a transactional perspective on mental retardation*

Haywood: Transactional Perspective on MR

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

H. Carl Haywood

Vanderbilt University

Abstract

The predominantly intelligence-based concept of mental retardation is examined critically and

found to be inadequate to encompass what is known about the behavior and development of

individuals with mental retardation. The author suggests that the nature of human ability itself

must be re-conceptualized and freed from the restrictions of an exclusive concept of intelligence.

He proposes a "transactional perspective on human ability" in order to understand variability in

behavior and development in general, and applies that perspective to the phenomena of mental

retardation. The transactional perspective rests on the three constructs: intelligence, cognitive

processes, and motivation, principally task-intrinsic motivation. Intelligence and cognitive

processes are sharply distinguished from each other. Implications of the transactional

perspective on human ability are drawn for developmental intervention in the lives of individuals

with mental retardation.

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A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION1

H. Carl Haywood

Vanderbilt University, USA

In a majority of research reports published in the American Journal on Mental

Retardation (formerly American Journal of Mental Deficiency) over the last 50 years, groups of

persons with and without mental retardation were constituted solely on the basis of IQ. Some

investigators gave nodding recognition to other criteria, such as adaptive behavior, but modern

research on mental retardation has been guided primarily by concepts that center on the nature of

intelligence.

A LITTLE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE AND MENTAL RETARDATION

The words that we have used, even in scientific parlance, to refer to the phenomenon of

mental retardation reflect both a very imprecise concept of its nature and a commitment to an

exclusively intelligence-based definition. For example, what is now the American Association

on Mental Retardation was originally called the Association of Medical Superintendents of

American Institutions for the Feeble Minded and its journal was known for several years as the

Journal of Psychoasthenics—both implying weakness of the mind and centering on an

intelligence-based concept of mental retardation. Even the current eponyms refer to "intellectual

disability," or "cognitive delay," demonstrating the persistence of our dedication to an

1In H. N. Switzky (Ed.), International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Volume 31, pp. 289-314. New York and Amsterdam: Elsevier/Academic Press. An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a keynote address to the Australian Society for the Study of Intellectual Disability, Brisbane, November 2003.

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intelligence-based concept.

While Alfred Binet (Binet & Henri, 1895) was insisting on the study of individual

differences as part of the then-new science of psychology, he published his famous paper (Binet

& Simon, 1905a) entitled "On the necessity of establishing a scientific diagnosis of inferior

states of intelligence," a paper that did much to stimulate psychologists toward more precise

diagnostic criteria and at the same time helped to preserve the intelligence-based concept (see

also Binet & Simon, 1905b). Edgar Doll (e.g., 1935, 1953, 1965) insisted on the relatively

independent assessment of adaptive behavior, but it was not until 1959 that the American

Association on Mental Deficiency adopted a three-part criterion for the diagnosis of mental

retardation: significantly subnormal measured intelligence (meaning IQ), significantly

subnormal adaptive behavior, and onset of these conditions during the developmental period,

now interpreted to mean before the age of either 18 or 21 years (Heber, 1959, 1961).

One of the most important conceptual developments during that time of change was the

appearance of Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1929). The gurus of Gestalt, Köhler,

Kaffka, and Wertheimer, set the stage for today's cognitive psychology by describing the

richness of mental experience, by insisting on the study of events that one could not observe

directly, and by emphasizing the interrelatedness of psychological events that cut across the

classical triad of cognition, conation, and volition (Ash, 1995; Boring, 1950; Simonis, 2001).

Some of their intellectual descendants, including Lewin (1935, 1936), Zigler (1966; Balla &

Zigler, 1979), and Cromwell (1963, 1967), studied personality correlates of individual

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differences in learning and performance in persons with mental retardation, with the clear

implication that variables other than intelligence itself were exerting major influence on

individual differences in learning and performance (Heber, 1964).

Thus, over much of the last century serious scientists and professionals have been finding

the heavily, if not exclusively, IQ-based concept of mental retardation to be too limiting and to

restrict our understanding of the nature of mental retardation and the development of persons

with mental retardation.

INADEQUACY OF THE IQ-BASED CONCEPT OF MENTAL RETARDATION

The inadequacy of that limited concept is demonstrated by at least the following

observations:

1. First, variability in the performances of persons with mental retardation is so great that

differences among them are often greater than is the mean difference between the performance

of persons with and without mental retardation. We often confront the question, "Why is it that

some persons with mental retardation perform so well on many tasks, in spite of low IQ?" and its

corollary question, "Why is it that some persons with mental retardation perform even better on

some tasks than do others who do not have mental retardation?"

2. The second observation is that, under certain conditions, the learning and performance

of persons with mental retardation can be improved substantially.

3. The third is a series of demonstrations of the powerful effects of motivational and

environmental (settings) variables on the learning and performance of persons with mental

retardation.

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4. The fourth is the frequently observed large "discrepancy" between IQ and adaptive

behavior.

VARIABILITY IN THE BEHAVIOR OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

The first of these observations, the extreme variability within the mental retardation

category, accompanied by mean differences within that group that are sometimes greater than is

the difference between those persons and persons of average IQ, is so familiar as to require scant

discussion, except to note that it has been seen typically as an annoying circumstance for

researchers because it has made the statistical determination of differences between conditions,

population subgroups, and experimental treatments difficult to accomplish. This has been so

because parametric statistical tests require large mean differences relative to group variances in

order for those differences to reach statistical significance. As Binet and Henri (1895) pointed

out so long ago, we should have been focusing our attention on that very variability, i.e., on

within-group individual differences in the effectiveness and efficiency of learning and

performance, rather than wishing they would go away. The latter attitude implies the

assumption that all or nearly all persons within a category constituted on the basis of IQ can be

expected to behave, especially in learning situations, in essentially the same ways, reflecting

something of the old mental age concept. It just isn't so! Even more troubling to psychological

researchers is the phenomenon of intra-individual variability in performance, meaning that

reliability of performance within persons in the mental retardation category tends to be low, and

to be even lower as one descends the IQ scale (see, e.g., Baumeister, 1968, 1998; Berkson &

Baumeister, 1967; Jensen, 1992).

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LEARNING AND PERFORMANCE CAN BE IMPROVED: A VERY SMALL SAMPLE OF

EXAMPLES

If the learning and performance of persons with mental retardation can be improved

significantly under certain conditions, then the obvious task for us is to specify those conditions.

Here is a very simple, and rather old, example from my research group. My graduate students

and I had been investigating what we call verbal abstracting behavior, that is, the ability to

categorize items according to their similarity and then to assign an abstract label to the resulting

class. We used a variation on the verbal similarities subtests that are found in several

intelligence tests, giving the tests under two conditions. Under the "regular" condition, we

presented two exemplars of each concept, for example, "In what way are an orange and a banana

alike?" Under the "enriched" condition, we presented five exemplars of each concept, for

example, "In what way are an orange, a banana, a peach, a plum, and a pear alike?" Figure 1

shows the results of that study (from Gordon & Haywood, 1969).

Figure 1 about here

We can see here the outcome of that early study: A larger number of exemplars of each

concept did not help the subjects who did not have mental retardation, nor did it improve the

scores of those with severe, organically based mental retardation, but it resulted in a 55 percent

improvement in the verbal abstracting scores of those with mild mental retardation that had been

diagnosed, in that era, as "cultural-familial." In fact, their 5-exemplar scores were not different

from those of another group of younger subjects without mental retardation who were matched

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with them on mental age. Later, by adding visual cues (the words printed on cards, plus pictures

of the objects represented) Call (1973) demonstrated that the verbal abstracting performance of

the participants with mild mental retardation came all the way up to that of the typically

developing participants of the same chronological age, although these procedures did not help

persons without mental retardation. Thus, Call essentially eliminated altogether the effect of

mental retardation on verbal abstracting! Tymchuk (1973), subsequently found similar effects of

this procedure in delinquent adolescents with mild mental retardation. Perhaps some part of their

initially poor performance on this task had been related to ignorance rather than inability; for

example, they might not have had the vocabulary with which to understand the meanings of the

spoken words. It is also possible that they had become so inept at making meaning out of

minimal information that they had to be given enriched information in order to find abstract

levels of meaning.

In another pair of widely unread studies, Haywood and Heal (1968, 1969) demonstrated

that apparent IQ differences in long–term memory of persons with mental retardation are

illusory, and should be attributed to learning levels rather than to IQ. That is to say, those who

learned a set of associations most effectively retained them best, regardless of their IQ. Figure 2

shows the retention performance on a learned visual paired-associates task of participants at

three levels of mental retardation (as suggested by IQ) and a non-retarded group, as a function of

IQ and of levels of original training.

Figure 2 about here

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When controls were introduced for learning level (Haywood & Heal, 1969; all participants went

through repeated trials until they reached the same probability of making a correct response), IQ-

group differences in retention were even further reduced. Here, then, is another condition under

which performance is improved: secure initial learning. Many other investigators have been

able to identify conditions under which the performance of persons with mental retardation can

be significantly improved, all of them representing environmental changes and not changes in

intelligence.

Applied Behavioral interventions have also very successfully improved the performance

of persons with mental retardation using environmental change techniques in all activities of

daily living , instruction, vocational training and social competence (Evans & Meyers, 1987;

Jacobson & Mulick, 1996; Lovass & Smith, 1989). Techniques exist for increasing prosocial

behavior (e.g., positive reinforcement and shaping), and decreasing behavior that are anti-social,

self-destructive, aggressive, and self-injurious (e.g., extinction, differential reinforcement

procedures, punishment, and time out from positive reinforcement). See also Schroeder, 1990.

EFFECTS OF MOTIVATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

Positive effects of changes in motivational and environmental variables have been

demonstrated repeatedly. In the 1960s, Butterfield and Zigler (1965) demonstrated that success

or failure on one task could significantly affect the probability of success or failure on ensuing

tasks, in persons with mental retardation. That motivational effect on performance was

replicated by Johnson, Haywood, and Hays (1992) with typically developing school children.

Switzky and Haywood have found repeatedly that the learning and work performance of persons

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both with and without mental retardation is significantly better when they are offered interesting

tasks to do, are permitted to regulate the complexity, the pace, and the reward system associated

with performing those tasks, and are not distracted with task-extrinsic incentives and rewards

(see, e.g., Haywood & Switzky, 1974, 1985; Switzky & Haywood, 1974, 1991, 1992; see also

Haywood & Weaver, 1967).

The questions that have occupied the psychology of mental retardation over the last 40

years might well be characterized as social ecological questions, i.e., the "where" questions:

Where should people with retardation live, work, go to school, play? Those issues are far too

large to be treated with due respect in this chapter, but it is essential to note the summary

concept: Settings have considerable influence on the development, behavior, and life

satisfaction of people in general, and especially of socially vulnerable people such as those with

mental retardation and developmental disabilities (Barker & Schoggen, 1973; Begab, Haywood,

& Garber, 1981; Bruininks, 1981; Bruininks & Lakin, 1985; Haywood & Newbrough, 1981;

O'Connor, 1976). The implication for the present argument is simply that if behavior and

development of persons with mental retardation is heavily influenced by variations in the

environments in which they live, then one's concept of mental retardation must extend well

beyond performance on intelligence tests and must include the ways in which individual

differences interact with settings variables.

RELATION OF IQ AND ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR

So-called "discrepancies" between IQ and adaptive behavior continue to puzzle

psychologists, but there is no particular reason why they should. Indeed, if the two were

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perfectly, or even extremely highly, correlated, then we would need only one or the other and

not both. Doll devised the Vineland Social Maturity Scale, and others have developed its

successors, because and only because of the observation that very many persons with mental

retardation behave in social and everyday activity domains in ways that are not predicted by IQ.

Mercer (see, e.g., Mercer, 1965, 1970) used to relate this story. She was doing a survey of all

persons assigned to special education classes in a California city. One adolescent who was then

classified as "trainable mentally retarded" (i.e., with IQ and adaptive behavior scores more than

three standard deviations below the population mean) could not be located, in spite of repeated

visits to his home. He was always absent from the home. Finally, the research team learned the

reason for his absences: He had a job, and was out working, helping to support the family!

Mercer wondered, quite rightly, on what basis he could be classified as retarded, much less not

even "educable." Psychometric studies of adaptive behavior by the Minnesota group (Bruininks,

Hill, Weatherman, & Woodcock, 1986; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996) have

shown that maladaptive behavior imposes severe restrictions on adaptability and daily

performance, and even on the appropriateness of residential settings, in cases of persons with

relatively mild mental retardation, i.e., those whose IQ would predict a higher level of social

adaptation and would also suggest less restrictive residential settings. The point is that if

adaptive behavior can sometimes be substantially above or below what would be expected on the

basis of IQ alone, then an exclusively or even heavily intelligence-based concept of mental

retardation is found once again to be inadequate.

NEED TO RE-CONCEPTUALIZE THE NATURE OF HUMAN ABILITY

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All of these observations suggest the need for a newer set of constructs that would be less

global, more precise, and far more developmental in character. How, then, might we choose

such concepts?

I suggest a minimal list of criteria for choosing theoretical concepts that might help us to

understand the nature of mental retardation. The first is that any theoretical constructs about

mental retardation must now explain a much greater variety of developmental and behavioral

phenomena than has been true in the past; that is, new constructs must be broadly encompassing.

The second is the quite standard requirement that new constructs must refer to events that are

observable and ultimately testable. The third is that new constructs must be developmental in

nature, that is, they cannot merely identify important variables but must offer some assistance in

understanding their development as well as the occurrence of individual differences. The fourth

requirement derives from the third: Because development constitutes on-going change, new

constructs must be dynamic, and ultimately transactional; that is, not merely interactive, but

capable of helping one to understand constantly changing relationships and interrelationships.

My fifth requirement is one that is not universally shared in scientific theory building. It is the

expectation that the constructs that we choose to explain the phenomena of mental retardation

must themselves be related to aspects of development that are subject to intervention and change,

that is, that are treatable. This last requirement is propelled not merely by a humanitarian motive

but also by a strategic scientific consideration: Induced change is an important investigative

strategy that frequently permits one to explain events that cannot be explained in any other way,

by permitting inferences about events that are not directly observable.

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A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Trying hard to stick to this list of requirements, I now offer a particular, and perhaps

idiosyncratic, view of the nature and development of human ability that I believe can be more

useful than older concepts have been in helping us to understand the nature of mental

retardation. I refer to this point of view as a transactional perspective on human ability (see,

e.g., Haywood, 1998, 2004; Haywood & Switzky, 1986a, 1986b, 1992; Haywood, Tzuriel, &

Vaught, 1992; Haywood & Wachs, 1981).

The three principal elements of the transactional perspective are intelligence, cognition,

and motivation.

Intelligence. Intelligence is seen as largely genetically determined, with opportunity for

only modest modifiability through experience. It is multi-determined, i.e., although largely

polygenic in origin, its ontogenetic expression may be influenced, especially early in life, by the

quality, intensity, timing, and duration of experience, which exerts its effects through direct

action on the morphology of the nervous system itself. Thus defined, intelligence is essentially a

biological characteristic. Because some persons who are judged to be high in intelligence

perform poorly in learning tasks and in problem-solving tasks, and because some persons who

are judged to be low in intelligence perform better than they are expected to do, intelligence is

inadequate to explain, by itself, individual differences in learning aptitude and performance. For

example, in spite of a full century of work on standardized intelligence tests and on standardized

tests of school achievement, about the best we can do by way of predicting school achievement

from IQ is a correlation of +0.70, which leaves fully 50% of the variance in school achievement

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unexplained (see, e.g., Anastasi, 1965). Even taking into account the limits placed on this

predictive correlation by the unreliability of the IQ, the unreliability of achievement tests, and

their joint unreliability, we are still left with a considerable chunk of unexplained variance.

Therefore, it is necessary to posit other influencing, if not determining, variables.

Cognitive processes. Cognition refers to person-characteristic modes of logical

perception, thinking, learning, and problem solving. It is a process variable rather than a stable

trait. Cognitive processes are not biologically determined but must be acquired through

individuals' successive encounters with their environments, and are shaped by feedback from

such encounters. It is possible to identify a certain number of quite fundamental cognitive

processes that appear to be universal, and that are so basic that they are required for the

performance of a very wide variety of everyday behavior. Piaget's criteria of concrete operatory

thought (comparison, categorization, classification, class inclusion, seriation, quantitative and

spatial relations, beginning of transitive relations) constitute the beginning of such a list.

Cognitive processes, having been acquired through experience, can be modified relatively easily.

Structural cognitive change (i.e., change in thinking modes that is basic, durable, and

generalizable) can be brought about by carefully constructed and applied educational strategies.

One can compare the constructs of intelligence and cognitive processes on a number of criteria

of comparison. Such a comparison is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

The dimensions of comparison in this scheme are their origin or source, their relative

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modifiability, their conceptual nature, the principal method by which each is assessed, the

composition or principal components of each, and the primary role of parents in their

development.

With respect to origin, the transactional perspective holds that intelligence is primarily

(although not entirely) genetically determined, but that cognitive processes must be acquired,

primarily through learning. This dimension alone constitutes the largest single difference

between the two constructs, but there is a catch: The more biological intelligence one has, the

easier it is to acquire the cognitive processes through experience. Nevertheless, it is not possible

to have so much intelligence that it would be unnecessary to acquire systematic, generalizable,

and durable modes and habits of logical thought, and without them effective perception,

learning, thinking, and problem solving will not be possible.

Because intelligence is largely genetically determined, it is only modestly modifiable,

with great effort. For example, the effect of well organized and systematically delivered

programs of early education on subsequent IQ is only about 10-15 IQ points on the average

(although much greater in some studies and much less in others), and even that much gain

frequently disappears after two or three years. Cognitive processes, on the other hand, being

acquired in the first place, are much more readily modifiable, thus satisfying my requirement of

concepts that are treatable.

Although less important than the criteria of source and modifiability, the other

comparisons are worth noting. The third criterion of comparison is the conceptual nature of the

two. Most of the time, intelligence is thought of as a "global" or very broad characteristic that

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encompasses a wide range of behavior and ability. This is not always true, of course. Some

theorists distinguish narrower dimensions of intelligence (e.g., Guilford, 1967; Meeker, 1969;

Thurstone, 1938), and different kinds of intelligence (e.g., Gardner, 1999; Sternberg, 2000,

2003), and these distinctions are often useful, but the weight of evidence up to now is in favor of

a powerful "g" (general intelligence) factor, individual differences in which are strongly

correlated with a very wide range of performance variables (e.g., Jensen, 1998). Cognitive

processes, on the other hand, are relatively narrow abilities, even though they are, by definition,

generalizable to (basic to, required in the performance of) a wide range of behavioral variables.

It is a case of a "one-to-many" phenomenon (Haywood, 1986): Acquisition of the most

fundamental modes of systematic thinking allows those thinking modes to be applied to the

understanding and manipulation of an almost infinite variety of thinking, learning, perceptual,

and performance domains. For example, the ability to think representationally or symbolically

enables one to abandon dependence on concrete reality, to categorize, to compare on multiple

dimensions, to seriate, to form subordinate and superordinate classes, to manipulate symbols

(e.g., words) rather than to depend on objects or actual events, to project potential outcomes, to

think hypothetically.

The fourth criterion refers to assessment of individual differences in intelligence and in

cognitive processes. So far, assessment of intelligence relies heavily on achievement; i.e.,

estimation of learning ability is done by assessing what one has already learned or not learned.

Thus, the standard intelligence tests contain information items, vocabulary tests, tests of mental

calculating and social inference, as well as tests of visual-spatial competence and often of speed

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of performance or problem solving. The operative concepts here are "competence" and

"achievement." This reliance on the products of presumed past opportunities to learn requires

some patently untenable assumptions. The most obvious of these is the assumption that all

persons at a given age, gender, and broad demographic characteristic (e.g., urban versus rural

residence) will have had the same opportunities to learn, and that individual differences in their

achievement or store of information and skill reflect differences in the extent to which they have

benefited from those opportunities. Such an assumption is ridiculous on its face. Further, the

product of such a test is a comparison of the performance of individual test subjects with the

average performance of some "normative" group, assumed to be like them in important respects.

By reference to norm tables, one is then able essentially to rank-order individuals' performance

(and presumably ability) with respect to members of the normative samples. The comparison is

one of an individual with other individuals, or, worse yet, with the central tendency of a group of

other individuals. Assessment of cognitive processes, by contrast, is done by comparing

individuals' performances in a variety of tasks with their own performance at a different time

and under different conditions, typically using the technology of "dynamic assessment" (see,

e.g., Feuerstein, Rand, & Hoffman, 1979; Haywood, 1997; Haywood & Tzuriel, 1992, 2002;

Lidz, 1987; Lidz & Elliott, 2000). By using such methods of assessment, one can identify

obstacles to performance, structure the test situation in such a way as to overcome those

obstacles (e.g., impoverished vocabulary, ineffective performance motivation, or inadequate

development of basic cognitive and metacognitive processes), and then estimate the kind and

amount of investment required to produce better performance. Thus, the emphasis is on finding

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out why test subjects do not perform better, and on specifying the conditions that can lead to

improved performance.

The next criterion of comparison is composition, i.e., examining the presumed

components of intelligence and of cognitive processes. Over the last century we have

distinguished quite determinedly between "intellective" and "non-intellective" contributors to

performance differences. Ability variables are the components of intelligence, as they have been

identified in hundreds of structural studies: verbal ability, visual-spatial-perceptual ability,

memory ability, speed of processing ability, for example. Cognitive processes, on the other

hand, are (as defined here) composed of quite a mix of "intellective" and "non-intellective"

variables, including intelligence itself, learning history, attitudes toward thinking and learning,

work habits, and motives (see, e.g., Feuerstein, Rand, & Hoffman, 1979; Feuerstein, Haywood,

Rand, Hoffman, & Jensen, 1986). In other words, the definition of cognitive processes is a more

pragmatic and somewhat circular one: Those acquired characteristics that influence the

effectiveness and efficiency of thinking, perceiving, learning, and problem solving.

Finally, there is the criterion of developmental requirements, or the fundamental role of

parents and other care-givers in the development of individual differences in intelligence and in

cognitive processes. According to this conceptual position, the role of parents in the

development of intelligence is to contribute genes, safety, nutrition, and a hospitable

environment in which one's native intelligence can flourish. The role of parents in the

development of cognitive processes is a much more active and deliberate one. They provide

"mediated learning experiences" (Feuerstein & Rand, 1974; Deutsch, 2003) through which

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children learn, partly by imitation, some culture-characteristic modes of logical thinking. For

more complete discussions of mediated learning experience and techniques of mediation from

different conceptual perspectives, see Deutsch, (2003); Feuerstein, Rand, Hoffman, and Miller,

(1980); Hansen, (2003); Haywood, (2003); Karpov, (2003); Karpov and Haywood (1998).

This comparison of the concepts of intelligence and cognitive processes is presented for

the purpose of distinguishing them as sharply as possible from each other, and to suggest that

such a distinction, one that is critical to the transactional perspective, can be very useful toward

understanding the nature of human abilities and of mental retardation, as well as in constructing

intervention strategies designed to improve the performance capabilities of persons with mental

retardation.

Task-intrinsic Motivation. Motivation, especially task-intrinsic motivation, is the third

important aspect of a transactional perspective. Intrinsic motivation is the motivation that is, as

Hunt (1963) observed, "inherent in information processing and action." It is the motivation to

behave, to take in and act upon information, to learn, to solve problems, all for the sake of doing

so and with no reward other than the satisfaction of doing so. Just as intelligence alone is not

sufficient for effective thinking and learning, requiring the addition of individually developed

cognitive processes, the combination of intelligence and cognition is still not sufficient. That

combination requires complex transactions in development with task-intrinsic motivation.

Motivation and cognition develop in individuals in such a way that each facilitates the

development of the other, with every increment in either motivation or cognition bringing about

qualitative changes in their transactional relations. Table 2 shows some of the characteristics of

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persons who are primarily intrinsically motivated and those who are primarily extrinsically

motivated.

__________________________________________________________________________

Table 2 about here

________________________________________________________________________

__

Figure 3 shows an example of a behavioral method of assessing individual differences in

intrinsic motivation. The subject's task is to work through this paper-and-pencil maze without

lifting the pencil and, insofar as possible, without "crashing through" any lines. Whenever the

Figure 3 about here

subject can reach the goal, he/she may stop working on this task, or may continue to solve the

next maze problem. That is to say, there are three choice points, at each of which the subject

may choose to continue to work on the mazes or to stop work altogether. Thus, the amount of

work done and the time spent engaged in this task is a function of the subject's own motivation.

One can then count the number of mazes each subject chose to enter. There are three levels of

complexity of this task, so adjusting task difficulty to the manifest ability level of each

participant should help to avoid confounding motivational and difficulty variables. The number

of mazes done voluntarily is positively correlated with mental age, chronological age up to

middle adolescence, persistence in laboratory learning tasks, grades in school with IQ and CA

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held constant, and scores on self-report tests of intrinsic motivation. Interestingly enough, these

scores are also positively correlated with the number of hours of classroom cognitive education

the subjects have had. It is also true that the intrinsic motivation scores of children who have

been in a cognitive education program increase significantly more from pre- to post-training than

do those of control group children (e.g., Tzuriel & Kaniel, 1992). So we can see that

intelligence, cognition, and intrinsic motivation are related in interesting and even "symbiotic"

ways (Haywood, 1992). In previous attempts to articulate a motivational theory of cognition

(Haywood & Burke, 1977), I have taken the position that individual differences in the tendency

to seek one's principal satisfaction from factors intrinsic to task involvement and achievement

may develop largely as a function of the outcomes of one's previous encounters with tasks and

attempts to gain mastery over the environment. This observation is yet another way of

suggesting the intimate and transactional relation of intelligence, cognition, and motivation. The

ease with which one acquires basic cognitive and metacognitive processes depends in some part

upon one's level of biologically determined intelligence, but experiential encounters with one's

environment are necessary for the acquisition of those cognitive and metacognitive processes.

The amount of help one might need in the process of acquiring basic thinking modes may

depend upon intelligence, but also upon one's relative level of task-intrinsic motivation.

Haywood and Burke (1977) illustrated this process by comparing the motivational and cognitive

development of two infants, one genetically and otherwise predestined to the "competent," the

other not so. They concluded that motivational and cognitive developmental variables, together

with intelligence, relate to each other in a transactional manner, each affecting the susceptibility

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and reactivity of the others to mutual influences. (See Haywood & Burke, 1977, for that

detailed illustration, and Haywood & Switzky, 1986a, for a detailed discussion of intrinsic

motivation and mental retardation.)

It is the dynamic character of the relations among these three determinants of human

ability that makes their relation transactional (Haywood, Tzuriel, & Vaught, 1992). If the

relation were merely interactive, then it would suffice to observe that the expression of each

component, that is, of intelligence, of cognition, and of motivation, would be influenced by each

of the other two. In a far more complex way, the effect of B on A depends upon the prior effect

of A on B, and of C on both A and B. This occurs in such a way that the effect of B on A today

may be vastly different from the effect of B on A one week ago, because in the interim A could

have affected B in a way that changed the character of B, and C could have changed the

receptivity of both B and A. Once B has acted upon A, the subsequent effect of A on B or on C

is changed irrevocably. In more physical and mathematical terms, the effect of B on A is not a

constant vector, but rather one whose precise angle of effect as well as velocity can be expected

to produce a different resultant, depending upon A's prior response to B and on the probability

that either A or B has been the object of one or more C vectors. Prediction in such a complex

situation is horribly difficult, because it is necessary to take account of both a large number of

influencing variables and the constantly changing character of both the actor variables and the

acted-upon variables. Happily for our field, the mathematical tools and statistical models to

manage developmental change variables have become available, for example, in the form of

Structural Equation modeling and Hierarchical Linear modeling techniques that permit us to use

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the slope of change curves as the dependent variable (see, e.g., Dunst & Trivette, 1994).

TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND MENTAL RETARDATION

One may now ask how all of this theorizing about the nature and development of human

ability helps us to understand the nature and development of mental retardation and of persons

with mental retardation. First, the transactional perspective fulfills the requirements for new

conceptions of intelligence and of mental retardation that I posed in the beginning of this paper.

The tripartite conception encompasses phenomena that intelligence alone cannot explain, and

integrates those phenomena into a comprehensive scheme. Although cognition and motivation

are not themselves directly observable, they are no less so than is intelligence. In fact, all three

must be inferred from their presumed effects upon other, more directly observable, phenomena,

especially the behavior of persons who are thought to vary in intelligence, cognition, and/or

motivation. All three concepts are developmental ones, and it is possible to construct and to test

models for their ontogenesis, not only separately but, more importantly, with respect to their

transactional effects upon each other and upon developing persons. All three are important

indivmental retardationual differences variables that are both dynamic and transactional. At

least the latter two, cognition and motivation, are constantly changing quantities and qualities

whose relations to each other and to intelligence shift with each quantitative change. The last

requirement was to focus upon developmental aspects that are treatable and thus subject to

change. I have argued that intelligence itself is modifiable only to a relatively minor degree, and

that producing positive change in intelligence requires great effort over quite a long time. Yet it

is not the qualities themselves that one seeks to change; it is rather the behavior and development

22


of persons. In an important sense, if we can help persons to think more effectively, to learn, to

solve the problems of everyday life, then it matters little what the IQ is. It is the incorporation

of the concepts of cognition and motivation into the mix with intelligence that makes possible

quite substantial behavioral and developmental change. The mix constitutes a kind of closed

system in which intervention in any one of the three domains, that is, intelligence, cognition, or

motivation, influences the other two as well as their subsequent effects on each other. We

already know that if intelligence is higher we can expect, all other things being equal, that

cognitive processes will be acquired and elaborated more readily and that motivational

orientation will be somewhat more likely to be of a task-intrinsic nature. The problem is that

raising intelligence is too difficult and not at all certain. So the most promising interventions

must be in the areas of cognition and motivation.

There is quite convincing evidence that carefully planned and executed intervention in

the cognitive and motivational systems of persons with mental retardation can lead to behavior

that is characteristic of persons with considerably higher IQs. In persons with mental retardation,

individual differences in intrinsic motivation may be associated with differences in both

laboratory and classroom learning as large as that associated with 20-25 IQ points (e.g.,

Haywood, 1968a). Many years ago, I found that children with mental retardation who made high

scores on a test of intrinsic motivation were achieving in the primary grades at a level that was

not different from that of age- and gender-matched children of average intelligence, although the

children with mental retardation who were extrinsically motivated were achieving at a much

lower level (Haywood, 1968b). The program of cognitive early education that my colleagues

23


and I have developed (Bright Start; Haywood, Brooks, & Burns, 1986, 1992; Brooks &

Haywood, 2003) has been applied in preschool and primary classes with children who are

diagnosed with mental retardation (Cole, Dale, Mills, & Jenkins, 1993; Dale & Cole, 1988;

Haywood, Brooks, & Burns, 1986; Mills, Dale, Cole, & Jenkins, 1995; Molina & Vived, 2004),

autism (see Butera & Haywood, 1992, 1995; Pou & Lam, 2003), emotional disturbances,

significant language delays (Nevalainen, 2002; Vanden Wijngaert, 1991; Warnez, 1991), socio-

economic disadvantage and/or cultural difference (Cèbe, 2000; Cèbe & Paour, 2000; Haywood,

Brooks, & Burns, 1986; Paour, Cèbe, Lagarrigue, & Luiu, 1992; Paour, Cèbe, & Haywood,

2000; Tzuriel, Kaniel, Zeliger, Friedman, & Haywood, 1998; Tzuriel, Kaniel, Kanner, &

Haywood, 1999 ), and learning disabilities (Garrido, 1996; Samuels, Killip, McKenzie, &

Fagan, 1992). One effect has been to shift their motivational orientation modestly toward a

more task-intrinsic one. Another has been to improve, sometimes quite dramatically, their

abstract reasoning performance. In case anybody cares, they also gain significantly in IQ.

Taken as a group, these studies have also shown improvements in task persistence in the face of

difficult learning tasks, and ultimately higher levels of school achievement, especially in reading

and in math (Cèbe & Paour, 2000; Paour, et al., 1992, 2000).

Paour (1992; Paour & Soavi, 1992) and his students and colleagues, applying a different

but conceptually related treatment, have found quite consistently that it is possible to elevate the

performance of adolescents and adults with mild and moderate mental retardation on tasks that

require analogical reasoning, planning, and the usual Piagetian criteria of concrete operatory

thinking. Their intervention is, on the face of it, a purely cognitive one, but both casual

24


observation and the research team's own reports suggest that a powerful motivational component

is involved. In a typical experimental sequence, Paour and his colleagues give their subjects

repeated opportunities to discover logical principles and to apply them to the solution of logic

problems. There is a minimum of actual teaching. As the subjects begin to gain cognitive

competence, their enthusiasm for the task increases, leading them to more and more exploratory

interaction with the task, which in turn leads to more and more success. After only about 40

hours of such training spread over several months, they find typically that their subjects have

moved from pre-operatory thinking to concrete operatory thinking. After the treatment, they

"pass" Piagetian challenges on conservation and several of the other operatory thinking tasks,

and, perhaps more important from a practical standpoint, some of their subjects are able to apply

their new-found cognitive competence to the learning of such academic subjects as reading,

math, and language.

It would be wrong to conclude that any of the persons with mental retardation in these

studies lacked the necessary intelligence to master the learning and reasoning tasks that were

presented to them. It would be equally wrong to conclude that any of these cognitive

interventions actually created intelligence that had not already been present. According to this

transactional perspective, neither good environments nor good psycho-educational treatments

can create intelligence, nor can bad environments or the absence of psycho-educational

treatments destroy intelligence (that is, short of actual assaults on the nervous system), although

I suspect that some American television programs might actually accomplish the latter feat! The

effect of "good" environments and of effective psychological and educational treatments is to

25


enhance both intrinsic motivation and cognitive processes in such a way that they lead to greater

access to and application of one's intelligence. The effect of "bad" environments, defined as

those that deprive developing persons of opportunities for cognitive and motivational growth, is

to mask intelligence, to limit one's access to one's own intelligence, and to limit the daily

applications of intelligence in the domains of systematic perception, thinking, learning, and

problem solving.

It is time to view mental retardation, as Paour (e.g., 1988) has suggested, as chronic

subnormal functioning that eventually leads to subnormal development in systematic thinking

processes. Although it is very likely low intelligence that brings about the initial deficient

functioning, the subsequent deficient development is not the direct result of low intelligence but

is rather the result of poor everyday functioning, which limits opportunities for cognitive growth

and for development of task-intrinsic motivation. Deficiencies in these two areas then lead quite

directly to deficient cognitive development, which ultimately means deficiencies in getting

access to one's own intelligence and in applying one's own intelligence to everyday perceiving,

thinking, learning, and problem solving situations. As I have argued elsewhere (e.g., Haywood,

1987, 1989), the experience of being retarded makes one more so in a way that is not ultimately

necessary!

The transactional nature of the relations among intelligence, cognitive processes, and

intrinsic motivation is of such a nature that intervention in any one or any combination of these

three domains can resound throughout one's developmental system. Thus, those who intervene

have the opportunity to select the modes of intervention that present the best opportunities to

26


make a difference. Inasmuch as we know that changing intelligence itself is very difficult to

accomplish and promises only limited gains from behavioral treatments, transactional treatment

personnel should emphasize attempts to enhance the development and elaboration of systematic

cognitive processes and intrinsic motivational systems. There are many programs of "cognitive

education" (curricula designed to promote the application of systematic logical thinking modes),

some of which have been used experimentally with persons with mental retardation (see Costa,

1991, for a list and descriptions of some such programs). Cognitive education is known to be

associated with increases in intrinsic motivation, and even with increases in performance on

intelligence tests.

In the treatment of mental retardation, great emphasis should be placed upon engineering

environments so as to maximize opportunities to acquire, elaborate, and apply fundamental

cognitive modes and operations as well as the motivation to process information, to learn, and to

solve problems entirely for the sake of doing so and without further reward. To the extent that

that is done, the biological intelligence of persons with mental retardation will become more

accessible, they will apply it more successfully in their everyday lives, and they will have a

chance to become lifelong independent learners.

27


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Table Heads

Table 1. Comparison of Intelligence and Cognitive Processes

Table 2. Orientation of Intrinsically Motivated and Extrinsically Motivated Persons

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Figure Captions

Figure 1. Verbal abstracting scores of persons with cultural-familial (C-F) and organic (ORG)

mental retardation and non-retarded (NMR) children matched with them on mental age.

Adapted from Gordon and Haywood (1969).

Figure 2. Total number of learned visual associations correctly recalled at four retention

intervals by persons at four IQ levels (80-100, 70-79, 55-64, 40-49 ) as a function of training

levels and intelligence. (Haywood & Heal, 1968)

Figure 3. Two difficulty levels of a Mazes Test of Intrinsic Motivation (Delclos & Haywood,

unpublished)

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a transactional perspective on mental retardation*

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