace’,Time,31.05.1999,p.81.134‘TheBacteriumandtheChicken’,NYT,21.10.1997,p.A26;cf.also:SusanGilbert,‘OveruseofAntibiotics’,NYT,18.06.1997,p.C11;‘Drug-ResistantGermShowsUpinUS’,NYT,22.08.1997,p.A20.135SandraG.Boodman,‘PoultryPeril’,WP,09.12.1997,p.13.

246

By 1998, US media commentators began to take note of the growing

discrepancybetweenEUandUSantibioticregulation.AccordingtoStuartLevy,

“theUShastojointhe[EU]on[banningAGPs].Welookalittlesilly.”136Although

the FDA announced that it planned to require manufacturers to test new

livestock drugs for resistance selection, Patricia Lieberman of the Center for

ScienceinthePublicInterestwarnedthattheFDA’sproposalswouldtakealong

timetorealiseanddidnottargetalreadylicenseddrugs.137Tooweaktowinthe

supportofenvironmentalistandconsumergroups,themildFDAproposalswere

immediatelyopposedbyindustry.138Subsequently,thefamiliarprotractedseries

of hearings and debates soonmademedia interest shift to other subjects like

bioterrorism,andpublicpressurewaned.139

Unfortunately,bacterialresistancedidnotceasetobeaproblem.In2000,

newspapersreportedthattheefficacyofsynercid(quinupristin-dalfopristin),the

newhopeagainstVRE,wasendangeredpriortoitslicensingbecauseofitsclose

relation to virginiamycin, a ‘nontherapeutic’ antibiotic used in US agriculture

since1974: asmuch as50%of supermarket chicken, turkey andpork already

carried virginiamycin-resistant bacteria strains.140Meanwhile, concerns about

quinoloneresistancemadetheFDAproposebansontheuseoffluoroquinolones

forturkeysandchickens.AccordingtoFDAdata,resistancehadbeennegligible

136DeniseGrady,‘AMovetoLimitAntibioticUsinAnimalFeed’,NYT,08.03.1999,p.A13;alsosee:‘USAntibioticsCountered’,NYT,20.05.1999,p.A20;DavidBrown,‘DrugResistanceinFoodChain’,WP,20.05.1999,p.A02;DickThompson,‘DruggedChicksHatchAMenace’,Time,31.05.1999,p.81.137PatriciaB.Lieberman,‘ControlAntibioticUse’,NYT,07.11.1999,p.WK14;theClintonadministrationreactedtotheEUmeasuresbystrengtheningUSresistancemonitoring;RobertPear,‘ClintonPlans$25MillionInitiativeonInfectiousDiseases’,NYT,27.12.1998,p.26.138MarcKaufman,‘WorriesRiseOverEffectofAntibioticsinAnimalFeed’,WP,17.03.2000,p.A01.139‘MilitaryMindsTurntoOutbreak’,NYT,11.10.1999,p.B4;‘APlagueofPublicity’,WP,16.08.1999,p.A15.140MarcKaufman,‘WorriesRiseOverEffectofAntibioticsinAnimalFeed’,WP,17.03.2000.

247

in 1996 but had risen to 13% of surveyed strains in 1998 and 18% in 1999.

However, theGermanBayerCorporationchallenged theFDA incourtandkept

itsproductBaytrilonthemarket.141

Because of Baytril’s similarity to Bayer’s profitable reserve antibiotic

Ciprofloxacin (Cipro),142the Baytril case became a matter of national security

followingthe9/11attacks.Laterdescribedas“Cipromania”143,aseriesofletters

containinganthraxsporesledtomasspurchasesofgasmasks,vaccinesandthe

entirenationalstockofCipro,whichwaseffectiveagainstanthrax.Worryingly,

manyAmericanstookCiproprophylacticallytowardoffmostlyillusiveanthrax

spores.144Whileunnecessaryhumanusealreadyfosteredbacterialresistance,an

NEJM editorial urged that fluoroquinolones like Baytril and third-generation

cephalosporins should be removed from the agricultural market so as not to

further compromise the treatment of actual anthrax victims. 145 Despite

widespreadmedia interest and its ability to invokenational security concerns,

theFDAwasabletobanBaytrilonlyin2005.146

Once again, regulators’ inability to mandate comprehensive antibiotic

restrictions resulted in the creation of a market niche. Starting in the early

2000s,purveyorsof conventional food likeTysonFoods,PurdueFarms,Foster

Farms, McDonald’s and Chipotle Grill attempted to attract wealthy,

141‘WonderDrugsatRisk’,WP,19.04.2001,p.A18.142AndrewPollack,‘AntibioticsBusinessIsAgainPopular’,NYT,13.11.2001,p.B6.143ChristopherWanjek,‘Cipromania’,WP,23.10.2001,p.F01.144RickWeiss,‘DemandGrowingforAnthraxVaccine’,WP,29.09.2001,p.A16;JustinGillisandCeciConnolly,‘EmphasisonCiproWorriesOfficials’,WP,19.10.2001,p.A17;ShankarVedantam,‘PrescribingCiproIs‘UncontrolledExperiment’,WP,03.11.2001,p.A15.145S.L.Gorbach,'TimetoStop',NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,345/16(2001).146ChristineGormanetal.,‘PlayingChickenWithOurAntibiotics‘,Time,21.01.2002,p.98.

248

environmentallyandhealthconsciousconsumersbypartiallyphasingout147–or

atleastclaimingtophaseout148–AGPs.Forthecompaniesthemselves,phasing

outAGPswithoutsubscribingtothestricterorganicrulesgoverningtherapeutic

antibioticuseisaneffectivewayofdemandinghigherpriceswhilstmaintaining

productioncosts.

US antibiotic restriction initiatives regained ground only following the

2008 elections. In 2009, microbiologist and Democrat Representative Louise

Slaughterreintroduced legislationagainstagriculturalantibiotics.149Slaughter’s

movereceivedoutspokensupport fromtheNYTandScientificAmerican,whose

editors accused the US food production system of protecting “a narrow set of

interestsoverthenation’spublichealth.”150EndorsedbytheAmericanMedical

Association,theObamaadministrationalsosupportedtheproposedAGPbansin

July2009.151However,industryoppositionandlegalobjectionssoonthreatened

to stall the Preservation of Antibiotics forMedical TreatmentAct (PAMTA). In

April2010,formerFDACommissionerDonaldKennedywarnedNYTreaders:

More than30years ago,when Iwas [FDAcommissioner],weproposedeliminating the use of penicillin and two other antibiotics to promotegrowthinanimalsraisedforfood.WhenagribusinessinterestspersuadedCongress not to approve that regulation, we saw firsthand how strongpoliticscantrumpwisepolicyandgoodscience.(…).It’s30yearslate,butCongress should now pass [PAMTA], (…) we don’t have the luxury ofwaiting any longer to protect those at risk of increasing antibioticresistance.152

147‘AntibioticsinthePoultryIndustry’,NYT,13.02.2002,p.A30;MarrianBurros,‘McDonald’sTakesStepsOnItsAntibioticsPromise’,NYT,12.01.2005,p.F2;‘AChainThatPigsWouldDieFor’,NW,12.05.2008,pp.45-46.148‘USWithdrawsApprovalforTyson’sAntibiotic-FreeLabel’,NYT,20.11.2007,p.C9.149NicholasD.Kristof,‘PathogensInOurPork’,NYT,15.03.2009,p.WK13.150‘HealthyGrowthforUSFarms’,SciAm(04/2009),p.32.151GardinerHarris,‘AdministrationSeekstoRestrictAntibioticsinLivestock’,NYT,14.07.2009,p.A18.152DonaldKennedy,‘CowsonDrugs’,NYT,18.04.2010,p.WK11.

249

However, followingthepublicationofaweak“draftguidance”153in June

2010, it became clear that the FDAwas not supporting PAMTA, and concerns

grewthatantibioticregulationsunderCommissionerMargaretHamburgwould

be “extremelymodest.”154AlthoughCDCdirectorThomasR.Friedenconfirmed

to Congress “the clear link between antibiotic use in animals and antibiotic

resistanceinhumans”,155theFDAmerelyintendedtoissuevoluntaryguidances.

AccordingtotheNYT,FDAtimidityresultedfromsignificantpressurebyUSDA

SecretaryTomVilsack,whoupheldthat“antibioticsneedtobeusedjudiciously,

andwebelievetheyalreadyare.”156

After45yearsofon-goingalarm, it seemsas thoughUSconsumerswill

have to continuewaiting for effective andholistic regulations againstbacterial

resistanceproliferation.Intheabsenceofamacro-crisissimilartotheEuropean

BSEcrisis,whichsawAGPrestrictionsturnintoaunifyingcornerstoneofreform

demands, antibiotic regulation remains a single-issue topic in the US.

Reappearingevery fewyearsasahot topic, theconvoluted judicialprocedures

necessarytowithdrawantibioticsandahesitantFDAusuallyleadtoawaningof

public pressure before restrictions can be enacted. The fact that ‘green’ topics

likeAGPbanshavefallenvictimtothepartisandivideofUSpoliticsalsomeans

that conservative media and politicians rarely rally behind the subject.

Meanwhile,antibioticmanufacturersandusersprofiteveryyearthattherapeutic

and non-therapeutic antibiotics remain a standard component of intensive

American livestock production.Without sustained and unified criticism by the

153‘AntibioticsandAgriculture’,NYT,30.06.2010,p.A30.154‘WeAreWhatWeEat’,NYT,22.09.2010,p.A24.155Ibid.156Ibid.

250

US media and public, companies’ opposition to regulations and financing of

counter-scienceisunlikelytostop.

Successfulagro-pharmaceuticaloppositiontomonopolisticstatecontrols

of the antibiotic market has also allowed a private market for ‘security’ to

flourish. As the growth of organic sales following residue scandals and

revelations about defunct controls shows, the absence of regulation does not

mean that US consumers have become less concerned about food ‘purity’.

Instead,thesteadyincreaseinorganicsalessincethe1980sindicatesagrowing

privatisation of purity and security demands. This tendency approximates the

Beckianmodelofriskasanewcategoryofsocialorder.157Thestate’sinabilityto

guarantee ‘pure’ – and in some cases even ‘safe’ – food gives rise to a socio-

economicdividebetweenconsumerswhoseriskperceptionand incomeallows

themtobuy ‘purity’andthosewhocannot.Thisdividecanalsobespatial.You

would be hard-pressed to find aWhole Foods supermarket in Chicago’s poor

Southside.Althoughthisdifferentiationofriskconsumption is far lesseffective

for bacterial resistance than for residues, the repeated failure of US antibiotic

reformhasresulted inasimilarcommercialdifferentiationofriskexposure. In

an attempt to upscale their clientele and speak to the values of the affluent

(white) middle-class, restaurants, fast food chains and supermarkets have

created ‘antibiotic-free’ conventional products,which are clearly differentiated

by price. Something that EU states provide for ‘free’ as a ‘right’ to citizens is

commerciallyavailableforapriceintheUS.

157Beck,Risikogesellschaft.AufDemWeginEineAndereModerne,pp.14;17-19;29-31&35.

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ChapterEleven–USfarmers–HostilityInSinkingNumbersForUS farmers, the USDA’s 2013 victory over antibiotic criticsmay yet prove

pyrrhic.Stuckintheboomandbustcyclesofintensiveproduction,manysmall-

andmiddle-sized farmers have been forced to leave agriculture. In 2014, four

companiescontrolled85%oftheUSbeefmarket.1Asoneofthemaintoolsused

tomaintainhighherddensities,on-goingaccesstoantibioticsultimatelyserves

large-scalecorporationsmorethanordinaryfarmers.SowhydoUSfarmersand

their powerful lobby continue to support technologies which ultimately

contribute tomany farmers’demise?Answers to thisquestioncanbe found in

theemergenceofthe1970spartisandivideonenvironmentalismandregulation.

BecauseofthesubsidyreformsoftheKennedyeraandimprovingglobal

markets,USfarmincomeshadimprovedsignificantlyduringthelate1960s.2One

yearafterCongressenshrinedfederalsupportintheAgricultureActof1970,the

energetic new USDA secretary Earl Butz secured an unprecedented federal

appropriation of $8.1 billion. Emboldened by Malthusian scenarios of global

overpopulation, federal support and the 1972 Soviet grain purchase, Butz

exhortedUS farmers toplant “from fencerow to fencerow”.3Thismessagewas

passed on via farm magazines. In Progressive Farmer, one commentator

speculatedthatthe1970swould“becometheeraofagriculturalcapitalism”and

“the time when American agriculture strikes out on a bold new course of

1BerniceNapach,'HowFourCompaniesControlNearlyAlloftheMeatYouEat',YahooFinance(http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/how-four-companies-control-the-supply-and-price-of-beef--pork-and-chicken-in-the-u-s-eat-prices-224406080.html[accessed:28.05.2014],19.02.2014).2Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,p.131.3Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,pp.132-33.

252

influence and prosperity.” 4 Family farmers would, however, “retain their

dominance in agriculture” only if they fully engaged in “a new, aggressive,

agricultural capitalism”,5invested their assets and became more efficient and

self-reliant.

Seemingly contradicting suchcalls for intensificationwas the increasing

prominence of environmental topics inWashington. Sponsoring the EarthDay

celebrations, establishing the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA)

anddeclaringanational‘waroncancer’,theNixonadministrationdiditsbestto

enhanceitsenvironmentalandpublichealthcredentialsduringtheearly1970s.6

Although the greatly empowered Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

tempered many measures,7Nixon’s environmental policies caused irritation

amongstfarmers.

PotentialDDTbanswereaparticularlycontentioussubject.Clashingwith

demands for intensification but speaking to farmers’ personal concerns, the

agricultural community resorted to cost-benefit thinking: DDT and other

chemicals might be dangerous, but if used responsibly, benefits outweighed

risks.ProgressiveFarmerclaimed,“millionsofpeoplenowliving ingoodhealth

wouldbedeadoranaemiccripplesifitwerenotforDDT.”8Existingalternatives

wereeitherinefficaciousordangerous:

Thedecisionfororagainstapesticideshouldbemadeontheprincipleofits benefit in producing food and fiber (…) versus its risk ofenvironmentalpollution.9

4C.G.Struggs,‘Willthe1970’sbecometheEraofAgriculturalCapitalism’,PF,Jan1970,p.23.5Ibid.;intheanalysedjournals,scepticismofthiscoursewaslimitedtotheNationalFarmersUnion;TonyT.Dechant,‘FarmConglomeratesAreDangerous’,PF,Feb1970,p.25.6Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.59.7Ibid.,p.63.8‘AgricultureHasBigStakeinCrackdownonPesticides’,PF,Feb1970,p.152.9Ibid.

253

Despiteoccasional internaldisagreement,10agriculturalcriticismofanti-

chemical consumer sentiments intensified as a result of the EPA’s 1972 DDT

ban.11According to the American Farm Bureau, the “disaster lobby” was

“workingovertime”12todepriveupto50millionAmericansoffoodbybanning

chemical pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers and drugs. Meanwhile, Progressive

Farmer warned that the DDT ban might be the first step towards federally

mandated “’organic’ farming.”13Despite private concerns about health and

environmental degradation, most conventional US farmers could envision no

futureapartfromafurtherchemical-enabledintensificationofproduction.

SimilarattitudescharacteriseddebatesaboutAGPrestrictions.Sincethe

1960s, antibiotics had only grown in popularity amongstUS farmers. In 1960,

4.16 million pounds had been produced in the US of which ca. 1.2 (ca. 29%)

millionpoundswere added to feeds. Ten years later, ca. 7.3millionpounds of

antibiotics (ca. 43.1% of total production) were added to feeds. By 1975,

industryfiguresindicatedthat‘nonmedicinal’antibioticuseamountedto48.6%

oftotalUSantibioticproduction.14

Far more ambitious than the Swann report, the FDA’s 1972 ban

announcements therefore took many agricultural commentators by surprise.

Unlesstheywereprovensafeandeffective,tetracycline,penicillin,streptomycin,

dihydrostreptomycinandsulphonamideAGPswouldbebannedonJan1st,1973

forpoultryandonJuly1st,1973forsheep,cattleandswine.Thebanswouldbe

10AbrahamL.Fairfax,‘FavorsDDTBan’,PF,Dec1972,p.1;ClarenceVanSant,‘VoiceoftheFarm–SaysPressIsUnfairToOrganicFarming’,WF,08.04.1972,p.62;AlexBower,‘TheMailbox–KentuckiansDifferonDDT’,PF,Oct1975,p.14.11‘FarmChemicals’,WF,08.04.1972,p.72;‘TheDDTBan–WhatDoesItMeanToYou’,PF,Sept1972,pp.20and42.12‘Hoodsaysfertilizers,chemicalsareessentialtofoodproduction’,FBNews,13.03.1972,p.43.13‘DDT,avictimofEcologicalFanatics’,PF,Sept1972,p.90.1443FedReg.3034(Jan.20,1978).

254

extendedtoallotherantibioticsalsousedbyhumansafterDecember31,1973.

Substances such as chloramphenicol, semisynthetic penicillins, gentamicin and

kanamycinwould remain prohibited from use as AGPs.15Although it reported

that seven of the 16 task forcemembers had disagreedwith the report’s final

risk assessment, theWallacesFarmeracknowledged, “Evidence indicates using

antibioticsinfood-producinganimalspromotesSalmonellaandthedevelopment

oftheRfactor(resistant)bacteria.”16Accordingtothemagazine,thereseemed

little hope that bans could be averted by industry safety trials: “Though it’s

possible,itdoesn’tseemlikelythatFDAwillbackoffmuch.”17Meanwhile,Iowa

StateUniversityswinenutritionistVaughnSpeerwentso faras tosay:“I think

the recommendations that certain antibiotics be reserved for human use is a

goodone.Ican’targuewiththat.”18

However,similartoDDT,itdidnottakelongforapre-formulatedprotest

matrix to emerge. 19 After “reaffirming their abiding faith in American

constitutionalgovernment,theprivateenterprisesystem,andman’sinalienable

right to worship God” in February 1972, members of the powerful American

FarmBureau’snationalassemblyvotedtooppose,“acompletebanontheuseof

anyagriculturaldrugandchemicalunless itcanbedemonstratedpositivelyby

prolonged and responsible research that the use of such product represents a

clearandpresentdangertohealthor thatsuchusewouldseriously jeopardize

our environment.”20While farming magazines began to supply readers with

15‘FDAproposesbanonantibiotics’,FBNews,07.02.1972,p.24.16‘Feedersfacestricterantibioticrules’,WF,26.02.1972,p.12-1317Ibid.,p.12.18‘Feedersfacestricterantibioticrules’,WF,26.02.1972,p.13.19‘Beefproducerssay…Basedruglawsonfact,notopinions’,WF,26.02.1972,p.74.20‘FarmBureau–ForandAgainst’,PF,Feb1972,p.63.

255

addresses for protest letters,21the formerly concerned swine nutritionist

Vaughn Speer suddenly claimed, “[the] possibility [of resistance transfer] has

beenthoroughlyexaminedandthere isnoscientificevidencethatresistance is

transferredthisway.”22

Initially, it seemed as though agricultural protests would fail.23In July

1972, Progressive Farmer warned, “stricter regulation of antibiotics in feed

look[s]99%certain.”24Attemptingtowinconsumersoverbutconfusingresidue

and resistance concerns, some Farm Bureau members even proposed a

mandatorycertificationprogramfordrugcompliance:

FederalauthoritieshavetakenDDTawayfromyourusecompletely.Thesame thing can happen to animal feed and healthmaterials. (…).Whenlivestock producers first heard about drug residues and withdrawalperiods,theytendedtoignorethewholething.(…).Iflivestockproducersare to continue benefitting from animal health products, theymust usethemproperlyandcertifythattheyaredoingso.England’sSwannReportand the United States’ FDA Task Force Report challenged the ability offarmersandrancherstocarryoutthisresponsibility.(…).Certificationisthebestwaytopleadourcaseeffectively.25However, all was not lost. Observers soon began to discern cracks in

federal agencies’ willingness and ability to impose substance restrictions.

Although DDT was eventually banned, the FDA’s indecisive handling of DES

renewed agro-industrial confidence in the potential of organized popular and

judicialoppositiontofederalaction.26BombardingtheFDAandpoliticianswith

21‘AnimalHealth…’,WF,11.03.1972,p.44;‘AnimalHealth…’,WF,08.04.1972,p.42.22‘Hogmencouldlosesomefeedadditives’,WF,23.09.1972,p.39.23Anderson,IndustrializingtheCornBelt.Agriculture,TechnologyandEnvironment,1942-1972,pp.194-95.24‘What’sNewInWashington’,PF,Jul1972,p.6.25‘DrugCertificationDoesApplytoYou’,PF,Sept1972,pp.62-63.26‘What’sNewinWashington’,PF,Aug1972,p.8;Langston,ToxicBodies.HormoneDisruptorsandtheLegacyofDes,pp.97-100;05-07.

256

letters,agriculturalcircleswererelievedtoseethatthisstrategyalsoseemedto

workforAGPswhentheFDApostponedbansin1973.27

FarmersdidnothavelongtoenjoytheirvictoryovertheFDA.Despitethe

reestablishment of ‘target prices’, inflation and the 1973 oil crisis brought a

returnofthecost-pricesqueezeandfarmers’netincomedeclinedfrom$34.3to

$25.5billionbetween1973and1975.Onceagain,manysmallerproducerswere

forced out of business.28Faithful to Earl Butz’s motto ‘get big or get out’,

remaining farmers participated in a further round of agricultural

intensification.29SimilartotheUK,worseningeconomiccircumstancesincreased

US farmers’hostility towards ‘nannystate’ regulationsdespite theiron-going–

and inmanycases increasing– relianceon federal subsidies.30Commentingon

the appointment of the executive director of the Consumer Federation of

America, Carole Foreman, as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in May 1977,

WallacesFarmernoted,“…it’stemptingtoseeherappointmentasaslapatthe

American farmer.”31By the late 1970s, the previously uneasy agricultural

balancebetweenprivateconsumerandenvironmentalistconcernsandhostility

towardsfederalinterventionshadtoppled.

Changing political attitudes also entrenched farmers’ hostility towards

potential AGP restrictions. Since 1972, intensification pressure had only

increased farmers’ antibiotic reliance. In February 1977, Wallaces Farmer

published a poll inquiring about readers’ antibiotic use. Of the farmers polled,27ForFDAreactionstoindustryandscientificpressureseeChapterTwelve,pp.281-28428Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.134.29Anderson,IndustrializingtheCornBelt.Agriculture,TechnologyandEnvironment,1942-1972,p.195.30Regardingenvironmentalinterventionism,thiscontradictsthepositivecorrelationbetweencrisisandeconomicinterventionisminLindaM.LobaoandPamelaThomas,'PoliticalBeliefsinanEraofEconomicDecline:Farmers'AttitudestowardStateEconomicIntervention,Trade,andFoodSecurity',RuralSociology,57/4(1992).31‘Consumeradvocatetoagdepartment’,WF,14.05.1977,p.18.

257

67%regularlyfed‘drugs’togrowingpigsandonly7%didnotfeeddrugsatall.32

Oneofthepolledfarmersstated:“Ineeddrugstohelpwithproduction.Keeping

thehogshealthy is theonlywaywecanmakea livingandprovideconsumers

with meat...”33While farming magazines actively cooperated with the FDA to

reduce antibiotic and sulfa residues,34they mostly ignored growing concerns

about antimicrobial resistance. According to E.G. Eggert from American

Cyanamid,antibioticswereabsolutely“vitalforfoodproduction”:

Withoutantibiotics,Americanswouldspendanextra$2millioneachyearforfood,(…).Farmerswouldhavetogrowanextra103millionbushelsofcornand23millionbushelsofsoybeanstoproducethesameamountofmeatwithoutantibiotics…35

Thebasicpremisesofantibiotic-intenseproductionremainedunquestioned.

In June1977,WallacesFarmerwarned readers aboutDonaldKennedy’s

plansto“withdrawpenicillinandchlortetracyclines[sic]”:

…subtherapeuticlevelsofantibioticshavebeenusedfor25years,’–andas yet they have not created a human health hazard. (…). What theseantibioticshavedoneisincreaseanimalproteinproductionatleast5%to10%. (…).Theneed for food ismore important thananyother factor inourpresentsociety.36

Withonly a few readers expressing concerns aboutpotential healthhazards,37

the followingweeks saw articles reinforce the impression that scientistswere

uncertain whether AGPs were harmful but certain that AGP substitutes were

inferior.38Stoking inflation fears, the Farm Bureau announced that current

antibiotic use saved “farmers about $2 billion a year which otherwise would

32MonteSesker,‘DiseaseproblemsplagueIowa’shogproducers’,WF,26.02.1977,pp.10-11.33Ibid.34‘AntibioticResiduesUnderFire’,PF,Jun1975,p.36D;‘Couldithappentoyou?’,WF,22.01.1977,p.10;‘FDAstepsupSulfatesting’,WF,09.07.1977,p.29;‘Speedupdrugresiduemonitoringinmeat’,WF,23.04.1977,p.43.35‘Antibioticsvitalforfoodproduction’,WF,26.02.1977,p.93.36MonteSesker,‘AnotherThreattoLivestockProducers’,WF,25.06.1977,p.18.37‘Animalhealth’,WF,23.07.1977,p.29.38‘Researcherscan’tagree…Penicillinsubstitutesinanimalfeed’,WF,08.10.1977,p.19.

258

havetobepassedontoconsumers.”39Meanwhile,WallacesFarmerclaimedthat

there were insufficient veterinarians to compensate for antibiotic restrictions

and demanded regulation changes allowing “feed manufacturers to file

prescriptionsatdosesnotprescribedbylaw.”40

After Congress stalled Donald Kennedy’s antibiotic bans, the mood in

agriculturalmagazinesbecameevenmoredefiant.By1979,articlesencouraged

farmers to pressure political representatives to oppose all planned bans on

nitrites,DESandantibioticswhilststokingfearsofinflationanddiscreditingFDA

health concerns.41FarmJournal launcheda stronglywordedattackon theFDA

for abolishing Americans’ “freedoms”42and cited a survey by the Forum on

Regulation (FOR).Eliciting over two million voluntary written responses, the

FORsurveyreportedthat41%ofrespondentsclaimedtobeworseoffasaresult

of federal lawsprotectingpeople from impure foodsanddangerousdrugsand

only 35% claimed to be better off. According toFarmJournal, the FOR survey

held“anunmistakablewarningforthefuture.Ifgovernmentkeepsonpilingon

new regulations, it will further erode citizen support for laws already on the

book.”43

Farmers also began to criticise ‘excessive’ federal residue monitoring.

Between 1973 and 1979, 10-15% of hogs controlled by federal inspectors

contained sulphonamide residues above the tolerated0.1ppm level. The swine

industrywasparticularlyaffectedbySMZresiduesbecauseofSMZ’sinclusionin

39‘Vowsantibioticsbaninlivestockfeed’,WF,22.10.1977,p.18.40MonteSesker,‘AnotherThreattoLivestockProducers’,WF,25.06.1977,p.18;USveterinarians’20thcenturydeclinewaspartiallylinkedtofarmers’antibioticaccess;Jones,ValuingAnimals.VeterinariansandTheirPatientsinModernAmerica,pp.8;104-06;11-14.41‘RegulatingMotherNature’,FJ,Jan1979,p.Hog32;‘Nitritebanwouldboostinflation’,FJ,Jan1979,p.Beef2;‘Whatiftheybanfeeddrugs’,FJ,Jan1979,p.Beef2.42‘’Worseoff’–fromregulation’,FJ,Mid-March1979,p.40.43Ibid.

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apopularfeedmixcalledASP-250.44Afterviolationratesroseto17.2%inJune

1977,theFDAannouncedthatitwouldconsiderlimitedrestrictionsifviolation

rates did not drop to 1%by September 1979. Arguing that the action level of

0.1ppm provided a 2,000-fold safetymargin for humans, the NPPC lobbied to

raisetolerancelevelsfrom0.1to0.3ppminliverandkidneysamples.However,

USDA-data showed that raising tolerances to 0.3ppm would merely lead to a

50%drop of violations.45Even hostile commentators became concernedwhen

violation rates refused to sink ahead of 1979 andwarned that ignorance and

sloppiness could harm the entire agricultural community. 46 Experts also

expressed concern about new residue tests for meat from dairy cows: “USDA

surveys show that 10% to 30% of the dairy cows going to slaughter have

‘specificdiseaseconditionsat timeof slaughterandhaveantibiotic residues in

violation of tolerances,’ …”47Although they might disagree about tolerance

levels, the vast majority of commentators ultimately agreed that residues in

animal produce were undesirable and necessitated a modicum of federal

controls.

This consensus did not hold for federal attempts to combat the

proliferationofbacterialresistance. In1979,manycommentatorscontinuedto

deny that resistance selection on farms could later harm humans. Despite

attemptsbytheFDA’snewDirectoroftheCenterforVeterinaryMedicine(CVM),

LesterCrawford,toconvinceFarmBureaumembersofantibioticrestrictions,48

the farming media prioritised information supplied by CAST-member and

44‘SynopsisofMeeting’,Nov.18,1976,enclosedin:MarylnPereztoBerkleyBedell,Feb07,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.1.45JamesR.Jones,‘CanWeLowerSulfaViolationRates?’,FJ,Mar1979,pp.Hog8-9.46Ibid.;‘Sulfatolerance‘toorestrictive’,FJ,Apr1979,p.Hog2.47‘TodayintheEast’,FJ,Mar1979,p.30.48‘RegulatorsTalkTough’,FJ,Nov1979,p.Hog28.

260

UniversityofKentuckyanimalnutritionistVirgilHays,whodidnot“cottonmuch

tothetheoreticalpossibilitythatresistantorganisms(…)maybetransferredto

man.”49Evenagriculturalfeaturesaddressingdrugoveruseorthedifficultiesof

treating resistant bacteria on farms did not problematize the reasons behind

resistance andmostly limited themselves to advocating improvedhygiene and

nutritionoraswitchtodifferentantibiotics.50

Bytheendof1979,thestrategyofignoringresistanceproblemsseemed

validated. After two years of intense conflictwithDonaldKennedy’s FDAover

hormones,nitrates,sulphasandantibiotics,farmershadlostonlythebattleover

DES. Although the USDA announced that itwould intensify its residue testing,

Farm Journal triumphantly noted, “Low-level feeding of antibiotics (…) will

almostcertainlybeallowedforanothertwoyears–possiblyasmanyasfive.”51

A CAST study attempted to drive a further nail into the coffin of regulatory

activism:

Of the 84 [recent] regulations, 36 showed a net positive social benefit,(…), the proposed ban on use of penicillin in animal feeds would havecosts as well as benefits (…). But the net social payoff is judged to beinsignificant.52

Republican Congressmen subsequently accused the USDA and FDA of “inept

handling”53of regulatory measures and proposed independent chemical risk

assessment panels and mandatory cost-benefit evaluations ahead of new

regulations.54Thenextyearbroughtfurthergoodnewsontheantibioticsfront.

InApril1980,FarmJournalannouncedthattheNASreviewhadconcludedthat49Ibid.50‘ArebacterialinfectionstheculpritinMMA?’,FJ,Apr1979,p.Hog26;JPKunesh,‘Aveterinarianlooksat…Buildingsystems’,FJ,Apr1979,p.Hog30;‘CanYouSayGood-ByeToSulfa’,FJ,Oct1979,p.Hog3.51‘Outlook/Washington’,FJ,Dec1979,p.10.52‘CASTconsidersregulations’,FJ,Dec1979,p.Beef2.53‘Whowoulddecidecancerrisk?’,FJ,Dec1979,p.Hog38.54Ibid.

261

“thetestprobablydoesn’texistthatcanproveordisprovethesafetyofusinglow

levelsofpenicillinortetracyclines.”55ItseemedunlikelythattheFDAwouldbe

abletodefendAGPbansincourtorCongress.

However, the victory over FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy’s AGP

bansdidnotleadtolong-termprosperity.Forfarmers,the1980electionvictory

ofRonaldReaganwasamixedblessing.56Althoughhestaunchlyopposeddirect

regulatoryinvolvementinthemarket,aprolongedanddireeconomiccrisisfor

US agriculture repeatedly forced Reagan to abandon neoliberal principles and

expandsubsidies.Between1980and1985,thetotalcostoftheUSfarmprogram

rose to more than $20 billion. However, CCC deficit purchases and storage

programs did not raise commodity prices and stimulated further

overproduction. Saddledwith debts from the 1970s and told to intensify even

further, the familiar tale of rural mass impoverishment and exodus repeated

itself.57Whereas farm debt had totalled $60 billion in 1972, it totalled an

astonishing$216billion in1983.58Theagricultural crisisbegan to recedeonly

following furthersubsidiesandrecoveringpricesduring thesecondhalfof the

1980s.59By this time, the fabric of US agriculture had changed: similar to the

DustBowlera,42%ofUSfarmlandwasoperatedunderrentalagreementsand

onlylargerconventionalproducersweremakingaprofit.60

55‘Outlook/Washington’,FJ,Apr1980,p.6.56MonteSesker,‘Badjoke,poorlytold’,WF,13.04.1985,p.14.57Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.132-34.58Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.138.59Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.132-34.60Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,p.150.

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Although most conventional farmers continued to defend the chemical

statusquo,61the severity and length of the economic crisismade an increasing

numberofproducerscastenviouslooksaton-goingprofitsintheorganicsector.

In 1981, IndianaPrairieFarmer warned readers to no longer “dismiss organic

farmingasmerelyafadorjoke”62Themagazinepraisedthepotentialoforganic

technologies like integrated pestmanagement and conservation tillage to save

expenditure on “insecticides, herbicides, growth regulators, and fertilizers.”63

Although the article avoided discussions of organic philosophy, other

commentatorsquestionedwhethertheexistingagriculturalsystemwouldallow

‘ordinary’ farmers to survive both economic hardship and growing popular

environmentalism.In1981,onearticlepredictedthatthe1990swouldnotonly

bringfurtherintensificationbutalsoreducedaccesstopharmaceuticals:

… less drugs will be available for everyday, continuous use due topressure from consumers and FDA actions. Less drugs will forceimprovedmanagementtechniquesforsuccessfulhogproduction.64

Nonetheless, it remained clear that farmers would bitterly oppose any

federallymandatedsubstancerestrictionsbecauseoffearsthatthesewouldlead

to further restrictions. Reacting to the NRDC’s 1983 petition and the seeming

1984 link by CDC epidemiologist Scott Holmberg’s 1984 between agricultural

antibiotic use and human illness, the well-oiled machinery of agro-

pharmaceutical opposition sprung to life. Farm Bureau News (FBNews)

questionedHolmberg’sstudy:“…otherfactorscouldhavecausedtheoutbreak,

(…) a direct linkwas never shown (The resistant Salmonella apparently came

61‘Farmerfeelsatighteningnoosefrompublicoutcryoverchemicals’,FBNews,29.07.1985,p.2.62‘Conventionalfarmersusingorganicfarmingprinciples’,IPF,16.05.1981,p.47.63Ibid.64AlMorrow,‘Howyoumayproducehogsinthe1990s’,IPFFarmProgressHogProducer,Sept1981,p.H18.

263

from an adjacent dairy farm, where no antibiotics were used.).”65Resistance

“[was] probably more due to [antibiotics’] prolific use for treating and

preventing human infection.”66 In Congress, Farm Bureau representatives

claimed that farmers would immediately abandon AGPs if their harmfulness

were proven: “‘If the potential hazard to humans is as great as some people

claim, why haven’t there been more cases of human illness.”67According to

FBNews, it seemed inconsistent tomerely banAGPswhilst leaving therapeutic

antibioticuseinhumanandanimalmedicineuntouched.Themagazinealsoused

theexampleoftheSwannreporttoargueagainstUSAGPbans:“Somescientists

saytherehasbeennoincreaseinantibiotic-resistantbacteria,noradecreasein

suchviruses[sic!]inGreatBritain.”68

However, economic duress also created rifts amongst conventional

producers.RelyinglessonAGPsthanotherproducers,theNationalCattlemen’s

Association (NCA) announced in spring 1985 that it would discontinue the

feedingoftetracyclines–butnotofpenicillin–“untilitcanberesolvedwhether

theiruse causeshealthproblems inhumans.”69Elicitingmixed responses from

other livestock groups,70theNCA stressed that itwould, however, continue to

opposefederalAGPbansbecauseofconcernsthattheywouldencouragefurther

anti-chemicalcampaigns:“Ifaproductcanbetakenoffthemarketbyinference

insteadof fact,whywouldanybody investanother$70milliontocreateanew

product?”71

65‘CalltobanantibioticsinfeedgetsFDAhearinglaterinmonth’,FBNews,07.01.1985,p.3.66Ibid.67‘FDA,saysFB,needsmoreevidenceonantibioticsinfeedquestion’,FBNews,28.01.1985.68Ibid.69‘StatusReport’,FBNews,29.04.1985,p.3.70SaraWyant,‘What’sbehindthesalmonellascare’,WF,25.05.1985,p.14.71LuAnneMetzger,‘Cattlemenstillopposeantibioticsban’,WF,23.03.1985,p.2.

264

While HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler’s 1985 rejection of the NRDC

petitionwasamajorvictoryforthefarmlobby,USfarmersexperiencedgrowing

culturalandpoliticalpressuretoendorseenvironmentalistmeasuresthroughout

the 1980s and early 1990s.72In 1990,WallacesFarmerconducted a survey of

200 farmers’ pesticide use. Of the 85% who reported a change in pesticide

management,94%claimedtohavedonesoforeconomicreasons;environmental

concernswerelistedby80%andhealthconcernsby79%oftherespondents.73

Inthesameyear,WallacesFarmeralsoprintedanarticleinwhichKansasswine

veterinarianSteveHenrynotedthatnewlivestockfacilitieswouldhavetoadapt

more to animals’ physiological, nutritional and genetic factors. In an almost

revolutionary statement,Henry acknowledged that the samewas also true for

animals’microflora:

Thetimeislongoverdueforustoacceptthepresenceoforganismswithpathogenicpotentialinallgrowingandfinishingherdsofswine.Weneedto adapt facilities, diets, labor, and efforts toward the peacefulcohabitationofpigs,microbes,andpeople.Necessarily,thiswillmeanlessrelianceondrugsformicrobialelimination…74Yet, it would be wrong to speak of an agricultural Saul to Paul

transformation. Despite their victory overmany environmental and consumer

initiatives in the1980s,conventional farmershadrealisedthat itwasbetter to

be–orat leastappear tobe– ‘green’ than toprovokepublicenvironmentalist

sentiments.Farmersreadilyadoptedgreenmeasuresthatcouldbeincorporated

into the enduring logic of intensification75and farm organisations launched

72Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,p.134.73‘Farmerswillingtoreducepesticide,fertilizeruse’,WF,10.07.1990,p.28.74‘News&Notes’,WF,13.03.1990,TheHogProducer,p.H3.75‘Survivalstrategiesforthe‘90s’,WF,13.03.1990,TheHogProducer,p.H23.

265

majoreffortstopromotethepublicimageof‘green’and‘responsible’farmers.76

According to FBNews, farmers should redefine the meaning of being an

environmentalist: whereas the term was usually used to label “someone who

favors locking up natural resources and opposes the use of chemicals”, it also

meant“someonewhocaresabout theenvironment”: “Thencertainlyyoucould

applythetermtofarmersandranchers.”77

All the while, agricultural magazines and organisations continued to

oppose external interference in farming practices. Holding fast to its 1970s

domino theory of chemical bans, the wider agricultural community remained

united in its rejection of “environcra[t]” 78 bans and regulations. Barely

mentioning the 1990s milk residue scandal, 79 agricultural commentators

attacked‘excessive’publichealthfears:

Tracesof this.Tracesof that.Thismaycausecancer, somight that. (…).Ours is a reactionary society, sometimes overreactionary [sic] in ourconstantpursuitof‘idealism’.80

Thedefaultposition seemed tobe thatAmericahad “the safest, thehealthiest,

andthemostabundantfoodsupplyintheworld...”81

When Newt Gingrich’s 1994 ‘Republican Revolution’ ended the

Democrats’52-yearholdonCongress,theAmericanFarmBureaualsoworkedto

roll back existing restrictions.82Speaking in front of the Senate Agriculture

Committee in February 1995, Farm Bureau representatives blamed farming’s

declineona“federalregulatoryjuggernaut”:

76‘NationalAgricultureWeekTVprogram’,WF,13.03.1990,pp.16-1777‘Farmersasenvironmentalists’,FBNews,07.05.1990,p.2;alsosee:JoAnnAlumbaugh,WF,09.01.1990,TheHogProducer,p.H1.78KeithPropst,‘Avoidselectiveinformationfromalternativeagstudy’,FBNews,01.01.1990,p.8.79‘CommodityBriefs–Dairy’,FBNews,25.02.1990,p.2.80MonteSesker,‘Putproblemsinperspective’,WF,08.05.1990,p.5.81Ibid.82Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.121.

266

AFBFsupportsfourmajorregulatoryreforms:riskassessment(…);cost-benefit analysis (…); private property compensation when Congressdecides to override private interests in favor of the general public; andredirection of regulatory resources into worthwhile private sectorincentives...83

With Republicans controlling both Houses, some of the most formidable

milestones of US consumer protection were successfully challenged. In 1996,

Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) and abolished the

DelaneyClause.AsdescribedbyhistorianSarahVogel,theFQPAwassupported

by environmental and consumer advocates because it ended the distinction

betweenchemicalresiduesonrawandprocessedfood;loweredtolerancestoa

one-in-a-million cancer risk; introduced right-to-knowprovisionsand required

reviews of existing standards. However, the FQPA also marked a significant

victoryforindustrybecauseitsimplifiedregulatoryproceduresandendedzero-

toleranceregulationsinfavourofnegotiablerisk-benefitcalculi.84

However, once again, chemical – and economic – deregulation did not

improvemostfarmers’economicsituation.In1996,twoyearsaftertheso-called

Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT)

stipulated an annual farm support ceiling of $19 billion,85the US government

passed the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR).86FAIR

eliminated nearly all acreage controls and effectively ended surplus purchases

by introducingCCC loansatorbelowmarketprices.However,FAIR’sso-called

‘production flexibility contract payments’ allowed politicians to bypass the

subsidyceiling.By2000,unofficialUSfarmsupportgrewto$11billionandtotal

subsidies amounted to $25 billion, which constituted ca. 47% of farmers’ net83‘RegshurtingagricultureFarmBureautellspanel’,FBNews,20.02.1995,p.1.84Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.122.85Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.134-37.86Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,pp.150-52.

267

income.87 With subsidies and deregulation again mostly benefitting large

producers, thenumberofUS farms fell to2,190,070 in1999.88Subsidy-fuelled

intensification and farm decline further increased under the Bush

administration.89

Agriculturalreactionstothesedevelopmentswereagaindivided.Onthe

one hand, commentators’ hostility against regulatory restrictions, ivory tower

‘agri-intellectuals’ and ‘uncomfortable truths’ like climate change reached new

heights.90Leavinglittleroomforconsensualandconstructivenegotiationsover

pollution, antibiotic overuse and animal welfare, organisations like the Farm

Bureauineffecthardenedtheattitudesoftheirmostlyliberalcritics.

On the other hand, medium-sized farmers’ demise gave rise to a

contradictorysetofarticles.In1998,WallacesFarmerpublishedasurvivalguide

forsmallpigproducers:

This isadifficultcolumntowrite.We’vealways tried tokeepapositiveattitude and present ways producers can become more efficient,productiveorprofitable.Butnothingweprintwillchangethefactthatthepork industry is going through a critical time. There ismore pork thanthereareconsumerstoeatit,(…).Oneoption(…)istopursuespecialitymarkets. (…) some producers are finding a high-value niche fororganically-raised,antibiotic-freepork.It’snotforeveryone,butitmaybeanideatoconsider.91

87Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.136-38.88Hurt,ProblemsofPlenty.TheAmericanFarmerintheTwentiethCentury,pp.155-56.89Conkin,ARevolutionDownontheFarm.TheTransformationofAmericanAgriculturesince1929,pp.140-41.90BlakeHurst,‘TheOmnivore’sDelusion’,FBNews,24.08.2009,pp.2;5-6;TimBall,‘Climatedatamaybeaninconvenienttruthforglobalwarmingadvocates’,FBNews,02.04.2007,p.4;PaulaMohr,‘Bookdebunksorganicfoodmyths’,PrFa,Mar2008,p.69;JohnVogel,‘Animalrightsgroupsarewatchingyou’,PrFa,Feb2009,p.44.91JoannAlumbaugh,‘Staycommitted–comeoutstronger’,WF,Oct1998,p.H1.

268

Magazines also began to publish advice on how to dowithout antibiotics and

highlighted the advantages of organic intensification and integration.92The

organicmarket’son-goinggrowthseemedtoconfirmthevalidityofsuchadvice.

Between2000and2011,thenumberofcertifiedUSorganicbeefcowsrosefrom

13,829 to 106,181; the number of organic milk cows rose from 38,196 to

254,771 and the number of organic broilers rose from 1,924,807 to

28,644,354.93Although overall numbers remained paltry in comparison to

conventional production, the organic sector’s stable double-digit growth

provided a much-needed perspective of future prosperity, which many small

producersnolongerfoundinconventionalproduction.

Contradictory attitudes also governed reporting on AGPs. Despite

highlightingways for smaller producers to go antibiotic-free,WallacesFarmer

maintainedthattherewasno“conclusiveevidenceofhumanhealthhazards”94:

Theanimalhealthindustryalreadyhasareasonableandcomprehensiveapproachtoaddressingantibioticresistance.RepresentativesofAHIfeelthe"framework"documentproposedbyCVMisunsupportedbyscientificevidenceandbasedontoomanyfaultyassumptions.95

FollowingthedelayoftheFDA’s1999reformattempts,concernsaboutbacterial

resistance were, however, soon forgotten and farm magazines refocused on

othermeatsafetyissues.96InApril2002,FBNewsnoted:

There’sbeena lotof clucking in recentyears that livestockandpoultryproducersareusingantibioticswillynillysotheycancrowdtheiranimals

92‘Interestinorganicskeepsgrowing’,WF,Apr2000,p.43;‘Cannon-antibioticmastitistreatmentswork?,WF,Jun1998,p.D2;‘Preventsicknessaunaturel’,WFBeefProducer,Mar2007,p.BP9;‘Moremoneyinorganichogs?’,WF,Aug2009,p.67.93'Table3-CertifiedOrganicandTotalUsAcreage,SelectedCropsandLivestock,1995and2011',USDAEconomicResearchService-OrganicProduction-Overview(http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/organic-production.aspx#25762[accessed:23.03.2015]).94ShannonLinderoth,‘Prudentpracticesinthecross-hairs’,WF,Apr1999,p.D4.95JoAnnAlumbaugh,‘Newanimaldrugguidelinesquestioned’,WF,Apr1999,p.H7.96Cf.NeilSmith,‘Weallneedsafemeatinspection’,WF,Nov2000,p.40;AlanNewport,‘Doctor’sorders:Eatmoremeat’,WF,Oct2008,p.BP12.

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together and farmon the cheap.The fact is antibiotics, likemostdrugs,aren’t cheap. (…). Farmers use [antibiotics] when they’re needed, andtheyshouldbeabletocontinuedoingso.97

Inavastunderstatement,themagazineclaimedthatAGPsconstitutedonly6.1%

of total US antibiotic use and exhorted farmers to educate consumers on the

benefitsofmodernagricultureandchemicaluse.98

Although smaller farm organisations supported guarantee schemes for

meat produced without GMOs, antibiotics or hormones,99the powerful Farm

Bureau continued to advocate routine antibiotic use and oppose federal

restrictionsthroughoutthe2000s.Reactingtonewrestriction initiativesunder

the Obama administration in April 2009, FBNewscontinued to question links

between agricultural antibiotic use and resistant bacteria on US meat. While

FarmBureauPresidentBobStallmanclaimedthat“thepossibilityofresistance

from antibiotics in livestock is declining”, FBNews reported that Danish AGP

bans had “resulted in more death and disease among animals and greater

amounts of antibiotics used to treat animal diseases.”100Conflating resistance

and residue concerns, the Farm Bureau significantly used previously decried

organic philosophies to claim that the market could resolve the situation by

itself:

If, however, a consumer still does not trust food from animals treatedwithantibiotics,there’salreadyawaytoavoidit.Tobecertifiedorganicunder USDA’s National Organic Program, animals can’t be given

97LynneFinnerty,‘Cluckingaboutagriculturalantibioticsisoverblown’,FBNews,28.04.2002,p.3.98Ibid.;formorerealisticdataseeChapterTwelve,pp.317-318.99‘NewAssociationofFamilyFarmsJoinsForceswithNFU’,NFUNewsRelease,27.11.2006;forparallelbattlesoverr-BSTfreelabelscf.‘OhioFB:Reviseddairylabelrulesmaybeimprovement’,FBNews,19.05.2008,p.7.100‘FarmBureau:Antibioticsareneededtokeepanimalshealthy,foodsafe’,FBNews,06.04.2009,p.3.

270

antibiotics.(…)ifsomeonejustwantstoavoidproductsfromanimalsthathavebeengivenantibiotics,theycanalreadydothat.101Magazines, which also addressed smaller farmers, expressed more

nuanced views. In Wallaces Farmer, one commentator advised farmers to

“respectcautionbyconsumers,butkeeptellingourstory”:

…antibiotic resistance in bacteria is a natural part of the evolutionaryprocess. (…).Butwealsoknow thatunderdosing, incomplete treatmentor choosing thewrong antibiotic for the problem bacteria can increasethe rate of resistance. (…). The same thing happenswithwell-executedantibioticuse,butatanarguablylowerlevel.102

Shouldfarmersfindthemselves“defendinganindefensibleposition”,thenitwas

time to “take a serious look at abandoning that particular practice”103.

Respondingtoareader,whofearedthatAGPbansmight“erasemyprofitmargin

andforcemeout”104,themagazine’sthreeagriculturalexpertsweresurprisingly

relaxed: two experts reminded the producer that therapeutic antibiotic use

remainedlegal,andthethirdexpertnotedthathogswerestill“beingproduced

profitably in European countries.”105In April 2011, the magazine printed an

article inwhichveterinarianMikeApleypredictedanendof “over-the-counter

salesofantibioticsforfoodanimals,andmoreveterinarianinvolvement”106

By2013,newdataandrisingresistancewarningsmadeevenmajoragro-

pharmaceutical interest groups like the Animal Health Institute (AHI)

acknowledgethatantibioticreformcouldnotbepostponedindefinitely.InApril

2013, Wallaces Farmer reported that the AHI was pressing for voluntary

101Ibid.102AlanNewport,‘Let’sgetargumentaboutantibioticsright’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2010,p.BP8.103Ibid.104‘Raisehogswithoutantibiotics?’,WF,Dec2010,p.61.105Ibid.106AlanNewport,‘Pressureismountingonanimalantibioticuse’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2011,p.BP8;alsosee:‘It’snottheresidues’&‘Tworesistances,oneworry’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2011,p.BP9;AlanNewport,‘Humansandanimalssharetheirdiseases’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2013,p.BP7;‘UniversityresearchfindsantibioticresistancetoBRD’,PrFa,Sept2013,p.91.

271

compliance with the formerly suspect FDA guidances in order to avert “what

happened10yearsago in theEuropeanUnion,when theuseof antibiotics for

growthpromotionwas stoppedvia regulation.”107However, aWallacesFarmer

commentatordoubtedthatsucharollbackwaswiseandcomparedittoIsrael’s

contemporarywithdrawalfromGaza –therebyindirectlycomparingantibiotic

criticstoHamas:

Canitbeasuccessfulstrategywhendealingwithsomanyradicalsintheanti-antibiotic crowd? Ceding ground to radicals always worries me. IthasneverworkedforIsrael,forexample.108

Although the AHI’s strategy seems validated given the FDA’s renewed

emphasis on voluntary instead of statutory bans,109agricultural commentators

remain concerned about future bans. During Iowa’s 2014 annual swine day,

formerUSDAUndersecretaryofFoodSafetyRichardRaymondcomplainedabout

one-sidedmediareportsandclaimedthat‘natural’bacterialresistancecouldnot

beblamedonagriculturalantibioticuse:“…thereisnoproofthatlowdosesare

any more likely to cause resistance than high doses of antibiotics.”110 The

American Farm Bureau also maintains that agricultural antibiotic use is

unproblematic. In a policy statement from March 2015, the Farm Bureau

expresses:

…serious concerns about the effects of removing important antibioticsand classes of antibiotics from the market, which would handicapveterinarians and livestock and poultry producers in their efforts tomaintainanimalhealthandprotectournation’sfoodsupply.111

107AlanNewport,‘Iscedinggroundinantibioticsfraysmart?’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2013,p.BP3.108Ibid.109RobertFears,‘Makewiseuseofantibiotics’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2014,p.BP6.110ChristinaDittmer,‘Therealityofantibioticresistance’,WF,Aug2014,p.74.111'PreservingAntibioticAccess',AmericanFarmBureauFederation-PriorityIssuesAntibiotics(http://www.fb.org/issues/docs/antibiotics15.pdf[accessed:24.03.2015],Mar2015).

272

Over half a century after E.S. Anderson’s studies, agricultural

commentators’andex-officials’continueddescriptionofresistancetransferfrom

bacteriaonfarmstobacteriainhumansas“hypothetical”112doesnotbodewell.

Despitemore nuanced views by smaller producers, domino thinking seems to

underlieon-goingagriculturaloppositiontofederalrestrictions.SinceDDT,any

concession to ‘activists’ or ‘Washington’ is interpreted as a threat to farmers’

freedom.Meanwhile,farmorganisationshavebeenhappytoabandonzero-sum

regulationhostilityifstricterstandardsareimposedbycommercialactors:while

publicantibioticcriticsarecomparedtoHamas,movesbyTysonandMcDonalds

to phase out antibiotics have not attracted similar criticism and the organic

market has become an acceptable haven for struggling conventional

producers.113Even though consumers’ changingpreferenceswill probably lead

to antibiotic restrictions in the long term, agro-pharmaceutical opposition to

federalinterventionhasbeenremarkablysuccessfulintheUS.

For the millions of producers forced out of farming by intensification,

their industry’s resounding victories over federal regulations have, however,

proven pyrrhic. Opposition to antibiotic restrictions has benefited

pharmaceutical manufacturers more than individual farmers. The persistent

‘othering’ofcriticshasledtoasituationwheretheconstantlyshrinkinggroupof

farmers has become publicly othered itself.Whereas it is up to US farmers to

decidewhethertheycanmorallycondonetheuseofstrategiestocastdoubton

crediblepublichealthhazards,itisundeniablethatholdingfasttocontroversial

technologies is unwise in the long term. Meanwhile, EU farmers are steadily

112Fears,‘Makewiseuseofantibiotics’,WFBeefProducer,Apr2014,p.BP6.113'Mcdonald'stoCutUseofAntibioticsinChicken',BBCNews(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31743764[accessed:24.03.2015],05.03.2015).

273

increasingtheirheadstartinaconsumer-drivenmarketwheremeatisproduced

withoutAGPsandashrinkingamountoftherapeuticantibiotics.

Regarding health hazards to themselves or their families, farmers have

tended to compartmentalise the antibiotic problem. Antibiotic residues and

bacterialresistanceselectionwereusuallydiscussedseparately:whileresidues

were mostly blamed on ‘black sheep’, concerns about (horizontal) bacterial

resistancewereeitherdismissedwith reference toAGPs’ continuedefficacyor

limited to a discussion of the selection for resistant pathogens on individual

farms and the supposed absence of direct proof of harm – and guilt. This

compartmentalisation makes agricultural antibiotic use seem reformable.

However, it ignores the fundamental problem at the heart of resistance

proliferation:themassuseofagriculturalantibioticshas,doesandwillselectfor

bacterialresistanceonanultimatelyplanetaryscale.Bygenerallyincreasingthe

amount of resistant organisms and R-factors in the environment, farmers are

continuously increasing the chance that harmless bacteria will turn into

pathogensor‘teach’pathogenstoresistantibioticsStallingregulatoryactionby

insistingonproofofharmincourtisahazardousstrategy.

274

ChapterTwelve–TheGovernment–FailingtoRegulate

SowhyhastheFDAfailedtoimplementmandatoryAGPrestrictions?Asthetwo

previous chapters have shown, the FDA’s inability to push bans past Congress

wasinpartduetotheriseofAmericanneoliberalismandconsumerswhofeared

residuesinfoodmorethanresistanceinbacteria.Itwasalsopartiallycausedby

the agro-pharmaceutical industry’s skilleduseof counter-science and the legal

system to defeat potential bans. However, as this chapter shows, the FDA’s

ambivalent record regarding antibiotic regulationwas also caused by internal

factionalismandtheagency’sfundamentalweakeningduringthe1980s.

Following FDA Commissioner George Larrick’s resignation in 1965,

heightenedFDAresponsibilitiesandgrowingpoliticalinterferenceresultedina

rapidsuccessionofCommissionersandbureaucraticturmoil.1Characterisedasa

“wild-eyed crusader with a battle-ax flailing boldly”2, Larrick’s successor,

CommissionerJamesGoddard,quicklyfoundhimselfisolatedandwasdamaged

by the chloramphenicol scandal.3FollowingGoddard’s resignation in 1968, the

trained physician and bacteriologist Herbert Ley became the last FDA

Commissionertohaverisenthroughtheranksbutwasreplacedinlate1969asa

resultofthecyclamatescandal.4

1Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.14-15&18.2DouglasMartin,‘JamesL.Goddard,CrusadingFDALeader,Diesat86’,NYTHealth,01.01.2010,URL:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/health/02goddard.html?_r=0(accessed:31.03.2015).3ChapterTen,pp.223-224.4Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.1-3;31-52.

275

Followingthecyclamatescandal,HEWUnder-SecretaryFredericV.Malek

recommended a fundamental reorganisation of the FDA along product rather

than function lines. The FDA’s Bureaus of Science, Medicine and Compliance

were subsequently replacedwith the Bureaus of Drugs, Foods, Pesticides and

Product Safety.5Although regulatory responsibility for antibiotics was now

divided between three different Bureaus, the Bureau of Veterinary Medicines

(BVM),whichhadbeenmadeindependentoftheBureauofDrugsin1967,held

themostresponsibilityfortheregulationofagriculturalantibiotics.6

UnderCommissionerLey,BureauofVeterinaryMedicine(BVM)director

C.D. Van Houweling had already focused efforts on enforcing compliance,

improving feed labels, reducing the Salmonella contamination of feeds and

combating antibiotic residues.7However, early attempts to prosecute residue

offenders and ban or extend withdrawal times for residue-prone medications

had not been very effective.8In 1966, initial USDA testing had revealed the

contaminationof15.9%ofanalysedmeatsampleswithantimicrobialsubstances

ofwhich only ca. 1% could be positively identified.9Despite internalwarnings

5Ibid.,pp.56;63-65.6'OralHistoryInterviewofCdVanHouwelingbyRonaldT.Ottes',HistoryoftheUSFoodandDrugAdministration-FDAOralHistoryTranscripts(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/OralHistories/SelectedOralHistoryTranscripts/UCM264576.pdf[accessed:13.04.2015],18.06.1990),pp.1-3.7VanHouwelingtoPaulA.Pumpian,Dec.21,1967,FolderA24B88-75-3,Box3966,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;HerbertL.LeytoCCJohnson,15.08.1969,Box4214,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.8VanHouweling,‘MemorandumofTelephoneConversation’,Dec.13,1967,FolderA24B88-75-3,Box3966,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;'FdaConsumerProtectionActivities-FdaReorganization',SubcommitteeonPublicHealthandWelfareoftheCommitteeonInterstateandForeignCommerce(HouseofRepresentatives;WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingPress,1970),p.274;'RegulationofFoodAdditivesandMedicatedAnimalFeeds',SubcommitteeOfTheCommitteeOnGovernmentOperations(HouseofRepresentativesWashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice1971),p.174.9‘Biologicalresidue(supplement)’,Mar.6,1969,Folder88-76-80,Box4215,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA

276

aboutsignificantresidueproblems,10CommissionerLeyreportedasurprisingly

goodcontamination rateof0.63% toCongress threeyears later.11Leywasnot

asked to clarify testing methods nor how high detected residues were and

attempted to smooth over the fact that the FDA had failed to prosecute any

offenders.12

Feed industry compliance also remained dismal. In one case, a feed

manufacturer ignored FDA cautions for ca. 7 years rather than lose

customers.13Meanwhile,theState-FederalMedicatedFeedProgramhadvirtually

disintegrated. Writing to Commissioner Ley in April 1969, Van Houweling

warnedthatattemptstofreeresourcesbyhandingoverbi-annualinspectionsof

medicated feedmanufacturers tostateshadbackfired.TheFDAhadconducted

only 251 inspections during the first half of the 1969 fiscal year and state

inspectorshadinspectedonly799ofthe8,567registeredmanufacturersinthe

preceding fiscal year.14Meanwhile, over45%of inspectedmanufacturerswere

failing to assay feeds and 25% of conducted assays were violative. Van

Houweling was “concerned that, lacking [controls], our approving medicated

feed applications represents little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ operation.”15

Relaxed controls were already resulting in “numerous batches of feeds not

containing the labelled potency of drugs” and “various drug residues in

10VanHouwelingtoHerbertLey,Apr.17,1969,Folder88-76-80,Box4214,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG,NARA,p.4.11'FdaConsumerProtectionActivities-FdaReorganization',p.274.12Ibid.13DanielKlebertoGeneralCounsel,Feb28,1968,Folder88-765V,Box4103,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.14VanHouwelingtoHerbertLey,Apr.17,1969,Folder88-76-80,Box4214,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG,NARA,pp.1-2.15Ibid.,pp.3-4.

277

carcasses”.16Themedicatedfeedprogramurgentlyneededadditionalresources

toprotectUSconsumersandensurecompliance.

Helpwas not forthcoming. During an internal conference inMay 1969,

Ley“appreciatedhavingthisinformation”but“added(…)thatunderthebudget

constraints(…), theseverepersonnelshortagedoesnotpermitmoreemphasis

to theprogramat this time.”17Amounting to ca. 4%ofFDAmanpowerand ca.

3% of the FDA’s budget, the 166 man-years and $2.4 million devoted to the

controlofveterinarydrugsmarkedalowpointfortheBVM.18

Given such problems, it is unsurprising that despite their interest in

British research, BVM officials were hesitant to devote limited resources to

combatting bacterial resistance. Responding to an inquiry in 1967, the FDA’s

DirectorofLegislativeandGovernmentalServicesclarified:

Atpresentthereisonlyoneantibioticavailableforanimalswhichisnotused in humans. Even this antibiotic causes cross-resistance (…),however, there is no definitive evidence linking antibiotic resistantorganismsofanimalorigin tohumandiseaseorallergies.Consequently,wearenotcontemplatingany[antibioticsbans].19

Without proof of concrete or imminent harm from ‘infectious resistance’, FDA

officials continued to believe that reducing human antibiotic-exposure in the

formof residueswas themost effectiveway to containbacterial resistance. In

ordertodeterminethe“realhazardtoman”20[emphasisintheoriginal]in1968,

16Ibid.17JamesGesling,‘MemorandumofConference’,May19,1969,Folder88-76-80,Box4214,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.18'FdaConsumerProtectionActivities-FdaReorganization',p.478.19PaulA.PumpiantoBirchBayh,Nov.21,1967,FolderA24B88-75-3,Box3966,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,pp.1-2.20RobertA.BaldwintoCDVanHouweling,Feb.13,1968,Folder88-765V,Box4103,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.

278

theFDAauthorized$25,000 for a studyof “resistantorganisms resulting from

medicatedanimalfeeds”.21

Withindustryrepresentativesfollowingdevelopmentscloselyintherun-

up to the British Swann report, 22 the BVM’s wait-and-see attitude was

controversial amongst other FDA Bureaus. In September 1968, FDA Papers

published an attack on AGPs by David Smith. Questioning AGPs’ efficacy and

summarising agricultural antibiotics’ risk, 23 Smith warned that resistant

Salmonellawerealreadycausingproblems:

AllstrainsofS.typhimuriumisolatedbefore1948,whenantibioticswereseldom used on farms, were sensitive to tetracycline; 30 percent ofstrainsisolatedfrompoultryin1962wereresistanttotetracycline,while94percentand57percentofstrains isolated fromcattleandhogswereresistanttotetracycline.24Following the publication of the Swann Report one year later, Van

Houwelingsummarisedtheregulatorysituationforhissuperiors:

Itisreliablyestimatedthatapproximately40milliontonsofanimalfeedcontaining drugs was consumed in 1968. Also, that almost 80% of themeat,milk,andeggsconsumedintheUnitedStatescomesfromanimalsfedmedicatedfeeds.The[AHI]reportedthat$72.5millionofantibioticswentintoanimalfeedlastyear.25

WhiletheBureausofScienceandMedicinewere“acutelyaware”of“thepossible

ecologicaleffectsofusing these largeamountsofantibiotics inanimal feeds”26,

therewas no evidence that “such resistance has caused difficulties in treating

21Note,‘Budget,Bureauof[432.1],Filed251’,20.02.1968,Ibid.22FredJ.KingmatoWarrenM.Reynolds,Feb.20,1968,Ibid.23DavidH.Smith,‘AntibioticsinAgricultureandtheHealthofMan’,FDAPapers(09/1968),p.12.24Ibid.,p.11;theFDA’sDivisionofMicrobiologylaterseverelycriticisedAGPs’continuedavailabilityduringthe1970-1972TaskForcereview;cf.RobertAngelottitoHermanF.KraybillandThroughKeithH.Lewis,Mar.27,1970,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,FDAGS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.[allindividualdocumentsinthisfolderareattachedtoeachother],p.2.25CDVanHouwelingtoDaleR.Lindsay,Nov.26,1969,Folder88-76-80,Box4214,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.26Ibid.

279

diseasesinanimalsormanintheUnitedStates”.27Twostudieswereunderway

to assess hazards: the FDA itself was attempting to trace resistant Salmonella

back to three farms but had beenunable to “process all the culture received”;

andWilliamG.HuberattheUniversityofIllinois’CollegeofVeterinaryMedicine

was attempting to “correlate antibiotic resistantbacteria found in animals and

peopleincontactwiththeseanimalsonthefarmsandinslaughteringhouses.”28

However, no concrete proof harm had emerged and Van Houweling

recommended that the FDA leave AGP policies unchanged “until there is

evidence that thepractice is contributing toahealthproblemeither inmanor

animals.”29

Taking over as FDA Commissioner shortly after Van Houweling’s

antibiotic memorandum, the trained surgeon and former consultant Charles

Edwards inherited a difficult situation:30medicated feedstuff controls and

enforcement had broken down, antibiotic abuse was causing residues in food

andtheSwannreportfundamentallychallengedexistingantibioticpolicies.

Responding to Swann, Edwards installed a Task Force onAntibiotics in

Animal Feeds. The Task Force had been recommended by the Commissioner’s

ScienceAdvisoryCommittee31andcorrespondedwithageneralincreaseofFDA

relianceonexternalexpertisetosupplementresourcesandenhancetheagency’s

27Ibid.,p.2.28Ibid.,p.3.29Ibid.30Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.56;63-65.LucasRichert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal(Lanhametal.:LexingtonBooks,2014),p.26.31CharlesC.EdwardstotheAssistantSecretaryofHealthandScientificAffairs,May5,1970,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,FDAGS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA,p.1.

280

credibility.32ChairedbyVanHouwelingandannounced inApril1970, theTask

Force was composed of officials; experts on infectious disease, bacteriology,

microbiologyandveterinarymedicine;andindustryrepresentatives.Consumer

representativeswerenotinvited.TheTaskForcewaschargedwithundertaking

an“in-depthreviewoftheusageandactualvalueofantibioticsinanimalfeed”33

andassessingpotentialhumanhealthhazards.

Between1970and1972, theTaskForcemetnine times.During its first

meeting, Task Force members decided “that while there was not enough

evidence to indicate an imminent and immediate health hazard, there was

sufficientdatatoassurethat there isapotential, ifnotprobable,healthhazard

associated with feeding of antibiotics to animals.”34 During the meeting,

membersformedseparategroupsdealingwithantibioticresearch,humanhealth

problems,animalhealthproblemsandantibioticeffectiveness.Theyalsocalled

for amoratorium on AGP licensing for the duration of their review. The Task

Force subsequently gathered evidence across the country and listened to

presentationsfromtheAHI,AFMA,NPPCandotheragriculturalorganisations.In

October1970,TaskForcemembersalsoattendedtheaforementionedNewYork

Conference on theproblemsof resistance.35During the conference, TaskForce

membersmetwithBritish geneticistNaomiDatta, British veterinarian JohnR.

Walton and other European experts aswell aswith Thomas Jukes and senior

industry representatives. In early February 1971, eight members of the Task

Force travelled to England where they met with prominent British antibiotic

32Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.76-79.33'ReporttotheCommissioneroftheFoodandDrugAdministrationbytheFdaTaskForceontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds',(Rockville(Md.):FDA,1972),p.2.34Ibid.,p.12.35ChapterNine,pp.192-194.

281

critics such as HerbertWilliams Smith and Ephraim Saul Anderson aswell as

with representatives of theBVA,NFU, the Swann committee,MAFF,DHSS and

industry.36 Following the delegation’s return, the Task Force drafted an

intermediatereportinlateFebruaryandafinalreportinOctober1971.37

Signed by all members, the final Task Force report was released in

January 1972. Regarding antibiotics’ economic benefits, it cautioned that the

“efficacy and safetyof long-term feedingof subtherapeutic levels of antibiotics

for animal disease control and prophylaxis [had] not been adequately

demonstrated.”38As a consequence it was difficult to quantify antibiotics’

economic benefits. According to the Task Force, antibiotics were worth

$414,135,000to livestockproducers in1970.Thepharmaceutical industryhad

earned $64,030,323 from selling agricultural antibiotics between 1968 and

1969. However, it was “not possible (…) to estimate the economic impact of

restricting antibiotics” because “some antibioticswill undoubtedly continue to

beavailableforgrowthpromotionpurposes.”39

Regardingpotentialhealthhazards,theTaskForceconcludedthatAGPs’

selectionforbacterialresistancewasathreat:

Evidence suggests that the use of certain antibiotics in food-producinganimalspromotesan increase intheanimalreservoirofSalmonella(…),theuseofsomeantibioticsinanimalsproducesamarkedincreaseintheprevalenceofR-factorcontainingbacteriawhichmaybetransmissibletoman’s enteric flora. These observations lead to the logical conclusion,though not fully documented, that such practices give rise to a humanhealthhazard.40

36'ReporttotheCommissioneroftheFoodandDrugAdministrationbytheFdaTaskForceontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds',p.14.37Ibid.,p.15.38Ibid.,p.8.39Ibid.,p.9.40Ibid.,p.8.

282

Itwas“theconsensusoftheTaskForcethatitwouldbehighlydesirablethatin

the future, a group of antibacterial agents be reserved exclusively for human

use.”41The Task Force advised restricting tetracyclines, dihydrostreptomycin,

sulphonamides,penicillinsand“allotherapprovedantibiotics”42toPOM-statusif

producers failed toprove that they couldbeused safely and efficaciously. The

Task Force also endorsed existing feed restrictions for chloramphenicol, semi-

syntheticpenicillins,gentamicinandkanamycinandcalledontheFDAtorevoke

quantitative labelling exemptions for antibiotic levels below 50g/ton. 43

Regulation proposals based on the Task Force report were published in the

FederalRegisteronFebruary1st,1972.44

Unsurprisingly,theTaskForceendorsementofAGPrestrictionsspawned

scientificcontroversy.Althoughtheyhadalsosignedthefinalreport,someTask

ForcememberspublishedaminorityreportquestioningE.S.Anderson’sfindings

and whether AGP use constituted a human health hazard.45An NAS ad hoc

committeechairedbyBostonCityHospitalinfectiousdiseasespecialistMaxwell

Finland also challenged the Task Force report. His prestige enhanced by the

Kefauver-Hearings and the success of his campaign against fixed-dose

combination antibiotics, Finland “remain[ed] unconvinced”46that research on

‘infectiousresistance’proveddangerresultingfromagriculturalantibioticuse.In

June 1972, Duke Trexler, Executive Secretary of the NRC-NAS Drug Research

41Ibid.,p.9.42Ibid.,p.10.43Ibid.4437Fed.Reg.,2444-2445(Feb1,1972).45‘Abstract:MinorityReportfromMembersoftheFDATaskForceonAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds’,Feb29,1972,enclosedin:FDAFActSheet–SummaryOfTheReportByTheFDATaskForce,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA,pp.1-2.46CLM,FP,SeriesII,A.AlphabeticalCorrespondence,Box2,Folder26,FinlandtoVanHouweling(22.06.1970).

283

Board (DRB), asked Finland whether he could head an ad hoc committee on

antibiotics in feeds. The NAS Division of Biology and Agriculture had already

publishedacritical‘positionpaper’.However,NASPresidentHandlerwantedthe

DRBtoreviewthepaperaheadofsendingittotheFDA.Finlandwouldbeableto

nominate committee members and be supplied with Task Force files and a

hostile review, which Thomas Jukes had sent to the FDA as a member of the

President’sScienceAdvisoryCommittee(PSAC).47Finlandagreed.Afterlessthan

fourmonths,hiscommitteesubmittedareporttotheNASinOctober1972.The

report recommended that the NAS approve the Division of Biology and

Agriculture’s ‘positionpaper’,opposedAGPbansandadvocatedfurtherstudies

andthedevelopmentofnewantibioticssolelyforagriculture.48

Finland’s report increased tensions within the US infectious diseases

community and attracted criticism not only from former Task Forcemembers

but also from Profs. George Mandel (a pharmacologist at George Washington

University) and Werner Kalow (a German-borne pharmacologist at the

University of Toronto), who had themselves been members of Finland’s

committee.49In 1973, Jukes and Finland discussed the degree to which their

colleagues were ignoring the ‘facts’. Jukes particularly disliked the “zealot”50

David H. Smith, who had headed the Task Force’s Human Health Hazards

Committee. Finland agreed: “It was only after [David Smith] joined the Task

47CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,DukeTrexlertoFinland(12.06.1972);FinlandtoTrexler(22.06.1972).48CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,‘RecommendationSubmittedforApprovalofAdHocCommittee’,enclosedin:FinlandtoTrexler(19.10.1972).49CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,H.GeorgeMandel,‘ReportToTheDrugResearchBoard’(18.10.1972);W.KalowtoTrexler(22.11.1972);KalowtoFinland(16.02.1973).50JukestoEdwards,Jan.17,1973,enclosedin:EdwardstoJukes,Mar.2,1973,Folder#145432.1Jan-Mar,Box4820,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,pp.1-2.

284

Force that he was ‘converted’ or perhaps brainwashed.”51Finland blamed

Smith’sbrainwashingontheBritishantibioticcriticsEphraimSaulAndersonand

HerbertWilliamsSmith.52

The split of the infectious diseases community caused significant

problems for FDA reformers, who were already facing severe industrial and

political opposition toAGPbans. Following the bans’ 1972 announcement, the

FDA received over 380 responses within the 60-day comment period.53In

August 1972, Commissioner Edwards was asked by NAS President Philip

Handler to defer regulatory action until Finland’s ad hoc committee had

completed its work.54Worried by the extent of industry protest, Edwards

informed theNAS that hewas deferring bans andwilling to consider theNAS

committees’conclusionstwomonthslater.AccordingtoDRBSecretaryTrexler,

Edwards’smovewasa“volteface.”55

Faced with contradictory expert reports but committed to the 1972

Federal Register announcement, Edwards faced a dilemma: reneging on bans

wouldalienateconsumers,but implementing themwouldenrage industry.The

onlywayoutseemedtobealoopholeintheTaskForcereportitself.Thereport

had proposed thatmanufacturers should prove that their productswould not

cause a significant increase of resistant pathogenic and multiple resistant

51CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,FinlandtoJukes(03.12.1973).52CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,JukestoFinland(11.12.1973).5338Fed.Reg.,9811-9812(20.04.1973).54PhilipHandlertoCharlesC.Edwards,Aug.3,1972,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,FDAGS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.55CLM,FPSeriesVI,B.Veteran’sAdministrationCommitteesandProjectsRecords,1950-1983,Box12,Folder8,DukeTrexlertoMaxwellFinland(03.10.1972);EdwardswasactingonanearlierrecommendationoftheFDA’sCommissionerforPlanningandEvaluation;GeraldL.BarkdolltoTheDeputyCommissioner,22.06.1972,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.

285

bacteria in humans, animals and feed or prolong the shedding of resistant

bacteria, increase their pathogenicity and produce cross-resistance to other

therapeutics.56However,decisionsoverconcretetestingprocedureswereleftto

theFDA,whichdrastically limited safety reviews’ scope following aBVMdraft

proposal from December 11th, 1972. According to the FDA Associate

CommissionerforMedicalAffairs:

The previous documents (…) approach the problem in a broad way,consideringthatantibioticsperseinthisparticularusemightconstituteahazard (…). The [BVM draft] narrows this scope considerably byrestricting the studies of human hazard (aside from the possibility ofsalmonella reservoir increase) to drugs which are (1) used in humanclinical medicine, and (2) which promote gram negative transferableresistance.57[emphasisintheoriginal]

Thenewdrugsafetystudieswouldbeconductedonaproduct-by-productbasis

bymanufacturersthemselves.58

ThemodifiedsafetytrialswereannouncedintheFederalRegisterinApril

1973.Initsannouncement,theFDAnotedthatconsultedexpertshadonlybeen

able to agree that AGPs constituted an imminent hazard if they significantly

increased the Salmonella reservoir in animals and food.59There was “less

agreement on the hazard to human health presented by other animal-source

bacteria (e.g. coliforms)”60and R-factor transfer. Referencing Finland’s NAS-

committee, theFDAthereforenotedthat, “uponthebasisofallof theevidence

currently available”, AGPswere still regarded as “safe under the conditions of

use”61.Manufacturersweregivenayeartoproduce“anassessmentoftheeffects

56'ReporttotheCommissioneroftheFoodandDrugAdministrationbytheFdaTaskForceontheUseofAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds',pp.4-7.57JohnJenningstotheCommissioner,Dec.18,1972,Folder#1281975May-July432.1,Box(FRC)25,FDAGS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.58R.MouretoAssistantCommissionerforPlanningandEvaluation,May11,1972,Ibid.5938Fed.Reg.,9811-9812(20.04.1973).60Ibid.,9812.61Ibid.

286

of subtherapeutic levels of [tetracyclines, streptomycin, dihydrostreptomycin,

the sulfonamides, and penicillin] on the salmonella reservoir.”62Producers

wouldalsohavetosubmitstudies“concerning(1)thecolonizationandR-factor

transfer from animals to man and (2) increased pathogenicity due to toxin-

linkagewithR-factor”63.

In the absence of popular protest against the Federal Register

announcement, industry and the FDA effectively postponed a serious

engagementwith‘infectiousresistance’inagriculturalsettings.

Withinayear,FDAscientistsbegantoexpressseriousconcernsaboutthe

qualityandtrustworthinessofindustry-conductedantibioticstudies.ByAugust

1974, eightmanufacturershadsubmitteda totalof21 invivostudiesonAGPs’

impactontheSalmonellareservoir.64Thereceivedstudieswereinabadshape:

“… omissions, deficiencies, or areas which raise questions [existed] in almost

everystudy.”65AbriefreviewofthreeindustrystudiesbyUniversityofMaryland

microbiologistMerillSnyderwasequallydamming:existingstudiesprovidedno

suitablebaseforregulatoryaction,andadditionaldatawoulddolittletoresolve

the situation.66Having reached a similarly pessimistic conclusion about four

extra-mural studies in March 1974,67FDA and Canadian officials travelled to

BritaintoenquireaftertheSwannbans’impact.AlthoughofficialsmetwithE.S.

62Ibid.,9813.63Ibid.64VanHouwelingtotheCommissioner,‘SalmonellaReservoirData.AntibacterialsinAnimalFeeds–Action’,Aug28,1974,Folder432.1July-Sept,Box4983,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.1.65Ibid.,p.2.66GeraldB.Guest,‘MemorandumofConference–SalmonellaReservoirStudies’,Aug.23,1974,enclosedin:ibid.67VanHouwelingtoLPaulWilliams,Jan30,1974,Folder432.1Jan-March,Box4985,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA;‘MemorandumofConference–CritiqueofWorkingGroupMeetingonAntibacterialsinAnimalFeeds’,Mar.15,1974,Folder#1281975May–July432.1,Box(FRC)25,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.

287

Anderson and other scientists,68the stagnation of British monitoring efforts

dashed FDA hopes for supportive data. Although efficacy reviews led to the

withdrawalofstreptomycinanddihydrostreptomycinAGPs,69theBVMdecided

thatitwouldbeunabletotakeregulatoryactionbasedonbacterialresistancein

lateAugust1974.70

However,inconclusiveproofofharmwasnotthesameasproofofsafety.

Wary of cumbersome regulatory pathways, the FDA chose a more creative

approachforitssecondattempttorestrictAGPs:duringthelate1960sandearly

1970s, the FDA had created national advisory committees to enhance

transparency and consumer trust. The committeeswere composed of officials,

experts and consumer and industry representatives. If staffed ‘correctly’, the

committeesofferedacovertwaytopushforchange.

In a memorandum to the new FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt

from February 1975, VanHouweling noted that “preliminary discussions” had

led to the conclusion “that the time involved in chartering and naming a new

committee was prohibitive.”71FDA General Counsel Peter Hutt had suggested

using the National Advisory Food and Drug Council (NAFDC) to circumvent

normalprocedures.72TheNAFDC’s‘neutralevidence’couldalsobeusedtofend

off external challenges to FDA decisions: “We anticipate that some of this

68VanHouwelingtotheCommissioner,‘Memorandum–ReportofJointUS/CanadianFactFindingVisittotheUnitedKingdom–Action,Jul17,1974,enclosedin:VanHouwelingtoLarryE.Stenswick,Aug.23,1974,Folder432.1July-Sept,Box4983,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.69Richardt.HunttoPeterB.Hutt,Oct.25,1973,Folder#142,Box4818,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA.70VanHouwelingtotheCommissioner,‘SalmonellaReservoirData.AntibacterialsinAnimalFeeds–Action’,Aug28,1974,Folder432.1July-Sept,Box4983,GS,DFA1/Entry5,RG88,NARA,p.3.71VanHouwelingandWilliamV.WhitehorntotheCommissioner,May14,1975,Folder#1281975May–July432.1,Box(FRC)25,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA,p.1.72SpecialAssistanttotheDirector(BVM)toAssistantCommissionerforProfessional&ConsumerPrograms,Apr.21,1975,Ibid.,p.1.

288

criticism will come in the form of formal litigation, still other in the form of

Congressional inquiries and committee hearings.”73The NAFDC subcommittee

would be staffed with three NAFDC members and several select external

consultants.74

Chaired by FDA Commissioner Schmidt, the NAFDC established an

Antibiotics inAnimal Feeds Subcommittee (AAFC) in June1975.75In its report

fromJanuary1977,76theAAFCrecommendedbanningtetracyclineandpenicillin

AGPs.Penicillinwasalsotobebannedfromuseindiseasepreventionifeffective

substitutes were available. Tetracycline and sulfaquinoxaline use was to be

limited“tothoseperiodsoftimeforwhichthepresenceofthedruginthefeed

(…)isnecessaryduetothethreatofanimaldisease.”77Althoughitdifferedfrom

BVMcallsforacompleterestrictionoftetracyclinestotherapeutictreatments,78

the AAFC report seemed to provide the long-awaited endorsement of FDA

antibioticrestrictions.

However, in a severe blow to the FDA, the main NAFDC rejected the

AAFC’srecommendations.Duringaone-daysession justaweekaftertheAAFC

report was published, the NAFDC accepted the AAFC’s recommendations

regarding penicillin and sulfaquinoxaline but rejected tetracycline restrictions

forgrowthpromotionandpreventivemedication.Instead,theNAFDCcalledfor

moreresearchandrecommendedthattheFDA’spositionbe“reevaluatedwithin

73Ibid.,p.2.74Ibid.,p.3.75RobertC.Wetherell,Jr.toCarlT.Curtis(USSenate),Aug.19,1975,Folder#1271975432.1Aug-Dec,Box(FRC)25,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry4,RG88,NARA.76GeraldB.GuesttoCaroBuckler,‘MemorandumofTelephoneConversation–AntibioticsinAnimalFeedsSubcommittee’,Dec.6,1976,Folder#1031926431.81–432.24,Box(FRC)20,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry15,RG88,NARA.77‘ForPresentationbyDonaldKennedy,CommissionerofFDAtotheNAFDC,‘AntibioticsUsedinAnimalFeeds’’,Apr.15,1977,enclosedin:DavidD.MartintoDickC.Clark(USSenate),May02,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.2.78VanHouwelingtoActingCommissioner,Mar.07,1977,Ibid.,pp.4-5.

289

three years”79. According to one observer, three people had influenced the

NAFDC’sdecision: “(one theChairmanof theBoardofadrug firm,another the

Presidentofafeedlot)whosesweepinggeneralitieswerenotbasedonscientific

factandneverthelesswentunchallenged.”80FDAmicrobiologistRosaM.Gryder

recalledhowshehad“listenedwithsomeconsternationas[theNAFDC]rejected

the [AAFC]’s recommendation regarding (…) tetracycline.”81Ahead of the

meeting, some NAFDC members admitted not having “read the background

material supplied to them” while “others did not clearly understand it”.82

MicrobiologistandformerAAFCconsultantDr.StanleyFalkowfumed:

Withoutmincingwords,toaccepttherecommendationsontherestrictionof penicillin and sulphonamide and to table the Subcommittee’srecommendationsontetracyclinesimplyreflectstheignoranceofthefullCommittee (…), the actionof the full Committeewasan insult to [AAFCmembers], (…), it is no exaggeration to say that the ecology of theenterobacteria,andrecentlyotherbacterialgroups(…)hasbeenchangedbythepatternofantibioticusageinmanandhisdomesticanimals.83FortheFDA,theNAFDC’spartialrejectionoftheAAFCrecommendations

could hardly have come at a worse time: after Commissioner Schmidt’s

resignationinthewakeofJimmyCarter’s1976electionvictory,theagencywas

headedbyaninterimcommissioner,andresourceswerestrainedbythefactthat

the Delaney Clausewas forcing the FDA to proceed against popular saccharin

sweeteners.84

Taking office in April 1977, it was clear that Stanford biologist Donald

Kennedy would have a tough time as Commissioner. In Congress, fears of

79Ibid.80RichardP.SilvertoActingCommissioner,Feb.07,1977,enclosedin:ibid.,p.4.81RosaM.GrydertoActingCommissioner,Feb.07,1977,enclosedin:ibid.,p.1.82Ibid.,p.3.83StanleyFalkowtoSherwinGardner,Feb14,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.84Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.68.

290

‘stagflation’andthe‘druglag’weretemptinganincreasingnumberofpoliticians

toattackFDAregulations.85ThenewCarteradministrationfurthercomplicated

thingsbystrengtheningexternaloversightandintroducingfiscalrestraintssuch

asamandatorysystemofinflationimpactassessmentsforanyregulatoryaction

projectedtocostmorethan$100million.Someobserverssoonworriedwhether

Kennedy, who had no prior political experience, would be able to strike a

workable balance between regulatory action and the administration’s goal of

reducing the bureaucratic footprint.86Kennedy’s AGP policy heightened such

concerns.

Only eleven days after taking office, Kennedy announced that he

considered the NAFDC’s decision non-binding and would ban penicillin and

tetracycline AGPs. Justifying his course to the NAFDC, Kennedy referenced

ecologistGarettHardin’s‘tragedyoftheCommons’:87

In short, the evidence indicates that enteric microorganisms in foodanimals andman, their r-plasmids and human pathogens form a linkedecosystemoftheirowninwhichactionatanyonepointcanaffecteveryother. Viewed in this light, the vulnerability of microorganisms toantibioticsisakindof‘commons’–aresourcewhichifweconsumeitbytheuseofantibioticsfornon-medicalpurposesinanimals,isdiminishedinman.88

In the long term, the benefits of restricting antibiotic access outweighed the

costs. Kennedy explicitly linked the AGP controversy to parallel regulatory

effortsregardingrecombinantDNAresearch.89

85Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.245-46.86Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.28;55-59.87GarrettHardin,'TheTragedyoftheCommons',Science,162/3859(1968).88‘ForPresentationbyDonaldKennedy,CommissionerofFDAtoNAFDC,‘AntibioticsUsedinAnimalFeeds’’,Apr.15,1977,enclosedin:DavidD.MartintoDickC.Clark(USSenate),May02,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.5.89Ibid.

291

Kennedy’s AGP policy was supported by the BVM according to whom

banningallnon-prescribedusesofpenicillinandthe tetracyclineswould“have

the approval of that segment of society represented by the consumer activist,

scientists and those members of the medical profession who feel that action

shouldbetaken”90.However,suchactionalsohadthe“potentialforcausingthe

greatest[sic]changeinUSanimalfoodproduction.”91Waryofsuchdisruptions,

CD VanHouweling reported: “five out of seven scientists from the staff of the

BVMAntibioticsinFeedsGroupandtheVeterinaryResearchDivisionarewilling

tocompromiseandadopttherecommendationsofthe[AAFC].”92Onepersonin

theBVMsupportedtheNAFDCposition,“whileanotherindividualandtheFDA

OfficeofScience“93preferredtotalrestrictions.AdvisingthattheFDAfollowthe

AAFC’srecommendations,VanHouwelingnoted:“Politically, theSubcommittee

position lies between the extremes desired by different segments of the

American public.”94Some officials, however, remained sceptical whether the

FDA’s position was strong enough to push AGP restrictions through a

congressionalandjudicialsystemthatcontinuedtoinsistonproofofconcreteor

imminentharm.InJune1977,amemorandumwarned“wemaynothaveenough

[evidence] toavoidahearing since theremaywellbe substantial andmaterial

issuesoffact.”95

Industry protest was impressive. Between 1977 and 1979, the FDA’s

general correspondence files are close to bursting with private, industrial,

90VanHouwelingtoActingCommissioner,Mar.07,1977,Ibid,p.4.91Ibid.,p.7.92Ibid.93Ibid.94Ibid.95RichardE.GeyertoEdwardAllera,Jun16,1977,Folder#1091977432.1June,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.6.

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congressional–andoccasionallyUSDA96–lettersopposingAGPrestrictions.97In

April1977, aCyanamidNewsRelease claimed that “banningantibiotics”98–not

only penicillin and the tetracyclines – would annually cost US consumers a

staggering $2.1 billion. According to Cyanamid, Britain’s Swann bans had

increasedanimaldiseaseandtherapeuticantibioticuse.Readerswereaskedto

maketheir“voiceheard”99andwritetotheirpoliticalandtraderepresentatives.

Cyanamidalsoprovidedalistofargumentsandwritingtips:

§ Make itknownat thestartofyour letter thatyou think theproposal isharmful,andthatyoudisagreewithit.

§ Tell how long youhaveused tetracycline antibiotics on your farm, andthebenefits youhave reaped that couldnothave come fromanyothersource.

§ Stress that you have seen no indication of adverse effects, to eitheranimalorhuman,fromtetracyclineuse.

§ Say thatyouwant tokeepusing tetracyclineantibiotics,andwhatyouroperationwouldbelikewithoutthem.

§ Whenwriting your Congressman and Senator, urge him to protect hisconstituents’interest.

§ You should also consider writing to your state Commissioner ofAgriculture. (…).Whenwriting a letter to aRepresentative, Senator, oranygovernmentofficial,therearerulesofetiquette(…).WhenwritingaCongressman,theenvelopeisproperlyaddressedto‘TheHonorable’…100

Agro-industrial letter campaigns like Cyanamid’s were extremely effective. In

June 1977, Commissioner Kennedy complained about the amount of hostile

96FDAcomplaintsaboutRCFish,theUSDA’sActingAdministratorforLivestockandVeterinarySciencesintheARS;RobertC.WetherellJr.toBillNichols(HouseofRepresentatives,Jul.07,1977,Folder#108432.11977July,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.97SeeamongstmanyothersSenatorJohnTowertoDonaldKennedy,May05,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA;DonaldKennedytoAllanGrant(presidentAFBF),Jun15,1977,Folder#1091977432.1June,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.98‘NewsfromCyanamid(AmericanCyanamidCompany)–ForImmediateRelease’,22.04.1977,ibid.,p.3.99Ibid.,p.5.100Ibid.,p.7.

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correspondence he was receiving: “The majority originate from a campaign

orchestratedbyamajorantibioticsproducer.”101

AccordingtoaBVMmemo,fierceindustryoppositiontoAGPrestrictions

was predictable. The US AGP market was estimated to be worth ca. $118.1

millionwithtetracyclinefeedsaccountingforca.60-70%ofthismarket.Dueto

tough competition in the pharmaceutical sector, it was easy to see that

“companiessuchasAmericanCyanamidCompany,Pfizer,Inc.andothers(…)are

likely to vigorously resist any change in use”102. Industrywas also opposed to

FDAregulationsbecauseofthe“beliefthatthisisapreludetootherrestrictions

and more control by the government”103. Companies had already spent much

“timeandmoney”on“defensiveresearch”andhadanticipatedFDAaction“since

about1970whentheAntibioticsTaskForcewasformed”–“whattodowhenthe

changecomes,hasprobablybeenintheplanningforseveralyears.”104

FDA penicillin and tetracycline bans were announced in the Federal

Registerin August andOctober 1977.105However, by this time, the FDA’s AGP

initiativewasalreadyshowingsignsof stalling:Congresshad just indicated its

readinesstointerveneinFDAaffairsbymandatinga15-month‘breathingspace’

onsaccharinregulations;106CanadahadrenegedonitsparallelAGPbans;107and

the FDA’s antibiotic expertise was under threat of dilution by a profusion of

101DonaldKennedytoJamesT.Broyhill(HouseofRepresentatives),Jun.21,1977,ibid.102VanHouwelingtoTheCommissioner,Jun.08,1977,Folder#1019774321.16-1-77/6-9-77,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.1.103Ibid.,p.2.104Ibid.10542Fed.Reg.,43769-43793(Aug.30,1977);42FedReg.56253-56289(Oct.21,1977).106Troetel,Three-PartDisharmony:TheTransformationoftheFoodandDrugAdministrationinthe1970s,pp.256-59.107VanHouwelingtoTheCommissioner,Apr.23,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA

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hearings and reports from other government and, in the case of CAST, non-

governmentalorganisations.

Similar to Finland’s 1972 NAS ad hoc committee, the establishment of

competingexpertgroupsconstrainedtheFDA’sabilitytomakeauthoritativeand

rapid decisions in the name of public health. Competing expert groups also

deflectedpublicandCongressionalattentionfromFDAandCDCwarningsabout

horizontalresistancetowardstheshort-termeconomiccosts.WhereastheUSDA

createdaTaskForceonAGPrestrictions’ economiceffects inOctober1977,108

theSenateCommitteeonAgriculture,NutritionandForestryrequestedthatthe

OfficeofTechnologyAssessment(OTA)reviewdrugandchemicalfeedadditives

inearlyautumn1977.109ByNovember1977,theagencyexpectedfinalactionsto

bedelayed“untillate1978attheearliest.”110

Aware that time was not working in its favour, the FDA attempted to

createafaitaccomplibyestablishinganewcategoryofprescription-onlyfeeds,

which included penicillin, chlortetracycline and oxytetracycline. Although cost

projectionsshowedthatthemeasureswouldcost$15.6million–“wellbelowthe

criterion for a major economic impact”111– it was clear that Congress would

interpretsuchameasureasanattempttobypassitsauthority.Duringinformal

hearingsfollowingthepublicationoftheso-calledControlsDocumentinJanuary

108BobBerglandtoClarkBurbee,RobertBrown,RogerGerrits,JonSpauldingandHowardTeague,Oct28,1977,Folder#105432.11977Oct-Dec,Box(FRC)21,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.109JBCordarotoJosephA.Califano,Aug8,1977,Folder#1061977432.1Sept,Box(FRC)21,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.1.110RobertC.Wetherell,Jr.toJohnC.Culver,Nov.01,1977,Folder#105432.11977Oct-Dec,Box(FRC)21,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.111VanHouwelingtotheCommissioner,Dec.07,1977,p.4.

295

1978,112prominentcriticsattackedFDAantibioticrestrictions.113Intheend,174

witnessesopposedrestrictionsandonly15supportedthem.114

Alarmed by the Controls Document, Congress alsomoved to block FDA

action.InFebruary1978,aresolutionwasintroducedtotheSenatedirectingthe

FDAtorefrainfromtakingactionagainstAGPspendingtheoutcomeof further

studies.At first theFDAattempted toappeaseCongress throughextending the

periodof commentson itsControlsDocument to June19th.However, theBVM

soonwarnedthatdelayswouldnotbeenough“inviewofCongress’ increasing

tendency to [take]actionwhereadministrativeagencieshave takenunpopular

standsonissueshavingsignificantpublicimpact.”115

The BVM prediction proved correct: by mid-1978, the FDA had been

trumped. By playing on inflation fears and drowning out resistancewarnings,

antibioticsupporterswonoverCapitolHillandregulatoryagencies’functionas

expertarbiterswaseffectivelytakenoverbyCongressmenandSenatorswithno

expertiseinrelevantareas.Followingathree-dayhearingduringwhich26of29

witnesses rejected AGP restrictions, Charles Rose, Chairman of the

Subcommittee on Dairy and Poultry of the House Committee on Agriculture,

proposed a resolution to stall FDA action on July 14th, 1978.116The resolution

wouldforcetheFDAtoawaittheoutcomeofOTAandUSDAstudiesaswellasa

11243FedReg.3032-3045(Jan.20,1978).113G.BraynPatrick,Jr.toHearingClerkFDA,Apr.07,1978,Folder#93432.11978Apr-May,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.114USHouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeonAgriculture:CommitteeResolution–RelativeToTheUseOfAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds,enclosedin:JosephA.Califano,Jr.toThomasS.Foley,Sept.07,1978,Folder#91432.11978Aug-Sept,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,p.2.115VanHouwelingtoTheCommissioner,May18,1978,Folder#93432.11978Apr-May,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,p.2.116SusanE.FeinmantoRobertWetherell,enclosedin:WetherelltotheCommissioner,Jul.27,1978,Folder#92432.11978June-July,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,ibid.,pp.1-2.

296

newNASstudyforwhichtheHouseAppropriationsCommitteehadearmarked

$250,000 two months earlier.117Ahead of the final vote, Rose showed a film

highlightingthecostsofFDAactionandfeaturingexpertslikeCAST’sVirgilHays.

RoseclaimedthattheFDA’sproposedactionswouldannuallycostca.$2billion.

Rose’sresolutionwaspassedunanimously.118

Following the US Senate’s endorsement of the House Resolution in

September 1978,119FDA officials could only hope for favourable evidentiary

hearings and external studies and became embroiled in a battle of numbers.

WritingtotheHouseAgricultureCommitteeinAugust1978,FDACommissioner

Kennedyattacked figuresreleasedbyCyanamidandanarticle in the Journalof

AnimalSciencesallegingthatrestrictingallAGPswouldtriggera$801.7million

increase of costs.120Instead, Kennedy upheld 1976 data from the Office of

Planning and Evaluation, which estimated that producers using substitute

antibioticswouldincuracostincreaseofonly$74millionandconcluded:

The OMB cost threshold for a ‘major’ impact is $100 million in theaggregate or $80 million on any one industry sector. (…). Unless ourestimatedcombinedimpactisinerrorbyseveralordersofmagnitude,adetailed studyofmacroeconomic effects is unlikely to support the viewthatouractionswillmeasurablyaffectinflationarytrends.121Released in 1979, the OTA’s external review supported FDA positions.

Thereportcautionedagainstrelyingtoostronglyoncost-benefitestimateswhen

117USHouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeonAgriculture:CommitteeResolution–RelativeToTheUseOfAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds,enclosedin:JosephA.Califano,Jr.toThomasS.Foley,Sept.07,1978,Folder#91432.11978Aug-Sept,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.118FeinmantoRobertWetherell,enclosedin:WetherelltotheCommissioner,Jul.27,1978,Folder#92432.11978June-July,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,pp.1-2.119'DrugsinLivestockFeed',(I-TechnicalReport;WashingtonDC:OfficeofTechnologyAssessment,1979),p.20.120HenryC.Jr.GilliamandRodMartin,'EconomicImportanceofAntibioticsinFeedstoProducersandConsumersofPork,BeefandVeal',JournalofAnimalScience,40/6(1975).121DonaldKennedytoThomasS.Foley(HouseofRepresentatives)Jun.09,1978,enclosedin:RobertC.Wetherell,Jr.toAssociateCommissionerforPlanningandEvaluation,Aug.04,1978,Folder#91432.11978Aug-Sept,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.

297

regulatingdrugs:“Onceremovedfromthestructuredexperimentalsetting,these

numbers retain an aura of legitimacy thatmay not bewarranted.”122TheOTA

noted, “… risks and benefits cannot be approached through a simple balance-

sheet typeof assessment.No commondenominator is generally acceptable for

comparinghumanillnessanddeathwithpoundsofmeat(…)Americanseattoo

much meat anyway.”123Regarding antibiotics, Congress had four options: (1)

allow the FDA to decide, (2) enact legislation requiring economic as well as

scientific assessments of benefits and risks, (3) force the FDA to decrease

therapeuticuseofantibacterialsinhumanandveterinarymedicineaswellasin

food production, (4) approve future drugs only if they are more or equally

effectivethanthosealreadyapproved.124

TheUSDA’sDecember1978reviewwasmorehostile.Althoughitclearly

contradictedindustrywarningsofapost-baneconomiccollapse,thereportwas

basedonthecuriousassumptionthattheFDAwasattemptingtobanallAGPsat

once.125AccordingtotheUSDA,“farmandfoodpriceswouldincreaseinitially”,

buttheeconomicsystemwouldgenerally“bequiteresilienttoamorerestrictive

policyonanimaldruguse.”126Farm incomesmighteven increaseasaresultof

reducedanimalnumbers.127

Although FDA officials subsequently attempted to use both reports to

push for Congressional approval, the activism of the early Kennedy years had

122'DrugsinLivestockFeed',p.8.123Ibid.124Ibid.,pp.11-13.125'TheEconomicEffectsofaProhibitionontheUseofSelectedAnimalDrugs',(WashingtonDC:USDAEconomics,StatisticsandCooperativeService,1978).126'AntibioticsinAnimalFeed.HearingsbeforetheSubcommitteeonHealthandtheEnvironmentonH.R.7285',SubcommitteeonHealthandtheEnvironmentoftheCommitteeonInterstateandForeignCommerce(HouseofRepresentatives;WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1980),p.432.127'TheEconomicEffectsofaProhibitionontheUseofSelectedAnimalDrugs'.

298

dissipated and officials were further demoralised by having to wait for the

outcomeofthe1980NASstudy.Frustrated,CommissionerKennedylefttheFDA

tobecomePresidentofStanfordUniversityinJune1979.17yearslater,Kennedy

reflected:

I felt that the evidence was plenty good enough [sic] to justify ruling[AGPs]out,butwelostthatfightthen,althoughplainlywewereright,andthat’ssomethingthathasturnedoutsincetohavebeenarealworry.I’mgladwetriedtotakeactiononitandatleastgotitonthetable...128Whileresistance-inspiredAGPrestrictionsfailedtopassCongress,rising

externaloversightduringthelate1970sdidforcetheFDAtoreaddressfeedmill

complianceandresiduereductions.

Reacting to on-going feedstuff violations and inadequate official

controls,129anFDAmedicatedfeedTaskForcewasestablishedinJune1978.The

Task Force subsequently recommended substantial reforms ofmonitoring and

licensing130andcriticisedinternalrivalriesbetweentheFDA’sBVMandBureau

ofFoods(BuFo).Problematically,C.D.VanHouweling’sBVMhadbeenallowedto

overruleBuFodecisionseveniftheBuFohadconcernsaboutproducts’effecton

foodsecurity:“…eachbureauhasbecomesuspiciousandcriticaloftheother.”131

Perhapsreferring toqualmsaboutVanHouweling,DonaldKennedynoted that

reducingBVMpowerswould“beausefulpoliticalsignalat this time,giventhe

128'OralHistoryInterviewofDonaldKennedybyRobertA.Tucker',HistoryoftheUSFoodandDrugAdministration-FDAOralHistoryTranscripts(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/OralHistories/SelectedOralHistoryTranscripts/UCM265233.pdf[accessed:13.04.2015],17.06.1996),p.12.129‘SecondGenerationofMedicatedFeeds.MedicatedFeedTaskForceReportandRecommendations’,Dec.1978,Folder#94432.11978Jan-March,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.130‘FDATalkPaper’,Dec.15,1978,Folder#901978432.11978Oct-Dec,Box(FRC)17,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.131‘ActionPlanforthe[BF]AnimalDrugsProgram’,Feb.13,1978,enclosedin:JosephP.HileandVanHouwelingtoCommissioner,Jun.07,1978,Folder#92432.11978June-July,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD_WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,p.5.

299

rangeofanimaldrugsproblemswe’refacing.”132Althoughinspectionprograms

were subsequently improved, the $850,000 joint-inspection budget and

Kennedy’s resignation made the long-term success of feedstuff reforms

doubtful.133

Duringthe1970s,noncomplianceinthefeedstuffsectoralsoexacerbated

residueproblems.However,incontrasttopreviousdecades,residueswerenow

beinghighlightedbyexpandedUSDAmonitoring.Althoughtheearly1970ssaw

ca. 80 million hogs and over 35 million cattle and 3 billion poultry annually

slaughtered in the US,134the USDA had tested only 1249 meat samples for

antibiotic residues in 1970.135Hoping to “[put] the fear ofGodor FDA into”136

producers,monitoring effortswere gradually expanded throughout the 1970s,

causing problems for an ill-prepared FDA.137Despite reports from concerned

consumersandparentswhosechildrenhadexperiencedseverereactionstodrug

residues in their food,138officials had done little to improve enforcement. In

1975,itwasrevealedthattheFDAwasunabletoassay27licensedanimaldrugs

in meat. During subsequent Congressional hearings, it emerged that Van

Houweling, who was later forced to resign by Commissioner Kennedy and

became a consultant for the pork lobby (NPPC), had pressured staff to license

132Ibid.,enclosed:ActionItem2:FunctionoftheBureauofFoodsDirector&ActionItem4:BureauofFoodsOrganizationUnitforAnimalDrugProgramManagement.133DonaldC.Healton,‘Memorandum–BVMProposedLettertoStateGovernors–Re:MedicatedFeedContractProgram’,Sep.12,1979,Folder#97432.1-432.1Sept-Oct1979,Box(FRC)19,GeneralCorrespondence[inthefollowingGC],DFUD-WW/Entry26,RG88,NARA,p.2.134H.C.Mussman,'DrugandChemicalResiduesinDomesticAnimals',FederationProceedings(FederationofAmericanSocietiesforExperimentalBiology),34/2(1975),p.197.135'RegulationofFoodAdditivesandMedicatedAnimalFeeds',p.183.136Ibid.,p.585.137Mussman,'DrugandChemicalResiduesinDomesticAnimals',p.200.138SandraEckmantoJimmyCarter,Jun.02,1977,Folder#108432.11977July,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA;PatriciaMcQueentoAaronFinkelman,Nov.2,1977,Folder#105432.11977Oct-Dec,Box(FRC)21,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.

300

drugs forwhich therewereno assaymethods.139VanHouweling alsousedhis

influencetomoderatetheFDA’sresponsetoSMZresiduesinpork.140

Meanwhile,prosecutionsofresidueoffendersremainedrare.Duringthe

1970s, most offenders merely received a letter informing them that their

animals’carcasseshadcontained illegalresidues.141BetweenJanuary1972and

January1978,theFDAconductedonly282follow-upinvestigationsasaresultof

oxytetracycline, chlortetracycline, tetracycline and/or penicillin residue

detections.142Given such toothless enforcement, farmers continued to ignore

drugguidelines.Inearly1977,theUSDAinformedawomanwhowasallergicto

antibioticsthatitwasbesttoavoidallconventionalUSmeatandmilkandswitch

to alternative drug-free producers.143Authorities could not guarantee that

conventionalUSproducewas‘safe’.

With faster and more effective USDA residue tests leading to a rapid

increase of sampling and residue detections during the late 1970s and early

1980s,144FDA authorities were under sever pressure to adapt. Writing to

Commissioner Kennedy in 1978, Van Houweling’s successor as BVM director,

Lester Crawford, suggested adopting a two-pronged strategy: while it would

continue to publish assurances that US meat was safe and refrain from

expanding enforcement, the FDA would focus on securing the successful

139'OralHistoryInterviewofCdVanHouwelingbyRonaldT.Ottes',p.16.140MarylnPereztoBerkleyBedell,Feb07,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.1.141JamesTessmertoIdahoFeedLot,Jul.22,1977,Folder#108432.11977July,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA.142CatherineW.CarnevaletoPhilipJ.Frappaolo,Nov.03,1978,Folder#901978432.11978Oct-Dec,Box(FRC)17,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA.143LVSanderstoEvelynLevy,Feb.07,1977,Folder1111977432.1Jan-May,Box(FRC)22,GS,DFUD-WW/Entry8,RG88,NARA,p.2.144SarahHartman,DonnaV.Porter,andElizabethR.Withnell,'FoodSafetyPolicyIssues',(WashingtonDC:CongressiionalResearchService,1981),pp.74-76.

301

prosecution of a limited amount of offenders and develop assays capable of

upholdingtheseprosecutionsincourt.145However,littlehappened.

The1980swereatimeofregulatoryfrustrationnotonlyforresiduesbut

also for resistance-based substance restrictions. Published inMarch 1980, the

congressionally mandated NAS study did not endorse AGP bans. The study’s

negative outcomewas in part due to problematic terms of reference. Already

tasked with assessing “the scientific feasibility of additional epidemiological

studies”146and focussing exclusively on the historically vague category of

‘subtherapeutic’ penicillin and tetracycline use, it was to be expected that the

NAScommitteewouldcall for furtherresearch.Unsurprisingly, the finalreport

concluded, “…that the postulated hazards to human health from the

subtherapeutic use of antimicrobials in animal feedswere neither proven nor

disproven.”147Taking care to limitdiscussions to subtherapeutic antibioticuse,

theNASalsocautionedthatconclusivedataonharmwasunlikelytoemergein

thefuture:

…itisnotpossibletoconductafeasible,comprehensiveepidemiologicalstudyoftheeffectsonhumanhealtharisingfromthesubtherapeuticuseofantimicrobialsinanimalfeeds,...148

This last assessment was, however, ignored by the House Appropriations

Committee, which provided funds for “a definitive epidemiologic study of the

antibiotics in animal feeds issue”149andprolonged the existingmoratoriumon

FDAaction.

145LesterCrawfordtoTheCommissioner,Aug.18,1978Folder#91432.11978Aug-Sept,Box(FRC)18,GS,DFUD-WW/EntryII,RG88,NARA,p.4;alsosee:ibid.,p.79.146'TheEffectsonHumanHealthofSubtherapeuticUseofAntimicrobialsinAnimalFeeds',p.vii.147Ibid.,p.xv.148Ibid.149'AntibioticResistance',SubcommitteeonInvestigationsandOversightoftheCommitteeOnScienceandTechnologyUSHouseofRepresentatives(December18,19,1984edn.,USHouseofRepresentatives;WashingtonDC,1985),p.81.

302

Unwilling to accept a prolongation of the status quo, Democrat

RepresentativesHenryA.WaxmanandJohnDingellproposedabill(H.R.7285)

thatwould allow the Secretary ofHealth to limit antibiotics in animal feeds if

theydidnotmeeta‘compellingneed’.150InJune1980,theHouseCommitteeon

Interstate and Foreign Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health and the

Environment held hearings on AGPs. Testifying experts remained divided.

According to American Medical Association vice-president Asher J. Finkel, his

organisationcouldnot“stateatthistimethatthereissufficientevidenceofthe

transferofdisease-causingantibioticresistantbacteriafromanimalstohumans

towarrantalarm...”151Bycontrast,OTAAssistantDirectorJoyceLashofnoted:

Our[1979]conclusionwasthattheincreasingpoolofresistantbacteriaisaserioushealthrisktohumans,andthatthecontributionfromlow-levelantibacterialuseinanimalfeedsplayedasignificantpartinincreasingthegeneralpoolofgeneticallyresistantorganisms.(…).Wealsopointedoutthatitwasnotrelevantthatthetherapeuticuseinhumansofthesesameantibacterials may be a larger contributor to the development ofresistance, as long as animal feed use was in itself a significantcontributor to resistance. (…). Furthermore, at any point in time thenumber of animals exposed to antibiotics far exceeds the number ofhumansexposed,…152

TheFDA’sLesterCrawfordalsosupportedHR7285.153

However, HR7285 failed to pass Congress, and chances for antibiotic

restrictions decreased dramatically after the election of Ronald Reagan in late

1980.Between1981and1989,theFDA’sworkloadgrewsignificantlywhile its

budget stagnated and its overall workforce declined from 8,089 to 7,398.

Reverting to voluntary industry compliance, the number of FDA enforcement

150'AntibioticsinAnimalFeed.HearingsbeforetheSubcommitteeonHealthandtheEnvironmentonH.R.7285'.151Ibid.,p.344.152Ibid.,p.353.153Ibid.,pp.427-28;34;DingelevensentalettertoScience;JohnD.Dingell,'AnimalFeeds:EffectofAntibiotics',Science,209/4461(1980).

303

actionsdroppedfromanaverageofca.annual1041actionsbetween1977and

1980to577actionsin1981.154Meanwhile,CDCpersonnelattheNationalCenter

forInfectiousDiseasesdecreasedby15%between1985and1988.155

TheReaganadministrationalsochangedbasicdecision-makingpathways

within the renamedDepartment of Human andHealth Services (HHS). Taking

over asHHS secretary in 1981, former Republican Senator Richard Schweiker

interfered directly in FDA decision-making and usurped significant powers.

Following 1981, FDA regulations had to be personally signed by the HHS

Secretary.Intentonreducing‘overregulation’andthe‘druglag’,itwasextremely

unlikely that Secretary Schweiker would agree to AGP restrictions. FDA

Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes was equally unlikely to push for bans.

AppointedbytheReaganadministration,Hayesenjoyedacloserelationshipwith

pharmaceuticalproducersandlaterhadtoresignbecauseofacceptingfinancial

honoraria.156ButevenifHayesandSchweikerhadapprovedAGPrestrictions,it

was unlikely that theywouldhavepassed theOMB. In February1981,Ronald

Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 turned the OMB into an extremely powerful

organisationbyrequiringallfederalagenciestosubmitcost-benefitanalysesto

the OMB. According to Lucas Richert, “E.O. 12291 soon made an impact on

regulation-making at the FDA”157and decreased the transparency of decision-

making.

154Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.97-98;101.155Podolsky,TheAntibioticEra.Reform,ResistanceandthePursuitofaRationalTherapeutics,p.167.156Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.83-91.157Ibid.,p.95.

304

AlthoughtheNRDC’s1983petitionandScottHolmberg’s1984Salmonella

studies briefly reignited hopes for AGP restrictions, 158 chances for AGP

restrictions under the Reagan administration were extremely slim. HHS and

OMB oversight remained in place even after Hayes’ and Schweiker’s 1983

resignationsandnewFDACommissionerFrankYoungshowedlittleenthusiasm

for AGP bans. 159 During hearings on antibiotic resistance by Democrat

Representative Al Gore’s Subcommittee On Investigations And Oversight in

December 1984, Lester Crawford also displayedmarkedly less enthusiasm for

antibiotic restrictions than four years earlier. 160 In 1985, HHS Secretary

MargaretHeckler’srejectionoftheNRDCpetitionthuscameasnogreatsurprise.

HecklerbasedherdecisiononanFDAreview,whichstatedthat theNRDChad

not proven that Salmonella posed an imminent hazard. Although Heckler’s

decision did not prevent the FDA from proceeding with formal withdrawal

procedures,iteffectivelyendedthe1970sbanattempts.161

Following 1985, CDC experts, non-governmental scientists and critical

politicians played a crucial role in keeping the subject alive on Capitol Hill. In

December 1985, Democrat Congressman Ted Weiss’s Intergovernmental

Relations andHumanResources Subcommittee published a scathing reviewof

FDAmedicated feedmarketoversight.Accordingtothesubcommittee, internal

FDA estimates believed that “asmany as 90 percent ormore of the 20,000 to

30,000newanimaldrugsestimatedtobeonthemarket”hadnotbeenapproved158ChapterTen,pp.237-238.159Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.116-21;28-30.160'AntibioticResistance',pp.83-96.161StuartLevy,TheAntibioticParadox:HowtheMisuseofAntibioticsDestroysTheirCurativePowers(CambridgeMA:PerseusPublishing,2002[2001]),pp.298-99.;cf.alsothedescriptionoftherun-uptothedecisioninWilliamA.Moats(ed.),AgriculturalUsesofAntibiotics(AmericanChemicalSocietySymposiumSeries320,WashingtonDC:AmericanChemicalSociety,1986),pp.104-09.

305

as safe and effective andwere “marketed in violation of the new animal drug

approvalrequirementsofthe[FDC].”162Noncomplianceencompassed“theentire

agribusinesscommunity”163:

Illegalveterinarydrugsalesareofsuchmagnitudeandpervasivenessthatthey threaten the ‘credibility of the veterinary drug approval andregulatoryprocess.’Ononetwo-weekroadtrip in Iowa, forexample,anFDAinvestigatorwasabletomake40illegalbuysoutof43attempts.164

Weiss’subcommitteealsoattackedrecentFDAlicensingdecisions.Accordingto

aCVMofficial,politicalpressureforspeedydrugapprovalshadfostereddubious

FDAlicensingandaproblematicweakeningoftheBuFo.165

Twoyearslater,on-goingconcernsaboutantimicrobialresistanceforced

theFDAtocommissionafurtherreviewofagriculturalantibioticswiththeNRC’s

Institute of Medicine (IoM). Not tasked withmaking policy recommendations,

the IoM’s terms of reference were limited to performing a quantitative

assessment of the risks associated with feeding penicillin and tetracyclines at

subtherapeuticlevels.166

Unsurprisingly, the 1988 IoM report restated that “unequivocal direct

evidence linking mortality to the postulated initial events is not available –

certainly not in sufficient quantity to establish a cause-and-effect

relationship.”167Regretting the absence of UK data on Salmonella resistance

development,168the IoM committee used US salmonellosis data to quantify

human health hazards. Ca. 15% of the 50,000 salmonellosis cases annually162CommitteeonGovernmentOperations,'HumanFoodSafetyandtheRegulationofAnimalDrugs',UnionCalender(Washington:HouseofRepresentatives,1985),p.2.163Ibid.164Ibid.,p.5.165Ibid.,p.8.166'ReportofaStudy.HumanHealthRiskswiththeSubtherapeuticUseofPenicillinorTetracyclinesinAnimalFeed.1988.',(WashintonDCCommitteeonHumanHealthRiskAssessmentofUsingSubtherapeuticAntibioticsinAnimalFeeds(IoM),1989),pp.iii-iv.167Ibid.,p.v.168Ibid.,p.7.

306

reported in the US were resistant to penicillin and the tetracyclines. Total

mortality from resistant Salmonella was ca. 1%. Of the ca. 70% of fatal

salmonellosiscasesassociatedwithstrainsoffarmorigin,88%wereattributable

to thegeneralagriculturaluseofsubtherapeuticantibioticsandca.90%to the

use of penicillin/ampicillin and tetracyclines. Following these arcane

calculations, the IoMestimated that therewere ca. 40annualdeaths in theUS

attributable to the subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracyclines for

prophylaxisandgrowthpromotion.169

Callingforimproveddataprovisionandresistancemonitoring,170theIoM

committeeitselfcautionedthatitsestimatewasnotveryrobust.Thecommittee

had not considered human morbidity, the effects of other AGPs, therapeutic

antibiotic doses and the health hazards from other resistant organisms like

Campylobacter jejuni, enterohemorrhagic E. coli and Yersinia enterocolitica.171

Although no causal link between AGPs and human death or disease had been

found, there was “ample evidence” documenting the “high prevalence” of

resistance“amongisolatesofsalmonellaefromfarmanimals”:

Thefrequencyofresistancetoanyofthecommonlytestedantimicrobialsamong farm-animal isolatesofsalmonellaeranges from69 to80%;(…).These frequencies of resistance (…) are 3-5 times greater than thoseamongstrainsisolatedfromhumanbeings.172However,theattentionpaidtotheIoMreportandaparallelCASTreport

wasminimal.173Inpart, thiswasdue to amajor corruption scandalwithin the

FDA’s Generic Drugs Division, which peaked between 1989 and 1990. The

169Ibid.,pp.8-9.170Ibid.,p.207.171Ibid.,pp.10-11.172Ibid.,p.3.173VirgilW.HaysandCharlesA.Black,AntibioticsforAnimals:TheAntibioticResistanceIssue.CommentsfromCast(Iowa:CouncilforAgriculturalScienceandTechnology(CAST),1989),p.1.

307

scandal resulted in the arrest of over 40 people and Commissioner Young’s

transfer to HHS. In early 1990, the Bush Administration ordered a committee

chairedbyex-FDACommissionerCharlesEdwardstoconductacompletereview

of the FDA. The committee found that the Reagan administration had

compromised FDA consumer protection by allowing HHS and OMB to usurp

decision-making. Strengthened by a Supreme Court ruling against OMB

countermandingofagencydecisions,thecommittee’sreportalsorecommended

ending HHS approval requirements and marked the beginning of a relative

strengtheningoftheFDA.174

Appointed in August 1990,175reforming FDA Commissioner David A.

KesslerimmediatelyfacedthescandalsurroundingCHARMIIdetectionsofSMZ

inculturallysensitiveandalreadyextensivelymonitoredmilk.176Havingalready

conducted the scathing 1985 FDA review, Democrat Congressman Ted Weiss

accusedFDAofficialsofnot“reallykeepingupwithscientificadvances”andnot

being“diligentenoughnoraggressiveenoughinpursuingthosepeoplewhouse

andprescribe thosedrugs,unlawfully,…”177ForWeiss, theCVM’s failingswere

amplified by the fact that it had known that SMZmight be carcinogenic since

1980andhadfailedtoactonthisinformation.178

However, FDA monitoring reforms remained tardy. In 1992, the

biochemist and microbiologist Stanley E. Katz, who had been involved in

revealingtheoriginalSMZscandal,publishedapaperonresiduestogetherwith

174Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.167-78,Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,p.167.175Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.179-82.176ChapterTen,pp.239-240;'Fda'sRegulationofAnimalDrugResiduesinMilk',pp.114-15.177Ibid.,p.131.178Ibid.,p.143.

308

MariettaSueBrady.AccordingtoKatz,reformedFDAmilksurveysweremerely

“snapshots”:

Fifty-threedrugshavebeenapprovedbyFDAforuseindairyanimals;25drugs have been reported to be used in an extra-label fashion. Only asmallnumberofdrugsarelookedforinthemilksupply;ofthese,only6drugs have confirmatory procedures. (…), it is not beyond reasonablelogictoassumethatmarketmilkcontainslowconcentrationsofresidues,atfrequenciesthatvary.179

AfteraGAOreportcriticisedexistingextra-labeldrugusepoliciesandon-going

testingproblems,180FDACVMofficialGeraldGuestpromisedimprovementsbut

alsodefendedtheFDApoliciesinfrontofWeiss’SubcommitteeinAugust1992:

[The 1968 FDC reform] required us in the approval process to makedrugs available to lay persons, if adequate directions for use could bewritten.So90percentofthetherapeuticdrugsforuseinfood-producinganimalsarelegallysoldoverthecounter.181

Initially allowing veterinarians to use “whatever he or she could legally

obtain”182,voluntary1984FDAguidanceadvisedextra-labeldruguseonlywhen

ananimalwassufferingor its lifewasthreatened.By1992,veterinarianswere

also supposed to inform farmers about responsible drug use and withdrawal

times.Guestdefendedthispolicy:

I’mquitewilling to comedown real hardon a veterinarian if he or shecreates a drug residue because of that. I’m not near sowilling to tell aveterinariantheycannottreatasickanimal.183

179StanleyE.KatzandMariettaSueBrady,'IncidenceofResiduesinFoodsofAnimalOrigin',inVipinK.Agarwal(ed.),AnalysisofAntibiotic/DrugResiduesinFoodProductsofAnimalOrigin(NewYorkandLondon:PlenumPress,1992),p.18.180'FoodSafetyandQuality.FdaStrategyNeededtoAddressAnimalDrugResiduesinMilk',(Washington:UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice(GAO),1992August).181'ProblemswithFdaMonitoringforAnimalDrugResidues:IsOurMilkSafe?',HumanResourcesandIntergovenrmentalRelationsSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonGovernmentOperations(SecondSessionedn.,HouseofRepresentatives;Washington:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1992),p.69.182Ibid.,p.70.183Ibid.

309

Despiteitsinabilitytodeviseassaysformanylicenseddrugs,184theFDAdidnot

considersubstancebans,whichmighthavealleviatedtheneedforexpensivetax-

fundedmonitoringprograms.

Concerns aboutUS food safety refused to die down. In thewake of the

Jack-in-the-Box food poisoning scandal, a 1994 GAO report pressed for risk-

basedHazardAnalysisCriticalControlPoint(HACCP)-inspectionsthatfocussed

on a biological, physical, and chemical assessment of neuralgic points of food

production. The report also called for a shift of emphasis from chemical to

microbiologicalcontaminants:

FSIS’ meat and poultry inspection system does not efficiently andeffectivelyuse its resources toprotect thepublic from themost serioushealth risks associated with meat and poultry – microbialcontamination.185

Fivemonths later, a secondGAOreport criticised theUSDA’sNationalResidue

Program.Notonlyweretherenotestingmethodologies forupto two-thirdsof

“367compoundsalreadyidentifiedasbeingofpotentialconcern”186,butalsothe

randomsamplingattheheartofUSDAmonitoringeffortswasflawed.According

to the report, the USDA’s FSIS “did not consistently follow random sampling

procedures”anddid“notadjustitssamplingofsomespeciestocompensatefor

climatic/geographic and seasonal changes in slaughter rates and animal drug

use.” 187 The averaging of residue finds from different species further

compromisedthevalidityofnationalresiduereports.188

184Ibid.,pp.93-95.185'FoodSafety.Risk-BasedInspectionsandMicrobialMonitoringNeededforMeatandPoultry',(WashingtonDC:UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,1994May),p.2,Jones,ValuingAnimals.VeterinariansandTheirPatientsinModernAmerica,p.151.186'FoodSafety.Usda'sRoleundertheNationalResidueProgramShouldBeReevaluated.',(WashingtonDC:UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,1994September),p.3.187Ibid.,p.4.188Ibid.,p.24.

310

AreformoftheNationalResidueProgramwaspossible,but itwouldbe

more effective to overhaul the entire monitoring system.189In addition to

monitoring, theGAOalsocriticisedFDAenforcement.Between1989and1992,

theFDAhadonlyinvestigatedca.20%ofthe21,439residueviolationsreported

byFSIS.Whereas“almost2,300violatorswerereportedduringthatperiod,”190

onlyoneprosecution,12injunctionsand383warninglettershadresultedfrom

FDAinvestigations191

Overfortyyearsafterantibiotics’mass-introductiontoUSagricultureand

numerous warnings, authorities continued to have little control over the

medicatedfeedmarketandthecontaminationofUSfoodandmilk.Meanwhile,

the regulatory statusquoregarding resistance-motivated antibiotic restrictions

continued. In 1994, Congress asked the OTA for an assessment of hazards

resulting from antimicrobial resistance.192The OTA’s Advisory Panel included

antibioticactivistslikeStuartLevyandNobel-laureateJoshuaLederbergaswell

asseniorindustryrepresentatives.Identifyingresistanceasaseriouseconomic

and political hazard in its September 1995 report, the OTA also devoted a

chapterto‘AntibioticsinAnimalHusbandry.’Althoughstudiesshowing“adirect

connectionbetweenagriculturaluseofantibioticsandhuman illnessordeath”

remained“sparseanddifficulttoobtain”193,thereportnotedthatantimicrobial

resistanceoriginating inagricultural settingscouldbedangerous.Over40%of

the population harboured resistant bacteria in their colon, which could cause

harm following antibiotic-ingestion for other reasons. Resistant food-borne

189Ibid.,p.5.190Ibid.,p.6.191Ibid.,pp.4&32.192'ImpactsofAntibiotic-ResistantBacteria',(WashingtonDC:OfficeofTechnologyAssessment.CongressoftheUnitedStates,1995September),p.2.193Ibid.,p.156.

311

pathogens like Campylobacter jejuni and Salmonella were already difficult to

treat.Agriculturalantibioticusecouldalsoturnfarmersintocarriersofresistant

bacteriaandselectforenvironmentalbacterialresistance.194

TheOTAalsowarnedagainstfollowingtheexampleofEuropeanstatesby

licensingagriculturalusesoffluoroquinolones.195However,withtheFDAunder

political pressure to reduce regulatory hurdles,196considerations of resistance

didnotprevailandthefluoroquinolonessarofloxacinandenrofloxacin(Baytril)

werelicensedforagriculturalpurposesin1995and1996.Inastatementbefore

Congress, FDA Deputy Commissioner Michael Friedman defended

fluoroquinolones’licensingbyannouncingthattheFDAwouldmonitorwhether

bacterialresistancepatternschangedandtakeactionifnecessary.197

Pressure on FDA officials to reduce regulatory barriers for new drugs

only increasedover thenext four years. Fully enacted in1999, the1997Food

andDrugAdministrationModernizationAct (FDAMA)wasdesigned to tighten

NDA deadlines and speed up licensing. However, consumer groups soon

criticised FDAMA’s risk-based priority assessments and the reduced time

allowed for FDAdrug analysis.198Two years later, Republican SenatorRichard

Shelbymadeatwo-lineadditiontoalargeomnibusbill.Soundinggoodonpaper,

theShelbyAmendmentallowedFreedomof InformationRequests for federally

sponsoredresearchbutineffectopenedafurtherdoorforindustrytodelayor

cast doubt on uncomfortable research. In 2000, the Information Quality Act

194Ibid.,pp.159-62.195Ibid.,p.165.196Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,pp.181-85.197'ImpactsofAntibiotic-ResistantBacteria',pp.30-32.198Richert,Conservatism,ConsumerChoice,andtheFoodandDrugAdministrationDuringtheReaganEra:APrescriptionforScandal,p.185.

312

(DataQualityAct)–developedwiththehelpofPhilipMorris–waspassedviaa

similarly large appropriations bill. Supposed to standardize the quality, utility

and integrityof scientific reviewsandriskassessments, theAct re-empowered

OMBeconomiststocontrolregulatoryagencies’scientificoutput.199

The three pieces of legislationwere bad news for critics of agricultural

antibioticuse.Inanageofinstitutionalisedcost-benefitassessments,itremained

virtually impossible to estimate agricultural antibiotics’ costs and easy to

highlight antibiotics’ economic benefits in already antibiotic-dependent

productionsystems.

With its regulatory options severely limited, FDA reactions to the EU’s

1998 AGP bans remained limited to a draft framework for ‘evaluating and

assuringthehumansafetyofthemicrobialeffectsofantimicrobialNewAnimal

Drugs’.200According to the draft framework, license applicants would have to

submitdataonantibiotics’effectsonresistantbacteriainanimals’intestinesand

estimate resulting human exposure to resistant bacteria, R-factors and

pathogens.201TheFDAwouldthenconductpost-licensingsurveillance.Thedraft

frameworkwouldapplytoalreadylicenseddrugs“onlytotheextentresources

allow.”202

In practice, the proposed post-marketing surveillance of new products

was already proving problematic. Since 1996, the National Antimicrobial

ResistanceMonitoring System’s (NARMS) Enteric Bacteria programhad tested

199Vogel,IsItSafe?BpaandtheStruggletoDefinetheSafetyofChemicals,pp.168-69.200'FoodSafety.TheAgriculturalUseofAntibioticsandItsImplicationsforHumanHealth',(WashingtonUnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice1999April),p.3.201DonnaU.VogtandBrianA.Jackson,'AntimicrobialResistance:AnEmergingPublicHealthIssue',CRSReportforCongress(CongressionalResearchService.LibraryofCongress,2001January24th),pp.CRS24-25.202'FoodSafety.TheAgriculturalUseofAntibioticsandItsImplicationsforHumanHealth',p.3.

313

Salmonella – and from 1997 Campylobacter – as a sentinel organism for

susceptibility to 17 antibiotics. 203 However, two years later, rising

fluoroquinoloneresistancehadfailedtopromptregulatoryaction,andtheFDA

evenconsideredexpandingagriculturalfluoroquinoloneusein1998.204

Bytheendofthemillennium,itseemedasthoughUSantibioticregulation

would continue to stagnate in its post-1966 moorings. Proposed in 1999, a

Preservation of Essential Antibiotics for Human Diseases Act failed to pass

Congress.Although resistancedata resulted inFDAactionagainst enrofloxacin

andsarafloxacininlate2000,theresultingfive-yearlegalbattlewithBayerover

enrofloxacinhighlightedtheFDA’sstatutoryweakness.Meanwhile,otherfederal

initiativesagainstantimicrobialresistancesimplyignoredagriculturalantibiotic

use.In2000,thePublicHealthImprovementAct(PHIA)gavestatutorypowerto

anInteragencyTaskForceonAntimicrobialResistance(ITFAR)andauthorized

$40milliontofosterdrugdevelopment,resistancemonitoringandtheprudent

useofantibioticsinmedicine.205

With companionbills forAGPbansonce again failing in2003despite a

supportive WHO report,206FDA attempts to reduce agricultural antibiotic use

remained limited to voluntary and educational measures. Similar to the 2003

‘Get Smart: KnowWhen AntibioticsWork’ campaign for humanmedicine, the

CVM developed prudent antibiotic use principles for livestock producers. In

203Ibid.,p.7;by2006,NARMSwastestingforresistanceinSalmonellaser.Typhi,Shigella,Campylobacter,andE.Coli0157;GeoffreyS.Becker,'AntibioticUseinAgriculture:BackgroundandLegislation',CRSReportforCongress(WashingtonDC:CongressionalResearchService,2009July30th),p.7.204'FoodSafety.TheAgriculturalUseofAntibioticsandItsImplicationsforHumanHealth',p.12.205VogtandJackson,'AntimicrobialResistance:AnEmergingPublicHealthIssue',pp.CRS1-2.206GeoffreyS.Becker,'AnimalAgriculture:SelectedIssuesinthe108thCongress',ibid.(2003October15th),pp.CRS25-26,'H.R.1549,PreservationofAntibioticsforMedicalTreatmentAct(Pamta)',CommitteonRulesUSHouseofRepresentatives(FirstSessionMondayJuly13,2009edn.,USHouseOfRepresentatives;WashingtonDC:UNSGovernmentPrintingOffice,2009),p.12.

314

2003,theFDAalsoreleasedvoluntaryGuidance#152for‘EvaluatingtheSafety

ofAntimicrobialNewAnimalDrugswithRegardtoTheirMicrobiologicalEffects

on Bacteria of Human Health Concern’. Based on the 1998 draft framework,

Guidance #152 instructed animal drug sponsors on preparing a hazard

characterizationof theirproductwith regards to antimicrobial resistance. FDA

andproducerswouldthenco-developariskassessmentofthenewantimicrobial

product and theFDAwould subsequentlydetermine appropriate conditionsof

use and potential further evaluations.While FDA riskmanagement could also

includepost-approvalresistancemonitoring,hazardssuchasagriculturalrunoff

remainedunaddressed.207

FollowingcriticismoftheglacialdevelopmentofUSantibioticreformbya

2004GAOassessment,208abriefwindowforreformopened in July2005when

LesterCrawfordwasappointedasFDACommissioner.Passionatelyarguingfor

AGP bans in 1980, Crawford had toned down his rhetoric under the Reagan

administration but announced a withdrawal of Baytril ten days after his

inauguration.209However,onlytwomonthslater,Crawfordwasforcedtoresign

afterpleadingguilty toa conflictof interest asa shareholderofFDA-regulated

companies.210

207'GuidanceforIndustry#152:EvaluatingtheSafetyofAntimicrobialNewAnimalDrugswithRegardtoTheirMicrobiologicalEffectsonBacteriaofHumanHealthConcern',(WashingtonDC,2003October).208'AntibioticResistance.FederalAgenciesNeedtoBetterFocusEffortstoAddressRisktoHumansfromAntibioticUseinAnimals',(WashingtonUnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,2004April),p.6.209'FdaAnnouncesFinalDecisionAboutVeterinaryMedicine',FDANewsRelease,P05-48(http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2005/ucm108467.htm[accessed:17.04.2015],28.07.2005).210'LesterM.Crawford-FdaCommissionersPage',FDAHistory.FDALeaders&TheirDeputies.Commissioners(http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/ucm110706.htm[accessed:17.04.2015]).

315

Following the 2007 election and the reintroduction of PAMTA (H.R.

962),211supporters and critics rallied for what seemed a decisive debate on

agricultural antibiotics. Politically, the context for restrictions had not been so

promisingsincethe1970s. In2008,aDemocraticpresidentcouldcountonthe

supportoftwoDemocrat-controlledHouses.Inthesameyear,restrictionswere

endorsed by a PEW report on Industrial Farm Animal Production, which

recommended that antimicrobial licensing for nontherapeutic uses in food

animals be stopped and older licensing decisions reinvestigated. According to

the PEW report, all nontherapeutic antibiotic uses in food animals should

ultimately be phased out. The report also recommended significant

improvements in agricultural, medical and environmental antimicrobial

resistancemonitoringandinofficialdatacollectiononantibioticconsumption.212

Althoughold frontlines re-emergedduringsubsequenthearingsand the

newCVMDirectorBernadetteDurhamremainedremarkablycoolregardingthe

prospect of EU-style AGP bans,213legislative change seemed forthcoming. In

2008, Congress added a provision to the Animal Drug User Fee Amendments

requiring drug sponsors to submit an annual report to the HHS for each

approved antimicrobial drug sold or distributed for use in food-producing

animals.Reportshadtocontaininformationontheamountofactiveingredient

211GeoffreyS.Becker,'FoodSafety:SelectedIssuesandBillsinthe110thCongress',CRSReportforCongress(Washington:CongressionalResearchService,2007September4),p.CRS12.212'PuttingMeatontheTable:IndustrialFarmAnimalProductioninAmerica',(PEWCommissiononIndustrialFarmAnimalProduction,2008),pp.61-67.213'HearingtoReviewtheAdvancesofAnimalHelathwithintheLivestockIndustry',SubcommitteeOnLivestock,Dairy,AndPoultyoftheCommitteeonAgriculture(SecondSession,September25,2008edn.,HouseofRepresentatives;WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,2009),pp.22-32;73-90,'EmergenceoftheSuperbug:AntimicrobialResistanceintheUnitedStates',CommitteeOnHealth,Education,Labor,AndPensions(UnitedStatesSenate;WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,2010).

316

distributed.For the first time,officialswouldknowhowmuchantibioticswere

beingusedonUSfarms.214

Oneyear later,DemocratRepresentativeLouiseMcIntoshSlaughterand

Democrat Senator Harry Reid introduced updated versions of PAMTA (H.R.

1549; S. 619). HHS would be required to withdraw, within two years, the

approval of any ‘nontherapeutic use’ in food-producing animals of a ‘critical

antimicrobial animal drug.’ Drug manufacturers would have the burden of

proving that a drug was harmless. ‘Critical antimicrobial animal drugs’ were

composed wholly or partly of any kind of penicillin, tetracycline, macrolide,

lincosamide, streptogramin, aminoglycoside or sulphonamide.215FDA Principal

Deputy Commissioner Joshua Sharfstein stated, “… both [FDA Commissioner

MargaretHamburg]andIstronglysupportactiontolimittheunnecessaryuseof

antibioticsinanimalstoprotectthepublichealth.”216ForSharfstein,itwasclear

that “the use of antimicrobials should be limited to those situations where

human and animal health are protected.”217Sharfstein also called for a

restriction of prophylactic antibiotic use to situations where there was

veterinarysupervision,evidenceofefficacyandno“reasonablealternativ[e]”218.

Although he did not explicitly endorse PAMTA, Sharfstein noted that PAMTA

couldprovidesignificantregulatoryreliefgiventheprospectof“burdensome”219

statutorydrugwithdrawals.

214Becker,'AntibioticUseinAgriculture:BackgroundandLegislation',p.5.215Ibid.,pp.1-2.216'H.R.1549,PreservationofAntibioticsforMedicalTreatmentAct(Pamta)',p.9.217Ibid.218Ibid.219Ibid.,p.10.

317

AfteragriculturalandpoliticaloppositionpreventedPAMTAfrompassing

beyondthehearingstage,theFDArevertedtoapolicyofvoluntarymeasures.220

InApril2012,theFDAreleasedGuidanceForIndustry#209(GFI#209)onthe

‘Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing

Animals”221,whichextendedthevoluntarypre-licensingprinciplesofGFI#152:

already licensedproductscontainingmedically importantantibioticsshouldbe

limited to uses “necessary for assuring animal health” under “veterinary

oversight or consultation.”222In December 2013, Guidance for Industry #213

(GFI #213) recommended voluntary label changes for medicated feeds and

drinking water so that they could be used only under veterinary supervision.

Claims for increasedweight gain or feed efficiencywere no longer considered

suitable.223To facilitate the end of OTC antibiotic feeds, the FDA planned to

reform the 1999 Veterinary Feed Directive, which mirrored the failed 1978

Controls Document and allowed the restriction of feeds to veterinary

oversight.224Officials threatened to consider “furtheractionunder theexisting

provisions of the FD&C” if, after three years, “we determine that adequate

progresshasnotbeenmade”.225

It was easy to forget that all of the Guidances were entirely voluntary.

Evenifmanufacturersadheredtothem,someAGPswouldremainavailableOTC

220ChapterTen,pp.247-248;RenéeJohnson,'FoodSafetyIssuesforthe112thCongress',CRSReportforCongress(WashingtonDC:CongressionalResearchService2012January9),p.Summary.221'GuidanceforIndustry#209:TheJudiciousUseofMedicallyImportantAntimicrobialDrugsinFood-ProducingAnimals',(2012April).222Ibid.,pp.21-22.223'GuidanceforIndustry#213:NewAnimalDrugsandNewAnimalDrugCombinationProductsAdministeredinoronMedicatedFeedorDrinkingWaterofFood-ProducingAnimals:RecommendationsforDrugSponsorsforVoluntarilyAligningProductUseConditionswithGfi#209',(2013December),p.5.224Ibid.,pp.4-8.225Ibid.,p.9.

318

and access to restricted AGPs remained possible via veterinary prescriptions.

SpeakingattheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs’OneHealthColloquiumin

2014,CommissionerHamburgnonethelessclaimedthatFDAGuidanceswerea

success:26pharmaceuticalcompanieswereintheprocessofrevisinglabelsand

30 individual OTC preparations had already been withdrawn. Aware of

considerable scepticism, Hamburg attempted to present the Guidances as a

victoryofpragmatism:

Experiencehas shownus that this in fact, is thequickest,most efficientway toreachourcollectivegoal–considerably faster thanamandatoryban thatwouldhaverequireddozensof individual legalproceedingsoneachproduct....226However,HamburgremainedvagueonhowtheFDAwouldensurelabel

compliance.InsteadofcreatingstatutoryregulationsforAGPs,whichmightone

daybeextendedtotherapeuticantibioticuse,Hamburg’sFDAhopedtocontain

bacterial resistance with voluntary compliance, new drugs and improved

surveillance.

HavingsteppeddowninApril2015,CommissionerHamburg’soptimism

has been criticised by senior politicians and themedia. In September 2014, a

Reuters report reviewed over 320 ‘feed tickets’, which detailed practices in

TysonFoods,Pilgrim’sPride,PerdueFarms,George’sandKochFoods:

The documents show that antibiotics were given as standard practiceovermostof the lifeof thechickens, (…). Inevery instanceofantibioticuse identified, the doses were at the low levels that scientists say areespeciallyconducivetothegrowthofso-calledsuperbugs...227

226MargaretHamburg,'FdaStrategiesforCombattingAntimicrobialResistance',SpeechesbyFDAOfficials(http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm427312.htm[accessed:17.03.2015]).227BrianGrowandP.J.Huffstutter,'UsLawmakersWantstoCurbAntibioticUseonFarms'',Reuters(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-farmaceuticals-chicken-congress-idUSKBN0HB1YZ20140916[accessed:17.04.2015],16.09.2014).

319

InDecember2014,DemocratSenatorsElizabethWarren,KirstenGillibrandand

DianneFeinsteinexpressedconcern

…thatFDAmaylacktheauthoritytoensureveterinariansadheretothecriteria for determining an appropriate preventive use laid out in itsguidancedocuments, that theFDAdoesnothavea clearmechanism forcollecting thedatanecessary to evaluatewhether its policies effectivelyreducethepublichealththreat,andthattheadministrationhasnoclearmetricsorbenchmarksthatwillbeusedtodeterminesuccessoraneedforfutureaction.228In April 2015, the FDA published a summary report of ‘antimicrobials

sold or distributed for use in food-producing animals’ in 2013. In total,

14,788,555 kg of antibiotics had been sold for use in food-producing animals.

Themajority of sales consisted of ionophores (30%), tetracyclines (44%) and

penicillins(6%).Oftheantibioticssoldforuseinfood-producinganimals,62%

were considered medically important. Only 28% of medically important

antibiotics (17% of grand total) had been administered for therapeutic

indications,therest(45%ofgrandtotal)hadbeenadministeredforproduction

orproduction/therapeutic indications.229Given suchnumbers,US citizensmay

well askwhether theObama administration’s substantial recent investment in

drug development is wise if the FDA remains unable to statutorily regulate

futuredrugs’subtherapeuticandtherapeuticuse.230

Allowing antibiotics’ mass-introduction to agriculture during a time of

technologicaleuphoria,theFDAhasstruggledtoassert itsauthorityoverthese

228'ThreeSenatorsHaveQuestionsforInteragencyAntibioticsTaskForce',FoodSafetyNews(http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/12/senators-have-questions-for-interagency-task-force-for-combating-antibiotic-resistant-bacteria/#.VTEPAWZqcds[accessed:17.04.2015],17.12.2014).229'2013SummaryReportonAntimicrobialsSoldorDistributedforUseinFood-ProducingAnimals',(FoodandDrugAdministration.DepartmentofHealthandHumanServices,2015April),pp.25;27-29.230LenaH.Sun,‘WhiteHouseannouncesplantofightantibiotic-resistantbacteria’,WP,27.03.2015,URL:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/03/27/white-house-announces-plan-to-fight-antibiotic-resistant-bacteria/(accessed:17.04.2015).

320

substancesforoverhalf-a-century.Itsfailuretodosohaspartiallybeendueto

skilful lobbyism, counter science, Congressional interference and growing

hostility against federal regulation. However, the FDA itself was often half-

hearted and contradictory in its regulatory efforts. Top officials’ close ties to

industryandinadequatefeedmillcontrolsandresidueandon-farmenforcement

notonlymeantthattheFDAfailedtofulfillegaldutiesbutalsohadlittlepower

toaddresstheamorphouschallengeposedbybacterialresistance.

321

Conclusion

After65yearsofuseas feedadditivesandaneven longercareerasveterinary

therapeutics,antibiotics’presenceonfarmshasseeminglybecomethenorm.No

activefarmertodayremembersatimewhenantibioticswerenotathand.

However, early antibiotic use was mostly uncontrolled. In the US, the

discoveryoftheantibioticgrowtheffectledtoaprofusionofantibioticfeedsfor

overayearbeforetheFDAretrospectivelylegalisedthepractice.Astheleading

culturalandeconomicpowerofthepost-warera,theUS’spathhadaprofound

impactonothercountries.InBritain,morecautiousofficialsstudiedtheresults

ofUStrialsandlistenedtoAmericanadvicebeforereversingpreviouspenicillin

restrictions and legalising AGPs in 1953. By licensing agricultural antibiotics,

authorities were also subscribing to an American vision of industrialised

livestockproduction.

Unfortunately,bothBritishandUSregulatorysystemswere ill-prepared

forthechallengesposedbyagriculturalantibiotics.Maintainingtheirtraditional

focus on preventing toxic substances in food, post-war regulators were

unfamiliarwith the hazards of bacterial resistance proliferation and non-toxic

antibiotic applicationsmostlyescaped regulatory scrutiny.Evenafter concerns

aboutagriculturalantibioticsincreased,regulators’primaryfocusremainedthe

preventionofresiduesratherthanbacterialresistance.InBritain,theregulatory

situation was further complicated by fragmented bureaucratic responsibilities

andatraditionofinformal‘gentlemen’sagreements’withindustry.Thingswere

only marginally better in the US. Although the FDA was responsible for

322

antibiotics in human medicine and agriculture, inadequate funding, lacking

expertiseandinsufficientstatutorypowersmadetheagencyfavouragatekeeper

policy based on licensing and voluntary compliance. With no data on sales,

residuesandresistance,officialsonbothsidesoftheAtlanticinitiallyregulated

antibioticsblindlyanddrugenforcementandproducercontrolsremainedrare.

The only exception wasmilk. Hedged by strong cultural taboos, detections of

penicillin inmilk resulted in US and Britishmilkmonitoring programs by the

1960s.

Despite knowing about bacterial resistance and antibiotic allergies, the

majority of transatlantic media commentators did not object to agricultural

antibioticseither.Commentators’relativetranquillitystemmedfromantibiotics’

benign medical image, the perception that substances like antibiotics were

crucial to overcoming theMalthusian trap and the belief that resistance could

proliferateonly‘vertically’.

An early transatlantic rift in antibiotic perceptions was most evident

between British and US farmers. In the US, post-war farmers already had

substantial experiencewith agricultural intensification andwere familiarwith

manufacturedfeedscontainingsulphasandvitamins.Asaconsequence,theydid

not think twice about adding fungal antibiotics to feeds. Because of their

remarkableefficacyinfightingandpreventinginfectionsandfosteringanimals’

growth, antibiotics quickly became a keystone holding together the dramatic

intensificationofpost-warUSlivestockproduction.Bycontrast,Britishfarmers

weremorewaryofantibiotics.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,animalproduction

had decreased dramatically and British livestock production remained more

diverse and small-scale than in the US. Many British farmers were wary of

323

antibiotic feeds and the associated American system of factory-like animal

husbandry. However, rising meat demand and official pressure to reduce the

balance of payments deficit gradually convinced British producers to adopt

intensiveUSproductionsystems,increaseherdsizesanduseantibiotics.

Wholesalepublic support foragriculturalantibioticswasshort-lived.By

the late 1950s, concerns began to grow about antibiotic residues, antibiotic-

enabled welfare problems and bacterial resistance. However, concerns grew

unevenlyonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.

IntheUS,publicconcernscentredmostonresiduesinfood.Inadditionto

the1956scareaboutantibiotics inmilk,antibiotics’ statusas ‘chemicals’made

their reputation vulnerable to long-standing concerns and scandals involving

unrelatedcarcinogenicortoxicchemicals.Withattentionfocussedondangerous

adulterants and trust in the FDA shaken by theWelch scandal and a series of

criticalbestsellers,publicconcernsaboutresiduesforcedUSofficialstopioneer

residuemonitoring programs formilk in the early 1960s and formeat in the

mid-1960s. However, there was little public pressure for the FDA to address

risingbacterialresistanceinnon-humansettings.

Although residue fears were also influential, British concerns about

bacterial resistance and animal welfare were far more important in changing

perceptionsofagriculturalantibioticsthanintheUS.Whereastoxicologists,the

Delaney Hearings and Silent Spring focussed US attention on invisible

contaminants, British PHLS researchers tracked the spread of bacterial

resistance via phage-typing and attacked the epistemic barrier separating

discussions of resistance in agricultural andmedical settings. In response, the

British government installed the Netherthorpe committee to review AGPs in

324

1960. Prefiguring four decades of committee debates, the committee’smedical

expertswereunabletoprovedirectharmresultingfromantibioticuseonfarms.

Althoughthefinal1962reportreflectedthisstalemate,medicalexpertsinserted

apassagecallingfornofurtherlicensingof ‘therapeutically’relevantAGPs.The

1962 distinction between therapeutically relevant and irrelevant antibiotics

would prefigure debates and legislation in Europe and the US for the next 50

years.

OneyearafterBritainexperienceditsownmilkresiduescandalin1963,

RuthHarrison’sAnimalMachines fused concerns about antibiotic residues and

bacterialresistancewithdeep-seatedculturalconcernsaboutanimalwelfareon

‘factoryfarms’.Oneyearlater,researchbyE.S.Andersonhighlightedthedangers

of‘infectious’resistanceandtriggeredtherecalloftheNetherthorpecommittee,

which in turn led to theSwanncommittee.Following the tragic1967Teesside

deaths,callsforantibioticreformwerevoicedbybothleft-wingandconservative

newspapers, and agricultural antibiotics increasingly functioned as a negative

symbol of ‘factory farming’. In November 1969, the so-called Swann Report

calledforabanoftherapeuticallyrelevantantibioticsinAGPs.

Britain’sSwann-inspired1971penicillinandtetracyclineAGPbanswere

indeedpioneeringpiecesoflegislation.However,theSwannmodelofrestricting

‘therapeutic’AGPswhilstleavingotherusesofthesameantibioticsunregulated

wasineffective.NotonlydidtheSwannmodelignorethefactthatveterinarians

hadafinancialincentivetoprescribeandsellthesamedrugsinhigherdoses,it

also left agricultural antibiotic dependency unchallenged and failed to address

cross-resistance resulting from nontherapeutic AGPS. Despite a short-term

325

reduction, overall antibiotic use in British and European agriculture quickly

reboundedalongsidebacterialresistance.

WithcallsforSwann-styleantibioticrestrictionsalsobeingvoicedinthe

US,farmersonbothsidesoftheAtlanticfacedadilemma.Duringthe1950s,easy

antibiotic access had led to the development of a path dependency whereby

every furtherwaveof agricultural intensificationwithin the alreadyantibiotic-

dependent system necessitated more antibiotic use. Althoughmore andmore

farmers were unable to afford on-going intensification and many shared the

generalpublic’senvironmentalandhealthconcerns,farmers’earlierinvestment

in antibiotic-dependent production systems made them wary of moves to

restrict antibiotics – especially during times of economic insecurity. Although

their integration into corporatist decision-making and their acceptance of

scientific concerns about resistancemadeBritish farmers accept the relatively

mild Swann bans, they remained opposed to further restrictions that might

threaten conventional intensive production. In the US, agricultural hostility

towards substance restrictions and federal controls increased markedly

followingthe1972DDTban.OpposingAGPbans,USagriculturalcommentators

invokeda typeofdomino-thinkingwherebyanyconcession to thegovernment

wouldentailfurthersubstancebans.

Luckily for conventional farmers, the early 1970s saw public concerns

aboutagriculturalantibioticsandresistanceebbonbothsidesof theAtlantic–

although residue fears fuelled thegrowthof the rejuvenatedorganic sector. In

Britain, theSwannreport’ssupposedsuccessmadeagriculturalantibiotics lose

their status as a common denominator and rallying point for animal welfare,

residue and resistance warnings. Widespread British interest in antibiotic

326

regulationswould re-emergeonly in the late1970swhen studies showed that

Swann was failing and investigations revealed a thriving black market for

agriculturaltherapeutics.

Meanwhile, US debates continued to ignore bacterial resistance

proliferationonfarms.Despitebriefspurtsofpublicityfollowingthe1966NEJM

resistancewarnings and the 1969 Swann report, agricultural antibiotics never

turned into unifying symbols of public protest against intensive agriculture.

Instead, media commentators focussed on the residue and cancer-centred

problemsofDDTandDES.Concernsaboutresistanceresultingfromagricultural

antibioticsonlygainedsustainedpublicprominencewhennewspapers like the

NewYorkTimesandWashingtonPostturnedintoplatformsofprotestduringthe

mid-1970s.However,bythistime,concernsabout‘stagflation’andthe‘druglag’

ledtosignificantoppositiontoregulatoryinterventionfromconservativeorgans

liketheNationalReviewandpartsoftheliberalpress.

Theresultinglullinpublicattentionharmedregulatoryeffortstocontrol

antibiotic use, residues and resistance on both sides of the Atlantic.

UncommenteduponbytheBritishmedia,Britishofficialssignificantlyweakened

the Swann report. Permanent programs for resistance and residuemonitoring

werenotestablished,andtheproposedcentralauthority forantibioticuse, the

JSC, was worn down by interdepartmental rivalries. Although British officials

fostered public pride in Swann, they remained ignorant of total antibiotic use

and whether regulations were really protecting public health. Whereas EEC

pressure forcedBritain toadoptbasic residuemonitoringprograms in the late

1970s,theneoliberalThatcheradministrationsubsequentlyopposedattemptsto

upgradeandexpandmonitoring.

327

Britain’s hollowing out of Swann also damaged US attempts to install

resistance-inspired regulations. In 1966, an FDA ad hoc committee had

addressedconcernsaboutantibioticresiduesinmeatbutlimiteddiscussionsof

resistancetoresidues’immediatepresence.AlthoughanFDATaskForcereacted

to Swann by calling for therapeutic AGP bans in 1972, Task Force members

remaineddividedonwhetherAGPsposedan imminenthazardandmadebans

dependentondrugsafetyandefficacytrials.Boggeddownbydiverseregulatory

battles, the FDA subsequently yielded to pressure from theNAS and industry,

narroweddrugreviews’scopeandallowedmanufacturers toreviewtheirown

products.Unsurprisingly, industrydata failed toprovideevidenceof imminent

harm. Following the failure of a second attempt to install AGP bans via a

favourably composed NAFDC subcommittee, FDA Commissioner Donald

KennedyoverrodeNAFDCoppositionandannouncedbansof therapeuticAGPs

in1977.However,intheabsenceofstrongpublicsupport,theFDAwasunableto

convinceCongresstorestrictAGPs.Ultimately,Congressionalinsistenceonproof

of harm and counter science produced by CAST and industry-friendly

researchers stalled Kennedy’s AGP bans. In 1978, Congress imposed a

moratoriumandmandatedadditionalstudies.ByusingCongressandthejudicial

systemtobypasstheFDA,antibioticsupporterswonamajorvictory.

Forantibioticcritics,thefailureofFDAAGPbansbroughttherealisation

that theUS legal system’s insistenceonproof of direct or imminentharmwas

problematicinthecaseofbacterialresistance.Criticswereatpainstoconvince

politiciansthat, fromanenvironmentalandpublichealthstandpoint,providing

clear judicial proof of harm resulting from resistant ‘agricultural’ bacteriawas

rationally irrelevant:by1980, itwasclearthatfarmers’mass-useofantibiotics

328

was substantially contributing to a ‘resistance friendly’ manmade ecology

favouring resistance proliferation via bacteria, plasmids or transposons. Over

time,resistancewasboundto–andmostlikelyalreadyhad–spreadtobacteria,

whichharmedhumans.1Becauseof lackingmonitoringdataandtheglobaland

interconnectednatureof resistance, itwasalsovirtually impossible toprovide

incontrovertibleproofofharmona judicial causeandeffectbasis.Despite the

absence of such ‘proof’, it was evident that selection pressure for resistance

wouldonlybedecreasedbyapermanentreductionofgeneralandnon-human

antibioticuse.

AlthoughboththeThatcherandReaganadministrationswerescepticalof

increasedstateintervention,the1980ssawregulatorydifferencesonbothsides

oftheAtlanticwiden.

In the EEC, policies increasingly invoked the precautionary principle,

whichheld thatproofof likelyharmwasenough tobana substance.Although

BritishofficialsinitiallyopposedmoreextensiveEECfoodandantibioticreforms,

theirresistancewasweakenedby the1980sSalmonella crisisandcrumbled in

the wake of the 1996 BSE crisis, which resulted in the questioning of many

fundamentaltenetsofintensiveagriculture.Antibiotics’oldstatusasacommon

denominator of agricultural criticism placed AGPs at the heart of reform

demands. Following the 1997 election, the New Labour government changed

Britain’s antibiotic policy. Buoyed by a series of domestic and international

expertreports,BritainsupportedEUAGPrestrictionsin1998and2003aswell

1Landecker,'AntibioticResistanceandtheBiologyofHistory',pp.14-24.;foranewviewofthebinarydividepathogenicvs.non-pathogenicorganisms,cf.Pierre-OlivierMéthotandSamuelAlizon,'WhatIsaPathogen?TowardaProcessViewofHost-ParasiteInteractions',Virulence,5/8(2014).

329

astheestablishmentofEUresistancemonitoring.Publicsupportforthereforms

wassignificantandagriculturaloppositionsmall.

By contrast, the principle of proven harm continued to dominate US

regulation,andthecauseforantibioticrestrictionswasfurtherweakenedbythe

impositionofHHSoversightovertheFDA.AlthoughCDCandnon-governmental

expertscontinuedtocampaignforAGPrestrictions, itcameasnosurprisethat

the FDA rejected the 1983 NRDC petition to ban AGPs despite CDC studies

linkingresistanceselectiononfarmstohumanillness.Intheabsenceofacrisis

like BSE, the changing political landscape of the 1990s resulted in a series of

industry-friendly legal reforms, which institutionalised cost-benefit based

policies formost substances.Meanwhile, public pressure for antibiotic reform

remainedweak.IncontrasttoEurope,agriculturalantibioticsneveremergedas

a unifying rallying point against the abstract system of intensive agriculture.

Antibiotic support also remained strong amongst US farmers, who did not

experience thesamecrisisof trust in intensiveproductionsystemsas theirEU

colleaguesduringthe1990s.

A potential moment of AGP reform seemed reached in late 2007.With

Democrats regaining control of both Houses, the FDA initially supported

Congress’s attempt to restrict antibiotics via PAMTA. However, industry and

USDA pressure once again made the FDA abandon statutory in favour of

voluntaryAGPrestrictions.

Meanwhile, problems abound. The CDC has recently reported that each

year about one in six Americans (ca. 48 million people) become sick from

contaminated food. An estimated 128,000 cases require hospitalization, and

3,000 are fatal. Amongst the main culprits are mostly resistant Samonella

330

enterica, Listeriamonocytogenesand Campylobacter spp.Together, these three

bacteriaspeciescostUScitizensca.$8.4billionperyear.Whilethisfigureisonly

valid for resistant foodborne infections, thecumulativecostofantibioticmass-

use in US agriculture is probably far higher.2Facilitated by a ‘medicated

environment’,resistantbacteriaandplasmidscirculatefreelybetweenUSfarms,

hospitalsandtheenvironmentandmuddytheboundariesbetweenhumansand

animals.

In Europe, awareness is currently growing that AGP bansmight not be

enough.With new resistant strains of livestock-associated pathogens found in

Britishfoodin2015,3theNGOallianceSustainestimatesthaton-farmantibiotic

use still constitutes ca. 45% of total UK antibiotic use.4Clearly, reforms of

therapeuticantibioticuseinagriculturearenecessary.However,theypromiseto

bedifficult.Despitethe2013publicationofa five-yearantimicrobialresistance

strategy,Britishofficialscontinuetohavenooverviewofon-farmantibioticuse

or resistance selection. Moreover, Britain’s five-year strategy specifies neither

concreteantibioticreductiontargetsnormeasurestoachievethem.Throughout

theEU,veterinaryoverprescriptionofantibioticsremainsaproblem.In2014,a

survey of 3004 veterinary practitioners from 35 EU countries cast light on

veterinary prescription habits. Although older antibiotics like penicillin and

tetracyclineswerestillpreferredformostdiseaseindications,so-calledCritically

2RenéeJohnson,'FoodSafetyIssuesforthe114thCongress',CRSReport(WashingtonDC:CongressionalResearchService,2015February13),p.1.3FionaHarveyandAndrewWasley,‘WhatisthesuperbugLA-MRSACC398andwhyisitspreadingonfarms?’,Guardian,18.06.2015,URL:http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/18/what-is-the-superbug-la-mrsa-cc398-and-why-is-it-spreading-on-farms(accessed:23.06.2015);FionaHarvey,MaryCarson,MaggieO’KaneandAndrewWasley,‘MRSAsuperbugfoundinsupermarketporkraisesalarmoverfarmingrisks’,Guardian,18.06.2015,URL:http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/18/mrsa-superbug-in-supermarket-pork-raises-alarm-farming-risks(accessed:18.06.2015).4'OveruseofAntibioticsinFarming',Sustain-SaveOurAntibiotics(http://www.sustainweb.org/antibiotics/overuse_of_antibiotics_in_farming/[29.06.2015]).

331

Important Antibiotics (CIAs) like macroloides, fluoroquinolones and third

generation cephalosporins were used for 26% of cattle and 20% of pig

treatments.5

Reactingtosuchfigures,NGOsliketheEuropeanConsumerOrganisation

(BEUC) demand mandatory reports for metaphylactic antibiotic use and a

phasing out of prophylactic antibiotic use. The therapeutic treatment of

individualanimalsshouldbethenormratherthantheexception.TheBEUCalso

call for a decoupling of veterinarians’ right to prescribe and sell antibiotics,

restrictingnon-humanusesofCIAsandendingveterinary‘offlabeluse’andthe

so-called‘cascade’,wherebyveterinarianscanprescribedrugslistedintheTable

of Allowed Substances in Commission Regulation (EU No37/2010) for

unauthorised uses. Lauding Norwegian and Dutch precedents, the BEUC

demandsEU-widereductiontargets.6

Similar demands have been voiced by the UK’s Alliance to Save Our

Antibiotics. The Alliance has also assessed agricultural antibiotics’ relative

impactonoverallbacterialresistance.Althoughnon-humanantibioticuse“may

notbethemaindriverofresistanceinhumans”, theAlliancestatesthat it is“a

very important contributor” 7 . Regarding Salmonella and Campylobacter

infections, farm animals are the “most important source of antimicrobial

resistance.”8For E. coli and Enterococci, there is “strong evidence that farm

5N.D.Briyneetal.,'AntibioticsUsedMostCommonlytoTreatAnimalsinEurope',VeterinaryRecord,(June42014),p.1&5.6'AntibioticUseinLivestock:TimetoAct',BEUCPositionPaper(Brussels:BEUC,August2014),pp.2-3.7'AntimicrobialResistance-WhytheIrresponsibleUseofAntibioticsinAgricultureMustStop.ABriefingfromtheAlliancetoSaveOurAntibiotics',(AlliancetoSaveOurAntibiotics,2015),p.10.8Ibid.

332

animals are an important source of antibiotic resistance.”9Regarding MRSA,

antibioticuseintheUKmightmakea“smallcontributiontotreatmentproblems

in human medicine”10, but international data shows that this might increase

substantially. Meanwhile, there is a “solid theoretical case”11that agricultural

antibiotic use could cause resistance in other pathogens such as Neisseria

gonorrhoeaeviahorizontalresistancetransfer.

Ahead of the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP), the challenges of antibiotic regulation seem daunting, and regulatory

differencesonboth sidesof theAtlantic remainsubstantial.However, theyare

notimmovable.

Asthisdissertationhasshown,therehasneverbeenatimelessandideal

waytoregulateagriculturalantibiotics.Instead,regulators’positionshavebeen

strongly influenced by the contradictory risk cultures surrounding them. Over

time,different riskcultureshaveemphasizedeither the residue, the resistance

orthewelfareaspectofthe‘antibioticproblem’.Thedifferentemphasesresulted

from antibiotics’ integration into pre-existing civic risk epistemologies.Within

theseepistemologies,antibiotics’linguisticandculturalconnotationsoftenhada

stronger influence on resulting risk priorities than an ‘objective’ evaluation of

theirimpactonpublichealthdid.

IntheUS,powerfulfearsofinvisiblecontaminationledtoanearlyfocus

onantibioticresiduesandanequationofantibioticregulationwiththestrategies

developed for unrelated toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. While this focus

neglectedthe‘objectively’greaterriskofbacterialresistanceandantibiotics’role

9Ibid.,p.12.10Ibid.11Ibid.,p.15.

333

in enabling problematic animal welfare standards, it was instrumental in the

pioneeringofnationalmonitoringprogramsforantibioticsinfoodstuffs.

Although residue concerns were also present on the other side of the

Atlantic, the riskemphasisgiven to themwasneverasprominentas in theUS

and was soon matched by growing concerns about bacterial resistance – as

visualised by the PHLS – and animal welfare problems. As a result of Ruth

Harrison’s Animal Machines, E.S. Anderson’s warnings about ‘infectious

resistance’ and the Teesside deaths; antibiotics surfaced as a common

denominator of consumer, medical, animal and environmental concerns. This

shared sense of risk created new alliances between different communities,

challenged institutional and epistemic boundaries between animal and human

health and enabled Britain to pioneer resistance-oriented reforms in 1971.

Following the enactment of the Swann bans, it took the 1996 BSE crisis for

antibiotics to re-emerge as a common denominator for various groups

concernedaboutrisksresultingfromintensiveagriculture.Historically,effective

antibiotic regulation thus emerged only in situations when differences in

attitudes towards antibioticswerebrokendowneitherby activists or external

crises.

Hoping for future crises is, however, not a viable regulatory strategy.

Neither is the regular invocation of doomsday narratives of a looming post-

antibioticapocalypse.Startinginthelate1950s,scenariosofresistantpandemics

orasuddenreturntoMedievalmedicinehavefailedtofostersustainedchange.12

12Antibiotic‘futures’andthetropeoftheantibiotic‘revolution’arediscussedinScottH.PodolskyandAnneKveimLie,'FuturesandTheirUses:AntibioticsandTherapeuticRevolutions',inJeremyA.Greene,FlurinCondrau,andElizabethSiegelWatkins(eds.),TherapeuticRevolutions:PharmaceuticalsandSocialChangeintheTwentiethCentury(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,Forthcoming).

334

Bycreatingtheimpressionthatantibioticswillgooutwithabangandnotwith

thefarmorelikelylongandquietwhimper,doomsdaynarrativeshavediverted

attention from the systemic importance that antibiotics have acquired in both

modernmedicineand foodproduction.Asevidencedbytherepeated failureof

dramatic medical warnings to engender action, it will need far more than an

individual spurt of panic and attention to motivate long-term policies of

sustainedantibioticreduction.

In order for future resistance-focussed reform to work, regulators will

have to establish a viable middle ground between stakeholders’ distinct risk

epistemologies.Onboththeinternationalanddomesticlevels,ithasneverbeen

‘natural’tobemoreconcernedaboutantibioticresistancethanaboutresiduesin

foodoranimalwelfareabuse.Ashighlightedbythehistoricalupsanddownsof

‘One Health’ perspectives, 13 integrated notions of animal and human

microbiologicalriskwerenotself-evidenteither.Inordertoconvincedomestic

and international stakeholders to reform farming, lifestyles and regulations,

merely stating the ‘facts’ about antibiotic resistance andhoping for the best is

notenough.Asaregulatoryandactiviststrategy,ithasfailedsincethe1960s.A

more successful strategywould consist in ‘learning’ the language of individual

risk cultures in order to effectively translate the risk posed by resistance and

buildaninternationalconsensusonantibioticreduction.

Most importantly, this dissertation has shown that even notionally

successfulantibioticreformshavefailedtoconvincemanyfarmersofthelogicof

antibiotic reduction. Although the agricultural community has often reacted

13MichaelBresalier,AngelaCassidy,andAbigailWoods,'OneHealthinHistory',inZinsstagEtAl.(ed.),OneHealth:TheTheoryandPracticeofIntegratedHealthApproaches(CABI,2015).

335

antagonistically to non-agricultural interventions, this does not mean that

farmerscannotreform.Inthecaseoftheorganicmarket,sharedconcernsabout

‘pure’ food in the absence of state guarantees created a lucrative risk alliance

betweenproducersandconsumers.Bothsidesagreedthattheabsenceofriskin

the formofantibioticsandotherchemicalsmatteredmore thanslightlyhigher

food prices or differences between the numerous philosophies guiding

alternativeagriculture.Whereassharednotionsofpurityhavecreatedanew,yet

conspicuousmarketfor‘pure’foods,suchastrategywillnotworkinthecaseof

resistant bacteria, which do not distinguish between consumers wealthy or

concerned enough to buy ‘pure’ food and those who are not. Relying on

antibiotics as a risk-minimizing tool since the 1950s, intensive livestock

producersstillhavetobeconvincedthattheriskofusingantibiotics isgreater

than the one they are supposed to combat. At the same time, they have to be

provided the financial and institutional security to do without their antibiotic

insurance.

Whiletheevaluationofmoreconcretepolicyisataskforthefuture,14one

canonlyhopethatatransatlanticconsensusonantibioticreductionarisessoon.

Cautionarytalesabouttheshort-sightedsquanderingofassetsaboundinhuman

historyandmythology.Living inapangenomicreality,consumers, farmersand

regulators have to realise that every antimicrobial intervention in the

environmentwillproduceamicrobialreaction.Regardlessofhowmuchmoney

isspenttoreopentheantibioticpipeline, therewillbenofinalhuman ‘victory’

overbacteriabecauseresistanceisnatural.Instead,itistimetoabandonthemes

14SeearecentcontributionbyScottH.Podolskyetal.,'HistoryTeachesUsThatConfrontingAntibioticResistanceRequiresStrongerGlobalCollectiveAction',JournalofLaw,Medicine&Ethics,43/2(SpecialSupplement)(2015).

336

of antimicrobial wars in hospitals and on farms and re-gear our systems of

pharmaceuticaluse toa sustainable strategyofmicrobialmanagementandco-

existence. By diverging from the standard account of antibiotic use in human

medicine and focussing on the ‘other 50%’,15this dissertation has highlighted

some of the reasons why the agricultural mass use of antibiotics in food

production has so far failed to meet this goal. If societies do not find a more

adaptive approach to adaptive resistance, the human history of antibiotic use

maywellturnouttobebriefandpyrrhic.

15IntheUS,someestimatesholdthatca.70%ofantibioticsimportanttohumanmedicinearegiventolivestock;'PewAntibioticResistanceProject',(http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/antibiotic-resistance-project/about/antibiotic-use-in-food-animals[accessed:17.04.2015]).

337

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