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"A CULTURAL VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE" by André LAURENT* N° 87 / 10 * André LAURENT, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France Director of Publication : Charles WYPLOSZ, Associate Dean for Research and Development Printed at INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

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"A CULTURAL VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE"

by André LAURENT*

N° 87 / 10

* André LAURENT, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

Director of Publication :

Charles WYPLOSZ, Associate Dean for Research and Development

Printed at INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

FS/AL.culorg2.260387

A CULTURAL VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE*

André LAURENT

Organizational change can hardly go beyond our own capacity to

conceive it. This capacity is often constrained by our own

premises, assumptions and conceptions about the nature of

organizations and the nature of change. Major or strategic

organizational change requires a transformation of the actors'

view of the organization.

This chapter will argue that similarly our understanding of

organizational change can benefit from a systematic probing of our

assumptions and beliefs about the nature of organizations and the

nature of their change. This probing process will be conducted

here at three interlocking levels of analysis: individual,

organizational and societal.

The first part of this chapter will examine a number of basic

assumptions that individuals may hold about organizational change

and will attempt to assess their validity against the evolution of

modern organizations.

* I wish to thank Michael Brimm and Paul Evans for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2

Looking at change from the perspective of the actors' assumptions

and belief systems and approaching organizations as social

constructions will bring us naturally to a cultural view of

organizations and their change. In the second part, we will try to

assess the consequences and the limits of a vision of

organizations as cultures and of a conception of organizational

change as cultural change.

This inquiry would be incomplete without giving careful

consideration to the wider cultuiul context of organizations.

Thus, the third part will broaden the picture to the societal

level by providing a comparative and research-based cross-cultural

perspective to organizational change.

3

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

The dynamics of organizations reflect to a certain extent the

processes that individuals conceive as being probable, possible,

feasible, desirable. The process of change is no exception.

Organizations are social inventions (Greenfield, 1973).

Organizational change refers to the ongoing nature of that

invention process which is embedded in the actors' assumptions.

The complexity of any organization makes it extremely difficult to

recognize the assumptions that have guided its development. Thus

the validity of such assumptions cannot be tested empirically.

One can only speculate on the logical consequences generated by

alternative sets of assumptions on organizational change. Such

speculation is important as a way of exposing implicit assumptions

to open inquiry and of broadening the spectrum of options that the

architect of change may envision.

The focus of this section will be on the pitfalls that individuals

may create through their own assumptions about organizational

change and on the opportunities that alternative assumptions may

generate.

Organizational shift versus organizational transformation

As a process of evolution, organizational change requires a dual

perspective: where we coure from and where we are going, the skills

of the historian and the skills of the visionary. A great deal of

confusion as to the nature and dynamics of organizational change

4

may originate from our mental inability to grasp the process of

change in its totality and from our obsessive concern for its

expected outcomes. Indeed, organizational change has very little

to do with shifting from state A to state B, but has much to do

with transforming state A into state B, which is very different.

A process of transformation requires equal attention to be given

to understanding the past, assessing the present and envisioning

the future.

This may be a place where our western linear conception of time

needs to be enriched by the eastern circular conception (Hall,

1983). A spiral provides a more accurate imagery of change than a

straight line does. Spirals remind us better of the historical

essence of evolution where previous states are progressively

transformed into new states. Straight lines may feed the illusion

that the past can be left behind and encourage a "fuite en

avant"(*) - type pathology. This particular perspective is

reinforced by the "doing" orientation of many western cultures

whereby individuals and groups tend to be defined mostly on the

basis of their actions and achievements.

(*) literally escaping forward i.e. a tendency to engage in new activities/thoughts as a way of postponing the consideration of past ans present problems.

5

While this orientation may provide impetus and movement, it needs

to be balanced by the insight of many eastern cultures that

exhibit more of a "being" orientation whereby individuals and

groups are defined predominantly in terms of their affiliative

context.

An effective conception of organizational change as a

transformation process also calls for a dual consideration of the

instrumental and social nature of organizations.

Resistance to change versus change capability

it is interesting to observe that a great deal of organizational

literature has been devoted to the issue of resistance to change.

Yet the evidence of today's world seems to indicate that

organizations can change and do change rather drastically over

time, either as a result of outside pressures, inside initiatives

or both. Dramatic turnarounds abound, so do mergers, acquisitions

and the like. Change is ail over the place whether organizations

moue from a state of success to a state of failure, disintegration

and death or whether they moue from mediocrity to excellence. In

spite of their noted resistance to change, the evidence seems to

be that organizations also have in fact a tremendous capability

for change which maybe has not been stressed enough in the

organizational literature.

As a matter of fact one could reasonably argue that organizations

have a much greater capacity for change than smaller organisme

like the individuals who populate them or larger entities like the

6

societies and cultures that constitute their environment.

In some caricatural way, the relative change capability of

individuals, organizations and societies could be sketched

according to the following diagram:

HIGH

change capability

LOW

organizations

. . individuals societies

Relationships between structural entities may be more amenable to

change than structural entities themselves. From this point of

view, it may be useful to look at both the individual and society

as fairly stable structural entities whereas organizations can be

viewed as temporary systems of relationship and transaction

between individuals and their environment. Whereas personality

confers stability to the individual and culture confers stability

to society, social organizations represent more of a "lieu de

passage", a cross-road, transaction fields, temporary arrangements

which result from choices and initiatives. Organizations are the

privileged places where change can occur most drastically. They

can also be conceived as the most significant levers of both

individual and societal change. They mediate important changes

such as technological change.

As they are populated by individuals and embedded into societies,

7

organizations are given attributes which are borrowed directly

from the individual level (we talk about the personality or

identity of an organization) and from the societal level (we now

talk about the culture of an organization). Even though such

concepts may help our understanding, they also contrebute to a

certain degree of confusion. For instance we may be led to

attribute to organizations some of the resistance to change

properties of both individuals and societies.

We may also be led to overlook thr, fact that the conjunction of

minor consistent changes in behavior at the individual level

throughout an organization can bring significant organizational

change that may become contageous and result in major turnarounds,

if the process is properly managed and orchestrated.

Alternatively, we often underestimate the impact of the larger

context, for instance national cultures, on organizations and

their ways of operating. We often fail to recognize that

organizations tend to reproduce in their internai structuring and

functioning significant features of their national environment,

mediated for instance by the educational system (Brossard and

Maurice, 1976) or by the founders and dominant elite of the

organization (Hofstede, 1985). Then when organizations become

multinational, they suffer from an inability to fully recognize

their cultural diversity and use it as a major asset and a source

of synergy. The opportunity loss is tremendous and the costs may

be enormous.

In the final analysis, it may be that our tendency to reify

8

organizations distorts our vision so much that we create in our

mind rigid pictures of what they are and we tend to underestimate

their change capabilities. Resistance to change may stem more

from our very ways of thinking about organizations than from any

objective organizational property.

Traditional versus new forms of organization

Our minds are prisoners of many other traps when thinking about

organizations and conceiving of their change. Significant traps

are created by our assumptions about the design of organizational

structures and systems. The cost of such unquestioned assumptions

is that we use obsolete forms of organization that cannot meet the

changing requirements of new tasks, new technologies, new people,

new environments. Organizational forms remain surprisingly

unchanged in spite of such changing requirements.

In spite of the well-known dysfunctions of organizational

hierarchies, only limited imagination and effort are being

invested into the design of alternative organizational forms that

would significantly deviate from the traditional pyramid. A

majority of managers have negative perceptions of such notions as

"boss" and "subordinate". They often like to substitute

alternative labels like "associate", "colleague", "co-worker",

etc. which they perceive as more socially desirable. Yet the same

people continue to enrich the organizational folklore everyday by

acting out, often unconsciously, fixed conceptions of upward and

downward relationships that essentially reflect the power

differential between the parties which a formai hierarchy of

9

authority implies (Bartolomé & Laurent, 1986). Managerial

cognitive maps for downward and upward relationships differ so

much that it becomes difficult to imagine that the same

individuals can shift from the role of boss to the role of

subordinate and vice-versa without losing their sense of personal

identity and integrity. Such models draw their stability and

unquestionability from outdated assumptions about organizational

relationships that perpetuate dysfunctional myths and we end up

with the ineffective organizational forms that we deserve.

Most managers remain unquestionably and emotionally attached to

the classical management principle of unity of command while there

is evidence that multiplicity of command may be more appropriate

and effective in a number of situations. The limiting assumption

that one cannot have two or more direct bosses is so deeply

anchored that if often undermines the effective functioning of

matrix-type organizational arrangements (Laurent, 1981).

At a broader level of organizational design, the very same mental

attachment to traditional hierarchies may prevent large

multinational corporations to consider their structural evolution

toward alternative designs such as a heterarchy of many different

kinds of strategic centers throughout the world that would replace

the traditional mother-daughter conception of

headquarter-subsidiary relationship (Hedlund, 1986).

Management versus leadership of organizational change

Organizations exist where they were Born in the first place, that

10

is in the mind of people. For organizations to change, people

have to change their minds about them. The social fabric of

organizations then requires a collective change of mind and this

in turn cannot occur without the federating lever of leadership.

Examples abound of carefully planned organizational changes that

have failed in spite of systematic management. Management may be

an excellent tool to maintain stability, ensure survival and keep

things going. It is not sufficient to transform or revitalize an

organization. Minds cannot be managed. They can only be

inspired.

Yet the literature on organizational change and development has

often communicated the impression that change could be managed

with the help of a few techniques and almost without inspiration.

At the same time, the observation of major changes in

organizations has almost inevitably indicated the presence of some

timely hero at the top. This has helped both theoreticians and

practitioners to better realize that the over-emphasis on

management had resulted in our overlooking the critical importance

of leadership. Unfortunately and at the same time the available

literature on leadership was not the most inspiring body of

knowledge as this field had been sterilized by a positivist

behavioral approach.

Salvation came from anthropology. If organizational change has to

do with a collective change of mind that needs to be inspired by

spirited leaders, then a conception of organizations as cultures,

a vision of organizational change as cultural change and a

11

definition of leadership as managed culture change (Schein, 1985)

could be helpful. This cultural perspective was reinforced and

encouraged by the economic success of Japan that seemed to suggest

that management and organizations could also reflect aspects of

their langer cultural context.

ORGANIZATIONS AS CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AS CULTURAL

CHANGE

Numerous books have appeared ip k he last few years that have taken

a cultural perspective on organizations (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale &

Athos, 1981; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Peters & Waterman, 1982;

Davis, 1984; Frost et al, 1985; Kilmann et al, Eds, 1985; Sathe,

1985; Schein, 1985). Academic journals have devoted special

issues to the topic.

One of the benefits of this movement is an invitation to look at

organizations in holistic terms, as totalities and as symbolic

systems of meaning. It can be seen as a revitalization of systems

theory on a different ground or as a synergy between systems

theory and a vision of reality as socially constructed (Berger &

Luckman, 1956). This perspective stresses the importance of

looking at organizations from the point of view of the meaning

that is attributed to behaviors and actions. Interestingly, if

one thinks of organizations as cultural systems, one can argue

that it may be easier and more effective to try to change the

whole organization in some minor or major way than to attempt to

modify some of its parts. The latter strategy is more likely to

upset the totality than to transform it.

12

What has been often labeled in the past as resistance to change

may have been the legitimate reaction of social actors against

attempts by some at changing aspects of the culture of an

organization without saying so, a reaction against undeclared or

hidden cultural engineering. In the same way that cultures resist

imposed change, they may also be motivated to foster their own

change provided that they perceive it as a process of mastering

their own destiny.

Beyond this theoretical perspective, we need to assess whether

indeed a vision of organizations as cultures can help to better

conceive their change.

Some people argue that culture may only be another of these labels

reflecting what may only be a passing fad. Some academics argue

that organizational culture is like a can of worms: if you try to

pull a few - like symbols - you get the whole messy pack of them

that include the taboos, values, heros, myths, rituals and

ceremonies, and then you wonder what to do with it. One could say

that an improvised surgeon would easily corne to the same

conclusion about the human body. Thus our understanding of

organizations as cultures might be enhanced by borrowing the

insights of experts. Anthropologists are supposed to know

something about culture. One of them (Geertz, 1973) defines

culture as "the fabrics of meaning, out of which human beings

interpret their experience and guide their action". From this

perspective, organizations become fabrics of meaning,

organizational change a process whereby new meanings emerge that

help reinterpret past experience and reorient action along new

13

lines that break away from repetitive cycles. The leadership of

organizational change becomes a process of imparting visions that

coherently and powerfully promote new lines of thinking and

action. It finally recognizes that social systems are symbolic

systems and that what counts in organizations is not so much what

people do, their overt behavior, but mostly the shared meaning

that is given by the whole group to these behaviors and actions.

It is so clear for instance that the very same behavior of

bypassing the hierarchical line may constitute the most legitimate

and praised action in organization A and the most dreadful sin in

organization B. Bypassing is obviously not the issue here. The

institutionalized meaning of it is. Organizational change refers

to the process by which new meanings get institutionalized.

Although the cultural perspective on organizations may be

promising, it does include a few traps as well and these will stem

again from our very conception of what culture is ail about.

Organizations may obviously die because of their strong culture.

The stronger the culture, the more solid the consensus on what

means what and what should be, the more rigidity, conformity, and

sclerosis can be expected and innovation may become unlikely when

needed. At the other extreme, organizations may die from their

weak culture. If everything has a different meaning to the

different organizational members and if everybody has different

ideas on what should be done, creativity may flourish for a while

but the whole edifice is likely to collapse from lack of

consistency, coordination and direction. The concepts of strong

and weak cultures may not be more useful than the popular concepts

of strong and weak personalities. More conceptual differentiation

14

is required. Effective corporate cultures may be those that have

developed a capacity to learn about themselves and their

environment in such a way as to monitor their own development.

Effective organizations are those that recognize better the dual

essence of culture as an inward and outward phenomenon. Corporate

culture becomes a snapshot of the organization's ways of defining

its environment, interpreting it and transacting with it.

This may reflect a number of basic assumptions on nature, reality

and truth (Schein, 1984) which are extremely bard to change. But,

maybe more importantly, an organization's culture will reflect

assumptions on clients, employees, mission, products, activities,

that have worked well in the past and that get translated in norms

of behavior, visions of the expected, appropriate, legitimate and

desirable ways of thinking and acting. Such norms are more

changeable than basic assumptions on nature. Following this line

of reasoning, we can argue that although large cultures like

nations and civilizations do not and cannot change easily or

rapidly as they are embedded into deep seated assumptions on

themselves and their environment, the same rationale does not hold

for goal-oriented younger and smaller social organizations like

commercial or industrial firms (Laurent, 1986). Such

organizations are likely to reflect the larger cultural context

(national for instance) from which they emerged and are not likely

to strongly modify the basic cultural assumptions that they have

borrowed from that initial context (Laurent, 1983). On the other

band these organizations have the power and freedom to shape

behavioral norms and to institutionalize preferred ways of acting

that are far more amenable to change than the earlier mentioned

15

assumptions.

If these norms of action constitute the heart of an organization's

culture, they are also the locus of its capacity for evolution and

change. Such a conception of organizational culture makes it

easier to understand major changes that some organizations have

been able to manage and to view organizations as highly changeable

in spite of the fact that cultures are not.

Wherever we locate the essence of organization's culture, there

seems to be a wide recognition among both researchers and

practitioners that it has a profound effect on strategy,

structure, results and many organizational processes. After

lengthy debates in the literature on whether structure follows

strategy or the reverse, there seems to be more agreement now that

both assertions are correct and that the dynamic interaction

between structure and strategy is mediated and shaped by the

culture of the firm. In this sense, culture is seen as the glue

that holds the different parts together in a coherent, consistent

and meaningful way. As cogently exposed by Schein (Chapter X in

this book) this glue will serve different functions at different

stages in the life of organizations.

The gap however is tremendous between the spreading awareness of

the critical importance of organizational culture and our limited

capacities or means to do something about it. If corporations

recognize that their culture is so critical to their success, why

is it that so little of corporate budget is being currently

invested into trying to find out about it in such a way as to be

16

in a better position to act more upon it, develop it, transform

it? Only a very limited number of corporations are presently

engaged into explicit and systematic attempts at better diagnosing

their culture, its history, roots, evolution, positive and

negative manifestations. Historians and social anthropologists

are not yet so numerous on corporate payrolls yet their

expertise seems to be needed.

To be fair to the corporate world, one should also recognize that

there is a similar gap among students of organizations between

their interest in the concept of organizational culture and the

available methodologies for cultural diagnosis and change that

they can propose. So everybody is aware of the presence of the

elephant but its investigation partly remains one of Blind people.

There is a long way to go for researchers, consultants and

practitioners to fill the gap between awareness and action

capability. Existing skills in transforming and revitalizing

organizations need the support of new knowledge and approaches.

The state-of-the-art in cultural change is probably to be found in

those organizations that try to go beyond the limited folklore of

corporate culture booklets and credos or the quick "fix it" type

consulting tricks. In any event there is indication that the

interpretation of organizational change as a case of cultural

change may enhance our understanding of the evolution of social

organizations by re-establishing the evidence that change can

hardly occur without a transformation of the actors' views,

attitudes and beliefs (Pettigrew, 1985).

17

A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

If the concept of organizational culture is relatively new, the

concept of national culture has been around for quite a while.

National cultures represent an important element of an

organization's context from which it draws its resources and with

which it transacts. In spite of its obvious impact and in spite

of the organizational literature focus on environments, the

national cultural context of organizations has been grossly

overlooked for many years in the literature. Unconscious

parochialism and unfounded universalistic claims have marked the

field of management and organization (Hofstede, 1980 b.).

Conceptions and approaches of organizational change have suffered

from the same ethnocentric pathology (Faucheux et al, 1982).

Strategies for organizational change developed in one particular

national culture continue to be viewed by many as perfectly

appropriate for any other culture. Management and organizational

theorists persist in entertaining the comfortable assumption that

their object of study, their observations and their concepts are

culture-free.

Yet comparative research has demonstrated that different national

cultures hold different conceptions and assumptions about

organizations and their management (Hofstede, 1980 a; Laurent,

1983). Managers from different national cultures hold different

assumptions on the nature of management, authority, structure and

organizational relationships. These different sets of assumptions

shape different value systems and get translated into different

management practices which in turn reinforce the original

18

assumptions.

Strategies for organizational change can be considered as cultural

artifacts reflecting and reinforcing the basic assumptions and

values of the national cultures in which organizations are

embedded. As cultural artifacts, they may be highly meaningful

for the home culture and possibly confusing and ineffective in

other cultures (Kreacic & Marsh, 1986).

For example, national cultures nitr be positioned on a continuum

from a basically instrumental to an essentially social view of

organizations. In the first case - which is more typical of the

North American context - the organization is perceived primarily

as a set of tasks to be achieved through a problem-solving

hierarchy where positions are defined in terms of tasks and

functions and where authority is functionally based. According to

the social view - which is to be found particularly in Latin

cultures - the organization is primarily conceived of as a

collective of people to be managed through a formai hierarchy,

where positions are defined in terms of levels of authority and

status and where authority is more attached to individuals than it

is to their offices or functions (Inzerilli & Laurent, 1983).

The instrumental view looks at authority as a means to achieve

tasks and conceives relationships as being instrumental to task

achievement. The social view looks at tasks as means to establish

authority and conceives tasks as being instrumental to the

development of relationships (Amado & Laurent, 1983). When the

instrumentally-oriented manager is primarily interested to find

19

out or define who is responsible for what, the socially-oriented

manager is more inclined to consider who has authority over whom.

While these represent ideal types, there is some evidence that

different cultural contexts approximate such ideal types to

differing degrees. By and large US organizations tend to reflect

more of the instrumental type whereas French organizations reflect

more of the social type (Inzerilli & Laurent, 1983). In the very

same way that it has taken some time and the help of the Japanese

mirror for American management writers to better identify what is

American in American management (Schein, 1981), some time has been

needed to recognize the cultural values that have inspired various

approaches to organizational change. Such movements as "OD" in

Northern America, "industrial democracy" in Northern Europe,

"institutional analysis" in France, or "quality control circles"

in Japan are obviously not independent from the cultural context

in which they have emerged. Thus it should not corne as a surprise

that OD emerged in the US with an instrumental focus on

organizational processes as tools to be improved, while the Latin

countries favored institutional approaches that tried to deal with

the social intricacies of human collectivities (Faucheux et al;

1982). Nor should we be surprised that the OD movement has

traditionally downplayed the importance of power issues in

organizations, while institutional analysis has been obsessed by

such issues.

If organizations reflect their societal context (Maurice et al,

1980), strategies for changing organizations obviously cannot

ignore it. Different change strategies are likely to be needed in

20

different cultural environments. A contingent approach to

organizational change needs to be developed that takes national

culture as a major parameter.

When a majority of German managers perceive their organization as

a coordinated network of individuals who make rational decisions

based on their professional knowledge and competence, any process

of planned organizational change in Germany will have to take this

into consideration.

When a majority of British managers view their organization

primarily as a network of interpersonal relationships between

individuals who get things done by influencing each other through

communicating and negotiating, a different approach to

organizational change may be needed in England.

When a majority of French managers look at their organizations as

an authority network where the power to organize and control the

actors stems from their positioning in the hierarchy, another

change model can be called for in France.

The above national caricatures based on comparative research in

managerial assumptions (Laurent, 1986) are obviously

over-simplistic like any other caricature. They are mostly

intended to highlight the challenge faced by organizations that

operate across national cultures when it coures to the management

of change.

Research indicates that the corporate culture and policies of

21

long-established large multinational companies do not reduce

national differences in management conceptions (Laurent, 1983).

while the corporate culture may lead to the creation of important

norms that result in significant behavioral adjustment, it seems

to leave intact the deep seated assumptions of the various

nationals.

What are the implications of such findings for the management of

change in multinational organizations? If the cultural change of

organizations has to do with the creation of new meanings, how can

this process be managed when different sets of meanings exist in

the first place across the various national organizations that

constitute the multinational?

In order to better frame the issues at stake here, we need to

return shortly to a number of points made earlier in this chapter.

If we look at organizational change as a process of transformation

of state A into state B, the easiest part of the management task

may be to specify what state B ought to be. Most organizations do

not encounter too many problems at this stage. Few organizations

would be explicitly against the development of a total quality

concept, against a people orientation that takes into fuller

consideration their clients and personnel, against the achievement

of equity inside, competitive performance outside, innovation and

flexibility in dealing with the environment and some degree of

corporate integration (Evans, 1986). Gospels of corporate culture

distributed by companies to their personnel show more similarities

than differences. Reaching consensus on such overarching

corporate goals may not be too difficult even in large

22

multinational firms that have a high degree of cultural diversity.

Presumably a key criterion for the strength of the international

consensus will be the extent to which the corporation has

mobilized a fair representation of its national constituencies in

the shaping, elaboration and diffusion of the new vision B.

Cross-national difficulties may start however at other levels.

First, different national organizations are likely to favor

different means and strategies to implement the desired change.

These preferred means will reflect culturally-based conceptions,

skills, and insights in the art of managing and organizing. They

may also reflect a completely different assessment of state A -

that is a different assessment of what needs to be transformed in

the first place.

Effective strategic organizational change, at a minimum, will then

require the integrative management of a decentralized process, if

it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentrism and to build on

cultural differences as assets.

If the multinational ambition of the corporation is of a higher

order, it will include some awareness that as a total system, the

corporation can actually learn from the various cultural

definitions of its constituencies, transfer and adapt change

know-how from subsidiaries to headquarters and across subsidiaries

in such a way that some degree of cross cultural learning and

synergy can be reached.

Such an orientation can be described as a strategic posture

23

whereby a multinational firm progressively acquires a true

multinational identity through a deliberate use of its cultural

diversity. However this cannot be the result of a rational

management decision. It requires an evolution of the mind from a

parochial and ethnocentric conception of management and

organization to a world view of it. This may be the most

important challenge in the strategic change of multinational

organizations.

Conclusion

We have argued in this chapter that our understanding and mastery

of organizational change may be enhanced:

. if we conceive change as a true transformation process

. if we conceive organizations primarily as social inventions

. if we refrain from attributing to organizations properties of

individuals and societies

. if we accept the evidence that, as transaction fields,

organizations have a high capacity for change

. if we view the so-called resistance to change not as an inner

property of organizations but as a natural reaction of the minds

and hearts of social actors subjected to cultural engineering

. if we recognize that organizational change requires a

transformation of the actors' view of the organization that

cannot be managed but only inspired by the compelling vision of

spirited leaders

. if we consider organizational change as a particular example of

cultural change

24

. if we locate this process of cultural change at the crossroad of

broader cultural context like civilizations and nations and the

more transient cultural history of organizations

. if we operate a clearer conceptual differentiation between these

two cultural universes by locating the roots of national

cultures in the very basic and stable assumptions of social

actors and the core of organizational cultures in the more

changeable representations, images and associated behavioral

norms of organizational members

. if we develop our awareness and understanding of the shaping

effects of both national and organizational cultures

. if we can go beyond the limitation of cultural determinism by

developing a higher capacity to build on the specific and unique

insight of our own culture (national and organizational) while

minimizing the negative impact created by the Blind spots of

such cultures

. if we can manage to develop organizations that can learn from

the insights and wisdom of other cultures (both national and

organizational).

Once we will have achieved all of this, the concept of culture

will not be needed anymore to understand and master change in

organizations and we will be searching for a newer concept.

The state-of-the-art in organizational change will have changed

again.

25

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BROSSARD, M., and MAURICE, M. Ts there a Universal Model of Organization Structure? International Studies of Management and Organization, 1976, VI (3) 11-45.

DAVIS, S.M. Managing Corporate Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984.

DEAL, T.E., and KENNEDY, A.A. Corporate Cultures. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982.

EVANS, P.A.L. The Strategic Outcomes of Human Resource Management. Human Resource Management, 1986, 25(1), 149-167.

FAUCHEUX, C., AMADO, G. and LAURENT, A. Organization Development and Change. Annual Review of Psychology. 1982, 33, 343-370.

FROST, P.J., MOORE, L.F., LOUIS, M.R., LUNDBERG, C.C., and MARTIN, J. Organizational Culture. Beverly Hiils, Calif.: Sage , 1985.

GEERTZ, C. The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays. New-York : Basic Books, 1973.

GREENFIELD, T.B. Organizations as Social Inventions : Rethinking Assumptions about Change. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 1973, IX(5), 551-574.

26

HALL, E.T. The Dance of Life : The Other Dimension of Time. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983.

HEDLUND, G. The Hypermodern MNC. A Heterarchy? Human Resource Management, 1986,25(1), 9-35.

HOFSTEDE, G. Culture's Consequences. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980 a.

HOFSTEDE, G. Motivation, Leadership and Organization : Do American Theories Apply Abroad ? Organizational Dynamics, Summer 1980 b, 42-63.

HOFSTEDE, G. Thc Interaction between National and Organizational Value Systems. Journal of Management Studies, 1985,22(4),347-357.

INZERILLI G., and LAURENT, A. Managerial Views of Organization Structure in France and the USA. International Studies of Management and Organization. 1983, XIII (1/2), 97-118.

KILMANN, R.H., SAXTON, M.J., SERRA, R. and associates (Eds). Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture. San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 1985.

KREACIC, V. and MARSH, P. Organisation Development and National Culture in Four Countries, Public Enterprise, 1986, 6(2), 131-134.

LAURENT, A. Matrix Organizations and Latin Cultures. A Note on the Use of Comparative Data in Management Education. International Studies of Management and Organization, 1981,X(4), 101-114.

LAURENT, A. The Cultural Diversity of Western Conceptions of Management. International Studies of Management and Organization, 1983, XIII (1/2), 75-96.

LAURENT, A. The Cross-Cultural Puzzle of International, Human Resource Management. Human Resource Management, 1986, 25(1), 91-102.

27

MAURICE, M. SORGE, A., and WARNER, M. Societal Differences in Organizing Manufacturing Units : A Comparison of France, West Germany and Great-Britain. Organization Studies, 1980, 1(1), 59-86.

OUCHI, W.G. Theory Z. Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1981.

PASCALE, R.T., and ATHOS, A.G. The Art of Japanese Management. New-York: Simon & Schuster, 1nR1.

PETERS, T.J., and WATERMAN, R.H., Jr. In Search of Excellence. New-York: Harper & Row, 1982.

PETTIGREW, A.M. The Awakening Giant : Continuity and Change in Imperial Chemical Industries. New-York, NY: Blackwell, 1985.

SATHE, V. Managerial Action and Corporate Culture. Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1985.

SCHEIN, E.H. Does Japanese Management Style Have a Message for American Managers ? Sloan Management Review, 1981, 23, 55-68.

SCHEIN, E.H. Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture. Sloan Management Review, 1984,25,3-16.

SCHEIN, E.H. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985.

1984 85/04 Philippe A. NAERT and Marcel WEVERBERGH

"A technological life-cycle to the organisational factors determiniag gatekeeper activities" , November 1983.

84/01 Arnoud DE MEYER

"Market share specification, estimation and validation: tovards reconciling seemingly divergent vievs" .

85/05 Ahmet AYKAC, Marcel CORSTJENS, David GAUTSCHI and Ira HOROWITZ

"Estimation uncertainty and optimal advertising decisions", Second draft, April 1985. "La politique budgétaire et le taux de change

réel", November 1983. 84/02 Jeffrey SACHS and

Charles A. WYPLOSZ

"Real exchange rate effects of fiscal policy", December 1983.

"European equity markets: a reviev of the evidence on price behavior and efficiency", February 1984.

85/06 Kasra FERDOWS "The shifting paradigms of manufacturing: inventory, quality and nov versatility", March 1985.

84/03 Jeffrey SACHS and Charles A. VYPLOSZ

84/04 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI "Evolving manufacturing strategies in Europe, Japan and North-America"

"Capital controls and balance of payments crises", February 1984.

85/07 Kasra FERDOWS, Jeffrey G. MILLER, Jinchiro NAKANE and Thomas E.VOLLMANN.

"An uncertainty model of the professional partnership", November 1983.

"The geometry of risk aversion", October 1983.

84/05 Charles A. WYPLOSZ

84/06 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI

84/07 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI

85/08 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Robert CARBONE

85/09 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Robert CARBONE

85/10 Jean DERMINE "Risk, Return and equilibrium of the NYSE: update, robustness of results and extensions" December 1983.

"Forecasting vhen pattern changes occur beyond the historical data" , April 1985.

"Sampling distribution of post-sample forecasting errors" , February 1985.

"Portfolio optimization by financial intermediaries in an asset pricing model".

85/11 Antonio M. BORGES and Alfredo M. PEREIRA

84/08 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI, Pierre MICHEL and Claude J. VIALLET "Energy demand in Portuguese manufacturing: a

tvo-stage model". "Industry influence on firm's investment in vorking capital: theory and evidence", January 1984.

85/12 Arnoud DE MEYER "Defining a manufacturing strategy - a survey of European manufacturera".

84/09 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI, Claude J. VIALLET and Ashok VORA

"Impact of the Belgian Financial Reporting Act of 1976 on the systematic risk of common stocks", January 1984.

85/13 Arnoud DE MEYER "Large European manufacturera and the management of R & D".

84/10 Gabriel A. HAWAWINI and Pierre A. MICHEL

"On the measurement of the market value of a bank", April 1984.

84/11 Jean DERMINE 85/14 Ahmet AYKAC,

Marcel CORSTJENS, David GAUTSCHI and Douglas L. MacLACHLAN

"The advertising-sales relationship in the U.S. cigarette industry: a comparison of correlational and causality testing approaches".

"Tax reform in Portugal: a general equilibrium analysis of the introduction of a value added tax", December 1984.

84/12 Antonio M. BORGES 85/15 Arnoud DE MEYER and

Roland VAN DIERDONCK "Organizing a technology jump or overcoming the technological hurdle".

"Integration of information systems in manufacturing", December 1984.

84/13 Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS

85/16 Herwig M. LANGOHR and Antony M. SANTOMERO

85/17 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES and Danny MILLER

"Commercial bank refinancing and economic stability: an analysis of European features".

"Personality, culture and organization".

"The darker aide of entrepreneurship".

1985

85/01 Jean DERMINE 85/18 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES

"The measurement of interest rate risk by financial intermediaries", December 1983, Revised December 1984.

"Diffusion model for nev product introduction in existing markets" .

85/19 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES and Dany MILLER

"Narcissism and leadership: an object relations perspective". 85/02 Philippe A. NAERT

and Els GIJSBRECHTS "Interpreting organizational texts".

85/03 Philippe A. NAERT and Els GIJSBRECHTS

"Tovards a decision support system for hierarchically allocating marketing resources across and vithin product groupa" .

85/20 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES and Dany MILLER

85/21 Herwig M. LANGOHR and Claude J. VIALLET

85/22 Herwig M. LANGOHR and B. Espen ECKBO

"Spatial competition à la Cournot".

85/23 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES and Dany MILLER

85/24 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

"Comparaison internationale des marges brutes du commerce", June 1985. 85/25 Gabriel HAWAWINI

"Hov the managerial attitudes of fins vith ENS differ froc other manufacturing firms: survey results", June 1986.

85/26 Karel 0. COOL and Dan E. SCHENDEL

"Les primes des offres publiques, la note d'information et le marché des transferts de contrôle des sociétés". 85/27 Arnoud DE MEYER

"Strategic capability transfer in acquisition integration", May 1986.

"Tovards an operational definition of services", 1986.

1986

86/01 Arnoud DE MEYER

"Nostradamus: a knovledge-based forecasting advisor".

86/02 Philippe A. NAERT Marcel WEVERBERGH and Guido VERSWIJVEL

"The pricing of equity on the London stock exchange: seasonality and size premium", June 1986.

86/03 Michael BRIMM

"Risk-premia seasonality in U.S. and European equity markets", February 1986.

86/04 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Michèle HIBON

"Seasonality in the risk-return relationships some international evidence", July 1986.

86/05 Charles A. WYPLOSZ

"An exploratory study on the integration of information systems in manufacturing", July 1986.

86/06 Francesco GIAVAZZI, Jeff R. SHEEN and Charles A. WYPLOSZ

"A methodology for specification and aggregation in product concept testing", July 1986.

86/07 Douglas L. MacLACHLAN and Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

86/08 José de la TORRE and David H. NECKAR

"Protection", August 1986.

86/09 Philippe C. HASPESLAGH

"Nationalisation, compensation and vealth transfers: France 1981-1982" 1, Final version July 1985.

"Takeover premiums, disclosure regulations, and the market for corporate control. A comparative analysis of public tender of fers, controlling-block trades and minority buyout in France", July 1985.

"Barriers to adaptation: personal, cultural and organizational perspectives".

"The art and science of forecasting: an assessment and future directions".

"Financial innovation and recent developments in the French capital markets", October 1985.

"Patterns of competition, strategic group formation and the performance case of the US pharmaceutical industry, 1963-1982", October 1985.

"European manufacturing: a comparative study (1985)".

"Subjective estimation in integrating communication budget and allocation decisions: a case study", January 1986.

"Sponsorship and the diffusion of organizational innovation: a preliminary viev".

"The R & D/Production interface".

"Confidence intervals: an empirical investigation for the series in the N-Competition" .

"A note on the reduction of the vorkveek", July 1985.

"The real exchange rate and the fiscal aspects of a natural resource discovery", Revised version: February 1986.

"Judgmental bisses in sales forecasting", February 1986.

"Forecasting political risks for international operations", Second Draft: March 3, 1986.

86/10 R. MOENART, Arnoud DE MEYER, J. BARBE and D. DESCHOOLMEESTER.

86/11 Philippe A. NAERT and Alain BULTEZ

86/12 Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI

86/13 S.P. ANDERSON and Damien J. NEVEN

86/14 Charles WALDMAN

86/15 Mihkel TOMBAK and Arnoud DE MEYER

86/16 B. Espen ECKBO and Herwig M. LANGOHR

86/17 David B. JEMISON

86/18 James TEBOUL and V. MALLERET

86/19 Rob R. WEITZ

86/20 Albert CORHAY, Gabriel HAWAWINI and Pierre A. MICHEL

86/26 Barry EICHENGREEN and Charles WYPLOSZ

86/21 Albert CORHAY, Gabriel A. HAWAWINI and Pierre A. MICHEL

86/22 Albert CORHAY, Gabriel A. HAWAWINI and Pierre A. MICHEL

86/23 Arnoud DE MEYER

86/24 David GAUTSCHI and Vithala R. RAO

86/25 H. Peter GRAY and Ingo WALTER

"Froc "Lydiametry" to "Pinkhamization": misspecifying advertising dynamics rarely affects profitability".

"The economics of retail firms", Revised April 1986.

"Analysing the issues concerning technological de-maturity".

"The economic consequences of the Franc Poincare", September 1986.

"Conceptualizing the strategic process in diversified firms: the role and nature of the corporate influence process", February 1986.

"Negative risk-return relationships in business strategy: paradox or truism?", October 1986.

"Interpreting organizational texts.

"Vhy follow the leader?".

"The succession gaine: the real story.

"Flexibility: the next competitive battle".

Performance differences among strategic group members", October 1986.

"The role of public policy in insuring financial stability: a cross-country, comparative perspective", August 1986, Revised November 1986.

1987

87/01 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Prisoners of leadership".

87/02 Claude VIALLET

"An empirical investigation of international asset pricing", November 1986.

87/03 David GAUTSCHI

"A methodology for specification and and Vithala RAO

aggregation in product concept testing", Revised Version: January 1987.

87/04 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Organizing for innovations: case of the Christopher BARTLETT multinational corporation", February 1987.

87/05 Arnoud DE MEYER

"Managerial focal points in manufacturing and Kasra FRDOWS

strategy", February 1987.

87/06 Arun K. JAN, "Customer loyalty as a construct in the Christian PINSON and

marketing of banking services", July 1986. Naresh K. MALHOTRA

86/27 Karel COOL and Ingemar DIERICKX

86/28 Manfred KETS DE VRIES and Danny MILLER

86/29 Manfred KETS DE VRIES

86/30 Manfred KETS DE VRIES

86/31 Arnoud DE MEYER

86/32 Karel COOL and Dan SCHENDEL

86/33 Ernst BALTENSPERGER and Jean DERMINE

86/34 Philippe HASPESLAGH "Acquisitions: myths and reality", and David JEMISON July 1986.

87/07 Rolf BANZ and Gabriel HAWAWINI

"Equity pricing and stock market anomalies", February 1987.

86/35 Jean DERMINE

86/36 Albert CORHAY and Gabriel HAWAWINI

"Measuring the market value of a bank, a primer", November 1986.

"Seasonality in the risk-return relationship: some international evidence", July 1986.

87/08 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Leaders vho can't manage", February 1987.

87/09 Lister VICKERY, "Entrepreneurial activities of European MBAs",

Mark PILKINGTON

March 1987. and Paul READ

86/37 David GAUTSCHI and "The evolution of retailing: a suggested Roger BETANCOURT economic interpretation".

86/38 Gabriel HAWAWINI

86/39 Gabriel HAWAWINI Pierre MICHEL and Albert CORHAY

86/40 Charles WYPLOSZ

86/41 Kasra FERDOWS and Wickham SKINNER

86/42 Kasra FERDOWS and Per LINDBERG

86/43 Damien NEVEN

86/44 Ingemar DIERICKX Carmen MATUTES and Damien NEVEN

"Financial innovation and recent developments in the French capital markets", Updated: September 1986.

"The pricing of common stocks on the Brussels stock exchange: a re-examination of the evidence", November 1986.

"Capital flous liberalization and the EMS, a French perspective", December 1986.

"Manufacturing in a nev perspective", July 1986.

"FMS as indicator of manufacturing strategy", December 1986.

"On the existence of equilibrium in hotelling's model", November 1986.

"Value added tax and competition", December 1986.

A M

.r 'ont. Oraelà

103MI %mg' nNgee'

Boulevard de Constance 77309 Fontainebleau Cedex, France Telephone (I) 60 72 40 40 Telecopy (1) 60 72 40 49 Telex 690389

EAC RESEARCH PAPERS

EAC RESEARCH PAPERS

(Academic papers based on the research of EAC Faculty and research staff)

1. LASSERRE Philippe (Research Paper n° 1) A contribution to the study of entrepreneurship development in Indonesia. 1980.

2. BOISOT Max and LASSERRE Philippe (Research Paper n° 2) The transfer of technology from European to ASEAN entreprises: strategies and practices in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. 1980.

3. AMAKO Tetsuo (Research Paper n° 3) Possibilité d'un transfert à l'étranger des techniques japonaises de gestion du personnel: le cas français. 1982.

4. SCHUTTE Hellmut (Research Paper n° 8) Wirtschaftliche Kooperation zwischen den ASEAN - Lândern und Nordrhein-Westfalen - Hemmungsfaktoren und Chancen für die deutsche Wirtschaft. 1983.

5. ISHIYAMA Yoshihide (Research Paper n° 14) The political economy of liberalisation of the financial system in Japan. 1984.

6. LASSERRE Philippe (Research Paper n° 17) Singapour comme centre régional. L'expérience d'entreprises françaises. 1985.

7. Von KIRCHBACH Friedrich (Research Paper n° 18) Patterns of export channels to developing Asia. 1984.

8. MITTER Rajan (Research Paper n° 19) A survey of European business in India. 1984.

9. CHAPON Marie-Claude (Research Paper n° 22) Stratégies des entreprises japonaises en Afrique. 1985.