annex a greece and crete war diaries.pdf - aws

Annex A Greece and Crete War Diaries.pdf

Annex B Establishment Table 1941.pdf

Annex C Greece_Crete Personnel _ Mason.pdf

Annex D Greece_Crete Personnel _ Butler.pdf

Annex E Establishments July 1942.pdf

Annex F Col Ryan's Reports.pdf

Annex G ASWG Report February 1944.pdf

Annex H Establishments May 1944.pdf

Annex I CABARLAH WW1 AND WW2.pdf

Annex J 51 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex K 52 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex L 53 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex M 54 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex N 55 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex O 56 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex P 57 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex Q 58 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex R 59 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex S 96 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex T Det A AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION.pdf

Annex U 61 _ 67 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTIONS.pdf

Annex V DISCRIMINATION UNIT.pdf

Annex W Radio Security.pdf

Annex X CB FIELD REPORT.pdf

ANNEX A to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

4 SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION WAR DIARIES

FOR GREECE AND CRETE

The following extracts are copied verbatim from the section of the 4 Wireless Section War

Diaries that contain reference to Greece and Crete1. It has been necessary to reproduce the

text as the original copy is in poor condition. To complement the Diary several graphics have

been included.

The Australian War Memorial file opens with the following page:

Figure 1: Captain Ryan Letter

1 AWM: AWM 52 7/39/41 Special Wireless Section Dec 1940 to Dec 1941

Author Note

The date of the letter is a bit suspect as the Section title was not changed to No 5

until January 1942 and he is referring in the past to Greece and Crete which

occurred in March/April/May 1941.

It is also date stamped Feb 1941

Strange!!


2

Figure 2: First page of War Diary

Extracts commence on 18 March 1941 with the Section departing Egypt

18 Mar 41 Embarked on H.M.T.2 Breconshire at ALEXANDRIA. Sailed at 1700 hrs.

20 Mar 41 Arrived PIREAUS 2200 hrs.

21 Mar 41 Disembarked at 0900 hrs. Proceeded by M/T3 supplied by a NZ unit to GLYFADA near ATHENS.

22 Mar 41 Tents and accommodation allocated to Section. Work on setting up a 30 cwt truck for a set room continued.

25 Mar 41 Left in convoy with Sigs 1 Aust Corps at 0900 hrs. Bivouaced at a point south of LAMIA.

26 Mar 41 Proceeded through LAMIA and DOMIKOS and camped in that vicinity, for the night.

27 Mar 41 Proceeded through LARISSA, DOMENIKO, ELESSONA to a point approximately 10 miles beyond ELESSONA towards SERVIA. Bivouaced beside the road at the junction of two streams near LAKUTHI. The Section was here separated from Corps Signals which bivouacked elsewhere.

28 Mar 41 Reconnaissance made during the morning for a better site and one found approximately 1 mile distant, on the banks of a small stream and in small gulleys. Section moved to this location.

30 Mar 41 Work commenced erecting tents, and putting set room into operation. Tents camouflaged with mud.

31 Mar 41 Work commence in reception of German W/T4.

1 Apr 41 101 Section5 was found to be located at ELASSONA. Contact was made with Capt Knowles and Lt Bone and Lt Mackower.

2 Apr 41 Arrangements made to cooperate with 101 Section which had certain documents and information. German air traffic was concentrated on.

2 H.M.T.: Her Majesty Troopship 3 M/T: Motor Transport 4 W/T: Wireless Telegraphy – probably Morse Code 5 British Special Wireless Section


3

4 Apr 41 Cpl Kelson attached to 101 Section for training.

5 Apr 42 Cpl Ballard and Cpl Inglis join the Section

6 Apr 42 Cpl Ballard and Cpl Inglis attached to 101 Section for training.

7 Apr 42 Messages received from German station which was identified as in LIBYA. This was the first indication that major operations were in progress there.

8 Apr 41 All traffic taken sent to 101 Section as before.

9 Apr 41 Carried out reconnaissance to the rear for a new location for the Section.

10 Apr 41 Further reconnaissance for new location and decided on a bastion about four miles south of ELASSONA on a high hill.

11 Apr 41 Heavy rain and low clouds. Moved some vehicles to higher ground.

12 Apr 41 Corps moved from GERANIA to ELASSONA. A German prisoner was brought for interrogation by Lt Tinson of YSS6. Preparations to move the Section on following day. Advance party under Cpl Dorgan went ahead.

13 Apr 41 Section moved to location chosen on 10th and commenced work on arrival.

14 Apr 41 First German reconnaissance plane seen to fly in the direction of LARISSA at 08930 hrs. Capt Knowles visited the Section. ELASSONA bombed at 1630 hrs, approximately 16 planes. Reconnaissance made on roads in vicinity. Messages received in German P/L7 passing between Major Yankovitch and German Army hagling [sic] with terms of capitulation of YUGOSLAVIA. Request to Corps Sigs for direct line to Corps refused on account of pending movement.

15 Apr 41 LARISSA bombed at 1030 hrs; approximately 60 planes were seen over the area. Aerodrome also bombed. Much aircraft R/T8 heard in encoded P/L directing the bombing. Signal strength excessive at times. Reconnaissance carried out on the roads in the vicinity of LARISSA. At 1730 hrs Warning Movement Order received from C.O.9 Corps Sigs and Capt Ryan instructed to report to Lt Col Kendall C.O. Corps Sigs for instructions when he received orders to move immediately to a position approximately eight miles south of LARISSA and to report to Major Murrel of that unit. Section moved at 1900 hrs in convoy. At 1915 hrs 30 German aircraf5t were seen to fly from a southerly direction and bomb ELASSONA. Route taken through LARISSA. Road much congested and vehicles were separated by cross traffic. Many streets in the town blocked by rubble. Reached rendezvous at approximately 2300 hrs and bivouacked in field at side of road.

16 Apr 41 Raining. Area becoming boggy. Section moved to higher ground on [opposite] side of the road. Work resumed. Enemy aircraft prevalent. During the day and night great M/T activity moving south.

17 Apr 41 Moved off in convoy with Sigs 1 Aust Corps. Roads congested by M/T. Low clouds; raining. Passed through LAMIA and BRAILOS [sic - BRALLOS] PASS. Bivouaced approximately five miles south of the pass. Heavy explosion heard during the night.

6 Not identified 7 P/L: Plain Language 8 R/T: Radio Telegraphy 9 C.O.: Commanding Officer


4

Figure 3: ELASSONA, THESSALY. THE BOMBING OF ELASSONA10

ELASSONA, THESSALY. THE BOMBING OF ELASSONA, GREECE, EASTER SUNDAY 1941 DURING AN ATTACK BY A HUGE

FLIGHT OF GERMAN PLANES. THE ELASSONA RIVER CAN BE SEEN WINDING ACROSS THE PHOTOGRAPH. THIS SNAP IS OF

THE FIRST FALLING OF THE BOMBS.

10 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P00149.005/


5

Figure 4: The road through Lamia Pass11

Figure 5: Brallos Pass12

LAMIA PLAIN, GREECE. 1945-04-26. THE SITE OF AUSTRALIAN POSITIONS, BRALLOS PASS, SEEN FROM THE

MAIN ROAD ON LAMIA PLAIN.

11 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/130626/ 12https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/130666/


6

18 Apr 41 Moved off at 0800 hrs, passed through LEVADIA and bivouaced with Sigs 1 Corps in open field. Instructions received from C.S.O.13 to listen for our own forward R/T [may be W/T- overtyped] communications. This was done and the messages received passed to the Cipher Staff.

19 Apr 41 Section moved approximately 1 mile to a location closer to Corps Headquarters. Work carried on receiving our own communications.

20 Apr 41 Enemy air activity over the area, machine gunning M/T, bombing the road. Reconnaissance carried out for a less exposed location for the Section. Decided to move to a location approximately 5 miles south of Corps Headquarters. M/T received slight damage from machine gunning while on the road; one radiator damaged beyond repair. New position afforded good protection and camouflage. Vehicles well concealed. Work resumed on enemy communications, but since contact with 101 Section had been lost and the Section possessed no German “I” Staff or Documentation the traffic was of little value. Much W/T received in KLARTEXT14 with coded names.

21 Apr 41 Capt Ryan and Lt Henry proceeded to THEBES with damaged radiator to find a Field Workshop. No suitable radiator was obtainable. Party also sent out to examine damaged M/T but no vehicles of the same model (Ford) were found. During the afternoon Capt Ryan was informed by the C.S.O 1 Aust Corps, Col Simpson that the Section was to work independently of Corps Signals, and for any further moves the O.C.15 Section would himself have to make all arrangements. Enemy aircraft less active.

22 Apr 41 Lt Hill and Lt Henry proceeded to Force H.Q in order to contact 101 Section. On arrival at the area it was found that FORCE had moved early that morning from its former location near KALKIS. A small rear party was left, and one officer requested that a message be passed to C.S.O. 1 Aust Corps to inform him that 85 miles of D8 signal wire was dumped at that location. This information was sent to C.S.O. by Section D.R.16. At 1300 hrs message received by special D.R. from G.O.C.17 ANZAC CORPS and signed by Lt Col Kendall that ANZAC CORPS was evacuating GREECE, and the Section was ordered to proceed to PIRAEUS, and embark that night with equipment. Secret documents were then burnt.

13 C.S.O: Chief Signals Officer 14 Possibly means clear text 15 O.C.: Officer Commanding 16 D.R.: Despatch Rider – normally on a motor bike 17 G.O.C.: General Officer Commanding


7

The following is an extract of the original signal18:

MOST SECRET – OFFICER ONLY – To Capt Ryan, Capt Hill and Lieut Henry from Comd

DAFE19 – Sigs 41 – 42

ANZAC CORPS is withdrawing from GREECE. You will immediately close down and

move with your complete Section to PIRAEUS area and report to the EMBARKATION

STAFF OFFICER, to whom you will shows this instruction. It is the GOC’s wish that the

ESO make arrangements to embark your valuable personnel and equipment

TONIGHT (22 Apr) Do your utmost to comply with this order.

ACK (Sgd R. Kendall Lt Col)

Figure 6: LEVADIA, GREECE. 1941-04-20. MEMBERS OF 1ST CORPS SIGNALS20

LEVADIA, GREECE. 1941-04-20. MEMBERS OF 1ST CORPS SIGNALS PREPARING TO DESTROY ALL NON-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT BEFORE RETREATING TOWARDS KALAMATA. (PHOTOGRAPHER T. EDWARDS. DONOR T. EDWARDS)

22 Apr 41 Continued

Section moved off in convoy at 1330 hrs towing the damaged vehicle. Owing to this vehicle, the four rea vehicles became separated and arrived at PIRAEUS at 1730 hrs, approximately half an hour after the main party. The Embarkation Staff Officer (ESO) was contacted, and after some difficulty the Section was embarked on the GREEK ship ELSE at PIRAEUS and sailed at approximately midnight. A rear party under Lt Henry was left with Sgt Lodd and eleven M/T drivers to make arrangements for evacuation of vehicles and the remaining equipment. The following was taken aboard the ELSE: Six receivers R-101, one receiver Kingsley, one 500 watt battery charger, three 3000 watt battery chargers, one wave meter type C, two Avo meters, two W/T sets number 11. Three days rations for all ranks and some cooking equipment was also taken.

18 Extract from On Ultra-Active Service page 57 19 Code name for HQ Anzac Command 20 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P01166.014/


8

Those embarked numbered two Officer and 77 ORs21. On the ship there were 174 German prisoners under the charge of a British guard of 2 Officers and 12 ORs. Captain Ryan received a request from the O.I.C.22 for assistance and accordingly 1 N.C.O.23 and 12 ORs were detailed for duty. Before sailing GREEK authorities demanded the return of 37 prisoners who had been taken by the Greeks. The O.I.C at first refused, but after threats were made to cancel the sailing of the ship, they were handed over. The ship sailed with 137 German POWs24. The rear party bivouaced on the wharf.

Figure 7: AMR-101 Receiver25

Figure 8: Kingsley AR7 Receiver26

21 ORs: Other Ranks (Signalman to Warrant Officer) 22 O.I.C.: Officer in Charge 23 N.C.O.: Non Commissioned Officer (normally Corporals) 24 POWs: Prisoners of War 25 http://www.qsl.net/vk4kdp/army.html One of two HRO "copies" made in Australia. This one by AWA. There is also an AMR-100 which

is a field "portable" version of this rack mounted '101. The "AMR" and "AMT" series of receivers and transmitters were actually made for the U.S. The AMR-101is a Single Signal type covering 480 kHz to 26 MHz with 6 plug-in coil boxes. Valve line-up is 1st RF=6U7, 2nd RF=6U7,Mixer=6J8, Osc=6J5, 1st IF=6U7, 2nd IF=6U7, Det/AVC/AF amp=6G8, BFO=6J5 and AF output=6V6 26 http://www.tuberadio.com/robinson/museum/AR7/ The AR7 is a communications receiver covering LF and HF bands. It was made in

Australia during 1940 and bears an extremely close resemblance to the National HRO receiver. The receiver has a tuning range from 138 kcs to 25 mcs, with a gap of 45 kcs either side of the 455 kcs IF amplifier. The internal design is a single conversion superheterodyne receiver with 2 RF stages, 2 IF stages, a BFO and an "S" meter amplifier. The sensitivity is quoted as 1 microvolt. The front panel is stainless steel and it is a very distinctive looking receiver

http://www.qsl.net/vk4kdp/army.html

http://www.tuberadio.com/robinson/museum/AR7/


9

Figure 9: WS1127

Figure 10: Charging Set 300 watt28

27 http://www.vk2bv.org/museum/ws11.htm The WS No11 (Aust) was designed to replace the Australian 101 set in the Army. The set was

produced by Amalgamated Wireless Australasia in 1942 and is an Australian-ised version of the UK No 11, using different valves and

receiver IF frequency.

28 Wireless for the Warrior by Louis Meulstee Compendium 2

http://www.vk2bv.org/museum/ws11.htm


10

Figure 11: Wavemeter Type C29

Figure 12: Wavemeter Type C Description30

29 http://www.tuberadio.com/robinson/Manuals/Wavemeter_Class_C.pdf 30 Ibid


11

Figure 13: Dates and approximate positions of 4 Wrls Sect in Greece

23 Apr 41 No Organisation on the Ship. Upper deck cluttered with baggage and civilian passengers, without any direction and blocking gangways. No AA31 defence. No guards on lifeboats. Conditions chaotic. British Legation staff which was on board together with Yugoslav Legation and approximately 150 refugees indicated that there was a possibility of mutiny among the ships company. Capt Ryan approached O.C. Troops, Lt-Comd O’Gaffery and bought the matter to his attention. He asked him if, in this event, he could navigate the ship. Lt-Comd O’Gaffery then said that he had no knowledge whatever of navigation. As no other officer attempted to take charge, Capt Ryan assumed the duties of Ship’s Adjutant. Civilian luggage removed to below decks. Civilians ordered to remain below owing to danger of air attack, and to clear the decks. Guards placed on lifeboats, AA guns manned by a detachment of R.A.32 which was on board; Lt Hill appointed in charge of air defence. Capt Wilson A.I.F. (Press Corps) took charge of Bren Gun AA Defence – five guns. Male civilians occupying cabins below were moved out and the accommodation allotted to women and children. One aircraft sighted but proved to be friendly plane. Arrived Suda Bay about 1400 hrs. Greek Government Officials disembarked about 1430 hrs. Air raids on Suda Bay about 1730 hrs. Proposed for the ship to sail for ALEXANDRIA

31 AA: Anti-Aircraft 32 R.A.: Royal Artillery


12

at 2200 hrs. About 2130 hrs Cpl Kelson reported to Capt Ryan that he had overheard remarks passed by the German prisoners which indicated that an attempt to escape was being organised. Guards were doubled. Bren Gun mounted above the gangway leading up from the hold and an Officer Guard posted. Rear party remained on wharf at PIRAEUS till 0600 hrs then moved away from the dock area. Lt Henry returned to wharf to see E.S.O. but he was not there. Went to G.H.Q.33. Advised to report to DAPHNE CAMP34 and return later. This was done and papers and documents burnt. At 1600 hrs was told at G.H.Q that train was due to leave at 1730 hrs from a place 20 miles north of ATHENS. Returned to pick up drivers in camp. Found that four men had Absented themselves and their whereabouts unknown. Decided to leave immediately with those present. Arrived at 1800 hrs at place indicated but train hot arrived. Contacted R.T.O.35 at 2200 hrs; told to return and entrain on a train leaving at 1130 hrs.

Figure 14: Probable route to Suda Bay Crete

33 G.H.Q.: General Head Quarters 34 Extract from The Battle for Greece and Crete by Mat Matt Walsh JP MLO ALGA (MCAE) Dip Bus & Corp Law (CPS. Australian troops

continued to arrive regularly and were initially camped in the village of Dafni (the camps were named Daphne 1 and Daphne 2) which is between Piraeus and Athens before they moved north. 35 Rail Travel Officer


13

Figure 15: Suda Bay36

SUDA BAY, CRETE. 1941-04. A VIEW OF PORTION OF THE BAY.

Figure 16: On-board the ELSE37

These men are tired... really tired... everyone was by the time they had managed to board a ship leaving Greece. They're

tired but not disorganized... note the rifles; ready for instant action against dive bombers, the boys' biggest enemy. The

men are aboard the Greek ship Else, being evacuated to Souda Bay in Crete. They are believed to be members of 4

Australian Wireless Section: left to right, VX10111 Signalman Frank Tasman Tatlow; Bill Potter; J. McLean (or NX26187

Frank Lionel Walker); and Harry Dempsey.

36 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/069893/ 37 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/007602/

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/069893/


14

CRETE

24 Apr 41 Ship still in SUDA BAY. Crew refused to sail. Prisoners searched and many diaries and other documents found. Sig Potter reported ill. Capt Ryan took Potter to shore to find a M.O.38 M.O. on HMAS YORK recommended that he should be removed to hospital. Transport to hospital arranged through the Naval Authorities. As the E.S.O. could not be found Capt Ryan reported to the NOIC39 at SUDA Bay and was informed that all passengers were to be disembarked. Heavy air raid on SUDA BAY at approximately 1200 hrs. While on shore Greek boat crew disappeared. Returned on board via the Tender Moonstone at 1400 hrs. Preparations made for disembarkation, using the Tender. Completed about 1700 hrs. Heavy air raid. Equipment stored in shed in Dock yard, personnel moved to empty Naval Barracks east of the Dock Yard. Facilities for washing etc much appreciated and troops in good spirits. Reported to E.S.O. at 1730 hrs. “Sing-song in the evening”. REAR PARTY Train arrived 0230 hrs, left 0330 hrs travelled via ELEUSIS to CORINTH CANAL. Many air alarms and Lt Reade with his Section from Corps Signals. Alec met Capt Knowles and Lt MacKower with Section. Arrived SUBA BAY about 1700 hrs.

Figure 17: Arrival at Crete. Joe Ellis standing on upper deck and a Section member on either side.40

Troops were evacuated from various points on the Greek coastline, all types of shipping being pressed into use. This shot

shows some of the legation staff and a few Aussies, including members of 4 Australian Wireless Section, being landed at

Crete from a British armed trawler, the HMS Moonshine. The first part of the trip for these people was on a tiny Greek

coastal vessel, the Else, which also had a cargo of 150 German prisoners... conditions were pretty bad.

38 M.O.: Medical Officer 39 NOIC: Naval Officer In-Charge 40 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/007609/ Names supplied by Alan Flannery (ex ASWG): Joe Ellis standing on (left) upper deck, Ron

Baines is on Joe’s Left and Joe Martin



15

Figure 18: Disembarking HMS Moonstone41

Caption reads: In foreground Jack Green, Eddie keelson and John Ollie after disembarking ‘Moonstone’. (Immediately after this Stuka Dive

bombers made a sustained attack on the wharf area.)

25 Apr 41 Air raid warning 0500 hrs. Reported at 0900 hrs to ESO Office and found Major W Lloyd, R Signals, acting CSO CREFORCE42 there. He immediately undertook to make the necessary arrangements to find a suitable bivouac area, transport the equipment, and to arrange for the supply of rations to the Section. At 1050 hrs the Section was moved to the bivouac are indicated by Maj Lloyd at 42nd Street43. Personnel dispersed under olive trees. Capt Ryan reported to Maj Lloyd at Bde HQs in M/T sent for him by Maj Lloyd, who arranged to send rations to ESO and Section to collect them from ESOs Office. Signal sent to AIF HQ, and GSI (S) ME44 reporting the arrival of the Section in CRETE. Lt Henry and one OR arrived approximately 1800 hrs. Piquet posted corner 42nd Street to direct other members of rear party and Corps Sigs. Capt Knowles with 101 Section arrived. Blankets and rations shared with them since they were without anything. Five more members of the rear party arrived before dark. Maj Evans and Lt Reade (Sigs 1 Aust Corps) arrived with approx.20 ORs. Other Signalmen from Corps Sigs were directed to the area by the Piquet. Approx 50 in all. Roads full of disembarked troops.

41 Photo and caption supplied by Alan Flannery (ex ASWG) 42 CREFORCE was the name of the Commonwealth and Allied Forces of Crete 43 See photo below and caption 44 Possibly General Staff Intelligence (Special) Middle East


16

Figure 19: 42nd Street Sign45

The Forty-Second Street sign, naming a lane in Crete where a small Allied force repelled advancing Germans. On 27 May

1941, 42nd Street was the site of a battle between the German 141st Mountain Regiment and two companies of the 2/7

Battalion, joined by New Zealanders of the 28th (Maori) Battalion, stopping the Germans for the rest of the day. The name

'42nd Street', a humorous appellation inspired by the musical of the same name, was given by a small group of sappers

from the 42nd Field Company, Royal Engineers who had bivouacked beside the dirt lane after being sent to garrison Crete

late in 1940. The name was recorded on British maps and passed into common use. With German advances into Crete,

allied troops joined together, withdrawing towards Canea and by 27th May occupied a line including 42nd Street, from

Suda Bay to the Malaxa escarpment. This was the rearguard of the Commonwealth force retreating southward to Sfakia,

site of evacuations.

26 Apr 41 Maj Evans and members of Sigs 1 Aust Corps moved to “C” “Camp area”. Separate areas in the same location allotted to 101 and No 4 W/T Section. Ration’s shared. Capt Ryan and Knowles reported to Maj Lloyd. Rations were there. ESO unwilling to hand them over. Obtained after some difficulty. Sgt Dodd and remainder of rear party including some of those left behind in GREECE arrived. The following personnel were still missing [names handwritten and obscure but believed to be Copp, Adams, Gamble, Watkins, Jenkins].

27 Apr 41 Maj Lloyd supplied picks and shovels. Bren Gun obtained and mounted. Defensive positions prepared and alarm stations allotted. CSO and Lt Col Welman were seen in CANEA by Lt Henry and Hill, and CSO was made aware of the Section arrival Lt Hill became ill in the evening – gastric trouble. Approximately 2300 hrs the Section was informed by Maj Lloyd that the Section was to move at 0400 hrs the following morning for embarkation. He also indicated that No 4 W/T Section would probably remain and carry on its work in CRETE.

28 Apr 41 101 Section moved off at 0400 hrs. Lt Hill feeling better. Several men in the Section reported ill. Facilities for sending cables. Many sent. Sig Potter re-joined Section.



17

29 Apr 41 More men sink. Attempt to find an Army MO without success. Lack of transport felt. During afternoon arrangements made through NOIC for MO to visit the Section the following morning. Capt Ryan and Lt Henry ill.

30 Apr 41 All officers much recovered. Several more men reported sick. MO arrived about 0900 hrs and ordered the following to hospital: Sgt Dodd, L/Sgt Ollie, Cpl Austwick, Cpl Dorgan, Sigmn Butler, Walker F.H, Biggs, Mott, Peterson, Dooris, Mawson, Wallace. Savage dive bombing attack on SUDA BAY during late afternoon.

1 May 41 Lt Col Smyth-Wyndam, R. Signals, CSO CREFORCE visited the Section with Maj Lloyd and advised that instructions had been received from GHQ ME that the Section was to remain in CRETE. Reconnaissance carried out for suitable area and the Section moved to a group of Villas east of CANEA about half a mile from FORCE HQ. CSO intimated that he would make arrangements with the CRE46 to construct a blockhouse for use as a set room and “I” Office. Billets very comfortable. Rest of the day spent in arranging billets. Sig Moore discharged from hospital.

2 May 41 Erected masts and aerials with poles and D8 signal wire obtained from Maj Lloyd. Batteries also obtained and placed on charge.

3 May 41 Commenced work at 1200 hrs. Three W/T sets in operation. General search for German W/T Heavy dive bombing attack on SUDA BAY. Capt Ryan contacted CRE with view to construction of blockhouse and visited hospital about personnel. Messages were written on naval message forms obtained from Naval HQ.

4 May 41 Message IS61625 dated 2 May received from GSI (S). Officer from CRE called, and site from blockhouse selected. Work carried out on medium frequencies as instructed in message. At 1800 severe air raid.

5 May 41 Message Nos IS61677 and IS 61678, dated 4 April [sic] and XZ/)/10 dated 30 April received. One of these messages instructed a watch to be kept on 127 k/cs and higher medium frequencies. Since 127 frequency was too low for any of the R-101 receivers, GSI was notified by cable. Arrangements made with ASC47 to deliver rations direct to the section. More batteries received. Four receivers brought into use. Traffic sent by fast bag to GSI (S) ME. Personnel sent to hospital on 30 April evacuated by hospital ship to EGYPT. Imprest account opened with pay office and section paid.

6 May 41 Massage IS60594 dated 29 April received. This message referred to arrangements made for Lt Mackower of 101 Section to remain with No 4 Wireless Section. But he has already sailed with 101 Section. Platoon stationed in grounds of nearby house as protection against possible parachute invasion since CREFORCE thought the first ground thereabouts was a likely landing ground. Message IS61895 stated that 127 kc/s traffic was valuable. Capt Ryan arranged to borrow a suitable receiver from W.O.48 Peck RN49 and in exchange, a W/T set No 11 was loaned to him. Telephone communication with GSI was installed. Leave to CANEA for one third of the section granted from noon to 1730 hrs. Air raid. 127 kc/s watch started using the naval receiver about 2200 hrs. Report forwarded to GSI ME, GSO 1 Aust Corps and GSI 1 Aust Corps.

46 CRE: Commander or Chief Royal Engineers 47 ASC: Expansion unknown. Possible Australian Service Corps 48 W.O. Warrant Officer 49 RN: Royal Navy


18

Figure 20: Canea50

CANEA (HANIA), CRETE. 1945-06-10. THE TOWN AND SURROUNDING AREAS SEEN FROM LOW HILLS TO THE WEST OF THE TOWN

7 May 41 CSO provided more batteries. BBC51 Broadcast at 0915 hrs received each morning and read out to section while on parade. This reduced rumours which were becoming prevalent. Lt Henry visited Naval W/.T station and delivered No 11 set to W.O. Peck, RN. W/T red forms obtained from Naval W/T station. More leave granted. No air raids. Work started on blockhouse by one man.

8 May 41 Raining. Defensive positions allotted to all ranks. Manned at 2000 hrs for half an hour. Platoon withdrawn. Watches continued and traffic forwarded to CAIRO by fast bag as usual. Lt Col Garrett contacted (AUST L.O.52).

9 May 41 Slow progress made with blockhouse. Only one man employed. Timber, concrete and sandbags arrived.

10 May 41 Progress on blockhouse too slow. Decided to construct a Dugout using for the purpose and empty rectangular well, in the ravine. Well roofed in with timber and sandbags. Usual half hour at defence stations at 2000 hrs.

11 May 41 Completed dugout and commended work on second shelter adjoining in ravine. Camouflaged with stones and bushes. One company of WELSH53 under Capt Evans and Lt Day occupied area as defence against possible parachute invasion. Sig McLean reported sick and discharged to hospital.

12 May 41 Set Room moved from villa into dugout. Six sets manned. W/T traffic concerning the German occupation of AGEAN ISLANDS received in P/L. References to KITHERA, MILOS, ANTIKITHERA and GYTHON. Traffic continued to be forwarded to MIDEAST. Night air raids. Many searchlights in use.

50 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/131004/ 51 BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation 52 L.O.: Liaison Officer 53 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welch_Regiment The 1st Battalion landed in Crete in February but was overwhelmed by the enemy in fighting at Suda Bay; Canea; and Sphakia Beach. Eventually the 1st Battalion was reformed in Egypt and joined the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, part of the 4th Indian Infantry Division

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suda_Bay

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canea

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5th_Indian_Infantry_Brigade

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5th_Indian_Infantry_Brigade

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_Infantry_Division_%28India%29


19

15 May 41 [sic]

All personnel of the section instructed to sleep in the open in future.

14 May 41 Severe air raid, area MGd54 by large number of planes. One company of the WELSH RGT55 under the command of Capt Evans and Lt Day in area and took up defensive positions. Section cooperated in rearrangement of defence posts.

15 May 41 Less air activity

16 May 41 Visit by Maj Thompson, acting GSI at 1800 hrs. Intense air rat at this time. Ship in Harbour set on fire.

17 May 41 Capt Ryan and Lt Hill went aboard RFA56 OLNA57 with Petty Officer Butland [may be Rutland] in order to obtain D/F 58equipment, but the receiver was missing. Visited HMAS YORK and obtained electrical fittings. Air raids on Suda Bay. Four ships in the harbour set on fire. One an ammunition ship, which blew up. MG59 supplied to section by Maj Lloyd.

Figure 21: Suda Bay under attack60

Suda Bay where many Anzac troops were landed by the fleet and were the target of heavy bombing by German forces. The smoke is rising from two tankers set alight by attacking aircraft.

This is the third image in a series of three with 007850 and 007847.

54 MGd: Machine Gunned 55 RGT: Regiment 56 RFA: Royal Fleet Auxiliary 57 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFA_Olna RFA Olna (X47) was an oiler launched in 1921 and beached at Crete in 1941 after being

bombed. 58 D/F: Direction Finding 59 Machine Gun 60 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/007845/

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=RFA_Olna_%28X47%29&action=edit&redlink=1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crete


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18 May 41 Capt Ryan and Sig Bryant went aboard SS ELANOR MAERSK damaged oil tanker on fire in the harbour, and obtained D/F equipment for M/F61. Petty Officer Butland [may be Rutland] and four other naval ratings also went aboard. Three explosions occurred while party was on board. Numerous air raids over SUDA BAY. Sixteen air raids over the area. Lt Sandford arrived with documents and letter of instructions from GHQ. ME saying that Section was to discontinue existing commitments and to do tactical work for the CSI FORCE. The Section was now complete for work in the field.

19 May 41 Several more air raids. Endeavour made to assemble D/F apparatus which was slightly damaged, but without success. Messages heard concerning movement of JU52s through ITALY to GREECE.

20 May 41 0730 hrs heavy air raids over the whole area. MALEME, CANEA, SUDA BAY – particularly to AA posts and at MALEMI aerodrome. This is the heaviest air raid to date. Fighters MGd our area. This raid lasted for 40 minutes. AA defence very active at first, but in most cases was eventually silenced. 0815 hrs heavy bombing over MALEMI aerodrome area. 0840 hrs parachute troops dropped near MALEMI. More troops were dropped on cemetery near CANEA. Planes were dropping on an average 15 to 20 parachutes. Some dropped fewer but larger parachutes. 1020 hrs gliders sighted approaching from the N West. Four gliders three of which flew directly over area manned by the main party of the Section met heavy fire from one Bren Gun and rifles directed on them by our troops. Three gliders crashed on the hill S E of our position and were dealt with by men of the WELSH RGT. A fourth glider landed east of our HQ and it was later reported that several more gliders had landed in the same vicinity. All unessential secret documents were destroyed at this time. Parachutes dropped at intervals during the day. A report was received from GSI Force that paratroops were wearing NZ Uniforms. 1345 Lt Henry contacted members of the WELSH RGT but could not get any definite information, so he inspected one crashed glider and saw one dead German soldier there. He was dressed in German uniform. Instructions were received from CREFORCE that all troops must wear shorts. 1400 hrs enemy air activity intensified and our area continually MGd. SUDA BAY and all roads heavily bombed. Recce planes flying low over our area possibly to locate glider troops. Wireless Activity: Enemy stations very active, numerous intercepts. Six sets were concentrated on three letter air. Many reports received from RECCE planes. Sample Message: “My position is …..” (Map Ref) followed by reports of what the observer could. Much valuable information was received and passed to GSI CREFORCE by telephone. 1700 hrs it was reported that the following men were missing: VX18521 Sig Wells A.E, NX32608 Wood J.W., NX37254 Leopold J.D., NX59418 Kelton F.K. Normal duties were carried out throughout the day with the exception of a general “stand to” when the gliders were sighted. All intercept duties were suspended for about

61 M/F: Medium Frequency


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an hour and a half during that time. All men off duty remained at action stations throughout the night. Enemy snipers active. Main strength of Section off duty employed to protect set room. Two other posts under Lt Hill were maintained to cover the road leading to Section HQ. During the afternoon an appeal for hand grenades was received from the OC NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS by Lt Hill, and Sigs Dempsey and Marsbridge succeeded in delivering some, in spite of rifle fire. Both of these men were recommended by Lt Hill. 2100 hrs Sig Wood J.W. returned to the Section wounded and was evacuated to hospital with the assistance of the WELSH RGT. Sig Kelton who had also been bought in wounded had previously been sent to hospital. All personnel not on duty were employed as picquets. Blockhouse still uncompleted. No rations received.

Figure 22: CRETE, 1941-05-20. GERMAN PARACHUTES OVER SUDA BAY DURING THE INVASION62

62 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/128432/


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Figure 23: German Glider63

Figure 24: German Parachute landings64

63 http://p2t2solutions.com/tag/xi-fliegerkorps/ 64 Ibid


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Figure 25: Strengths65

21 May 41 Enemy air activity intense. Area often MGd. Many R/T messages were heard from the ground station in the vicinity of MALEME directing aircraft action against British troops and AFVs66.General location established from the messages but exact location unknown. Capt Ryan sent to GREEK Wireless Station at CANEA where CSI said D/F equipment would be found. He obtained 1 portable Telefunken set but equipment needed overhaul. Arrangements made for further equipment of the same kind to be fetched from the town on the following day but this was prevented by heavy air bombardment of the town. Very large number of enemy air recce reports received. About 1100 hrs mention was made in one of these of a convoy steering towards CRETE, and details of escort and composition were mentioned. This was reported to GSI. About the same time two British Cruisers were reported NE of CRETE steering Ne. These were reported at intervals, but early in the afternoon aircraft were not able to report their whereabouts. Reports showed that a very extensive reconnaissance of the seas around CRETE were going on during the whole day. Successive reports were received giving the position of the convoy throughout the afternoon.

65http://www.diavolirossi.net/forum/threads/crete-may-1941-operation-mercury-historical-back.4481/ 66 AFVs: probably armoured fighting vehicles

http://www.diavolirossi.net/forum/threads/crete-may-1941-operation-mercury-historical-back.4481/


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At about 1830 hrs an urgent reconnaissance report was heard giving the position of two British Battleship SW of CRETE. This was followed shortly by another report that a fleet of fourteen British ships had been sighted. During the night a large number of messages were received which showed that there was an extensive movement of troop-carrying JU52 planes coming down through AUSTRIA and ITALY to GREECE. About 1900 hrs additional sandbags were obtained for defensive positions. Snipers active. About 2100 hrs WELSH RGT post about 200 yards away engaged in mortar duel with enemy troops about 500 yards off. This continued for about one half hour when the enemy mortar was silenced and later captured. In early afternoon the complete Signal Plan and orders for the start of the operation of the XI FLISTER KORPS67 were sent to Section by GSI. This had several copies of three different code books still sealed. One copy of each was retained. Rations received during the night about 2300 hrs. All personnel not on duty in set room employed as picquets.

22 May 41 Before dawn heavy gunfire was heard and several burning ships were seen out to sea. There was search light activity and several flares were dropped. 0230 hrs an enemy patrol of two or three men was challenged by Cpl Smith who was acting as picquet. In reply a hand grenade was thrown and three shots fired, which failed to injure him. Capt Ryan heard the patrol talking together and fired at one of the men whom he could see against the sky-line. We roused the rest of the Section which stood to until daylight. During this period much activity was noted around the wharf at CANNEA and in the beam of searchlights which were used occasionally small boats could be seen disembarking troops. This was reported to GSI who in turn reported to the Naval authorities, who informed the GSI that they were British troops. At approx. 0600 hrs a general search of the area for enemy troops was conducted and one German soldier was found dead near the spot where Capt Ryan fired during the night. GSI asked for his effects to be send town. This was done. The German had in his possession British Rifle, hand grenades, food tablets, pistol, verey pistols68 and one flare. He had rubber soaked knee boots and field grey uniform. During this search it became evident that Germans had visited the well near the Villa previously occupied by the Section. A broken Bakelite drinking mug and several unfired German cartridges were lying about. At the front gate a large number of empty gun shells were strewn around. It was later learned that four men belonging to the WELSH RGT who had been visiting their cookhouse had been shot from there during the night.

67 http://p2t2solutions.com/tag/xi-fliegerkorps/ The XI Fliegerkorps was responsible for ferrying the paratroops to Crete using 500 JU-

52′s and 70 DFS-230 light assault gliders, all together 8100 men were dropped on to Crete, 1860 men at Maleme, 2460 men at Hania, 1380 men at Rethymno and 2360 men at Iraclion. 68 Verey Pistol: A firearm that launches flares. It is typically used for signalling, as distress signalling

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_52

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_52

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DFS_230


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About 0930 hrs a second large invasion of parachute troops took place. These were dropped over the MALEME area and in the vicinity of the head of the gully leading down to SUDA BA. Wireless Activity: numerous messages received reporting survivors in water and in rubber boats. A wireless station was heard directing by R/T in clear, bombing of troops and AFVs. This station was being operated by the ground invasion troops and gave the exact location of the objects to be bombed e.g. “Enemy AFVs under sit of trees at side of road ….. kilos from ….” “English riflemen in wood, rifle fire very dangerous, don’t wait for reconnaissance, shoot now” An operation order of battle was received. This gave considerable detail, e.g. ……. Will take up ….. position and …. Will move at …. Hrs. A message was also received saying the Messerschmitt fighters were at MOLAI. A very large number of reconnaissance reports was also received giving the position of ITALIAN destroyers and Caiques 69. During the day these reconnaissance reports showed that a second convoy was approaching CRETE its position and course being given. This information was passed by the GSI to the Navy. Sig Leopold returned about 2100 hrs. He had been slightly wounded in back and held prisoner for some time but had made his escape. Report received that approximately 40 German troops were approaching from easterly direction. All personnel not on sets were employed as picquets. Very intense air activity over battle area, SUDA BAY, and CANEA area generally. Constant MGg. Remaining AA posts heavily dive bombed. Outposts covering road approaching the area withdrawn, being taken over by one Sgt and 12 ORs from FORCE HQ. Posts around set room rearranged for better protection. Morale high. No rations received. Snipers active.

23 May 41 During the night gunfire heard and fires seen out to sea. Intense air raids all day. CANEA bombed intensely during the afternoon. R/T messages in clear from aircraft heard directing the bombing and commenting on the accuracy. Heavy dive bombing over battle area in vicinity of gully at head of SUDA BAY. Message received in P/L abbreviations sent from ground wireless station working behind German lines asking for a large quantity of ammunition, anti tank rifles, and anti tank ammunition. Message received in answer saying that this would arrive at MALEME aerodrome at 1600 hrs that day. Signal heard in P/L English asking that two hurricanes be sent to patrol CANEA [ALOE name mostly unreadable – may be AREA] between 1530 and 1630 hrs. Shortly afterwards German signal heard saying that fighter aircraft were setting out from MOLAI. Numerous messages heard concerning men in the water and in rubber boats in the vicinity. Other message heard giving directions to aircraft for dropping rubber boats to men in the water. During the day message heard asking if JU52s could land at MILOS. This was again sent after an interval. Later reply received saying it was possible. During morning message received saying 19 German Caiques setting out for MILOS. Later message asking how many at MILOS, and reply 19. Later message heard saying that 19

69 Caiques – a type of Greek fishing vessel


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Caiques sailing towards CRETE. This was reported to GSI. At 1800 hours CANEA heavily bombe A 6” Naval gun started firing nearby on German positions during the night.

24 May Very heavy bombing of CANNEA which was intensified during the afternoon. All roads MGd and bombed. Reconnaissance reports still received. Aircraft closely reconnoitred our location at 1900 hrs. About 1400 hrs report received from GSI that approximately 200 Germans had occupied the Monastery of AG TRIAS about three miles distant. Reports at first indicated that these troops were poorly armed. About 20 British troops were sent up to deal with this enemy but were severely mauled and suffered heavy casualties. The Sgt in charge of this detachment told Capt Ryan that the enemy were armed with Trench Mortars, MGs and Tommy Guns. It was decided that this location for the Section was becoming untenable, and contact was established with the BGS70. A move was decided upon and the sets closed down at 2000 hrs. L/Cpl Walker and party sent out to search for Wells. Body found but air activity made burial impossible. Transport for moving was to be supplied by ASC. At 2200 hrs Lt Hill remained at FORCE HQ to act as guide. Transport had not arrived at 2300 hrs, and Capt Ryan returned to FORCE HQ. Transport had been appropriated by another unit. CSO requested Capt Ryan to take charge of the Cipher personnel and some members of the British Legation from GREECE.

25 May 41 Two trucks were obtained at about 0200 hrs by Maj Lloyd, and Lt Sandford with documents, wounded personnel, and others together with essential equipment loaded. Ciphers moved off with Lt Sandford and were handed over to Naval Authorities located in quarry holes near SUDA BAY. Main party under Lt Henry marched off at approx. 0330 hrs. Three other trucks were obtained, one of which was allotted to the British Legation Staff; the others were sent to Section HQ but one was wrecked on the journey. Most of the remaining equipment was loaded on the remaining truck, and moved off in company with the British Legation Staff to SUDA BAY. Lt Hill remained in the expectation that one of the trucks could be sent back for the remainder of the effects. As this had not arrived at daylight he moved off and rejoined the main party which was located in a gully south of SUDA BAY dockyard. The Section was complete by 0900 hrs. A suitable loction in this area was selected with the cooperation of Maj Torr of the 6th Aust Div. Personnel were very exhausted and rested. Capt Ryan left on motors cycle to find location of FORCE. Officers of GSI Staff contacted. Very intense air activity. CANEA and area around 42nd street bombed.

26 May 41 Capt Ryan contacted CSO who told him where FORCE was located and indicated that KALIBES71 might be a suitable location for the Section to resume operations. Saw Lt Col Cremorne who was in command of CREMORNE FORCE72, who suggested an area in neighbourhood of KEPHALIA73. This was found suitable, and Lt Col

70 Expansion unknown 71 Not found – possibly Kalives, Kalivys 72 No further information found 73 Not found – possibly Kefalas


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Cremorne arranged for the necessary protection. About 1400 hrs arrangements were made with MO at Naval sickbay for Sig Wood and Leopold to be evacuated that night. Capt Ryan reported to FORCE in the vicinity of KALIBES and arranged with CSO for the necessary telephone communications to be provide the following day. Transport was also arranged for 2000 hrs that night to move equipment to the new location. At approx. 1630 a general “stand to” was ordered since it was reported that the Germans had broken through. At approx 1730 hrs Lt Henry received orders through Maj Lloyd from the GOC that all documents which might be of use to the enemy were to be immediately destroyed and that the Section was not to move to the site chosen by Capt Ryan. Transport was to be provided at 2000 hrs. Documents were immediately burnt. Capt Ryan returned about this time with more detailed information from BGS after having met Maj Lloyd on the way. Remaining rations were distributed amongst the personnel and equipment moved ready for loading. Main party moved off at 2000 hrs. Rear party under Lt henry and six ORs remained.

27 May 41 Main party arrived in vicinity STILOS at 0130 hrs. Capt Ryan lost acquitance roll during the march. Rear Party. No transport arrived; D.R. sent to Capt Ryan for further instructions. Instructions were issued to destroy sets this was later done. Rear party instructed to join main party in vicinity of STYLOS. Lt Henry contacted Capt Ryan, there collected rear party and joined the Section at MAKHOCRI about 1500 hrs. Capt Ryan reported to force at 0730 hrs and received instructions from the BGS and a written order from the CSO to evacuate CRETE from SPARKIA. On arrival at MAKHOCRI it was learned that no further road movement of marching troops would take place during daylight. GOC contacted in this area. Section remained under olive groves during the remainder of the day. At 1700 hrs a number of enemy planes MGd the neighbourhood and bombed vehicles on the road. Instructions received that movement would commence at 2000 hrs. All surplus equipment destroyed. Section moved off at 2000 hrs together with a large number of various troops and reached a point in the vicinity of VAPHI at 0330 hrs 28th May. Great congestion on the narrow and stoney road accentuated by the movement of some vehicles past the marching troops, so it was not possible to march quickly.

28 May 41 0300 hrs reached a point in the vicinity of VAPEA.I and bivouaced until daylight on stoney hillside. Moved off about 0830 hrs. After proceeding about one mile a medical officer on the road stated that orders had been given that no troops would move until nightfall. Section was moved to a ravine at the side of the road. After some time it became evident that troops were continuing on the road and as a continuous stream of men continued marching on it was decided to resume the march. At this stage it was noted that Cpl Ryan was absent. March proceeded. Much water being


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consumed by troops. Water bottles filled at every opportunity. Very little enemy aircraft until afternoon. Reached NIBROS at 1700 hrs where Capt Ryan saw Maj Dyke AIF ALO and showed him the order. Section was told to proceed and that there was a possibility of embarkation that night. Section proceeded for about 3 miles when Capt Ryan was instructed by GOC that there would be no embarkation that night. Section bivouaced at the side of the road.

29 May 41 Section sheltering on side of hill under pine trees. About 0800 hrs English officer appeared saying that he was arranging embarkation. Parties of 200 in groups of 50 to be arranged ready for movement that night. Further details to be supplied later. Several Aust Officers from 6th Div Engineers in the vicinity were contacted. Maj Dajboor 2/2nd Field Regt was the senior officer present. Parties arranged. Supply of water short and party (Lt Henry, Sgt Thompson, Cpl Ballard, Sig Wilson) sent back for it to NIBROS. Enemy air activity considerable. About 1500 hrs the British Officer who had stated that he was arranging the embarkation had not returned. A meeting was then held between all the Aust OCs present in the area, about 4 officers. A message ws then received by D.R. from Lt Col Cremorne for all OCs to report to him as a spot approx. 1 ½ miles south of the position. Lt Col Cremorne then stated that he was in command of all Aust troops in the area, and that he was arranging the evacuation. An order of march was given with the starting time 2030 hrs. Section was placed second, to follow 6th Div Engineers. At 2030 hrs 6th Div Engrs move off but the road was already congested by troops from the rear who had begun to move forward about 1930 hrs. Lt Col Cremorne took personal charge of the road movement and restored order. Maj Dajboor sent 4 W/T Section ahead of his unit and Section move off about 2100 hrs. Troops on the road were divided into parties of 50. And marched off. About two miles down the road the parties were halted and formed single file. Then move off the road down a goat track. Guides were posted in several places but it was only with greatest difficulty that parties kept in touch. KOMITADES was reached about midnight. Going was very difficult over loose stones and rough track.

30 May 41 Proceeded down wide track from KOMITADES towards SPHAKIA. Numerous halts up to then minutes, cause not obvious. Section had been divided when the groups of 50 were formed. First party under Capt Ryan and Lt Sandford: rear party, Lt Henry and Lt Hill. Rear party had passed forward in the darkness, and went aboard HMS GLENGYLE at 0200 hrs. Party under Capt Ryan boarded HMS HASTY at 0300 hrs. Ships sailed at 0330 hrs. Plentiful supply of hot coffee, and troops well attended to by Naval ratings. Recce plane overhead about daylight. Air raid at 0900 hrs. Very heavy air raid at midday, another raid during afternoon. British air escort arrived 1430 hrs. Mistaken at first for enemy – some shots fired.


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Figure 26: Sphakia74

The village of Sphakia, situated on the southern coast of Crete. Sfakia Cove, visible in the midground, was the site of the Allied withdrawal from Crete over four nights,

beginning on 28 May, 1941. Over 12,000 Allied troops were evacuated in a series of naval convoys, some of which sustained damage from German aerial attacks, to Alexandria.



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Figure 27: Crete Evacuation75

75 On Ultra-Active Service. Page 95

Note

It has been difficult to accurately map the place names contained in

the diary due to different spellings on current maps.

Road distance Souda Bay to Sphakia approx. 80 km


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Figure 28: Approximate route Sphakia - Alexandria

31 May Arrived Alexandria 0300 hrs. Section disembarked and the two parties moved by train to IKINGI MARYUT. Excellent arrangements for reception of troops both on wharf and at the camp. One man collapsed on wharf and taken to hospital. Capt Ryan and Lt Sandford remained in order to report to GSI (S) at CAIRO. Section under Lt Henry and Lt Hill boarded train at INGIRI MARYUT, thence to DEIR SUNEID near GAZA, Palestine

OC and IO Reports on Greece and Crete

The following reports from Capt Ryan, Lieut Sandford and Lieut Hill are dated 6 May, 6 June

and 5 May 41. They have been transcribed due to poor quality of the original76.

Figure 29: Capt Ryan's Report

76 AWM AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946) September 1942


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MOST SECRET G.S.I. (S) MIDEAST C.S.O. 1 Aust Corps (For Information) G.S.I. I Aust Corps (For Information) REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF No 4 W/T SECTION 1 AUST CORPS The following is a brief outline of the activities of this section in Egypt, Greece, and Crete. Transport was first made available on 24 Feb 41, but was again partly withdrawn for use in the Western Desert, and returned on 9 Mar. This consisted of 8-30 cwt trucks, 2-20 cwt Wireless vans, and 1 car D.S. All were of a commercial type. Three of these vehicles were fitted up on the ground; one as set room, for 6 receivers, one as an office, and the third for battery charging. This entailed considerable amount of work, as benches, electric light, and battery boxes in the trucks had to be provided, and made a permanent fixture. The work was not completed until 6 Mar 41 in Greece. Numerous technical difficulties were encountered principally owing to shortage of valves and insufficient smoothing in the HT Units. The first, was overcome at a later date, when a set of valves was obtained from the 101 section, and later from MIDEAST. The second, by filters improvised on the around. The section embarked for Greece, on 18 Mar 41, and after a short stay at Glyphade Camp, reached its first location at Elessona, and commenced operations on 31 Mar 41.Contact made with the 101 section on 1 Apr. and from then on the sections worked in close co-operation. Work was carried on in various locations, the exact nature being already covered in another report by the section I(S) Officer to the GSI (S) MIDEAST. On 22 April orders were received from the G.Q.C. to evacuate the section from Greece, and for this purpose to proceed immediately to Pireaus. The section embarked on the night of 22 Apr. on a Greek ship (“ELSE") at Pireaus 2 officers and 77 0.Rs. I Officer and 12 O.Rs remained behind in an endeavor to make arrangements to save more equipment, and if possible the vehicles. Instructions were issued that the party was not to delay more than 24 hours before leaving. However it was found impossible to save any more equipment, and accordingly the former was destroyed, and the vehicles handed over to the Camp Commandant at Daphne Camp. The party with the exception of five O.Rs, who failed to report at the assembly point embarked from Argos on 24 Apr and joined the main party in Crete. The main party arrived in Crete on 24 Apr. and reported to the C.O. Sigs. (Maj. Lloyd). On 25 Apr. the 101 section arrived, and reported to Maj. Lloyd, by whom you were informed of the arrival of the two sections. The sections remained together until the departure of 101 for Egypt on 29 Apr.


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On 30 Apr 41, 2 Sgts and 13 O.Rs were discharged to hospital suffering from some gastric illness. On 1 May, the C.S.O. (CREFORCE) intimated that the section would probably be attached to CREFORCE H.Q., and the section was accordingly moved to a more suitable location. The equipment which was saved from Greece consisted of the following:— 6. R101 receivers (less batteries) 1. Kingsley Receiver (Aust pattern,) less batteries 1. 550 watt battery charger. 3. 300 watt battery chargers. 6. H.T. Units (Rotary Type). 1. Wavemeter Type C. 2. Avo Meters. 2. No 11 Sets (less fittings) Some batteries have been obtained through the C.S.0. (CREFORCE) and it is now possible to operate four receivers. During the past few days a number of messages from MIDEAST have been received, as follows:- IS61265 sent 2 May 41 received 4 May 41

1S61677 sent 4 May 41 received 5 May 41 1361678 sent 4 May 41 received 5 May 41 XZ/0/10 sent 30 Apr41 received 5 May 41 IS61895 sent 5 May 41 received 6 May 41 IS60594 sent 29 Apr 41 received 6 May 41

The delay which has been experienced with some of these messages has made it rather difficult to carry out the instructions. Attention is again drawn to the lack of trained (I) staff, and if the section is to remain here and do satisfactory work, this personnel is essential, (Signed.) J.W. Ryan, Capt OC. No 4 W/T Section. 1 Aust Corps. DISTI: G.S.I. (S) MIDEAST C.S.O. 1 Aust Corps GSI 1 Aust Corps War Diary.


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Figure 30: Lt Sandfords's Report

Report of Interception 4 W/T (Special B Type Wireless Section), 1st AUSTRALIAN Corps during the recent operations in CRETE

General The Section moved to CRETE upon the evacuation of GREECE and took up a position E.N.E. of the town of CANEA in a group of villas some 500 yards East of CREFORCE H.Q. The personnel comprised 4 officers 53 O.Rs, i.e. about60% of the normal establishment. Capt Ryan the O.C. Section, requested CREFORCE to construct a blockhouse or dug-out to house the set-room and “I” room but as the contractors were slows the personnel of the Section improvised a dug-out from a disused underground cistern. This position was retained until 0001 hours 25 Mar 41 when the Section moved with borrowed transport (3 30-cwt trucks) to a gulley about one mile South of SUDA. At 2030 on 26 May the Section moved some 8 miles South East on the road to STILOS, and were obliged to leave all equipment in the gulley referred to owing to lack of transport. On the morning of 27 May 41, representations were made - once again to G.S. CREFORCE for transport for the equipment as soon as evacuation was ordered. The equipment comprised six R.101 sets and one Naval set in addition to the D/F equipment salvaged by Capt. RYAN from H.M.S. YORK and a Telefunken D/F set obtained in CANEA. Transport was not made available. All equipment was therefore destroyed, together with all codes, logs and traffic. Types of traffic intercepted. (a) R/T. This was intercepted to any considerable extent only between 20th and 24th May 41. The signal strength was extremely powerful and as far as can be remembered Medium Frequencies were employed. It seemed apparent from the type of messages received that several stations were using the same frequency for R/T and it is believed that one of these was on the ground. The STAFFEL “BRUNO”,”CAESAR" etc., wrere called by name and exact instructions for bombing and machine-gunning were given. These were as precise as e.g. riflemen under the olives to the west of the prison”, “house with red roof between Cypress trees” etc. (b) W/T (i) 3-letter codes. The Section did not deal with any transposition ciphers. The possession of the 3-letter code was immensely valuable a reasonably accurate opinion could therefore be formed of all GERMAN Air activity in and the AEGEAN.


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The Signals spruchbuch C [sic] of FLIEGERKORPS XI was captured on the Island and one copy was immediately handed to the Section (I) with whom the 0.C. and I.O. of the Section were in constant close liaison. In this way messages of great operational importance were intercepted and decoded. It is therefore regarded as essential for every Type “B” Section to be provided immediately with a copy of all captured codes. In addition to the 3-1etter code of FLIEGERKORPS which was captured on the Island, many other 3-letter codes were used. These were already in the possession of the Section. (ii) Clear. This was used far less than 3-letter codes, a certain amount of traffic was received, chiefly either S.O.S., messages from shipwrecked GERMAN troops (and aircraft sighting then) or messages signed by Gen. RINGEL. Aircraft also requested recognition signals from the ground in clear" Use made of traffic intercepted. All traffic of any apparent value was passed on immediately to (I) CREFORCE. On one occasions, it is believed to have been the morning of the 20th May 41 the exact bearings of the GERMAN convoy about to attempt a landing at CRETE were intercepted and taken to G.S. (I) with the strongest recommendations to inform the Royal Navy. This was done, with the result that the convoy was intercepted and scattered. This was repeated again the following night with another convoy sailing South from MELOS. On another occasion, it is believed 23rd Mar 41, a signal in “clear" and signed RINGEL was intercepted. This signal was a request for large quantities of munitions of which the exact specifications were given. The reply was intercepted about two hours later stating that the munitions desired would be landed on MALEME aerodrome at 1600 hours on that day. G.S.(I) were at once informed, and shortly afterwards a powerful signal (R.A.F.) was intercepted in clear in ENGLISH asking for two Hurricanes to be sent between 1530 and, it is believed, 1630 hours. Shortly afterwards a GERMAN signal was intercepted to the effect that aircraft were setting out from MALAOI (GERMAN fighter base). Whether this was a result of the R.A.F. signal is not definitely known, but appears primafacie evident that a GERMAN intercept station had picked up the signal and that the information had been acted upon quickly as in the case of the signals relating to convoys which were acted upon by the Royal Navy. Retreat and Embarkation. Owing to the lack of transport referred to in para (1) above, all the equipment of 4 W/T had to be destroyed, though it is believed that a large amount of M.T. was destroyed at the conclusion of one journey to the embarkation point at SPHAKIA and that in certain cases was used for the carriage of baggage. Very considerable difficulties were experienced, moreover, in the embarkation of the personnel of the Section. Preference tended to be given to larger units in spite of a signal from the C.S.0 CREFORCE, which insisted on priority of embarkation for No 4 W/T. The Section finally embarked aboard H.M.S. GLENGYLE and "HASTY" at 0200 hrs., 30th May 41.


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Conclusions (i) It is considered absolutely essential that sufficient transport to carry equipment e.g., at least 2 30-cwt trucks, be placed at the disposal of all Special Type Sections in future. (ii) It is most desirable that such Sections be provided with special authority from the C-in-C or DMI to prevent the possibility of the capture or Loss of personnel or equipment. (iii) It is also most desirable that the I.O. of all Type “B” Sections be provided immediately with all captured ciphers and codes for the purpose of perusal and copying. (iv) The practise of asking in clear for aircraft to be sent at a specific time some hours later seems to be dangerous. Cannot a delaying code be used for such purposes. 3 Jun 41 Signed. A W.Sandford,

Lieut. I.O. 4 (Australian) Special Sec

Figure 31: Lt Hill’s Report

G.S.I. MIDDLE EAST General Report on Operations in Greece. Because of the evacuation from Greece it was necessary to destroy all records and as a result, this report can only be of a general nature. As, however, most of the material obtained was passed to your 101 Sec and, through then, to CSI, it is


37

assumed that you are in possession of details. Throughout our operations we were handicapped through not having our I officer attached and also we did not have the necessary books which would have made it possible for us to interpret much of the material obtained. However, the fact that we were in close contact with the 101 Sec allowed us to pass all material to then for dissection. A large amount of five Letter code and cipher was obtained, but as nothing could be done with this locally, three letter and, of courses plain language materiel constituted our first commitment. Three Letter: For the most part material of this nature was operational and at first full use could be made of it, but when the German offensive was launched, his code books were rearranged and, for a period, the bulk of material obtained could not be interpreted. Five Letter: The greater portion of this appeared to be high-grade machine cipher and would, no doubt, have been of interest to you had facilities for its despatch been readily available. Because of the frequent moves made by the Sec it was not possible to enter into direct postal communication.. Samples of what appeared to be a field cipher were passed to the 101 Sec and then, we believe, to you, and we will be pleased to know whether these messages held any interest. Mainly the code groups were of the consonant-vowel type and pronounceable, one frequently recurring group being ROPEG. Plain Language. A considerable quantity of material in plain-language was obtained and our experience was that whenever major operations were in progress or about to take place, the use of cipher was discontinued and all communications passed en Claire. The main operations which we succeeded in covering were:- Land operations:

(a) Libya (b) Salonika (c) Jugo-S1avia (d) “Jupiter”

Air operations: Cyrus

(a) Libya: A full report covering the Libyan operations was submitted by the 101 Sec and you may recall that when the firstof these messages was received there was no indication as to the theatre of operations but all doubt was removed when our Sec intercepted a message in which two place names were given - Barce and the River Luus. Many of the messages were oblique in character and it is of interest to point out that during these operations formations were given insect names, e.g.


38

Earthworm, Cricket. The battleground was referred to as “Dance Floor”. Personalities and units were named from time to time, which might indicate that preparation of a list of codes names did not always allow for unexpected contingencies; consequently when units held in reserve were brought into action no code names had been provided, and so they had to be named in full. Another explanation night be that when speed is essential all security precautions are thrown overboard, and the full story is told in plain language to remove completely the Possibility of error. One instance occurred when German patrols found a British position thinly held and orders were immediately given in clear to a certain formation to attack with all force at its disposal. In this case both the Unit itself and the General Commanding were named. The exact details cannot be recalled, but this message was passed on to 101 Sec.Because of our distance from Libya, a considerable amount of corruption occurred, but as both Secs were watching frequencies on which these messages were being received, it was often possible to compile from the joint efforts an almost exact copy of the original message. (b) Salonica: These consisted of a series of messages from a mobile W/T station which was apparently proceeding to Salonica and, while they had no operational value, the fact that they were received so strongly at our Location in Ellason indicated that the station had considerable power. The rigid discipline normally enforced on German stations appeared to have been relaxed, for many of the communications were of a conversational nature, such as one sent when the station arrived at Salonica “Happy Easter Eggs from Salonica”. (c) Jugo-Slavia: This series of messages was possibly the most all received, and traced in detail the attack, the ebb flow of the battle, the use of parachute troops atthe psychological moment, the first negotiations with Major Yankovitch, the request for an armistice, and finally the terms under which the Armistice would be allowed. In this operation again the two Secs worked in close touch and their combined effort allowed the full text of the armistice conditions to be received, information which no doubt had vital bearing on subsequent operations in Greece. The messages were of a Straight forward operational nature and apparently no attempt was made to conceal meanings by the use of oblique phrases or words. (d) “Jupiter” The "Jupiter” series contained the last messages received in Greece, but unfortunately orders to evacuate were given while this operation was in progress. The 101 Sec was some miles distant, and as its location was not known, all material was sent by D.R. direct to CSI Force HQ, but it is unlikely that all the messages despatched came into their hands In many ways there was a strong similarity between the “Jupiter” messages and those from Libya. For instance instead of Earthworms and Crickets, fish of different species were named e.g. Big and Little Seals, and Sharks. There may be some significance in a word which appeared in an early message –“Fischhandlung”. Literally this can be interpreted as "fish shop” which night have been used in the same sense as “Dance floor". On the other hand, the thought occurred to us that “handlung” might have been used in the sense of “plot” or “scenario”, so that the operation question might have been termed the “fish” operation, which would account for the use of fish names throughout. "Seals, Big and Little" might, for


39

example, have referred to tanks. There were occasional references to “ants". These would be out of character in a fish-shop but the term might have referred to troops. Most of the messages received were addressed "To Jupiter personally” and one of the most significant referred to “Ida 40” ---- a question whether this locality had been prepared for "Jupiter” on 22 Apr ---- and ended with the query “Wohin die Schlachter”. If not corruptly received, this can be translated as “where are (or where to”) the butchers? In this series of messages certain names such as “Nordpol”, Cesar”, “Anton” and “Ida” frequently recurred. It was discovered subsequently when a certain German document came into our hands that the phonetic alphabet is employed, and the above names actually stand for letters. Nordpol is N, Cesar C, Anton A and Ida I. A copy of the document referred to will be found appended. The original was found in the pocket book of a German airman, a number of whom we were called upon to guard. At one time it became necessary to search the prisoners and, during the search, the pocketbooks were discovered. These are being sent to you under separate cover for further examination. Air operations – Cyrus. These comprised a series of R/T communications between aircraft apparently attacking a convoy. Three formations appeared to be engaged, namely "Antons”, “Ludwigs” and "Heddas”. The attack appeared to be costly to the Germans as several of the machines employed were described during the operations as being down on the water. Reverting to the work of the Sec: For a period its real work was temporarily suspended at the request of CSO 1 Aust Corps, and from 16 Apr to 19 Apr inclusive, its task was to intercept messages passing to and from forward formations and of our own Forces. You will doubtless be interested to know that information obtained in this war proved invaluable to our Corps. From 19 Apr to 22 Apr normal work was carried out, it was during this period that the messages were received.

. . . . . . .

Present Operations

The Sec arrived here on 28 Apr and after a period of inactivity commenced operations under instructions, and a quantity of raw material has been obtained and sent you under separate cover. Certain difficulties are confronting us, and we feel that the value of our role is being restricted because of the following factors:-

(a) Our I Offr Capt Sandford has not yet joined the Sec. (b) No code books are in our possession. (c) Distance from you and slow means of communication. (d) Lack of equipment

With regard to the last mentioned difficulty, this is being overcome as rapidly as possible. We were fortunate in saving the majority of our sets, some accumulators, and the necessary charging equipment. At the moment, however, we have only


40

three sets in operation, and it is difficult therefore to watch closely all the frequencies you have named as being important. However, the best arrangement possible is being made, and we hope that the material sent proves of value.

(Signed) W. – Hill, Lieut. Intelligence Offr 4 W/T

Phonetic Alphabet A Anton K Konrad U Urich B Bertha L Ludwig V Victor C Cesar M Martha W Wilhelm D Dora N Nordpol X Xantippe E Emil O Otto Y Ypsilon F Friedrich P Paula Z Zeppelin “ G Gustav Q Quelle A Arger “ H Heinrich R Richart O Odipus “ I Ida S Siegfried U Ubel J Julius T Theodor CH Charlotte

ANNEX B to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

A SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION TYPE B (1941)

WAR ESTABLISHMENT

The following was handwritten on the top of the document Notified in A.C.Is for 15th

October 1941. Effective date 29 September 1941 111/129/1

Figure 1: War Establishment - Page 1

ANNEX B to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

2

Figure 2: War Establishment - Page 2

ANNEX C to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

LIST OF NO 4 AUST W/T SECTION WHO SERVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The following list of No 4 Aust W/T Section who served in the Middle East was forwarded to

Jack Fenton by Steve Mason and then to the author1:

1 Email 22 March 2015

ANNEX D to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

LIST OF NO 4 AUST W/T SECTION WHO SERVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The following list of Special Wireless personnel was attached to the script of the presentation given

by Jack Butler to the Officers of 7 Signal Regiment on 14 August 1992:

Figure 1: Middle East Personnel - Page 1


2



3


ANNEX E to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

ASWG ESTABLISHMENT 29 JULY 1942

Initial Establishment

The ASWG was formed as an Army Sigint group on 18 May 1942 at Ringwood, Victoria. With a war establishment of 1,000 personnel. The original complement consisted of three officers and 180 other ranks1 primarily members of No. 4 Australian Special Wireless Section (also known as the No. 5 Australian Special Wireless Section). Soon after establishment, the unit moved to Bonegilla, Victoria.

Authorised Establishment Special Wireless Section Type “B”

The War Establishment for A Special Wireless Section Type B was issued on 29 July 19422:

Figure 1: Special Wireless Section Type B - Page 1

1 A later report from Lt Col Ryan detailed in Spook Stuff states that the strength was 13 Officers and 250 ORs 2 NAA: A6923, History of Sigint (General) 15B [1cm folios]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonegilla,_Victoria


2



3



4

Authorised Establishment Special Wireless Section Type “C”

The War Establishments for A Special Wireless Section Type “C” was issued on 30 November

19423:

Figure 4: Special Wireless Section Type C - Page 1

3 Ibid


5



6



7

Vehicles

There were three GS Van classes used by the AMF during WW2 :

12 cwt GS Van: based on a saloon car chassis

15 cwt GS Van: based on a light commercial truck chassis

1 Ton GS Van: based on a light commercial truck chassis

There were derivations in the official nomenclature, for example, some utes were fitted out as

wireless trucks and called: Van or Truck 1 Ton wireless. A few chassis were also fitted with fully

enclosed panel van type bodies. Also, a few Indian pattern ambulance bodies were built on the

Dodge and International D series 1 ton chassis, these bodies were normally built on the 30 cwt

chassis ( Ford and Chev ) . The most numerous GS Van types seen with the AIF (Australian Imperial

Force) in overseas service were Ford and Chevrolet. Within Australia, Dodge, Plymouth, De Soto and

International utes were also used by the three services, AMF, RAAF and RAN

http://www.vmvc.org.au/vmvc1au/vmvc/www.geocities.com/vmvc1au/utes.html

ANNEX F to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

ANNEX F

REPORTS

ON

AUSTRALIAN

SPECIAL

WIRELESS

GROUP

Unidentified Author - 1943

Lt Col Ryan - 1945


2

Unknown Author

In late 1942 early 1943, the following repot was issued1. The author of the report has not

been identified2.

Figure 1: Report Front Page

3.

1 NAA: A6923, History of Sigint (General) 15B [1cm folios] 2 Based on the dates, the report was most probably initially written in late 1942. 3 Some of the extracts of this report, including establishments were obviously included in the Final Report written by Lt Col Ryan. Extracts

from his report are included in the relevant sections of the Story

A copy of the report is included in its Entirety

Some of the extracts of this report, including establishments, were obviously

included in the Final Report written by Lt Col Ryan in 1945

Extracts from his report are included in the relevant sections of the Story

The various Establishment Tables are included in both Reports as the dates are

slightly different


3

Figure 2: Report - Page 1


4



5



6



7



8



9


It appears that at least two pages of the report are missing


10

Figure 9: Report No 2 - Page 1


11



12

Figure 11: Report No 2 - Appendix B – Page 1


13

Figure 12: Report No 2 - Appendix B - Page 2


14

Reception Set No.1 (Aust.)4

The Reception Set No.1 (Aust.) was a special communications receiver designed for interception reception in special Wireless Sections and for general communications within and above Corps. on CW and MCW telegraphy (W/T), and Radio Telephony (R/T). It covered a frequency range of 138 to 410 Kc/s (2174 to 731 metres) and 495 Kc/s to 25 Mc/s (606 to 12 metres) using 6 plug in coils to cover the range..

NOTE that the Reception Set No.1 (Aust.) was adapted from the Kingsley Radio KCR/11 that was used by the RAAF as the AR7.

A separate power supply was provided which allowed the receiver to operate from either 230-240v ac, from mains supply or a petrol generator, or from 12v dc provided by two 6 volt 150 ah. secondary batteries. The current consumption on ac was 0.32 amps at 230v. On dc it was 4.75 amps. The Power Supply had a 3 position switch on the front: 12VDC - OFF - 230VAC.

Figure 13: Sketch of Reception Set No 1 (Aust) #1

Figure 14: Sketch of Reception Set No 1 (Aust) #2

4 http://www.qsl.net/vk2dym/radio/No.1a.htm


15



16



17



18

Example of completed Message Form AAF C1025:

Figure 18: Message Form

5 NAA Series A10909


19



20

Figure 20: Report No 2 - Appendix M


21

Figure 21: Section Type B Establishment - Page 1


22



23



24

Truck ¼ ton GS Example

Figure 24: Example Truck 1/4 Ton GS

15 cwt GS Example

Figure 25: TRUCKS, 15-CWT. G.S. (AUSTRALIAN), 1. THREE-QUARTER FRONT VIEW, RIGHT SIDE6.

6 AWM 127818


25

Truck 15 cwt Wireless Signals Example

Figure 26: Three unidentified Australian soldiers with their Canadian Military Pattern Chevrolet C15A, 15cwt, wireless signals truck 7

Truck 3 Ton Office Example

Figure 27: Lorries, 3-Ton Office, (Australian). Chevrolet.

Three-Quarter Front View, Left Side; Showing Office Tent Erected Across Lorry Office 8

7 AWM P04986.063 8 AWM 127773


26

Figure 28: Section Type C Establishment - Page 1


27



28



29

Figure 31: Report No 2 –Appendix F - Page 1


30

Figure 32: Report No 2 –Appendix F - Page 2


31

Examples of Training Programme

Week One

Figure 33: Report No 2 –Appendix G - Page 1


32

Week Eight

Figure 34: Report No 2 –Appendix G - Page 2

Two of the equipment mentioned:

Fullerphone9 (Used for Morse Code Training)

Initial issues of Fullerphones were made up from converted field telephone sets. This type, however, appeared to be not the most successful. Towards the end of 1916, the Fullerphone was firmly established, and by 1918 most dvisions had adopted Fullerphones for all their forward communication circuits. After the Armistice, more improvements and modifications of the instrument were carried out. The basic principle, however, was never changed. In about 1937 a fully re-designed model, the Mk. IV, went into service. This (and its later variations) can be considered as the most successful model, not only being more sensitive than its predecessors, it had also a simplified buzzer-chopper, and was easy to use as it carried no telephone set. Although the Fullerphone was devised as a non-overhearable signalling set for static warfare, it was again widely used during World War Two because of its capability to work simultaneously with a telephone over the same line and working through very long or leaky lines where telephone or telegraph traffic was impossible. In the South West Pacific, for example, the Australians made extensive use of the Fullerphone, notably in New Guinea.

9 www,wftw.nl/ful.html


33

Figure 35: Fullerphone

Wireless Set No 11

AWA in Sydney built a version of the British No 11 Set. Although from the

outside the two sets look similar, internally the sets are quite different. The

AWA version used locally made valves and components in a new chassis

layout. It appears that the production got underway during late 41 early 42

just when the British version ceased production.

The decision to manufacture a British set designed for the temperate

conditions of Europe was in hindsight a mistake. Although the No 11 Set

(Aust) was used in operations in the South West Pacific Area it proved to be

too heavy and cumbersome for use in the jungle terrain. It was also prone to

breakdowns caused by moisture intrusion. The cotton covered wiring looms

and inadequate waterproofing of the genemotor [sic] power supplies caused

major headaches for signal ops.


34

Figure 36: Wireless Set No 11 #1



10 www.vk2bv.org/museum/ws11.htm


35

Report Issued by Lt Col Ryan (1945)11

Figure 39: Report No 3 - Covering Letter

11 A10908, 2 Report prepared by Lt Colonel J W Ryan AIF on "Australian Army Special Wireless Units 1940-1945" [0.5cm folio,

and NAA: A6923, History of Sigint (General) 15B [1cm folios]


36



37



38



39



40



41



42



43



44



45



46

Figure 50Report No 3 - Appendix A - Page 1


47

Figure 51: Report No 3 - Appendix A - Page 2


48

Figure 52: Report No 3 - Appendix A - Page 3


49



50



51



52

Figure 56: Report No 3 - Appendix C - Page 1


53



54



55



56

Figure 60: Report No 3 - Appendix D - Page 1


57



58



59



60

Figure 64: Report No 3 - Appendix E - Page 1


61



62



63

Figure 67: Report No 3 - Appendix F - Page 1


64



65


ANNEX G to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

REPORT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS GROUP.

Attached to the February 1944 Monthly Report1 was the following Report on the

Employment of Aust Special Wireless Group.

Figure 1: Report Page 1

1 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946) February 1944


2



3


Note

Unfortunately no Appendixes were enclosed.

ANNEX H to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

ASWG ESTABLISHMENT 31 MAY 1944

Overview

On 31 May 1944 a new Establishment for the Special Wireless Group was issued. In his Report on Special Wireless Units (Signals) 1940 – 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan attached the following establishments for the Special Wireless Group1:

A Special Wireless Group.

Figure 1: ASWG Establishment #1

1 NAA A10908, 2 Report prepared by Lt Colonel J W Ryan AIF on "Australian Army Special Wireless Units 1940-1945


2



3



4



5

Possible Outline Organisation of the ASWG2

Figure 5: ASWG Organisation

2 Drawn by Author, based on the preceding Establishment

Note:

Officer and Senior Ranks only shown.

Due to the array of trades, no ORs shown for HQ Group.

The majority of ORs in the Operating Company were Operator Signals.

Note that the new Group Establishment caters for four Type “A” Sections as part of the Group

– not the previous “B”, “C” and “D” Sections.

See the following Special Wireless Section Types “A” and “B” Establishments that cater for

additional Units that can be allocated to a Special Wireless Group


6

A Special Wireless Section Type A

Figure 6: Special Wireless Section Type “A” – Page 1


7



8



9

Figure 9: Special Wireless Section Type ”A” – Page 4


10

A Special Wireless Section Type B

Figure 10: Special Wireless Section Type ”B” – Page 1


11

Figure 11: Special Wireless Section Type ”B” – Page 2


12

Figure 12: Special Wireless Section Type “B” – Page 3

ANNEX I to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

CABARLAH

PRE 1946


2

World War I

The author has been unable to find why or when Cabarlah, Queensland, just outside

Toowoomba, was first established as a military camp. There is one mention of Cabarlah

being occupied as a training area in World War I, but no authenticated reference as to

where this information came from:

Borneo Barracks, Cabarlah, began as a World War I training area.1

Figure 1:: Location of Cabarlah

There is also an unreferenced note that there was an AASC [Australian Army Service Corps]

detachment in Toowoomba in 1912/13 and they were normally supporting light horse units.

This has not been verified.

1 http://ada.asn.au/commentary/opinion-articles/2010/borneo-barracks,-cabarlah.html


3

World War II

Several books and internet web pages mention the various units that occupied the camp

during World War II. Extracts from these publications follow:

11th Light Horse

The Courier Mail Newspaper2 mentioned the 11th Light Horse as follows:

30 July 1941

Light Horsemen Want to fly

Many members of the 11th Light Horse in camp at Cabarlah applied yesterday to join different sections of the Air Force [3]. Thirty-four marched in a hotly to the headquarters of the R.A.A.F. recruiting drive committee rooms at Toowoomba. Most of them wished to he enlisted as air crew. The area officer (Lieutenant A. J. Royal) said last night that more than 40 members of the regiment had been accepted for the A.I.F. since the camp began.

15 August 1941

Queensland had one of the best organisations in Australia for the supply of meat to the troops, he said. The beef was of exceptionally high quality. The new camp [4] at Cabarlah, between Toowoomba and Crow’s Nest, where the 11th Light Horse regiment was in training, had appealed to him most for its up-to-date methods of catering. The food was cooked by steam, and the other catering facilities were excellent.

Base Supply Depot

BSD Cabarlah. 5 [Australian Army Service Corps Base Supply Depot]

25th Battalion6

The remaining men of the battalion returned home to the Downs, [from Chermside, Brisbane] with the exception of a training cadre of officers, NCOs and specialists. These men moved by train to Cabarlah, north of Toowoomba, as part of the

government’s new policy to call these men up full-time.

2 http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/result?q=%22+cabarlah%22&s=300 3 Possibly an editorial error and should read AIF instead of Air Force and RAAF 4 Note that the camp is called new 5 http://books.historia.com.au/equal-to-the-task_v1-raasc/e1-p2_states/e1-c6_qld.html 6 Doneley, Bob (2012-03-28). Toowoomba to Torokina The 25th Battalion in peace and war, 1918–45 (Kindle Locations 1468-1576). Big

Sky Publishing. Kindle Edition


4

On 16 December [1941] members of the battalion began to report at Cabarlah. Within a few days there were 642 men in camp.

The camp at Cabarlah had originally been laid out on the same lines as Chermside, with tents neatly aligned and right-dressed, everything gleaming. This was changed after Darwin was bombed in February:

All tents had to be sighted [sic] under trees, we moved ours under bush where the bracken fern grew feet tall. The tents were then smothered with red mud, whitewash, charcoal or any other measure to break up the outline of those tents. Each time it rained we had to camouflage the tents again. As far as we were concerned it made us feel a lot more private – in some cases you had no near neighbours.

There were problems with the camp in the early days. Drought had made the area very dusty, and water levels in nearby Cooby Dam had dropped significantly. Algae was growing in this water which, when combined with corrosion in the water pipes, made drinking water quite unpalatable. There was a shortage of nearly all camp equipment. In fact tables and forms had to be hired from schools in Toowoomba, and

there were insufficient floorboards and lanterns for each tent.

After two and a half months training in the basics of military life, the battalion was

moved from Cabarlah.

On the 17th March, which is a date to remember, it’s St. Patrick’s Day, at

2.00 o’clock in the morning, we were ordered out of our camps down the

escarpment at Cabarlah there, down to Spring Bluff… we didn’t have much

notice, maybe 2 or 3 hours, that’s all. We couldn’t even let our families know

where we were going or anything like that. We didn’t know anything about

the move at all.

4th Field Regiment7

In March [1942] the regiment moved to Connelly’s Dam, south of Warwick,

Queensland, where a third battery was raised. By the end of April the regiment had

its full establishment of 18 25-pounder guns as well as 12 18-pounders and four 4.5

inch Howitzers. At this time too, the 4th Brigade was deployed to the Maroochydore,

Brisbane, Southport areas. While there, the 4th Field Regiment trained with the 7th

Division’s 2/4th Field Regiment. In June the 4th moved to Cabarlah, near

Toowoomba.

Normally an infantry division would have three field regiments to support its

operations, but during the Pacific war, Australian infantry divisions were reorganised

into “jungle divisions” and the number of field regiments were reduced from three to

one. The 4th Field Regiment survived this period and moved to the Helidon area in

July 1943.

7 https://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_10324second_world_war.asp?query=cabarlah


5

First Australian Army Gas School:

September 1943. Land Headquarters Gas School, located at Bonegilla, Victoria and

First Australian Army Gas School, located at Cabarlah, Queensland are

amalgamated.8

Army Staff School:

A militia battalion of the 7th Brigade [25th Battalion] was based there in 1940-41 and the senior wing of the Army Staff School was located there in 1942-45.9

Command and Staff training expanded during the Second World War. The Command and Staff School moved to Canberra, and courses lengthened to twelve weeks. In 1942 the school was renamed the Staff School. Then located in Cabarlah, Queensland, it conducted separate courses to prepare officers for Grade One (Lieutenant Colonel) and Grade Two (Major) staff appointments. By 1944, a third course was added, with the aim of preparing officers for Grade Three (Captain) appointments. 10

The Army Staff School (founded in April 1942) moved from Duntroon to Cabarlah in

October 1944 “for two reasons: first to enable it to work in conjunction with other

Army establishments in Queensland, and second so that the Royal Military College

could concentrate on its primary task of training cadets.” The Staff School had three

wings – ie for training GSO1s, GSO2s, and GSO3s. In mid-1946, as the “Army Staff

College”, it moved to Seymour – then to Queenscliff in early 1947. 11

Appointed liaison officer at headquarters, 6th Division, in September 1943, Ferguson

was promoted to temporary major that month (substantive May 1945). He attended

the junior wing of the Staff School (Australia) at Cabarlah, Queensland, and in

October 1944 was posted to the 1st Australian Combined Operations Section.12

8 http://mustardgas.org/timeline.htm There is also a record at the AWM that mentions Land Headquarters. Gas School, Cabarlah Qld.

Course No 24: Unit gas officers and non-commissioned officers, 28 September - 21 October 1943 9 http://ada.asn.au/commentary/opinion-articles/2010/borneo-barracks,-cabarlah.html 10 http://www.fortqueenscliff.com.au/page12.htm 11 Email from Ernie Chamberlain 16 Nov 2013, Source: Tookarook 1959 12 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ferguson-ian-bruce-12484

http://mustardgas.org/timeline.htm

http://www.fortqueenscliff.com.au/page12.htm


6

Figure 2: Cabarlah Camp Staff School 1944 #113

Figure 3: Cabarlah Camp Staff School 1944 #214

13 7 Sig Regt archives 14 ibid


7

Figure 4: Cabarlah Camp from the main road15

The following map of the Staff School was found in the National Archives Collection16:

Figure 5: Map of Staff School Cabarlah

15 ibid 16 http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ListingReports/ItemsListing.aspx

http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ListingReports/ItemsListing.aspx


8

The Map also included the following information:

A 1943 plan of the Staff School showss it was arranged around three streets in a

rough pitchfork pattern, west of the Toowoomba-Crow’s Nest Road. Quarters for

Australian Women's Army Service (AWAS) personnel were located off the

northernmost street.

The Courier Mail Brisbane17 on 9 November 1944 had the following headline:

Figure 6: Courier Mail Headline

Article Extract:

STAFF training in the Australian Army has been centralised at the Staff School (Australia) at Cabarlah, near Toowoomba. For the first time the school takes its place with the famous Empire Staff Colleges of Camberley and Quena. Addressing the students when opening the school, the chief of the general staff (Lieut.-General J. Northcott) said that the new arrangement represented one of the greatest achievements in staff training in the Commonwealth. The concentration of staff courses into one organisation enables us to take our place among the great Empire Staff Colleges in England and India.’ He added. The commandant of the school is Brigadier R. N. L. Hopkins, and those appointed to the directing staff include some of the best brains in the Australian army. All have had wide experience on the battle front of Europe, the Middle East and New Guinea. Two lieut.-colonels from famous British regiments and a major from the Canadian forces are included in the list. Duntroon’s Fine Job Cabarlah, as the school will be known from now on, comprises the old staff school senior and junior wings, which have been operating at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and the L.H.Q., junior staff school which has been located for some years at Ashgrove.

17 http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/48950909


9

In his address, Lieut-Gen. Northcott paid a tribute to the work that had been done at Duntroon, where it was necessary to establish staff courses for senior and junior officers to meet the increased demand for staff officers. Scope of Courses Duration of courses at the new school will be 17 weeks for the senior and intermediate wings, and eight weeks for the junior wing. Instruction includes staff work in all types of operations, restricted in each wing to the required scope and standard. In general, students of the senior wing will concentrate on the working of a division, and the intermediate and junior ‘sings on brigade and battalion staff duties. Duntroon will now revert to its original status as a cadet college for lads who seek to become members of the Australian Staff Corps.

Volunteer Defence Corps

The following photographs, with captions, of the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC)18

training at Cabarlah were found in the AWM Collections19:

Figure 7: Volunteer Defence Force #1

CABARLAH, QLD. 1944-01-31. PERSONNEL OF E GROUP, VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS

ADVANCING THROUGH LIGHTLY WOODED COUNTRY DURING A UNIT EXERCISE.

18 http://www.ww2places.qld.gov.au/theServices/Pages/TheAustralianArmy.aspx As Japan increasingly loomed as a major threat to

Australia, civil defence measures were stepped up. The Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) was formed in July 1940 to carry out home defence duties using World War I veterans. It reached its maximum strength in June 1942 when enlistments in Queensland alone totalled over 17,000 men. The VDC covered coast-watching duties in the Torres Strait and along the eastern coast and Gulf; sentry duties at key installations; and the manning of beach defences, anti-aircraft guns and coastal batteries to free up regular troops for service in forward areas. 19 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/063856/



10


CABARLAH, QLD. 1944-01-30. LANCE CORPORAL W. RISSMAN (1) AND PRIVATE F. LOBEGEIGER (2) OF E GROUP, VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS

PREPARING TO FIRE OWEN AND VICKERS MACHINE GUNS DURING A UNIT EXERCISE.


CABARLAH, QLD. 1944-01-31. MEMBERS OF E GROUP VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS LINING UP IN THE MESS QUEUE DURING A WEEK-END CAMP.


11

Local Watering Hole

The history of Cabarlah would not be complete without mention of the Cabarlah Hotel. The Farmers Arms Hotel was first licensed in 1863 and is located 1.5 km north of the Cabarlah Camp. The Hotel became affectionately known as “The Stump" and to this day is still a meeting place for off-duty personnel.

Figure 10: Cabarlah Hotel circa 1947

ANNEX J to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

51 AUST SPECIAL WIRELESS SECTION

Overview

In May 1942, an advance party detachment of one officer and 24 ORs moved to Darwin. Full

strength was not achieved until January 1943. The Section remained in the Darwin area until

May 1945, when duties were assumed by 1 Canadian Special Wireless Group.

In his Report on Special Wireless Units (Signals) 1940 – 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan presented an overview of 51 Section1:

Figure 1:: 51 Section – Lt Col Ryan



2

Central Bureau Committee Meeting No 22

On 22 October 1942, the Central Bureau Committee Meeting discussed2.

Figure 2: Extract CB Minutes 22 October 1942

Tasking

G Ballard3:

The task of 51 Wireless Section was to ensure coverage of enemy intentions and

activity, especially air activity, in the area north of Darwin; to inform local

commanders of the movement of hostile aircraft to nearby enemy airfields so that

offensive action could be taken against them; and to give warning of impending air

raids over Darwin itself.

Deployment

Jack Butler4:

Whilst the conscripts were being trained at Bonegilla I was in a party of 20 who

travelled to Winnellie near Darwin to set up 51 Section and we were eventually

relieved by trainees. Then after a break we were off to Perth area to set up 56

Section.

Figure 3: Winnellie Location

2 National Archives of Australia: Series A6923 Control SI/2. Australian Military Forces - Y Organisation in Australia [Director of Military

Intelligence - Central Bureau - Special Intelligence, Special Wireless Group, ULTRA material related to the interception of enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines- staffing and other Allied administrative arrangements for collection of Y Intelligence] [2.5cm], 3 Extract from On Ultra-Active Service. Page 178 4 Extract from a presentation to 7 Signal Regiment Officers 14 August 1992 by John Butler


3

Jean Hillier5:

Nev Wintin has written, “I was not part of the early days of training in Bonegilla as a

party numbering about twenty left for Darwin with the object of selecting a site for

what was to be 51 Section. Our boss was Ralph Thompson, we had eight operators

and the rest were drivers, technicians and cooks, etc.”

“We found a suitable site and began operating out of what we called set trucks. They

were trucks with four receivers set up inside. All the time we were doing lots of other

things like slowly building a camp, logging frequencies that the Japs were using etc.

All this so that when the first lot of trainees arrived from Bonegilla everything would

be made easy for them when they took over from us.”

After about four months the trainees arrived but unfortunately they were not

sufficiently trained and Ralph decided that instead of us being relieved were to stay

another couple of months and have the “green” boys sit on sets with us while we

copied the Jap traffic and they picked up the tricks of the trade”

Bill McCue 6:

On 25 May, 51 Wireless Section took over the commitment of Special Wireless Group

at Ringwood. The Section received advice that it would probably move to Darwin on

29 May.

On [5 September] the rest of 51 Section moved out [from Bonegilla].

On 21 September a signal was received from 51 Section reporting to “battle” station

NTFORCE.

Steve Mason7:

On February 28, 1943 RAAF planes destroyed 10 and strongly damaged another 1`4

Jap planes in an attack on Koepeng Aerodrome – the result of information supplied

by Section 51.

Jack continued8:

I was not to see Bonegilla. In June 1942, a detachment of approximately 30 moved to

Darwin as the nucleus of 51 Wireless Section and we set up camp south of the town

but was subject to almost daily bombing by Japanese planes based in the Dutch East

Indies. Accordingly, the section moved to a new site some 30km south of Darwin and

immediately set about sorting out the Japanese radio groups to our north, A

considerable amount of useful intelligence information, particularly in regard to

5 No Medals In This Unit pages 24 -25 6 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 7 Letter to Jack Fenton 13 May 2014 8 Extract from a presentation to 7 Signal Regiment Officers 14 August 1992 by John Butler


4

enemy air movements and pending raids, was passed on to the Air Force and

enabled fighter aircraft to be up and waiting for the bomber formations to appear.

Receivers for 51 Special Wireless Section

On 1 August 1942, Central Bureau requested special receivers for 51 Section9:

Figure 4: CB Letter re receivers

Intercept Area

Extract from the book The Emperors Codes10:

By early 1943, the Australian Special Wireless Group had deployed 51 Wireless

Section to Darwin where it was picking up a good deal of Japanese military traffic,

particularly from Borneo and the Philippines, and 55 Wireless Section to Port

Moresby, on New Guinea.

9 NAA: A6923, 16/6/289 Australian Military Forces - Central bureau - administration of [Special Intelligence related to the interception of

enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines [1.5cm] 10 Smith, Michael; Erskine, Ralph (2010-06-29). The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park's role in breaking Japan's secret cyphers (Kindle

Locations 2984-2987 and 2948 - 2950). Biteback Publishing. Kindle Edition.


5

The Interception and Shooting Down of Yamamoto

There are several writings on the interception and shooting down of the aircraft carrying

Admiral Yamamoto, and several units have claimed outright responsibility for the initial

message intercept.

If normal intercept practices had been conducted, the author believes that more than one

intercept station would have been copying the traffic and all could claim some input into the

activity.

Bill Esdaile (ASWG) related in an interview11:

Now on one occasion one of our operators took a message to say that General Yamamoto was flying to Bougainville and they acted upon that, they sent off some P38 Lightning fighters, intercepted his plane and his plane was eventually shot down. We pride ourselves with having played a big part in the death of a major Japanese army general at that time. We're not sure whether he was actually killed in the plane or whether he was killed by the plane having been shot down. But you read also accounts of where US [United States] intelligence intercepted a message. We were intercepting, the US was intercepting and even the English were intercepting. So who actually got the vital message we can't actually, with any great degree of accuracy, say. But we always claim that it was us.

The following is an extract from the book The Emperor’s Code12

In mid-April 1943 a number of Allied intercept sites picked up messages referring to a

proposed visit by Yamamoto to the Solomon Islands to boost the morale of the

Japanese forces based there. It was first picked up in Hawaii, in a JN25 message from

Combined Fleet to the outstations that Yamamoto was to visit. FRUPAC’s chief

linguist, Major Alva ‘Red’ Lasswell, began to work on it. ‘Lasswell approached

cryptanalysis like a chess player manoeuvring relentlessly to untangle his problem,’

wrote Jasper Holmes. ‘His desk was usually clear of everything but his current puzzle .

He worked sitting upright at his desk, wearing a carefully pressed Marine Corps

uniform of the day, his sole deviation being a green eyeshade for protection against

the hours under the fluorescent lights.’ As Lasswell worked his way through the

Yamamoto message and began to realize what it was about, he called out to his

colleagues: ‘We’ve hit the jackpot.’ He laboured through the night to recover the

itinerary. Then Lasswell and Holmes took it by hand to Commander Edwin T. Layton,

the Fleet Intelligence Officer. As the message filtered down to the Japanese lower

echelons, it was relayed on in much lower-level systems and was picked up in

Australia by both the US codebreakers in Melbourne and 51 Special Wireless Section

in Darwin. Lieutenant-Commander Gill Richardson decoded the message at FRUMEL:

‘The message I worked on was in a Japanese Army code system. Although we were

unfamiliar with Japanese Army codes, we got this message out in a hurry because it

was a substitution system.’ Nobby Clarke was working at Central Bureau when a

11 http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1819.aspx 12 Smith, Michael; Erskine, Ralph (2010-06-29). The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park's role in breaking Japan's secret cyphers (Kindle

Locations 3135-3153). Biteback Publishing. Kindle Edition


6

message about the visit was picked up by Australian Army operators using a very

basic army-air code:

The signal was intercepted by 51 Wireless Section and translated at Central

Bureau in Brisbane before being passed on to those thought to need to

know. The implications of this message are so bizarre that they have

remained clear in my memory to this day. They were sent in the familiar

Japanese Army air– ground code they were obliged to use to communicate

with their beleaguered outposts. The message was so larded with the kana

spellers that anyone familiar with the book could read them on sight.

Extract from The Library of Congress World War II Companion13,

The Death of Admiral Yamamoto. In April 1943, U.S. cryptographers deciphered a messages encoded in JN-25, the Japanese naval code, detailing Admiral Yamamoto’s itinerary for the next five days. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox ordered that Yamamoto be shot down. On April 18, 16 P-38s flew 400 miles from Guadalcanal to Bougainville in the Solomon Islands at wave-top height to avoid radar. The mission was timed to the second: as the US pilots approached the island, two Japanese bombers and six fighter escorts appeared. The Americans quickly shot down the two bombers and killed Yamamoto. To maintain secrecy about the US ability read JN-25, the Army Air pilots who carried out the mission were told that Allied coast watchers had provided the information about Yamamoto’s flight.

13 The Library of Congress World War II Companion, Margaret E Wagner, Linda Barrett Osborne, Susan Reyburn, and Staff of the Library of

Congress. Simon & Schuster


7

Figure 5: Sketch of Yamamoto's Interception

Accommodation

Report by Dick Thompson14:

51 Wireless Section personnel built their own huts at their camp at Coomalie Creek. The huts would hold 6 to 8 personnel. The main roof was sheeted with galvanised iron and the walls were made from pandanus palms. Each man had his own bed with hessian stretched 3 feet off the ground between a bamboo frame. While they were in at night they could hear the sound of the white ants due to amplification of the noise through the hollow bamboo bed frame. One of the 51 Wireless Section personnel was surprised to find his bible had a hole in it after the white ants had eaten through the shelf to get to the bible. 51 Wireless Section personnel paid 2 cartons of beer to have a football oval graded by one of the other local military units. There was a set room on a hill in the 51 Wireless Section camp where 12 Army radio operators worked a 12 hour shift, which was part of a 24 hours per day continuous operation. Each operator had two high-powered radio receivers. One of the receivers was receiving every radio signal sent by one Japanese operator and the other receiver was receiving every signal sent bv the other Japanese operator. This way each Section 51 operator could monitor both sides of a "conversation".

14 Email from Jack Fenton to Bob Hartley


8

Figure 6: Building the SI Section15

Figure 7: 51 Section in Darwin 1943 #116

15 7 Sig Regt archives 16 Ibid


9

Figure 8: 51 Section in Darwin 1943 #2 17

Figure 9: Accommodation Buildings Darwin - 1943 18

17 7 Sig Regt archives

18 Photograph from On Ultra-Active Service


10

Figure 10: Darwin tent site19

51 Wireless Section personnel were able to warn Darwin of impending Japanese air raids. The Japanese would bring their aircraft down from Kendari in Borneo to Koepang the day before they would bomb Darwin. They did not even have to read their messages to know that Darwin would be bombed the next day. They only had to be aware that the Japanese aircraft had arrived at Koepang. 51 Wireless Section personnel were also able to provide information that would allow the Allies to bomb Japanese aircraft while they were on the ground at Koepang.

19 Photo courtesy of Steve Mason


11

“I” Committee Meeting 8 March 1943

The “I” Committee reported20:

Figure 11: "I" Committee Letter [seems bit old]

RAAF Support

On 20 July 1943, the Assistant Chief Signals Officer at RAAF Command, Allied Air Force,

wrote to Central Bureau regarding “Y” Signals Organisation Policy on DF stations and

manning21. Extract:

Figure 12: RAAF Support for 51 Section #1

Central Bureau Concurs

On 25 July 1943, Central Bureau agreed with the RAAF policy22:

Figure 13: RAAF Support for 51 Section #2

20 NAA A11093, 334/81J PART 1 RAAF Command Headquarters -GHQ [General Headquarters] - Committee "I" - Signal Intelligence 21 NAA A11093, 311/236G RAAF Command Headquarters - 'Y' signals communications [signals intelligence] [1cm 22 Ibid


12

Detachment Locations

Bill McCue23:

[Lew Morton] In June 1943 I was deployed to a D/F detachment on Groote Island.

14 July 1943: Location 57 Mile Peg, Darwin Area.

In June 1944, a cricket match was held between 51 Section and a combined team of

62 and 66 Sections.

Central Bureau Communications to 51 Section

On 27 June 1944, in a letter to DMI, Central Bureau advised arrangements were being made

for the installation of an additional teletype circuit to Darwin to cater for 51 Section

Traffic24:

Figure 14: Extract of letter

23 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 24 National Archives of Australia: Series A6923 Control SI/2. Australian Military Forces - Y Organisation in Australia [Director of Military

Intelligence - Central Bureau - Special Intelligence, Special Wireless Group, ULTRA material related to the interception of enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines- staffing and other Allied administrative arrangements for collection of Y Intelligence]


13

Figure 15: Type of Teletype used25

Section Movements

Bill McCue26:

Under “Moves” dated 7 September 1944, the 54 Section move to Northern Territory

was reported complete and 60 ORs departed [from HQ] for 51 Section.

On 20 November, approval was granted for the Section to move to an area in the

Reception Area. Move cancelled.

In December Major Simpson, SO-in-C visited the unit to discuss re-organisation and

deficiencies and, on the following day, went to SCR291 D/F Station, RAAF Strathpine.

25 AWM 123545 26 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


14

SCR-291

The following information on the HF Direction Finding equipment SCR-291 was found on the

Radio Nerds Webpage27:

Figure 16: SCR-291 #1

Figure 17: SCR-291 #2

27 http://radionerds.com/images/8/82/SCR-291_Data.png


15

Probable interior of the SCR-291 found on a Czech web page28:

Figure 18: SCR-291 HF DF29

Bill McCue30:

On 22 December 40 OR departed by air to 53 Section Hollandia.

In the projected moves for April 1945, there was mention of 51 and 54 Sections to

return to HQ when relief effected by 1 Canadian SWG.

ASWG Reorganisation

In January 1945, Major General Simpson, the Signals Officer-in-Chief wrote to DSD regarding

the re-organisation of the ASWG, Major General Simpson, the Signals Officer-in-Chief again

wrote to DSD regarding the re-organisation of the ASWG31:

Figure 19: Reorganisation of ASWG - 51 Section - #1

28 http://en.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/t/126834/start/-1 29 http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/t/126825 30 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 31 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals

http://en.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/t/126834/start/-1


16

Figure 20: Reorganisation of ASWG - 51 Section - #2

(a) Absorb personnel as far as possible in serial 1 remaining personnel to be

absorbed in serial 2

(b) Three sections are at present performing and operational role in

Northern Territory and cannot be disbanded until they are relieved by 1

Canadian Special Wireless Group. The date on which they will be

available for withdrawal and disbanding sill be advised separately. Until

disbanded these sections remain on the OOB as at present shown

Central Bureau Technical Signals Intelligence Report

Extracts from Central Bureau Technical Signals Intelligence Report No 2 dated April 194532:

Figure 21: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report #1


32 NAA A6923, SI/5 Central Bureau - Technical - Signals - Intelligence Report No. 2. [Includes Supplement to Report No. 2].


17

Figure 23: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report – Commitment

Section Moves

Bill McCue33:

On 26 May Sections 51 and 54 left Darwin.

On 6 June Sections 51 and 54 marched in [to Kalinga] from Darwin.

Central Bureau Technical Records

Extract from Central Bureau Technical Records, Part J, Field Sections summary34:

Figure 24: Extract from Field Sections Summary - Page 1

33 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 34 NAA B5436 PART J Central Bureau Technical Records Part J - Field sections


18


ANNEX K to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


Overview


Figure 1: 52 Section - Lt Col Ryan oVERVIEW


On 16 June 1942, the Central Bureau Committee Meeting discussed2.

Figure 2: Extract Central Bureau Minutes 16 June 1942

1 NAA A10908, 2 Report prepared by Lt Colonel J W Ryan AIF on "Australian Army Special Wireless Units 1940-1945 2 National Archives of Australia: Series A6923 Control SI/2. Australian Military Forces - Y Organisation in Australia [Director of Military

Intelligence - Central Bureau - Special Intelligence, Special Wireless Group, ULTRA material related to the interception of enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines- staffing and other Allied administrative arrangements for collection of Y Intelligence] [2.5cm],


2

Enemy Target Details

On 7 December 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Little (Deputy Director DMI at GHQ) requested that the

ASWG forward details of Japanese Diplomatic Stations on cover at 52 Wireless Section3:

Figure 3: Request for target information

Extract from the Book Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes4

In April 1942 a small W/T [Wireless/Telegraphy] Section of the Australian Corps of

Signals was set up at Ferny Creek in the Dandenongs to intercept Japanese

diplomatic circuits. In July it received reinforcements from 2nd Company GHQ Signals

to bring it up to strength as a Special Wireless Section (Type B) and was named 52

Australian Wireless Section. It operated successively at Ferny Creek between April

and August 1942, Bonegilla between August 1942 and November 1943 and

Mornington between November 1943 and February 1946. Its sole task was

intercepting Japanese diplomatic traffic for delivery to Trendall's Section (about 20

per cent by hand Morse by a direct landline, the remainder by a daily bag delivery).

From the time of its move to Bonegilla it was the principal source of the Diplomatic

Section's raw material and, after the latter's transfer to the army it was, with certain

exceptions, its sole source of raw material. 52 Section's all-ranks strength was 85,

comprising one Captain, one Lieutenant, one Lieutenant (Australian Women's Army

Service), one Company Quarter Master Sergeant/Company Sergeant Major, two

Sergeants, seven Corporals, 72 Signalwomen/Signalmen (including seven Lance

Corporals). Of the rank and file, 52 were operators. The unit operated 24 hours a day

in four shifts using communications receivers of various makes (Kingsley,

Hallicrafters, AWA and Philips) and an elaborate system of rhombic aerials set up on

the Bonegilla racecourse. The operators kept watch on designated call signs and

frequencies and were able to identify Japanese diplomatic traffic from the sending

3 A6923, 16/6/289 Australian Military Forces - Central bureau - administration of [Special Intelligence related to the interception of enemy

wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines [ 4 Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War, Edited by Desmond Ball and

Keiko Tamura, Published by ANU E Press, ISBN: 9781925021073 (paperback) 9781925021080 (ebook)


3

station's output by the originator and addressee designated in the preamble of each

message (which, of necessity, was transmitted en clair and at hand speed). The text

of the message was usually transmitted at machine speed. The operator recorded

this on Edison wax cylinders and later replayed it at manageable speed and

transcribed it.

In the table that follows, I have shown the earliest and latest monthly totals

available and those of two intermediate months. These figures, of course, include

much material that the Special Intelligence Section did not read, e.g. naval and

military attaché and JAA (i.e. PURPLE) traffic (all of which was forwarded to GC&CS)

and messages in the low grade cypher LA (which were read only if specifically

referred to in a high grade message).

Diplomatic Traffic

In a letter on 22 June 1943, the ADMI responded to the DMI, primarily about Diplomatic traffic

[extract]5:

Figure 4: Extract of ADMI Letter

5 NAA: A6923, 37/401/425. CGS Branch - Military Intelligence - Special Intelligence Section [administrative arrangements of the setting up

and staffing of the section to work on Y intelligence, Diplomatic cyphers for the ULTRA project on intercepted enemy communications- also includes recruitment of linguists with expertise in mathematics or the Japanese language, such as Professor T G Room, Mr R J Lyons and Mr A P Treweek of the University of Sydney] [3cm]


4

Movement of 52 Wireless Section

On 13 October 1943, the Signal-Officer-in-Chief advised staff of the movement of 52

Wireless Section6 (Extract):

Figure 5: Move of 52 Section to Mornington

Steve Mason7:

In December 1945 came the move to Mornington – 52 Wireless Section. It was sad in a way

to be leaving Brisbane but the War was over and we were keen to be doing other things.

We were amongst the last troops to leave and I was given thirty fellows to take to

Mornington, including my scallywags from NG days. I suppose the bulk of them would have

been New South Welshmen. You can imagine going from Brisbane to Mornington, through

NSW, passing home towns of many of them. The War was over, what could you expect?

When I got to Royal Park I think I had five! I started on the Sergeant there, saying these

fellows had had a pretty hard war and deserved a few days leave. I thought this would give

me a bit of time to try and collect my troops! He gave us four or five days leave! I still didn’t

know how I was going to get these blokes back! After the leave was over, I looked around,

and I think there were about 20 in the trucks. When we got to the racecourse I think I was

up to 29. Then we were called on parade and just as we were being called, a taxi screamed

to a halt and I think it was Joe Pritchard baled out, so I was able to present all my people on

time!

6 Ibid 7 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs


5

ASWG Reorganisation

In January 1945, Major General Simpson, the Signals Officer-in-Chief again wrote to DSD

regarding the re-organisation of the ASWG8:

Figure 6: Reorganisation of ASWG - 52 Section

Disbandment

On 4 September 1945, 52 Wireless Section was included in a Minute from Major General

Simpson, the Signal Officer-in-Chief, to the Directors of Staff Duties about the disposal of

some of the Wireless Sections9:

Figure 7: 52 Wireless Section Disbandment

8 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals 9 NAA A6923, SI/3 Australian Military Forces - Signal Officer in Chief - DMI - Central Bureau - [Special Intelligence, ULTRA, related to the

interception of enemy wireless traffic interception and C intelligence dealing with the Radio Security Service RSS under the control of the director General of Security Brigadier W B Simpson

ANNEX L to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947


Overview

53 Special Wireless Section was formed in October 1942. The Section was located at ASWG

HQ until November 1943 then moved to Finschafen in New Guinea. In January 1944, the

Section was located at Dreger Harbour and later in August 1944 moved to Hollandia. In April

1945, the Section was renamed Detachment A, and the majority of personnel returned to

Australia.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan presented an overview of 53 Section1:

Figure 1: 53 Section – Lt Col Ryan

Deployments

Bill McCue2:

In January 1944, 53 Section was now at Dreger Harbour.

March 1944. 53 Section to be bought to full strength using personnel from 55

Section.

In June 1944, 53 Section was located at Dreger Harbour. In the projected move it was

stated that 2 officers and 62 ORs to move from HQ to NTFORCE.

1 Ibid 2 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


The advanced echelon of 53 Section has moved with ALAMO3 FORCE.

Figure 2: Dregar Harbour4

Steve Mason5:

In March 1944 we made a move from Nadzab to Finschaven as we were pressing up

closer to the front line. We were to join 53 Section, who had come up later than us

and gone straight to Finschaven. Our people from Section 55 at Moresby and our

Detachment were to go and join 53 Section, led by Jimmy Woods.

The officer in charge of 53 section was Lieutenant Jim Woods. He had built up a little company and we were not really made welcome. We were regarded as reos (reinforcements), and we found that our fellows were getting all the dirty jobs and it wasn’t well received. We were very much the outsiders. Jimmy did not give any consideration to members who had been with 55 Section, which was a great pity. I remember fronting him and accusing him of giving preference to his 53 section, which I understood but I felt we should be all one section and treated equally. It wasn’t a happy introduction with a Lance Corporal telling a Lieutenant how he should be running the show, however, things improved after that.

Movement of Section

Steve Mason6:

3 In February 1943, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army arrived in SWPA, and its headquarters became that of Alamo Force.

Alamo Force reported directly to MacArthur, and as a result Blamey did not command of the majority of American land forces in the theatre after that time, although his post was not abolished 4 AWM 061721 5 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs 6 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Krueger


The time came to leave Finschaven. It was a matter of getting on a boat – the SusieQ, an

LST, (landing ship tank), a Yankee ship of course. It was July 3, and I said to my blokes it’s a

Yankee ship, we’ll have it all loaded, and we will be on a Yankee ship on July 4, and we are

bound to get a good feed. Beauty! So they got to it, loaded the ship and it sailed. Well I don’t

think they have ever forgiven me! We were crowded, we slept on the decks under the trucks,

Bill McCue7:

The July monthly report, dated 28 July, advised that W/T links were established with

53 Section and the Detachment A at Yanrey, Western Australia – the former being

suspended temporarily during the movement of 53 Section. In the ‘Projected Moves”

it was stated that on the completion of the move of 3 officers ad 62 ORs to NTFORCE

it is proposed to withdraw 56 Section from Western Australia to HQ Brisbane. The

advanced echelon of 53 Section has moved with ALAMO FORCE.

On 29 August the Monthly report noted that the movement of the rear echelon of 53

Section to Hollandia was completed.

“Projected Moves” dated 28 October stated that owing to local requirements it is

proposed to move 53 Section from its present location currently at Hollandi to

Liemok Hill, Sentani Lake. The move was completed on 27 November.

On 22 December 40 OR departed by air [from Kalinga] to 53 Section Hollandia.

Figure 3: Painting of Camp on White Beach Hollandia8

7 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 8 Photo courtesy of Steve Mason


Figure 4: Camp at Hollandia9

ASWG Reorganisation



9 Ibid 10 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals



(a) Absorb personnel as far as possible in serial 1 remaining personnel to be

absorbed in serial 2.

(b) This section is at present engaged on an operational role in New Guinea

and cannot be disbanded until Aust Special Wireless Group is available for

employment overseas. The date on which it may be disbanded will be

advised separately. Until disbanded these sections remain on the OOB as

at present shown.


Projected Move

Bill McCue11:

In the projected moves for April there was mention of a request to completely relieve

53 Section by 3 officers and 67 ORs to be known as Detachment A.




Figure 7: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report – Positions

Figure 8: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report – Equipment

11 Ibid 12 NAA A6923, SI/5 Central Bureau - Technical - Signals - Intelligence Report No. 2. [Includes Supplement to Report No. 2].


Figure 9: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report – Communications

Personnel Movements

Bill McCue13:

On 23 April 1945, 2 Sgts and 40 ORs marched out [from HQ] to relieve 53 Section.

Section Renamed

Bill McCue14:

On 7 May, 55 Section was renamed Detachment A, ASWG under the provisions of the new War Establishment

The report on 26 May stated that 53 Section was disbanded and reorganised into

Detachment A ASWG on 30 April.

13 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 14 Ibid

ANNEX M to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


Overview

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan presented a description of 54 Aust Special Wireless Section1:

Figure 1: 54 Section - Lt Col Ryan

ASWG Reorganisation



1 NAA A10908, 2 Report prepared by Lt Colonel J W Ryan AIF on "Australian Army Special Wireless Units 1940-1945 2 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals


2


(a) Absorb personnel as far as possible in serial 1 remaining personnel to

be absorbed in serial 2

(b) Three sections are at present performing and operational role in

Northern Territory and cannot be disbanded until they are relieved by 1

Canadian Special Wireless Group. The date on which they will be

available for withdrawal and disbanding sill be advised separately.

Until disbanded these sections remain on the OOB as at present shown


Extract from Central Bureau Technical Signals Intelligence Report No 2 dated April 19453:

Figure 3: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report

3 NAA A6923, SI/5 Central Bureau - Technical - Signals - Intelligence Report No. 2. [Includes Supplement to Report No. 2].


3

Figure 4: Japanese Wireless Transmitter4

SORONG, DUTCH NEW GUINEA. 1945. A WIRELESS TRANSMITTER ON DOOME ISLAND, PART OF THE RADIO STATION USED BY THE JAPANESE

FORCES IN THIS AREA TO COMMUNICATE WITH LOCAL ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND JAPANESE IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS IN JAPAN.

(DONOR: LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. W. LONDON.)

4 AWM 133782

ANNEX N to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

55 AUST WIRELESS SECTION

Overview

55 Section was Formed in July 1942. The Section moved to Port Moresby in September 1942 at half strength and was reinforced in January 1943 to full strength. The Section Operated at Port Moresby until March 1944.The Sections had intercept and DF detachments operating in several areas. Det ‘A’ operated at Wanagela, Milne Bay and Kerema, returning to ‘55’ in September 1943. Det ‘B’ moved to Wau in July 1943 then Nadzab in October 1943. The Section was withdrawn to Port Moresby in January 1944.

Det ‘A’ was a Mobile D/F detachment, which carried out an experimental and operational role during the detachment.

Det ‘B’ was operated in forward areas to obtain more complete coverage of certain low-formation Army Links.


Figure 1:55 Section - Lt Col Ryan #1



2

Figure 2: 55 Section - Lt Col Ryan #2


On 31 July 1942, Central Bureau Committee Meeting discussed2:

Figure 3: Extract CB Minutes 31 July 1942

Deployments

Bill McCue3:

On 1 August Jack Vasey took over 55 Wireless which commenced training as a section.


Intelligence - Central Bureau - Special Intelligence, Special Wireless Group, ULTRA material related to the interception of enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines- staffing and other Allied administrative arrangements for collection of Y Intelligence] [2.5cm], 3 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


3

Planned Move of Detachment

On 17 October 1942, General Blamey advised HQ Land Operations and subsequently HQ

Land Forces Melbourne of planned moves for 55 Special Wireless Section and equipment to

HATRACK (possibly Nazrab) 4:

Figure 4:: Move forward of 55 Section Detachment with DF5

Bill McCue6:

4 Ibid 5 Also shown previously 6 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


4

On 1 September 55 Section moved out [from Bonegilla] to Bandiana railway station.

On 24 September a signal was received from NGFORCE of the arrival of 55 Section.

Jack Butler7:

I had been in Darwin only a couple of months when another operator and myself (now a full-blown corporal) were given orders to fly to Townsville en-route to Port Moresby to join. 55 Section. We took off in the plane, an RAAF Sunderland flying boat, in the early hours of the morning so that we would be well clear of the Darwin area before Japanese fighters put in an appearance, put down at Groote Eylandt in the gulf to refuel, across Cape York to Cooktown and then down to Townsville. It was a very noisy, slow trip which took some 22 hours. We hung around Townsville for 3 or 4 days and were then put aboard an American troopship, Johann van Oldenbarnevelt, for Port Moresby. We were the only Australians aboard, in with some 1000 American troops. There was to be no sign of 55 Section for another 4-5 weeks.

Figure 5: Johann Van Oldenbarnevelt8

Jack continued:

When Gordon (my mate) and I were unloaded in Port Moresby nobody wanted to know us. The Japanese were advancing down the Kokoda Trail and things were decidedly unpleasant for two unattached personnel. We made ourselves known to the area CSO and asked for a receiving set, aerial wire, stationery and a work tent so we could begin mapping out the Japanese groups in New Guinea. We did, of course, have an ulterior motive. We reckoned that, if there was to be another evacuation, we were going to be the CSO's bag carriers.

During our hours on the set taking down Japanese traffic and recording station callsigns, groups and frequencies, it was possible to identify the station locations at

7 Extract from a presentation to 7 Signal Regiment Officers 14 August 1992 by John Butler 8 http://www.rafchangi.com/troopships/


5

places like Rabaul, Wewak, Madang, Salamaua, Buna, Gona and the rest. Most groups consisted of a rear control with two forward stations. It was also interesting to note that the closer a unit got to the front, the simpler was the cipher employed in sending messages with the result that, when we were taking down front-line traffic, it was simple to convert the messages into plain language for translation. We passed all our traffic through the CSO.

We are still not sure what delayed the arrival of 55 Section, but it could have been Uncle Jack's deciding not to have another Greece and Crete operation on his hands. In any case, the section arrived after the Japanese advance had been halted. We were very pleased to see them.

It was in New Guinea that the practice of utilising detachments in outer areas was used extensively. Once the Japanese advance down the Kokoda trail had been turned back, I took a small detachment into the Owen Stanleys to a native village called Bisiabumu. Reception there of useful tactical traffic was good. We also had a grandstand view of formations of Japanese bombers which passed overhead on their way to bomb the airstrips at Port Moresby. We had to pull out of Bisiabumu when the wet season looked like stranding us for two or three months. In time, other detachments went to places on the north coast.

Steve Mason9: We eventually got to Townsville. We were called 55 Australian Wireless Section at

that time. We had a few days there while we were waiting for a ship. It was hot, it

was humid and there was very little water in the town. We were camped at a place

called Anoomba

We eventually boarded the S.S. Canberra, a former coastal steamer. 6,600 tons. It

had iced water on board! The iced water lasted an hour at the most! As soon as the

troops realised they were into it! Three days on the ship, and the sea was completely

calm

We landed at Moresby, and it had been pretty badly battered with bombing. We

found our way to camp which was at Seven Mile. We arrived at Moresby on 21st

December.

Bill McCue10:

On 8 January 1943 Ernie Austwick returned from special duty in New Guinea (the

installation of DF equipment at Wanigela).

On the 16th [January] a second draft moved out from Bonegilla to 55 Section.

9 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs 10 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


6

Figure 6: Port Moresby - Camp for 5311 Section12

Figure 7: Port Moresby - Thatching the roof of the new set room building13

11 As written on rear of photo. Another photo from Steve Mason states Camp at Hollandia 1944 (Section 53) 12 7 Sig Regt archives 13 Source Unknown


7

Figure 8: Completed Building14

Figure 9: Operating Hut: Set Room and in foreground showing dug-in construction15

14 Extract from On Ultra-Active Service. 15 Photo courtesy of Steve Mason


8


On 22 October 1942, the Central Bureau Committee Meeting discussed16:

Figure 10: Extract CB Minutes 22 October 1942

RAAF Support

Extracts from the book The Emperors Codes17

A detachment of the RAAF’s No. 1 Wireless Unit was sent to Port Moresby in January

1943 to assist 55 Section in its coverage of air-to-ground radio networks. The

Japanese followed set procedures that allowed the intelligence analysts attached to

the intercept units to predict precisely when and where they would strike. Direct

telephone links between the intercept sites and the fighter controllers ensured that

Allied aircraft could be in the air to intercept the enemy bombers.

and

By early 1943, the Australian Special Wireless Group had deployed 51 Wireless

Section to Darwin where it was picking up a good deal of Japanese military traffic,

particularly from Borneo and the Philippines, and 55 Wireless Section to Port

Moresby, on New Guinea. At one point the Japanese were only thirty miles away

from Port Moresby and Bob Edwards, one of 55 Section’s operators, recalled seeing

RAAF Spitfires and USAAF Thunderbolts doing victory rolls as they flew back from the

front line.

There were occasions when bombers returned with gaping holes in wings or tail

assembly, sure evidence of the activity they had been involved in. There were two

sad occasions. Firstly when a Flying Fortress, returning at night from a raid, hit the

top of the mountain behind the camp and blew up with the loss of all its crew. The

second tragedy occurred one night when a bomber crashed on take-off. As its bomb-

load went up, it sounded like all hell had been let loose.

and

The men of 55 Wireless Section at Port Moresby were monitoring divisional-and

regimental-level army networks along the northern New Guinea coast and at Rabaul.

But many of these operated on low power, and reception on the other side of the

Owen Stanley Range was far from perfect, so a detachment was moved forward to


Intelligence - Central Bureau - Special Intelligence, Special Wireless Group, ULTRA material related to the interception of enemy wireless traffic including Y signals and X (Typex) cypher machines- staffing and other Allied administrative arrangements for collection of Y Intelligence] [2.5cm], 17 Smith, Michael; Erskine, Ralph (2010-06-29). The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park's role in breaking Japan's secret cyphers (Kindle

Locations 2984-2987, 2948 – 2955 and 3164-3174). Biteback Publishing. Kindle Edition.


9

Kaindi, some 7,000 feet above the frontline Australian outpost of Wau , an old gold-

mining centre. Based in the deserted home of a former mine manager, the

detachment was able to pick up large numbers of new radio networks, many of

which used extremely lax security. There were a lot of plain-language transmissions

and the detachment was able to report a good deal of intelligence, including details

of troops being sent in to reinforce the Japanese garrison at Lae. Traffic analysis of

the operator message logs carried out by Stan Clark’s section in Central Bureau built

up an extremely accurate picture of the movement of barges down from Palau and

along the northern New Guinea coast, allowing General Kenney’s 5th Air Force to

launch devastating attacks that cut supplies to the increasingly beleaguered

Japanese outposts. When Blamey’s forces captured Lae on 16 September and the

Japanese 51st Infantry Division began its retreat to Kiari, the Australian Army

intercept operators at Kaindi were able to track its movements. Ripped apart during

the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as a result of intelligence provided by Central Bureau

and FRUMEL, the unlucky 51st now found itself under sustained attack yet again as a

result of the codebreakers’ efforts.

Nadzab

Detachment B of 55 Wireless Section was located at Nadzab from December 1943 until April

1944.

Steve Mason18:

We did reasonably well at Nadzab; again for some strange reason I was seconded to the Air Force. The RAAF had an intercept section there, 1 Wireless Unit. They were based at the end of the airstrip. Why they took up location there I’ll never know – I couldn’t see any sense in that. My job was to work with the RAAF on the DF (Direction Finding) machine – they had a Collins machine there and I had a transceiver. My job was to get onto the set when we picked up possible enemy air raids and inform the section that a raid was pending. They would then inform the Ack Ack and the Fighters and so forth and a reception committee could be waiting for them. The idea was all right but I could never get through on the set! I think the mountain structure and the skip distance may have had something to do with it but it was not a success. So I got a jeep, and when we had successfully identified the enemy aircraft I used to jump in the jeep and hurtle along the strip to let my people know and they then alerted the fighters and Ack Ack!

18 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs


10

Figure 11: Nadzab Location19

Figure 12: Nadzab Site

19 Google Map 2014


11

Figure 13: DF Detachment at Wanigela20

Figure 14: Detachment Hut at Wanigela21

20 Extract from On Ultra-Active Service. 21 Ibid


12

Figure 15: DF equipment used by 55 Section22

Traffic Analysis

Extract from the book The Emperors Codes23

Although the Japanese Army codes were still frustratingly difficult to break, traffic analysis of 55 Wireless Section intercepts provided an early success for Central Bureau. It very quickly built up a detailed picture of the Japanese troops attempting to cross the Owen Stanley Range, north of Port Moresby, allowing the Australian 7th Division and the US 32nd Division to defeat them at Kokoda and force them back to the northern coast.

Mobile/Man Portable DF

The author has not been able to ascertain what Mobile/Man Portable DF equipment was used by the Detachments24. The following two models are known to have been used in Europe and the SWPA:

22 ibid 23 Smith, Michael; Erskine, Ralph (2010-06-29). The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park's role in breaking Japan's secret cyphers (Kindle

Locations 2977-2980). Biteback Publishing. Kindle Edition 24 Steve Mason noted in a letter to Jack Fenton: Det B Nadzab, [Steve Mason] worked with 1 Wireless Unit (RAAF) on a Collins DF machine

situated on the air strip


13

Figure 16: Receiver DFP425

Figure 17: Receiver DFP526

25 http://www.wftw.nl/rsets.html 26 Ibid


14

Intercept Receivers

The main receives used by the ASWG were the HRO and Kingsley 101. Steve Mason27:

ASWG Sections used 101s, which were known as ‘KINGSLEYS’ manufactured in Melbourne and named after the company’s founder, Kingsley Love. In New Guinea the American HROs were issued but they proved useless in jungle conditions. The Kingsleys were set in rubber and could be roughly handled in and out of aircraft. In March 1944 we made a move from Nadzab to Finschaven as we were pressing up closer to the front line. We were to join 53 Section, who had come up later than us and gone straight to Finschaven. Our people from Section 55 at Moresby and our Detachment were to go and join 53 Section, led by Jimmy Woods.

ASWG Reorganisation



Figure 18: ASWG Reorganisation

Absorb personnel as far as possible in serial 1 remaining personnel to be

absorbed in serial 2.


27 Letter to Jack Fenton 13 May 2014 28 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals


15



29 NAA B5436 PART J Central Bureau Technical Records Part J - Field sections


16



17



18

Figure 22: Extract from Field Sections Summary – Page 4

ANNEX O to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

56 AUST WIRELESS SECTION

Overview

56 Section was formed in October 1942. It was primarily manned by AWAS personnel. In April 1943, the Section moved to Perth. In October 1944 the Section was withdrawn to Kalinga.

56 Section Movement

On 12 April 1943, the advance party of 56 Section departed and on the 17th the remainder

departed for Western Australia1.

Employment Area

Jean Hillier2:

Until our set room was built we worked in a truck. This was located away from the camp, around the corner and along the Albany Road. We never felt lonely or isolated as far as I can remember. The truck was such a hive of activity with the sound of Morse, (which always sounded busy), the moans of despair or yelps of jubilation from the operators, and the check and supervisor moving around us constantly. It was a tiny world of its own. Perhaps the least happy member of the group would have been the guard sitting outside by his fire and looking pleased when the check took him his tea. Once the Advance Party arrived it did not take long to have the truck in position and connected to aerials. We were allotted our watches, A, B, C and D to which I belonged. Each watch consisted of about eight girls and, to begin with, a male supervisor. At first we worked naval watches of twenty four hours on twenty four off. During the twenty four hours we worked four hours on four off with two dog watches.

Later an ‘I’ staff joined us, a little group of about six men, I think.

The set truck was a five ton Chevrolet. Benches were fitted along the sides and also the back, I think. It was covered, of course and no hint of its contents visible. There were two sets for each operator, swivel Bendix chairs and a table for the supervisor and check to sort messages and prepare them for dispatch.

1 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946) 2 No Medals In This Unit pages 78,79,80


2

Figure 1: Chevrolet 5 ton truck

The set truck was heavily armed. Along the front, backing the cabin was a Bren. It was mounted rather like one of those huge salmon that grace baronial fireplaces and as far as the girls were concerned, of about as much use. Around the rest of the truck were dispersed sub machine guns and .303s plus the occasional hand grenade. I always worked on Jap Army; we called it ‘Y’, but for all I know the others may have been covering naval traffic. Search went on on one set, the face of the operator a picture of total absorption One set was manned by a member of Sixty Four Section attending to her separate duty, Security, and for a while one set was devoted to taking Reuters for the benefit of the Commander in Chief, Western Command who liked his news ahead of anyone else. Reuters was strictly forbidden to the rest of us because we had to concentrate on our assignment and nothing else. I forget how long we used the set truck but eventually a setroom was built. It was a rather nice building, certainly better than the truck which was a bit crowded. The floor and benches were jarrah and kept beautifully polished. Slowly the war moved away from the Indian Ocean. Our presence in the West became unnecessary. We left Perth in late spring of 1944 and re-joined Headquarters in Brisbane.


3



Figure 2: Extract from Field Sections Summary

ASWG Reorganisation




Absorb personnel in serial 2.

3 NAA B5436 PART J Central Bureau Technical Records Part J - Field sections 4 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals


4

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Overview


Figure 4: Section 56 - Lt Col Ryan


ANNEX P to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


Approval for Raising 57 Aust Special Wireless Section

On 25 February 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Charge advised D.S.D that the CGS had approved

the raising of 57 Aust Special Wireless Section Type B1:

Figure 1: 57 Section Approved

1 NAA MP729/6 37/401/1561 Additional Special Wireless Sections Type B


2

Staff for 57 Special Wireless Section

On 5 March 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Charge advised D.S.D that the staff requirements for

57 Aust Special Wireless Section Type B2:

Figure 2: Staff for 57 Special Wireless Section



3

Adjutant General Advice

On 17 March 1943, the Adjutant General advised various HQs of the establishment of the

new Sections3: (Poor copy –pertinent sections reproduced below original)

Figure 3: Raising of 57 Section - Page 1

1. The officers will be selected by LHQ and the OR Personnel will be provided as

under:

For 57 Aust Spec Wireless Sec “A” Class personnel will be selected from

general reinforcements in Central Sig Trg Depot Bonegilla.

3 Ibid


4


Section Being Raised

On 28 April 1943, The General Officer Commanding Victoria L of C Area advised Land HQ

that the new section was being raised and completion date4:

Figure 5: GOC Victoria LofC Advice

4 Ibid


5

Transfer of Personnel

On 9 June 1943, the General Officer Commanding Victoria L of C Area advised Land HQ of

the transfer of personnel5:

Figure 6: Transfer of Personnel

5 Ibid


6

Specialised Training

On 9 June 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Chief advised DSD of the requirement for specialised

training6

Figure 7: Specialised Training

ASWG Reorganisation





7


Absorb personnel as far as possible in serial 1 remaining personnel to

be absorbed in serial 2.

ANNEX Q to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


Approval for Raising 58 Aust Special Wireless Section

On 25 February 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Charge advised D.S.D that the CGS had approved

the raising of 58 Aust Special Wireless Section Type B1:

Figure 1: 58 Section Approved



2

Staff for 58 Special Wireless Section

On 5 March 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Charge advised D.S.D that the staff requirements for

58 Aust Special Wireless Section Type B2:

Figure 2: Staff for 58 Section



3

Adjutant General Advice

On 17 March 1943, the Adjutant General advised various HQs of the establishment of the

new Sections3: (Poor copy –pertinent sections reproduced below original)


1. The officers will be selected by LHQ and the OR Personnel will be provided as

under:

3 Ibid


4

For 58 Aust Spec Wireless Sec the ORs will be raised from AWAS personnel in

Nos 1 and 2 Aust Sig Trg Bns (AWAS) but until such time as fully trained

AWAS personnel are available, males will be provided from within the

resources of Aust Special Wireless Gp in the following categories:

Officers - 2 CQMS - 1 Sgts - 2 Electric. Sigs 2 Fitters Siogs 2 Inst Mechs 2 Carpenters 1 2 10 12

Section Being Raised

On 28 April 1943, The General Officer Commanding Victoria L of C Area advised Land HQ

that the new section was being raised and completion date4:

Figure 4: GOC Victoria LofC Advice

4 Ibid


5

Transfer of Personnel

On 9 June 1943, the General Officer Commanding Victoria L of C Area advised Land HQ of

the transfer of personnel5:

Figure 5: Transfer of Personnel

5 Ibid


6

Specialised Training

On 9 June 1943, the Signal Officer-in-Chief advised DSD of the requirement for specialised

training6

Figure 6: Specialised Training

6 Ibid


7

AWAS for 58 Section

On 31 August 1943, MILBASE Melbourne advised Land Force HQ and MILBASE Brisbane that

1 Officer and 60 Other Ranks AWAS were despatched to 58 Aust Wireless Section on 30

August 19437.

Figure 7: AWAS for 58 Section

ASWG Reorganisation







8

Overview


Figure 9: Section 58 - Lt Col Ryan


ANNEX R to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


ASWG Reorganisation

On 29 March 1945, Major General Simpson, the Signals Officer-in-Chief again wrote to DSD






Figure 2: Extract from CB Technical Intelligence Report – Commitment

1 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals 2 NAA A6923, SI/5 Central Bureau - Technical - Signals - Intelligence Report No. 2. [Includes Supplement to Report No. 2].

ANNEX R to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

2

Bill McCue3:

HQ ASWG, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 Sections were disbanded on 11 May 1945.

ASWG and 96 Section was raised on 11 May 1945.

3 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616

ANNEX S to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1


Overview

96 Section was formed late in the war when the reorganisation of the ASWG occurred. The

Section was established from personnel of the other Wireless Sections that were closing.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan reported on 96 Section1:

Figure 1: 96 Section - Lt Col Ryan

ASWG Reorganisation



Figure 2: Reorganisation of ASWG

Operations

Bill McCue3:

In the projected moves for April 1945 there was mention of the reorganisation of

ASWG and the raising of 96 Section will then take place.

On 26 May 96 Section was located at Nundah Brisbane.

1 Ibid 2 NAA A10857 A Special Wireless Section – type A – Australian Corps Signals 3 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616

ANNEX S to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

2

HQ ASWG, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 SECTIONS WERE DISBANDED ON 11 MAY 1945. ASWG

AND 96 SECTION WERE RAISED ON 11 MAY 1945.

On 11 June Section 96 commenced operations as a separate field section.

On 11 August in the monthly information letter it stated that Landforces SD58618

places ASWG under warning order for embarkation for tropical service. It was

recommended that 96 be re-organised into a Type B Section and should move with

ASWG. Section 96 establishment was 1 officer and 79 ORs.

On 7th September a warning order was received for the movement to Balcombe of 96

Section prior to disbandment.

On 17 September 61 males and 50 AWAS personnel of 96 Section entrained for

Balcombe.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Overview

In his Report on Special Wireless Units (Signals) 1940 – 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan presented an overview of 96Aust Special Wireless Section4:

Figure 3: Section 96 - Lt Col Ryan Report


ANNEX T to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

DETACHMENT ‘A’

Overview

On 7 May 1945, 53 Australian Wireless Section was renamed Detachment A, ASWG, in

accordance with the new establishment1.

Bill McCue2:

The “Projected Moves” in the monthly report for December 1944 stated that it was

anticipated that Det A, ASWG will be withdrawn to HQ early in the New Year.

In the projected moves for April 1945 there was mention of a request to completely

relieve 53 Section by 3 officers and 67 ORs to be known as Detachment A.

On 7 May, 53 Section was renamed Detachment A ASWG under the provisions of the

new War Establishment.

The report on 26 May stated that 53 Section was disbanded and reorganised into

Detachment A ASWG on 30 April.

The monthly information letter of September, 1945, stated that relief personnel of

Detachment A arrived at Morotai on 20 August. It was intended for operations in

Labuan but due to developments in the South West Pacific Area the unit remained in

Morotai and commenced operations as required by Advance Central Bureau on 31

August.

Detachment A left Morotai [circa 20 December] on the “Georgetown Victory”.

Detachment A disembarked at Brisbane. Low priority personnel were sent on leave

thence to Mornington.

1 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946)April to June 1945 2 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616

ANNEX U to The History of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

Wireless

Sections

TYPE

C


2

Sections 61 – 67 (Type C)

General

The Sections numbered 61 to 67 were established to conduct surveillance of own force

communications, to detect security breaches and use of incorrect communications

procedures1. There is little mention of these units in the ASWG and subsequent 1 Aust

Independent Signal Unit War diaries.

Bill McCue included in his manuscript the following description of Type C units2:

(a) Special Wireless Section Type C –

(i) To maintain signal security on Australian Army and RAAF traffic.

(ii) To make reports to SO-in-C and CSO to whom they are attached on

(a) Breaches of security (b) Poor procedure, standard of efficiency of

units etc.

(b) Two Special Wireless Sections Type C are employed on the intercept of illicit

wireless.

Jack Butler 3:

Historically, when we went to Seymour and became part of 2 Coy Sigs 1 Aust Corps,

No. 2 section was also formed. Its purpose was to monitor our div sigs sections and

recording breaches of message transmission procedures. So we also quickly earned

the title of "snoopers". We had to live with this unpopularity in 2 coy because of the

secrecy requirement Uncle Jack hammered into us right from the start. Strangely

enough, and I don't know why, when ASWG was formed in May 1942 these snooper

sections were joined in with us. We, the sigint sections, were 51 to 56, while the

snoopers were 61 to 66.

1 Aust Independent Signals Unit

The War Diaries for 1 Aust Independent Signals Group4 noted that on 1/4/44 62,62,63,54,54,55,67 Australian Wireless Sections reallocated to Order of Battle for Aust Indep Gp.

The War Diary for November 1944 showed the following:

61, 62, 63, 64 (AWAS), 64 (AWAS) 66, 67 Wireless Sections under command._

Section Date Event

61 21 Jan 43 Section marched out from Bonegilla for New Guinea

16 Mar 43 Deployed at Port Moresby

1 In later years called COMSEC (Communications Security) 2 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 3 Email to Jack Fenton April 2014 4 AWM: AWM52 7/20/2 1 Aust Independent Signal Unit


3

Section Date Event

22 Mar 44 Relief personnel departed ASWG HQ for 61 Section

12 May 44 Section transferred to No 1 Aust Independent Signals Group

62 24 Jan 43 Section commenced departing Bonegilla for Darwin

Mar 43 Employed in the Darwin Area

Nov 43 To be relieved by 66 Section and after leave, relieved personnel to relieve 61 Section


Mar 45 Section working with 64 Section at Balcombe

63 3 Feb 43 Section marched out from Bonegilla for Queensland

Mar 43 Employed with ASWG HQ at Kalinga

31 May 43 Deployed to Atherton, Queensland

29 Sep 43 Section returned to HQ ASWG

Dec 43 Section personnel move out to 62 Section as relief


64 12 Apr 43 Section commenced moving to Perth

May 43 Moved to Perth

May 43 Operational in the Perth Area


Jun 44 Section moved to Balcombe, Victoria

Mar 45 Section working with 62 Section

4 Sep 45 Section to be disbanded

9 Oct 45 Section Disbanded

65 April 43 Section formed at Bonegilla. Consisting of 1 Officer, 3 NCOs and 19 ORs

17 May Section at Bonegilla

25 Oct 43 Section moved to Mornington, Victoria

Oct 44 Section moved to Townsville and Cairns, Queensland area.

4 Sep 45 Section to withdraw to Balcombe and disband

66 6 Jul 43 CGS approved the raising of 66 Section

Jul 43 In process of formation at HQ ASWG

Nov 43 Section preparing for move to Darwin Area

Mar 44 Section moved out with 1 Aust Discrimination Unit



67 6 Jul 43 CGS approved the raising of 66 Section

Jul 43 In process of formation at HQ ASWG

15 Mar 44 Advance Party departed for Barrine, Queensland

17 Mar 44 Remainder of the Section departed for Barrine



1 Aust Discrimination Unit

10 Mar 44 Members of 1 Aust Discrimination Unit marched out for Canberra

4 Sep 45 Unit to withdraw to Balcombe and disband

15 Oct 45 Unit closed down


4

61 Section

61 Section Move

On 21 January 1943, the War Diary listed 61 Section as marched out5.

Section Location

In late March 1943, the War Diary listed 61 Section as being deployed in the field6:

On 31 May 1943, the War Diary listed 61 Section as being deployed in the New Guinea

area7:

Figure 1: Ken Hardy and Tom Alderdice 61 Section- Port Moresby 19438

5 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946) 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Photo courtesy of Steve Mason


5

62 Section

62 Section Move

On 24 January 1943, the Advance Party of 62 Section marched out and on the 25th the rest

followed9.


On 31 May 1943, the War Diary listed 62 Section as being deployed at Darwin11:

War Diaries for 1 Aust Independent Signals Group12

Extract from a Monthly Report covering January 1945:

Location Leanyer13. Preparing for move

Extract from a Monthly Report covering April 1945:

BBC commitment watched by this Section up to 25 March is now being covered by 64

Wireless Section.

End of month 62 Australian Wireless Section ceased working with 64 Australian

Wireless Section. Located Balcombe.

63 Section

63 Section Move

On 3 February 1943, the War Diary listed 63 Section as marched out14.


63 Section Locations

On 17 May 1943, the War Diary16 records 63 Section at their new location [no location

given].

On 31 May 1943, the War Diary listed 63 Section as being deployed at Atherton17:

9 Ibid 10Ibid 11 Ibid 12 AWM: AWM52 7/20/2 1 Aust Independent Signal Unit 13 Suburb of Darwin 14 Ibid 15 Ibid 16 Ibid 17 Ibid


6

64 Section

Overview

64 Section was formed in April 1943 and moved to Perth in May 1943. It moved to

Balcombe, Victoria in June 1944.

Sections Movement

On 12 April 1943, the advance party of 64 Sections departed and on the 17th the remainder

departed for Western Australia18.

On 31 May 1943, the War Diary listed 64 Section as being deployed at Perth19:

Deployments

Bill McCue20:

On 5 April l1943], the MT of 56 and 64 Sections moved out [from Bonegilla] at 0900

hours. The next day the advance party of both sections moved out at 0700 hours.

Five days later the remainder of the two sections moved out to Western Australia.

Jean Hillier21:

She [Eileen Brown] includes a poignant memory of having a good cry after taking P.O.W. messages and wondering if the writers came home. I asked Eileen to tell me more about this assignment and she says the messages were in English spoken by someone who said she was Tokyo Rose. “There was also Charles Cousens, who was an Australian and, I think, arrested after the war. We listened into Radio Tokyo, Radio Saigon and Radio Shonan. I had my own version of shorthand which I hope was understood.” Apart from taking these messages, Eileen, being in 64 Section, had the job of

monitoring our Forces’ traffic, a job none of the girls liked but which was essential all

the same.


Extract from a Monthly Report covering November 1944:

Sections listed as C1, V2, W4, X2, Y, Z1`, Z2

18 Ibid 19 Ibid 20 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 21 No Medals In This Unit page 68 22 AWM: AWM52 7/20/2 1 Aust Independent Signal Unit


7

Extract from a Monthly Report covering December 1944

Located Western Port23. No 4 Reception Sets (Aust) better than No 1.

Reception Set No 124

The Reception Set No.1 (Aust.) was a special communications receiver designed for interception reception in special Wireless Sections and for general communications within and above Corps. on CW and MCW telegraphy (W/T), and Radio Telephony (R/T). It covered a frequency range of 138 to 410 Kc/s (2174 to 731 metres) and 495 Kc/s to 25 Mc/s (606 to 12 metres) using 6 plug in coils to cover the range..

NOTE that the Reception Set No.1 (Aust.) was adapted from the Kingsley Radio KCR/11 that was used by the RAAF as the AR7.

A separate power supply was provided which allowed the receiver to operate from either 230-240v ac, from mains supply or a petrol generator, or from 12v dc provided by two 6 volt 150 ah. secondary batteries. The current consumption on ac was 0.32 amps at 230v. On dc it was 4.75 amps. The Power Supply had a 3 position switch on the front: 12VDC - OFF -

230VAC.

Figure 2: Reception Set No 1 (Aust)

Reception Set No 425

The Reception Set No. 4 (Aust.) was designed for interception reception and general communications in both mobile or fixed locations, on radio telephony (RT), wireless telegraphy (CW) and modulated wireless telegraphy (MCW) in the range 1.2 Mc/s (250metres) to 20 Mc/s (15 metres). It was also the primary set for use with the Wireless Set (Aust.) No. 133 and the secondary set for the WS No. 22. It was made for the Australian Army by the Australian Philips organisation.

23 Probably on the Mornington Peninsular 24 http://www.qsl.net/vk2dym/radio/No.1a.htm 25 http://www.qsl.net/vk2dym/radio/No.4a.htm


8

The frequency coverage was arranged in four switched bands as follows:

BAND A 1.2 Mc/s 3.3 Mc/s

BAND B 3.3 Mc/s 8.2 Mc/s

BAND C 8.2 Mc/s 13.8 Mc/s

BAND D 13.8 Mc/s 20 Mc/s

It weighed approximately 41 pounds alone (18.6 Kg) but with accessories and protecting cover the all up weight was 66 pounds (30 Kg). Dimensions of the set only were 19 ½” wide x 10 ½” deep x 9” high (483mm W x 267mm D x 229mm H).

Figure 3: Reception Set No 4 (Aust) #1

Figure 4: Reception Set No 4 (Aust) #2


9

Extract from a Monthly Report covering January 1945:

Located Western Port. Working conditions good

Extract from a Monthly Report covering March 1945

Move to new Operations Hut. New receivers in use by 62 and 64 Wireless

Sections who are combined in 64 Operationg Hut Balcombe.

Extract from a Monthly Report covering April 1945:

End of month 62 Australian Wireless Section ceased working with 64 Australian

Wireless Section. Located Balcombe.

Disbandment

On 4 September 1945, 64 Wireless Section was included in a Minute from Major General Simpson,

the Signal Officer-in-Chief to the Directors of Staff Duties about the disposal of some of the Wireless

Sections26:



In October 1945 the War Diaries indicated the disbandment of section 64 and later that the

Section was disbanded on 9 Oct 45.. No other Sections were mentioned.

26 NAA A6923, SI/3 Australian Military Forces - Signal Officer in Chief - DMI - Central Bureau - [Special Intelligence, ULTRA, related to the

interception of enemy wireless traffic interception and C intelligence dealing with the Radio Security Service RSS under the control of the director General of Security Brigadier W B Simpson 27 AWM: AWM52 7/20/2 1 Aust Independent Signal Unit


10

65 Section

Overview

65 Section was formed in May 1943 at Mornington, Victoria. It later moved to Queensland and was located in the Townsville and Cairns areas.

65 Section Location

On 17 May 1943, the War Diary28 65 Section still at Bonegilla.

On 31 May 1943, the War Diary listed 65 Section as being deployed at Bonegilla29:

Deployments

Bill McCue30:

On 26 May [1943], a Lt Winter went to Bonegilla to command 65 Section at Bonegilla.

Movement of 65 Wireless Section

On 13 October 1943, the Signal-Officer-in-Chief advised staff of the movement of 65

Wireless Section31 (Extract):

28 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946) 29 Ibid 30 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 31 31 NAA: A6923, 37/401/425. CGS Branch - Military Intelligence - Special Intelligence Section [administrative arrangements of the setting

up and staffing of the section to work on Y intelligence, Diplomatic cyphers for the ULTRA project on intercepted enemy communications- also includes recruitment of linguists with expertise in mathematics or the Japanese language, such as Professor T G Room, Mr R J Lyons and Mr A P Treweek of the University of Sydney] [3cm]


11

Figure 6: Movement of 65 Section

Operations

Jean Hillier (Nee Maney) 32:

Operator Postings

The girls who had obtained their Group I rating were working on assignments and soon A.W.A.S. Sections left for Mornington33. These Sections covered Press, Diplomatic, and I think, Security traffic. They were extremely well thought of.

Peggy Banff, too, served in Mornington for a while as a member of 65 Section. We left Peggy Banff in Mornington and she now resumes her story. “It was during 1944 that our 65 Australian Wireless Section was sent to Cairns. We were joined by others who earlier had been serving in Western Australia, for that long journey north.” “Our own and Allied signals came in loud and clear. We monitored the dawn landings along the coast. Our greatest challenge was to keep up with the plain language sometimes very plain language- being sent by allied servicemen landing on the beaches from the landing crafts. The shock of finding females as interceptors of communications drew some unflattering comments from our ‘brothers-in-arms’”.

32 No Medals In This Unit pages 12, 13 16 33 Suspect Mornington equates to Balcombe


12

War Diaries for 1 Aust Independent Signals Group34 Extract from a Monthly Report Dated 16 Nov 44:

Engaged on 4 commitments from CSO 1 Aust Corps – relied on General Search.

General Logging having been resumed as from 23 Oct

3 sets engaged in logging exercises.

Located at Cairns

Extract from a Monthly Report covering February/March 1945:

16 Feb. Posted strength of 12 Operators [sic]

Longer coverage of commitments. Located Cairns

Disbandment

On 4 September 1945, 65 Wireless Section was included in a Minute from Major General Simpson,

the Signal Officer-in-Chief, to the Directors of Staff Duties about the disposal of some of the Wireless

Sections35:


34 AWM: AWM52 7/20/2 1 Aust Independent Signal Unit 35 NAA A6923, SI/3 Australian Military Forces - Signal Officer in Chief - DMI - Central Bureau - [Special Intelligence, ULTRA, related to the



13

66 Section

Additional C Type Sections

On 6 July 1943, the CGS advised D.S.D that the CGS had approved the raising of two

additional C Type Special Wireless Sections numbered 66 and 67 for Radio Security36:

Figure 8: Approval for the Raising of Two C Sections

Overview

Little is written about 66 Section.

Bill McCue37:

In June 1944, a cricket match was held between 51 Section and a combined team of

62 and 66 Sections.

36 NAA MP729/6 37/401/1561 Additional Special Wireless Sections Type B 37 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616


14

Disbandment


Simpson, the Signal Officer-in-Chief to the Directors of Staff Duties about the disposal of






15

67 Section

Overview

Little is written about 67 Section. A few snippets follow: Bill McCue39:

On 14 July 1943, shown as being in process of formation at HQ location.

It is believed that 67 Section was included with the Signals Discrimination Unit.

March 1944. An advance party of 67 Section departed for Barrine, Queensland.

Figure 10: DF installation used by 67 Section40

Personnel for 67 Australian Special Wireless Section Depart

On 15 March 1944, the advance party of 67 Australian Special Wireless Section departed for

Barrine41, Qld and the remainder marched out on 17 March42.

39 Spook Stuff by Bill McCue AWM Accession No MSS 1616 40 Photo contained in Spook Stuff, supplied by George Auger 41 First Reference. Located between Cairns and Atherton 42 AWM52, 7/39/3 Special Wireless Group [Whole diary - 119 items] (May 1942 - Dec 1946)


16

Disbandment


Simpson, the Signal Officer-in-Chief to the Directors of Staff Duties about the disposal of





ANNEX V to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

Discrimination

Unit


2

Overview

In February/March 1943 Colonel Stratton, Royal Signals, visited Austalia and wrote a report

dated 11 March 19431, detailing the detection of illicit radio tranmsissions from Australia

and how a unit should be established. A pertinent extract relating to the formation of a

Discrimination Unit follow:

Figure 1: Formation of a Discrimination Unit

Signal Officer-in-Chief Minute

The following is an extract of a Minute dated 29 May 1943, to the CGS from the Signal Officer-in-Chief regarding the functions of the Discrimination Unit2

Figure 2: Discrimination Unit Functions

1 NAA A6923, SI/3, Australian Military Forces - Signal Officer in Chief - DMI - Central Bureau - [Special Intelligence, ULTRA, related to the




Note

Although not officially part of the ASWG, the Discrimination Unit is

included due to its close association with C Type Sections


3

Steve Mason 3:

I was transferred to Mac’s4 section – Mac grabbed me, I fancy. Army politics! I wonder! Here was a man so skilled in Japanese, and Japanese procedures, wireless and so forth and they put him in charge of the Discrimination Unit, a Unit formed to track down illegal radio transmission throughout Australia. Goodness me! What a waste of talent. Obviously politics were involved. I worked there with Keith Hart the Sergeant and Mel Laney and Mac – really the four of us were the most part of the Discrimination Unit in those early stages. On one occasion some local residents had noticed flashing lights coming off the coast round the Surfers Paradise area. At that time Lutheran missionaries had been released from internment, and they had bought a property overlooking the sea. There was a bit of a concern that they might be sending messages to submarines off the coast. We were given the job of doing the signals work, and Roy Rayner, Geoff Day and myself were sent out with two sig trucks to do the signal work, and ASIO or whatever the security service was called, did the work. The object was that we would have a sig truck at ground level by the sea shore and the other truck would be up in the mountains. As we saw a flash we would communicate with the truck in the mountain and they would try to pinpoint where the flash was coming from. We weren’t all that successful though the operation went on for a week. It was marvellous, these fellows would line up the best pub in town and we would eat there – we did pretty well even though we didn’t achieve anything! At the end the ASIO bloke reckoned it was just flashing lights from the cars going up the mountain. The car headlights were hooded in those days, and the lights were catching the mica in the rocks. It had been going on all the time, but because the Lutherans had just moved in suspicions had been aroused. I don’t know whether it was right or not but that was the story.

Disbandment Advice

On 4 September 1945, The Discrimination Unit was included in a Minute from Major

General Simpson, the Signal Officer-in-Chief to the Directors of Staff Duties about the

disposal of some of the Wireless Sections5:

Figure 3: Discrimination Unit Disbandment

Personnel Commitments

3 Jack Fenton Email to Bob Hartley 15 June 15 that contained Steve Mason Memoirs 4 Captain Bob McNamara 5 Ibid


4

On 11 October 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Sandford of Central Bureau requested advice from

Army HQ on the allocation of personnel after the closure of Special Wireless Sections Type

‘C’6

Figure 4: Request for advice on personnel allocation

Disbandment

On 15 October 1945, the Signal Officer-in-Chief advised that 1 Aust Discrimination Unit has

now closed down7:

6 Ibid 7 Ibid


5

Figure 5: Discrimination Unit Closure

ANNEX W to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

Radio Security

Defence Committee Agenda

On 29 March 1943, an item on the Defence Committee Agenda refereed to the

establishment of an organisation to detect illicit radio transmissions to and from Australia.

An extract of page 1 follows1:

Figure 1: Defence Committee Agenda Extract

1 NAA A6923, SI/3, Australian Military Forces - Signal Officer in Chief - DMI - Central Bureau - [Special Intelligence, ULTRA, related to the



2

Colonel Stratton Report

The report dated 11 March 1943, detailed the detection of illicit radio tranmsissions from

Australia and how a unit should be established2:

Figure 2: Colonel Stratton Report #1

2 Ibid


3



4



5



6



7

Army Response

On 31 March 1943, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Military Intelligence (ADDMI)

informed the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) that Army should be against the proposal3:

Figure 7: ADDMI Response

3 Ibid


8

Defence Committee Recommendations

At the meeting on 2 April 1943, the Defence Committee decided that sufficient expertise

existed in the Services and that the Service Chiefs and Director of Security Service should

meet and discuss the decision4

Figure 8: Defence Committee Recommendation

4 Ibid


9

Sub Committee Meeting

On 14 April 1943, the Service Chiefs met and the following decisions were presented5:

[Main points are highlighted]

Figure 9: Service Chiefs Recommendation

5 Ibid


10

DCGS Approval

On 29 April 1943, the DCGS agreed with the establishment of the Radio Security

organisation and two Army C Sections6:

Figure 10: C Sections Approved by DCGS

6 Ibid


11

Type C Sections Approved

On 6 July 1943, the CGS approved the raising of two additional Special Wireless Sections

(Type C) numbered 66 and 67 under the command of the Australian Special Wireless Group

Figure 11: C Sections Approved by CGS

1 Australian Discrimination Unit Overview

The following is an extract from the Web Page OZATWAR7:

During WW2 the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs made available Observation Centres across Australia for the monitoring of various frequency bands. These Observation Centre were fully manned by the Post Office with qualified Radio Operators who carried out radio surveillance work. These qualified radio operators formed what was known as the 1 Australian Discrimination Unit.

The men in the Unit were basically telegraphists who had an interest in radio and were professional Morse men employed by the PMG. Some of them may have had a marine background or came from OTC. They intercepted illicit transmissions and were responsible for preventing merchant shipping from being attacked by the Japanese off the coast of Australia.

7 http://www.ozatwar.com/civilian/1ausdiscrimunit.htm


12

Observations Centres for the Radio Security Organisation were located in the

following locations:-

Brisbane Sydney Melbourne Adelaide Perth

Stuart Brown's father was a member of 1 Australian Discrimination Unit at the Sydney Observation Centre in a suburban house in Telegraph Road, Pymble, Sydney, where he tracked a Japanese subversive who was using a Seventh Day Adventists radio station in Newcastle to transmit his messages.

On 30 August 1945, Mr. W. B. Simpson, the Director General of Security wrote a letter to The Secretary, The Department of Defence in Canberra to enquire about the ongoing role of Radio Security. Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion that the need for the Radio Security Organisation no longer existed in its present form and that perhaps it should be disbanded. At that time the 1 Australian Discrimination Unit was attached in Canberra with a War Establishment comprising 1 Officer, 1 Warrant Officer and 8 Ordinary Ranks. Mr. Wilson proposed that the unit be returned to the appropriate Headquarters (Signal Officer-in-Chief Branch) for disposal.

Mr. Wilson went on to say "If it should be decided that the Radio Security Organization is to discontinue, then it will be no longer necessary to retain these Observation Centres."

Whilst making this recommendation he also said "I should point out that Majors Ogilvy and Hill (of the Radio Security Organisation) on their return from the United Kingdom (in Nov 1944) reported that the U.K. Authorities propose continuing Radio Security in the post war years and suggested that Australia might retain some form of Radio Security Organization. The Defence Committee might desire to consider this aspect, but I very much doubt whether the cost of such an organization would be accepted by the Government in time of peace. I would appreciate your further advice".

The Join Planning Committee (JPC 73) considered the above recommendations. This Joint Planning Committee meeting comprised:-

Captain H.J. Buchanan, D.S.O., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Brigadier A.W. Wardell, M.C., Representing Brigadier General Staff Air Commodore F.M. Bladin, C.B.E., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

The Committee agreed that the Radio Security Organisation should be disbanded forthwith. The Joint Planning Committee considered that Radio Security was clearly an integral and vital part of Intelligence work, and in fact, that it fell into place as one of the group of tasks which formed what was known as Signal Intelligence.

It was the opinion of the Joint Planning Committee that planning for Radio Security should commence at an early date to ensure that it could be quickly organised in

http://www.ozatwar.com/sigint/radiosecurityorgn.htm

http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/ocrsobne.htm

http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/ocrsosyd.htm

http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/ocrsomlb.htm

http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/ocrsoade.htm

http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/ocrsoper.htm









13

Australia whenever circumstances required, but it considered that such planning must be part of planning for a Signal Intelligence Organisation.

The findings of the Joint Planning Committee were then considered by the Defence Committee. In a letter from H. D. Preston, Joint Secretary Defence Committee dated 30 October 1945, they endorsed the recommendation of the Joint Planning Committee that the present Radio Security Organisation should be closed down immediately. They recommended however that the question of Radio Security should receive consideration in connection with the future organisation of Joint Intelligence services which the Defence Committee understood was then under review.


ANNEX X to The Story of the ASWG 1939 – 1947

1

CENTRAL BUREAU REPORT ON ASWG ACTIVITIES

Contained in an Australian National Archives undated document titled Central Bureau Technical Records, Part J, Field Sections was a summary of the activities of the ASWG1:

Figure 1: Field Sections Report Cover

1 NAA B5436 PART J Central Bureau Technical Records Part J - Field sections


2

Figure 2: Central Bureau Field Sections Report - Page 1


3



4



5



6



7



8



9



10



11



12
