an anglo-sicilian gentleman interventionist pamphlet at the outbreak of the great war

Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Series Historica, vol. XII / 2015, p. 85 - 105

An Anglo-Sicilian Gentleman Interventionist Pamphlet at

the Outbreak of the Great War

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI**

Abstract: Joseph Isaac Spadafora Whitaker (Palermo 1850) was the heir of the

wealthy merchant Whitaker-Ingham family, with British origin but established in

Sicily. He was a renowned ornithologist, botanist, philanthropist and archaeologist.

His wife, Tina Scalia, was the daughter of General Alfonso (who should have to land

in Sicily with Garibaldi) exiled in England, whose house, Whyndam Place, was the

refuge of the Italian patriots, as well as the meeting place of many protagonists of the

Risorgimento.

This cultural affiliation influenced Joseph Whitaker in order to write a short

work, published in Palermo in 1914, focused on Great Britain, Germany and Italy

role at the at the outbreak of the First World War.

Italy formally announced a policy of neutrality on 2 August, 1914. According

with the guidance of what he still felt as his mother-country, he opposed with all his

strength pacifist propaganda. He stated that to remain neutralists would be betray

the spirit that had animated the men of the Risorgimento. He thought that pacifists

were doing any effort in order to hinder the work of the Government and to spread

discord and distrust in the country. He also urged not to be afraid of the war because

Italy was founded on solid parliamentary basis, with a Sovereign faithful to its

commitments and obligations provided for in the Constitution.

In his opinion, Italy was favorable to the cause of freedom and could have an

opportunity to claim its territories (Italy Trieste, Istria, Zara and Dalmatia), all

Austrian possessions. He was confident that the Italian Government would have soon

taken the right decision. In effect, Prime Minister Antonio Salandra together with his

Foreign Minister, Baron Sonnino, would play a leading part in Italy’s decision for

war.

Keywords: First World War, Joseph Whitaker, Italian Neutrality, Triple

Alliance, Italian Parliament Positions in 1914

A premise

Joseph Isaac Spadafora Whitaker was a descendant of the wealthy merchant

family Whitaker-Ingham, one of British origins but established in Sicily.1 He was a

I would like to dedicate this article to the kind and helpful staff of the Fondazione Whitaker of

Palermo, whose President is Prof. Angelo Falzea, and particularly to Prof. Beatrice Palmigiano

Gozzo (see footnote 47) and Dr. Arch. Corrado Mirmina.

** Ph.D., University of Messina ([email protected]). 1 The story of this English family dynasty in Sicily covers 200 years. Benjamin Ingham, was attracted

to Sicily from his humble beginnings in Yorkshire by the burgeoning trade in Marsala wine. He was

mailto:[email protected]

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

86

renowned ornithologist, botanist, philanthropist and archaeologist.2 His wife, Tina

Scalia, was the daughter of General Alfonso (who would land in Sicily with

Garibaldi in 1860). Before that time, Alfonso had been exiled in England and his

house, Wyndham Place, was the refuge of the Italian patriots, as well as the meeting

place of many protagonists of the Risorgimento.

This cultural affiliation influenced Joseph Whitaker, who dedicated himself to

politics, and inspired him to write a short work, published in Palermo in 1914,

successful in making the money, and his beneficiaries, the Whitaker family, were among the

protagonists of two hundred years of Sicilian history. Cfr. Robert Sanderson Whitaker, Whitaker of

Hesley Hall, Grayshott Hall, Pylewell Park, and Palermo (London: Mitchell Hughes and Clarke,

1907); Raleigh Trevelyan, Princes Under the Volcano. Two Hundred Years of a British Dynasty in

Sicily (London: Faber and Faber, 2012 [1973]). See also Rosario Lentini, Pietro Silvestri (eds.), Atti

del seminario di studio I Whitaker di villa Malfitano, Palermo 16 - 18 marzo 1995 (Palermo:

Fondazione Giuseppe Whitaker, 1995); Francesco Brancato, Benjamin Ingham e il suo impero

economico (Napoli: E.S.I., 1994) and, of the same Author, “I Whitaker di Villa Malfitano. Lineamenti

e l’Archivio documentario”, Nuove Prospettive Meridionali 4 (9), 1994, 15-29; Romualdo Giuffrida,

Gli Ingham - Whitaker di Palermo e la villa Malfitano (Palermo: Accademia Nazionale di Scienze

Lettere e Arti, 1990); Raleigh Trevelyan, Rosario Lentini, Vincenzo Tusa, La Storia dei Whitaker

(Palermo: Sellerio, 1988). 2 Joseph Whitaker junior (Palermo 1850-1936) inherited vast vineyards and his great grandfather

Ingham’s banking empire. Choosing Palermo over the more provincial Marsala, he built the Villa

Malfitano, an Italian Art Nouveau mansion near Zisa Castle on the Via Dante, after his marriage to

Tina Scalia. They had two daughters; the elder of which married General Antonio Di Giorgio, an

Italian Minister of War. Thus the family was firmly established in the upper echelons of Italian

Society. In the Belle Époque age, the house was the venue for lavish parties attended by British and

Italian royalty. Tina Whitaker knew Richard Wagner, Benito Mussolini, the Kaiser and Edward VII,

Empress Eugenie and Queen Mary. Whitaker himself was founder and president of the Society for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals at Palermo. Also he was a prime factor in the foundation of U.S.

Città di Palermo in the later 1880s, a football team who he was the first president of. In 1891 already a

very keen ornithologist Whitaker joined the British Ornithologists’ Union. Collecting expeditions to

Tunisia followed. These extended over a period of ten years (1894-1904). Notebooks kept at the time

contain information on the natural history of the birds as well as other fauna and also the flora of

Tunisia. The Tunisian bird and bird nest and egg collection was housed in the grounds of his home

alongside a very complete collection of Sicilian birds and collections made on his behalf by Edward

Dobson in Morocco. To these were added specimens of birds from the Mediterranean littoral. Some of

Whitaker’s collection of Tunisian birds are in the Natural History Museum, London. The Sicilian birds

are divided between the Royal Scottish Museum and the Ulster Museum. Whitaker devoted the last

years of his life to archaeology, purchasing the island of Motya, near Trapani, the site of a Phoenician

town founded in the eighth century BC. On Joseph I.S. Whitaker life and works, see Giuseppe

Quatriglio, “Giuseppe Isacco Whitaker, ornitologo”, I Whitaker e il capitale inglese tra l’Ottocento e il

Novecento in Sicilia, Atti del Seminario svoltosi a Trapani nell’Aula Magna della Libera Università

del Mediterraneo nel dicembre 1990 (Trapani, 1992); Joseph was the Author of a number of

remarkable works, written in Italian and English, particularly in the ornithology field, as Notes on the

Birds of Nottinghamshire (1907); The Birds of Tunisia. Being a History of the Birds Found in the

Regency of Tunis (1923); and in archeology: Motya, a Phoenician Colony in Sicily (1921), recently

reprinted in Italian: Joseph Whitaker, Mozia. Una colonia fenicia in Sicilia, presentazione di Luigi

Bernabò Brea, traduzione italiana di Emilia Niceta Palmeri, Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti

(Palermo, 1991).

An Anglo-sicilian Gentleman Interventionist Pamphlet ...

87

which focused on the roles of Great Britain, Germany and Italy at the outbreak of

the First World War.3

Italy had formally announced a policy of neutrality on 2 August 1914.4 In line

with the guidance of what he still felt to be his mother-country, Whitaker

vehemently opposed pacifist propaganda. Although Italy declared its neutrality, he

was certainly in favor of intervention, sharing the stance adopted by the countries of

the Entente, France and England, to which he felt bound by traditions, culture and

economic interests. He stated that neutrality would be a betrayal of the spirit that

had animated the men of the Risorgimento. He thought that pacifists were making

every effort to hinder the work of the Government and to spread discord and

distrust throughout the country. He also urged Italians not to be afraid of the war

because Italy was founded on a solid parliamentary foundation, with a Sovereign

faithful to the commitments and obligations contained in the Constitution. In his

opinion, Italy was favorable to the cause of freedom and would have an opportunity

to reclaim its territories (Trieste, Istria, Zara and Dalmatia), all Austrian

possessions.5 He was confident that the Italian Parliament, under the guidance of the

Government, should soon have to take the right decision. In effect, Prime Minister

Antonio Salandra together with his Foreign Minister, Baron Sonnino, would play a

leading role in Italy’s decision to go to war.

3 Joseph Isaac Spatafora Whitaker, The Great War. Great Britain & Germany. Italy (Palermo: Virzì’s

Printing House, 1914). At the same time, the work was published in Italian: La Grande Guerra.

Inghilterra e Germania. L’Italia (Palermo: Stabilimento Tipografico Virzì Dicembre, 1914). The

two editions only show a difference with regard to the size of the font, just a little smaller in the

Italian one, which has, in total, 60 pages instead of 59. It was usual for Whitaker to use the two

languages. In fact, this was due to the fact that he continued to regard the English as his mother

tongue. But, of course, by translating his works in Italian, he took part in the cultural debate of the

country in which he lived. The only other difference between the two texts is that on the Preface of

the English one, the Author declared that the work “have been translated in Italian” (p. 6), a further

proof that the essay was first conceived in English. 4 There was little surprise when Italy refused to join her Allies in what was seen as an aggressive war

in August 1914, even if Italy had formed part of a Triple Alliance with Germany and its traditional

enemy, Hapsburg Empire. On Italian neutrality, see the classic work of Brunello Vigezzi, L’Italia di

fronte alla prima guerra mondiale, 3 vols (Milano-Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi,1966), particularly

vol. I, L’Italia neutrale, 6-29; of the same Author, Brunello Vigezzi, I problemi della neutralità e

della guerra nel carteggio Salandra-Sonnino. 1914-1917 (Milano: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri,

1962), 1-72. 5 As we said above, Italy had been a member of the triple Alliance since May 1882 and renewed its

membership in 1891, 1902 and 1912, but public opinion on the question of relations, with Austria

was deeply divided, especially because Italian nationalists considered the Adriatic a natural area for

the consolidation of Italian influence. There was a growing feeling, within Italian Parliament, that

the country should ally itself with France and Britain, since the defeat of Austria-Hungary might

mean the liberation of Italia Irredenta (the parts of the Hapsburg Empire largely inhabited by

Italians). David Nicolle, The Italian Army of World War I, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 3.

On the roots of war, see Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914

(London: Allen Lane, 2012).

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

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Joseph Whitaker traced an excursus of the events leading up the Great War,

beginning from describing Germany as the Power mainly responsible for it. He

went on to profile England’s attitude and actions connected with it. Lastly, he

outlined Italy’s position in relation to the conflict and how this was to evolve.

Whitaker published his work in December, 1914. In the summer of the same year

Europe had already exploded with mass violence, with global repercussions as war

destroyed four empires and cost millions of lives6, the worst cataclysm Europe had

ever known till that era, one directly involving 61 million troops from 16 nations.

The body of literature on this event is, of course, immense. The struggle involved of

human strength en masse as manpower was mobilized from home countries and

troops returned from the colonies abroad. Governments increasingly intervened in

everyday life. New weapons and organizational structures were developed. Yet the

history of the war and the reasons for its outbreak and rapid spread were vastly

more complex than the players realized.7

Among the huge quantity of studies, a memoir written by an Englishman long

resident in Italy and belonging to the upper echelons of wealthy Sicilian society but

whose sympathies with Great Britain were deeply rooted, presents a peculiar

interest.8 Whitaker analyzed the various phases of the crisis leading up to the war,

as well as the new theories and conceptions which had led to the evolution of the

modern Germany and to the conflict, with regard to the part Italy had played in the

Triple Alliance and the position it held in the unfolding of the events in Europe.9

On the Threshold of War

The chain of events that led directly to World War I is well-known. In the six

weeks between the Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination on 28 June and the

outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, they evolved in such a way that showed

Austrian antagonism and racial animosity towards Serbia. Immediately after the

Archduke’s assassination, the focus of events was briefly transferred from Sarajevo

to Zagreb.10

Public opinion was unanimous in condemning the atrocious crime that had been

committed, much of the responsibility for which was, rightly or wrongly, attributed

to Serbian Government. However, according to Whitaker, the Serbian Government

6 David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World (London: Penguin, 2005). 7 Robin D.S. Higham, Dennis E. Showalter (eds), Researching World War I (Portsmouth - NH:

Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003). 8 To have an idea of the Italian perception of the war by Whitaker’s contemporaries, see the classic

volumes of Luigi Albertini, Le origini della guerra del 1914, 3 vols; Le relazioni europee dal

Congresso di Berlino all'attentato di Sarajevo, vol. I, La crisi del luglio 1914. Dall’attentato di

Sarajevo alla mobilitazione generale dell’Austria-Ungheria, vol. II, L’epilogo della crisi del luglio

1914. Le dichiarazioni di guerra e di neutralità, vol. III (Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1942-1943). 9 Whitaker, The Great War, 6. The work is articulated in five Chapters. 10 Andrej Mitrović, Serbia’s Great War, 1914-1918 (West Lafayette (IN): 2007), 3-11.


89

might not itself have been to blame. Serbian subversive influence was supposed to

have been at work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since Austrian annexation of the

two provinces in 1908, a very prominent Serb nationalist movement had been afoot

there. Things in fact had reached such a point that Serbia had become a source of

serious concern to Austria: “Serbia must be severely punished, humiliated and

humbled to the dust; the nationalist Serb propaganda must be suppressed; […] The

Serajevo crime furnished the desired opportunity and pretext for a determined and

vigorous offensive action on the part of Austria-Hungary, against the hated

Serbs.”11

During the period following the perpetration of the crime, a searching inquiry

appears to have been conducted, and the case thoroughly investigated by the

Austrian authorities. A trial was held at Sarajevo, the outcome of which according

to the verdict of that court, appeared to show that the assassination plot had been

conspired in Belgrade, that the bombs and weapons for committing it were of

Serbian origin, and that Serbian officials had trained the actual perpetrators in the

use of the weapons, and arranged for their safe transit across the Austrian border.

Apparently, no actual proof of Serbian complicity and guilt had been furnished, but

the counts arrived at, were sufficient for Austria’s purpose.

On 23 July, Austria-Hungary issued a “Note” practically amounting to an

ultimatum, to the Serbian Government, requiring an answer within 48 hours.12

The

terms of it were so grievous and humiliating as to render them impossible to accept

by any independent State. Though ready to agree to the greater part of the

conditions imposed, onerous as they were, Serbia could not accept them all

unconditionally, and “thus yield up her very life and being as an independent

kingdom: nor was it either expected, by those who had drafted the ultimatum!”13

A further observation to include at this point: Austria is said to have presented

its “Note” to Serbia without having previously communicated its contents to either

of her allies. Whatever may have been the case with regard to Italy, one can hardly

believe that Austria would have taken so important a step without having previously

consulted Germany, and obtained its approval. On the contrary, there is every

reason to believe that Germany was fully informed regarding Austria’s Note. Sir

Maurice de Bunsen, telegraphing Sir Edward Grey on 30 July, wrote: “I have

private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austria

ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to German

Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line

11 Whitaker, The Great War, 8. On the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the war, see Sean

McMeekin, July 1914. Countdown to War, Icon Books (London: Purdue University Press, 2013),

383-405. 12 See the recent book of Thomas Otte, July Crisis. The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), particularly chapter 4, Localizing the crisis: 19 to

23 July, 173-221. See also McMeekin, July 1914. Countdown to War, 169-175. 13 Whitaker, The Great War, 8.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

90

of it”. Moreover, on the very day the ultimatum was issued, the German Chancellor

instructed his Ambassador in London, Paris and St. Petersburg to advise the

English, French and Russian Governments that “the acts as well as the demands of

the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.”14

Germany, although having apparently previously admitted that the Serbian

Government was not to blame, then stated that it approved the ultimatum. At the

same time the Reich Chancellor declared that “we urgently desire a localization of

the conflict; any intervention by another power will, in view of the divergent

alliance commitments, lead to incalculable consequences.”15

It was important for its

interests that the conflict should be confined to the two contending parties, and that

Austria should be allowed a free hand to deal with Serbia as it wished.

Sir Edward Grey, who played a leading role and did his utmost to secure peace,

proposed that the German, French and Italian Ambassadors should meet him in

London “for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent

complications.”16

France and Italy accepted the proposal at once, Russia also approved it, but

Germany declined to take part in such a conference, on the grounds that in its view

it would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not be convened

except at the request of Austria and Russia.17

The German Secretary of State affirmed that such a conference was not

practicable, but, at the same time, he professed Germany’s desire to cooperate for

the maintenance of peace. The proposed conference thus fell through.

In response to Sir Edward Grey’s repeated expressions of the desire that

Germany should use its influence with its ally in order to bring about a satisfactory

settlement of the question, and thus secure peace, the German Chancellor had

assured Grey that he was trying to mediate in Vienna and St. Petersburg. In his

account, Whitaker’s focus is thus on Sir Edward Grey’s attempt to avoid the war

and on the German Government’s ambiguous position.

14 German White Book: Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, Annex 1A (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1924). See also John Hance, Chaos, Confusion, and Political Ignorance

(Bloomington - IN: Trafford Publishing, 2014), 221-223. 15 Volker Berghahn, Imperial Germany 1871-1918. Economy, Society, Culture and Politics (New

York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 267-268. See also Dong Sun Lee, Power Shifts, Strategy and War:

Declining States and International Conflict(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 65-66. 16 “Correspondence N. 36, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, H. Rumbold,

British Chargé d’Affairs at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, 26 July 1914”,

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented to Both

Houses of Parliament, May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 30. 17 “Correspondence N. 36, Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir E. Grey, 27 July

1914”, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented

to Both Houses of Parliament, May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 52.


91

He underlined that Grey had said that “mediation was ready to come into

operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would

press the button in the interest of peace.”18

Diplomacy has an important part to play at the onset of a war. And, for Great

Britain, neutrality was not an option. A British Empire that stayed neutral would be

faced either with a German-dominated continent, or a world dominated by France

and Russia. Therefore, the British decision to go to war was consistent with the

imperial concerns that had been central to its policy during the permutations of the

European state system since 1814. What no one at the time was able to foresee, was

that subsequent events were to show that this system would have ceased to exist.19

From Whitaker’s words, it appears clear that from the end of July until the

beginning of August, political games were conducted by Ministries of Foreign

Affairs and diplomatic representatives. And that, over and above the Sarajevo

assassination, the true cause of the war, in his opinion, was Germany’s aims and

ambitions.

On 2 August, German troops invaded Luxemburg; The British Ambassador in

Berlin telegraphed Sir Edward Grey stating that the German Secretary of State had

informed him that Germany and Russia were in a state of war. The same day, Grey

assured the French Ambassador in London that the British fleet, subject to the

ratification by Parliament, would protect the French coasts and shipping; the day

after he was informed that, in reply to the German Government’s question as to

what Italy’s intentions were, the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for

Foreign Affairs, had replied: the war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences

which might result, had, in the words of German Ambassador himself, an

aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive

character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances, Italy would remain

neutral.20

On 4 August the King of Belgium made an appeal to the King of England for

diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium, under threaten from

Germany, because Belgium had refused to grant passage through Belgian

territories. The German Ambassador in London received instructions from Berlin: a

18 “Correspondence N. 84, Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, 29 July 1914”,


Houses of Parliament, May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 67. 19 Francis Roy Bridge, Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914

(Abingdon: Routledge 2013), 324-336. 20 “Correspondence N. 152, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 3 August 1914”, Collected Diplomatic

Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament,

May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 106.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

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French attack via Belgium had been planned, and Germany was consequently

forced to disregard Belgian neutrality.21

Brussels informed London that Belgian territory had already been violated. Sir

Edward Grey telegraphed the British Ambassador in Berlin stating that in view of

the fact that Germany declined to give assurances respecting Belgium, as France

had already given, in reply to the request simultaneously made at Berlin and Paris,

he had to repeat the request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it be received in

London by midnight that same day. In the event of non compliance, the British

Ambassador was instructed to ask for his passports.22

No reply was received therefore England and Germany were at war.23

The German’s Chancellor Speech to the Reichstag: Whitaker’s comment

In Germany, the Kaiser and the Chancellor spoke to the people gathered in the

streets as early as 1 August, 1914. On the 4 they explained the situation more fully

in their speeches in the Reichstag.24

On 4 August, just after Germany entered the Great War, the Reichstag convened

for perhaps the most famous session in its history. Kaiser Wilhelm II ended his

speech to the legislative body with the dramatic words, “I no longer recognize

parties, only Germans”. The Emperor’s statement was expressing a sentiment with

21 “Communicated N. 157, by German Embassy to Sir E. Grey, 4 August 1914”, Collected Diplomatic

Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament,

May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 109. 22 Whitaker, The Great War, 16-17. 23 «Great Britain declared war on Germany at 11 o’clock last night. The Cabinet yesterday delivered

an ultimatum to Germany. Announcing the fact to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said:

“We have repeated the request made last week to the German Government that they should give us

the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality that was given to us and Belgium by France last

week. We have asked that it should be given before midnight”. Last evening a reply was received

from Germany. This being unsatisfactory the King held at once a Council which had been called for

midnight. The declaration of war was then signed. The Foreign Office issued the following official

statement: -Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by his

Majesty’s Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, his Majesty’s

Ambassador to Berlin has received his passports, and his Majesty’s Government declared to the

German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m.

on 4 August, 1914. A statement made in London last night said the British Note to Germany was

sent direct to Sir E. Goschen, the Ambassador in Berlin. German troops have invaded Belgium. The

Premier informed the Brussels Chamber yesterday, after King Albert had addressed the Deputies in

a speech calling on the nation to defend its integrity. Mr. Asquith knew of the invasion when he

made his statement in the Commons». England declares war on Germany, The Guardian,

Wednesday 5 August 1914. 24 Ebba Dahlin, French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims, 1914-1918 (Stanford -

CA: Stanford University Press, 1933), 14.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian


93

which most deputies agreed and seemed to eclipse the political and social conflicts

of the immediate past.25

Later that day, the public display of unity between the Kaiser and the people

seemed substantiated when the Social democrats not only voted for war credits but

stood for the first time in the history of the German Parliament to hail the Kaiser,

Fatherland, and Volk. The dramatic Reichstag session represented the “new spirit of

1914”. All the political and social division seemed to be set aside in the Reichstag

chamber, which led Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg to assert that 4 August 1914

would be remembered as one of the greatest moments in German history, a time

when all Germans rallied to the national cause.26

In effect, it was a day to be remembered. Early in the morning, when Sir Edward

Grey demanded an immediate statement from Germany on Belgian neutrality, the

Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, told the British Ambassador, Sir

Edward Goschen, that he was confident Britain would not go to war over “a scrap

of paper”. This phrase was summarized by Goschen: “Bethmann considered that

just for a word, neutrality, and just for a «a scrap of paper», Great Britain was going

to declare war “to a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends

with her.”27

The Chancellor never denied his words, which became a cliché, an adequate

summary of what the war was actually about. Bethmann’s phrase was drastic but

accurate: the Whilelminian interpretation of the concept of self-defense permitted

the repeal of treaty law.28

At 14.00 of the same day, Grey was informed that Belgium had been invaded. At

midnight, when the British ultimatum deadline passed, Great Britain entered the

war.

In the speech before the Reichstag on the day of the invasion, Bethmann

Hollweg insisted that Germans had been forced by Russia in a defensive war move:

it was claimed in Germany that the war was a result of Tsarist aggression, and that

the threat of a French attack had compelled it to violate Belgian neutrality.

However, he accepted the protests of the Belgian Government as “legitimate” and

spoke about the invasion as an “injustice”.29

25 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed. Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German

Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 64. 26 Jeffrey R. Smith, The First World War and the Public Sphere in Germany, eds. Douglas Mackaman,

Michael Mays, World War I and the Cultures of Modernity (Jackson - MS: University Press of

Mississippi 2000), 64. 27 Otte, July Crisis. The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914, 502. 28 Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper. Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War

(Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 2014), 42-43. 29 Bernard A. Cook, Belgium, neutrality of, to 1914, Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), The European Powers in

the First World War. An Encyclopedia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 118.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

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Joseph Whitaker was highly critical of Germany’s attempt to foist the

responsibility for the war on others, and affirmed that, besides the vast preparations

for war made by Germany, “recent German publications showing clearly that

Germany meant to have war and that it had been preparing for it for years” and he

took great care to stress that public opinion could be manipulated by the press. In

effect, he read the international press very closely, in order to form his own opinion

on the events, and underlined that, in some way, the Chancellor at the Reichstag on

4 August, had admitted the “wrong” Germany was committing when violating

Belgium’s neutrality. Germans had been condemned by “the whole civilized World,

but they had already been pre-condemned by Germany herself in her General Staff

Regulations published in 1902. Sad to say, however, a more recent publication of

the German General Staff (Kriegbrauch im Landkriege – The usage of war on land)

not only authorizes such atrocities, but actually counsels them.”30

The Italian Parliament during the Crisis

During the crisis leading up to the war, Great Britain’s – as well as those of the

other countries – attitudes and actions, were mostly conducted through the

Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the respective Embassies. Most of Sir Edward

Grey’s peace negotiations affecting the other members of the Triple Entente were

conducted in concert with the full approval of the Powers. However, the position of

both Russia and France, regarding the issue differed from that of England. The

former was one of a powerful State, whose racial and religious ties, as well as the

material interests, bound it to uphold and support a smaller State, threatened with

aggression, by a third Power.

The position of France, while similar to England’s in being disinterested in the

question directly, differed from it as a result of being bound by the terms of an

alliance to stake itself openly on the side of Russia. As forth other belligerent

nations, to mention Belgium first, according to Whitaker no words could fully

express all that must be felt and thought of its heroic behavior and the noble part

that it played in the great conflict. Belgium recognized that her only hope of safety

lay in her neutrality, guaranteed by the London treaty of 1839.

Serbia’s part in events from the beginning of the crisis leading up to the war was

well known, and required no comment.

Japan standing by its alliance with Great Britain from the outbreak of the war

rendered valuable assistance in the Far East and had shown itself a trusty ally.

Finally, Turkey’s action of joining the Central Powers, in Whitaker’s opinion

had signed its own death warrant as a European Power “and taken a step which will

be ultimately prove its ruin”. It is significant that Whitaker had had, in effect, the

opportunity to speak personally with one of the ex Sultan’s most influential Cabinet

30 Whitaker, The Great War, 25.


95

Ministers, who assured him that Turkey’s action in no way represented public

opinion in the country.31

With regard to Italy’s part in the events, it is well known that Italy had joined an

alliance already formed between Germany and Austria in 1879. This alliance had

been unpopular with many Italians, but had nevertheless been renewed time after

time, and had continued in force.

Italy, although not a belligerent country, and whatever may have been the

position it held in the Triple Alliance, it was reasonable to presume that, as an ally,

and particularly considering how its interests were affected by complications in the

Balkans, it would have been consulted or, at least, informed, of the important step

Austria contemplated taking with regard to Serbia in July 1914.32

On the contrary Italy appeared to have been kept in the dark as to her Allies’

movements and intentions.

During the war itself, Giovanni Giolitti, the former Italian Premier, revealed that

Austria-Hungary had planned to launch a pre-emptive war against Serbia in August,

1913, after the Balkan Wars. This was explained by a statement made by Giolitti in

the Italian Parliament on 5 December 1913, to the effect that Austria, as far back as

9 August 1913, had notified Italy of its intention to attack Serbia and that Italy had

replied that – as Austria’s action could not be considered a defensive one – it could

not look upon it as a causa foederis.33

31 Whitaker, The Great War, 40. 32 Whitaker, The Great War, 41. 33 Giovanni Giolitti had given a speech before the Italian Parliament on 5 December, 1914, disclosing

the Austrian intention to declare war on Serbia. Giolitti argued that Austria was seeking to justify

the war on the grounds that the Balkans Wars created a casus foederus for the Triple Alliance, which

also included Germany, to act. He maintained that there was nothing to justify the treaty

requirement for a declaration of war. This is the text of the speech: “During the Balkan war, on 9

August, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received

from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram: Austria has communicated

to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as

defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the

contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. [Sensation.] I am endeavoring to arrange for a combined effort

with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state

clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore,

we do not consider that the casus foederis arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve. I

replied: If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a casus foederis cannot be established. It

is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as

no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to

Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade

Austria from this most perilous adventure. [Hear, hear!] This course was taken, and our

interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our

relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government

conforms therefore in all respects to the procedures of Italian policy, and conforms also to an

interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies. I wish to

recall this, because I think it is right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

96

In this atmosphere reigning in of the early 20 century, of craving for power to

divide up the world among the Great Powers, let’s not forget that Giolitti had

sparked a first fuse with the war in Libya. On the threshold of World War I,

imperialism was cloaked in nationalism.34

This observation of Joseph Whitaker is relevant because it confirms that there

was a debate within the Italian Parliament when the risk of war was not so

immediate and when it was still possible to have a wider ranging consultations in

parliament, this before the Government, and particularly the Prime Minister and the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, would advocate to them the power of decision.

Giolitti’s disclosure was important revealing, as it did, that Austria’s aggressive

intentions towards Serbia were not recent. With regard to the Italian Parliament’s

role, we must acknowledge that Parliament had always been the preferred forum of

Giovanni Giolitti: he firmly believed in the power of Parliament, and regarded

politics as “the art of the possible”. Italy’s declaration of neutrality at the outbreak

of the conflict was clear and consequential, but it had immediate repercussions on

the Italian political scene.35

The fact of Italy not having been consulted on the occasion of Austria’s

subsequent action with regard to Serbia, enabled Italy to side itself openly with

England in working for peace. And this, in Whitaker’s opinion, was what Italy did

most earnestly from the very start of the crisis, supporting the proposals made by

Sir Edward Grey with a view to averting war. He mentioned this issue: Italy had

warned its allies, prior to Austria’s ultimatum, that any action against Serbia’s

independence would not be tolerated by Russia and further that Germany’s

participation in the conflict would inevitably mean Great Britain’s intervention also.

The idea of a conference to be held in London was immediately agreed to by the

Marquise di San Giuliano, Italy’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs and on

Germany’s refusal to participate, he made valuable suggestions designed to

overcome that country’s objections. The Marquise also told Sir Rennel Rodd, the

British Ambassador in Rome, that the German Government was being informed

that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion in Italy unless

they had taken every possible step to avoid the war, and that he was urging the

German Government to lend their cooperation in this.36

remained completely loyal to the observances of her pledges. [Loud applause.]

(http://www.gwpda.org/1914/giolneut.html). 34 On this theme, see the books of Luciano Canfora, 1914 (Palermo: Sellerio 2014), and of Franco

Cardini, Sergio Valzania, La scintilla. Da Tripoli a Sarajevo: come l’Italia provocò la prima guerra

mondiale (Milano: Mondadori, 2014). 35 Roland Sarti, Italy. A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present (New York: Infobase

Publishing, 2009), 46, 49-52. 36 “Correspondence N. 80, Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir E. Grey, 29 July 1914”,


Houses of Parliament, May 1915 (London: Harrison, 1915), 62. See also Whitaker, The Great War,

http://www.gwpda.org/1914/giolneut.html


97

Italy, throughout, appears to have done its utmost in order to bring about peace,

and when this ended unhappily, it rightly declared that, as Austria’s war had an

aggressive step, and it was in conflict with the purely defensive character of the

Triple Alliance, Italy would remain neutral. The allies didn’t protest against this

decision and their silence afforded the best proof of their admission of the

aggressive nature of Austria’s actions, as well as of their recognition that Italy’s

stand point of there being no causa foederis was perfectly correct. 37

Italy’s Position in the Triple Alliance and Neutrality

Whitaker openly addressed an issue: whether or not the Alliance had been for

Italy an advantage. In his opinion, it might have been an advantage once, from the

fact of the alliance having been repeatedly renewed over such a length of time,

although it was questionable whether the advantages that may have accrued from it

had been as much for Italy’s benefit as for that of its allies. In any case, Italy had

been constrained to stifle its feelings and abandon its aspirations with regard to

unredeemed territory, so important strategically for its frontier, and the furtherance

of its interests on the Eastern Adriatic, while Austria, in the meantime, had become

a powerful rival to it in that sea.

Whitaker underlined that distasteful as it had always been to a large proportion

of the Italian people, the alliance in those years had become even more unpopular,

so much so that the possibility of its renewal had, at one time, come to be

considered as extremely doubtful.

Shortly before the Tripoli war, Italy’s attitude with regard to the alliance had

become even more diffident, and had begun to cause its allies concern, shortly

followed by consternation on their part when Italy finally embarked on the

campaign. When Italy annexed Tripoli, in 1911, the Austrian Chief of General

Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, advocated preventive war against Italy and

Serbia. Although war did not come (and Conrad was dismissed for advocating it

against an ally), Austria’s chief military strategist revealed the depth of Austro-

Italian antagonism.38

Substantially, the support given to Turkey by Germany and

Austria incited that country to vigorous action, and undoubtedly greatly enhanced

the difficulties Italy experienced during this campaign.

On the other hand, in effect, Germany had realized that Italy had been gradually

withdrawing from the triple Alliance, and needed to be drawn back in, and that

retaining Italy in that alliance was absolutely essential for carrying out the Teuton

aims.39

The importance of this was dwelt on by General von Bernhardi in his book,

41-43. Luigi Carnovale

https://archive.org/stream/whyitalyentered00carngoog/whyitalyentered00carngoog_djvu.txt. 37 Whitaker, The Great War, 43. 38 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2004), 89-90. 39 Whitaker, The Great War, 44.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

98

Germany and the Next War, when he wrote: “If Italy really withdraws from the

Triple Alliance very distinctly superior forces will be united against Germany and

Austria”; and further: “Such superiority will certain exist if Italy ceases to be an

active member of the Triple Alliance.”40

Bernhardi also alluded to the war between

Italy and Turkey when he wrote: “It is advisable to end the Turco-Italian conflict”

and “The international disruption of the Triple Alliance, as shown already by the

action of Italy towards Turkey, threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head.”41

Acting on the events, Germany wasted no time in helping to bring about the

conclusion of peace between Italy and Turkey, as well as in obtaining a renewal of

the Triple Alliance. Both the treaty of peace and the one renewing the Triple

Alliance were signed in the Autumn of 1912.

As the ambitions of Germany multiplied, however, and its warlike intentions

become ever more apparent, so did the possibility of the Triple Alliance continuing

to exist became gradually more slender. The views entertained by the two Central

Powers with regard to the Balkans were totally opposed to those of Italy, and to

second them would have been political suicide.

On the other hand, from the day on which, in order to establish a balance of

power in Europe, it was forced to resort to an “entente” with France, which

eventually led to an understanding also with Russia, it became no longer in Italy’s

interests to be a member of the Triple Alliance.

Italy’s position in this alliance was very different from that of Austria-Hungary,

and what might be submitted to by the Teutonic part of the Dual Monarchy, could

not be possibly be countenanced for Italy, whose people justly entertained the

aspirations of a reunited kingdom, and would never consent to accept a position

which would practically be nothing less than one of vassalage under the Teutonic

hegemony.

The majority of Italians, in Whitaker’s view, recognized this fact and had wisely

made up their mind as to what was best for the interests of their country. But he had

to admit that a number of Italian people, chiefly among the higher class “differ in

their view on the subject, and, in their utterances and expressions of sympathy with

Germany, they seem to have lost all sense of dignity and of their own nationality.”42

He was sure that Italian unity, founded on freedom, could never submit to the

severity of the Prussian régime. German rule would not allow the personal freedom

and liberty of thought so dear to the “true Italian”.

These words clearly demonstrate that Italian public opinion was divided, not

only about whether to enter the war or not. The influx of Germans, noticeable in

some parts of Italy, together with the important position Germany had held in the

40 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, translated by Allen H. Powles, Chas A. Eron

(New York: 1914 [1911]), 102, 169. 41 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 101, 168. 42 Whitaker, The Great War, 46.


99

Italian world of commerce, and particularly of finance, had ensured Teutonic

penetration. Even the Italian Government knew that they had to prepare Italian

public opinion for war: the professional, upper and landed classes were still

sympathetic to the central Powers, fearing that an Entente victory would mean the

triumph of republicanism and socialism in Italy. The British were particularly

concerned at the way in which the Vatican manipulated public opinion, as, while

the Pope Benedetto XVI, had expressed his humanitarian position against the war,

the clerical press was in favor of the Central Powers.43

And Joseph Whitaker, even

if he was a wealthy member of the Sicilian upper class as well as the world of

finance, stood firmly by their side.

Meanwhile Austria’s systematic persecution and harsh treatment of the million

of Italians who were its subjects, had created an intolerable situation, which would

rend it imperative for Italy to be more careful in safeguarding its interests in the

Adriatic. Austro-German ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula posed a serious threat

to Italy. Predominance would virtually be a German one, and Italy would have a

“far more formidable rival in the Adriatic than she has at present.”44

From Neutrality to Intervention. Joseph Whitaker’s Manuscripts

The peculiar nature of the Italian situation concerns the timing and manner of

intervention.45

With regard to the influence of warfare on the Italian Parliament, we should

underline that, although Parliament had proclaimed neutrality on the opening of the

Italian Parliament on 5 December 1914, there was more than one way to see the

situation. As reported by the international press, Antonio Salandra declared, amid

indescribable enthusiasm, that Italian neutrality could not be the exclusive aim of

Italian policy, and the political configuration of Italy might be about to be

transformed. “Italy must maintain her vital interests and just aspirations. The Italian

Government’s supreme concern was to complete preparations of the army and navy.

The lessons of history, and, still more what was happening today, had taught them

that if the rule of law was to cease, the rule of force would remain as the only means

for safety of the people. Italy had no aggressive aims, but she must arm as

effectively as possible. The hour demanded a strong and firm Government, and if

Parliament strengthened its hands, the Cabinet would pursue the defence of the

country’s present interest with a great concern for her future destiny.” The Radical

and Democratic groups resolved to support the Premier.46

Something had changed.

43 David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916 (RLE First World War) (Abingdon:

Routledge, 2014), 87. 44 Whitaker, The Great War, 47. 45 Antonio Gibelli, Italy, in A Companion to World War I, ed. John Horne(Hoboken - NJ: Blackwell

Publishers, 2012), 466. 46 Opening of Italian Parliament. The Premier’s speech. Italian Neutrality, The Barrier Miner,

Saturday, 5 December, 1914.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

100

The Whitaker Foundation Archive, among Joseph Whitaker’s unpublished

writings, conserves three original manuscripts, which are interesting sources of

additional information, related to the First World War.47

First of all, two long papers deserve to be mentioned. The first one is against

pacifist propaganda, and the other is related to the opportunity, for Italy, to take part

in the war immediately. Both these documents are written in Italian.

The first one, consists of eleven pages, numbered from I to XII, with the title

Contro la propaganda pacifista.48

It was probably conceived as an article to be

printed, or a speech to be read at a political meeting.

It concerns the “vergognosa”(disgraceful) propaganda which, for reasons “poco

onorevoli”(dishonourable), pervaded the neutral countries. Militarily and

economically, the war could be considered lost for the Central Powers; and that was

why the propaganda for peace at this point would be reprehensible.49

47 Joseph Whitaker’s manuscripts have been catalogued by Prof. Beatrice Palmigiano Gozzo. All the

documents of the Whitaker Family were preserved with great care until the death of the last of

Whitaker, when the order of the same was turned upside down. Subsequently, Prof. Palmigiano

Gozzo reordered the documents and prepared an inventory. The collection (1851-1994: bb. 36)

contains documents, letters, notes of various family members, from the second half of the nineteenth

century to almost the entire twentieth century, which allow us to reconstruct the history of the

family, related to many English families living in Sicily and who entertained friendly relations with

the nobility of Palermo. The papers were divided into the following series: Joseph Isaac Spadafora

Whitaker, Catherine Pauline Anna Luisa Scalia Whitaker, Sophia, Juliet , Emily , Eleanor Whitaker,

Cordelia, Star, Georgette, Edith Whitaker, General Antonino Di Giorgio, Manfred Pedicini and

other Whitaker, Ingham & Whitaker Enterprises properties in Palermo, English Church, British

Cemeteries, Directors, Directors et al., Banks. Among the documents highlight, the most interesting

series is especially that relating to the interests and varied activities of Joseph Isaac Spadafora

Whitaker. I would like to note that, with extreme philological care, and passion put in her research,

Prof. Palmigiano Gozzo has preserved even the so-called “pizzini”, any autograph of Joseph, as she

herself told me. To her I dedicate my most heartfelt accolades for her work and the generous help

provided. 48 Joseph I.S. Whitaker, Contro la propaganda pacifista, manuscript preserved in the Whitaker

Archive, 1-12. 49 Here are some of the most salient parts of the manuscript: “Intanto vi sono purtroppo degli esseri

ignobili, i quali anche non ignari delle mene del nemico e con perfetta conoscenza di tutto ciò che è

avvenuto nel passato e che si delinea nell’avvenire, che si ostinano sempre ad invocare la pace a

qualunque costo, una pace poi che finirebbe per essere servitù. Per fortuna però la maggior parte dei

pacifisti non appartengono a questa categoria, ed al patriottismo ed al buon senso di questa

maggioranza rivolgiamo il nostro appello, facendo loro pensare che per quanto altamente umanitario

ed ammirevole può essere il desiderio e lo scopo di por fine ad una guerra, onde evitare un maggior

spargimento di sangue, con gli altri gravi danni che ne derivano, pure vi sono dei casi quando per

ottenere un bene permanente conviene sopportare un male temporaneo, e che l'attuale guerra

appunto ci presenta un tale caso. […] Una pace conclusa ora senza avere prima raggiunto

completamente i fini prefissi dall'Intesa, sarebbe una grande calamità per il mondo tutto, giacché fra

relativamente pochi anni saremmo di nuovo in guerra e forse in condizioni meno favorevoli per noi!

[…] Insieme ai nostri alleati noi combattiamo per una causa santa e di giustizia, combattiamo per il

mantenimento del diritto internazionale delle genti, per salvaguardare l'integrità degli Stati minori e

per la libertà del mondo intero.” L’Italia ha basi democratiche molto solide, un popolo sobrio


101

In Whitaker opinion, the opportunity to take part in the war would be a

successful step; Italy sood only to gain by the triumph of the Triple Entente, which

was fighting to uphold the international law of nations and to safeguard the weaker

states.50

The political vision of Joseph Whitaker, which may fall within the diverse

democratic camps, was tinged with Wilsonian elements, but bore some nationalistic

hues. He believed that Italy should think that it was better to deal with the aftermath

of a war which, terrible as they are, could never be the same as those that would

result from a prolonged state of inaction at a time when the destiny of Europe was

to be decided, and certainly not the fatal consequences which might result from a

possible Teutonic domination and hegemony. Wanting to realize its legitimate

aspirations and to affirm its position as a Great Power, Italy could not lose an

opportunity that would never come again.

The second manuscript was Whitaker’s political analysis of European

conditions. Of considerable interest are the considerations reported in his “Esame

della posizione dell’Italia a guerra finite.”51

At the outbreak of the First World War,

Italy had assumed a position of neutrality. In Italy the mere question of whether to

take part in the war provoked substantial strife before the official position of

neutrality was abandoned.52

frugale, non ha la capacità di ricevere influenze esterne come la rivoluzione russa, perché non si

trova nelle condizioni della Russia o della Germania; l’Italia ha una gloriosa tradizione

risorgimentale dal 1848 all’Unità. […] Assistiamo in questo momento al grande sforzo collettivo di

una Italia unita e compatta, condizione non mai prima completamente raggiunta, dalla quale dovrà

nascere quella più grande Italia, sognata ma non interamente realizzata dai nostri eroi del

Risorgimento; una Italia più grande non soltanto per maggiore estensione di territorio, ma più

grande per quella meravigliosa fusione ed omogeneità nata da questi anni di dolore e di sofferenza

patite insieme, e che seguirà una era nuova nella storia della Patria. […] Sorreggiamo anche l’opera

sapiente e provvida del Governo, soprattutto nei momenti difficili e critici, quando l’aiuto del suo

popolo gli può essere più utile e prezioso, ed infine, come di recente raccomandato dallo stesso on.

Sonnino, cerchiamo di vincer noi stessi, per così vincere i nostri nemici, e portare ad una fine

vittoriosa e gloriosa questo immane conflitto mostrandoci davanti al mondo intero degni figli della

Patria e di un’Italia grande e forte!». I.S. Whitaker, Contro la propaganda pacifista, 6-10. 50 Whitaker, Contro la propaganda pacifista, 10-12. 51 Joseph I.S.Whitaker, Esame della posizione dell’Italia, a guerra finita, manuscript preserved in the

Whitaker Archive, 1-2. 52 Hence the note that we report in full:

1. Continuando nella sua neutralità: l'Italia naturalmente sarebbe risparmiata dagli orrori e le spese di

una grande guerra.

a) Nel caso della vittoria delle Potenze Centrali: L’Italia forse riceverebbe il Trentino e qualche altro

territorio, ma non possiamo essere ben certi che le Potenze Centrali non le darebbero più di questo

trattamento necessario, onde verificarsi per il non intervento dell’Italia a loro favore. In ogni modo,

la posizione dell’Italia, sia nell'Adriatico, sia nel Mediterraneo, e si potrebbe dire generalmente,

diventerebbe una posizione sottomessa, e col tempo l'Italia finirebbe per diventare poco più di una

vassallo della Germania.

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Whitaker’s political ideas, thus, reflects, once again but worded more strongly, a

Wilsonian spirit of tolerance, peace and reason, and the principle of the defense of

the freedom of oppressed peoples and their self-determination, in a renewed

European context that could absolutely have not reproduced the status quo ante

bellum. The reasons for the “tedescofili”, the neutralist who thought that Italy

should remain neutral, counted for nothing against the supreme interests of the

Nation, the reclaim of the territories and the liberation of oppressed people.

Germany was a force, albeit a negative one. Germany was purely imperialist and

domineering. Germany had provoked a huge conflict, and savage and brutal

methods used in the conduct of military operations. Its purpose was selfish absolute

dominion over the whole world, to obtain when it had trampled all the principles

and all the laws of the civilized nations, shouting fiercely that “might was right”. It

was necessary to throw themselves body and soul in opposition to this hegemony.

Italy, thus, by joining the defenders of freedom and holding to the principles of

international law and of civilization against barbarism and oppression, would affirm

once again the glorious traditions of a great nation. Whitaker did not fail to point

out how, in the event of victory by the Entente, Italy would probably recover

Trentino. And would also remain independent and free as before.

The third manuscript related to the outbreak of the war, is the only one written in

English. Presumably, it was prepared as a speech to be delivered in public.53

From the second to the third page of the introduction, the text is very similar to

the Italian one.54

The first point, dealing with the continuance of the Italian neutrality, however,

contains a statement in contradiction with an interventionist position. Whitaker

wrote that “Italy should have been spared the horrors of war, and her position,

economically, for some time after the war, no doubtlessly would be a satisfactory

one”. He didn’t express this opinion any more, even if he further repeated the

b) Nel caso di una vittoria dell’Intesa: L’Italia probabilmente riceverebbe il Trentino, ma null'altro.

Resterebbe però sempre indipendente e libera come prima, sebbene forse non avrebbe molta voce in

capitolo in quanto alla sistemazione delle cose dell’Europa, e la sua posizione sarebbe isolata e poco

soddisfacente.

2. L’intervento dell’Italia a fianco dell’Intesa.

L’Italia naturalmente avrebbe sofferto gli oneri e le spese d’una guerra.

a) Nel caso della vittoria delle Potenze Centrali certamente la posizione dell'Italia sarebbe brutta, ma

il rischio sembra così minimo, che essa lo dovrebbe affrontare.

b) Nel caso della vittoria dell’Intesa. L’Italia riceverebbe il Trentino, Trieste e probabilmente

qualche altro territorio nell'Oriente e nell'Asia Minore anche. Essa avrebbe affermato il suo diritto -

farsi sentire nella sistemazione delle cose dell'Europa e nell'Asia Minore. Mediante un'alleanza

oppure un'intesa coll'Inghilterra avrebbe consolidata la sua posizione nell'Adriatico e nel

Mediterraneo nonché nell'Africa del Nord, dove essa avrebbe affermata la sua posizione come una

delle Grandi Potenze dell’Europa». 53 Joseph I.S. Whitaker, The times has now come for Italy to make up her mind, 1-6, manuscript

preserved in the Whitaker Archive, 1-2. 54 Whitaker, The times has now come for Italy. Point 1. Under a continuance of neutrality, 2 and retro.


103

reference to “the horrors of war”, and it is evident that the phrase has been inserted

on second thought55

, between the title and the following point.

This point is articulated in two parts: A) In the event of the Central Powers being

victorious, and B) In the event of the “Triple Entente” being victorious. On these

points, Whitaker analyzed the first of two opposing hypothesis, what might happen

if Italy entered the war, and what the consequences could be if were victorious or

not.

The second part of the pamphlet is quite new and examined another opportunity:

what, in Whitaker’s opinion, might happen if Italy, abandoning her neutrality,

joined the “Triple Entente”. Whitaker first comments that Italy would suffer the

consequences of war, while, at the moment, Italian people were far from the war

scene. He was aware that, in the event of the victory of the Central Powers, Italy’s

position would undoubtedly not be a pleasant one, but the risk of remaining out of

the game and to be considered a comparatively insignificant country in the political

world, would justify Italy in taking that risk. No more words are spent on this

eventuality, which would surely be a complete disaster for Italy.

As regards a “Triple Entente” victory, more optimistically, Whitaker dedicated a

detailed analysis. Instead, by preserving its neutrality, Italy would spare her country

the horrors of war, but (and but is underlined) it would be an uncertain future

independence if the Central Powers proved victorious, while, in the event of the

“Triple Entente” securing victory, Italy would naturally have to forego the many

advantages that could be gained provide that it joined them.56

Finally, Whitaker wrote that “it should be borne in mind that wishing to realize

its first aspirations to affirm its position as a great European Power, the opportunity

is a golden one not to be lost for a similar one may probably never again presents

itself.”57

Conclusion When speaking of the causes of the war, references have been made to the

influence that Great Britain’s position had in forming Whitaker’s opinion. Trying to

be impartial, he, however, asked himself: “might not this terrible cataclysm have

been avoided? What has really brought it about, what invisible forces have been

working at the back of the apparent causes, and what fell destiny has impelled the

course of event to so dire end?”58

They were difficult questions. He concluded – in answer to the first question –

that the war was inevitable so long as Germany maintained its predominance and

refused to conform to the laws of nations. On the real causes of the war, he thought

55 The phrase has been written in a narrow space between two lines on the paper. 56 Whitaker, The times has now come for Italy, 4. 57 Whitaker, The times has now come for Italy, 6. 58 Whitaker, The Great War, 58.

Rosamaria ALIBRANDI

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that one must look “behind the scenes” in order to find what had brought about “the

revolution of ideas and principles which has made modern Germany what she is at

present”. In essence, he was deeply convinced that the immediate cause of the war

was Germany’s aspiration for power and greatness, combined with the radically

changed mindset of the “new Germany”.59

With regard to his confidence in British conduct, Whitaker felt that the

awareness of the justice of England’s cause would continue to give the nation the

strength to carry it through. England represented a guarantee for peace and liberty

and for respect of justice and laws of nations.

Like other European Powers, Italy, though still neutral at the time he was

writing, had to foresee the danger with which Europe was threatened by the

hegemonic rule of a despotic State. He considered that the question of Italy passing

from the state of neutrality to one of active participation in the conflict was a

serious one, and had to be carefully considered by the Government. Italian Ministry,

in his opinion, was a strong one, and could be counted on to decide the best for its

country’s interests. But he also considered it imperative for the Italian nation to put

aside all party differences and support the Government to the utmost in that fateful

moment. In any case, “whatever may be Italy’s decision” he wrote, “one may be

sure the heart of her people and her entire sympathies will be with the just cause

which must and will triumph in the end!”60

A careful examination of the full body of Whitaker’s manuscripts shows some

other papers which, although they aren’t directly related to the war, do, however,

reveal – still in the postwar period – his confidence in the possibility of Italy having

a role of international importance.

When, after the war, the advent of fascism came to Italy, he considered that the

political degradation to which the country had come had left the King no choice but

to appoint Mussolini the head of Government. Several considerations are contained

in another two notes, perhaps prepared for publication in English newspapers, in

which he wrote about his confidence in a renewed national pride.61

His opinions of Mussolini, however, were destined to change. In fact, the latest

documents we have and consider worthy of being mentioned, are specifically

concerned with the responsibility of Mussolini.

Whitaker took note of the failure of Fascism, and invoked the monarchy to

recover its prestige and leadership to rule the nation. He strongly hoped that the

monarchy would resume its old position, regain its Constitution, without violent

upheavals, giving back to the Italian people individual freedom of expression.

59 Whitaker, The Great War, 58. 60 Whitaker, The Great War, 59. 61 The first note (November 3rd, 1922) was on the Fascists meeting of 28 October in Naples; the

second, “On the present-political situation in Italy” (31 December, 1924). The manuscripts are

preserved in the Whitaker Archive.


105

Finally, there seem interesting observations, those concerning the end of

European hegemony in the world, in other words, the end of the so-called

“Eurocentrismo”. “No country will want to give up the large industries created

outside Europe during the war”, he wrote. “The whole world, it is evident, is

organized to live without Europe.”62

This political view was looking at a Western Europe alliance system, including

the development of a European identity, in which Europe could have a role of Great

Power.63

A little step towards a new Europe: not a balance of power, but a

community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Every story starts from the end. None of them ever ends, because we are always

ready to write it again. And always in a different way, depending on the viewpoint.

The present continually reshapes the past. History remains a living matter, a modern

instrument of power, so much so that the contemporary strategic doctrine prizes a

kind of competitive storytelling, as if the conflicts are not won on the battlefield,

but in the immaterial sphere of the narrative. The winner is the one who imposes his

version of the facts. Rethinking today the First World War, the original catastrophe

of our age, is an exceedingly significant act. In this context, the men of 1914 are our

contemporaries. In 1918, as then in 1945 or even in 1991, the end of a war was

touted as the end of all wars. But the magic formula for perpetual peace, according

to the Rousseauian enlightened dream of creating a new society, still awaiting its

creator. Our utopias, meanwhile, continue to build on what will be the criticism of

what there was.

62 Joseph I.S. Whitaker, On the present-political situation in Italy, manuscript preserved in the

Whitaker Archive, 1. 63 Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I. America, Britain and the Stabilization of

Europe, 1919-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 64-67; Jeremy Black, Great

Powers and the Quest for Hegemony. The World Order Since 1500 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007),

116-118.