MARRIAGE (lex loci)

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitatedto remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, throughthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILYCODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governsrespondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

. . .

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 toa marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while inthe U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insistson a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying forrelief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," whichtook effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amendingArticles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code,the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge

Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, isto avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, butlater on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should beinterpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtainsa divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to

the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her toremarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separationwould not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriagetie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remainmarried to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one whoalleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our

own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Suchforeign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that thedivorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the presentpetition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, weare unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained adivorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is nowcapacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properlyupon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

MARRIAGE (Lex loci)

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs.HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

 

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitionerin Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, inPasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right tomanage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no communityproperty" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and

Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of aninterlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim onthe alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by theNevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Courtduring the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &

GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorceproceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is notvalid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case,the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage fromthe standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation ofhusband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,

ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guiltyparty shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control overconjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country'sCourt, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (Quita v quita)

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS andBLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.

D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, weremarried in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.  They were nothowever blessed with children.   Somewhere along the waytheir relationship soured.   Eventually Fe sued Arturo fordivorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.  She submittedin the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from eachother and a settlement of their conjugal properties.  On 23July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.  Three(3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz inthe same locality but their relationship also ended in adivorce.  Still in the U.S.A., she married for the thirdtime, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died.  He left no will.  On 31August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of lettersof administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favorof the Philippine Trust Company.  Respondent Blandina Dandan(also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be thesurviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,

named in the petition as surviving children of ArturoPadlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointmentinstead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved infavor of the latter.  Upon motion of the oppositorsthemselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by HiginoCastillon.  On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina andthe Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment ofdivorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of thedeceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediatedeclaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution ofhis estate.  At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987,private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan childrenand Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice.  On thesame day, the trial court required the submission of therecords of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) daysfrom receipt thereof, after which, with or without thedocuments, the issue on the declaration of heirs would beconsidered submitted for resolution.  The prescribed periodlapsed without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño[1] which heldthat "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought anddecreed  after  the  effectivity  of the present Civil Code(Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid inthis jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce betweenpetitioner and Arturo.  Consequently, it expressed the viewthat their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in1972.  Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicialsettlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicialapproval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was noshowing that marriage existed between private respondent andArturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlanchildren had been acknowledged by the deceased as hischildren with her.  As regards Ruperto, it found that he wasa brother of Arturo.  On 27 November 1987[4] only petitionerand Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of

Arturo.  Accordingly, equal adjudication of the nethereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestateheirs.[5]

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlanchildren were allowed to present proofs that the recognitionof the children by the deceased as his legitimate children,except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,had been made in their respective records of birth.  Thus on15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granteddeclaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis,entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion ofRuperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.[7] Privaterespondent was not declared an heir.  Although it was statedin the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturowere married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearlyvoid since it was celebrated during the existence of hisprevious marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and herchildren assigned as one of the errors allegedly committedby the trial court the circumstance that the case wasdecided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90,of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is acontroversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceasedperson or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under thelaw, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alonesufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decisionand 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directedthe remand of the case to the trial court for furtherproceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]

Should this case be remanded to the lower court forfurther proceedings?  Petitioner insists that there is noneed because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains forresolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan childrenor as to their respective shares in the intestate estate ofthe decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between

petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of thedecedent is one of law which can be resolved in the presentpetition based on established facts and admissions of theparties.

We cannot sustain petitioner.  The provision relied uponby respondent court is clear:  If there is a controversy before thecourt as  to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to thedistributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, thecontroversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases .

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either asto the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit fromthe decedent because there are proofs that they have beenduly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself evenrecognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to theirrespective hereditary shares.  But controversy remains as towho is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.  The trialcourt, after the parties other than petitioner failed toappear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 ofthe motion for immediate declaration of heirs anddistribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring thesubmission of the records of birth of the Padlan childrenwithin ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, withor without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirswould be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motionprivate respondent raised, among others, the issue as towhether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from thedecedent considering that she had secured a divorce in theU.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.  She also invokedthe above quoted procedural rule.[11] To this, petitionerreplied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remainedlegally married to her in spite of the divorce theyobtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication isthat petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the timeof her divorce from Arturo.   This should have prompted thetrial court to conduct a hearing to establish hercitizenship.  The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain thetruth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary

and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of theparties either supporting or opposing theevidence.  Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settledher claim in her favor by merely applying  the rulingin Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/orreconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that thecitizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of theruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according totheir national law.  She prayed therefore that the case be setfor hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed tosquarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15] The trialcourt did not grant private respondent's prayer for ahearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the findingthat both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens andwere married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that theirdivorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.  We deducethat the finding on theircitizenship  pertained  solely  to  the timeof  their  marriage  as  the  trial court was not suppliedwith a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at thetime of their  divorce.  The  doubt  persisted  as towhether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorcewas decreed.  The trial court must have overlooked themateriality of this aspect.  Once proved that she was nolonger a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, VanDorn would become applicable and petitioner could very welllose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue onpetitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit enlightenmenthowever from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding,petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore byprivate respondent.   She even furnishes the Court with thetranscript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 duringthe hearing for the reconstitution of the original of acertain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance

of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trialcourt.  When asked whether she was an American citizenpetitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner andArturo was obtained in the same year.  Petitioner howeverdid not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase theuncertainty about her citizenship at the time of theirdivorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conductedby the trial court.  Consequently, respondent appellatecourt did not err in ordering the case returned to the trialcourt for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determinedby the trial court should be limited only to the right ofpetitioner to inherit from Arturo as his survivingspouse.  Private respondent's claim to heirship was alreadyresolved by  the trial court.  She and Arturo were marriedon 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner andArturo was    subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamousmarriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80and 83 of the Civil Code.  Consequently, she is not asurviving spouse that can inherit from him as this statuspresupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]

As regards the motion of private respondent forpetitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt ofcourt and that the present petition be dismissed for forumshopping,[21] the same lacks merit.  For forum shopping toexist the actions must involve the same transactions andsame essential facts and circumstances.  There must also beidentical causes of action, subject matter and issue.[22] Thepresent petition deals with declaration of heirship whilethe subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trialcourts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copiesof titles of certain properties belonging to the estate ofArturo.  Obviously, there is no reason to declare theexistence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The decision ofrespondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the caseto the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring

null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quitaand Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is  AFFIRMED.   Theorder of the appellate court modifying its previous decisionby granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate tothe Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, allsurnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother  RupertoPadlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.  The Court however emphasizesthat the reception of  evidence by the trial court should belimited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as thesurviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel incontempt of court and to dismiss the present petition forforum shopping is  DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (LEX LOCI)

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, inhis capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

 

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended ina foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg LocalCourt in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is stillpending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of thedivorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adulterybefore the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain WilliamChia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr.,

after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, uponreview, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against thepetitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapiland James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary ofJustice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal beset aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to deferher arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of thearraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a pleaof not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusalof the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the

main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant,a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directingthe respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery,as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It haslong since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adulteryand concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint shouldbe the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offendedparty. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State,as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default ofher parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not

include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, onlythe offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse toinstitute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationalewould not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved partywho might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalousspectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and withreference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery thatthe marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that theinnocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legaleffect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not suchas to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law andjural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at thetime of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status ofpersons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorcewas granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial courthere alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannotsue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippinenationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent isno longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husbandentitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.

When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither wouldthere be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth beno spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hencethe actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the RevisedPenal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a marriedwoman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null andvoid, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage isvoid ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and withinthe purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quashis SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary

restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (LEX LOCI)

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS andALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the

Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional TrialCourt, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaringrespondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as“Alicia”), as co-owners of whatever property she and thedeceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as“Lorenzo”) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlistedserviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 toSeptember 30, 1957.[3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner PaulaLlorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were marriedbefore a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,Camarines Sur.[4]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departedfor the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal homein barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to UnitedStates citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.5579816 was issued in his favor by the United StatesDistrict Court, Southern District of New York.[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the AmericanForces in 1945, Lorenzo  was granted an accrued leave by theU. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited thePhilippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula waspregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterousrelationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registeredin the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “CrisologoLlorente,” with the certificate stating that the child wasnot legitimate and the line for the father’s name was leftblank.[9]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.  Infact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a writtenagreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowancesallotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’ssalary and all other obligations for Paula’s dailymaintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they woulddissolve their marital union in accordance with judicialproceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreementregarding their conjugal property acquired during theirmarital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula forher adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her faultand agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.  Theagreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and waswitnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother.  The agreementwas notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16,1951 filed for divorce  with  the  Superior Court of theState of California in and for the County of SanDiego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and

actively participated in the proceedings.  On November 27,1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for theCounty of San Diego found all factual allegations to be trueand issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente

in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of thefirst marriage even if they resided in the same town asPaula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together ashusband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year unionproduced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamedLlorente.[16]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will andTestament.  The will was notarized by Notary Public SalvadorM. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnessesFrancisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.  In thewill, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia andtheir three children, to wit:

“(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNOexclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

“(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, inequal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay

Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and BarangayPaloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

“(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto mywife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, inequal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificateof Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of TitleNos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deedsof the province of Rizal, Philippines;

“(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold andconveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

“(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, andin her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

“(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

“(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;

“(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, norelatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner

whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to eachone of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.”[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the RegionalTrial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for theprobate and allowance of his last will and testament whereinLorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed SpecialAdministratrix of his estate.[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motionfor the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was dulyexecuted, the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could beterminated, Lorenzo died.[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court apetition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzo’sestate in her favor.  Paula contended (1) that she wasLorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various propertywere acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s willdisposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and herchildren, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in theconjugal property.[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testateproceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for theissuance of letters testamentary.[24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testateproceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’spetition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was publishedin the newspaper “Bicol Star”.[26]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a jointdecision, thus:

“Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.  This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.  Likewise, she is not entitled to receive anyshare from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

“On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

“Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.  As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from

the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legaciesand charges on the same, or such dividends thereon asshall be decreed or required by this court; to rendera true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time whenrequired by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

“On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

“SO ORDERED.”[27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion forreconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’smotion for reconsideration but modified its earlierdecision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are notchildren “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since theywere not legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision ofMay 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente asthe only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her toone-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of thefree portion of the estate.[30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Courtof Appeals.[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated itsdecision, affirming with modification the decision of thetrial court in this wise:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five(25) years of cohabitation.

“SO ORDERED.”[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court ofAppeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied themotion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sortingthrough the various arguments raised,[36] the issue issimple.  Who are entitled to inherit from the late LorenzoN. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court ofAppeals.  We remand the case to the trial court for rulingon the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became anAmerican citizen long before and at the time of: (1) hisdivorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution ofhis will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted andundisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents arenecessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

“Art. 15.  Laws relating to family rights and duties,or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

“Art. 16.  Real property as well as personal propertyis subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

“However, intestate and testamentary succession, bothwith respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in ourjurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them.  Like any other fact, they must bealleged and proved.[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, theCourt of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.  The Courtof Appeals and the trial court called to the forethe renvoidoctrine, where the case was “referred back” to thelaw of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippinelaw.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law ofNew York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath itmade the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that“American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,Philippine law applies when determining the validity ofLorenzo’s will.[38]

First, there is no such thing as one American law.  The"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Codecannot possibly apply to general American law.  There is nosuch law governing the validity of testamentary provisionsin the United States.  Each State of the union has its ownlaw applicable to its citizens and in force only within theState.  It can therefore refer to no other than the law ofthe State of which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second,

there is no showing that the application ofthe renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New YorkState law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsicallyinvalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice,who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour.  Thetrial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her twochildren, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will.  Itdeclared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whateverproperty she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the completedisregard of the will, already probated as duly executed inaccordance with the formalities of Philippine law, isfatal,especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances hereobtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to thenationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the CivilCode, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policyagainst absolute divorces, the same being consideredcontrary to our concept of public policy and morality.  Inthe same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorcesabroad, provided they are valid according to their nationallaw.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Courtof Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer aFilipino citizen when he obtained the divorce frompetitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicableand petitioner could “very well lose her right to inherit”from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtainedby the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of

Germany.  There, we stated that divorce and its legaleffects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar asrespondent is concerned in view of the nationality principlein our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of theCourt of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that thedivorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wifePaula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as amatter of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as tothe succession to the estate of the decedent) are mattersbest left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

“Art. 17.  The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governedby the laws of the country in which they are executed.

“When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnitiesestablished by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.” (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property tohis second wife and children by her is glaringly shown inthe will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate hiswishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on“family rights and duties, status, condition and legalcapacity.”[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shallinherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign lawwhich must be pleaded and proved.  Whether the will wasexecuted in accordance with the formalities required is

answered by referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the willwas duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note thatwhatever public policy or good customs may be involved inour system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extendthe same to the succession of foreign nationals.  Congressspecifically left the amount of successional rights to thedecedent's national law.[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass uponthe other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated onJuly 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of theRegional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree ofdivorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorenteby the Superior Court of the State of California in and forthe County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court oforigin for determination of the intrinsic validity ofLorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’successional rights allowing proof of foreign law withinstructions that the trial court shall proceed with alldeliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceasedwithin the framework of the Rules of Court.No costs.

MARRIAGE (LEX LOCI)

G.R. No. 142820            June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuseof discretion allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, forthe purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, onDecember 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motionto dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 datedMay 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court ofFirst Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513,has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First

Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed forthe purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and thedistribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that thereis nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tiebetween petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 ofthe Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses

as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which wasopposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relationto Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for PartialReconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to PetitionerWolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over thepresent case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for thereason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in

controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she partially set aside herorder dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen inhis country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunityto do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of atribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge theforeign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a partyand, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata withregard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of theirtwo children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to

petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and educationmindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonancewith the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subjectof this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred,however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

MARRIAGE (LEX LOCI)

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.RECIO, respondent.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognizedin our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid accordingto the national law of the foreigner.  However, the divorcedecree and the governing personal law of the alien spousewho obtained the divorce must be proven.  Our courts do nottake judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence,like any other facts, both the divorce decree and thenational law of the alien must be alleged and provenaccording to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the RegionalTrial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.3026–AF.  The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.”[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to EdithaSamson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife inAustralia.  On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by anAustralian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australiancitizen, as shown by a “Certificate of AustralianCitizenship” issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were marriedon January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church inCabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license,respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”[8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondentlived separately without prior judicial dissolution of theirmarriage.  While the two were still in Australia, theirconjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordancewith their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint forDeclaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, onthe ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a priorsubsisting marriage at the time he married her on January12, 1994.  She claimed that she learned of respondent’smarriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as1993, he had revealed to petitioner his priormarriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended thathis first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validlydissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple’swedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullitywas pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorcedecree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the“marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.”[13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint bedismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed withrespondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentaryevidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted theirrespective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailedDecision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on theground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid andrecognized in the Philippines.  It deemed the marriageended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essentialelement of the marriage; that is, respondent’s alleged lack of legalcapacity to remarry.  Rather, it based its Decision on thedivorce decree obtained by respondent.  The Australiandivorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no moremarital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for ourconsideration:

“1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

“2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent

“3

The trial court seriously erred in the application ofArt. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

“4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

“5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that thedivorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.”[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of thisDecision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson wasproven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legallycapacitated to marry petitioner.  Because of our ruling onthese two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court’s recognition of thedivorce between respondent and Editha Samson.  Citing Adongv. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree,like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition inthis jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1)the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) thealleged divorce decree itself.  She adds that respondentmiserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph ofArticle 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroadare governed by the law of the place where they werecelebrated (the lex loci celebrationis).  In effect, the Coderequires the presentation of the foreign law to show theconformity of the marriage in question to the legalrequirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legalprinciples as the take-off points for ourdiscussion.  Philippine law does not provide for absolutedivorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriagebetween two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorceobtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of theCivil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and aforeigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the formerto contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitatinghim or her to remarry.”[26] A divorce obtained abroad by acouple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistent with their respectivenational laws.[27]

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far aspleading and proof are concerned, can be made.  Van Dorn v.Romillo Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad,which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided theyare valid according to their national law.”[28] Therefore,

before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by ourcourts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as afact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign lawallowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree isinsufficient.

Divorce as a Question of FactPetitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be

admitted in evidence, it must first comply with theregistration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 ofthe Family Code.  These articles read as follows:

“ART. 11.  Where a marriage license is required, eachof the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x                                                x xx                                        x x x

“(5)             If previously married, how, when andwhere the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

x x x                                                x xx                                        x x x”

“ART. 13.  In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to

“ART. 13.  In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouseor the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or

the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.  x x x.

“ART. 52.  The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shallnot affect their persons.”

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australiandivorce decree is a public document -- a written officialact of an Australian family court.  Therefore, it requiresno further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself.  Before a foreignjudgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, thedocument must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decreeitself.  Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is thejudgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written actor record of an act of an official body or tribunal of aforeign country.[32]

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,a writing or document may be proven as a public or officialrecord of a foreign country by either (1) an officialpublication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officerhaving legal custody of the document.  If the record is notkept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompaniedby a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consularofficer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in theforeign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samsonappears to be an authentic one issued by an Australianfamily court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient;

compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must bedemonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorcedecree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counselfor petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but onlyto the fact that it had not been registered in the LocalCivil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruledthat it was admissible, subject to petitioner’squalification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence andaccorded weight by the judge.  Indeed, petitioner’s failureto object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible asa written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) ofthe Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longerbound by Philippine personal laws after he acquiredAustralian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is thelegal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with thepolitical and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak oftheir former states, don the attires of their adoptivecountries.  By becoming an Australian, respondent severedhis allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris thathad tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian LawRespondent contends that the burden to prove Australian

divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the partychallenging the validity of a foreign judgment.  He contendsthat petitioner was satisfied with the original of thedivorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws ofAustralia, because she had lived and worked in that countryfor quite a long time.  Besides, the Australian divorce lawis allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges maytake judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise ofsound discretion.

We are not persuaded.  The burden of proof lies with “theparty who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessaryin the prosecution or defense of an action.”[41] In civil

cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the materialallegations of the complaint when those are denied by theanswer; and defendants have the burden of proving thematerial allegations in their answer when they introduce newmatters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised byrespondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australianlaw validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courtscannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like anyother facts, they must be alleged and proved.  Australianmarital laws are not among those matters that judges aresupposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44] Thepower of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, andevery reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolvedin the negative.

Second Issue:   Respondent’s Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficientproof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitatedto marry her in 1994.  Hence, she concludes that theirmarriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,which was validly admitted in evidence, adequatelyestablished his legal capacity to marry under Australianlaw.

Respondent’s contention is untenable.  In its strictlegal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawfulunion for a cause arising after marriage.  But divorces areof different types.  The two basic ones are (1) absolutedivorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or amensa et thoro.  The first kind terminates the marriage, whilethe second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type ofdivorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutorydecree -- a conditional or provisional judgment ofdivorce.  It is in effect the same as a separation from bedand board, although an absolute divorce may follow after thelapse of the prescribed period during which noreconciliation is effected.[46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court mayunder some foreign statutes and practices, still restrictremarriage.  Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage maybe limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorcewhich was granted on the ground of adultery may beprohibited from marrying again.  The court may allow aremarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decreecontains a restriction that reads:

“1.               A party to a marriage who marries againbefore this decree becomes absolute (unless the otherparty has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorceobtained by respondent may have been restricted.  It did notabsolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry accordingto his national law.  Hence, we find no basis for the rulingof the trial court, which erroneously assumed that theAustralian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity toremarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorcedecree raises a disputable presumption or presumptiveevidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that noproof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorcedecree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal CapacityPetitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity

required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submittedtogether with the application for a marriage

license.  According to her, its absence is proof thatrespondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify.  To repeat, the legal capacity to contractmarriage is determined by the national law of the partyconcerned.  The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of theFamily Code would have been sufficient to establish thelegal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it incourt.  A duly authenticated and admitted certificate isprima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the partof the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence thatproves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.  Areview of the records before this Court shows that only thefollowing exhibits were presented before the lower court:(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit “A” – Complaint;[51] (b)Exhibit “B” – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c)Exhibit “C” – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit “D” – Officeof the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification thatno information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio andEditha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit “E” –Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit “1” -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit “2” – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi ofDissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit “3” – Certificate of Australian Citizenshipof Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit “4” – Decree Nisi ofDissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of AustraliaCertificate;[59] and Exhibit “5” -- Statutory Declaration ofthe Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude thatrespondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,1994.  We agree with petitioner’s contention that the

court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipsofacto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarrywithout requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to showthe Australian personal law governing his status; or at thevery least, to prove his legal capacity to contract thesecond marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare hermarriage to respondent null and void on the ground ofbigamy.  After all, it may turn out that under Australianlaw, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as adirect result of the divorce decree.  Hence, we believe thatthe most judicious course is to remand this case to thetrial court to receive evidence, if any, which showpetitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.  Failing inthat, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of theparties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there beingalready in evidence two existing marriage certificates,which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, inCabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure andsubstantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court aquo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusivelyshow respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner; andfailing in that, of declaring the parties’ marriage void onthe ground of bigamy, as above discussed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (LEX LOCI)

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent

Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 inSanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the FirstInstance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issuedCivil Decree No.

362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a yearlater, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the"conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and allthe improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebeccafiled with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carryinga child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the

court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca alsoprayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amountof PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause ofaction and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, asaffirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contractedanother marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints againstRebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismissand Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 andgranting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to precludeher from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted,via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of whichreads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings inCivil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctivewrit25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebeccahad no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorcedecree she personally secured as an American citizen.Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacityto contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time theforeign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Herallegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship wasalso doubtful as it was not shown that her father, atthe time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the

Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and having made representations tothat effect during momentous events of her life, suchas: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied fordivorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsiderationof the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance ofher petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have

entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of theassailed CA decision submitting as follows:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITIONBEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THEMATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TOCONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the

success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized inthe Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of publicpolicy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss bythe appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment wasrendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of ThisCase

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of suchcitizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship:(1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureauof Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. Onits face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAYBAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the sealof this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date of Birth:     March 5, 1953

Sex:     female                             Civil Status:     married       Color of Hair:    brown

Color of Eyes:     brown               Distinguishing marks on face:    none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 st   Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11 th  day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZAASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988issued at Maniladated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition asa Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issuedthe required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition

issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJwhich is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services andimplement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stayof aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretaryof Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events

which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before thedate of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmationof Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not aFilipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petitionshows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February

22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorcein the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") andBirth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a caseof lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident inthe text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibilityof temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCAM. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 yearsof age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43years of age, married and domiciled and residingat 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court representedby DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound bythe national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca wasvalid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when shesecured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree dulyauthenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree ofpartition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity todo so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly providethat with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or nota divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, thereckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured byRebecca, the same shall be given a res judicataeffect inthis jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formallypronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacityto remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O.227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of

the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need notbelabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that CivilDecree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are

hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity ofMarriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elementsof a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the

part of such defendant violative of the right ofthe plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff forwhich the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with thedocumentary evidence attached therein: The petitionerlacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity ofmarriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of amarriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce securedby Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legalobligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is

best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for thesupport of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial courtcan thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness,while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (MARITAL COHABITATION)

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filedwith the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, heknew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that whenhe officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not knowthat Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was

married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayedthat the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would bedealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating hisplea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which wereallegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of thoseaffidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at leastfive years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing factsin an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husbandand wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the partiesmust be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement thathe had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouragedhim from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previousmarriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between twoindividuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, shouldbe the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is herebyADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposedupon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

MARRIAGE (MARITAL COHABITATION)

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs.JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage withFelisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarderin Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that hisrefusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learnedabout their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top ofthe table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality ofmarriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 Inher pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the NationalStatistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one yearwithout emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] couldhave already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him onguard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. Andyet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied bythe fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was writtenin his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, shetestified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the HonorableCourt if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by

her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commencedby the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of theFamily Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and(5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then hehad only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman whohave lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. TheCourt of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity ofthe marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further notedthat on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V.Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was thatthe requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrarof Pasay City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence ofthe marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that isunbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should notbe afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a licenseis required in order to notify the public that two persons are aboutto be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character,shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement

of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007,denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before thisCourt in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ AmendedDecision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack ofmerit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

I

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITYOF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid

liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage byciting this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that asa marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wifefor at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnizedunder Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by theBarangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attestingthat Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the

Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisitesare complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar ofthe municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more thanthe legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license isthe essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license didnot make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, afterthe proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are coveredby Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, thesemarriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being

unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least fiveyears, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legalimpediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is thatthe publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executedan affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity;that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desireto marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage voidab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions tothe rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for atleast five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with noother expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five

years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely fivemonths before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of amarriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wifefor at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the lawsought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject

circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republicthat as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There isa law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that ittook Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriagedoes not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

MARRIAGE (PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY)

G.R. No. 141528             October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs.EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to

respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketedas Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated January 21, 2000.

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE

LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA,SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage torespondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct andseparate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.

On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration ofnullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

The petition lacks merit.

The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.

The contention is untenable.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially actedupon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of theparties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."11

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should bevexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12

In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the actionor special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and underthe same title and in the same capacity; and,

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar tothe prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to resjudicatain its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order onthe merits; and (4) there is -- betweenthe first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.15

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are consideredthe same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessaryto sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchoredon the purported absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of

action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right ofanother.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects ofthe pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that themarriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.18

It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20

x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preservethe right to bring a second action after the loss of the firstmerely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which heclaims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be

permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No.SP 4341-95.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

 

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended byE.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance ofLeouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provisionwhich is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of thecourt a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage

with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. Shenever did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliancewith Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping,but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years,more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital

obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use."On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting insufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the ideain subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also apsychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice

Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in theFamily Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the CivilCode. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is preciselythe reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacityis not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomesmanifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretationsof the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" —in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriageby acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defectin consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are reallyremoving it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is notprincipally a vitiation of consent since there is a validconsent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as avoidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; itshould be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it

should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have beenpsychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitationshould not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that thereis a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentaryperiods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity willnot apply if the marriage was contracted at the time whenthere is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. JusticeReyes commented that in some instances the impotence thatin some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychologicalincapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the timeof the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of thecelebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomesmanifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply withthe essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation ofpsychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that

mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect thatmarriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were forprospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee inultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of expertsand researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not bindingon the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect sincethe provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an accounton how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravemanomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated.it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind ofpsychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disordersof personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a realinability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacityof a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility ofbeing bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not beenmeant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely lowintelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code andtheir Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construedindependently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to themost serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative ofan utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significanceto the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality orlesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to

Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpfulor even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union betweena man a woman entered into in accordance with law for theestablishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, isthe foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, cancome close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO,Petitioner,

   

G.R. No. 184063 Present: CARPIO, J.,

           - versus -

    REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO,

Respondents. 

      Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated:    January 24, 2011 

 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x  

DECISION 

NACHURA, J.:                             

Before this Court is yet another tale ofmarital woe. 

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) isassailing the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2008 andthe Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Courtof Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CAaffirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioner’sPetition[4] for the annulment of her marriage torespondent Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on theground of psychological incapacity. 

Petitioner and respondent were married onDecember 21, 1968 atthe Philamlife Church in Quezon City.[5] On July 11,2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner fileda Petition[6] before the RTC, Makati City, prayingthat the marriage be declared null and void byreason of respondent’s psychological incapacity,pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[7]

 In her petition before the RTC, petitioner

narrated that, since the beginning, her andrespondent’s married life had been marred bybickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to thelatter’s inability to comply with the essentialobligations of married life.[8]

 Petitioner averred that through all the years

of their married life, she was the only one whoearned a living and took care of the children.Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat andsleep all day, and spend time with friends. Whenrespondent would find a job, he would not be ableto stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent wentinto several business ventures, which all failed.In addition, respondent loved to gamble and wouldgamble away whatever money would come his way. 

Petitioner also claimed that, when theirchildren were babies, respondent did not even helpto change their diapers or feed them, even whilepetitioner was recovering from her caesareanoperation, proffering the excuse that he knewnothing about children.[9] Later, respondent becameinsecure and jealous and would get mad every time

he would see petitioner talking to other people,even to her relatives. When respondent startedthreatening to kill petitioner, she decided toleave the conjugal abode and live separately fromhim.[10] She then consulted a psychiatrist whoconcluded that respondent was indeedpsychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential marital obligations.[11]

 In his Answer, respondent denied that he has

refused to work. He claimed that he had been tryingto find a decent job, but was always unable tobecause of his old age and lack of qualifications.He also claimed that he did not stay long in thejobs he had because the same could not support theneeds of his family, and yielded benefits that werenot commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He hadventured into small businesses but they failed dueto various economic crises. Respondent furtherclaimed that he was not, in fact, contented withliving with petitioner’s relatives since his everymove was being watched with eagle eyes.[12]

 Respondent denied that he gambled, positing

that since he had no income, he would not have thefunds for such activity. He alleged that evenwithout a steady source of income, he still sharedin the payment of the amortization of their housein BF Homes, Parañaque City. 

As to the care of their children, respondentcountered that no fault should be attributed to himbecause that is the duty of the household help.[13]

 

Respondent also denied that he threatened tokill petitioner, considering that there was neverany evidence that he had ever harmed or inflictedphysical injury on petitioner to justify the latterhaving a nervous breakdown.[14]

 He further alleged that he never consulted any

psychiatrist, and denied that he waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential obligations of marriage.[15]

 On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a

decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack ofmerit. The RTC held that petitioner’s evidencefailed to support her argument that respondent wastotally unaware of and incapacitated to perform hismarital obligations such that the marriage was voidfrom the beginning. The court said that, even aspetitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage,it is incontrovertible that the union lasted forover thirty years and the parties were able toraise three children into adulthood withoutsuffering any major parenting problems. The courtalso noted that respondent was faithful topetitioner and never physically abusedher. Likewise, when the parties lived withpetitioner’s parents, respondent got along wellenough with her family.[17]

 The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed

have many faults, such as his indolence and utterirresponsibility. However, the RTC said,respondent’s failure to find decent work was due tohis not having obtained a college degree and his

lack of other qualifications. Likewise,respondent’s failure in business could not beentirely attributed to him, since petitioner was abusiness partner in some of these ventures.[18]

 The RTC also rejected the supposed negative

effect of respondent’s Dependent PersonalityDisorder. The RTC said that, although the evidencetended to show that respondent would unduly relyupon petitioner to earn a living for the family,there was no evidence to show that the latterresented such imposition or suffered with theadditional financial burdens passed to her by herhusband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that,despite a supposedly horrible married life,petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in hercompany and buy properties with hardly any helpfrom respondent.[19]

 The RTC concluded that while respondent might

have been deficient in providing financial support,his presence, companionship, and love allowedpetitioner to accomplish many things. Thus,respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity,and moral support, which are obligations expectedof a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20]

 Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s claim

that she suffered through respondent’s overbearingjealousy. It found that respondent only becamejealous when he thought that petitioner wascheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousywas not a character trait that contributed torespondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less

did it amount to psychological or mental torture onpetitioner.[21] Thus, the RTC concluded that theparties might have indeed entered into a badmarriage, but this did not in itself prove that themarriage did not exist, given the 30 years theyremained together through the various ups and downsof their volatile relationship.[22]

 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was

denied on May 21, 2007.[23] Petitioner subsequentlyfiled a Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given duecourse by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.[25] She then appealed to the CA. 

In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CAaffirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held thatpetitioner failed to show that respondent waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential obligations of marriage. It pointed outthat respondent exerted efforts to find a source ofincome to support his family. However, his failureto find a suitable job and the failure of hisbusiness ventures were not mental but physicaldefects and, hence, could not be considered“psychological incapacity” as contemplated underthe law. 

The CA also found that petitioner’s claims thatshe lived in misery during the marriage and thatrespondent failed to keep his promises to her werenot duly established. The CA held that the factthat the parties lived together for 35 years andraised three children well, and the fact thatrespondent never physically abused petitioner

belied the former’s psychological incapacity. TheCA also held that respondent’s refusal to care forthe children was not psychological incapacity but“merely constituted refusal to perform the task,”which is not equivalent to an incapacity orinability.[27]

 The appellate court also rejected petitioner’s

allegation of respondent’s unbearable jealousy. Itsaid that the same must be shown as a manifestationof a disordered personality which would makerespondent completely unable to discharge theessential obligations of the marital state.[28] TheCA averred that a jealous attitude simply evincedrespondent’s love for his wife, whom he could notbear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CAconstrued the purported threats to kill petitioneras “emotional immaturity” and not psychologicalincapacity.[29]

 Lastly, the CA found the report of expert

witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino)to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since thefindings therein were not corroborated by any otherwitness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the reportnor petitioner’s testimony established thatrespondent’s psychological condition was graveenough to bring about the inability of the latterto assume the essential obligations of marriage, sothat the same was medically permanent or incurable.[30]

 

Petitioner’s subsequent motion forreconsideration was denied in a resolution datedAugust 4, 2008.[31]

 Petitioner is now before this Court in a last

ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage torespondent. In her petition for review, petitionersubmits the following assignment of errors: 

I 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INHOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THATRESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATEDTO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OFMARRIAGE

  II 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INHOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSINGTO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OFMARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED ORUNABLE

  

III 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INHOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT’S UNBEARABLEJEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTERTRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICALINCAPACITY

  IV 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INHOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENTEVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICALCONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH,INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE (sic)[32]

   

Petitioner argues that respondent’s DependentPersonality Disorder was sufficiently establishedby her testimony and that of her sister, whichtestimonies were both credible considering thatthey have personal knowledge of the circumstancesprior to and during the parties’ marriage. On theother hand, respondent’s evidence consisted merelyof his sole testimony, which were self-serving andfull of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points outthat what the CA characterized as respondent’s“efforts” in finding jobs were merely the result ofshort-lived bursts of industry, failing to notethat the jobs were few and very far between.[34] Therest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat,sleep, and party with his friends.[35] Petitioneralso alleges that respondent was given theopportunity to finish his studies, first by hisparents, and then by petitioner herself, but henever took up these offers.[36]

 Petitioner also highlighted respondent’s

failure to earn his keep, participate in household

chores, or take care of their children. She arguesthat respondent had the obligation to help andcontribute to all the needs of the family, whetherthe same be in the form of material or physicalsupport.[37]

 Petitioner also refutes the CA’s conclusion

that respondent was merely refusing to attend to hisfamily’s needs. She insists that respondent’sinability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e.,Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to bythe expert witness she presented during trial.[38] Part of this same disorder, according topetitioner, is respondent’s jealous tendencies,which the CA belittled and attributed to emotionalimmaturity.[39]

 Finally, petitioner argues against the CA’s

finding that respondent’s laziness and dependencecould not be characterized as inability but justplain refusal. Petitioner contends that she hascomplied with the guidelines laid down by the Courtin Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She furthercontends that the framers of the Family Code neverintended to give such a suppressed definition ofpsychological incapacity, and, in fact, declaredthat a restrictive definition would limit theapplicability of the provision.[40] Moreover, sheasserts that she has proven that respondent’sunbearable jealousy and Dependent PersonalityDisorder manifested themselves even before themarriage of the parties, although not in the samedegree as when they were already married.[41]

 

The petition has no merit and, perforce, mustbe denied. 

Article 36 of the Family Code states: 

Art. 36.  A marriage contracted by anyparty who, at the time of the celebration,was psychologically incapacitated to complywith the essential marital obligations ofmarriage, shall likewise be void even ifsuch incapacity becomes manifest only afterits solemnization.

  

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recentpronouncement that each case for declaration ofnullity under the foregoing provision must bejudged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,predilections, or generalizations, but according toits own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courtsshould interpret the provision on a case-to-casebasis, guided by experience, the findings ofexperts and researchers in psychologicaldisciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychologicalincapacity may be informed by evolving standards,taking into account the particulars of each case,current trends in psychological and even canonicalthought, and experience.[43]

 While the Court has not abandoned the standard

set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenetthat the factual milieu of each case must be

treated as distinct and, as such, each case must bedecided based on its own set of facts. 

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held thatpsychological incapacity must be characterized by(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)incurability. These guidelines do not require thata physician examine the person to be declaredpsychologically incapacitated. In fact, the rootcause may be “medically or clinicallyidentified.”[46] What is important is the presence ofevidence that can adequately establish the party'spsychological condition. If the totality ofevidence presented is enough to sustain a findingof psychological incapacity, then actual medicalexamination of the person concerned need not beresorted to.[47]

 Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up,

thus: Does the totality of petitioner’s evidenceestablish respondent’s psychological incapacity toperform the essential obligations of marriage?           The Court holds that it does not. 

The intendment of the law has been to confinethe application of Article 36 to the most seriouscases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity orinability to give meaning and significance to themarriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulledunder Article 36 of the Family Code, thepsychologically incapacitated spouse must be shownto suffer no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes him or her to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It isa malady so grave and so permanent as to depriveone of awareness of the duties and responsibilitiesof the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]

 In this case, there is no showing that

respondent was suffering from a psychologicalcondition so severe that he was unaware of hisobligations to his wife and family. On thecontrary, respondent’s efforts, though few and farbetween they may be, showed an understanding of hisduty to provide for his family, albeit he did notmeet with much success. Whether his failure wasbrought about by his own indolence orirresponsibility, or by some other externalfactors, is not relevant. What is clear is thatrespondent, in showing an awareness to provide forhis family, even with his many failings, does notsuffer from psychological incapacity. 

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability totake cognizance of and to assume basic maritalobligations and not merely difficulty, refusal,or neglect in the performance of marital obligationsor ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of thefollowing: (a) a true inability to commit oneselfto the essentials of marriage; (b) this inabilityto commit oneself must refer to the essentialobligations of marriage: the conjugal act, thecommunity of life and love, the rendering of mutualhelp, the procreation and education of offspring;and (c) the inability must be tantamount to apsychological abnormality.[52] It is not enough to

prove that a spouse failed to meet hisresponsibility and duty as a married person; it isessential that he must be shown to be incapable ofdoing so due to some psychological illness.[53]

 That respondent, according to petitioner,

“lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment andresponsibility”[54] does not mean he is incapable tomeet his marital obligations. His refusal to helpcare for the children, his neglect for his businessventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy mayindicate some emotional turmoil or mentaldifficulty, but none have been shown to amount to apsychological abnormality.           Moreover, even assuming that respondent’sfaults amount to psychological incapacity, it hasnot been established that the same existed at thetime of the celebration of the marriage. 

In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentinomerely said, “[b]ecause one’s personality orcharacter is formed early in life, it has a clearANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of innerexperience that deviates from the expectations ofthe individual’s culture,”[56] without explainingthis antecedent. Even petitioner, in herallegations, never explained how the allegedpsychological incapacity manifested itself prior toor at the time of the celebration of theirmarriage.

           Likewise militating against petitioner’scause is the finding of the trial court, and the

same was affirmed by the CA, that respondent nevercommitted infidelity or physically abusedpetitioner or their children. In fact, consideringthat the children lived with both parents, it issafe to assume that both made an impact in thechildren’s upbringing. And still, as found by theRTC and the CA, the parties were able to raisethree children into adulthood “without any majorparenting problems.”[57] Such fact could hardlysupport a proposition that the parties’ marriage isa nullity. 

Respondent may not have turned out to be theideal husband, or may have failed to meetpetitioner’s exacting standards. Yet this Courtfinds it impossible to believe that, as petitioneralleges, there was nothing but heartache and strifein their over 35 years (prior to filing thepetition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

 To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little

more effort on his part, could have been morehelpful and could have made life that much easierfor his wife. The fact that he did not, however,does not mean that he is psychologicallyincapacitated to discharge his marital obligations,as to give the Court a reason to declare themarriage null and void. 

Certainly, the marriage was beset bydifficulties, or as petitioner puts it, “marred bybickerings, quarrels, and recrimination.” It is afact, however, that all marriages suffer throughthe same trials at one point or another, with some

going through more rough patches than others. TheCourt concedes that petitioner and respondent’smarriage, as characterized by the former, mayindeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However,that they had gone through 35 years together ashusband and wife is an indication that the partiescan, should they choose to do so, work throughtheir problems. 

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262are AFFIRMED. 

SO ORDERED

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI,           G.R. No. 165424                                      Petitioner,                                                                                         Present:                                     

                                                                   PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,                                                                   CORONA,                   -  v e r s u s  -                          VELASCO, JR.,*

                                                                   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and                                                                   PERALTA,** JJ.                                                                    CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILIand THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,                                             Respondents.             Promulgated:                                                                                    

June 9, 2009                                  x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

 R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.: 

This resolves the motion for reconsideration ofthe April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denyingpetitioner’s petition for review on certiorari(under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petitionsought to set aside the January 26,

2004 decision[1] and  September 24,2004 resolution[2]  of  the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010. 

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed apetition to declare his marriage to respondentChona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basisof his psychological incapacity to perform theessential obligations of marriage in the RegionalTrial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

 He alleged that he wed respondent in civil

rites thinking that it was a “joke.” After theceremonies, they never lived together as husbandand wife, but maintained the relationship. However,they started fighting constantly a year later, atwhich point petitioner decided to stop seeingrespondent and started dating other women.Immediately thereafter, he received prank callstelling him to stop dating other women as he wasalready a married man. It was only upon making aninquiry that he found out that the marriage was not“fake.”

  Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be

suffering from a mixed personality disorder,particularly dependent and self-defeating

personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expertwitness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo heldthat petitioner’s personality disorder was seriousand incurable and directly affected his capacity tocomply with his essential marital obligations torespondent. It thus declared the marriage null andvoid.[3]

 On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the

decision of the trial court on the ground that thetotality of the evidence presented failed toestablish petitioner’s psychological incapacity.Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It wasdenied.

 The case was elevated to this Court via a

petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed theCA’s decision and resolution upholding the validityof the marriage.

 Petitioner then filed this motion for

reconsideration reiterating his argument that hismarriage to respondent ought to be declared nulland void on the basis of his psychologicalincapacity. He stressed that the evidence hepresented, especially the testimony of his expertwitness, was more than enough to sustain the

findings and conclusions of the trial court that hewas and still is psychologically incapable ofcomplying with the essential obligations ofmarriage.

 We grant the motion for reconsideration. In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of

the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courtsshould interpret the provision on psychologicalincapacity (as a ground for the declaration ofnullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis —guided by experience, the findings of experts andresearchers in psychological disciplines and bydecisions of church tribunals. 

 Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very

nature of Article 36, courts, despite having theprimary task and burden of decision-making, mustconsider as essential the expert opinion on thepsychological and mental disposition of theparties.[5]

 In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioner’s

expert witness revealed that petitioner wassuffering from dependent personality disorder.Thus:

 

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinationsand interviews which you conducted, can youbriefly tell this court your findings [and]conclusions? A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from apersonality disorder. It is a mixedpersonality disorder from self-defeatingpersonality disorder to [dependent]personality disorder and this is broughtabout by [a] dysfunctional family thatpetitioner had. He also suffered frompartner relational problem during hismarriage with Chona. There were lots offights and it was not truly a marriage, sir. Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lesteris suffering from psychological incapacityto handle the essential obligations ofmarriage? A. Sir, for the reason that his motivationfor marriage was very questionable. It was avery impulsive decision. I don’t think heunderstood what it meant to really bemarried and after the marriage, there was noconsummation, there was no sexualintercourse, he never lived with therespondent. And after three months herefused to see or talk with the respondentand afterwards, I guess the relationshipdied a natural death, and he never thoughtit was a really serious matter at all. 

xx   xx   xx

 Q. Likewise, you stated here in yourevaluation that Lester Halili and respondentsuffered from a grave lack of discretionaryjudgment. Can you expound on this?A. xx  xx I don’t think they trulyappreciate the civil [rites which] they hadundergone. [It was] just a spur of themoment decision that they should get marriedxx   xx   I don’t think they trulyconsidered themselves married. 

xx   xx   xx 

Q. Now [from] what particular portion oftheir marriage were you able to concludexx   xx   that petitioner and respondent aresuffering from psychological incapacity? A.  xx   xx   they never lived together[.][T]hey never had a residence, they neverconsummated the marriage. During the veryshort relationship they had, there werefrequent quarrels and so there might be aproblem also of lack of respect [for] eachother and afterwards there was abandonment.

  In Te, this Court defined dependent personality

disorder[7] as[a] personality disorder characterized

by a pattern of dependent and submissivebehavior. Such individuals usually lackself-esteem and frequently belittle their

capabilities; they fear criticism and areeasily hurt by others’ comments. At timesthey actually bring about dominance byothers through a quest for overprotection.

 Dependent personality disorder usually

begins in early adulthood. Individuals whohave this disorder may be unable to makeeveryday decisions without advice orreassurance from others, may allow others tomake most of their important decisions (suchas where to live), tend to agree with peopleeven when they believe they are wrong, havedifficulty starting projects or doing thingson their own, volunteer to do things thatare demeaning in order to get approval fromother people, feel uncomfortable or helplesswhen alone and are often preoccupied withfears of being abandoned.

    

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan statedthat petitioner’s dependent personality disorderwas evident in the fact that petitioner was verymuch attached to his parents and depended on themfor decisions.[9] Petitioner’s mother even had to bethe one to tell him to seek legal help when he feltconfused on what action to take upon learning thathis marriage to respondent was for real.[10]   

  Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected

of persons suffering from a dependent personality

disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeatingattitude.  This submissive attitude encouragedother people to take advantage of him.[11] This couldbe seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to bedominated, first, by his father who treated hisfamily like robots[12] and, later, by respondent whowas as domineering as his father.[13] When petitionercould no longer take respondent’s domineering ways,he preferred to hide from her rather than confronther and tell her outright that he wanted to endtheir marriage.[14]

 Dr. Dayan traced petitioner’s personality

disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]

 Q. And what might be the root cause of

such psychological incapacity? A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that

Lester’s family is dysfunctional. The fatherwas very abusive, very domineering. Themother has been very unhappy and thechildren never had affirmation. They might[have been] x x x given financial supportbecause the father was [a] very affluentperson but it was never an intact family. xx x The wife and the children werepractically robots. And so, I would say

Lester grew up, not having self-confidence,very immature and somehow not trulyunderstand[ing] what [it] meant to be ahusband, what [it] meant to have a realfamily life.

  Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that

petitioner’s personality disorder was grave andincurable and already existent at the time of thecelebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]

 It has been sufficiently established that

petitioner had a psychological condition that wasgrave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.This Court, in the same Te case, recognized thatindividuals with diagnosable personality disordersusually have long-term concerns, and thus therapymay be long-term.[17] Particularly, personalitydisorders are “long-standing, inflexible ways ofbehaving that are not so much severe mentaldisorders as dysfunctional styles of living. Thesedisorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhoodor adolescence, create problems for those who display them and forothers.”[18] 

From the foregoing, it has been shown thatpetitioner is indeed suffering from psychologicalincapacity that effectively renders him unable to

perform the essential obligations of marriage.Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner andrespondent is declared null and void.

 WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is

hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution ofthis Court and the January 26, 2004 decisionandSeptember 24, 2004 resolution of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

 The decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17,1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

 SO ORDERED.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.MARCOS, respondent.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground fordeclaring the nullity of a marriage, may beestablished by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however, that therespondent should be examined by a physician or apsychologist as a conditio sine qua non for suchdeclaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed asfollows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3,1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion forReconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruledthus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized onSeptember 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each tothe Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City wherethe marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are asfollows:

"It was established during the trial that the partieswere married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila

(Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead ofher, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainfulemployment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would evenforce her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on

their children for a slight mistake and was so severein the way he chastised them. Thus, for several timesduring their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the militaryservice, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was soangry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Centerwhere her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the

reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while theappellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitudetowards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychologicalincapacity had not been established by the totalityof the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in thiswise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently

proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 ofthe Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, oras would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychologicalillness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity

[was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court'sconsideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals couldset aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court ofpsychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petitionfor declaration of nullity of marriage simply becausethe respondent did not subject himself to psychologicalevaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented andthe demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis ofthe determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medicalor psychological examination of respondent is not arequirement for a declaration of psychologicalincapacity.Nevertheless, the totality of the evidenceshe presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and theresults of various tests that were submitted todetermine respondent's psychological incapacity toperform the obligations of marriage should not havebeen brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply

because respondent had not taken those testshimself. Petitioner adds that the CA should haverealized that under the circumstances, she had nochoice but to rely on other sources of information inorder to determine the psychological capacity ofrespondent, who had refused to submit himself to suchtests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governingthe application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred toin Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by thisCourt as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should beresolved in favor of the existence and continuation ofthe marriage and against its dissolution andnullity. This is rooted in the fact that both ourConstitution and our laws cherish the validity ofmarriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitutiondevotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriageas legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it fromdissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the familyand marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

x x x x x x x x x2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) allegedin the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of theFamily Code requires that the incapacity must bepsychological - not physical, although itsmanifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Theevidence must convince the court that the parties, orone of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such anextent that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could nothave given valid assumption thereof. Although no exampleof such incapacity need be given here so as not to limitthe application of the provision under the principle

of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must beidentified as a psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidencemay be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinicalpsychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'thetime of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidencemust show that the illness was existing when the partiesexchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of theillness need not be perceivable at such time, but theillness itself must have attached at such moment, orprior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically orclinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability maybe absolute or even relative only in regard to the otherspouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone ofthe same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must berelevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, notnecessarily to those not related to marriage, like theexercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnessesof children and prescribing medicine to cure them butnot be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bearand raise his/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about thedisability of the party to assume the essentialobligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriologicalpeculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotionaloutbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illnessmust be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nota refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.Inother words, there is a natal or supervening disablingfactor in the person, an adverse integral element in thepersonality structure that effectively incapacitates theperson from really accepting and thereby complying withthe obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be thoseembraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code asregards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and

their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidenceand included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National AppellateMatrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in thePhilippines, while not controlling or decisive, shouldbe given great respect by our courts.

x x x x x x x x x(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counselfor the state. No decision shall be handed down unlessthe Solicitor General issues a certification, which willbe quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein hisreasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case maybe, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along withthe prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court suchcertification within fifteen (15) days from the date thecase is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.TheSolicitor General shall discharge the equivalentfunction of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon1095."[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basicrequirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must becharacterized by (a) gravity (b) juridicalantecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoingguidelines do not require that a physician examinethe person to be declared psychologicallyincapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be"medically or clinically identified." What is important isthe presence of evidence that can adequatelyestablish the party'spsychological condition. Forindeed, if the totality of evidence presented isenough to sustain a finding of psychologicalincapacity, then actual medical examination of theperson concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totalityof the evidence presented in the present case --including the testimonies of petitioner, the commonchildren, petitioner's sister and the social worker-- was enough to sustain a finding that respondentwas psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court issufficiently convinced that respondent failed toprovide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, thetotality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion ofpsychological incapacity on his part. There isabsolutely no showing that his "defects" were alreadypresent at the inception of the marriage or that theyare incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can beattributed to the fact that he had lost his job andwas not gainfully employed for a period of more thansix years. It was during this period that he becameintermittently drunk, failed to give material andmoral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was tracedonly to said period and not to the inception of themarriage. Equally important, there is no evidenceshowing that his condition is incurable, especiallynow that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is notto be confused with a divorce law that cuts themarital bond at the time the causes therefor manifestthemselves. It refers to a serious psychologicalillness afflicting a party even before the

celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so graveand so permanent as to deprive one of awareness ofthe duties and responsibilities of the matrimonialbond one is about to assume. These maritalobligations are those provided under Articles 68 to71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legalseparation, in which the grounds need not be rootedin psychological incapacity but on physical violence,moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexualinfidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, theevidence presented by petitioner refers only togrounds for legal separation, not for declaring amarriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenientdivorce law, this Court laid down the proceduralrequirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolutionof the marriage for failure of petitioner to showthat the alleged psychological incapacity ischaracterized by gravity, juridical antecedence andincurability; and for her failure to observe theguidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailedDecision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiringpersonal medical examination as a conditio sine quanon to a finding of psychological incapacity. Nocosts.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 109975      February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without

explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last theyheard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter,on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Ordergiving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conductedan investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, NuevaEcija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September1975 to be null and void.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .

SO ORDERED."

On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlindato comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration inan Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough toshow psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.’

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the FamilyCode. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothingcan be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.

Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerouschurch, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED"

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILYCODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:

"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16

Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase"psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 ofthe Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides -

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than inany field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidencemay be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective indiagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,

much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectivelyincapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall dischargethe equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to thealleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. TheCourt is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubtshould be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.)"24

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision ofthe Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROWENA  PADILLA-RUMBAUA,                                            Petitioner,

    

-   versus    -     EDWARD RUMBAUA,                                         Respondent.                              

      G.R. No. 166738

           Present

:            *CARPIO-

MORALES, J.,               Acting Chairperson,          **CARPIO,         ***CHICO-

NAZARIO,            

        ****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

             BRION, JJ.

             Promu

lgated:                 A

ugust 14, 2009x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 

                 D E C I S I O N 

BRION, J.: 

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner)challenges, through her petition for reviewon certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, 2004[2] andthe resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of theCourt of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. Thechallenged decision reversed the decision[4] of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriageof the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua(respondent) null and void on the ground of thelatter’s psychological incapacity. The assailedresolution, on the other hand, denied thepetitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

 ANTECEDENT FACTS

 The present petition traces its roots to the

petitioner’s complaint for the declaration ofnullity of marriage against the respondent beforethe RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. Thepetitioner alleged that the respondent waspsychologically incapacitated to exercise theessential obligations of marriage as shown by thefollowing circumstances: the respondent reneged onhis promise to live with her under one roof afterfinding work; he failed to extend financial supportto her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; herepresented himself as single in his transactions;and he pretended to be working in Davao, althoughhe was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches,Quezon City.

 Summons was served on the respondent through

substituted service, as personal service provedfutile.[5]  The RTC ordered the provincialprosecutor to investigate if collusion existedbetween the parties and to ensure that nofabrication or suppression of evidence would takeplace.[6]  Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s reportnegated the presence of collusion between theparties.[7]

 The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),

through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG),opposed the petition.[8] The OSG entered itsappearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutorof Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of thecase.[9]

 The petitioner presented testimonial and

documentary evidence to substantiate her charges. The petitioner related that she and the

respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax delNorte, Nueva Vizcaya.  Sometime in 1987, they metagain and became sweethearts but the respondent’sfamily did not approve of theirrelationship.  After graduation from college in1991, the respondent promised to marry thepetitioner as soon as he found a job. The job camein 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)

accepted the respondent as a computerengineer.  The respondent proposed to thepetitioner that they first have a “secret marriage”in order not to antagonize his parents.  Thepetitioner agreed; they were marriedin Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner andthe respondent, however, never lived together; thepetitioner stayed with her sisterin Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondentlived with his parents in Novaliches.           The petitioner and respondent saw eachother every day during the first six months oftheir marriage. At that point, the respondentrefused to live with the petitioner for fear thatpublic knowledge of their marriage would affect hisapplication for a PAL scholarship. Seven monthsinto their marriage, the couple’s daily meetingsbecame occasional visits to the petitioner’s housein Fairview; they would have sexual trysts inmotels. Later that year, the respondent enrolledat FEATIUniversity after he lost his employmentwith PAL.[10]

           In 1994, the parties’ respective familiesdiscovered their secret marriage.  The respondent’smother tried to convince him to go to the UnitedStates, but he refused.  To appease his mother, hecontinued living separately from thepetitioner.  The respondent forgot to greet the

petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewisefailed to send her greeting cards on specialoccasions.  The respondent indicated as well in hisvisa application that he was single. 

In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died.The respondent blamed the petitioner, associatinghis mother’s death to the pain that the discoveryof his secret marriage brought. Pained by therespondent’s action, the petitioner severed herrelationship with the respondent. They eventuallyreconciled through the help of the petitioner’sfather, although they still lived separately.

 In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner

that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, thepetitioner and her mother went to the respondent’shouse in Novaliches and found him cohabiting withone Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia).  When sheconfronted the respondent about it, he deniedhaving an affair with Cynthia.[11]  The petitionerapparently did not believe the respondents andmoved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the painand anguish that her discovery brought.[12]

 The petitioner disclosed during her cross-

examination that communication between her andrespondent had ceased.  Aside from her oraltestimony, the petitioner also presented acertified true copy of their marriage contract;

[13] and the testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] andpsychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr.Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

 Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that

she administered the following tests on thepetitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a BenderVisual Motor Gestalt Test; a RorschachPsychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; aSach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] Shethereafter prepared a psychological report with thefollowing findings:

           TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION 

Psychometric tests data revealpetitioner to operate in an averageintellectual level. Logic and reasoningremained intact. She is seen to be the typeof woman who adjusts fairly well into mostsituations especially if it is within herinterests. She is pictured to be faithful toher commitments and had reservations fromnegative criticisms such that she normallyadheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Herage speaks of maturity, both intellectuallyand emotionally. Her one fault lies in hercompliant attitude which makes her a subjectfor manipulation and deception such that ofrespondent. In all the years of theirrelationship, she opted to endure hisirresponsibility largely because of the merebelief that someday things will be muchbetter for them. But upon the advent of herhusband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope

as well as the sense of self-respect, thatshe has finally taken her tool to beassertive to the point of being aggressiveand very cautious at times – so as to fightwith the frustration and insecurity she hadespecially regarding her failed marriage.

 Respondent in this case, is revealed to

operate in a very self-centered manner as hebelieves that the world revolves around him.His egocentrism made it so easy for him todeceitfully use others for his ownadvancement with an extreme air of confidenceand dominance. He would do actions withoutany remorse or guilt feelings towards othersespecially to that of petitioner.

 REMARKS 

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbedto be boundless as it goes beyond theexpectations people tagged with it. In love,“age does matter.” People love in order to besecure that one will share his/her life withanother and that he/she will not die alone.Individuals who are in love had the power tolet love grow or let love die – it is achoice one had to face when love is not thelove he/she expected.

 In the case presented by petitioner, it

is very apparent that love really happenedfor her towards the young respondent – whoused “love” as a disguise or deceptive tacticfor exploiting the confidence she extendedtowards him. He made her believe that he isresponsible, true, caring and thoughtful –only to reveal himself contrary to what wasmentioned. He lacked the commitment,

faithfulness, and remorse that he was able toengage himself to promiscuous acts that madepetitioner look like an innocent fool. Hischaracter traits reveal him to sufferNarcissistic Personality Disorder - declaredto be grave, severe and incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]

  

The RTC Ruling           The RTC nullified the parties’ marriagein its decision of April 19, 2002.  The trial courtsaw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner andDr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:

x x x x Respondent was never solicitous of the

welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposedlimited or block [sic] out communication with hiswife, forgetting special occasions, likepetitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day; goingout only on occasions despite their livingseparately and to go to a motel to have sexualintercourse.

 It would appear that the foregoing narration

are the attendant facts in this case which showthe psychological incapacity of respondent, at thetime of the celebration of the marriage of theparties, to enter into lawful marriage and todischarge his marital responsibilities (SeeArticles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacityis “declared grave, severe and incurable.”

 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua

and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declaredannulled.

 SO ORDERED.[18]

  

The CA Decision           The Republic, through the OSG, appealedthe RTC decision to the CA.[19]  The CA decisionof June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTCdecision, and denied the nullification of theparties’ marriage.[20]

           In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr.Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention thecause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissisticpersonality disorder;” it did not discuss therespondent’s childhood and thus failed to give thecourt an insight into the respondent’sdevelopmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed toexplain why she came to the conclusion that therespondent’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and“incurable.”           The CA held that Article 36 of the FamilyCode requires the incapacity to be psychological,although its manifestations may be physical.Moreover, the evidence presented must show that theincapacitated party was mentally or physically illso that he or she could not have known the marital

obligations assumed, knowing them, could not haveassumed them.  In other words, the illness must beshown as downright incapacity or inability, not arefusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform theessential obligations of marriage.  In the presentcase, the petitioner suffered because therespondent adamantly refused to live with herbecause of his parents’ objection to theirmarriage.           The petitioner moved to reconsider thedecision, but the CA denied her motion in itsresolution of January 18, 2005. [21]

 The Petition and the Issues

           The petitioner argues in the presentpetition that – 

1.     the OSG certification requirementunder Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case)cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, tookeffect only on March 15, 2003;

 2.     vacating the decision of the courts a

quo and remanding the case to the RTC torecall her expert witness and cure thedefects in her testimony, as well as topresent additional evidence, would temperjustice with mercy; and

 3.     Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the

deficiencies in her psychiatric report. The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the

CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and thecase be remanded to the RTC for furtherproceedings; in the event we cannot grant thisprayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and theRTC’s decision be reinstated.

 The Republic maintained in its comment that:

(a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although ittook effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b)invalidating the trial court’s decision andremanding the case for further proceedings were notproper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establishrespondent’s psychological incapacity.[23]

 The parties simply reiterated their arguments

in the memoranda they filed.   

THE COURT’S RULING We resolve to deny the petition for lack of

merit. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable 

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of theprosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they

are to appear as counsel for the Statein proceedings for annulment and declaration ofnullity of marriages:

 (8) The trial court must order the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolicitorGeneral to appear as counsel for thestate. No decision shall be handed down unless theSolicitor General issues a certification, whichwill be quoted in the decision, briefly statingtherein his reasons for his agreement oropposition, as the case may be, to thepetition.  The Solicitor General, along with theprosecuting attorney, shall submit to the courtsuch certification within fifteen (15) days fromthe date the case is deemed submitted forresolution of the court. The Solicitor Generalshall discharge the equivalent function ofthe defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[Emphasis supplied.]

  

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Courtpromulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published --is geared towards the relaxation of the OSGcertification that Molina required. Section 18 ofthis remedial regulation provides: 

SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may requirethe parties and the public prosecutor, inconsultation with the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, to file their respective memoranda insupport of their claims within fifteen days fromthe date the trial is terminated. It may requirethe Office of the Solicitor General to file itsown memorandum if the case is of significantinterest to the State. No other pleadings or

papers may be submitted without leave of court.After the lapse of the period herein provided, thecase will be considered submitted for decision,with or without the memoranda.

 The petitioner argues that the RTC decision

of April 19, 2002 should be vacated forprematurity, as it was rendered despite the absenceof the required OSG certification specifiedin Molina.  According to the petitioner, A.M. No.02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15,2003, cannot overturn the requirements ofMolina thatwas promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.

 The petitioner’s argument lacks merit. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-

10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; itdoes not create or remove any vested right, butonly operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmationof already existing rights. The settled rule isthat procedural laws may be given retroactiveeffect,[25] as we held in De Los Santosv. Vda. de Mangubat:[26]

 Procedural Laws do not come within the legal

conception of a retroactive law, or the generalrule against the retroactive operation of statues- they may be given retroactiveeffect on actionspending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage and this will not violate any right of aperson who may feel that he is adversely affected,insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules ofprocedure.

         A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure,

removed the mandatory nature of an OSGcertification and may be applied retroactively topending matters.  In effect, the measure cures inany pending matter any procedural lapse on thecertification prior to its promulgation.  Ourrulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] havesince confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on thematter of certification, although Article 48 mandatesthe appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscalto ensure that no collusion between the parties wouldtake place.  Thus, what is important is the presenceof the prosecutor in the case, not the remedialrequirement that he be certified to be present.  Fromthis perspective, the petitioner’s objection regardingthe Molina guideline on certification lacks merit. A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper             The petitioner maintains that vacatingthe lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the caseto the RTC for further reception of evidence areprocedurally permissible.  She argues that theinadequacy of her evidence during the trial was thefault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, andasserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allowher to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. Sheposits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel

bind a party, the rule should be liberally construedin her favor to serve the ends of justice.             We do not find her arguments convincing.             A remand of the case to the RTC forfurther proceedings amounts to the grant of a newtrial that is not procedurally proper at this stage.Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved partymay move the trial court to set aside a judgment orfinal order  already  rendered  and  to  grant a newtrial within the period for taking an appeal.  In addition, amotion for new trial may be filed only on thegrounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence that could not have beenguarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reasonof which the aggrieved party’s rights have probablybeen impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidencethat, with reasonable diligence, the aggrievedparty could not have discovered and produced at thetrial, and that would probably alter the result ifpresented.           In the present case, the petitioner citesthe inadequacy of the evidence presented by herformer counsel as basis for a remand.  She did not,however, specify the inadequacy.  That the RTCgranted the petition for declaration ofnullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’scounsel had not been negligent in handling thecase. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s

counsel had been negligent, the negligence thatwould justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. onethat ordinary diligence and prudence could not haveguarded against. The negligence that the petitionerapparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First MetroIntegrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]

 Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the

proceedings in the trial court as a result of theignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counseldo not qualify as a ground for new trial.  If suchwere to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end tolitigation so long as a new counsel could beemployed to allege and show that the prior counselhad not been sufficiently diligent, experienced orlearned.  This will put a premium on the willfuland intentional commission of errors by counsel,with a view to securing new trials in the event ofconviction, or an adverse decision, as in theinstant case.

 Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant thepetitioner’s requested remand. Petitioner failed to establish therespondent’s psychological incapacity

 A petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage is anchored on  

Article 36 of the Family Code which providesthat  “a marriage contracted by any party who, atthe time of its celebration, was psychologicallyincapacitated to comply with the essential maritalobligations of marriage, shall likewise be voideven if such incapacity becomes manifest only afterits solemnization.”  In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] theCourt first declared that psychologicalincapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;(b) juridical antecedence; and (c)incurability.  The defect should refer to “no lessthan a mental (not physical) incapacity that causesa party to be truly incognitive of the basicmarital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and discharged by the parties to themarriage.” It must be confined to “the most seriouscases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity orinability to give meaning and significance to themarriage.”

 We laid down more definitive guidelines in the

interpretation and application of Article 36 of theFamily Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullityof the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favor of the existenceand continuation of the marriage and against itsdissolution and nullity. This is rooted in thefact that both our Constitution and our lawscherish the validity of marriage and unity of thefamily. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire

Article on the Family, recognizing it “as thefoundation of the nation.”  It decrees marriage aslegally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it fromdissolution at the whim of the parties. Both thefamily and marriage are to be “protected” by thestate.

The Family Code echoes this constitutionaledict on marriage and the family and emphasizestheir permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be          (a) medically orclinically identified, (b) alleged in thecomplaint,           (c) sufficiently proven byexperts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires thatthe incapacity must be psychological - notphysical, although its manifestations and/orsymptoms may be physical. The evidence mustconvince the court that the parties, or one ofthem, was mentally or psychically ill to such anextent that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them,could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application ofthe provision under the principle of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must beidentified as a psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature fully explained. Expertevidence may be given by qualified psychiatristsand clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to beexisting at “the time of the celebration” of themarriage.  The evidence must show that the illnesswas existing when the parties exchanged their “Ido's.” The manifestation of the illness need notbe perceivable at such time, but the illness

itself must have attached at such moment, or priorthereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to bemedically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relativeonly in regard to the other spouse, notnecessarily absolutely against everyone of thesame sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must berelevant to the assumption of marriageobligations, not necessarily to those not relatedto marriage, like the exercise of a profession oremployment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough tobring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mildcharacteriological peculiarities, mood changes,occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be acceptedas root causes. The illness must be shown asdownright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. Inother words, there is a natal or superveningdisabling factor in the person, an adverseintegral element in the personality structure thateffectively incapacitates the person from reallyaccepting and thereby complying with theobligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must bethose embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of theFamily Code as regards the husband and wife aswell as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Codein regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be statedin the petition, proven by evidence and includedin the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controlling

or decisive, should be given great respect by ourcourts…

(8) The trial court must order theprosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolicitorGeneral to appear as counsel for the state. Nodecision shall be handed down unless the SolicitorGeneral issues a certification, which will bequoted in the decision, briefly stating thereinhis reasons for his agreement or opposition, asthe case may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral, along with the prosecuting attorney,shall submit to the court such certificationwithin fifteen (15) days from the date the case isdeemed submitted for resolution of the court.  TheSolicitor General shall discharge the equivalentfunction of the defensor vinculi contemplated underCanon 1095.

 These Guidelines incorporate the basic

requirements we established in Santos.  Toreiterate, psychological incapacity must becharacterized by:     (a) gravity; (b)juridicalantecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] Theserequisites must be strictly complied with, as thegrant of a petition for nullity of marriage basedon psychological incapacity must be confined onlyto the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity orinability to give meaning and significance to themarriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code doesnot define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing outits terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-casebasis through jurisprudence.[32]  We emphasized this

approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33]  when we explained:

                   It was for this reason that we foundit necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each caseinvolving the application of Article 36 must betreated distinctly and judged not on the basisof a priori assumptions, predilections orgeneralizations but according to its own attendantfacts. Courts should interpret the provision on acase-to-case basis, guided by experience, thefindings of experts and researchers inpsychological disciplines, and by decisions ofchurch tribunals. 

          In the present case and using the abovestandards and approach, we find the totality of thepetitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove thatthe respondent is psychologically unfit todischarge the duties expected of him as a husband. 

a.     Petitioner’s testimony did not prove theroot cause, gravity and incurability ofrespondent’s condition The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that

the respondent:           (a) reneged on hispromise to cohabit with her; (b) visited heroccasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot herbirthday in 1992, and did not send her greetingcards during special occasions; (d) representedhimself as single in his visa application; (e)blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f)

told her he was working in Davao when in fact hewas cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

 These acts, in our view, do not rise to the

level of the “psychological incapacity” that thelaw requires, and should be distinguished fromthe  “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or“neglect” in the performance of some maritalobligations that characterize somemarriages.  In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was notenough that respondent, alleged to bepsychologically incapacitated, had difficulty incomplying with his marital obligations, or wasunwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of anatal or supervening disabling factor – an adverseintegral element in the respondent's personalitystructure that effectively incapacitated him fromcomplying with his essential marital obligations –had to be shown and was not shown in this citedcase.                   In the present case, the respondent’sstubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner wasdoubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never provento be rooted in some psychological illness. As thepetitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merelyrefused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizinghis application for a scholarship, and later due tohis fear of antagonizing his family. Therespondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her

birthday and to send her cards during specialoccasions, as well as his acts of blamingpetitioner for his mother’s death and ofrepresenting himself as single in his visaapplication, could only at best amount toforgetfulness, insensitivity or emotionalimmaturity, not necessarily psychologicalincapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act ofliving with another woman four years into themarriage cannot automatically be equated with apsychological disorder, especially when no specificevidence was shown that promiscuity was a traitalready existing at the inception of marriage. Infact, petitioner herself admitted that respondentwas caring and faithful when they were going steadyand for a time after their marriage; their problemsonly came in later.           To be sure, the respondent was far fromperfect and had some character flaws. The presenceof these imperfections, however, does notnecessarily warrant a conclusion that he had apsychological malady at the time of the marriagethat rendered him incapable of fulfilling hisduties and obligations. To use the words ofNavales v.Navales:[35]

                   Article 36 contemplates downrightincapacity or inability to take cognizance of and toassume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,”“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of maritalobligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse

is different from “incapacity” rooted on somedebilitating psychological condition orillness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexualinfidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity andirresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselveswarrant a finding of psychological incapacity underArticle 36, as the same may only be due to a person'srefusal or unwillingness to assume the essentialobligations of marriage and not due to somepsychological illness that is contemplated by saidrule.

            

b.          Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and courttestimony

 We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s

conclusions about the respondent’s psychologicalincapacity were based on the information fed to herby only one side – the petitioner – whose bias infavor of her cause cannot be doubted. While thiscircumstance alone does not disqualify thepsychologist for reasons of bias, her report,testimony and conclusions deserve the applicationof a more rigid and stringent set of standards inthe manner we discussed above.[36]  For, effectively,Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from theprism of a third party account; she did notactually hear, see and evaluate the respondent andhow he would have reacted and responded to thedoctor’s probes. 

          Dr. Tayag, in her report, merelysummarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on thisbasis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who“believes that the world revolves around him”; andwho “used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploitingthe confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.”Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of “love”;made a generalization that respondent was a personwho “lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,”and who engaged “in promiscuous acts that made thepetitioner look like a fool”; and finally concludedthat the respondent’s character traits reveal “himto suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder withtraces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declaredto be grave and incurable.”           We find these observations andconclusions insufficiently in-depth andcomprehensive to warrant the conclusion that apsychological incapacity existed that prevented therespondent from complying with the essentialobligations of marriage. It failed to identify theroot cause of the respondent's narcissisticpersonality disorder and to prove that it existedat the inception of the marriage. Neither did itexplain the incapacitating nature of the allegeddisorder, nor show that the respondent was reallyincapable of fulfilling his duties due to someincapacity of a psychological, not

physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid butconclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report– i.e., that the respondent suffered “NarcissisticPersonality Disorder with traces of AntisocialPersonality Disorder declared to be grave andincurable” – is an unfounded statement, not anecessary inference from her previouscharacterization and portrayal of the respondent.While the various tests administered on thepetitioner could have been used as a fair gauge toassess her own psychological condition, this samestatement cannot be made with respect to therespondent’s condition. To make conclusions andgeneralizations on the respondent’s psychologicalcondition based on the information fed by only oneside is, to our mind, not different from admittinghearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness ofthe content of such evidence.                   Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr.Tayag’s subsequent testimony in court curedwhatever deficiencies attended her psychologicalreport.           We do not share this view.           A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’stestimony reveals that she failed to establish thefact that at the time the parties were married,respondent was already suffering from a

psychological defect that deprived him of theability to assume the essential duties andresponsibilities of marriage. Neither did sheadequately explain how she came to the conclusionthat respondent’s condition was grave andincurable. To directly quote from the records:                         ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:                         Q:        I would like to call

your attention to the Report alreadymarked as Exh. “E-7”, there is astatement to the effect that hischaracter traits begin to suffernarcissistic personality disorder withtraces of antisocial personalitydisorder. What do you mean? Can youplease explain in layman’s word, MadamWitness?

                         DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:                         A:        Actually, in a

layman’s term, narcissistic personalitydisorder cannot accept that there issomething wrong with his own behavioralmanifestation. [sic] They feel that theycan rule the world; they are eccentric;they are exemplary, demanding financialand emotional support, and this isclearly manifested by the fact thatrespondent abused and used petitioner’slove. Along the line, a narcissisticperson cannot give empathy; cannot givelove simply because they love themselvesmore than anybody else; and thirdly,narcissistic person cannot support his

own personal need and gratificationwithout the help of others and this iswhere the petitioner set in.

                         Q:        Can you please

describe the personal [sic] disorder?                         A:        Clinically,

considering that label, the respondentbehavioral manifestation underpersonality disorder [sic] this isalready considered grave, serious, andtreatment will be impossible [sic]. As Isay this, a kind of developmentaldisorder wherein it all started duringthe early formative years and broughtabout by one familiar relationship theway he was reared and cared by thefamily. Environmental exposure is alsopart and parcel of the child disorder.[sic]

                         Q:        You mean to say, from

the formative [years] up to the present?                         A:        Actually, the

respondent behavioral manner was[present] long before he enteredmarriage. [Un]fortunately, on the partof the petitioner, she never realizedthat such behavioral manifestation ofthe respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

 x x x x

                         Q:        So in the

representation of the petitioner thatthe respondent is now lying [sic] withsomebody else, how will you describe the

character of this respondent who isliving with somebody else?

                         A:        This is where the

antisocial personality trait of therespondent [sic] because an antisocialperson is one who indulge inphilandering activities, who do not haveany feeling of guilt at the expense ofanother person, and this [is] again abuy-product of deep seated psychologicalincapacity.

                         Q:        And this

psychological incapacity based on thisparticular deep seated [sic], how wouldyou describe the psychologicalincapacity? [sic]

                         A:        As I said there is a

deep seated psychological dilemma, so Iwould say incurable in nature and atthis time and again [sic] thepsychological pathology of therespondent. One plays a major factor ofnot being able to give meaning to arelationship in terms of sincerity andendurance.

                         Q:        And if this

psychological disorder exists before themarriage of the respondent and thepetitioner, Madam Witness?

                         A:        Clinically, any

disorder are usually rooted from theearly formative years and so if it takesenough that such psychologicalincapacity of respondent already existed

long before he entered marriage, becauseif you analyze how he was reared by herparents particularly by the mother,there is already an unhealthy symbiosisdeveloped between the two, and thiscreates a major emotional havoc when hereached adult age.

                         Q:        How about the

gravity?                         A:        This is already grave

simply because from the very startrespondent never had an inkling that hisbehavioral manifestation connotespathology and second ground [sic],respondent will never admit again thatsuch behavior of his connotes againpathology simply because the disorder ofthe respondent is not detrimental tohimself but, more often than not, it isdetrimental to other party involved.

 x x x x

                                               PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:                         Q:        You were not able to

personally examine the respondent here?                         DR. NEDY TAYAG:                         A:        Efforts were made by

the psychologist but unfortunately, therespondent never appeared at my clinic.

                         Q:        On the basis of those

examinations conducted with thepetitioning wife to annul their marriage

with her husband in general, what canyou say about the respondent?

                         A:        That from the very

start respondent has no emotional intentto give meaning to their relationship.If you analyze their maritalrelationship they never lived under oneroom. From the very start of the[marriage], the respondent to havepetitioner to engage in secret marriageuntil that time their family knew oftheir marriage [sic]. Respondentcompletely refused, completelyrelinquished his marital obligation tothe petitioner.

                       x x x x

                          COURT:                         Q:        Because you have

interviewed or you have questioned thepetitioner, can you really enumerate thespecific traits of the respondent?

                                               DR. NEDY TAYAG:                         A:        One is the happy-go-

lucky attitude of the respondent and thedependent attitude of the respondent.

                         Q:        Even if he is already

eligible for employment?                         A:        He remains to be at

the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a

set of responsibility. I think that hefinished his education but he never hada stable job because he completelyrelied on the support of his mother.

                         Q:        You give a more

thorough interview so I am asking yousomething specific?

                         A:        The happy-go-lucky

attitude; the overly dependent attitudeon the part of the mother merely becauserespondent happened to be the only son.I said that there is a unhealthysymbiosis relationship [sic] developedbetween the son and the mother simplybecause the mother always pamperedcompletely, pampered to the point thatrespondent failed to develop his ownsense of assertion or responsibilityparticularly during that stage and thereis also presence  of the simple lyingact particularly his responsibility interms of handling  emotional imbalanceand it is clearly manifested by the factthat respondent refused to build a hometogether with the petitioner when infact they are legally married. Thirdly,respondent never felt or completelyignored the feelings of the petitioner;he never felt guilty hurting thepetitioner because on the part of thepetitioner, knowing that respondentindulge with another woman it is very,very traumatic on her part yetrespondent never had the guts to feelguilty or to atone said act he committedin their relationship, and clinically

this falls under antisocialpersonality. [37]

 In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer wasvery vague and inconclusive, thus:

x x x x                                               ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO                    Q:        Can this personally be

cured, madam witness?                         DR. NEDY TAYAG                         A:        Clinically, if

persons suffering from personalitydisorder curable, up to this verymoment, no scientific could be upheld toalleviate their kind of personalitydisorder; Secondly, again respondent orother person suffering from any kind ofdisorder particularly narcissisticpersonality will never admit that theyare suffering from this kind ofdisorder, and then again curability willalways be a question. [sic][38]

            This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayaginitially described the general characteristics ofa person suffering from a narcissistic personalitydisorder, she did not really show how and to whatextent the respondent exhibited these traits.  Shementioned the buzz words that jurisprudencerequires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the

marriage, psychological incapacity relating tomarriage – and in her own limited way, relatedthese to the medical condition she generallydescribed.  The testimony, together with herreport, however, suffers from very basic flaws.            First, what she medically described was notrelated or linked to the respondent’s exactcondition except in a very general way.  In short,her testimony and report were rich in generalitiesbut disastrously short on particulars, most notablyon how the respondent can be said to be sufferingfrom narcissistic personality disorder; why and towhat extent the disorder is grave and incurable;how and why it was already present at the time ofthe marriage; and the effects of the disorder onthe respondent’s awareness of and his capability toundertake the duties and responsibilities ofmarriage.  All these are critical to the success ofthe petitioner’s case.           Second, her testimony was short on factualbasis for her diagnosis because it was wholly basedon what the petitioner related to her.  As thedoctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not atall examine the respondent, only thepetitioner.  Neither the law nor jurisprudencerequires, of course, that the person sought to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated should bepersonally examined by a physician or psychologist

as a condition sine qua non to arrive at suchdeclaration.[39]  If a psychological disorder can beproven by independent means, no reason exists whysuch independent proof cannot be admitted and givencredit.[40]  No such independent evidence, however,appears on record to have been gathered in thiscase, particularly about the respondent’s earlylife and associations, and about events on or aboutthe time of the marriage and immediatelythereafter.  Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolvesaround the one-sided and meager facts that thepetitioner related, and were all slanted to supportthe conclusion that a ground exists to justify thenullification of the marriage. We say this becauseonly the baser qualities of the respondent’s lifewere examined and given focus; none of thesequalities were weighed and balanced with the betterqualities, such as his focus on having a job, hisdetermination to improve himself through studies,his care and attention in the first six months ofthe marriage, among others.  The evidence fails tomention also what character and qualities thepetitioner brought into her marriage, for example,why the respondent’s family opposed the marriageand what events led the respondent to blame thepetitioner for the death of his mother, if thisallegation is at all correct.  To be sure, theseare important because not a few marriages havefailed, not because of psychological incapacity of

either or both of the spouses, but because of basicincompatibilities and marital developments that donot amount to psychological incapacity.  Thecontinued separation of the spouses likewise neverappeared to have been factored in.  Not a fewmarried couples have likewise permanently separatedsimply because they have “fallen out of love,” orhave outgrown the attraction that drew themtogether in their younger years.           Thus, on the whole, we do not blame thepetitioner for the move to secure a remand of thiscase to the trial courts for the introduction ofadditional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence inits present state is woefully insufficient tosupport the conclusion that the petitioner’smarriage to the respondent should be nullified onthe ground of the respondent’s psychologicalincapacity.            The Court commiserates with thepetitioner’s marital predicament. The respondentmay indeed be unwilling to discharge his maritalobligations, particularly the obligation to livewith one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presumepsychological defect from the mere fact thatrespondent refuses to comply with his maritalduties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough toprove that a spouse failed to meet hisresponsibility and duty as a married person; it is

essential that he must be shown to be incapable ofdoing so due to some psychological illness. Thepsychological illness that must afflict a party atthe inception of the marriage should be a malady sograve and permanent as to deprive the party of hisor her awareness of the duties and responsibilitiesof the matrimonial bond he or she was then about toassume.[41]

           WHEREFORE, in view of theseconsiderations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM thedecision and resolution of the Court of Appealsdated June 25, 2004and January 18, 2005,respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.                   SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

 

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriagein its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and

correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidencedby their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband andwife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together withher mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were allinvited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in BaguioCity for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private partsnor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closethomosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed

his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. Hispenis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID themarriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev.Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon

City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

I

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there wasno sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacityinasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner andthe private respondent to have sex with each other constitutespsychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the partiesdecreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and

confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, onmotion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But inactions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of

whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from anyphysical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingnessto consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a seriouspersonality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychologicalincapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void maybe filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record toshow that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusalmay not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in

the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence ishis doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorderon the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to provesuch a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses toperform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunalsattribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or herspouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the FamilyCode is "To procreate children based on the universal principle thatprocreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband'splea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent,but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if

it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to resther marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity,and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within thecontemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I couldnot have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the naturalorder, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husbandand wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is atwo-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vowsand unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs.MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sortof deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trialcourt.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage torespondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsistsup to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to befrom Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in thecommercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only

figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 Shespent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extentof calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on thetests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affairwith another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contractwith the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband butaverred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget ofP7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was thatthe totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent wasnot psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses,

which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National AppellateMatrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision ofthe National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by theCatholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals neverthelessheld that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient toestablish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing theapplication and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guidedby the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court hasyet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree ofnullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised thebar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The

concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’sincurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" wasclassified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of theFamily Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the FamilyCode revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded thatthe spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does notaffect the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opinedthat "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45

(5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now ChiefJustice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with itscentral phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of churchtribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisionwas taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than inany field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistentlyapplied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providinga unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions fordeclaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church

is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canonlaw, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, whileChurch thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullityunder Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of thenation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and activelypromote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislatureto define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that thejudicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not bethe only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Voidab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essentialobligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the presentpetition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since itspromulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not

physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their"I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective indiagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligationof marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacityor inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element inthe personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced byArticles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husbandand wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Codein regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate MatrimonialTribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causesof psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages andAnnulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court isextant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many

material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He alsopresented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount topsychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below consideredpetitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declarationof nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties,but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things thatseems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behaviorof an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuationsof the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towardsanother. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected totell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on

the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoidjealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be consideredpsychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts ofrespondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not requiredfor the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, thereis no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essentialobligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitiouscharacters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstancespeaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the

essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable tocomprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are notconvinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuatesher lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiatesthe consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to copewith her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take intoconsideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulledby the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by theNational Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion"on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacitywas considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent isconsidered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude requiredby law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient

evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lackof due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived atnot only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factualfindings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medicallyor clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initiallyseparated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made

explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before thetrial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after thereception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the datethe statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychologicalincapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacitywas curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessityyet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep

reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expertwitnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Anylingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the CatholicChurch tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent inthe first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161793               February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, vs.ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychologicalincapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treatsthis case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had aboyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood oneanother and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boatticket.4

However, Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated likea prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could liveon their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and herfamily whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that itwas better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basisof the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as CivilCase No. Q-00-39720.11

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In themeantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both partiespsychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluationin relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business worldby whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield InternationalIncorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His

interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner andthis became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at thehouse of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and whenhe arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to theextent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondentbrought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract

before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any MarriageLicense.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look

for him at his parents[ۥ] and relatives[ۥ] houses. Sometime in Juneof 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told hisparents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported himby giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already gethis share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. Whenrespondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was causedby both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. Hewas still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Draw A Person Test

Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test

Sach’s Sentence Completion Test

M M P I

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immatureand recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as eachof them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should notbe taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitionerand respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have

impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering thegrave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and AntisocialPersonality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals andMolina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSGbriefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25

In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He positsthat the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine

respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of theessential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.31

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and chartingthe development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced

the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new FamilyCode (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even theCivil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fixthe property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditionalconcept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom thegreat majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the

civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of thecelebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgmentto understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essentialmarital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriagevoid, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’

‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’

x x x x x x x x x

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with ArchbishopOscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have

children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands aremanifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34

In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of thecelebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgmentto understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essentialmarital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session wasover:

"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does notrefer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychologicalor mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard tothe other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of thesame sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining voidmarriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriageas contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essentialrequisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essentialobligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to complywith the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and aformal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, theformer being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required inmarriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time ofthe wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rotahad reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after themarriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent atthe time of the ceremony.36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisionitself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed asto allow some resiliency in its application.38

Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment ofthe law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, arotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has beenestablished a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent,and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, isdirected towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are stillcapable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciencesis abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding,it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able tounderstand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assumethe essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this

irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is preciselythe question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect isalways and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit theobject of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to haveseen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as hedid a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing theobject of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves theprocess of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same personwith the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of

marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

x x x x

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party quapersona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presenceof this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order toachieve one’s ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Seriouspsychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity toassume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is saidto be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In

this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does notnecessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, andintellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, theinvalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causesof a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable inthis juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of thisinvalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to besome freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, whileone accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lowercourt’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v.

Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protractedrefusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of thebench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such

incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective indiagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacityor inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element inthe personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the

petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriagedue to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall dischargethe equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another three—including, as aforesaid,Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "eachcase must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Inthe field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to imposea rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applyingMolina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.51

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be

alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, childabuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void fromthe very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicialdeclaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorderrecurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychologicaldisciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged maritalvows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primarytask and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriagecould necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the rightof the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is,

in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves atrue intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse isnot considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugalcommunion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or senseof moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no realfreedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

x x x x

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other

terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychologicalcategory.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time ofthe marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."58

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Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at theinception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for aconclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the caseto a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties.This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat,

dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxietiesor to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phalliccharacter types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness andan inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later

researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder nototherwise specified," that can be used for other specific

personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify asany of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness orcriminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others andthe need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltlessbehavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground ofboth parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that thetrial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible,has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disordermakes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.