aleksander fuksiewicz, julia klein (2014): euroscepticism in the polish and german 2014 european...

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EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE POLISH AND GERMAN 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

ALEKSANDER FUKSIEWICZJULIA KLEIN

1Euroscepticism in the Polish and German ....

INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRSThe European Programme

This publication was co-funded by the German-Polish Science Foundation

Project implemented with the financial support from the European

Commission. The European Commission support for the production of this

publication does not constitute endorsement of the contents which reflects

the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsi-

ble for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Research team: Aleksander Fuksiewicz, Julia Klein [Institute for European

Politics (IEP)], Agnieszka Łada, Paweł Polok

Translation: Anna Dzięgiel

Proof-reading: Hayden Berry

© Copyright by Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw 2014

2 Aleksander Fuksiewicz, Julia Klein

IntroductionJulia Klein, Aleksander Fuksiewicz

Euroscepticism is a term which came into use in 1980s to describe political

parties opposing European integration. Its first application has been attributed

to The Times. Outside the United Kingdom, the term became popular during

the debate on the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, and in Poland – during the

debate over the Polish accession to the European Union.1

Describing Eurosceptic trends is not made easier by the fact that

Eurosceptic attitudes are determined by the specific nature of the country in

which they are found. Euroscepticism will be different in Poland and different

in Germany, its character will depend on a number of factors: the nature of

public debate, the shape of the political scene, and economic and social factors,

etc. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a consistent and uniform definition of

Euroscepticism. Political scientists have been making such attempts for many

years, not only proposing various definitions, but also different typologies

of the very phenomenon of Euroscepticism or typologies of attitudes

towards European integration in general.2 The furthest-reaching concept of

Christopher Flood, who proposed a six-level scale describing the attitudes

towards European integration (rejectionists, revisionists, minimalists,

gradualists, reformists, maximalists)3 is not only the most exhaustive, but it

also best reveals the difficulties involved in applying complex concepts to

describe the practice of public debate.

For it is common practice in Poland that during election campaigns, the EU

is rarely mentioned. It can even be argued that Eurosceptic parties talk about

it less than other parties. It is reasonable, after all, as in 2014 the specific nature

of the pre-election debate was such that the parties which could be classified

as Eurosceptic, were also the parties in opposition to the (pro-European)

government and their election strategies consisted mainly of attacking the

government for its domestic activity and not its European one. In the context

of little knowledge and interest of the public in European matters, from the

point of view of the efficiency of communication, this strategy may be deemed

justified. In Germany, European elections are still to characterize as second-order elections, although there has been an increased reporting in press and

TV during the pre-election debate in 2014. Nevertheless, the German voters´

interest in and awareness of European issues and campaigning had remained

low, as did the voter turnout. European elections are still used by German

1 Information Guide. Euroscepticism, http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/insrv/resources/edc/Euroscepticism.pdf2 For a synthetic review of the definitions, typologies, and theories – see Aleksandra Moroska, Prawicowy populizm a eurosceptycyzm [Right-wing populism versus euroscepticism], Wrocław 2010, Wydawnictwo Uniw-ersytetu Wrocławskiego, pp. 56-68.3 Christopher Flood, Euroscepticism: a problematic concept, UACES 32nd Annual Conference, Belfast, 2-4 Sep-tember 2002, http://uaces.org/documents/papers/0201/flood.pdf (28.07.2014).


voters to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with governing parties and are also

characterized by the success of small fringe parties.4 Similar to Poland those

parties that show principle objection to the European integration process and

the EU belong to the right-wing populist and extremist protest parties that

oppose the mainstream and parliamentary party system in general. But in

contrast to the Polish eurosceptical parties, their Anti-mainstream strategy

contains a European dimension and the newly emerged party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is mainly focused on its Euroscepticism and attacking the

European policy of the German governing parties, as will be showed in the

German part of this analysis.

As a result, difficulties already appear when one attempts to identify the

general position of Polish and German political parties regarding European

integration. There are major methodical and empirical problems identifying

eurosceptical parties to the extent that would allow their classification as one

of the six attitudes towards the EU as defined by Flood. Firstly, the parties´

Euroscepticism shouldn´t be analysed solely on basis of their European

election campaigns and programmes, as European elections are still described

as second order elections and secondly, there is to expect that parties don´t

articulate their definite position towards the European integration and EU

neither in their European nor national election program. Quantitative and

qualitative surveys of party members and interviews of a parties elite are

an absolute precondition, but would be costly, time consuming and difficult

to implement. Thirdly, a party´s eurosceptical position is flexible as it is

highly influenced by certain events and situations e.g., the Eurozone crisis,

Treaty ratification processes or referenda, its internal party organization

and fractions, and short- and medium-term tactical and domestic motives

due to a party system´s competition. Furthermore, historical, cultural and

geopolitical issues are to consider, especially by comparing different national

party systems. In conclusion, as Euroscepticism is a very complex empirical

phenomenon, there are also conceptual problems. Especially complex and

detailed concepts as Flood´s categorization are very difficult to operationalize

and to measure.5

Therefore, for the purposes of this text, a slightly simpler definition of

Euroscepticism or “soft” Euroscepticism has been applied, as opposition

against the enhancement of European integration and against the most

advanced elements of political integration. It is, therefore, an attitude opposing

not only any form of European federalism but also one that questions the

current shape of the EU and looks at the EU with deep distrust, questioning

the way it operates and the sense of pursuing some of its policies. This is the

4 Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, 1980, Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results, European Journal of Political Research 8(1): 3-44.5 Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart, Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No 69; European Parties Elections and Referendums Network Working Paper No 1


so-called “soft” Euroscepticism as defined by Szczerbiak and Taggart,6 who

describe it as a lack of the essential opposition against European integration

and membership in the EU, but opposition to the enhancement of integration,

development of new EU integration policies and to European federalism, that

is, against anything that would lead to further broadening of the competencies

of the EU. The so-called “hard” Euroscepticism as defined by Szczerbiak and

Taggart means opposition against membership in the EU, and in the language

of journalism, it is rather to call “anti-EUism”, in Poland represented by the

Congress of the New Right of Janusz Korwin-Mikke and in Germany by the

right-wing extremist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National

Democratic Party of Germany).

An additional difficulty in describing Euroscepticism is the fact that this

term has gained pejorative overtones. Probably most of the parties, which

are instinctively called Eurosceptic, would not use this term to describe

themselves or try to distance themselves from the hard Eurosceptics. The

parties which wish to emphasise their ambivalent attitude towards European

integration or some of its aspects usually use the expression “Euro-realists”.

For an analyst, it is an additional difficulty but also an important clue –

wherever Euro-realism is mentioned, what is probably actually meant is

Euroscepticism. It should be emphasised that in this paper, Euroscepticism is

a neutral category, which facilitates an attempt to describe the attitudes of

reluctance towards enhancing European integration.

6 Ibidem.


Euroscepticism in the 2014 Polish election campaign

Aleksander Fuksiewicz

Poland – the land of Eurosceptics or Euro-enthusiasts?

Judged on the basis of public opinion polls, Poland is a country of Euro-

enthusiasts. However, judged on the basis of the results of this year’s

elections to the European Parliament – it is a land of Eurosceptics. According

to CBOS surveys, Poland’s membership in the European Union in March 2014

was supported by 89% of Poles.7 On the other hand, the Eurosceptic parties

(including Kongres Nowej Prawicy [the Congress of the New Right]) won

almost half of the seats assigned to Poland in these elections.8 There are more

such paradoxical situations in the Polish European debate. Western European

Eurosceptics may be surprised by the fact that Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law

and Justice), which often emphasises that European integration has gone too

far, at the same time supports the creation of a European army and the quick

accession of Ukraine into the EU. The same situation is similar as far as the

internal market is concerned; while in the West the questioning of the internal

market’s very principles, and especially of the opening of the labour markets

to the citizens of the “new” EU member states, is the main element of the

Eurosceptics’ campaign, Polish Eurosceptics are the advocates of the internal

market, in particular, the free movement of people.

In this paper, we will attempt to have a closer look at Polish Euroscepticism

and highlight its differences as compared to the Western European variety,

discussed here using the example of Germany. In the first part of the text, we

describe the parties in whose programmes and campaigns it is possible to

find Eurosceptic elements and which will be included in the further analysis.

Here, the most important party is Law and Justice, as it gained the second best

result in Poland in these elections and remains the main opposition force in

the country, and – according to opinion polls – it has a chance of winning the

national parliamentary elections which will take place during the current

term of the European Parliament. Where the programme of Law and Justice

is moderately Eurosceptic, the programmes of the two other parties, as the

election results have shown – niche parties – Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidarna

Polska (United Poland) and Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem (Poland Together)

go much further. The above three parties may be recognised as Eurosceptic

according to the adopted criterion, whereby Euroscepticism means opposition

7 10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej, Komunikat z badań Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej [10 years of the Polish membership in the European Union, Report from a survey by the Public Opinion Research Centre CBOS], 52/2014.8 Law and Justice – 19, Congress of the New Right – 4. There are 52 Polish MEPs in the European Parliament. The remaining seats were gained by: Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform] – 19, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [Democratic Left Alliance] – 5 and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Polish People’s Party] – 4.


to the strengthening of European integration and to the most advanced

elements of the political integration but also certain suspicion against the EU

and its institutions. After the elections, United Poland and Poland Together

turned out to be parties of marginal importance, which not only failed to win

a single seat but which have also been “absorbed” by Law and Justice after

the elections. They are, however, interesting examples of the opposite sides

of the Polish right-wing Euroscepticism – a welfare-oriented one and a free

market one.

It is, however, worth noting that Eurosceptic themes also appear in the

slogans and programmes of the parties which are universally perceived as

pro-European, such as the Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) which,

in its election programme demands that the EU’s interfering with “people’s

lifestyles” be limited.

Further in the article we will discuss the thematic areas that Eurosceptic

parties most willingly use in their election campaigns. The most important

differences and similarities between the parties have been highlighted. The

review is based on election campaigns before the elections to the European

Parliament in May 2014. It includes, first of all, parties’ election programmes,

television and Internet spots, and other contributions by the main politicians.

Polish Euroscepticism – right wing

LAW AND JUSTICE

Law and Justice firmly opposes the federalisation of the EU. “The EU

is – and must remain – an international organisation.”9 They are, therefore,

a Eurosceptic party if we define Euroscepticism as opposition to further

integration. They do not oppose integration as such but they also place

themselves in opposition to its present shape. Instead, they demand the

return to economic integration and limiting political integration.

The party proposes that the principle of EU subsidiarity and the precedence

of the state’s competencies over those attributed to the EU as an international

organisation (and the establishing of the Ministry of European Integration)

be guaranteed by a statute. The party declares: “We will not lead Poland into

any voluntary arrangements increasing the extent of European integration

which do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests

and we will withdraw from the objectively disadvantageous solutions of

enhanced cooperation in which Poland has already been included.” Law and

Justice further declares: “We propose a Euro-realistic community of nations

and states to replace the European fantasies or a vision of Euro-domination

of the strongest.”

9 Zdrowie, praca, rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014 [Health, work, family. 2014 Programme of Law and Justice], http://www.pis.org.pl/dokumenty.php (30.5.2014) – subsequent quotations from the same source.


Law and Justice also wants to defend Polish identity in the EU. “We will

effectively defend Polish national identity, tradition, culture, and the Polish

model of life and customs against the emerging tendencies to introduce,

in a supranational manner, some risky cultural experiments which are not

accepted by the majority of society. Every nation and every state, within the

European community, must preserve its sovereign right to shape its own

model of social order and not to be subjected to some specific ‘cultural re-

education’ from the outside.”

Law and Justice is significant as in these elections they achieved the

second best result and won as many as 19 seats in the European Parliament.

If, therefore, Law and Justice is recognised as a – perhaps moderately –

Eurosceptic party, it turns out that in Poland, Euroscepticism is clearly present

in mainstream politics. As it has been mentioned above, this is in contradiction

with the results of public opinion polls, which form a picture of Poles as one

of the most Euro-enthusiastic societies in the EU, which, in a way, proves

that European issues in the “European” election campaign were definitely of

secondary importance compared to domestic matters.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the voters supporting Law and

Justice and, for instance, those voting for pro-European Civic Platform differ

considerably in their attitude towards European integration. According

to CBOS surveys, 100% (!) of Civic Platform supporters approve of Polish

membership of the EU. Integration opponents can, indeed, be found among

the potential Law and Justice voters, although even in this group they are

a definite minority; as many as 91% of the supporters of this party declare

their approval for EU membership (8% are against).10 Eighty-two per cent of

potential Civic Platform voters and 63% of potential Law and Justice voters

believe that accession to the EU has given Poland more advantages than

disadvantages. An opposite view is held by 8% and 17%, respectively. It may

therefore be concluded that even the voters supporting Eurosceptic Law and

Justice are, in majority, rather pro-European.

In the definition adopted here, Euroscepticism is defined, primarily, by the

attitude towards further strengthening of European integration. In this case,

most of the Law and Justice supporters appear to be Eurosceptics and most of

the Civic Platform supporters – proponents of further integration. Forty-three

per cent of Law and Justice supporters and only 22% of those supporting Civic

Platform agreed with the statement “Unification of Europe has already gone

too far”. An opposite view (“Europe should unite even more”) was expressed

by 55% of Civic Platform supporters and 36% of those supporting Law and

Justice.11

10 The electorates of the remaining parties described here and their number in the surveyed sample are too small to make a reliable comparison.11 The rest did not have an opinion or expressed a view half way between the two. The question was: Some believe that Europe should be even more united. Others believe that unification of Europe has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please describe your views on the scale from 0 to 10. “5” was treated as an ambivalent view. 10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej, Komunikat z badań Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, [10


CONGRESS OF THE NEW RIGHT

The Congress of the New Right is a specific kind of party. Even though

their Eurosceptic themes sound similar to other parties, they are more radical.

The party is also opposed to further integration and even wishes to strive for

reducing the EU to a free trade zone, similar to what the European Economic

Community once was and to “fight the centralist zeal of the federalists”.12

However, just because of its radicalism (the Congress declares that it is “the

only party in Poland which is consistently and uncompromisingly anti-EU”)

and the lack of any positive programme, the Congress should be treated as

an anti-European (anti-system) party rather than as a Eurosceptic one. Janusz

Korwin-Mikke himself said that the EU “should be abolished as soon as

possible. Poland should remain a member of the Schengen Agreement and the

Economic Area – but these are institutions independent of the EU”.13

In its election “programme”, however, the Congress announces that it is

going to be a “happenings” party; intending to “ridicule, criticise, and expose

the absurdities”. This type of happening has already become too excessive for

Western European Eurosceptics, as a result of which the Congress for the New

Right has not entered any of the emerging political groups in the European

Parliament.

POLAND TOGETHER

In these elections, Poland Together has appeared as a party that definitely

opposes stronger integration and demands profound change which lead to

diluting the EU, and also dismantling of the Eurozone. It has declared that it is

a party of “Euro-realism”, which wants to see the “EU small”.14 In its programme,

it has repeatedly emphasised that the EU is in crisis (not only an economic

crisis) and that it “needs profound changes”. Poland Together opposes the

federalist tendencies, of which “the Eurozone and the Lisbon Treaty are an

expression” (which, “in most cases turned out to be a dead end”). It announces

“the construction of Europe as a single market”. It wants more powers for

member states’ constitutional tribunals in reviewing EU legislation.

Poland Together wants to abolish the Committee of Regions and the

Economic and Social Committee. It wants to reduce the employment of EU

bureaucracy by 10% during the subsequent terms of the Parliament, as well as

reducing the expenses of MEPs and EU officials.

Poland Together has a vision in which every new transfer of power from

Warsaw to Brussels would have to be approved in a referendum. The issues

years of the Polish membership in the European Union, Report from a survey by the Public Opinion Research Centre CBOS] 52/2014.12 Program Kongresu Nowej Prawicy na Unio-wybory 2014, [Programme of the Congress of the New Right for the 2014 EU-elections], http://www.nowaprawicajkm.pl/info/program-wyborczy/program-wyborczy-do-pe-2014 (30.5.2014) – subsequent quotations from the same source.13 Ankieta “Rzeczpospolitej”: Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, miejsce nr 1, okręg nr 11, śląskie) [Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Congress of the New Right, position No. 1, district No. 11)], http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1097687-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Janusz-Korwin-Mikke.html (15.8.2014)14 Wielka Polska w małej Unii. Manifest polskiego eurorealizmu [Great Poland in a small Union. The Manifesto of Polish Euro-realism], http://polskarazem.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ProgramEuropejskiPRJG.pdf (30.5.2014) – subsequent quotations from the same source.


of identity and the view of the world are also important. Polish membership

in the EU “cannot harm the values which determine our identity – such as

family, Christianity, and the free market”. “We will consistently fight against

all attempts to impose in the EU legislation a view on the world and the law

that are contrary to the principles of Christianity,” Poland Together declares.

UNITED POLAND

United Poland presents itself as a political group which is relatively

Eurosceptic. It promotes a EU which is “only a forum for economic cooperation

and limited political cooperation”.15 At the same time, it declares its opposition

to further political integration and support for the “return to the Union based

on economic cooperation”. It sees the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty as “a

grave mistake”, demands “putting an end to it” and “returning to the EEC”.

“Member states must have the right to veto the absurd economic regulations

invented by officials in Brussels.” They do not, however, give any definition of

the absurd economic regulations which would made it possible to distinguish

those in case of which the veto could be applied from those to which it could

not. Examples of such regulations include the Tobacco Products Directive,

limitations in the sale of traditional light bulbs, and the new regulations

concerning smoke flavouring.

United Poland “is against EU [left-wing] propaganda (‘extremely leftist

gender ideology’) and supports limiting the EU to an economic community.

Social matters, the sphere of culture, and values must be shaped by each

society without any pressure from the outside.”

15 Europejski Dekalog Solidarnej Polski [The European Decalogue of the United Poland], http://www.solidarna.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Europejski-Dekalog-Solidarnej-Polski.pdf (30.5.2014) – subsequent quota-tions from the same source.


Eurosceptic themes in the programmes of other parties – the ruling coalition

As it has already been mentioned, there are also parties on the Polish

political scene which one would not really call Eurosceptic, although it is

possible to find some Eurosceptic signals in their programmes or in public

statements made by their politicians; the ruling party itself is the best example

of the above.

CIVIC PLATFORM

In its programme, Civic Platform presents itself as a clearly pro-European

party (“as a party we have always been ... pro-European”16; “A strong and

efficient European Union is in the strategic interest of Poland”, Civic Platform

has written in its election programme), a party which sees the sources of

Polish economic growth and security in the EU. Civic Platform declares that

it wants to strengthen the Union. However, there are no references here,

either to federalism or to anti-federalism. In the text, we only once find the

European Commission, (“The strong and impartial European Commission is the

foundation of the European Union”), and then the willingness to strengthen

the European External Action Service. On the other hand, Civic Platform has

made the energy union project17 a priority of its programme, which shows that

they indeed wish to strengthen integration.

PO emphasises that the EU should create legislation only in areas that

cannot be better regulated at the national level. This can be viewed as a slightly

Eurosceptic declaration, suggesting that currently the EU tends to exceed

its powers. There are similar tones in the following declaration that Civic

Platform’s aim in the European Parliament will be to limit the EU’s legislative

activity “in insignificant matters, outside its competence and concerning, for

instance, people’s style and model of living”.

POLISH PEOPLE’S PARTY

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (the Polish People’s Party, PSL) declares its

attachment to the idea of the Europe of Homelands – “operating on the basis

of the principle of subsidiarity, preserving … the attributes and powers of the

Polish state, necessary for the development of the Polish nation”,18 which rather

suggests some reluctance towards federalism. “PSL’s priority is to preserve or

even restore the model of the Europe of Values (?) … and preserve the model

16 SILNA POLSKA W BEZPIECZNEJ EUROPIE – Europejski manifest Platformy Obywatelskiej [STRONG POLAND IN A SAFE EUROPE – the European Manifesto of the Civic Platform], 12/04/2014, http://www.platforma.org/aktualnosc/36587/silna-polska-w-bezpiecznej-europie-europejski-manifest-platformy-obywatelskiej (30.5.2014) – subsequent quotations from the same source.17 Former Prime Minister Donald proposed the creation of an energy union in April 2014. It would include, among others, joint negotiations with energy suppliers, better use of European energy sources – coal and shale gas, solidarity in case of an embargo on energy supplies and efforts to diversify the energy suppliers.18 Polskie priorytety europejskiej polityki PSL [Polish priorities of the PSL’s European policy], http://prasowka.psl.pl/Polskie_Priorytety_Europejskiej_Polityki_PSL.pdf (30.5.2014); Deklaracja wyborcza PSL do Parlamentu Europejskiego – 2014 [PSL’s Declaration for the 2014 Elections to the European Parliament], http://prasowka.psl.pl/DEKLARACJA_WYBORCZA_1.pdf (30.5.2014) – subsequent quotations from the same source.


of Social (or Welfare-oriented Europe) Europe”. The Polish People’s Party also

declares that “the time of Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm has passed.

Today is the time for Euro-realism.” It is difficult to say what it really means, as

the position of PSL vis-à-vis the federalisation of the EU is complex. The party

opposes federalisation but not further integration. Czesław Siekierski, a Polish

People’s Party MEP, firmly opposes a European “super-state”: “the European

Union should be a union of sovereign national states … . Federalisation, or

striving to form a super-state, are the ideas popular mainly among certain

European political and economic elites; at the same time, however, they have

not found any broader recognition among the societies of member states. As

a result, they carry a serious risk for the whole integration project because of

the lack of public legitimacy.”19

However, summing up the statements of individual candidates of this

party, it should be stated that the Polish People’s Party firmly supports further

integration in certain areas, provided that it does not apply to some other

areas (e.g., family law, education). A statement made by another MEP, Andrzej

Grzyb, seems very typical: “For a long time to come, the European Union will

and should remain a union of states. … This does not mean, however, that

the process of European integration should not be enhanced, both in the

economic and in the political sphere. … We should achieve a higher level of

coordination in foreign policy. We should also enhance the common market

and, for the sake of security of the monetary union, we should, to a certain

extent, coordinate the fiscal and banking policies (this applies primarily to the

Eurozone members). Cross-border regulations concerning property or family

law also require coordination at the EU level … . On the other hand, the Union

should not be given powers in the area of family law or education and the

common security policy should be stronger and more effective but it should

remain just an addition to the prerogatives of the member states.”20 To sum

up: “yes” to further integration of the EU, but with the exclusion of family law,

education, and security.

The Left – the most pro-European group

DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE and EUROPE PLUS YOUR MOVEMENT

(EUROPA PLUS TWÓJ RUCH)

While analysing only the most recent election campaign and the election

programmes of the parties, one should conclude that the most pro-European

political forces in Poland are the left-wing parties, and especially Europe Plus

Your Movement. Even though the coalition did not manage to win any seats in

19 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Czesław Siekierski (Polish People’s Party, Position No. 1, District No. nr 10, małopolsko-świętokrzyski), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1100708-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Czeslaw--Siekierski.html (24.7.2014).20 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Andrzej Grzyb (PSL, position No. 1, Wielkopolska), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1101325-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Andrzej-Grzyb.html (23.7.2014).


the European Parliament, it is still worth mentioning as it was the only one that

decided to bravely promote pro-European proposals. They support, among

other things, further strengthening of the role of the European Parliament,

which should “control the actions of the European Commission in the same

way as it is the case with national parliaments and governments”. Europe Plus

wants to strengthen the European Citizens’ Initiative and wants to introduce

a European referendum regarding the most important European issues, to

be conducted together with the elections to the European Parliament. The

coalition announces their support for the introduction of the common EU

fiscal policy, “which will impose some discipline on member states’ finances”.

Moreover, Europe Plus is the only political party whose candidates

directly support the federalisation of the EU. Krzysztof Iszkowski, one of the

candidates, said, for example: “Only a united Europe will be able to compete

effectively in the global economy and pursue an assertive policy towards

other global players. Achieving this must be accompanied by limiting the

powers of national governments, including – in the 15-20-year perspective –

formal withdrawal from the paradigm of sovereignty of the member states.

The present institutional arrangements, which require that a compromise be

reached among the 28 EU members, are ineffective and should be replaced

with a classic federal structure: understandable for the citizens and clearly

defining (by separation) the competencies of the EU, national, regional, and

local levels.”21

It is more difficult to describe the position of Sojusz Lewicy

Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance, SLD), as this party did not present

its own programme before the elections. It was referring to the programme

of the Party of European Socialists. The statements made by politicians of

this party show, however, that suspicion directed towards the EU is alien to

the Democratic Left Alliance. They also firmly support further integration.

Statements such as this, by Wojciech Olejniczak, also appear: “The European

Union should go in the direction of federalisation.”22

21 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Krzysztof Iszkowski (Europe + Your Movement, position no. 3, district no. nr 4, Warsaw), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1081230,1096783-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Krzysztof-Iszkowski--Europa---Twoj-Ruch--miejsce-3--okreg-nr-4--Warszawa-.html (3.9.2014).22 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Wojciech Olejniczak (Democratic Left Alliance, position no. 1, district no. nr 4, Warsaw), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1099242-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Wojciech-Olejniczak.html (12.8.2014).


The most important themes in the Eurosceptics’ campaign

Based on the last election campaign, it is possible to create a list of

subjects which Polish Eurosceptics find particularly important, interesting,

and useful in their fight for votes. Some of them relate to a different vision of

the development of the EU than the prevailing one. One can include in the list,

the opposition to the accession of Poland to the Eurozone, reluctance towards

the Lisbon Treaty or any new forms of enhancing European integration,

opposition to the excess of EU regulations, environmental and climate

policies, and the alleged overgrowth of bureaucracy. What the Eurosceptic

parties have in common is their support for economic cooperation in Europe

(the single market), but also willingness to reduce the Union to just this

cooperation, more or less in the form of the EEC, or at least to slow down the

strengthening of the process of political integration.

Another group of subjects seems rather to serve the purpose of

emphasising the opposition to the parties that are presently in power, e.g.,

the demands for levelling the direct payments for Polish farmers. Polish

Euroscepticism – at least the one which plays some role on the political

scene – is clearly right wing and conservative, often invoking the authority of

the Church. Hence, the frequent slogans about the necessity to “restore the

normality” and the opposition to “the imposition of alien (i.e., liberal) values”,

which is often attributed to the European Union.

In the following part of the paper, we discuss the subjects most often

raised by Eurosceptic politicians in the last European Parliament election

campaign. However, we only mention the “European” themes, that is, those

concerning the EU, although most of the election campaign was in fact

devoted to domestic issues. In addition, we focus on these demands and

slogans, which can be an expression of Polish Euroscepticism and which may

help to define it.

The negative overall effect of Polish membership in the EU

An element typical for the Eurosceptic parties in Poland is a negative

assessment of the overall effect of Polish membership in the EU, or at least

emphasising its negative aspects. At the same time, it is a political programme

area that distinguishes the Eurosceptic parties from the anti-European parties,

which reject Polish membership in the Union. The criticism of the Union and

– also frequent – of the conditions, on which Poland joined the EU, leads the

Eurosceptic parties to a conclusion that the EU must be reformed and to

demanding that the Polish government should fight more fiercely for Polish


interests, whereas in case of the anti-European parties, such as the Congress

of the New Right – this criticism leads to demanding that Poland leave the EU.

A typical example of this may be a fragment of an article by Mirosław

Piotrowski, a Law and Justice MEP. “It is only today that people begin to realise

that the negotiated accession conditions were disadvantageous, and, as a

number of independent economists point out, for a few years we have been,

in fact, net payers to the EU budget. … Indiscriminate Euro-enthusiasts are not

bothered by that and say that if it were not for the EU funds, we would not

have built the roads and the bridges on our own. This denotes not only a lack

of faith in the self-reliance of our citizens, but it also undermines the sense

of building civil society. We undoubtedly need not only new spirit and the

energy, but also a fresh view on EU structures and possibilities, which may be

ensured by a shift in the balance of power after the European elections of 25

May of this year.”23

Poles do not want the euro, nor do the EuroscepticsWhat all Polish Eurosceptic political groups have in common is their

opposition to adopting the euro in Poland. The question of the Latarnik Wyborczy (Polish VoteMatch), whether Poland should remain outside the

Eurozone, received a “yes” answer from all the Eurosceptic and right-wing

(and only those) parties, i.e., Law and Justice, United Poland, Poland Together,

the New Right, and the National Movement.24 For the Eurosceptics, this is a

politically “convenient” matter, as the majority of Poles are also opposed

to adopting the euro. According to a GfK Polonia survey in March 2014, 74%

of Poles were against introducing the common currency. In this case, the

differences among the electorates of individual parties are also important.

Those opposing the euro are much more numerous amongst the supporters of

Law and Justice (85%) than amongst the potential supporters of Civic Platform

(59%).25

Law and Justice opposes the adoption of the euro, and it is also the main

obstacle on the road to its adoption, as it is able to block the introduction of

the necessary changes into the Constitution. Law and Justice is also against

“subjecting the Polish budget to the control of EU officials”. United Poland

represents a similar stance, as it opposed the adoption of the euro in Poland,

blaming the common currency for triggering the economic crisis in the South

of Europe. “Retaining the Polish zloty will allow … a flexible Polish response to

changing economic conditions and will ensure the macroeconomic security.”

23 http://www.piotrowski.org.pl/10-lat-w-ue,721.html24 The full set of answers given by political parties to the Latarnik’s questions, see “Euro, imigranci, europejska płaca minimalna? Marihuana, aborcja, eutanazja? Co na to kandydaci?” [Euro, immigrants, European minimum wage? Marijuana, abortion, euthanasia? What do the candidates say to that?] [ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE], http://wyborcza.pl/1,137766,16000005,Euro__imigranci__europejska_placa_minimalna__Marihuana_.html (1.8.2014).25 Stosunek Polaków do wprowadzenia euro – sierpień 2014 [Attitude of Poles towards the introduction of the Euro –August 2014], GfK Polonia Survey Report, 21.8.2014.


Poland Together goes the furthest, as it states in its programme that

“the euro has turned out to be a failed experiment”. Not only does it oppose

the adoption of the euro in Poland, but it also advocates “the controlled

dismantling of the Eurozone and the return to national currencies” in the

remaining EU member states.

The Congress of the New Right also opposes the adoption of the euro.

As for the other parties, Civic Platform declares that it wants the adoption of

the common European currency, although it will not be possible in the coming

years due to political (lack of majority needed to change the Constitution) and

economic reasons. In March, former Prime Minister Donald Tusk said: “We will

join the Eurozone when it is completely safe for Poland to do so, that is, when

Poland is fully prepared for it.” He also stated that “the unfortunate provisions

of the Constitution” were, at present, the only “political obstacle” to adopting

the common currency.26 At the same time, however, the ruling party does not

declare, in any way, that it will work on fulfilling the convergence criteria or

on persuading the public to accept the European currency. Just the opposite,

one may get the impression that the reluctance of the public towards the

euro makes the ruling party avoid the subject, even though some individual

politicians do declare that adoption of the euro in Poland will ultimately be

beneficial and inevitable. Danuta Hübner is perhaps the only one to break

ranks, as she said, that “it is, however, necessary to inform the Polish public

of the risks connected with remaining outside the common currency area”.27

The Polish People’s Party declares that Poland should “set the date for

adopting the euro independently, on conditions which are beneficial for

Poland”. This conservative position of PSL is, however, accompanied by some

more positive statements by leading politicians of this party, e.g., Czesław

Siekierski, MEP: “However, there is no doubt that we should join the Eurozone,

sooner or later, and that is not only because we are obligated by the Treaty

to do so – the common currency has some notable benefits in the area of

trade and account settlements, and it reduces the costs of loans, etc. Let us

hope that it will take place at the moment when our economy is strong and

competitive and the Eurozone – strengthened and balanced.”28

During the campaign, representatives of both Civic Platform and the

Polish People’s Party pointed out that adoption of the euro, especially in

the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine, would be a factor increasing

Poland’s security.

26 Tusk: Polska wejdzie do strefy euro, gdy będzie w pełni gotowa [Tusk: Poland will join the Euro Zone when it is fully prepared], http://www.pb.pl/3592417,64022,tusk-polska-wejdzie-do-strefy-euro-gdy-bedzie-w-pelni--gotowa (3.9.2014).27 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Danuta Huebner (PO, position No. 1, Warsaw), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1105304-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Danuta-Huebner.html, (3.9.2014).28 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey : Czesław Siekierski (Polish People’s Party, Position No. 1, district no. 10, małopol-sko-świętokrzyski), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1100708-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Czeslaw-Siekierski.html (3.9.2014).


Agriculture: level the direct payments!The EU’s agricultural policy is a subject which is readily used by

Eurosceptics, but this really applies to only one of its elements, namely, the

unequal direct payments for farmers from Poland and from the states of

Western Europe. The reason why this subject is so popular is that it is so easy

to demonstrate the “discriminatory” nature of this policy (“Polish farmers are

getting less than those from Western Europe”) and that it is relatively easy for

voters to understand. As a matter of fact, it is a subject which unites different

political forces in Poland, as it has also appeared in the election programme of

Europe Plus Your Movement.

Both United Poland and Poland Together demanded the levelling of the

direct payments. The latter also wanted “that the milk quotas be retained and

increased and that the area payments be levelled” and also that the sugar

production quotas for Poland be retained. It wants competition to be the

basis for the development of agriculture. Levelling direct payments has also

been appearing for years in the statements of politicians of Law and Justice.

On the other hand, the Congress of the New Right wants to abolish all types of

support for agriculture.

Defenders of the internal marketThe internal market is an interesting area for examining Polish

Euroscepticism and the differences between the Polish and, for example,

Western European Eurosceptics. While in Western Europe, undermining the

principles of the common market is one of main elements of their election

campaign (opposition to immigration from the “new” EU member states, to

opening of the labour market, to granting welfare benefits to immigrants), in

Poland, the Eurosceptics are, paradoxically, the ones who defend the internal

market. In this respect, United Poland has been the most pronounced; in its

programme it wants “to guard the principle of the free movement of persons”,

“the liberalisation of the labour markets and implementation of the four

freedoms”. On the other hand, Poland Together opposes the standardisation

of the EU tax law.

What is visible here is certain pragmatism and following the way in which

a given party understands the national interest or the expectations of voters.

On the other hand, a general image of Polish Eurosceptics is confirmed as

those who object to any political integration, but support the economic

cooperation, even going as far as the single market.

Opposition to undermining the principles of the four freedoms (the

movement of persons, goods, services, and capital) is something that the

Eurosceptics have in common with the rest of the Polish mainstream political

parties. It brings together both the Eurosceptics, Civic Platform, and Europe

Plus. Politicians representing Law and Justice have said little about this subject

in the campaign, which is also politically justified. The British Prime Minister,


David Cameron, who, together with Law and Justice forms the conservative

political group in the European Parliament, has become the chief opponent of

the free movement of persons.

However, the support for the internal market goes hand in hand with

criticising the creation by the EU of the excessive number of regulations

impeding economic growth. On this occasion, various absurd – according to

the Eurosceptics (and often falsely or inaccurately presented) – EU regulations

are ridiculed: the curvature of the banana, the ban on the smoking of cold

meats, and the like. When entering this area, politicians often resort to

populist slogans. In one of its spots, United Poland appeals, “Poles, look what

Europe looks like today. There are no funds to fight unemployment, but there

are funds in the EU to measure the curvature of the banana, provide guidance

on how to wear wellington boots, and test the usefulness of a toilet flush. The

EU bans the smoking of meats using traditional Polish methods. It bans the

use of cheap light bulbs only because of some invented ideology.”

Law and Justice uses the so-called absurdities of the EU law to criticise

the EU, although applying a gentler language. On an Internet spot, Mirosław

Piotrowski from Law and Justice says: “After joining the European Union,

Poland not only receives European funds and subsidies, but is also obliged to

adopt EU regulations. There are a lot of them and they cover the entire life and

all the activities of man and not only of man,” and then he lists a number of

such regulations, from the obligation to provide toys for pigs in the pig farm to

the ban on manufacturing so-called traditional light bulbs. The spot bears the

characteristic title “Member of the European Parliament Mirosław Piotrowski

introduces the viewer into the subject of legal absurdities in the European

Union.”29

Enemies of bureaucracyThe theme of producing excessive regulations is linked to another one,

used by Eurosceptics probably all over Europe – costly EU bureaucracy. Here,

their tool is primarily the lack of any concrete details. United Poland in a spot,

state: “The unbridled European administration costs a fortune. Eighty per

cent of the officials in Brussels earn more than the president of Poland. Their

privileges are incredible, and if that is not enough, they impose alien culture

and alien values on us.”

Both Poland Together and United Poland want to reduce the costs of EU

bureaucracy. Poland Together demands the reduction in the employment

of EU bureaucrats by 10% in the subsequent terms of Parliament and the

reduction of spending by the MEPs and officials. United Poland goes further

and calls for the reduction of EU bureaucracy costs by half within this term of

the Parliament.

29 http://www.piotrowski.org.pl/regulacje,325.html


Environment and climate policy – at least for re-negotiation

Polish Eurosceptics are united not only by their opposition to deeper

integration within the EU, but also by their reluctance towards certain

EU policies, especially those associated with left-wing values. This applies

in particular to climate policy, to actions connected with environmental

protection, and the energy sector.

For instance, Law and Justice is in favour of re-negotiating the climate and

energy package “to guarantee the interests of Polish industry”. They also want

to exclude Poland from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The Congress of the

New Right goes even further, it wants to abolish the package altogether. Its

leader said: “It is necessary to abandon any action in this area, to demand that

the EU pays compensation for the losses sustained by Poland because of that

– I estimate them to be approximately 1.5 trillion euros – and to hold criminally

liable the conspirators who surreptitiously involved European countries

in this. Also: to take the appropriate measures against the ‘scientists’ who

backed this action with their false analyses.”30 United Poland, too, demands

abolishing the climate and energy package. Ecology is generally suspicious.

Let us recall a quotation from an Internet spot by United Poland: “[the Union]

bans the cheap light bulb only because of some invented ideology.”

The EU climate policy raises scepticism not only among Eurosceptics.

Civic Platform, too, emphasises in its programme, that the EU climate-related

obligations “cannot devastate the European economy and compromise

energy security,” and during the campaign Jerzy Buzek said, “we want to

reduce emissions, primarily for the sake of our health, but not at the expense

of the competitiveness of the European – including Polish – industry. Our

economy cannot be held hostage to the EU climate policy.”31

On energy issues, Law and Justice declares support for the traditional

sources of energy: “At the EU level we will fight to abolish the economic and

legal discrimination against electricity generation with the use of hard coal.”

Poland Together announces its opposition to any attempts to regulate the

extraction of shale gas at the European level. Moreover, it demands a report on

the implementation of the EU energy policy and voices its objection against

granting privileges in the area of transport and trade in energy sources to

selected businesses and against a tax system favouring more efficient sources

of energy. It declares: “We will defend Polish coal.” United Poland criticises the

regulations applying to shale gas extraction, which, in the party’s view, are too

restrictive.

30 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Janusz Korwin-Mikke…31 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Jerzy Buzek (PO, position no. 1, district no. 11, śląskie), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1103293-Ankieta-Rzeczpospolitej--Jerzy-Buzek.html (15.8.2014).


European values as a threat?What unites the Polish Eurosceptics is certainly a belief that the EU

poses a threat to conservative values. According to this vision, the EU is an

organisation which imposes its left-wing-liberal values on member states

and their citizens against their will, or at least promotes them in the member

states. These values are supposed to be alien to Polish culture and tradition,

and even abnormal. The “normality” is frequently invoked; a vote cast for a

Eurosceptic party in an election would therefore be a vote for the “return of

normality”. In this case, there is practically no positive programme (unless

support for families is concerned). It is mainly about fighting and defending:

the national identity, Christianity, the family, the model of life, and customs.

Law and Justice wants to defend the Polish identity in the EU. In its

programme, it declares: “We will effectively defend the Polish national

identity, tradition, culture, and the Polish model of life and customs against

the emerging tendencies to conduct, on a supranational scale, some risky

cultural experiments which are not accepted by the majority of society. Every

nation and every state, within the European community, must retain their

sovereign right to shape its own model of social order and not to be subjected

to peculiar ‘cultural re-education’ from the outside.” The combination of

attachment to conservative values and a sense of threat to these values is

clearly visible here, although the source of the threat (“from the outside”) is

not specified. Whether it is about the EU, Europe, the West, other states or

politicians – it is hard to decide without a doubt.

According to Poland Together, EU membership “cannot harm the values

which determine our identity – such as family, Christianity, and the free

market”. “We will consistently fight against all attempts to impose in EU

legislation a view on the world and the law that are contrary to the principles

of Christianity,” Poland Together declares.

United Poland has been the one to devote most attention to this subject.

In its programme, the party only wrote, “social issues, the sphere of culture

and values must be shaped by every society without pressure from the

outside” (the source of the threat defined as vaguely as in the case of Law and

Justice). The party’s television spots tell us more. In one of them, United Poland

declares its opposition to “gender, homosexual marriages and adoption of

children by such couples”. In another, “[EU officials] impose on us [Poles]

the alien culture and values”. And further on: “Promoting alien ideology is

the reason why, even during the Eurovision Song Contest normality cannot

stand a chance against quirkiness (sic!).” Representatives of the party also talk

about “restoring the normality” and the necessity “to return to the Christian

roots of Europe”. At the same time, it can be seen that the topics discussed

in the campaign are derived rather from national debates (gender) than from

European discussions, especially as the EU has no powers to interfere in such


matters as homosexual marriages or the adoption of children by homosexual

couples.

In the area of cultural norms, Eurosceptic trends are noticeable even in

Civic Platform, which, in its programme, emphasises that Civic Platform’s aim

in the European Parliament will be to limit the EU’s legislative activity “in

insignificant matters, outside its competence and concerning, for instance,

people’s model and style of living”. Thus, the perception of the EU or the West

as a source of undesirable social change is common for the entire Polish right,

including its more liberal part.

EU foreign policy – high level of compatibilityThe foreign policy of the EU could have become a crucial element of

this election campaign because of the conflict in the East of Ukraine and

discussions about the EU sanctions against Russia, etc. This subject was

“more convenient” for the ruling party, and therefore it was emphasised by

it. In the statements of Eurosceptics it was not so prominent. An exception

was made for the issues of relations with Ukraine or, more widely, with the

Eastern Partnership states (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and

Azerbaijan). In this area, however, at the general level there is a consensus

among most of the political powers, which consists of support for concluding

EU association agreements with these states and support for the future EU

membership of Ukraine. Eurosceptics also expressed such views. Sometimes

they are accused of inconsistency in their opinions (“the EU is bad for Poland,

but good for Ukraine”), which is not entirely justified. One must remember

that Eurosceptics, in general, demand that European integration should be

limited to economic cooperation. If the Union again became an organisation

of intergovernmental economic cooperation, it would be easier to accept new

members, than it is in a supranational, politically integrated organisation.

In case of the Congress of the New Right, some contradictory statements of

its leading candidates appeared: “The European Union is not beneficial for its

members, therefore I consider enlarging the Union to include other countries

inappropriate” (Robert Iwaszkiewicz)32 and “[the European Union should be]

enlarged to include additionally Armenia, Montenegro, Syria, Lebanon, Israel,

Egypt, Libya, Tunis [Tunisia], Algeria, and Morocco” (Janusz Korwin-Mikke).33

There is an approach towards the issue of defence policy and transatlantic

relations that is characteristic of Polish Eurosceptics. Firstly, what attracts

attention is the belief in the uniqueness of the relations of the EU, and

particularly Poland, with the United States. Secondly, what is clearly visible

is the strong attachment to the role of NATO as the guarantor of the military

security of Poland. Whereas, amongst themselves, Eurosceptics differ as to

32 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Robert Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, miejsce 1, okręg nr 12, dolnośląsko-opolski), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1094980,1101340-Ankieta--Rzeczpospolitej---Robert--Jaroslaw-Iwaszkiewicz.html?p=2 (15.8.2014).33 Rzeczpospolita Daily survey: Janusz Korwin-Mikke…


the role of the EU in this respect and the issue of the expansion of its own

armed forces.

Law and Justice in its programme emphasises that NATO membership is

the foundation of Poland’s security, the party also emphasises the special

role of the relations with the US. In spite of the party’s ambivalent attitude

to the strengthening of political integration in Europe, Law and Justice

supports the expansion of EU military capabilities – which is, actually a Euro-

enthusiastic declaration, but they demand that the priority of NATO and

cooperation with the US should be guaranteed. In its election programme,

Law and Justice declares, “we recognise the building of the foundations for

an ambitious security policy in the European Union as an important action.

It cannot, however, lead it to the emergence of a system that would be in

competition with the transatlantic cooperation of the allies … “. Law and

Justice also declares its support for the formation of “regional tools of military

cooperation”, particularly Central-European units.

Poland Together opposes the European army. In their view, military

cooperation between member states and the EU’s eastern neighbours is

necessary. NATO should remain the basis for security. Poland Together wants

the free trade zones with third countries, including the US, to be introduced

as soon as possible.


ConclusionsThe competition between Polish political parties involves rather ideological

declarations or television-Internet spots than election programmes. Therefore,

it is a real challenge just to establish what a party’s detailed programme is. It is

even more difficult to make a thorough analysis of the programmes from the

point of view of the Eurosceptic elements appearing in them.

Domestic issues were the main subject of this campaign. Therefore, the

importance for the party’s supporters of the Eurosceptic elements in the

campaigns of individual parties should not be overestimated. Among people

voting for Law and Justice there are certainly many who are more pro-European

than the programme of this party; among those supporting Civic Platform –

there are many opponents of the euro. The 7% result of the Congress of the

New Right does not necessarily mean that 7% of Poles would like the EU to be

dissolved or would like Poland to leave it, as this party has probably benefited

from voters’ fatigue caused by the current shape of the Polish political scene

and their anti-system sentiment (perhaps also from low voter turnout).

It is characteristic of the Polish political landscape that Euroscepticism

is clearly right wing. All the mainstream right-wing parties are Eurosceptic

and at the same time, there is no Eurosceptic left in Poland. Moreover, the

federalist proposals or, e.g., open appeals for the fastest possible adoption of

the euro in Poland appear only in left-wing circles.

The number of Eurosceptic proposals appearing in the programmes of

individual parties, results partly from their position on the political scene.

The awareness of being a niche party makes it possible to voice more radical

demands, of which it is known, that they will not be satisfied anyway. Therefore,

United Poland may demand the limitation of costs of EU bureaucracy by half

during the current term of the European Parliament. Hence, most probably,

also the greater boldness of Europe Plus Your Movement in declaring their

support for the creation of a European federation modelled on Switzerland.

On the other hand, Civic Platform, competing with Eurosceptic Law and Justice

could restrain its pro-European slogans, of which the best example is the lack

of clear declarations concerning the adoption of the euro in Poland.

The great vagueness of Eurosceptic programmes is also conspicuous.

Reproaching the Union for its mistakes or the so-called legislative absurdities

is usually not accompanied by any positive programme, namely, any specific

reform proposals. Parties do not actually tackle the issues which are, at

present, most important in the European debate, such as reforms of the

Eurozone, economic governance, or EU anti-crisis measures – issues which

will be of key importance in the coming term of the European Parliament.

The programmes do not include anything, either, about possible institutional

changes in the EU, even though these institutions and their operation are so

often criticised.


Some demands of Polish Eurosceptics make them quite distinct from

their Western European partners. Such a list could include support for the

formation of a European army, firm defence of the free movement of workers

in the EU, and support for the enlargement of the Union.


Euroscepticism in the German 2014 European election campaign

Julia Klein

Euroscepticism in Germany – no “dark matter” anymore?

Germany is traditionally a country of Euro-enthusiasts – a fact that not

been questioned by political elites and integration theorists for a long time.

However, public opinion polls in Germany have shown a more ambivalent

attitude towards European integration and the European Union since the

Maastricht Treaty and the beginning of the eurozone crisis.34 Since the

beginning of the European integration process, in no other EU member

state besides Germany have the attitudes of the societal elites and general

population towards European integration been more positive and thus

rewarded as a “model for support”.35 However, the extraordinary acceptance of

German EU membership, which the EU Commission’s Eurobarometer Project

results showed, changed to a more reluctant opinion in the 1990s. Those that

viewed German membership as a negative thing increased slightly over time

and reached around 20% in 2010.36 During the eurozone crisis, about 32% of

Germans thought that they no longer benefit from EU membership anymore.37

Although these opinions have been hardly represented in the political

mainstream of the German party system, they have contributed to the

emergence of a new ultra-conservative party in 2013 that is characterised,

in terms of Paul Taggart (1998) in the category of Eurosceptic parties,38 as

an anti-Euro “single issue party”. Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative

for Germany, AfD) barely feel short of the German 5% parliamentary entry

threshold, Sperrklausel, with 4.7% of the national parliament votes. In the

European parliament elections in 2014, AfD had a vertical take-off into the

European Parliament straightaway with seven seats. Since then, the electoral

successes of the AfD at the federal level have posed a further threat to the

established parties that have shared a broad agreement on the desirableness

of the European integration process since its beginnings, and have hardly

34 The results of the Eurobarometer project are published online: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/in-dex_en.htm. 35 Michele Knodt, Nicola Staeck, Shifting Paradigms: Reflecting Germany’s European Policy, European Integra-tion, online Papers, 3 (1999): 4, URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-003.htm.36 Europaische Kommission, Standard-Eurobarometer 73. Table of Results. Die offentliche Meinung in der Europaischen Union. Befragung: Mai 2010, November 2010, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_anx_full.pdf. Since 2011, the question about EU membership of a country is only asked in possible candidate countries.37 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Deutsche zunehmend skeptisch über die Vorteile der Europäischen Union. Polen und Franzosen verbinden auch angesichts der Euro-Krise vergleichsweise mehr Vorteile mit Europa, Pressemeldung Gütersloh/Berlin, 17.09.2012, URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/nachrich-ten_113500.htm. 38 Taggart defines four Eurosceptic party types in relation to the Euroscepticism they manifest: single issue Eurosceptic parties, protest-based parties with Euroscepticism, established parties with a Eurosceptic position, and Eurosceptic factions. In: Paul Taggart, A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems, European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 363-388.


reflected the increasing scepticism on the part of mass publics. Before then,

openly Eurosceptic statements have been considered a taboo in the political

discourse.39 Compared to other EU member states, in Germany, there have

been fewer incentives for established parties in the parliament to exploit

Euroscepticism in their national programmes and election campaigns, and

the term “dark matter”40 seems to fit well by describing Euroscepticism in

its hard manifestation in German politics. But does the emergence of AfD

and its immediate success in the European Parliament elections as well as

the general rise of Euro-criticism and protests in the mass public challenge

this term? To what magnitude is Euroscepticism manifested in the European

election programmes of German parties that are classified as being either soft or hard Eurosceptics? What are the main thematic issues in the campaigns

that their Euroscepticism is based on?

The first part of this article describes Euroscepticism within German

politics through the characterisation of political parties as either being hard or soft Eurosceptics as well as the key thematic areas of their European

election programmes. Just like in the Polish party system, there are two parties

represented in the German Bundestag whose Euroscepticism is considered

moderate, the conservative Christlich-Soziale Union party (Christian Social

Union, CSU) and the democratic socialist party Die Linke (The Left). The

right-wing, extremist, and nationalist party Nationaldemokratische Partei

Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) belongs to the hard Eurosceptic parties that express objection to European integration or EU

membership.41 The most important party that is also classified as Eurosceptic,

with an obvious tendency towards its hard manifestation, is AfD.

Secondly, this article will discuss the main thematic areas that the

Eurosceptic parties tend to use in their election campaigns, by analysing

their motives based on party ideology and strategy. This review will be based

on election campaigns, mainly concerning party programmes, before the

European Parliament elections in May 2014. The conclusion will contain a

summary of the results and policy recommendations.

39 Timm Beichelt, EU-Skepsis als Aneignung europäischer Politik, Berliner Debatte Initial 2 (2010).40 Charles Lees, Dark matter: institutional constraints and the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Ger-many, SEI Working Paper No 54; Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No 8 (20041 The Bavarian right wing extremist party Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP), which is also a hard Euros-ceptic, is not included in this analysis because of its lack of electoral support at the national and European level.


German Euroscepticism in its soft version – right- and left-wing parties

CSU

Including the right-wing conservative party Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, CSU)42 from Bavaria, there is currently a soft version

of Euroscepticism represented in the German government coalition by pro-

European parties Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian

Democratic Union of Germany, CDU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei

Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD), which is led by

Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU). Although CSU’s electorate has decreased

in recent European elections, the party achieved its worst election result in

2014 and is represented in the European Parliament by just five members of

parliament (MEP).

The party’s election programme, the so called “European plan”,43

contains a more regional (“Länder”) view on some key areas of the European

integration process that were not in line with the CDU position that led to

strongly pro-European lobbying at the federal level. Therefore, the CSU is

accused of promoting excessive EU-criticism,44 railing against what is seen as

Brussels interventionism and that contains terms such as “Brussels-inspired

regulating mania“ (“Brüsseler Regulierungswut”), “a one-way street of transfer

of competencies from the member states to the EU” (“Einbahnstraße der Kompetenzübertragungen von den Staaten an die EU”), and a “suffocating flood

of bureaucracy from Brussels” (“erstickende Flut von Bürokratie aus Brüssel”).

Concrete demands not only include the reduction of the number of European

Commissioners and EU agencies, but also the withdrawal of the Commission’s

monopoly on initiatives and disestablishing the delegated Community acts.

Generally, the CSU believes that the EU’s competencies need to be refocused

on their main objective, which is safeguarding the EU’s fundamental freedoms,

rather than extensive regulations. A “Court of Competencies” shall control

compliance with the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, the CSU wants to

establish referendums on particularly significant European questions that

concern EU enlargement as well as competency and financial transfers to the

EU level.

In the future, “the EU shall just take actions, where it’s really needed”,

which especially concerns its “historical mission for peace and freedom on

the European continent”. In face of the Ukrainian crisis, the CSU has called

for an efficient European common foreign and security policy, especially in

42 The CSU is a regional party that only stands for national elections in Bavaria and traditionally forms a pre-electoral coalition and a joint parliamentary faction in the parliament with the CDU.43 CSU Landesverband, Europaplan Bayern, 2014-2019 (European plan Bavaria, 2014-2019) (2014), URL: http://www.europawahl-bw.de/europawahlprogramm_csu.html (11.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.44 Björn Hengst, Europawahlkampf: CSU wehrt sich gegen CDU-Kritik, SPIEGELOnline (25.04.2014), URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/csu-wehrt-sich-gegen-cdu-kritik-am-europawahlkampf-a-966240.html (11.10.2014).


the areas of material and energy supplies, and in the prevention of further

humanitarian catastrophes at the EU’s external borders. But generally, poverty-

driven migration should be contained in order to prevent further exploitation

of the European social systems. CSU, therefore, stands up for tightening the

provisions of asylum. As the EU’s absorption capacity is clearly overstrained,

CSU opposes further enlargement projects in the following legislature period

and especially any accession negotiations with Turkey.

Regarding the eurozone crisis and Monetary Union, CSU favours the

temporary withdrawal of countries that can’t comply with the stability

criteria from the Monetary Union in order to maintain a stable EU. Eurobonds,

the communalisation of debts, and the purchase of government bonds by the

European Central Bank are clearly rejected by the party. In order to overcome

the crisis and receive financial help from the EU, a debtor country has to limit

the extent of public debt and keep implementing reforms.

The soft version of CSU’s Euroscepticism is embedded in its “Bavarian

agenda” that is articulated at state level,45 and CSU firmly opposes any

federal or centralising tendencies of the EU and stands up for a sovereign

“Federal Republic of Germany and the Free State of Bavaria” in a European

union. Although CSU generally supports the European integration project, its

opposition mainly concerns the EU’s broadening competencies, especially

those of the European Commission, and further EU enlargement. This

discourse has already been described as “an anti-interventionism position

that has come close (…) to UK-style Euroscepticism”46 that stressed the principle

of subsidiarity and reform of the EU. Hence, the main slogan in its election

campaign demands “to strengthen Bavaria and to improve Europe”. Due to

anti-EU statements of the party’s election campaign, CSU has been accused

of being populist and using its soft Euroscepticism in order to prevent any

competition with parties such as AfD on the right in Bavaria.

Die Linke

The left-wing party Die Linke (The Left) have consistently participated

in the elections to the European Parliament since 2004, and has set a slowly

ascending trend of percentage points. In 2014 it gained seven parliamentary

seats and joined the fraction European United Left–Nordic Green Left. As a

parliamentary party in the German Bundestag whose electorate support is

concentrated in the new Federal states, Die Linke is part of the opposition, but

is the third largest among the four parliamentary fractions. As a democratic

socialist party, its European policy is embedded in its general opposition against

neoliberal policy, capitalism, de-regulation, and the effects of globalisation.

Die Linke is the only German party that has consistently criticised the current

and future developments of the EU and can, therefore, be characterised as a

45 Lees, Dark matter: institutional constraints and the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany (2002): 18.46 Charlie Jeffery, Stephen Collins, The German Länder and EU enlargement: between apple pie and issue-linkage, German Politics 7 (2, 1998): 91.


soft Eurosceptic. “Europe should be different: social, peacefully, democratic”

titles its relatively detailed European party programme,47 which mainly

focuses on the eurozone crisis, economic issues, and the Monetary Union as

well as the EU’s and the German federal government’s austerity policy that

“failed to resolve that crisis fairly”.

Economic issues and the eurozone crisis have a very prominent place

in Die Linke’s European policy agenda. According to its European election

programme, the neoliberal and “business as usual” policies of the EU and the

German federal government has not solved, but exacerbated, many problems

the EU has been facing since the last elections. The massive deregulation of

the financial sector, the financial redistribution from poor to rich, the extreme

trade imbalances in the Monetary Union, and the continued dismantling of

Europe’s national economies, are just a few negative reasons why the current

“crisis policy destroys democracy and the welfare state in Europe”. Hence,

Die Linke firmly demands the immediate withdrawal from the austerity

policy, which has led to rising unemployment especially among the young

generation that “is being robbed of its future” and condemns millions of

people to poverty. Permanent export surpluses in the EU, especially in

Germany, should be sanctioned for financing structural changes in countries

in crisis to stimulate export policies. Regarding labour market problems,

the party proposes the establishment of comprehensive guarantees for the

youth, and a European minimum wage of 60% of the national average wage.

The reduction of the debt level of countries with the weakest budget situation

should be achieved by the partial reduction of debts and the implementation

of a one-time millionaire levy in all EU countries. To prevent tax dumping and

ruinous competition between production locations, Die Linke promotes a

minimum EU-wide corporate tax rate and more effective coordination of the

remuneration policy. Die Linke completely rejects the concept of the Banking

Union and promotes the regulation of the financial sector throughout

the EU, as well as a fee on financial transactions in order to avoid financial

speculations towards the common currency. The party rejects any discussions

about dismantling the eurozone or any of the member states leaving.

As Die Linke has consistently criticised the foundations of the EU, which

favour the liberalising of markets, the party rejects the Lisbon Treaty that

failed to solve the democratic deficit of the EU. In order to create a more

democratic EU, the party wants not only to introduce “referendums in which

citizens throughout the EU can vote on the EU treaties on the same day”, but

also calls for a revision of all EU treaties. Die Linke wants to force back the

influence of big business lobbies on the EU’s decisions and to strengthen civil

society stakeholders and organisations at EU level. Die Linke’s rejection of

47 Die Linke, Europe should be different: social, peacefully, democratic (Europa geht anders: sozial, friedlich, de-mokratisch) (2014), URL: http://www.die-linke.de/wahlen/europawahlen-2014/europawahlprogramm/download-einschliesslich-fremdsprachen/ (11.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.


the Lisbon Treaty is also rooted in its aversion against militarisation. Hence,

it proposes in its foreign policy agenda the withdrawal of Germany from

NATO and the participation of the German contingent within CFSP and CSDP.

According to the humanitarian catastrophes at the external EU borders,

the party targets a refugee policy that respects human rights and makes all

countries accountable: “We want to dissolve the FRONTEX and EUROSUR

systems for sealing off the EU. No one is illegal!” Die Linke totally rejects

the current asylum and neighbourhood policy of the EU, fights for full visa

liberalisation, and is against poverty and social inequality. The party favours

EU enlargement, as “Europe is bigger than the EU”, but demands more social

standards and limiting of the conditions of accession to the Copenhagen

criteria.

The soft Euroscepticism of the left-wing party Die Linke is deeply rooted

in its general democratic and socialist party ideology. As the foundations and

current developments of the EU are too neoliberal, militaristic, and favour

only the economic elites, the party aims at either an extensive reconstruction

of the existing institutions or a complete restart. Therefore, the party stands

up for a European integration process that will result in a different, social,

and democratic Europe. In comparison to the other Eurosceptic parties’ ones,

Die Linke shows the most comprehensive/profound and detailed election

programme marking a more qualitative criticism.

The hard version of German Euroscepticism – the right-wing extremist

party NPD

To the hard Eurosceptic parties that express principled objection to

European integration or EU membership belongs the right-wing extremist

and nationalist party Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National

Democratic Party of Germany, NPD).48 NPD gained its first seat in the European

Parliament in 2014, partly due to the abolishment of the 3% threshold in

European elections by the German Federal Constitutional Court, but has never

managed to be represented in the German Bundestag.

Due to the party’s general xenophobic, anti-pluralistic, and system-

critical party ideology, the European integration process and EU represent an

extensive threat to German national sovereignty and identity. As the party’s

commitment to Europe is based on “a Europe of free nations” as it is said in

the preamble to the party’s European election programme,49 NPD demands

in its usual aggressively nationalist agitation, that “Europe has to stay the

Lebensraum (living space) of the European”. But the EU appears “to be little

more than a reorganisation of a Soviet-style Europe along financial lines”.50

48 The Bavarian right-wing extremist party Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP), which is also a hard Euros-ceptic, isn’t included in this analysis because of its lack of electoral support at the national and European level.49 NPD, Europe votes right. National democratic European election programme (Europa wählt rechts. Nation-aldemokratisches Europawahlprogramm), URL: http://npd.de/inhalte/daten/dateiablage/br_201401_europapro-gramm.pdf (11.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.50 Peter Lesniak, A Guide to Far-Right and Far-Left of the New European Parliament, Huffington Post, 29.05.2014,


Ultimately, Germany should withdraw from the EU, which it describes as a

“Brussels juggernaut” (Brüsseler Moloch) with its “transnational, remote super-

bureaucracy with totalitarian tendencies”, or the EU should transform itself

into a cooperative, loose union of countries. The party, therefore, demands

the re-nationalising of tasks that have previously been the sole matter of

national competence that are, e.g., social, budget, currency, foreign, and

security policies, and the complete cessation of further transfer of legislative

competence to Brussels.

An important element of the programme is the suggestion of a national

referendum on the restoration of the German Deutsche Mark as the national

currency. NPD vehemently opposes the “forced single currency” euro that is

“an instrument of the permanent exploitation of Germany”, and demands the

complete dissolution of the Monetary Union. To ensure the smooth transition

of the process of currency transformation, the party demands the return of all

foreign gold reserves belonging to Germany for storage only in the German

Bundesbank. In terms of the European economic policy related to the financial

crisis and the austerity package, the EU is committed to “an uninhibitedly

deregulated bank and market liberalism and otherwise to an egalitarian

debt socialism” (gleichmacherischen Schuldensozialismus). Hence, the party

demands the quickest possible liquidation of the “absurd” European Stability

Mechanism along with its institutions and the immediate withdrawal of

Germany from the TARGET2 system, which – according to the diagnosis of

the party – was created under the pressure of the financial crisis and is used

for permanent financing of other central banks from Bundesbank assets, and

thus at the expense of the Federal Republic. Furthermore, NPD proposes the

gradual withdrawal from financial rescue packages and the Greek bailout by

introducing a permanent veto in the event of any future aid applications. NPD

is also completely opposed to the project of a banking union.

“Our nation first! We are not the social security office of the world” and

“Stop the flood of the poor and low-skilled immigrants” are the basic mottos

in the election campaign, regarding migration problems. In order to defend

Germany against the uncontrolled immigration of criminals and so-called

social tourism, the party stands up for a rigorous stop to uncontrolled mass

immigration by using all possible measures – including military – changing

the ultraliberal policy of the free flow of people within the EU and the re-

introduction of effective border controls within the Schengen Area.

In matters of the European foreign and security policy, NPD wants to

combat the EU’s high-risk globalisation and intervention policy. NPD is

committed to Carl Schmitt’s “ban on intervention for foreign powers” and

the restoration of the sovereignty of Europe by demanding the withdrawal

of all foreign troops, especially American ones, from European territory.

Another proposition is the establishment of the European Defence Pact (PPE),

URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/peter-lesniak/european-parliament_b_5392502.html (11.10.2014).


as the platform for the coordination of the EU’s security policy. Moreover,

NPD calls for the termination of negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the

EU. According to the representatives of the party, Turkey is not a European

country and never will be.

NPD’s hard Euroscepticism is clearly based on its right-wing populist and

extremist party ideology that has an affinity with National Socialism, in which

the current European integration process and especially the EU is perceived as

a totalitarian foreign rule that threatens the national identity and sovereignty

of all European countries, especially Germany. Its aggressive and populist

agitation is characterised as xenophobic, ethnic-nationalist, revisionist, and

clearly anti-European. NPD is not afraid of confessing it belongs to a right-

wing movement, as there are “a great number of demands of NPD’s European

election programme are based on the requirements of our nation’s will to

survive (…) and speaks from the heart of our fellow citizens”. Nevertheless, the

party sees itself as being highly marginalised by German “political enemies

and media”.

AfD – the anti-Euro single issue party

Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) in Germany

joins the ranks of the Eurosceptic, mainly right-wing populist parties that

most member states in the EU are now facing, with their increasing number

and electoral success at the national level. Although AfD doesn’t characterise

itself as being part of these right-wing populists and has rejected collaboration

with them in the new European Parliament so far, the new party is perceived

as a concurrence in the “anti-European protest milieu”51 by parties such as

NPD. Hence, its main campaign slogans, such as “We aren’t the world’s social

security office”, and the general anti-euro and anti-EU sentiments have been a

genuine part of the extremist right-wing parties’ repertoire (NPD: “Our nation

first! We are not the social security office of the world”) and shows anti-

immigrant views.52 Regarding its party background, there have been obvious

relations to the former right-wing populist party “Bund freier Bürger” and a

range of party members have already participated in the right-wing extremist

milieu. Furthermore, some party members as well as party leader, Bernd Lucke,

have attracted attention through xenophobic and Islamophobic statements.53

Although the party is still developing, there are obviously right-wing populist

tendencies present.

51 Alexander Hausler, Die „Alternative fur Deutschland“ – eine rechtspopulistische Partei? Materialien und Deutungen zur vertiefenden Auseinandersetzung. Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung NRW (2013): 20.52 Alexander Hausler, Die „Alternative fur Deutschland“ – eine rechtspopulistische Partei? Materialien und Deutungen zur vertiefenden Auseinandersetzung. Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung NRW (2013): 60.53 For example, party leader Bernd Lucke states in a newsletter for party members in October 2013: “If the sentence ‘The Islam belongs to Germany’ declares de facto Islam’s existence in Germany, this sentence is super-fluous (…). But if this sentence does implicitly affirm Islam in Germany, it is wrong and foolish (…)” („Wenn der Satz ,Der Islam gehort zu Deutschland‘ nur die faktische Existenz des Islam in Deutschland feststellen sollte, ist er uberflussig (...). Wenn er aber als eine implizite Bejahung des Islams in Deutschland gemeint ist, ist er falsch und toricht (...)“. In: The Huffington Post, Der rechte Populismus der AfD in zwölf Zitaten, 25.3.2014, URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.de/2014/03/25/rechte-populismus-afd_n_5025753.html (11.10.2014).


AfD’s party scepticism is mainly focused on the euro as single currency

and the eurozone crisis policy of the German government parties, and

thus the party is characterised as an anti-euro single-issue party with hard

Eurosceptic tendencies similar to Britain’s UK Independence Party (UKIP).

AfD presents itself as real “alternative”: “In fear of seriously misleading

political and economic developments in Germany and EU, we founded the

party Alternative für Deutschland.”54 AfD’s Euroscepticism doesn’t concern

European integration in principle, but rather a federal EU “as there is no

European nation and no European people”.55

As the introducing of the euro as single currency was “a decision

without any political and economic reasoning”, AfD opposes the euro as it

“destroys Europe’s foundations” and main principles including subsidiarity,

economic competition, non-liability for other eurozone states, and the

ECB’s independence. “Blind trust into the euro and the supposed lack of

alternatives makes it impossible to revise the crisis’ causes.” The EU’s rescue

package and stabilising of the euro represents “a bottomless pit”. Therefore,

the party demands the dissolution or at least the extensive restructuring of

the eurozone including appropriate measures, such as the reduction of the

Monetary Union by excluding uncompetitive countries. If restructuring the

eurozone cannot be achieved, Germany has to leave the Monetary Union

and reintroduce the former German currency, the Deutsche Mark. The debt

crisis in parts of Europe should be solved by returning to a so-called stability

union with full fiscal discipline and the lack of collective responsibility for

the debts of other countries. The possibility to finance the budget deficit

via the ECB is firmly rejected. The main financial, economic, and social

policies must remain at the national level. Therefore, a banking union is not

acceptable. In accordance to its labour and social policies, the party opposes

the phenomenon of so-called worker colonies and dumping prices offered by

tourism workers. Immigration into the German social security system is firmly

rejected by the party: “Immigrants that can’t cover their living costs on their

own have to leave Germany.” Generally, the party advocates a more restrictive

asylum policy at EU level, but also in Germany.

AfD demands “a turning away from the EU’s centralising policy agenda”,

and therefore advocates the greatest limitation of union competence and

so-called “multi-speed Europe”, in which every member state decides on its

own which policy areas should be integrated and which ones should not.

All matters that are not explicitly written in treaties should belong to the

exclusive competence of national countries. The principle of subsidiarity

has to be strengthened as well as the introduction of elements of direct

54 First sentence of the preamble of the party congress resolution, In: Satzung der Alternative für Deutschland. Parteitagsbeschluss vom 14.04.2013, URL: https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/AfD_Sat-zung_1-Bundessatzung.pdf (11.10.2014).55 AfD, Show Courage to Germany. To a Europe in diversity (Mut zu Deutschland. Fur ein Europa der Vielfalt) (2014), URL: https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Europaprogramm-der-AfD.pdf (11.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.


democracy at EU level, as referendums or “citizen vetoes”. Regarding the

reform of the union institutions, it is postulated to strengthen the position of

the Council of Ministers as a second chamber that represents member states

by granting it legislative powers. In order to minimise Brussels’ bureaucracy,

the Commission members and other EU officials must be drastically reduced.

Germany, in proportion to the size of its population and importance in Europe,

should gain more appropriate influence in union institutions. The European

Parliament should be strengthened at the expense of other union institutions,

which are not formed by direct elections. In terms of further enlargement of

the EU, AfD demands the total interruption of expansion processes, because

they should be authorised by popular vote as a general precondition of

any political integration and enlargement policy of the EU. According to

the programme, the possibility of Turkey’s EU membership is categorically

rejected because of geographical, cultural, and historical reasons.

AfD’s foreign policy includes demands for a European foreign and

security policy that is based on common interests, but respects the genuine

competences of the member states, and on NATO as a defensive alliance. The

party rejects the introduction of a EU defence minister, a European army, and

the communalisation of the police, military, and secret services.

AfD describes its European policy agenda as a “fight against the super-

state EU and its debt policy”. This profound EU-pessimism and its anti-euro

rhetoric mainly focus on its national and European programme. For these

reasons, AfD is classified as a Eurosceptic party with the tendency to lean

towards the hard definition of Euroscepticism. AfD also has much in common

with other right-wing populist parties in Europe that unite and mobilise

Eurosceptic sentiments in the European mass public as an electoral strategy.56

Its self-description as “alternative” especially attracts protest voters that are

disappointed with the government parties, as their concerns and fears about

the European integration process and the crisis seem to be hardly considered

by them.

Pro-European parties – the political mainstream parties

With the exception of CSU, the ruling grand coalition parties Christlich

Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany,

CDU) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic

Party of Germany, SPD) are the most pro-European parties in the German party

system.57 Both parties unite a solid pro-European consensus that resolutely

supports the European integration process as “a worldwide unique project

of common values and peace”58 and German EU membership even in the

56 Karsten Grabow, Florian Hartleb, Exposing the Demagogues. Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2013), URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.35420/ (11.10.2014).57 There are also more or less organised groups and single party members in the left or right wings of these parties that express concern on the European integration process and the EU, but that aren’t supported by a majority of the parties and represented in their party programmes.58 CDU, Together successful in Europe. European party resolution of the 26th CDU’s party congress (Gemeinsam erfolgreich in Europa. Europapolitischer Beschluss des 26. Parteitags der CDU Deutschlands), 05.04.2014, URL: htt-


eurozone crisis. Withdrawal from the eurozone is also not acceptable for

both parties. “Without the EU, Germany isn’t imaginable by Germans any

more.” This statement within the main European campaign message of CDU

highlights that there are no alternatives to the EU such as those promoted

by hard Eurosceptic parties, and, therefore, Europe and the euro need to be

further strengthened and stabilised. SPD’s European election programme59

also emphasises the non-negotiable importance of “Europe and the European

integration process that belong to the German reason of state”. “There is no

alternative to a European Germany,” states the party in response to anti-

European populism in Germany. But in contrast to CDU’s “stay on target”

policy, the social-democratic party promotes a “change of direction” to a

European social union with an economic government that is controlled by a

parliament and more federal governance patterns. Regarding the eurozone

crisis, SPD criticises the strict austerity policy that is promoted at EU level

by CDU and Chancellor Angela Merkel, who belonged to the former German

government that has become more overt and assertive in the exercise of its

power in the EU during the eurozone crisis.

The German green opposition party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/

The Greens) remain resolutely an enthusiastic pro-European party, as there

is no alternative to the EU in order to implement and protect democratic,

ecological, and social values as well as peace in Europe. Similar to SPD, its

main European campaign message promotes60 “a better Europe as Europe

is our common future”. The liberal party Freie Demokratische Partei (Free

Democratic Party, FDP), which isn’t represented in the current German

parliament, as the party lacked electoral success at the national level,

advocates a pro-European policy, although it has a vocal “anti-euro” national

liberal minority. In its European election programme,61 the party promotes the

political integration of the EU, the euro as the single currency, and a common

foreign and security policy, but supports a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon

in contrast to the other parliamentary parties.

ps://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/140405-beschluss-gemeinsam-erfolgreich-in-europa.pdf (13.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.59 SPD, To give Europe a new direction. European election programme (Europa eine neue Richtung geben. Wahl-programm fur die Europawahl am 25. Mai 2014.), URL: https://www.spd.de/scalableImageBlob/114930/data/wahlprogramm-data.pdf (13.10.2014). Subsequent quotations are from the same source.60 Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Europe. Participating, renewing, holding together. European election programme 2014 (Europa. Mitentscheiden, erneuern, zusammenhalen. Europawahlprogramm 2014), URL: http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Gruenes-Europawahlprogramm-2014.pdf (13.10.2014). 61 FDP, That’s what Europe needs! European election programme 2014 (Das braucht unser Europa! Programm der Freien Demokratischen Partei fur die Wahl zum VIII. Europaischen Parlament 2014), URL: http://www.fdp.de/files/408/EPT-Europawahlprogramm-Brosch_re_final.pdf (13.10.2014).


Key issues in the Eurosceptics’ election campaign in the context of party ideology and strategy

Analysing the Eurosceptic parties’ European election programmes, there

is a wide range of common important thematic issues articulated in their

party positions towards the European integration process and the EU that are

motivated by both their party ideology and strategy. Nevertheless, including

Die Linke, the German Eurosceptic parties differ greatly due to their party

ideologies and quality of their scepticism as well as their motives for using

Euroscepticism in their fight for votes. The German Eurosceptic parties are

either relatively small parliamentary parties or fringe parties that rely more or

less on more votes to gain more influence.

Given that parties usually reject policies, values, and norms that are

incompatible with their own party ideology and values,62 the German

Eurosceptic right-wing populist and extremist parties oppose the European

integration process and the EU, as it threatens the national sovereignty and

identity of the nation state. Issues that are related to these threats to national

sovereignty are German membership in the EU “super-state” and its unbridled

growing centralism, the eurozone with the euro as the “forced single currency”,

and Brussels’ “super-bureaucracy” administration. NPD in particular vividly

states that the EU has developed in an “USSR light”. According to NPD and

AfD, the EU is developing into a federal state, and the union institutions have

gained too much power. They, therefore, demand withdrawal from the EU, and

although AfD opposes federal tendencies, the main focus lies in encouraging

withdrawal from the eurozone. The hard Eurosceptics’ opposition to the EU

and the eurozone is also motivated by their aversion to the party ideologies

and values of the mainstream, as the ideas and values that have shaped

the European integration process, as well as their current European policy.

Their hard Euroscepticism is further aimed at distancing themselves from

the European-friendly mainstream. AfD in particular goes to great lengths

to differentiate itself and offer an “alternative” to what they view as the

misguided European and crisis policies of the governing parties. Therefore,

the EU’s eurozone crisis policy and the German government represent an

important thematic issue next to the euro in general in NPD’s and AfD’s

election programmes. Another issue concerning German relations with the EU

is Germany’s role in the EU’s institutional setting and its role among the other

member states. Both parties ask for a more vigorous exercise of power at EU

level by the German government in order to fight for German interests, and a

more appropriate influence in the EU. Consequently, AfD calls for a German

representation in the EU that is in proportion to the size of its population and

62 Jan Rovny, Conceptualising Party-based Euroscepticism: Magnitude and Motivations, Collegium 29 (2004): 35.


its importance in Europe. They also call for the German language to be used in

proceedings in all European institutions.

Concerning European values as thematic issues, “(…) the EU promotes

a value system that is alien to European traditions (…)” and an “unworldly

ideology, ideological paternalism of citizens as well as all methods of organised

opinion formation, censoring, and mind check”. Consequently, there are a

wide range of European policies that are at odds with NPD’s party ideology

and values including the EU’s “absurd ‘Gender Mainstreaming’-ideology, the

support of sexual and other minorities (…), the abortion policy, e.g., in the so-

called ‘Estrella-report’, and the disregard of the traditional image of family

with children”. However, AfD states that ethically and morally controversial

issues including abortion are solely a matter of the nation state, and the EU

has to respect the member states’ different values and moral concepts, and

consequently the principle of subsidiarity.

In contrast to the hard Eurosceptics, the soft Eurosceptic parties do

not question German membership in the EU and particularly eurozone

membership. CSU’s soft Euroscepticism sometimes overlaps with issues

including the federalisation of the EU, the rising power of the union

institutions, and bureaucracy that is normally reserved for hard Eurosceptics

in areas concerning matters of national sovereignty due to their conservative

right-wing party ideology. CSU’s soft Euroscepticism seems to be at odds

with its general pro-European position, its involvement in German politics

at the national and EU level as the governing party, and in relation to its

sister party CDU. Hence, it can be concluded that the party’s Euroscepticism

is used to placate the portion of its conservative electorate in Bavaria that is

EU-sceptical and vulnerable to being poached by AfD. Die Linke formulates

totally different positions as well and puts forward the most qualified EU-

criticism of all the Eurosceptic parties. Its Euroscepticism is mainly driven by

its democratic and socialist party ideology. However, its opposition towards

the governing parties as well as its aversion towards right-wing populism and

extremist parties with their politics of national identity and sovereignty also

play an important role.

The European institutions’ alleged remoteness from the citizenry

represents an all-encompassing theme that all Eurosceptic parties can identify

with. The demand of additional elements of direct democracy including

referendums also shows a high level of compatibility between the hard and

soft sceptics. However, only Die Linke supports such democracy-oriented

reforms based solely on party doctrine. The right-wing Eurosceptic parties call

for referendums in order to slow down or stop further political integration

and enlargement projects of the EU. As the EU’s remoteness from the citizenry

is already prominent in the political and public discourse, this issue provides

an additional electoral mobilisation instrument for parties.


Concerning the eurozone crisis, the right-wing Eurosceptic parties lump

the rejection of Eurobonds, the communalisation of debts, and the purchase

of government bonds by the ECB together. On the contrary, Die Linke supports

such policies and additionally demands a turning away from austerity policies

as well as parliamentary scrutiny over the ECB in order to ensure price stability

and sustainable economic activities to prevent further crisis. In addition, the

dissolution of or the (temporary) withdrawal of countries from the eurozone is

not accepted by Die Linke in contrast to the right-wing parties. CSU supports,

like the governing parties, the permanent European Stability Mechanism

(ESM). However, NPD, AfD, and Die Linke reject the ESM. As the eurozone crisis

evoked uncertainty among the Germans and the support of the EU still has

tendency to decrease, criticism about the eurozone crisis and the German

government’s crisis policy is also used to gain further electoral votes.

Further key issues that show consensus among right-wing Eurosceptics,

while illustrating the distance between the left-wing brand and right-wing

brand of Euroscepticism, are the EU Enlargement, European Neighbourhood

Policy, and immigration and asylum policy of the EU that is due to their party

ideologies. Turkey’s EU membership illustrates the distance between right-

wing and left-wing scepticism, as only Die Linke promotes the country’s

membership. The right-wing parties demand at least to slow down or stop

the enlargement projects and a more conditioned accession process, ask for

tightened control at the EU’s external borders, and advocate a more or less

restrictive asylum policy. In order to stop social tourism and criminalisation,

NPD and AfD promote the reintroducing of inter-EU border controls. The

German Die Linke opposes such positions and promotes EU visa liberalisation,

stating that the “EU must not be a fortress”. However, the Eurosceptic parties

also differ greatly in their positions concerning the EU’s common foreign and

security policy. As NPD and AfD state that the foreign and security policy is

primarily a matter of the national state and NPD additionally demands non-

interventionism, CSU promotes a common and coordinated EU foreign and

security policy. Die Linke emphasises a de-militarisation policy and withdrawal

from NATO membership.

It must be noted here that the agricultural as well as environment and

climate policy played a minor role in the German Eurosceptic parties’ European

election programmes, although Die Linke is more focused on environmental

than agricultural issues.


ConclusionsRegarding the European election campaign, the German political parties’

and voters’ domestic interests continued to be a dominant factor. Although

there was increased reportage in the press and television during the German

pre-election debate in 2014, the European election and themes are still

characterised as second order issues. AfD states clearly, “Germany comes first,

and then Europe.” The election campaigns have also been personalised, but

only SPD’s campaign has been concentrated on a European candidate for

the President of the European Parliament’s office. However, this has been

mainly due to the simple matter that Martin Schulz is the German candidate

of the Party of European Socialists. The other parties have mainly relied on

long-proven methods and persons, e.g., the German Chancellor Angela Merkel

for CDU’s campaign, and generally their election campaigns have reminded

voters of the parliamentary elections for the German Bundestag in 2013, with

a European dimension. With the exception of ignoring and tabooing hard

Eurosceptic issues and parties, the election campaigns of the pro-European

parties have hardly been influenced by such sentiments. Solely CSU has

intensified its Eurosceptic rhetoric during the European election in 2014, as

the conservative party had to compete with AfD for votes of the Eurosceptic

electorate in Bavaria. Bias on the eurozone crisis in the European election

campaigns is less due to the emergence of AfD than the general importance

of this issue. Nevertheless, the pro-European parties and especially Die Linke all mention and condemn hard Eurosceptic sentiments in their programmes’

introductions as dangerous and misleading right-wing Anti-Euro-populism.

There remains a great vagueness in the Eurosceptic parties’ election

programmes as well as a lack of specific reform proposals, with the exception

of the left-wing party Die Linke, which showed the most detailed and

qualitative election programme of all of them.

Eurosceptic positions are influenced by party ideology, but inconsistencies

in the German Eurosceptic political landscape indicate that there are

important incentives for fringe and small parties to use Euroscepticism in

their fight for votes, particularly in the case of the right-wing parties. In order

to represent themselves as “real” protest and opposition parties to German

voters, the sceptics cast themselves as champions of the voter frustrated

with the EU’s direction, and the governing parties’ European policy provides a

target to attack. However, hard Euroscepticism is concentrated on the right-

wing parties in the German party system, namely NPD and AfD. As CSU belongs

to the governing mainstream parties, its soft Euroscepticism is mainly driven

by its party strategy to maintain its traditional electoral predominance in

Bavaria in concurrence to AfD. Die Linke is distinguishable from all other

Eurosceptic parties, as their qualitative EU-criticism is mainly driven by

ideological motives.


There is still great pro-European consensus among the German mainstream

parties, especially the governing parties CDU and SPD. Although facing a rise

in Euroscepticism in the public discourse, in the form of marked electoral

success by AfD, the pro-European parties still marginalise any EU criticism and

EU scepticism and leave Eurosceptic sentiments in the German population

solely to the mobilisation tactics of the right-wing populists. As the German

sociologist Armin Nassehi states, there is a democratic deficit, as the EU lacks

opposition.63 Political elites at the national and EU level must stop demonising

every criticism of the EU and should introduce a qualified and prominent

discussion on the main thematic areas of Eurosceptic grievances.64 However,

as Eurosceptic movements continue to grow, it will be politically less feasible

for the pro-European parties to ignore these sentiments as “dark matter”.

Nevertheless, the political pressure in Germany on the governing parties

is still not as strong as in many other member states, e.g., France and Great

Britain.65 The German fringe parties still lack electoral success at the national

and EU level, and despite the abolition of the threshold in the European

election they did not manage to gain further votes. In the case of AfD, it

remains to be seen whether the party will manage to overcome its protest and

anti-euro image and raise its profile as a “real alternative” to the established

parties with a positive policy programme. So far, its electoral success in the

European elections 2014 can still be characterised by its new appearance, its

protest character, and its anti-euro populism. Therefore, voters also used AfD

in the so-called European second order election in 2014 to demonstrate their

dissatisfaction with German governing mainstream parties at national level.

63 Armin Nassehi, Europa braucht eine echte Opposition, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.5.2013, URL: http://www.sued-deutsche.de/politik/demokratiedefizit-in-der-eu-europa-braucht-eine-echte-opposition-1.1672987 (10.11.2014).64 Markus Pausch, Keine Angst vor dem Schreckgespenst Euroskeptizismus!, The European, 20.03.2014, URL: http://www.euractiv.de/europawahlen-2014-000394/artikel/keine-angst-vor-dem-schreckgespenst-euroskeptizis-mus-008677 (15.10.2014). 65 Douglas Webber, 2013, How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate? A critical analysis of com-peting theoretical perspectives, European Journal of International Relations 16: 1-25.

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