273 civil society in singapore: popular discourses and concepts civil society in singapore: popular...

273Civil Society in Singapore: Popular Discourses and Concepts

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

SOJOURN Vol. 20, No. 2 (2005), pp. 273–301 ISSN 0217-9520

Civil Society in Singapore:Popular Discourses and Concepts

Terence CHONG

This paper takes a critical look at various popular discourses andconcepts found in the Singapore civil society literature. It finds manyconcepts in the literature to be dominated by the spectre of the stateand the political acquiescence of the local middle class, both of whichpaint a picture of a weak and emasculated civil society. This picture,however, fa i ls to capture pockets of pass ive res istance andcontestations that may take place. The paper concludes by suggestingthat Singapore civil society be examined as a series of “reciprocal”relationships between activists and state representatives situated indifferent locations of power and resources, who are able to engage witheach other when their interests converge and disengage when theydiverge.

The character of a civil society is largely dependent on contemporarypolitical conditions, the nature of the state, and the manner of society-state relations, thus infusing the term with a hermeneutic instability thatis reflected in the broader literature. For Adam Ferguson and AdamSmith, 18th century British philosopher and economist, respectively,“civil society” was envisaged as a regulatory and socializing force thatcurbed man’s unstable nature in order to protect market practices,property rights, and the flourish of capitalism. Hegel, however, drewclear distinctions between civil society, family, and the state (Ehrenberg1999). According to Hegel, civil society was itself a product of themodern state, without which there could be no civil society. Made upof diverse competing interests, the occasional socio-political discord thatplayed out “led Hegel to view civil society as prone to instability andconflict, despite its natural tendency towards a natural equilibrium. Toensure “civility” and stability, he concluded, the state — which in his

Reproduced from SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia Vol. 20, No. 2 (October 2005)(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from

the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproducedwithout the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at

< http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

Terrence CHONG274

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

view was the only entity capable of representing the unity of society andfurthering the freedom of citizens — had to order civil society. Hence,state intervention to guide and govern civil society was legitimate”(Alagappa 2004, p. 28).

Gramsci, writing in the 1930s, sought to excavate Marxist civilsociety from the depths of the economic base by referring to civilsociety as a group of associations and organizations between theeconomic structure and the state. Though Gramscian civil society wasan essential site in which cultural and ideological support ensured thelegitimacy of European capitalism values, it was also responsible forthe emergence of counter-hegemony narratives that expressedthemselves through the competition of ideas (Gramsci 1999;Ehrenberg 1999). The Gramscian civil society was necessarilyfragmented, demarcated by different interests, and highly competitive,in contrast to a Marxist civil society framed rigorously by class-basedconflict, and together with institutions of the economic sphere suchas employers’ associations and trade unions, institutions like churches,parties, professional associations, educational, and cultural bodiesformed the constellation of a civil society with the dual ability forideological hegemony and contestation. This view of civil society wasa breakaway from conventional Marxist suspicions of mechanismssuch as an independent press, freedom of speech or assembly, andvoting rights, which were seen by Marx as the forms through whichonly bourgeois power is consolidated, while the economic sphere itself,with its institutions such as firms and corporations responsible fororganizing production, was not, by definition, part of Gramscian civilsociety.

Civil society was resuscitated in the 1970s during the “third waveof democratization” in East Europe (Huntington 1991).1 Theexperiences of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, among others,consequently endowed civil society with ideas of conflict, resistance,and empowerment. The “East European-inspired conception of aconflict view of civil society” is dedicated to “empowering theindividuals and disadvantaged groups and opening a space for themto organize, protect, and articulate their interests and well-being” and,


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

“because of their distrust and fear of the state”, regards “civil societyas a necessary countervailing force to the state” (Lee 2005, p. 5).Although similar to the concept of a “liberal-pluralist civil society” inthe way civil society groups were positioned diametrically to the state,the greater concern of Eastern European civil society was to liberate“society from the all-pervasive totalitarian ideology of the party-state,recover social autonomy, expand civil liberties and human rights, andcreate democratic space (in education, culture, media, and the like)outside the party-state” (Alagappa 2004, p. 31). The fundamentaldifference between the Eastern European civil society and the liberal-pluralist civil society is that the former did not set out to alter theparty-state or to capture political power, but was instead moreconcerned with encouraging and nurturing the normative practice ofdemocratic values within the sphere of civil society in contrast toexisting heavy-handed state apparatuses and manoeuvres, while thelatter, in neo-Tocquevillian fashion, saw the democratization ofautocratic regimes and the influencing of government policy as itsraison d’être, and is driven by the unshakeable belief that the linkbetween its presence and the enshrinement of democracy is non-negotiable.

More recently, civil society has been depicted as an ideal-type that“describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of legallyprotected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent,self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension with eachother and with state institutions that ‘frame’, constrict and enable theiractivities” (Keane 1998, p. 5). Displaying a more postmodern grain, civilsociety is also seen as a society’s coming of age where it develops theability for contemplation, and critical and independent thought. In thissense, a civil society is “a mature form of critical self-reflection, whichmarks the transition from a ‘conventional’ orientation to fixed rules,unreflective duty and respect for authority, to a ‘post-conventional’,critical attitude towards identity construction” (Fine 1997, p. 12), thuslaying the ground for the construction of a post-national, cosmopolitancivil society.

Terrence CHONG276

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

A Brief Survey of the Literature

This hermeneutic instability is also evident in Singapore civil societyliterature, which began to grow from the late 1980s and early 1990s, inthe trail of an expanding middle class. Indeed, in the aftermath of the“third wave of democratization”, along with the raised local expectationsover the succession of Goh Chok Tong to the country’s top post, 1990was declared “the year of civil society” in Singapore (Heng 1990). TheStraits Times, the local broadsheet, carried two contrasting concepts ofcivil society, one a liberal-pluralist interpretation in the tradition ofDahrendorf and Keane where autonomous non-state organizations fromtrade unions to social movements jostled in the competition of interestsand ideas, and the other, approaching a Hegelian perspective, arguedthat the state was a necessary arbiter of competing interests and thereflection of dominant ones (Heng 1990; Latif 1990). Several conceptsand discourses of Singapore civil society have emerged since, most ofthem connected fundamentally by their attempt to describe and explainthe barely audible calls for liberal democracy from the local middle class,the culture of political apathy and materialism, asymmetrical society-state power relations, as well as the privileged position of the state inpublic sphere. This is in stark contrast to the civil society literature frombroader Southeast Asia where socio-political resistance, conflict, andagitation are set against a backdrop of poverty, mass mobilization or“people power”, and working-class conditions. The fact that severalconcepts of civil society have emerged in the Singapore literature in thelast decade is as much down to the absence of a clear civil society modelin Singapore as it is to the unfolding political climate wrought by thechange in administration from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong to LeeHsien Loong in a space of 14 years.

A key theme in the literature is the lack of middle class pressure forpolitical liberalization and liberal democracy (Brown and Jones 1995;Chua and Tan 1999). The political legitimacy of the Singaporegovernment, specifically the People’s Action Party (PAP), lies in its thusfar unfailing ability to deliver material largesse to its electorate sinceindependence in 1965. Although somewhat jolted by the 1997 Asian


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

crisis, national economic development and its fruits have trickled downto the different classes, and though wealth distribution has not matchedthe ability of neo-capitalism to widen social inequalities, the Singaporegovernment, according to Chua and Tan (1999), have managed todiffuse class conflict by warning against the “politics of envy”.Meanwhile the ideologies of meritocracy and social mobility are stilllargely intact, encouraging the middle class to focus, at least for theforeseeable future, on material accumulation for financial security. Assuch, “in fundamental terms then, there is no reason for the now sizeablemiddle class to seek drastic political change” (Rodan 1995, p. 39).

Another consensus in the literature centres on the easing of stateregulations over non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Tanakaargues that the transition from the Lee Kuan Yew to the Goh Chok Tongadministration in 1991 marked a shift in the politics of state-societyrelations whereby direct forms of regulations and restrictions over NGOswere eased, and replaced with more subtle forms of control.

Today, the authorities have switched from open repression to a systemof subtle and indirect but nonetheless potent measures to keep NGOsin line … NGOs are also under strong pressure to exercise self-restraint and limit their programme to those the ruling elite considers“socially acceptable”. (Tanaka 2002, p. 216)

This observation is supported by a study of easing censorship overSingapore theatre. Previously direct and draconian modes of censorshipregulation such as script-vetting by the Singapore Police Force have givenway to behind-the-scenes politics such as subtle threats by the state towithhold funding and placing the onus of self-censorship on theatrecompanies (Chong 2004a). This general loosening of formal stateregulations that directly constrain, censor, and check NGOs may be aconsequence of globalization. Here the need to align local norms tointernational, perhaps even Western, standards is pressuringauthoritarian governments with global city ambitions to relinquish, atleast in form, tight controls over civic spaces if only to win internationallegitimacy and to succeed in the global competition for human talent.Ooi Can Seng (“State–Civil Society and Tourism”, in this issue)reinforces this assertion with his survey of the tourism industry’s

Terrence CHONG278

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

influence on policy-making. In identifying the re-branding of Singapore,the decision to build two casinos, and the promotion of medical andeducational tourism as civil and social spaces, Ooi argues that touristshave become Singapore’s de facto constituents whose interests and needsare absorbed in parliament. Ooi’s provocative suggestion calls intellectualattention, as does Lenore Lyon’s piece on foreign domestic workers(“Transient Workers Count Too?” in this issue), to the characteristics ofa global civil society whereby politically framed and circumscribed socialrelations stretch across state boundaries to problematize issues ofsovereignty; in particular, the ways in which issues of liberalism andhuman rights are lodged within national consciousness and the influencethey have on political discourse. Nonetheless, the occasional resurrectionof such issues does not necessarily mean that such governments haveconceded greater space to civil society nor does it automatically signala greater willingness on the government’s part to compromise with civilsociety. As such, greater academic attention needs to be paid to thestrategies of non-public and indirect regulating, behind-the-scenespressure to conform, and the manipulation of resources to achievespecific interests. This type of research will add a broader dimension tothe politics of local society-state relations.

There are also divergences in the literature. One primary disagree-ment is the intellectual contextualization of pre-independence non-stategroups — can these groups be deemed civil society groups in thecontemporary sense of the term? They can, according to Gillis (2005),who conceptualizes “civil society” as “associational activity” duringBritish colonial rule from 1819 to 1963, and finds evidence of a vibrantcivil society in Singapore despite an authoritarian British regime. Gillisdrives the point further to assert that local civil society played a key rolein independence movement and was eventually curtailed by post-independence PAP. Agreeing with Gillis is Tay (1998; see also TerenceLee, “Gestural Politics”, in this issue), who categorizes Singaporecivil society in four stages: pre-independence, where civil society was“indigenous and strong”; the Merdeka movement in the build-up toindependence; the period between the 1970s and the 1980s, where PAPdominance resulted in a stifled civil society; and the present time where


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

contemporary society-state relations are still unfolding. Chua, however,rejects the notion of a pre-independence “civil society” for two reasons.

First, the associations were not only independent of, but were also notin contact with the colonial administration whether to act incollaboration or in contestation with the administration. Second, tothe extent that they were organized along ethnic lines, they wereorganized to promote interests on the primordial rather than on asocietal scale. Hence, the difficulties of conceptualizing thesenetworks as constitutive of a “civil society” lie in the absence of a“nation”. (Chua 2000, p. 69)

So, can there be a pre-nation civil society? This seemingly academicquestion goes to the heart of the definition and membership of civilsociety. Do we count civil society groups as those based solely on vol-untary membership with whom individuals may choose to associate ordisassociate based on the sovereignty of their own free will, right of as-sociation, and freedom of choice, that is, basic individual and civil rightswhich are guaranteed and protected by no other entity except thepostcolonial state? If so, then in order for civil society to function andremain as a set of voluntary memberships it cannot be detached fromthe nation-state. This position squares firmly with the Hegeliantradition whereby the very existence of civil society presumes thepresence of the nation-state. Or do we also include groups whosemembership is based on ethnicity, religion, and heredity, which areexclusive by nature and where an individual’s disassociation from thegroup is never complete? To bring these groups into the “civil society”fold would place fewer demands on the state to uphold individualand civil rights since membership is pre-determined and organizationlargely autonomous, and would show that civil society canfunction without reliance on state regulations, apparatuses, or secularlaws. This would open up the possibility of conceiving a pre-nationcivil society. The Damocles’ sword to this dilemma seems to be thehealth of a liberal democracy. Alagappa (2004, pp. 34–35) writesthat “inclusion of [the latter] groups highlights the complexnature of civil society and the struggles and tensions that pervadeit”, and that “the society must afford autonomy to individuals and

Terrence CHONG280

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

groups, but the balance should favour the individual’s freedom to associ-ate. When this right is curtailed, civil society fragments into rigid groups”.

While it is reasonable to argue for a nation to precede civil society,others have, meanwhile, wondered if globalization forces have todayendowed contemporary civil society with transnational features. Thevalidity of the nation-state as the territorial boundary of civil societycomes under question in the papers by James Gomez (“InternationalNGOs”, in this issue) and Lenore Lyons (“Transient Workers CountToo?” in this issue). Gomez focuses on the role of international NGOsin raising awareness over “freedom” issues in Singapore. With theInternet as a vehicle, international NGOS such as Reporters SansFrontieres and Amnesty International have been able to create greaterglobal awareness of local injustices, forcing the Singapore governmentto respond to or counter these NGOs, an ability that is, according toGomez, lacking in local civil society, thus bringing him to conclude thatsuch global forms of civil society inform, accentuate, and complementthe nationally rooted forms of civil society, even though he makes clearthat the former is in no way meant to replace the latter. Lyons, on theother hand, explores the global-national binary by looking at a resolutelylocal NGO — Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) — and itstransnational subject, foreign domestic maids. Lyons argues thatTWC2’s transnational subject, as well as transnational ideas such asinternational human rights discourse, have not only been useful inchallenging the PAP’s vision of civil society, but also helpful in forgingtransnational alliances between local and foreign feminists. Clearly, asGomez and Lyons suggest, ideas of a nationally bound civil society haveincreasingly problematized in this age of globalization, not least by therise of what in the general literature is known as “global socialmovements” (Cohen and Rai 2000). Local problems, community issues,and cultural matters — all bound by the national framework — areincreasingly articulated and theorized with universal vocabularies ofpatriarchy, human rights, class struggle, minority marginalization,allowing them national slippage and endowing them with transnationalcurrency. National slippage and transnational currency will be a growingfeature of Singapore civil society groups, especially those with


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

transnational actors and cosmopolitan visions, and will complicatefuture state–civil society relations.

Elsewhere, Kadir (2004) looks at the limited space for Singapore civilsociety groups to contest identity politics. With ethnic and religiouspolitics in mind, Kadir points to the violent legacies of such kinds ofcontestation, and ventures that “the state’s inflexibility in allowing forthis space may not necessarily be a negative development in the pushfor democratic change in the long run. … Hence the state managementof civil society space may be positive for ensuring democratic practicein the long run” (2004, p. 325). Birch (1993), in contrast, warns thatstate management of civil society space has profound effects on theSingapore citizen habitus — a set of dispositions that incline agents toact and react in certain ways. Through the national media, the state’sdissemination of its ideologies, rationale, and myths go into thediscursive construction of the “ideal Singapore citizen”, whose interestsare invariably aligned with those of the state. This “ideal Singaporecitizen” is consequently more receptive and reactive to the “staging ofcrises” ranging from economic survival, emigration, as well as religiousand ethnic relations. In limiting the space for identity politics to contestand engage with each other, itself a crucial feature of the individual’shabitus development, it becomes easier to impose the state’s ideal“Singapore citizen habitus”, one that comes with its own set ofintransigent worldviews, weltanschauung, and life-solutions.

Also thinking about democratic space, Koh and Ooi (2000, p. 5)believe that it is “remarkable” that in a “tightly controlled democracy”,groups like the Association of Women for Action and Research(AWARE), the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), and theNature Society, have “emerged in the effort to provide an alternativechannel for voicing views on issues”. Meanwhile Birch and Phillips(2003, p. 116) contend that “Most of these groups, however, simplyprovide a forum for alternative voices rather than action or change, oroperate where the state has promoted discussions of civic concerns. Ithas even been suggested that this governmental initiative stems purelyfrom governmental self-interest and a realization that it has over-extended itself in the management of society”. This particular view

Terrence CHONG282

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

corresponds with the idea that civil society groups are in danger ofbecoming “junior partners” of the state (Chua 2003) and the belief thatit is the Singapore state, not civil society, that is expanding through theco-option of social groups under state-controlled institutions (Rodan2003). In essence, one of the key ideological and normative debates inSingapore civil society is that between proponents of “local realities” whosee the political need to engage within existing cultural-politicalframeworks in Singapore in order to achieve concrete results and toavoid marginalization, while understanding the overwhelming powerand public legitimacy of the Singapore state, and advocates of a liberal-pluralist civil society who have less sympathy for “local realities” for fearthat such explanations only legitimize the status quo, and whose raisond’être is advocacy and the open competition of self-interest such that thecultural identity of a civil society lies not in its modus operandi but,rather, in the types and specificity of the interests at stake. As it is, thereis no clear consensus on a concept of a Singapore civil society. As mootedelsewhere, “it may be necessary to generate multiple accounts of [anAsian] civil society” (Hudson 2003, p. 16).

Reviewing Some Concepts in the Literature

Having looked at some of the convergences and divergences in theliterature, this section now turns to some of the recurring concepts oflocal civil society. The various conceptual leitmotifs presented here areneither a typology nor a comprehensive representation of the Singaporecivil society literature but rather, to affirm that “civil society” is a“contested concept” (Tay 1998), a “contested notion” (Koh and Ooi2005), and to highlight, compare, and contrast the different paradigmsof society-state relations and their politics.

Civic Society: An “Apolitical” Civil Society

Carving Singapore civil society in two, Chua (2000) makes the distinc-tion between organizations that publicly align themselves with the stateand its institutions in order to further fulfil its goals and interests, andthose that seek to retain their independence, jealously guarding theirautonomy, to occasionally compete with and challenge government


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

viewpoints. The latter group is an ensemble that reflects the con-ventional qualities and values of a liberal-pluralist civil society, wheregroups are in permanent tension with each other and the state. Theformer group, though demonstrating the universal tendency for smallgroups to form alliances with the state, either out of a genuine belief inthe state’s visions for society or as a calculated Faustian pact that seeksto overcome natural limits with ideological compromise, cannot helpbut be framed by George Yeo’s now classic “banyan tree” speech (Yeo1991). Yeo, then Minister for Information and the Arts, admittedthat civil society groups may have found it hard to flourish under thebanyan tree of a strong state, and proposed a “judicious” pruning of thetree in order that other plants may flourish. State gestures such as thesehave led to the rather controversial observation that

In Asia, in contrast to most of Europe, the state has often played apivotal role in establishing civil society. Consistent with this, theWestern notion that civil society has to be made up of autonomousnon-state voluntary organizations often needs to be challenged inAsian contexts. (Schak and Hudson 2003, p. 3)

This seemingly magnanimous gesture by the Singapore state is,nonetheless, tempered by its interpretation of “civil society”. Here, “civicsociety” is used in place of “civil society”, thus privileging a civicrepublican notion of citizenship where the emphasis of citizenship is noton individual rights, but civic and national duty. Civic and national dutyin this context may be fleshed out as the formation of welfareassociations such as those that care for the elderly, abused children,materially deprived families, even abandoned animals — associationsthat are seen by the state to be largely apolitical, non-critical, and arecomport with the dominant values of a conservative patriarchal society.Such welfare associations may also link up with state agencies in apartnership where the former identify welfare and social issues that needattention and provide the initial groundwork for action, thus enablingstate agencies to step in with a greater chance of success.

The civic society is one of the state’s earliest articulations of Singaporecivil society, and is without doubt a key concept in the Singapore civilsociety literature. Its exhortation of civic duty as the raison d’être of civil

Terrence CHONG284

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

society has been broadly described as an ideological siphoning ofcompeting interests, liberal values, and marginal voices from the publicactivities of citizens (Koh 1998). The civic society is conceived as anideologically congruent society where there is not only a presumedabsence of competition between non-state groups for political legitimacyand material resources, but also one that has little need for theapplication of agency. Civic society’s “reconciliation” of state and non-state interests invariably renders the need for individual struggle eitherredundant or gratuitous, denies any form of systemic or institutionaloppression, and is capable of mobilizing the discourse of national interestas a means to de-legitimize and neutralize alternative voices. Thenormative functions of a civic society are informed by the dynamics ofother local state-society relations like those between the Singapore stateand trade unions and the local press, and, to some extent, academia.Without the autonomy and independence enjoyed by their counterpartsin Western democracies, these three communities are locally legitimizedby a variety of tropes including the discourse of survival, nation-building, and the need for state-society partnership, all of which advancethe political language of compromise in the promotion of communalor national interests, resulting in a dominant ideology that isconservative, conflict-shy, and void of competitive politics. Thisdominant ideology has elsewhere been shown to be deeply genderedwhereby masculine energies are channelled from competitive politicalparticipation into national service, thus leaving the political sphereemasculated and ineffectual while the public sphere, within which civilsociety is located, is largely feminized, burdened with the duties ofreproduction and family nurturing (Tan 2001).

Given the ideological hegemony of the Singapore state, a civic societyhas several characteristics. Many civic society groups would carry theappearance of an apolitical nature. Associations and organizationsconcerned with social issues such as family well-being, elderly welfare,or youth development would represent themselves as apolitical groupsuninterested in challenging the state. Many such groups are, however,driven by specific identity politics, and have firm ideas on whatconstitutes a “family unit”, a “normal” sexual orientation, or gender


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

roles. Such civic society groups are able to flourish within the establishedpolitical perimeters because of the broad convergence of conservativestate and non-state interests, although disagreements may surface if moreprogressive members of the ruling elite proceed with policy decisionsthat are deemed to contradict conservative identity politics and morals.The government’s decision to build two casinos in order to boosttourism figures, for example, was seen by many civic society groups,from religious organizations to social welfare groups, to be contrary topublic interest, though follow-up action or advocacy from such groupsmay be hindered by their apolitical self-representations and professeddisinterest in state-confrontation (“Anti-Casino Groups Keep Up theFight”, 26 November 2004).

The Intellectual Society

Civil society in Singapore is also sometimes described as a set ofenlightened and humanist ideals or broader social memory, andpresented as an antidote to the pervasive culture of materialism,consumerism, and individualism. Civil society here is envisaged as anideological lacuna that enriches the soul and protects it against thedehumanizing effects of modernity and capitalism. It comprisesideologically driven associations, arts groups, and liberal professionsneeded to counter the survivalist mentality and economic pragmatismof Singapore, or as Tay (2002, p. 3) puts it, “Has the ‘nobody owesanyone a living’ and ‘nothing is for free’ thesis come home to haunt theseamless projection of the [Singapore] success story?” Such a civil societyis invariably manned by the highly educated, culturally sensitive, andaesthetically sophisticated:

In an imaginary perfect society, there will be no civil society, onlyblissful individuals basking in the glory of themselves. Thus imperfectgovernments cannot help but produce discomfort in their intelligentclasses. And since governments cannot undo themselves or becomeperfect, the more they succeed in satisfying the masses, the more theycreate discomfort in the thinking class. (Tay 2002, p. 9)

Close to this is Chng’s (2002) notion of civil society as the ability ofSingaporeans to reclaim history, national narratives, and social

Terrence CHONG286

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

knowledge from the state. This ability to recover national, historical, andcultural discourses from the state is an avenue for social and politicalempowerment, and when framed against the broader literature, echoesGramscian conceptions of civil society as a site from which counter-hegemonic narratives may emerge to, unlike a “civic” society, allocateagency a central role in its activities. It is here that Kersty Hobson’s(“Considering ‘Green’ Practices”, in this issue) contributions can besited. Eschewing the idea of a hegemonic “octopus-state”, Hobson offersa more complex examination of how local environmental groups mayoccupy existing, albeit limited, political spaces in Singapore, madepossible by socio-political relations that are less rigid and structured thanconventional theorizations suggest. A key finding is how these groupstake pains not to come into conflict or be co-opted by state apparatusesin their articulation and imagination of a Singapore beyond that whichis constructed by state discourses, one that evokes an enthusiasm for anation not captured or invoked by the duty-bound discourses soprevalent in the Singapore polity.

Central to this concept of civil society is the personal enrichment andcultural empowerment of individuals. Instead of adhering to the stateideology of “communal values” or “the greater good of society”, thisversion of civil society warns against the political and social impasse thatoccurs when societal interests takes priority over the Self, with “collectiveconscience” becoming an excuse for personal moral action (Tay 2002).In sociological terms this concept of civil society seeks the accumulationof cultural capital not to perpetuate or legitimize dominant ideology asBourdieu (1993) would have it, but to challenge it by offering alternativenon-state sources of knowledge, information, histories, and ideologies,in order to influence the identity construction of citizenship. Individualswho possess the required cultural capital in the Singapore contextinclude members of the arts community, liberal intellectuals andacademics, and well-educated and well-heeled civil society activists, mostof whom are heterodoxical, that is, in possession of beliefs and valuesthat challenge the status quo and received wisdom.

This concept of civil society recognizes the hegemonic tendencies ofthe authoritarian state, while its actors are educated with the requisite


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

cultural capital to question and challenge state narratives, and are moreinclined towards a liberal-pluralist civil society where contestation andresistance are normative functions between non-state groups and thestate, though local realities may force them to seek other means ofengagement. Like Gellner’s (1994) civil society, the intellectual societybelieves in organizations and institutions that are influential and strongenough to counterbalance the state while, at the same time, acceptingthe political legitimacy of the state and does not seek to hinder the statefrom fulfilling its duty as arbitrator between major domestic interests.More important is civil society’s agenda to prevent state interests fromdominating public discourse, constructing histories and narratives, anddefining public interests. It has, however, been noted that as long as theSingapore state perceives civil society to be a threat or as confrontational,there is little hope of change (Birch and Phillips 2003), suggestingthat the ruling elite continues to conceive of civil society strictly inliberal-pluralist mould — a necessary countervailing force to the state— and subsequently feels the need to define, limit, and check local civilsociety.

A Consulted Public

Another popular concept of Singapore civil society revolves around theincreasing number of state mechanisms for public consultation. Herecivil society is understood as a more open society-state relationshippremised on efforts by the state to provide platforms and initiateoccasions where the views and ideas of professionals, specialists, and thegeneral public, may be articulated and heard. These platforms andoccasions may even extend to social groups who are the subject ofspecific policies. While this concept of civil society probably grew inpopularity with the Goh Chok Tong administration, which promiseda “kinder, gentler society”, the process of public consultation, however,began long before Goh’s succession with the establishment of theFeedback Unit in 1984. The rhetoric of public consultation gainedgreater momentum with the White Paper on the Maintenance ofReligious Harmony (1989) and the White Paper on Shared Values(1991), both of which benefited from consulting relevant non-state

Terrence CHONG288

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

associations and organizations. In the 1990s the consultation process wasinstitutionalized in the form of the Nominated Member of Parliament(NMP) and the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP)schemes, all for the purpose of hearing opposition voices in parliament.

Public consultation and civil society intersected most intimately withthe Singapore 21 initiative. Prime Minister Goh launched the Singapore21 initiative in 1997 with the aim of articulating, examining, anddeveloping Singapore’s “heartware” for the 21st century. The governmentused the term “heartware” to refer to “the intangibles of society — socialcohesion, political stability, and the collective will, values, and attitudesof a people” (Singapore 21, 1999). The Singapore 21 committee,together with its five subject-committees, totalled 83 memberscomprising MPs, civil society groups and activists, lawyers, unionists,businessmen, and others. According to a senior government official:

The process of formulating proposals for the Singapore 21Committee is another illustration of policy consultation at an earlystage. Both the main committee and subject committees spent muchtime and effort talking to focus groups of Singaporeans from all walksof life. Members of these focus groups were given freedom to speaktheir minds and hearts, while committee members listened. (Chan2000, p. 123)

The shift in state rhetoric from civic society to public consultation is areflection of the Singapore state’s re-invention and the correspondingchange in society-state relations.

There have been various interpretations of the Singapore state.Scholars have called it an a “developmental state” (Low 2001), a“paternalist state” (Chua 1995), a “strong state” (Malhotra 2002), anda “corporatist state” (Brown 1993, 1994). Of these, it is perhaps the“corporatist” interpretation that best explains the phenomenon of publicconsultation in Singapore. State corporatism “refers to attempts by anavowedly autonomous state elite to organize the diverse interestassociations in society so that their interests can be accommodatedwithin the independent and organic national community” (Brown 1994,p. 67). This is in line with the corporatist vision of an ideal societyas:


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

… harmonious, well-regulated, non-conflictive society, based onmoral principles and well-defined norms which are issued andmaintained by the public authority, the state. … There should besome intragroup autonomy and self-regulation but the very existenceof groups and their relationships with each other are granted andregulated by the state. (Brown 1994, p. 68)

In this sense, the “corporatist state” is also an “interventionist state”.Since the early 1990s, there has been a discernible shift from “exclusivecorporatism” to “inclusive corporatism” in Singapore. Exclusivecorporatism signifies a greater degree of authoritarianism where “thestate is dominated by technocrats-bureaucrats” and “where institu-tionalised co-operation is restricted to a small elite”, amounting to “acorporatist strategy of interventionist management” (Brown 1993,p. 18).

The “managerial egotism” of state élites … persuades them that theirinterventions as “experts” are necessary and fruitful, and that the non-expert masses are not to be trusted with autonomous politicalparticipation. (Brown 1993, p. 18)

Inclusive corporatism, ushered in by the Goh administration, “is wherethe organic community is built on a more genuinely consensualpartnership between state and society” (Brown 1994, p. 69). Withinclusive corporatism, a more democratic, but not necessarily liberal,process “in which the network of corporatist institutions for controlled,mobilized participation is broadened to incorporate wider segments ofsociety, to the point where it begins to provide the dominant basis forpolitics” (Brown 1994, p. 72). The corporatist state, is also not at oddswith the fundamental characteristics of the Hegelian state, namely, itbeing the most concrete expression of national interests; the highest levelin the social and historical hierarchy; a rational entity; and whoseexistence is necessary for the preservation of its people.

The “public consultation” discourse is designed by the Singaporestate to counter unruly advocacy initiatives, as well as to institutionalizethe process of feedback in order to establish clear frameworks withinwhich advocacy, protest, and dissent are de-politicized, and staged in acalm and orderly manner, and ultimately touted as the “Singaporean”

Terrence CHONG290

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

way. Public consultation, to be sure, is no guarantee of change orfulfilment of civil society interests since the mere act of consultationitself, as opposed to acceding to public opinion, is often touted by theSingapore state to be evidence of its embrace of civil society values. Thisattitude may be undermining public faith in consultation exercises. Inreference to the Singapore government’s decision on 18 April 2005 tobuild two casinos, a survey by the Institute of Policy Studies showed that

62 per cent of 963 respondents did not believe that the Governmentwas — as it has claimed — ready to abandon the idea of a casino ortwo. Sixty per cent felt their opinions did not count towards the finaldecision and 29 per cent of those respondents who accepted thedecision did so because they felt the government had already madeup its mind. (“When the Govt Ask: So What Do You Think?” 1 July2005)

This profound lack of public faith in state-led consultation exercises maybe due to public recognition of what Terence Lee (“Gestural Politics”,in this issue; see also Lee 2002) describes as “liberal gestures” of theSingapore state. Lee argues that Singapore civil society, along with itsattendant notions of active citizenship, feedback, and openness, is bestunderstood as a series of “gestural politics” from the Singapore state toappease an increasingly demanding middle class, such that the state’s civilsociety rhetoric holds greater discursive power in shaping state-societyrelations than actual power asymmetries. Much like the corporatist state’smanagement of interests, such “gestural politics” will continue to be arecurring feature in the Singapore state’s response to the liberalizationtendencies of globalization processes, the consequence of which may bethe cultivation of public cynicism and apathy among an increasinglysophisticated public.

The Active Citizen

Economic progress and material affluence, by the 1980s, began to resultin greater social stratification. This stratification is evident in variousforms such as class, gender, political aspirations, and cultural identities,and is exacerbated by the increasing levels of education, growing globalawareness, and cosmopolitan attitudes among younger Singaporeans,resulting in more diverse and complex expectations, which the Singapore


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

state now has to manage. It is in this context that Koh and Ooi (2005)put forth the concept of the “new ideology of active citizenship” as theresponse of the Singapore state. The ideology of “active citizenship” isthe promotion of “an ethos of noblesse oblige and voluntarism among thebetter-off in order to tap community-based resources to help the needyand disadvantaged” (Koh and Ooi 2005, p. 171). In this form, “activecitizenry” does not differ greatly from a “civic society” since activism isstill thought of as apolitical and grounded in community-based work.Nor does it differ greatly from public consultation since the politicalimpetus behind consultation exercises and the state’s call for activecitizenry is largely the same — the management of changing interestsand expectations.

Active citizenry is, however, not the same as civic society or publicconsultation. While a civic society is prescribed by the state, activecitizenry suggests a greater tolerance for agency. While publicconsultation exercises are passive in the way they are only useful as faras the ruling elite is willing to “listen”, active citizens may now drawlegitimacy for their views from their status as members of a nation-state.After all,

Those with ideas should not sit back and complain about lack ofparticipation. People should not be shy in coming out with ideas.Everyone should be committed to his/her thinking and ideas, to beprepared to stand up and be counted, to sell those ideas, and to putin effort and resources to realise them. (Chan 2000, p. 126)

And perhaps most significantly, the concept of active citizenry, unlikemost local conceptualizations, carries a greater recognition of citizenryrights in its discourse. It takes for granted the fact that citizens have aright “to sell” their ideas, to be “committed” to them, and finds littlecontradiction in exhorting citizens to find “resources to realize” theseideas.

Reality is, however, somewhat more ambiguous. A quick glance backat the infamous Catherine Lim affair in 1994 when the local novelistwas reprimanded by no less than the Prime Minister for her commentaryon the governing styles of the Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tongadministrations suggests state intolerance for citizenry dissent.2 Another

Terrence CHONG292

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

well-cited government response is that of the then Minister forInformation and the Arts, George Yeo, in 1995, who chastised vocallycritical Singaporeans for being boh tua, boh suay (a Hokkien termdenoting a lack of respect for elders and those in authority) (“DebateYes, but Do Not Take on Those in Authority as ‘Equals’”, 20 February1995), reinforcing both the corporatist ruling elite’s insistence on classhierarchy as a framework for society-state relations and the Hegelianstate’s belief that it is the sine qua non of national talent, leadership, andpublic good. However, more recently, and perhaps taking her cue fromPrime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s clarion call for an “open and inclusivesociety”, Lim appeared again with another article — “Utopia orDystopia” — calling on the government for greater political openness(Lim 2005). This time around, the Singapore government’s lack ofresponse was deafening, perhaps implying a genuine desire from theruling elite to encourage active citizenry. Having said this, other recentevents also suggest that clear limits to the civil liberties of active citizensremain squarely in place. Recent curbs on civil liberties such as the useof defamation laws by a government scientific research agency to quellcriticism from an Internet blogger and the summoning of a local film-maker for police questioning over a documentary on a local oppositionfigure have been highlighted by the international press (Burton 2005).

Nonetheless, if active citizenry is all that it is touted to be — theembrace of diverse views, increased ideological tolerance, pluralism,advocacy, a renewed sense of agency — then what of the corporatist statemodel? How would the technocratic elite, deeply distrustful of masspolitical participation and skilled in the management of popularconcerns and interests for the purpose of accommodating state interests,engage with active citizens? Unless one is prepared to argue that theSingapore state has once again re-invented itself, this time from acorporatist state to one that is pluralist and liberal in character, theconcept of active citizenry or citizen participation must necessarily beexamined as part of the techniques and procedures of this corporatiststate.

To be sure, there is space, albeit limited, for active citizenry topromote and highlight socio-cultural issues. Civil society groups such


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

as the Nature Society, AWARE, and AMP, are continually resurrectedas evidence of active citizenry. Nonetheless, while the inclusivecorporatist state may encourage active citizenry, this does not necessarilyresult in greater consensus or the empowerment of civil society becausethe Singapore state has a history of “consulting” civil society groups onlyafter policy formulation and of taking “over ideas from civicorganizations or it renders defunct, citizen-initiated organizationsthrough the formation of state-sponsored ones, but fails to acknowledgetheir contributions and participation” (Koh 2000, p. 162). The reasonfor this could be the way in which republican notions of citizenship,emphasizing citizenry duty over individual rights, continue to play agreater operational role in animating the active citizen. The onus ofactivism is placed on the citizen while personal initiative is seen as aroutine and required fulfilment of citizenry duty that need not becelebrated.

As such the Singapore state uses the mechanisms and rhetoric ofpublic consultation and active citizenry for the purposes of interest-management and resources-tapping, with little evidence to suggest anyreal intention to empower civil society. This is largely because, typicalof a corporatist state, political direction, agenda, and decision-makingmust be seen to emanate only from the ruling elite lest it loses itslegitimacy in the eyes of the public. Or as described elsewhere, “To theSingapore governing elite, politics is only about leadership. They believethat the strength of elitist ideology lies on the premise that leaders arethe best judges of the country’s destiny. Leaders are the country’s guidingforces. This explicit attitude has implications on their perceptions aboutcitizen involvement and public opinion” (Ho 2003, p. 337).

Civil Society as Reciprocal State-Society Relations

Lastly, civil society has been conceptualized by Koh and Ooi (2000) asan achievement of society-state “synergies”. This conceptualizationproposes that there is “an emerging and credible corpus of empiricalstudies suggesting that a paradigm shift is possible” where “civil societycan complement state structures at different levels and in ways thatpromote development goals” (Koh and Ooi 2000, p. 2). A synergetic

Terrence CHONG294

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

civil society would be one that, rightly, pays attention to the matchingof interests between NGOs and the Singapore state in a manner that thelatter allows the former to tap its resources. However, in order to avoidthe fate of becoming a “junior partner” of the state (Chua 2000) orenable the state expansion through NGO co-option (Rodan 2003), Isuggest that the idea of a “synergetic” civil society be reframed as a setof reciprocal society-state relations where civil society is examined as aseries of relationships between activists and state representatives situatedin different locations of power and resources, able to engage with eachother when their interests converge and disengage when they diverge.While both a synergetic civil society and a reciprocal civil society are ableto account for and empirically grasp the politics of collaborationbetween individuals, NGOs, and the state, it is only the latter that seessociety-state disengagement as a normal and sometimes necessary partof civil society.

Perhaps one example of a reciprocal relationship is the case of TheNecessary Stage (TNS), a local theatre company, and the National ArtsCouncil (NAC). TNS, in the early 1990s, was at the forefront of theatre-in-education (TIE) where theatre and drama were used as education aids.Bringing theatre to local schools at that time was an ad hoc affair as thelack of structural guidelines and regulations made school principalsreluctant to hire theatre practitioners. The formation of NAC in 1991signalled a convergence of TNS and state interests, namely, the promotionof arts appreciation among young Singaporeans. With the resources at itsdisposal, NAC soon formulated an arts education programme as well asa list of local arts practitioners from which principals and teachers couldchoose for their schools. The main players behind the collaboration wereHaresh Sharma and Alvin Tan from TNS, and Chua Ai Liang from NAC,the latter of whom was instrumental in recognizing TNS’s expertise andidentifying the need for arts education (Chong 2004b). Hence, theconvergence of organizational interests, aided by discussions betweenwilling and sincere individuals situated in both civil society groups andstate infrastructures, resulted in a synergy between state resources and civilsociety group expertise. This reciprocal relationship, however, did not last.A variety of structural and ideological obstacles eventually made it


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

impossible for TNS to continue with its TIE programme withoutexhausting or bankrupting itself, and when it finally ceased to be areciprocal relationship, TNS ended its TIE programme in 1998.

The case of TNS and NAC demonstrates that a reciprocal conceptof civil society and state is empirically sound. Such a model dependsheavily on the individuals involved. Notions of a monolithic state mustgive way to the reality of individuals situated in various positions inthe state hierarchy, some enlightened, some not so, who may share theinterests and values of civil society, and have the resources to fulfilthem. Such willing state representatives have to operate within theframework of bureaucracy, state ideology, conservative norms, and apatriarchal culture in their dealings with civil society groups. In otherwords, the concept of a reciprocal civil society opens up the politicsof persons, personalities, and interpersonal relations, all of which de-mand a stronger sociological perspective in the literature. Such a per-spective would pay greater attention to individual action and agencywithin existing structures, and avoid the anthropomorphizing of im-personal entities such as “civil society”, “institution”, and “the state”.The study of Singapore civil society as the politics of persons, person-alities, and interpersonal relations would also address the ways inwhich state pressure is exerted discreetly through various means likeclose-door forums, the persuasiveness of a charismatic leader, unoffi-cial telephone calls, and personal agreements brokered between rep-resentatives. In doing so, such a study of civil society would describewith greater accuracy the politics of co-option and appropriation, andexplain why more NGOs agree to short- to medium-term collabora-tions with the state and its agencies with modest and realistic targetsif only to avoid co-option or stasis. With such a mindset, the disen-gagement or discontinuation of society-state collaborations will be seennot as a failure but as part and parcel of interest protection.

Conclusion

The various conceptualizations of civil society in Singapore aredominated by the central role of the state and the political acquiescence

Terrence CHONG296

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

of the middle class. Many local civil society activists argue that thevariety of mechanisms at the state’s disposal, including defamation suitsand the Societies Act, in addition to a strong aversion amongst the rulingelite for socio-political disorderliness, has limited the advancement ofcivil society groups and retarded the empowerment process ofindividuals. Critics counter that a competent, clean, efficient, andresponsive government has delivered not only material largesse but hasalso redistributed wealth in various forms, thus circumscribing therelevance of civil society in Singapore.

This simple dichotomy, however, fails to account for the variousconstituencies such as the religious, the ethnic, the linguistic, and thegendered in a multicultural and increasingly globalized society. Localhistory has shown how different constituencies have different “power”and are treated differently by the Singapore state. Take for exampleTalaq (“divorce” in Malay), a Tamil play that was at the centre of anartistic and religious controversy in 2000. Talaq, portraying issues ofmarital violence, rape, and submission amongst the Indian Muslimcommunity in Singapore, made its debut in Tamil on 24 December1998 with the support of NAC. Its first run in Tamil was greeted withpositive reviews from the local press and garnered little controversy,thus making a state-society reciprocal relationship between NAC andAgni Koothu possible. The controversy began in February 1999 when,in a build-up to a second run of the play, this time acted in Malay andEnglish to a wider audience, the New Paper (a local tabloid) and theStraits Times wrote about MUIS’s (Islamic Religious Council ofSingapore) disapproval of the play. Soon protests from other religiousorganizations such as the South Indian Jamiathul Ulama (SIJU) wereaired. The failure of the artistic and religious constituencies to cometo a compromise resulted in Talaq being denied a public entertainmentlicence on the grounds of religious sensitivities.4 The uncompromisingstance of Agni Koothu, together with the powerful discourse of“religious sensitivity” from religious constituents, made a formerlyreciprocal relationship between Agni Koothu and NAC unfeasible.The Talaq episode is a clear reminder that some constituencies mattermore than others, in this case the religious was prioritized over the


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

artistic. Another example is the establishment of the Association ofMalay Professionals (AMP) in an attempt to provide “collectiveleadership” for the ethnic community. Although warned by topgovernment leaders against pushing for Malay interests which mayinadvertently undermine the legitimacy of PAP Malay MPs, the AMPhas largely been accepted both by the state and the public as alegitimate component of local civil society. As an organizationpremised primarily on ethnicity, the AMP would have met with greatersuspicion from the ruling party if its constituency were not the Malaycommunity. These two examples, as disparate as they are, show thatsociety-state relations are neither completely hegemonic nor asdeterministic as they are often made out to be. Instead, a more accurateassessment would entail greater attention to the constituencies fromwhich civil society groups engender, the political history of theseconstituencies, as well as the ways in which global politics are affectingthese constituencies and their identities, thus increasing or decreasingtheir importance in the nation-state. By examining civil society groupsas sets of interests with different, sometimes unstable, levels oflegitimacy in the eyes of an authoritarian state, a more complex anddynamic picture of society-state relations would emerge.

NOTES

* I would like to thank Russell Heng and Garry Rodan for reading an earlier versionof this paper and offering their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thankGillian Koh for bringing Alagappa’s Civil Society and Political Change in Asia to myattention.

1. The first wave of democracy began in the 1820s with the American and Frenchrevolutions and lasted for nearly a century, having established “minimal nationaldemocratic institutions” in 33 countries (Huntington 1991, p. 17). The secondwave came about with the victory of the Allies in the Second World War andinvolved more diverse countries from those just liberated at the end of the war tothe achievement of independence by former European colonies. The third wavebegan in southern Europe and spread to Latin America and then eastern Europeby the mid-1970s.

2. PM Goh then announced to would-be critics that “You can criticise us and we

Terrence CHONG298

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

would treat you as though you have entered the political arena. If you do not wishto do so … you want to hide in the sanctuaries to criticise the government, toattack the government, we’d say even though you don’t want to join a party, wewould treat you as though you have entered the political arena” (“PM: DebateWelcomed but Govt Will Rebut Malicious Arguments”, 24 January 1995).

3. According to Pateman (1970), citizenry participation can be divided into pseudo,partial, and full participation. Pseudo participation only entails national awarenessand keeping one’s self informed of issues and challenges facing the country; partialparticipation is the offering of feedback and suggestions; while full participationis where citizens are fully engaged and involved in policy implementation.

4. The NAC attempted to arrange for a private preview for the religiousrepresentatives but the president of the theatre company, Agni Koothu,S. Thenmoli, objected to the lack of women representatives at the private preview.Her argument was that a play about marital rape and violence suffered by thewomen in a religious-ethnic community should not only be judged by the menof this very religious-ethnic community.

REFERENCES

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. California: StanfordUniversity Press, 2004.

“Anti-Casino Groups Keep Up the Fight”. Straits Times, 26 November 2004.Birch, Brown. “Staging Crises: Media and Citizenship”. In Singapore Changes Guard:

Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan.New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993.

Birch, David, and Marianne Phillips. “Civic or Civil Contingences? RegulatingTelevision and Society in Singapore”. In Television, Regulation and Civil Societyin Singapore, edited by Philip Kitley. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.Brown, David. “The Corporatist Management of Ethnicity in Contemporary

Singapore”. In Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and EconomicDirections in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan. New York: St Martin’s Press,1993.

. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge,1994.

Brown, David, and David Jones. “Singapore and the Myth of the Liberalising MiddleClass”. Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1995): 79–87.

Burton, John. “Singapore’s Arts Ambitions Caught Up in Rights Debate”. FinancialTimes, 14 May 2005.


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

Chan Soo Sen. “The Singapore Government and Civil Society”. In State-SocietyRelations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Geok Ling. Singapore:Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press, 2000.

Chng Nai Rui. “Fragrance and Fragments of Civil Society: Reclaiming History”. InBuilding Social Space in Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative in CivilSociety Activism, edited by Constance Singam et al. Singapore: SelectPublishing, 2002.

Chong, Terence. “Mediating the Liberalisation of Singapore Theatre: Towards aBourdieusian Analysis”. In Ask Not: The Necessary Stage in Singapore Theatre,edited by Tan Chong Kee and Tisa Ng. Singapore: Times Edition, 2004a.

. “Society-State Collaboration in Singapore: The Necessary Stage and theArts Education Programme”. In Ask Not: The Necessary Stage in SingaporeTheatre, edited by Tan Chong Kee and Tisa Ng. Singapore: Times Edition,2004b.

Chua Beng Huat. Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore. London:Routledge, 1995.

. “The Relative Autonomies of State and Civil Society”. In State-SocietyRelations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling. Singapore:Institute of Policy Studies, 2000.

. “Non-Transformative Politics: Civil Society in Singapore”. In Civil Societyin Asia, edited by David Schak and Wayne Hudson. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Chua Beng Huat and Tan Joo Ean. “Singapore: Where the New Middle Class Setsthe Standard”. In Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, edited by MichaelPinches. London: Routledge, 1999.

Cohen, Robin, and Shirin Rai, eds. Global Social Movements. London: Athlone,2000.

“Debate Yes, but Do Not Take on Those in Authority as ‘Equals’”. Straits Times,20 February 1995.

Ehrenberg, John. Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1999.

Fine, Robert. “Civil Society: Theory, Enlightenment and Critique”. In Civil Society:Democratic Perspectives, edited by Robert Fine and Shirin Rai. London: FrankCass, 1997.

Gellner, Ernest. Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. London: HamishHamilton, 1994.

Gillis, E. Kay. Singapore Civil Society and British Power. Singapore: TalismanPublishing, 2005.

Gramsci, Antonio. The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935, editedby David Forgacs. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1999.

Hegel, G.W.F. Elements of the Philosophy of the Right, edited by Allen W. Wood. First

Terrence CHONG300

© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

published 1821. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.Heng, Russell. “This Is the Year of Civil Society …”. Straits Times, 30 December

1990.Ho Khai Leong. Share Responsibilities, Unshared Power: The Politics of Policy-Making

in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003.Hudson, Wayne. “Problematising European Theories of Civil Society”. In Civil

Society in Asia, edited by David Schak and Wayne Hudson. Aldershot: Ashgate,2003.

Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century.Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Kadir, Suzaina. “Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy within the Political StatusQuo”. In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia, edited by MuthiahAlagappa. California: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Keane, John. Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.Koh, Gillian, and Ooi Giok Ling. “Relationship between State and Civil Society in

Singapore”. In Civil Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan.Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

Koh, Gillian, and Ooi Giok Ling, eds. State-Society Relations in Singapore. Singapore:Institute of Policy Studies, 2000.

Koh Tai Ann. “Civil or Civic Society? The S’pore Idea(l)”. Business Times (WeekendEdition), 30 May 1998.

. “The Role of the Intellectuals in Civil Society: Going Against the Grain?”In State-Society Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi GiokLing. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2000.

Kumar, Krishan. “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an HistoricalTerm”. British Journal of Sociology 44 (1993): 375–95.

Latif, Asad. “… But How Many Singaporeans Are Members?” Straits Times,30 December 1990.

Lee Hock Guan, ed. Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 2005.

Lee Hsien Loong. “Remaking the Singapore Economy”. Keynote Address at theAnnual Dinner of the Economics Society of Singapore, 4 August 2003.

Lee Kuan Yew. Speech in parliament, 6 September 1999.Lee, Terence. “The Politics of Civil Society in Singapore”. Asian Studies Review 26,

no. 1 (2002): 97–117.Lim, Catherine. “Utopia or Dystopia”. Straits Times, 10 May 2005.Low, Linda. “The Singapore Developmental State in the New Economy and Polity”.

Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): 411–41.Malhotra, Kamal. “Development Enabler or Disabler? The Role of the State in

Southeast Asia”. In Local Cultures and the “New Asia”: The State, Culture and


© 2

005

Inst

itute

of

Sou

thea

st A

sian

Stu

dies

, S

inga

pore

Capitalism in Southeast Asia, edited by C.J.W.-L. Wee. Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 2002.

Pateman, Carol. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970.

“PM: Debate Welcomed but Govt Will Rebut Malicious Arguments”. Straits Times,24 January 1995.

Rodan, Garry. “Class Transformations and Political Tensions in Singapore’sDevelopment”. In The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s andMiddle-Class Revolution, edited by Richard Robison and David Goodman.London: Routledge, 1995.

. “Embracing Electronic Media but Suppressing Civil Society:Authoritarian Consolidation in Singapore”. Pacific Review 16, no. 4 (2003):503–24.

Schak, David, and Wayne Hudson, eds. Civil Society in Asia. Aldershot: Ashgate,2003.

Singapore 21: Together, We Make the Difference. Singapore: Ministry of Informationand the Arts, 1999.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “‘Civic Society’ and the ‘New Economy’ in Patriarchal Singapore:Emasculating the Political, Feminising the Public”. Crossroads 15, no. 2 (2001):95–124.

Tanaka, Yayoi. “Singapore: Subtle NGO Control by a Developmentalist WelfareState”. In The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, edited by ShinichiShigetomi. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002.

Tay Kheng Soon. “Prospects of Civil Society in Singapore”. In Building Social Spacein Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative in Civil Society Activism, editedby Constance Singam et al. Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002.

Tay, Simon. “Towards a Singaporean Civil Society”. In Southeast Asian Affairs 1998,edited by Derek da Cunha and John Funston. Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 1998.

“When the Govt Ask: So What Do You Think?” Today, 1 July 2005.Wong Kan Seng. Speech at the Bishan East National Day Dinner, 7 August 2004.Yeo, George. “Civic Society — Between the Family and the State”. Inaugural NUSS

Lecture, 20 June 1991, World Trade Centre Auditorium, Singapore.

Terence Chong, a sociologist, is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, andco-editor of SOJOURN. His research interests include the Southeast Asian middle class,political Islam in Malaysia, and the sociology of culture.

273 civil society in singapore: popular discourses and concepts civil society in singapore: popular...

Documents