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,(f;■'. UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 115 lL Vi Date 06/06/2006 '\\\le 'fl Time 11 :29:25 AM ~
I IIII IIII I I IIIIII Ill II Ill II Ill II Ill I IIII II Ill II Ill II IIIII Ill I IIIIII Ill II IIII IIII II Ill II Ill II Ill II IIIII Ill I IIII S-0902-0005-02-00001
Expanded Number S-0902-0005-02-00001
Title Items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - concerned governments -Namibia
Date Created 11/12/1973
Record Type Archival Item
Container S-0902-0005: Peacekeeping -Africa 1963-1981
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/ CONFIDENTIAL 21 September 1976
NAMIBIA AND SHUTTLE DIPLCHACY
The Danger of Surrendering U,N. Authority
1. A concerted effort ls now be Ing made to block further Uni ':'ed !fat ions a~~io~·to ensure the independence of Na~lbia, There is great pressure to postpone Security Council action against South Africa for refusing to end its illegal occupation of that country. And there ls general confusion about how to proceed in order to meet United Natio.1.S obligations towards Namibia. This confusion threatens the surrender of U.N. authority on the Namibian question at a crucial moment,
2. It the ref ore threate~~--the _}n~~pez:1dence . .of_Jia!'llP:>1-? and the interests of the vast majority of the Namibian people.
3. _ The Unlt~d States Secretary_9f State has~deliberately_create4 th~_ confusion which.·riow clouds ··1:he future-ofnI~amibia. And he has done it in-·order to·, ....... prevent U.N. ·acti~n at -this.-_ti~e~. The immediate purpose of the· present. Kissinger mission to southern Africa is to seize the initiative. u.s. officials reason that as long as they can "keep the :t,all in the air" they can prevent the Security Council fro:n taking action.
4. South Africa and the major western powers fear U.N. action, They kno-;., that elect ions in Nil1lli bla under United :fat ions.supervision and control \.:ould result in a SwAPO victory. And a goverrnent.led by S~APO would mean the dismantling of apartheid and the end of South African influence. It wo~ld set in motion far-reaching changes,
5. These powers are therefore trying to buy time ln order to iopose their own I "solution" in Namibia. They want to install a 11moderate 11 and acceptable { government which will leave the existing economic and social structures intact.
They believe that continuing South African influence will help to ensure · "stability".
6. The dfing~f of installing such a ''governr::ent" -is that lt will inevitably create an _explosive situation. A client regime 'Would have no popular re.in.date •.. It could -~urvive only by repress ion and violence. The 11 be rat lon struggle would continue. And the client regl□e would have to find the ~eans to 11ffi..lintaii\ order", It would thus hdve to depend upon South African forces or upon "security ass istance 11 from some sympathet 1c country.,
page 2
7. There are already signs that South Africa, the United States and other western powers are preparing to install a client regime in Namibia. A press campaign ls under way to establish the legitimacy of the Turnhalle talks in \./'lndhoek. A plan for an "independent" Namibian government has just been announced there. Efforts are being made to build the credibility of a Namibian "leader" who is expected to assume power in the near future. And plans are being readied in the U.S. and other countries for substantial economic, financial and technical assistance to an "independent" Namibia under South Africa's shadowo
8. Furtherrnore, reliable sources have reported that the United States pledged at Zurich to finance, train and equip a "Namibian army" to replace South African forces which might be withdrawn after "independence". These reports Indicate that the U.S. ls prepared· to send military "advisors" to Namibia to speed the creation· of a mercenary ·army ~hlch could provide •Ys-ome kind of security for a client regime.
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9. It would be exceedingly dangerous for the United Nations to allow South
!Africa and the_U.S. to usurp its authority-to act- on ~he Namibian question at this time. The 11solution"" for which Dr~ Kissinger argued at Dar es ·s-aiamn ;ould int ens lfy the confl let in southern Africa and draw in other powers in support of the status quo. It would produce the same results in Namibia that the attempt to install Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors produced in Indochina. In 'this case, however, the repercussions are likely to be even more graveo
The Long~run Objective of the Kissinger Mission
1. There has also been considerable confusion about the ultimate purpose of ·the Kiss i~er miss ion to southern Africa. It is well knmm that Dr. Kiss ir-.,ger ~as the architect of the famous policy of rapprochement with the white regi=es which was set out in the "Tar Baby~' option. of the 1969 National Security_ Council study on_ southern Af:r:ica. The objective of that policy was to help
11·s-t:ablllze 11 the situation in the region by providing various kinds of supr,ort for Portugal, South Africa and the Smith regime. And the continued pursuit of that objective led to the covert U.S. intervention in Angola in 1975.
2. The poltcx elaborated in 1969 was a policy of opposition to Majority rule. Yet Dr. Kissinger now presents himself as the advocate of African ~ntionalis~. In his Lusaka speech in April he stated that the United States would henceforth press for independence and majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe, Hon? recently he has been openly critical of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Even his recent negotia~ ions -11th Hr. Vorster have been seen as part of an atte.rnpt to make S('lt.:th Africa see re!\son.
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It would be altogether wrong to conclude from the_present flurry of. diplomatic act lvity and from ·-t:he .. publi~ ~i:~tements which are be lng made that U.S. policy, or the policy of the western bloc, has changed. The western powers still seek to prevent change in southern Africa. They are willing to accept some fonn of "majority rule", for they no longer see any way of preventing that. They are not, however, willing to accept the kinds of changes, the elimination of white privilege and the reduction of econo=iic inequality, for which Africans have been struggling.
Namibia ls a country of extraordinary inequalities. It has always been assumed that the purpose of majority rule would be to eliminate the systero of apartheid which creates those inequalities. The western powers, ho~ever,
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are insistent.ly urging an implicit distinction between 11maj.orlty rule" and 11funda.t1ental change" in Namibia. ·
Dr. Kissinger has made this position clear in a number of statements over recent months. These have, not surprisingly, received little notice in the western press. Yet they represent the foundation of the policy now being pursued by the United States in Africa. On his return from his April trip to Africa, Dr. Kissinger told the House International Relations Committee that
"we were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West;~---and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan_."
In May he told the Senate Committee <?n Foreign Relations that
11\-le have a stake ••• in not having the whole continent become radical and more in a direction that is incompatible with western interests. That ls the lssue. 11
At his 11 September press conference in Washington, he elaborated on this point:
"We are facing a situatlon now in which a so-called 'anned struggle' is already taking place in Rhodesia and isbeginning in. Nami_bia. The history of .these struggles ls"'that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of foreign Intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the ~hole continent of Africa, in which moderate governments will find it less and less possible to concentrate on the aspirations of their people and becoming (slc).more and more focused on events in southern Africa~ For this reason, we want to provide a non-violent alternative to this prospect. 11 ~-- -- ·---· ··•--· ... _ · ,.-·--··---·-·
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.. 6. The U.S. position, and that of i,ts allies, may be summarized schematically
as follows: -·----
@:, e~<?alat ing yiolenct;. -~i;~~~~-'~£,~~-:<!.;!~~~}£n." · · I in southern Africa• ! -~•""' ... ~......... ... ~ .. , .. ~ ·- - ~ ' __ ,_.t.,~
@1 and possibly, presumably by example, to "radicalization" ~ in the rest of the African continent;
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"radical lzat ion" means "economic estrangemen'i the \.lest" and movement "in a direction that is incompatible with western interests 11
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from
the kind of 11radlcallzatlon 11 which might take place would affect ·not just the U.S. but the whole western bloc of countries;··---~---.
7. It is now being said, in consequence, that the escalation of violenc~ in southern Africa must be.stopped at all costs. President Ford has recently indicated that this is now considered a matter of vital interest to the U.S. In a statement issued from the White House on 8 September,· he said that i:he· first objective of the Unlt~d States in Africa was 11to prevent an escalation of the violence which ln time could threaten our n3t ional securit:z."• · This · appears to be the first time in ,~hich a high official has publicly linked the possibility of change in Africa to United States national security.
8. Thus the United States and its allies have not abandoned the quest for "stability" in so~thern Africa. They are merely looking for a formula wllich will ensure r:stability 11 in the :1ew conditions which prevail today. And the obvious formula is to accept 11majority rule" without allowing lt to disrupt the existing pattern of power and lnterestso They want to establish governments which will "represent" the majority but which will also eschew any kind of fundamental chan3eo TI1ey want to install "moderate" governments which will respect South African and western interests. ""'",...._,........,_...,.,.
9. South Africa and its supporters are therefore seeking guarantees wh!ch,:ln e~fect, would seriously limit the sovereignty of any future government in -Namibia. This ls not a secret. But, again, the matter has not been dealt with objectively in the western press. A few western journalists have alluded to the problem. But that ls all. On 3 -~eptenber,_ in the 1-:ctshlnc:ton Post, Robin Urlght pointed out that_ "moderate" Africctn governments might be expected to ensure 11the protection of the white minority's rights, and (secure) con-
·\ tinued Uestern ties in an area important for strategic, economic and political reasons. 11 And John Burns pointed out in The New York Times of 4 September that Vorster's "solution ls to expedite peaceful solutions that will install middle-of-the-road black governments~·"
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The new policy of support for "majority rule" ls thus founded on a serious contradiction. The.western powers seek to establish "moderate" governments which will respect foreign interests. To protect those interests, such 11goverruoents" would have ·to hold change within very narrow limits. They would not be able to change the basic conditions against which Africans have struggled for so long. They would consequently be unable to "deliver the goods" of independence. Such "government" would be estranged from the peo;,le. They would be seen as illegitimate. And fighting would cont~~ue_and lnten~if~.
f 1To, install such ugovernments_~• a~ this time, .. the ref ore,- is·~?,~.~~--:~:...-~;~~~-•~-( .a conflict ~hich will shake not only Africa but the world. : l; .,,i;t.:!'.,~':l • · ► -·-~ .. ·•··•·-"'·=1<..•.,-:. .. .,.-... _,._ .. .,.,..,._~,: .·. ~ ~..;..:.,.._"\;G-~.:...1.•.~::;~•-, ..... ~ .... :, • .,..,., •. -..1·.-·.\1~~-~ ... •-·-·...:.•·~--- ,.·.J- .-. ,_ • 0 .~.J--•
11. It ls nonetheless clear that the United States and other powers are ready to accept the client regime which South Africa ls about to install in Nanibia
(and that they are working as well to provide it with all the support_ which, ( in their judgment, such a "government" would need to survive. ·
South Africa's Plans for an "Independent" Namibia ·
1. Plans for the so-called 0 independence" of Namibia are now well advanced. And it ls likely that South Africa will announce the fonnation of an interi.rl government of placemen uithin the near future. Once such a govern..~ent is in place, and once it begins to receive foreign assistance, it will be difficult to dislodge it. There ls consequently very little time left for the United t;ations to act. --~~--~-,--~-··•··"" ___ ,_.,.~---·~-•-··~·-··"·-··~·• ---·c:a.......-.--.. ....... ...-'-'··~ ~~--- ·-.~--.. ~--i;...,a.•,.,,.
2. In:1974 South Africa began to realize that it could no longer continue to treat Namibia as a colony in the tradit lonal sense. The collapse of the . Portuguese empire increased the pressures for change everywhere in southern Africa. South Africa therefore detennined to mo~e towards establishing a client regime in order to by-pass S'rlAPO •. By September of. last year the South Atrican'authoritie·s had ·succeeded· in organizing a 11multi-racial 11 conference ln Windhoek which was charged with laying plans for "independence". This conference brought together representatives of eleven ethnic groups in Nanibia. SWAPO 'was excluded from its deli be rat ions.
· 3. The "con.st ltut ional talks" began wl thin a framework which ensured South Africam control of the final results. The assumptions on which they were based were: 1) that South Africa would determine the date of "lndependenceri; 2) that no solution unacceptable to the white cormaunlty would be allowed; and 3) ciiat the Bantustan policy of ethnic "governments" would continue.
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On 18 August of this-year a "constitutional committee" of the conference announced the first results of its deliberations. vague general plan for movement·towards "independence" at the The plans provided for the following sequence of events:
1. agreement on a constitutional "foundation 1'
in the near future;
2. the creation of an interim "multi-racial" government;
3. finalization of a constitution;
4. establishment of a permanent goverrunent;
5. 11independence 11 on 31 December 1978.
page 6
Turnhalle It issued a end of 1978.
ThQ publication of this plan was timed to avert Security Council action :tga tnst South Africa after passage . of Resolution 385 in January of this., year. · The Resolution set August 31st· as the deadline for South Africa to
:i.hnounce plans for ending its illegal occupation and for moving towards elections under U.N. supervision and control.
Sb The plans set out on 18 Aucust made no mention of elections. It was subsequently reported in Johannesburg that South Africa would inform the Security Couhcil that elect n:ms would be held in the territory before 11independence 11•
But lt ls clear timt South Africa will not accept United Nations supervision ~ftd control of elections unless i1::···1s forc"ed to •. The United Hati~ns would . b·e able to ensure that elections were free. It w;uld be in a position to prevent intimidation and the manipulation of the electoral process by South -Aft'ica. S~-lAPO would thus be bound to win a significant majority of votes, and that would scuttle the whole South African plan.
61o 1'he 1.'Urhhal le proposals were lmmcd!ately rejected ·as inadequate by both S\JAl?O and the United Nations Council for Namibia. The Council pointed out that the organizers of the Wlndhoe_k !'.!onference had excluded the 11authent le l"eprcsentative" of the Namibian people and that the August proposals 11do not even app~oach any of the requirements for genuine self-deteIT!llnatlon and lndepehdence".
?. lt has been known for some time that South Africa would soon move to ~~tabllsh an interim "government" in r.;amibia. It ls also known that the .Pr-e~ldent of the regime to be established is Chief Kapuuo, who has been COfflmUtln.g between Hindhoek and the United States f;r mor~ than a year. The l?rlme Hinister of this "government" is to be Dirk Mudge, a prominent member of the Namibian white community and the convener ·of the \andhoek conference.
page 7
South Africa is moving ahead rapidly with the timetable set out in the proposals of 18 August. Less than a week ago, the "constitutional committeen of the Turnhalle conference announced another step towards the establishment of a client regime in Namibiae It reported that the conference had agreed upon a basic structure for a future Z-:aiillbian 11government".
9. The governmental system proposed would be three-tiered. On the first level there would be a national and "multi-racial" government dealing with questions of national importance. Representation would be on a~ ethnic basis. At a second level, tirbal "governments" would deal with tribal affairs. At a third level, local authorities would be chosen by the residents of different towns and villages.
10. Thus the "government" proposed would be founded upon and incorporate the Bantustan.system which South Africa has imposed on Namibia.
11& The entire South African scheme -- a plan proposed by Dr. Kissinger.as representing "independence" -- is furthertnore ~ased upon ··conditions which l-1111 make any real changes ·1n·I~amibla impossible. The South Africans have insisted upon two important conditionsf
1. the contfouat1on of the South African occupation;
2. control of .the economy by the white cor:munlty.
Thus ariy future 11goverrunent" would have very little leeway to begin with. It would have to operate within a framework of constraints which would deny it real sovereignty. It would not be able to eli:ninate apartheid, although lt might end sone particularly restrictive regulations. And lt would not be able to control the use of the country's resources. South Africa and the muJtinational corporations which now operate in Namibia would continue to exploit the territory 1 s mineral and hwnan resources. And things would remain much as they are nowo
Plans for Foreign· Economic, Technical a:t_1d _Military Assistance
1. In his speech to the Urban League in Boston on 2 August, Dr. Kissinger indicated that the Uni':ed States would be willing to assist a Namibian "government" once the country was on its way to inctependence. "Once concrete steps are undernay", he said, "the U.S. will ease its restrictions on
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trade and investment in Namibia and provide econonic and technical assistance to help that nation consolidate its independence." Thus Dr. Kissinger
3.
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seemed to leave the door open for U.S. assistance to an interim government appointed by South African authorities. This ls precisely the kind of assistance which South Africa would need to make its scheme work. The U.S. political commitment to underwrite a client regime would be indispensable.
U.S. support for such a regime ln Namibia would make it possible to protect the status quo without seeming to frustrate majority rule.
There is evidence that such U.S. involvement ls now much more than a theoretical possibility.and that it ·may soon go to.the a·ld of ·a Kapuuo-l-tudge·":;·•···interlm 11governrnent 11 • ·rhe·u.s.·Government ls now conducting a series of ..... __ .. - . extensive studies into the problems of transition in Namibia and Zimbabl.'e. One study, which ls apparently being done on a rush basis with an appropriat~on of some $350,000 ,for the Agency for International Development, seeks to analyze in detail almost every aspect of Namibian society during the process of transition. And .it is concerned as well with the formulation of the "appropriate" U.S. Government "policy and program responses 11 to the crises of transition.
4o The A.I.D. study project, which has been under way for some weeks, ls concerned not only with the problems which will arise -- and which are to be set out in different "scenarios" -- during transition, but also with the way ln which antlclpated:developments will affect neighboring countries. It is clear from the text.of the project proposal that the principal country with wh~ch the investigators are concerned is South Africa.
5. The project ls clearly focusing on the ldentlficatlon of possible levers in Nar.1ibian society by which the United States Government and others may influence the novement of events there. The fi"rst objective of the "Principal Investigator~', for instance, is to make an informed assessment of:
"the attitudes of government and liberation leadership ln southern Africa to ascertain their position with regard to transition in Zimbabwe and Namibia and their assessment for prospects and problems arising from majority rule, their openness to and attitudes towards U.S. policy and pro,:;rams related to transition, their planned role with regard to transition and any possible U.S. role associated therewith, and finally their estimate of the effects of majority rule on their own country or other countries in the region. 11
6. Furthermore, the study ls attempting·to identify the political, social, university, non-profit, foundation, corporate and other institutions or groups~hich might be willing to support or ass 1st 1'U. s. Government programs and policies related to the transition to majority rule 11 • That is, it seeks. to identify those who may be enlisted within the United States to assist South Africa's efforts to install a client regime in Namibia.
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The project proposal reads very much like many of the proposals which set~ _ in motion the wheels that produced the U.S. campaign to "win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people" in the period after the Geneva conference of 1954. It 1s reconlzably an exercise In counter-Insurgency. And it ls probably not by accident that a number of the senior "investigators" associated with the project have long records of involvement with the Central Intelli-gence Agency. ..,....-d•~~-...,.......
'80 Even with substantial 1nternat ional ass !stance, however, an interim "government" in Namibia would have only the most narrow-chance of survival. For
I the people of Nami bla are well aware that South Afr! ca is triing to install 1 a regime which it can count upon to maintain the status quo •. And they are
t'ound to continue .. the armed struee;le which they are now waging. SUAPO have said that the armed struggle will continue if the road to genuine independence is barred.
9. A K.apuuo-1-ludge regime would therefore face exactly the same problem \i._hlch the South African authorities now face: an expanding war, a war which has tied down some 50,000 South African troops and police and caused much of the country to be placed under martial law. The question ls how could such a regime do without South African '1security" forces?
10. The United States has evidently come up wlth an answer to the questlon,.an ~ansHer which might make it possible for South Africa to "make a commitment to withdraw lts forces from Namibia". It has been reported by reliable sources that the United States has pledged in Zurich to fin2nce, train and equip a
1!'Namlbian' army" which would replace South African forces. This is reportedly ~fi~~S~)~ ·pro quo. for ~- South African_ agreement --~o _ wi thdra~· .from Nami bla. · Such a_ct ion on the part of the United States would, of course, make it possible for South Africa to withdraw in the certainty that its ~llent regime would be well protected.
lle Jn'the Dublin S~nday Press of 19 September a former United Nations advisor in Africa reported that with the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia,
"A new Black Namibian armed force would then be created, St~Jn~d_by United States military personnel, equipped by the U.S. and financed by.the U.S. for at least a decade. What the l imlt would be on the number of United States military advisors i~ not known. It is intended that a
I large proportion of the American soldiers and other personnel working in Namibia should be black."
12. The pattern of South Africa-United States actions and plans ls clear. These powers"'t'.are preparing to establish a client regime •. furnish it with ample aid and provide it with the means of holding power. TI1e pattern·I~-classlc~l~Itis"''one whlcri"has· been repeated many times, ~~d i; being repeated. And it ls a pattern which almost inevitably produces war and unnecessary horror, suffering and hardship. ___..- --·~-------~
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. . . . page 10
The Present Position
1. The analysis set out above describes roughly what South Africa and the. United States are trying to accomplish and how they are planning to accomplish it. They have made lt clear by their state~ents and actions that they would. 1 ike to consolidate a Kapuuo-l-:udge ·reg ine and have it accepted by the international community. This does not mean that these plans will succeed. South Africa is in an exceedingly difficult situation militarily in Namibia. And the United States ls bound to be troubled by the fact that
Jan obvious client regime will be denounced as illegitimate, by SHAPO, by \the Organization of African United and by the United Nations.
2. So,far·no co:nmon ground has been found which would make it possible for negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa to begin. But it may be that some of the obstacles to negotiations have been cleared away~ South Africa is now in a pas it ion to make some concessions to SlJAPO. . It has ·susgested ~ ...... t'i-iat · it" might release 11some11 poll t lcal prisoners. And," if the American offer to create a "Namibian anny" has been worked out, it may be able to offer SWAPO a "reasonable timetoble 11 for the withdrawal of South African forces. These concessions, of ·course, would not really change the situation or bring SWAPO and South Africa closer together on basic issues. They might, however, make it possible fore neg'otiations to begin.
3. Negotiations in Geneva would be long and drawn out. They would buy time ... for··south Africa and the western p0i-1ers. ·ouring that time, Security Council
4.
a·ctlon would government. "referendum"
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t __ ~f proposed conference. ttreferendum"
be delayed and some way might be found to legitimize an interim Dirk Hudge, for instance, has suggested that there might be a in Na,mibia in which the voters might be asked to choose between SHAPO constitution and the arraneements proposed by the Turnhalle It would not be difficult to predict the results of suCh a···• ........ , held under South African control.
South Africa and its supporters clearly want South Africa to retain control in Namibia by one means or another. However long negotiations may last, it ls difficult to imagine SHAPO agreeing to any fon1Ula for a settler."!eht which would make South African control possible. If SVAPO is to succeed.in breaking
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f~rough wha~. can. only_ be seen .as a dis ingenuous "offer to negot late" by the ·-~" ptfier-s ide, then. l t. will need the m.:iximtnn pressure and support from· ·the-··· __ .., l~-=--d N~t ion:_::~d .:he ~-f_r_!.~~~~~~:_..- __ ., .. ~-·--··-·· -------- ►~---•-·---- -~-~-~
(~'!i UN1TED NATIONS V/J NATIONS UN IE S _,....,...
N E W YO R K f~/' ,\li· '.i 11. _:_: /ib·t--
~/ - -~if
NO\/ 2 9 1976,
With the comp/
of
Sean Mac Bride
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia
.... 1
• ,... , · • , • , ~ .' , • i : , • • r , : i · , · · ! ~ J '
'flIE Tl;-ll .. S SATURDAY'NOYl:;v113ER 27 1976. • •• -• - • • • - • r • • •• .. - • I
~. I( ~~>v o)s~iJ~~{ti~;:ei-e11-[i tif. , /_?:· lYjL.a_, d . . . .. _.J , a _ .. •-. , · . .-·. ,
s.J·,vv:t~fri¢fi _t_~~Jl<:~-,~d~~~f :~·!(/\---~, fr'om dur ·own Cori-c,pontlcnt· ·- . The Turnhalle talt:s, .. wl11ch Johanncsbur;;:, ~ov 2G , _;.:·:-: ha\·e _b~~n. dra2,iing __ on for 15
?\f v · ,ter '·the'· s·oiith m:i:1t]1s,. liaye _bc~n _delayed bY ·. r ,. _or_- • . . . - . conflicting propos~ll:., for. ' a
.\fncan,, r_1_·1111e_ )~1111ster, . h~s ticr~:l · interim. ; · ~(!\'Crnmcnt !old the con<utut1on commit-• whi;::;i would t.tke.-orer con:rol tee of the Turn!dle cunr dCl}Ce of the' cou:-ilry. until f~ll indein wii,dhock .-.-:iich is d:;cuss-· pc1idcnce in 19i3. 1fr Vorster in,. the future of S0·1th-Wesf is unJ.::r.;tood to hav<made it .-\ft·ica (X:imibiJ) to stop drag:-· known · __ t)1at ne !\'as. co:11ing f;ing its feet, 2.:1d to form an. unde-r strong. rn1ernat1onal' interim 0 oycrnmcnt in the ter- pre,,ure for S:iuth Africa to be ritory a~ quickly as po5sibl~-- seen. to. be _di_n;sting __ ~t_self_ ~f
This emerged from yester- the tcrratory. . , . . , , · • . ,fay's·. lengthy discussions in:,_ H<! ·eycn· ;;,1,;•e a warning that, Pretoria: between members· of· Sout'.1 Africa might im;1ose a, the ~ommittee, reprc~cming the con,tit11tio11 on the_ territory if I tern tory's • 11 · main· black, the Turn]ialle conference cLlJ.ys, brown ;,,nd white etlrnic groups. continued. Ho1,c1·i:r, he cmpha-·: and ?>.rr . Vo1·:'.ter and senior sized that the people should be memb;:rs-of.his Cabinet..;· . allowed to decide·.', ·. ~
The Prime . :,!inistcr. is. also .••. 0;1cc concrete· proposals for ; .. understood.10·.ha\'e· rulcd.out:__a·n. interim ,;0H,rnment ·had:. ... • an. intcr;,ational conft:Tcncc in-~. bc:en ~uhmit::c:-d; South' .-\fricaJc.;.,... 1·0Jving the South African Gov•·. woul:l t.:.l:e b1:1:2d:ate sh:ps to,
·c1·:1ment and the South-i\'cst _·put the tcrritor:i on ·the· r,,ad to: Africa's People's. Orgai1iz;;tion · in:Iepcn<lcnce, ··he _ told the; (Swopo) . . --. ·r ·· ~-- · ! .T:L:ri.1!1anc delegJ.tes.~ .--~----·.
'1 . -
•l·r··/' ~ o -;; i ·:·-~--;1..r::3~ r.1 ·j \.\...,/ .{ }.~J.hc..0
p.J __ ti . . . :. ·ea . . . 11· fl';'.'11,-a .
:~ .;_. - \:#.- -~ l
:i from DAVID. l\1A_RTIN .in Geneva .
~ IF, AS now ;ippcars 'prob- the N..-imibian p·cople •· ,1·ould ' able, South. Africa. estab- be excluded. · -. · . ' .· ·
·l · , 'If they impose an inter1m· ;: lish es an interim" gi:n·ei-n- government on _the people of-; 1 mcnt in ·N"amibia (South N'amibia, we'1·eserve the ri~l1t,j West Africa) early in the to· ·call in mi_1itary support l -- · ·11 b from friendly- - countries.,' -l new year, the st;igc WI. c SiV.\PO'S Secretary for In• _; set for another Afncan _ formatifn _an_d _Pub_licity, Mr l 1 war with the danger of Peter 1'..at3anv1, said here. I 1 st perpowcr involvement· .. :·r S\YAPO, whiclJ has·. be1:n I .. 1 • • . • . • • .• fighting a guernlla war m · Thi~ 1s. -1~~-• widely !1eld . Namibia for 10 years already
\·ie1". rn ?;i.1111~;;:rn and ~ipl?• rect:il'cs . military : si1pport m;,ti~ c11:cles aft~r Fridays from Eastern Europe·an counmce1111g J1l Preto_na bctw~1::n tdes and, in p;irticular; the the South African . Pnme Sol'iet Union.. I . · ·. . r-.Iinister • .!\Ir John Vorster.- The only sccui-ity forces and dcle~ates to tlJe r~r~-tbe interim gol'crnment could hallc _t;ilkS on Namibia S call upon to fight the guer-future .......... · •· . · rillas would be those of ·· Although few details !Hive South Africa. That· says 1!r
I emergcp from t~e meeting; it Katjavivi, would be 'tantais known. that It was called mount to a declaration of
I, pdmaril,Y to_ discuss setting war by_ South Africa •. _- ·-up an 111tenm government. Despite some movement by
1 with members of the ethnic South Africa, the attempt by and tribal dcle;;ates to the the United States Secretary Turnhalle'talks. - of State, Dr Henry Kissinger•
The South West Africa to convene a Geneva confer~ Peoples · Organisation ence to agree on the proce·sscs: tS\\':\PO), reco.snised by !he leading to independence in trnited Nations as the N:i1n:bia. appears to 'h..1Ye
i 'lt:·giti:i~:He t epi~~~~o!~ti, e of fa.i!rd.. ~ 1 , • ~
by Peter Chippindate' and Martin Walker- --- · · ·
Mr Merlyn Rees is facing his first major test ·tried to use once before, .~nd then'~ns~ccessful~·. , be served hours before they were actually . can countries. He said he believed that th~ ,s Home Secretary as protests erupted over his ly. · 1 ·:' :, handed to the two rnen. CIA wanted the book stopped. He had almost 'ecision to deport two Americans on the ground, .... Allegations agalnst'the'•Home :office centred · . . . .; 'finished the research and was about to start JI national security. /_.·on Am~rican pres~ure.: The. Nat_i,onal Union of';: . But _the.· Embassy· stoutly 'deni~d that .a~y· ' writing. If he was deported he could be stopped
When Mr Ree_s a!te_mpted to address a , . Jo_urnal,sts, of wh_i_c~ 1?oth_ men 1are members, · ,pressure had been brought to bear and this. from writing the book, for example by being labour Party ant1-rac1a!1sm rally -In Trafalgar•,.!. said· they were vIctIm~·. of, al• sho?dY .. deal _ 'was confirmed by CIA sources In Washington, · put on trial. Square on Saturd~y, his speech was almost.-;, .. between the US and Brit1sh:iauthorl_t1es. The•,·. ··.who said: "Some, of our guys might have. ., ;'rowned by chanting from supporters of Mr . ,, de_puty general se~reta_ry,_ -~r- Charles Har~ness, · .. sounded off at dinner parties a:Jout Agee. but_; · · One pointer. to the reasons for Mr Hosenball's _.iark Hosenball, a reporte~ ~n the London Even- .,· , .. saI_d they _w_ere being v1ct1~Ised for t~.e ~rime of· , the idea of bringing pressure to deport him _,1.'deportation was given by a claim by Miss Julie ·ng Standard, an~ Mr Phtlip A_gee, the _ex-CIA , do,n{! their JOb,,and doing 11 too well._ It 15 an at- , is unthinkable. He l_s small fry as far as we are· · 'Brooks, the editor of an American magazine call-":an who _has achieved_ worldwide notoriety for .. tack 1~ the crudest form on the freedom of the concerned." eel Counterspy, which exists to expose lntor-,,s revelations about his former employers. · press, I , , '.r, · ,,, , : ' . national intelligence activities Miss Brooks
MPs. the National Union of Journalists, the Mr Agee himself suggested thatthe decision Mr Agee made his name with his book Inside claimed that Mr Hosenba\l w~s "one of our ~ational Council for Civ_il lib~".ies, and a hasti:y- might have been _made afte:•the appointment of , the Company - a CIA Diary, published In 1973, -. England group" ·and connected him with Mr ormed defF!nce _ c_omm1ttee Joined to condemn a new CI_A chief tn London, D~. Edward_ Proctor. · and has recently been working with an American · Winslow Peck, who runs the magazine and was
'101 only the c!ec1s10~ to deport the two men but 1nfor~at1on from th~ , CIA, ,. Certainly the co-author on another book which is an account barred from entering Britain last summer af\er ;,t~o t~e controve'.s1al procedure under the Im- ~merican Embassy tn ~ondon had been of CIA involvement since the war in Eastern and trying to give evidence at the Baader-Meinhoff -n1gratIon Act which the Government has only informed that the deportation notices were to Western Europe, Portugal, ~ome South Ameri-.' trial in Wester Germany.
I . . .· •. 1·J,,·' .;I'll<' I, Ii .
. ,. , ' ' i t,1:-,,: , :1 I ;,-· .I, fl ,. ' ,, 0 , ,rIAJs COlilmf,~!: .. ,fH[3Cl~IIng 1' ... , .
THE SUBSTANTIAL group of civil 'iberty experts and former intelligence f,fficers in Washington who have been 1.rying to publicise the- CIA's covert operations over the years are surprised and baff:ed bv Britain's intention to deport Phi!ip ~\gee and Mark Hosenba!L It is taken for granted that the CIA's hand is behind the move against Agee, but the timing seems particularly odd. The anti-CIA lobby admits it 1-ias been on the defensive in recent months ever since the agency,managed ~o emasculate last winter's attempt in Congress to have covert operations abolished.
Why pick on Agee no~, ani~isk a renewal of pressures against the CIA? One theory is that the agency i~ totally
. ronficent once again. Another is that '
1Ie ('J :\ 's new station chief in London, 'r · · "ruc'..or, is under orders to '.c-11-·,, /,•;•.'e before the Carter ad-
1:iini,trntiun takes over.. , .. ·
On the reason~ for Mr Hosenball's deport.at:on, opinion is divided. Mr Wi~slow Peck, who runs Counterspy, thinks tliat the South African security organis.1 tion, BOSS is mainly concerned. !3ut he does not rule out· a comp!icated triang'.e involving British, American and South African intelli~ence.
,The forthcoming_ issue :·or Counterspy contains 11n article alleging :Cl,\ control over the Southern ,\fricon regional development plan
~ ,' 0 , :
0 r • • I , : ,'. ' , o ~ : I , ~ ' I 1 ' t ~ ; 1
I :
,.currently being ,prepared by the US US .Attorney General asking him to '_Agency for International Develop- state the Government's intentiori. · ment. The plan's day-to-day work is , Agee ,could also face a civil injunc: supervised by Mr Terry Lambacher, tion .from the CIA as a former -.'an AID official who worked as AJD's em.ployee demanding that he submit ·liaison· officer with the South Viet- any future books t<> the agency for cen-: ·namese interior ministry at the height sorship, Another former agent, Victor ,of the "pacification programme" and · Marchetti, was forced to., cut huge whom Mr Peck from his own ex- , chunks out of his book, perience as an intelligence officer in . ,In' Washington, Mark Hosenball's Vietnam says h'e knows is a CIA man, · father said he was shocked by the deci-
Mr Peck denies categorically the · sion, to expel his son. As general suggestion that ~!ark Hosenball was counsel, Mr Neil Hosenball holds the planning to publish the names .. of . top legal job in National Aeronautical British intelligence agents :_in Space, Administration, NASA. He Counterspy .. The last issue of the jour~ could not believe that his son had done nal said the magazine would "explore ·. anything to undermine Britain's CIA operations in Britain more : security.
. thoroughly in future issues," including ' The magazine Counterspy started its , "relationship with journalists, three years ago, Its advisory board in-military circles, and politicians." ,Mr eludes many members of the radical Peck stayed with Hosenball when he . wing of the movement against the Viet-
. visited London in February. He was , nRm wRr and its articles come mainly refused entry by Mr Roy Jenkins, then from people who resigned from the in-Home Secretary, without any explana, telligence services in protest. This tion when he tried to return last June, summer it went through a financial
. But Mr P~ck says Hosenball was crisiH when one cf its main backers, the one of many friends who gave him writer Norman :Vlai!er, pulled out in hospitality rather than information. favour; of supporting efforts to lobby Counterspy has no plans now to, against the CIA on campuses and with publish nnything on Britain. ' 1 , films rather than through a magazine.
The immediate issue among Philip Counterspy did not become promi-Agee's frien<ls is whether he will he n~n,t until it began naming CIA agents prosecuted if Britain forces him to as a method of last resort to block ii-return to the United States.,_His legal covert activities. When Mr. lawyer, Mel Wulf, who is legal director Richard Welch, the CIA station chief of the influential American Civil in Athens,was murdered at the climax
··· Liberties Union, sent a telcb'fam to the of the congi-essionnl inquiry into the
Jonathan :Steele-fro_m;Washington gauges US_ reaction to the Home Office deportation orders ·.'.
CIA last winter,' the a·gency accused Counterspy of responsibility. The apparent connection was that some months earlier the magazine had reprinted Mr Welch's name from a Latin American left-wing journal, bu.t it placed him in Lima not Athens, .
·. · 'It wns also pointed out by the CIA's critics_ that Mr Welch was a "lightcover" agent whose link to the CIA was well-known in Athens. In fact the main beneficiaries of Mr Welch's still
· unsolved murder turned out to be the • CIA itself. As a result of the huge . publicity given to his funeral in Arlington National Cemetery, attend-ed by President Ford, the focus of ¢iddle-of-the-road discussion of the CIA shifted from its abuses to the 'question of leaks and the safety of its 'personnel.
If the murd~r had any temporary effect on recruitment, that was soon
' overcome and the new director of CIA, Mr George Bush,_ is known to boast
. "! •
, nowadays that the quality of n~~ : applicants for CIA jobs is higher than
before. Whether President-elect Carter will
. take a different line towards the CIA is · unclear. In his issue paper on the agency he says: "We must not use the CIA or other covert means to effect violent
' change in any government or govern-ment policy." The use of the. word
; "violent" would allow Mr Carter to go on with the "destabilisation efforts" in
, developing countries such as Jamaica, Chile, or other countries which the
, CIA prefers now to its more ham-· handed assassination operations in the past. Mr Carter's· vice-president Walter Mondale was on the Senate
· sub-committee on intelligence headed : by Frank Church which attempted to · investigate the agency. However its
final report d_ropped a number of ' chapters at the agency's request and : ended up by endorsing some forms of ; covert activity.
THE GUARDIAN, November 28, 1976
..
'· y
-tJ/ .. ,ll.'. . {
§ Afrli~i ITT1et~irrns:iG~1iioi%i·B~F~1Yfi~f~ fifSVvO~iFi tVMch d11llilltche§ s/JJY. slhlOws aieStD'eiifibn. · \/ 5::;:; '>J
• . • . .· • • • . , ~; . >, - -: .· 1.c · -· , ·-· -· · t , ~ .t..-: .:~ ;.. : 1 · _ - ~ . ..,._ l J;rom :,..;icholas Asl1ford. A~t follo\\·ing ·:i·csterda~•s polic·e· immincpt less than '13 hours_ 'The 'prac;idiuin· of the South, Johannesburg, ~ 0 ,, 26 raid. They are I\lr Cedric before the Sowdo disturbances African Cou:icil of Churcl1cs~
, • l • l\fa"S011 editor of the Christian bcz:m in June. Al:'.,ou;h. · s;;.id in a statc-mcnt loni:!llt that Anot,1er pro1111nent · w 11te , • - • -fostitute's .Journal Pro Vcri- n>,'.;2rdcd as a rno1lcrci:e by ·111e police· r.{i<l. was "s,·inpto-1 churchman, the Rev Reinhardt ,
Eruckncr. has been dct.iincd by tale; :\frs Dernadctte r-.fosafa, most Soweto inhabit2.111s '.,e has ·m;:nic• of• ·a regime which, the South African security an employee of the South be.en ~ persistent .critic ,;f the hecoming desperate because of police in the _wake of ·yester- African Co,rncil of Churches; South . African. Covcrn·mcnt's . the· failure :of i,ts 1)01icics, is day's swoop on the Jo1iannes- her husb:rnd. Mr Leonard r.,ce policies and has . been. to· ·increasing]y·· • : equating· · :iny burg licadquarters of a num- Mosala; }Jr E3rney 1\';akane, the'fore in demanding a better oppDsition to those policies as ber of Christian or;.inizations. director of the SACC's univcr- d~al for urban blacks, · . ." . hdng legally offensi•,e ". It saw'
:\fr Eruckner, a West sity fund; }.fr Bruckner and ' His dctc;1tion pr1;rc11ted him 'the ,raid. as part of a country-Get m:m citizen, is director of Miss \Vyngaard.· A scycnth froni i1iecting J\lr Dick Clark,' ;,·ide .ittemin to· "crij,ple · and the Christian AcaJi:my. Ycstcr- person. :\!rs Sybil Brown, was the American senator, ·and I\k . paralize. organizations · which dav his vffices were searched briefly .det:iined · Cliarlcs Diggs, a Con~re,sm,rn; pur_sue. policic_s : _ _ and·· f:Jcals and :\fiss ~.!yrtle Wyngaard. liis Mr · Leonard :'.\fo5aJa, »ho ,,·ho are. touring souihcrn _ _r.1d1cally opposite to those. of 2-~sistant \,·as detained. _. But 1rnrks for IB~,1 today also lost Africa~··: ___ ; · ·· .' · . the National Party ".c·; -·~"- : . · :,,_fr Bruckner w:is al!ow1;d to go his post on the Soweto Urban '. The·-raid .liri 'chu;.ch 'offic~s'-~ ,_ \kanid1ilc -· ano.thei-_' African free until he· returned home Bantu C01111cil where he was a was d~plored today by t~e most. :was. detained· in S~wcto ·today,~ ·:. last ni:;:ht ,rhcn the ·police· leading member of the oppo-_ Re,· Dill nurnett, Archbishop of , Mr. _L?;-eda~e Khum~lo, . a _ picked him up. sition. The township's new C;ipe Town, who is head of the . stat1sllc1an - m the-. f1n:mc1al .·
The West German Embassy, - mayor, ?\rr D:irid ThebchaJi, s;iid Anglican·. Church· in South .. library {!f the Jolzm.nesburg 1,hich has· r~,ised the matter that ?\fr ?\fosala and Mr Lennox Africa. Spc3king _in Grahams- ,,Still": He \\.J:s· s_cized "·he_n a·, 1\ith the South African Depart· i\rlonzi. t,·.-o leaders ·of· the· 101rn ,rhe1·e the church is hold-· squad of 10 policemen raided ·mcnt of foreign Affairs. has Soweto Pro~rcssire Party, ·were ing its'pro.-incial s_ynod, he said ''.)his home at 3 am. . . · . been told· that :\fr Bruckner is being di srnisscd because they he tl10ught there w.is no need He is the nintl1 person 'known ·1 11·a111ed for questioning for had failed to attend 1l1ree' con- fof such · action althou;;:h he . to !Jaye been det;;ined within ~ "an 1111dctermi11cd period". He secutive meetings. . said the church should not com- ·11ie last 24 hours. T\\'o others was due to return to Germ3ny· irr ·]lfosala acMc1·cd i~ter- phin' . t'oo·. much when it .:were held in Cape To"n yestcr- · for Christmas tonight. · · national fa:ne earlier this yc:1r suffered." a little indi~nily and day, ~frs Jean };'aidoo and Mr
Alto:::cther six people are when he g;n•e a ,,·arning that interference". ?lfony other were llruce Campbell Smith, an art, being held under tl1e TctTorism « another Sharpeville" was suffering a. good deal more. student.
. . . - l . ,\ .
rrxt1~ U N I T ED NAT I O N S ~-~~-·-~ NAT I O N S U N I E S
%-~LP
~ w POSTAL "OOAE5S-,1,.0AESSE PC,ST"LE UNITEO NA..TIO!'.S. N. Y, 10017
CA.BL£ AOOftl:S..-ACRltSSI
UNITED NATIONS NAT IONS .UN IE S
- 2 -
Because of the hiehly responsible position she holds I felt that
you would be interested in the two paragraphs quoted above.
Yours respectfully and sincerely,
Sean M acBride
cc: Mr. Rafeeddin Ahmed, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, R. 3800E Mr. A.A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special
Political Questions, Room 3834A
••
No such documents have been brought to the
attention of the Secretary-General or any of his
senior colleagues and they have no knowledge
whatsoever of their existence or their preparation •
22 November 1976
.r
..
Re1vealed: plaras fo1~ Na:nnibia ca:rve-up By James Fox, Peter Pring-le
and Ste\"c Weissman T\VO- confidential documents circ'iilating ms:de the J lrnteri Nations headquarters i_n__N.ew
, York reYcal ho\~ the United _S.~ing with South Africa, plans to tie l\"amibia-a territory with some of the richest mineral deposits in the world-into t.he western sph_ere of influence after it gains independence. probably next January_ T.he documents also warn that the plan will inevitably lead to bloodshed . . 'fhe strategy, accon:!ing to the
U~ documents. is to install a moderJte govcmment. instittite a progra~me of rapid economic expanswn and crC':ite conditio:1s favour:1ble to the exn!oitation of Namibia's Yast mineral wealth'.
The danger in the strateE!'y. the documents conc:iude is that it hinges upon l'Xcl~drng from power in !-...;amibia. the Russi:mbacked South West Africa
, Peoples'_ Org:misalion (Swapo ). Swapo JS currently li_;ht!n;.:; ;1
guerrilla war a'.:!::ims: South Africa~ forces in ·:--::unibia and is rec::i.~nised b\" the L-:-: :i~ the "k•gitimate repi·C',e11tat1n: of the !\ami!.Ji.:11 pcupil'.". Exdudm~ :b members frC>m po\H'r thl' don:ments predict. eould lead onh· to !u~lher violence. ·
The documents have been pre• I pared by l'N personnel on the basis o.f considerabie knowiedg..! of the US GorernmC'nt's µ:ans for l\"amib1a. The lirst is titled Namibia and Shuttle D1plom~C'~and dated September ~1 this year. The !:iunda:,.· Tim·~~ obtained 1.his last week. It was dr;;,,·n up inside the UX Councii for Namibia.
The second rlocument. which was published in the L'S :e~terday. is a memorandum bet\1-ee:i t\-ro high l.i2\ otiicials (\\·hose identi~ies. for somewhat comple:: reasons. have to be prC>tectcd). It is entitled Apparent Co,·ert Operations Against I\'amibia, and is dat0d October 31
The contents of both o\·erlap to a degree. in that both deal v,·ith the activities of the US Agency for International Devc!opments (AID). Both papers arc now understood to be Jr, the desk of the UN Secretarv General Kurt Waldheim. (And. as corrobo"ration, The Sunda,· Times
' has independently obtai11ed the internal AID document or- ,,·hich at least one of the UN analvses was based.) •
THE i\IOST likely candidate to I lead the pro-western, post-independence government in :\amib:a is Clemens Kapuuo, chief of the ' Herero tribe. And a big effort is alr~ady being made to estabfoh Kapuuo as a credible inter• national figure. rnd not simply a man controlled from either Pretoria or Washingto!l
The !>takes in Namibia are vast. Even in. its present underdeveloocd state. it has the fourth largest mineral output in Africa; and .huge deposits of uranium. diamonds <1nd copper remain largely unt::ippcd. And m coastline has. in Wah'is Bav one of the great natural harbou~s of the South Atlantic. Concer!1 over the ::omplexion · of its future govermne'.lt is inevitable.
Eqlally inevitable is the crowd of more-or-less freeiance operators whc,, as power approaches. -are clustering around Chief Kapuuo. A motley collection of international husllers. Park Avenue marketing men. mirnng entrepreneurs and ~cw York lawyers are all busilv a~sistin2" the ~mergence of ·a Kapuuo gover'.l;nent.
At the current constitutional talks on Namibia's future. initiated bv South Africa some years ago: Kapuuo JS. in the absence of Swapo. the mai:~ Afric-:in leader. ,\nd he is rrett1n" good adYic:e-from a !\c,1; York
r ii
I
promotin;: a Kapuuo · style Xamibi:m anny, and st-t up a co1:1in,1cd _from paac l govcrnmcnt is already accepted. pro:;::imme of rapid economic
Last ~!av, a month alter his expansion. law firm. Burn, and Jacoby: But meeting irith the Sou:h African T!IF: FIRST l"S \. 1 • 1 -Kapuuo himself 1s not payin;; prcnuer, John Vorster. ~he ~n·• ' , • ' ~c, proJCC 1~ their fee,. .Secretary of State. Henry his- a • .,.,g.ooo s,u_dj, \I h.ch. one or
:'lkanwhile. another Xew York sin::cr, tole\ the Ser.ate Foreign !,h_e l.::-1 an_alj~~s ,,,comments, 1s agency, 1',ycho;;raph1c Commun:• itet.itions Committee:" \\"c have _a_ppare_n:1{, hem.,. done .. on -~
• a stake ... in not ha,·in;; the ru~a b~':b. and. \i luch _ ~ceb ftat~~t:so 1:ncd, /ie ·:o~t~rrke~rat~ whole cont.nent become radical to analj 5e _rn <l_ct.11_] almo~t e1_ery politicians at the conference. and mo1·e in a d:rcction that is _aspect ot );amtbi~n soeiely Psycho,2raphic's founder. Jack incompatible with western in- Jurrng ~~e process 0 t tran.sit:_'l1'· Summers. has told Tnc Sunday tere:;ts. That is the issue." fhr~d j~~~f;t~~~neif aih~ el!~~~
10~
Times that he, too. is charging no Ki~in:;-er·s "len•r" in inmpl:: p,iate CS Coi·ernn:ent • policy fees. menting ll-iis po!icy in southern. and p:--::-::;~::-nme rc:;i)onses to the
Amon.;: Kapuuo·s other fans Africa is Vorster. For. in the c:--ises of transition.'" are a jct-sett!n~ millionaire intense dip"lomatic activity lead- This stucly ha.s been conspeculator, Alan :\Janus, who has in 6 up to Kissinger's first Africa tracted to a bodv called the share; in a comnanv which clai:ns shuttle in June, both men a~rced African-American · S ch o I a rs mining ri;:ht 'across no· fewer t!:at they understood "majority Council in \\'ashi_n;:;ton. than 2·5 million acres of Xamibia rule" to mean, also, moderate But. according to · the l:N' -one-sixth of the co11ntru. rule. And it is now clear, from analy~is. only a few people in
When we ·spoke to Summers uS Go\·ernmcnt sou:--ces. that the study have any knowledge in London l:ist week. he was among the prospC<."15 held out of Africa. convinred that the l:S Govern- by Kissin.;:er to Vorster w·hen The second AID project, ment w::rn!d ha\"e to throw its thev met in Zuri.c:h in :-.ray. ·was callee! the Southern African full we!,::ht behind J.;:apuuo and that. in return fo:. Vorster·s Regional Development Plan. is the other mcderate black pressurillg Smith to accept bud.;:eted to cost a million leaders, to avoid "another · majority rule in Rhodesia, the do:l:irs. This co1·ers a much Anc:ota.'' US would relieve South Africa wid~r area than )famibia alo:-ie
According to the U~ docu- of the contentious burden -0£ and, according to the lJ)I docu• ments. the rs is indeed moving .Namibia. ments, "there are 20 profesrapidly to implement its plan . To replace the South African sional researchers working ful! for ~amibia. troops now in .:\"amibia, the L'S ti:nc on this project, including ·THE • A)IERICA::{ interest_ in -would finance and tr:iin a black economic specialists and experts
:'\amhla: a land at stak~ on tr:rns;:iort and a;;riculture.''
The projec:t, thtlu::-:1 run on a I d:iy-to-day basis by ser.ior AID ! men, has been contra<.:tcd to a pri•;ate firm. Chccc~i & Co., big "\\'asllin;:;ton comuitants who did considerable work in \'1etnam in the 18GOs. "The precise s,;,tt:s · of the project is not dear,'' says. the li:-l memorandum. lF \\'ASH[:-;GTO:'-i is only now waking up to the pote:1Ual wealth of Xamibi::i, thougll. frcel~nce operators got the m2ssage 1ong ago. The first to catcil the scer:t was a short, plump ligure ·sith a contincn~al ':[oatee who called himself .Jame', Patrlck E:ndyL:ott. He arrived in :\amibia in late 196S or early 1969. wor;.;ing ti.rst as an architect and then as a partner in a ,:n:iii, Aniericanowncd mining firm. Gem;tone )liners. Jle was, he ~aid, Am"lra-lian by birth. ·
In fact, Endycott was 'born in. -----------------~---------------------------, Hungary sometime aronr.ct i93O.
A contemporary, now in F:-.:mkfurt, remembers his as :-iameth Gyorgy, an archited-a!"!d sc.:retary of a Budapest tenni:; l:iub. Gyorgy apparently !•~ft in 1956 _and went the following year on a refugee flight to Austr:ilia.
Later, in ::"l'amibia. E!"!dycott claimed to his :\'ew Zealand wife that he was gathering intelligence for some government or agcn('y, Se\·eral of his as;;ociates also remember his claim thJt he had worked for the Cl.-\-funded Radio Free Europe. ( But checks produce no confinmtion of th15.)
Endycott's politics were flexible. When he lirst reached Namibia, he took as pro-South African line. But soon he WilS courting the militant leaders of Swapo. He and In; wife e\·en acted as occa~iunal couriers for the group.
·•· When he was \\'Orkin:;: for Swapo he was tryin;; to \\'can them away from the Ru~sians." his widow says. "Uut 1 don·t belie\"e he was doin.'.: 1t for the CIA because there was so little money around."
'
···1i::::1t(ons ~rem to hare ~oure( artcr Endyrott prupli-r,I J three \\ ay 11:::1:n,; deJI h,'t .< ··•·n l11m· $Clf. s.,;ipu. ;rnd thr Go,·rrn:ncnt rif Zam'J,a. For it •.,a, ~0'111 after that deal fell thruu;;h that F.ndycotl b~came tllc Lo:1d0n repre• scnlal11·c of Swapo·~ ma1or antago:iisls, the :::roup around the llcrero Ch:ci Clemens Kapuuo.
Endyco!t 11-a5, in rJct. one of the first outsider:; to throw m his Jot with Ka;rnuo (ll'horn he had actually met wlu?c still in Namibia). He ;:;a1·e hospitality and even airline tickets to the
, Kapuuo group, llyin:r them to 1 London and -:-;ew Yor,- and ; introducing them around. : Endycott also in,raduced 1 Kapuuo lo the American lJ11yer,
I. Arnold Burns, whose :'\e1, York
Jaw firm-Burns ::nd Jacobi·! now represent Kapuuo·s group I at the constitutional talks. i Burns claims that he is doin(;( ' the work without getting paid : ! from anv source. I ! But Enrlycotfs hic;gest contri• !
I' bution appears to be more inllir- j
ect: the introduction to the . Namibian scene of a fast-talking ' New York "marketing stra:e-
gist.'' Jack Summers and his Psychographic Communicatiom. AS A PRO:l!OTER, St,m·mers claims se\·era1 successes: the invention or Chiquita Bananana ; for United Brands, for instance, 1
and the promotion of Better Homes ancl Gardens Cookbook. which he rates the best-seller in America after the B;ble.
"I started marketing Kapuuo," he said, H but you can't just market Kapuuo, you gotta market them· all.'! Summers now says he is marketing all the anti· Swapo black and coloured groups at the Namibia constitutional conference .
. The link between Kaouuo and Summers was, in fact, a wealthy American businessman named Allan :\lanus. Endycott was involved with :\!anus. But !IIanus also had his own keen interest in Xamibla. · According to ~1anu5 himself,
he owns the controlling sh,1re of a holdin;z company - International South Africa-whir:\ owns 15 per cent of the shares of an old German colo111al minin:.: company, Kaokol'(~Jd Land und Minen Gescllschaft, which in turn owns a disputed minin:a claim to '.!3 million acres of mineral-rich -reaf estate in the far northwestern corner of Namibia. ri.~ht next to the border with An;:;ola. :\Ianus saH he would tic ." wry happy to sec Kapuno as leader of a new governmrnt."
Summers ha5 eciuall~· lon;::term benefits in mind. lie s:1y.; nobody is paym:; 11im for his 1
lime and rnnsidl'rabl<' c1w1·.:.:y. 1 But hr rxp:ain~ th:1t if J,:1p11110 , and !ht' mo<ll'rat,·s eo1111· t11 power, h,., 1vill be n·L·o:.:n:~c:l :i, ;1 l"OIJSllll:111t on to11ri,1 /ll',J'l!(J•
lion an,l l11•rl'!op111r11I. II!' 1:1:ds Naimbia is ideal for a high-,la~:; tourist rc:.ort.
nr~l~ ~ ~~,~'.._1
\HIii 'I) 1111. II 'llU.U.
...
The following document, obtained tlzrouglz sources at the United Natio11s, provides rare insight into developing COl'ert operations-apparently mounted by the CIA an.d the South African secret police BOSS (see Spring 197/5 issue of CounterSpy }-against Namibia's struggle for independence from South Africa. Too often we arc univ able to piece together such actil'itics long after the fact. The confidential clocument we are p11hlishi11g here for the first time will, lwpejidly, alert our readers and the general public to what those actil'ists of Kissinger's foreign policy, the CIA, an: doing in this Mlatile territory before the U.S. becomes inextricahly i11vofred in yet anotherintemational conflict.
Already signs of an all-out war rire shaping 11p, as South
42 CounterSpy
African troops conduct military operations "nd police actions daily. The entire northern part of Namibia has hccn placed under martial law, and the /Jorder with Angola '1Cf;> been declared a "free fire zone." fl/ea11whilc, U.S. i11i-oll'cment in Namibia- increases. A farmer U.N. ac!Pisor i11 Africa reported ·io tile Duh/in Sund;y Prc~s 011 September 19 that, ''A new Black Namibian amzcd Jiirce. trainee! f>.1' United States military perso11ncl. cquipried hy the U.S. a1:cl fi11a11cccl by the U.S. for at least a decade." is bci11;: p/a1111cd. Ile cmuimtccl , l·at, "what Ti111it would be 011 the 1111111her of r
United States militan• aclri.rnrs is not k11ow11. It is i11tcmlcd that a larf{C proporti;m of the American soldiers 1111,l utlicr personnel working in Namihia should be black."
Since the mid-1960 ·s, a liheratimz movement, spear-
,1,-~------ ·---------· I
].-.! t,.1· the South West Afri,·a l'coplc'.i Org1111i:atio11 1U/'O!, has hem fi.rliting f,,r ,\'amibi11\ i11Jcpc11dl'//cc.
ih'_.lf'() is the stronicst 110/iric11! force in tlic country, and h.1s been rccogni::cd by the U.N. as the legitimate reprcsentarh'e of the Namibian people. The proS/JCCf oj American Blacks training Namihi,m Blacks ro fight Sll'.-ll'O is chilling.
Namibia, also knuirn by its colonial name, South West Afrira, is a territory the si:e of France and England combined, located u11 rhe west coast of A (rica. and burJering
011 South Africa, Angola, Zambia, and Botswa11a. Formerly a German Protectorate, this mi11erat-n·c1z land became a "sacred (rust of cii'ilizatiorz "following W()r/d War I. It was admi11istercd by South Afn·ca tmder a mandate of the League, and later the U.N. In 1966, the U.1V. declared an end to the ma11date and called for steps toward indeP,e11de11ce. But South Africa continues to rule Namibia in spite of the withdrawal of the U.N mandate, and despite a 19 71 decisio11 by the Intcmatimzal Court of Justice that the continued presence of Soutfz Africa in Namibia was illegal.
In 1974, South Africa, responding to intcnzational pressure, called for a constit11tio11al conference in Wind·hoek, the capital of Namibia, to consider the question of independence. SWAPO was barred from the proceedings. 11ze Tumhalle Conference, as it was called, was convened in September, 1975, and was attended by a number of moderate, black, tribal leaders and the White National · Party of South l\'est Africa. Amo11g the delegates to the Turnhalle Conference was CLEHENS KAPUUO, Chief of the Herera tribe, who is now being promoted as the first president of Namibia.
As the following document, and independent research by Counterspy show, Kapuuo is being promoted by d New York law firm, Schwartz, Burns, Lesser and Jacob_v; the KUDU fozmdation, headed by John Summers of Psychographic Communications (Psycomm); and a man called James Endycott, who is really Cyorg Nemeth, a refugee from Hungary who has probable CIA co1111ections. and is reported to 1ra11e wnrked with Radio Free Europe. Endycott was said to have died suddenZv of "nawral causes" recently in London, but SO!trces point out that he was quickly cremated, and that his death might hai·e been faked. His wife has taken over his business assets which include Gemstone
• mining, now reported tu be i11 liquidation, a11d Kakao11eld Minen Geselsclzaft. Whether Endycott s wife co11ti1111es to support the Kaprmo campaign through these mysterious companies remains to be seen. What is clear is that South Africa, the multinational corporations in Namibia, and tire
. United States can liJ,e with Kazaw far more easily tlra11 with a SWAPO government.
The Trmrlralle Co11[l're11cc has drafted 'a proposed constitutio11, and has called for the "indcpende11ce" of Namibia by Dccemhcr 31, 1978. No solution short of genuine illllependence would he acceptable to tire !ihcratinn nrm·emmt. But South Africa has yet to approve ci•e11 these far-future independence plans, and clearly will on(v do so Oil terms it finds acceptahle--as it did recently i11 granting "imlependence" to the Transkci, a cou11 try that not 011c nation in tire world rccogni:::cs hccause if is so blatcrHly a product of the racist policies of :ip:irthcid.
The allcs:<1ti011.5 of Ki.ui!l~cr\ secret fl"licT Ji!r Xamihia. i11d11ding C!.-1 1·01·1·n actions. need ///Or<' rt'warch. B111 Thi' dala from rhis document shn11/J he enough J'o; rc/fr;ious anJ lay groups Sllfl/lOrti11g .Vamibian indcpe11dc11ce to
.demand a Jitll inrcstigatinn hy Congress.
r· ..,,
r
US-backed puppet o( Namihia, Chief Clemens Kapuuo
Countl'rSpy 43
,, I.
t:nitcd Nations CO~FIDE:\'TIAL
To:_ PRIAM From: ODYSSEUS
Subject: Apparent Covert Operations against Namibia
Date: 3 I October I 976
\
I. There now arrears to be little chance of the United Nations forcing South Africa to the conference table to the Namibian question_ ;it any time in the forseeable future. Prime l\1inister Vorster has stated in a widcl\' published interview that he will not negotiate with SW APO. Dr. Kissinger has been unable, or unwilling, to extract any signific:mt concessions from South Africa. And the major western powers, by vetoing the Security Counsel arms embargo resolution, ·have for the time being blocked further L!nitcd Nations action. ,
. · 2. Thus South Africa is now consolidating its position in Namibia. The major western powers support its efforts to maintain control of the Territory, for they believe that Namibia has assumed great importance in
. the southern African strategic balance. The occupation of Namibia e·nables South Africa to extend its defence perimeter far to the north. In the present context, this is seen by defence ministries as a valuable advantage. They believe that South Africa would be weakened militarily and politically if it agreed to the transf~r of power to S\V A PO at this time. · 3. South Africa, c,f course, cannot impose itself upon
· Namibia at this juncture. It ·must bow to the great pressure for majority rule. This was forcsliatlowed in Dr. Kissinger's Lusaka sreech at the end of April.,The U.S. line has changed superficially: there must be majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe. The implicit premise, however, is that South Africa and the western powers
4 musrensure that those who assume power are "moderates" who can be trusted not to force radical changes or politicar rc-ali[;nments.
4. South Africa and its supporters have developed a joint sfrategy for reconciling these conflicting objectives. South Africa plans to ''grant" Namibia its "independence" in the near future. Its intentior:.i. however, is to by-pass SW APO and ensure that power goes to those whom it can control. The Turnhalle conference has ·already set a provisional da'tc for "i ndependcnce" and prepared a basic constitutional "foumlation" upon which an interim government could be based. The SAG is now moving rapidly towards the appointment of such a government, reportedly under Kapuuo and Mudge. The SAG will control al[ the political machinery and keep its occupation forces in place. The economy will remain in the hands of the: white communitv. Bv blocking United Nations action, the western pow~rs have ensured South Africa a breathing space during which the necessary arrangements can be completed. That, at least, is the intention. . 5. The major western powers arc now mobilising to.
. support South African rolicy. They arc preparing a vast expansion of private investment, publi-: aid to a future
44 CountcrSpy
"independent" gmcrnmcnt and much else. Thert:: arc continuing reports of efforts to assist in the creation of a black N,unibian army. ThcseJrc bcingTollowed up. The basic western aim appe:irs to be to provide a South African client rer.ime with the means to survi\'C and to ensure its crcdibilil\'. _
6. South Africa's situation, however, is far fr~m c;:isy. As has been no:cd, the war now extends across much of northern Namibia. PLAN attacks arc frequent. Politic;.il. supp~rt for SW:\ PO is ~rowing everywhere, partly as a reaction to the harshness and brutalitv of South Afric:in. methods of "pacification.'' South Africa has now had to sencl additional forces to Namibia. At the end of the s_umrncr s~r:ie 46,000 men of the security forces were tied down 111 northern and central Namibia. The number of additional men just dispatched is not known. Thus South African forces have been and are stretched to the limit. And they now face an expanded S\VAPO offensive. . ·. .
7. It is not surprising that as this situation has developed the major v:estern powers have resorted to covert operations on an ext~nsive scale. These complement the usual diplomatic, political, financial and, miiitary support for South African policy towards Namibia. Coyert operations appear now to have been mounted:
against the leadership of SW APO
against Angolan support for SW APO
against SW APO in Zamb~a .
against the U.N. Cornn1issioner for Namibia
against the internal wing of S\\:APO in Namibia
in support of a Kapuuo-l'v1udg~ interim government
BOSS is clearlv involved in these operations. It would also appear that ihe Central Inteiligence Agency is involved in some of them. Tbis memorandum will rc\'iew some of the evidence on the last three operations. None of these operations, of course, can be said to have a single, narrow target. Each has multip!e effects. They arc therefore mu,ually supporting. They arc all aimed Jt clearing obstacles to the implementation of the broad strategy adopted for securing control of Namibia.
8. Clc~uing the ground for airl to :1 South Africa client regime and placing counterinsurr,ency assesls in .
1:
.Namibia. The USG is engaged in a number of studies . and projects designed to help it develop policies and programmes · for backing South Africa in Namibia. I Some details have become available about two of these projects, both of which are being organized from the Agency for International Development. lloth projects focus on problems of transition in Namibia and Zimbabwe. 130th projects arc being done in a great rush. Both are designed to provide answers to a broad range of questions posed by intelligence an:llysts and to help prepare plans for private finance, public aid and othc:r 'kinds of support for an interim government in Namibia.
A )The AID contract study to the .-\frican-Amcric:rn Scholars Council. This is a S3)0.0:lO stud,· on th::: problems of transition to niajn,,r,· rule in ·N:1mibi:1 and Zimbabwe. lt has been coi11 · . :,Cl\ lo the Africin-
Atnl'ric.in Scholars Council in Washington. This is a scho!.11h body which has broul!ht together a team of cxrcrt~ ·10 address 1he r,roblen1s posed by the ,~ID,
[. there bc:int~ an cvitknt Lick of knnwledgable Afncan
sp.::cdists in th.: USG. Th.: study is being directed by Or. S.illl Ad.mis, Jr., who was formerly in charge of the ,\ID programme for the Sahel and who came umkr mu.:h criticism in that post. The team brought together includes a number of younger consultants with experience on the Hi ii-but few with any knowledge of Africa-or in academic life. Aside from Adams, the lc:1ders of the team arc prominent and conservative n1cmbcrs of the white academic establishn1ent. The "Principal Investigator," for instance,
. is Robert Rotberg of the i\fassachusetts Institute of Technology, a political scientist who- is believed to have connections with the Central Intelligence Agency. Rot berg, who has recently returned from a tour of Africa, was ref used permission by the University of Zambia not long ago to conduc;t a study of the liberation movements in southern Africa. The grounds of UNZA's refusal were that Rotberg's work might serve to undermine the southern African indepen~ · dence struggle. Eliot Berg a conservative economist ·:;·._k from the University of Michigan is in charge of the economic part of the report. Stuart North of the University of Houston is to supervise the preparation of a report on human resources in Namibia and Zimbabwe.
The research proposal for the project calls for a broad political, ernnomic and social assessment of the present situation in Namibia, focusing in particular on the "problems" arising during the period of transition to majority rule. This, however, is not intenped to be
•· an idle set of studies, bu! is meant to he!r produce
answers on which the USG can act. Thc-ohJ('c:,w qf the contractor, the African 11ureau of the /\ID. 1-, 1n identify the problems arisinf~ during the tr:111-,it,Pr~ 1,, majority rule and "suggcSl arrropri'atc prn·~r.,mm 1li,· and policy responses." . . - ·
Thc'"Principal Investigator," who deals with political questions, is asked to investigate a numh-:r of questions which are important in dctcrminin,: 1h,..: ~ase or ~ifficulty of moving along a rarticu:.,r 110l1-::~ lme. He rs asked, for instance. to assess "th•.:-::ttitud:.', of govcrnmellt and lihcration lc,1dcrship in s,,uth::-~n Africa" towards the problems arising from th.:· transition to m;-ijority rule and to assess ;·,their o,it"nr:~•ss to and attitrnlcs tow:irds U.S. policy :rnd pro!.!ramnH·~ relatcu to tr::msition." He is asl--;ed to :1sscs~ "the in-'· tere~ts other nations might h:ne in facilit:!ting thl' transition to m::ijority rn!t>" and "any possihk t.S. role associated therewith." He is ask.cu ,is \\ (;l/ ll)
survey the assets which the U.S. mJ\' ha\'C :1vaiiablc to assist it in imnlementirn, "its·· 1~olicics lO\\;m!s Zimbabwe and Namibia. AiD requested he ,bse-:s
"the willingness of political, social, univcrsitv, r..on·prnfit, foundation, corporate and other C.S. institu!"• tions or groups in the U.S. to support or ~ssi-;I l.S. Go\ernment programmes ancl policies rcl:ilcd to the transition to majority rule in Zimba.b\\e am! Namibia." (Emphasis added.) Thus the principal researchers alreadr seem to h:,\<.? been told. at least in rough terms, what U.S. r,olicy 1,-_ For they are asked to invcstiuate the reacti\)Ib 0r others to hypothetical policies.-Dcspitc this ,J:J\:uus r.eculiarity, some of the consultant hav~ been un«b!c to obtain any clarification from Dr. Ad:11ns or the purposes of the project. "What is this for?:· the\' '1.1·,c asked. No answer, however, has bi:cn ci\"c:n. The scope, personnel and contradictio·ns of th•: prujcct thus suggest that the African-American Sl'ho!::rs Council is basically being used to do intclli'.-'.cnc:::: work. The project proposal reads like m:111'.' <JI the proposals set in motion by AID for countcrii1sur:'.cncy purposes in other countries. And il seems quite:
· likely that the findings of the_ Council will be used ll' draw up plans for installing a "nioderate'· _gtl\'Cr:J-mcnt in Namibia. ,-
B)The A ID Southern African Regional Devcl0rment Plan. A second and far more impor:;::11 proicct is being undertaken bv AID. This is a rcL:ion;il u..:,ciopment planning stucly for the whole 'or -~Olltlv.rn Africa. There are twenty profession:il resc:1rchcr.~ workin'g full time on this project. Five nt" thc~c a~c specialists in economic planning. Ten arc countrv specialists (although they have apparently little C\
pertise). Five specialize in the studv of particu!ar sc ·tors such as tr:insportation or agrn:u!wrc. I tic ~UJ1i''·,n team must be quite large in its entirety. It h:1-, b-.:,·n estimated that some SI million is being sp~'nl un rhi~ project, which has been contracted hy :\ID to Ch..:cchi and Co., a major Washirn1ton contr:1cl con"ul1i1)•'. firm which did considerable \vork in Snutll \"i1.:1n:.•:1 from the e:Hly I 960s. The precise status of I he: rniic, t is not clear. Chccchi and Co. arc saiu to ha\L' "p1il
. .
tnrc·:hc•r" the team of "cx1,crh,'' hut the projeL't is run on a tl,l \'-to-<lay ba-;is hy senior ,\ 1 D person ncl. Overall sup1.irvision is by Owen Cy Ike, Deputy Director of ArD·s Office of Ccntra[ :ind West African Affairs. O.lv-to-<lay supcr\'ision of the project is in the hands of i"crr.y Lam bachcr. a senior management analyst at AID. -
AID appears ·10 be attcmrting to Llraft a series of interlocking country pfans for accelerated economic growth in southern Africa. Thus a separate stully is pl:inned for c:1ch of 8 or IO countries. each study being bounded by the parameters of a country's rclationshirs·{rith its neighbors. There will probJb\y be a broad "regional plan·· as well. The basic assumption, however. on which t!:icse plans are based is that growth must be accekrated along the present lines of specialization of e:.1ch economy. Thus, in the cnse of Namibia, the plan will provide for a rapid increase of. mineral exploitation rather than the expansion and -modernization of agriculture. From what is known at present about the AID's lines of research the kind of ecoriornic growth which is being projected will:
• leave the distribution of income roughly the same
• leave the strLicture of production the same
* maximize foreign capital inflows
* accentuate the present specialization of the economy
· · "' increase the degree of economic dependence upon South Africa
Thus the plan for Namibia will set in motion forces which will help to consolidate South Africa's hold on the Territory, directly and indirectly. Within southern Africa as a whole it seems likely that the effect of this kind of acceleration will be to strengthen South Africa's economic power in--relation to the countries of .the poorer periphery. This is an obvious effect
•'which an economist or administrator must under·s1and. It is therefore difticult to avoid the conclusion that this is the intended result.
. . AID is presently pressing the completion of a · rough plan in order, they say. to g9 to the Congress in . the beginning of the year for a series of aid programs for southern African countries. It has been learned that an aid bill for Namibia is being drawn up despite the foct that there is no legitimate independent
· government in Namibia at the present time. 1his sug-• gests strongly that the plans being prepared are designed to assist in channeling and rationaiizinglJ.S. support for a Kapuuo-Mudge interim regime in Namibia.
The whole project also has definite undertones of counterinsurgency war. For Cylke and Lambncher, who are in char!l,e of tl:e project, have histories which indicate that they arc much more than economic planners or man:.1gers. Cylke took his 8.A. at Yale and went' into international - banking. In the early or mid-1960s, however, he volunteered for the Peace Corps in Ethiopia. I le ttJen returned and joined the ,.
46 CounterSpy
.. regular USG service with the 1\ ID. Sources believe that he joined !he Central ln!cllircncc ,\p::ncy in the late )%Os, althoti-!h he remained in thc AID. llc \•,as a consultant to tt1e ,\frican D..:vclorment lbnk in Abigjan. with the AID Carita] Proicct Orticc in Nairobi and then returned to AID, \V;1:.;hin1:ton. He 'received a Meri! llonor Award in 1972. Lainbacher was in the U.S. Armv overseas from 1963 to 1%6. He joined rhc S:iigon o·ffice of the AID in l 967 as an assistant development officer. Sources believe he joined the Cl,\ at about that time, operating from an AID office. He was both assist"Jnt programme officer and programme ofticcr with AID in Vietnam. He received an award for heroism in 1970. He w;is a senior U.S. civilian official in Hau Nghia province,just west of Sai1wn, until late 1970. He then became the AID advisor and liaison officer to the ~linister of the Interior of the Government of South Vietnam.
These •histories and associations sw::gest that there is. much more going on in the AID regional development study of southern African than meets the eye. Sources suggest it is very probably in part a cover for the development of counterinsurgency assets which the U.S. could use in Namibia in the event of ' 1nced.'' The situation in Namibia today is obviously highly ui1stable. And the indications are that the U.S. mav be preparing itself to assist South Africa through CO\.Trt action. against SW APO's internal wing in Namibia. which is the logical political organization to be "targeted."
9. Covert opcr::1tions to create a credilJle politk:'1 alternative to SW APO. There are ~-ome indications that BOSS, and possibly the CIA, arc behind the campaign to make Chief Kappuo a credible political leader of the Namibian people in the eyes of international. pubi;;: opinion. _Two U.S. firms are involved in this campaign: a New York law firm and a New York market!ng consulting agency. The first. Schwartz, Burns, Lesser and Jacoby, has been advising Chief Kapuuo for well over a year. One of the partners. S. Schwanz, accomp:rnied
·chief Kapuuo to \Vindhock and is believed to h:1',··~ been the author of the "Constitutionai Proposal" wbic:: Kapuuo presented to the conference on 9 l\-1arch of th:s year. The mystery about 'the law firm arises from the fact thal they refuse to reveal who is paying them. S,::1-wartz .and Burns are believ.:::d to be costing Kaptit:o $1.000 per day._ He is obviously not paying them himself. Me has not the means. The lawyers for all the other Turnhalle delegations. it h2s been learned, ,:re paid by the South African Go\'ernment. Schwartz and Burns, however, have denied that they arc.
Sch\\;'..Htz and Burns appear to h::ivc a close rclati0nship with Jack Summers of Psychol,!wphic Communic,1-tion (PsvComml. a marketing consulting arcnty w;1:1 plush offices nl Ddmonico's. Summers has been h:,ndlinp., the PR for Kapuuo in the Unitd States. lie ;, . been doing a lot of work o\'er the p:1st year. Kapw:J ,, belie\'cd to have been here three or rour tiines in t!. · last 12 or 15 months. Psychographic CommuniL-:itio•·; has don.: 'cl very professional press kit for Kap1i1. i whicr.. presents the Chief as the lcaucr of modt·~
'·\. • ...
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N:imibi:i. Summers pvc a p::irty for the Chief at Ddmonicu·s in ~c:ptcnihcr to which selected rress were invi!i.:d. St>uth .-\fric.in mission rcrsonnel provided the sc.::urity, \vhich w::s tibht. The C,hief was introduced to v:.irinlli c,·ld!ritics, had his picture taken with Mohammed Ali anJ Eli11bcth Tuvlor, and, all in all, wa~ made "ver\' visible." This has b·;.:cn going on for some rime. On a recent trip l(::ipuuo met :md talked with Cyrus \':incc, I knry Ford, the editorial boards of Nev,sweek Time and The New York Times, as well as the publisher of the New York Post. So Kapuuo has been receiving good trc:itmcnt :ind has made exceedingly im
_ponant cont:.icts. He is believed to have talked with State Department officials on a nun·1ber of occasions.
Aeain, tile mystery is mnney, as well as the remarkable coincidence of circumstances. Summers will not say who pays him. In fact, he says he docs it all because he believes in Kapuuo. The publicity campaign, however, is estimated to have cosl in excess of 5500,000 over the last two years or so. There is obviow;ly some wealthy individual or organization behind Kapuuo. Summers says he has started a foundution, the Kutlu Foundation, to "build schools in Namibia after independence.' 1
Chief Kapuuo, however, has stated publicly that the purpose of the Foumbtion is to pay his expenses. It has not been possible to investigate Kudu. It should be registered as a non-profit foundation, but is not. It is not clear at this point whether the Kudu is the channel for the money which Summers is using. Money, however, is coming from somewhere, in large quantities.
Some clues exist. James Endicott has been· Chief Kapuuo's representative i:-i London for some time. He is believed to have been born in Hungary but now car•ries an Australian passport. He went to Namibia about 1970, where he worked as an architect. He started working for Gemstone !\liners (Pty) Ltd., an American company registered in Hempstead, Long~lsland, with min-
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ing concessions in Namibi:.i. Endicott is believed to have worked for R:idio_ Free Europe, and is th::rcfore suspected of intcllit"cncc connections. There have been a number of strange events surrounding Endicott and Gemstone Minin!!. Endicott left Namibia for London with a string of debts. lie began to publish the N::1mibia Bulletin in London. According to lhe U.S. Small Business Admini'.;tration Gemston~e received, inexplicably, SBA· gu:uant:.:-e for a S350,0CD loan. The loan is now in default and Gemstone's opcr:.ition in Namibia is now in liquidation. Gemstone 1nay be the ch:rnncl for funds received by Endicott which were believed at t)ne time to total mar~ than Sl,000 a dav. It lrn:; been rcnortcct in the last few days that Endicott died of a he:irt :ii tack in London. ·Other re1;orts say he died in 1'1::lrnibia. Sources in London at the \veekcnd were not aware of the reports,
· although they were circulating in New York. . It is clear that someone is orchestrating the attempt to
publicize Kapuoo. And it is clear that they have a r;reat deal of money and excellent connections. The K:,puuo campaign has had some success. Kapuuo is now on the map, although he still remains less than credible for many who meet him. However, there is everv indication that s_ome kind of campaign will contir.u~. Sum-"'· mers is now sugge:;ting th::it the Turnhalle h::is been "radicalized." He seems less interested in K:muuo than he was. His line is very markedly anti-South Afrkan, anti-imperialist and anti-SW APO. He has even suggested that SW APO are working for South Afri-::a, be-
. cause by pressing the war they are ''.forcinr, South African to keep its troops in Namibia. ·. ·
This seems to be a BOSS operation. To do ,vhat they have done on U.S. territory, however, they would have to have the assent of the CIA at the ve;v ·1c.1st.
IO.The ~pparent "bl:!d;: prc;-!:J~and~" c;:;::1p:1ign f against Sean I\facBride of the OHice of the Ci:'.'m~:is- / sioner for Namibia. There has been r,reat pressure
, against the Commissioner since the end of the winter of this year. It seemed at first that this might be nothing more than the usual kind of diplomatic rowing which one expects in certain situations. It appcc1rs now, however, that there has been a planned and systernatic attempt to undermine the Commissioner, to force him out of the United Nations and even to abolish the
. Office of the Commissioner altogether. Thiscampair,n is >apparently aimed at removing one of the pr1ncipal
obstacles to international acceptance of a South African · client regime in N:imibia. If Sean MacBridc rem;.iins in . office, he will certainly use his in0uence and prc:--tige to ' prevent the United Nations fron turning its back on the maneuvers to i!lstall an interim regime. He will oppose \ such maneuvers vigorously. His presence therefore pre- · ji
sents a real problem for South Africa and for the major western powers. The evidence reviewed bdow must / be seen within this context.
Scan Macllridc, U.N. Commissioner and 1974 recipient of Nobel Peace Prize, under attack hy the C/.,1 station at the U.N. ·
CountcrSpy 47
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1, .-. .-•i;L·d rrcs:,ure directed against MacBride began 1 .. : :: : ,· 1rlY rart _of this ycc..f. A_mbassador Dunston ~ .. •·:.: n( Zambia made comp],Hnts to the Secretary-
. 1 ·, _ .::r.d 111 lhc United N:11ions about statcmenis m_ade .. \!.,:BriJe in Irc!Jnd and Africa. These complaints , ..• \1 itndrawn afterwards on the specific instructions .. '; ;~c <.i o\'crnmcnt of Zambia, which sent a rn~sage to
,;.,_: S:.:crd:1rv•Gcncral indicacing that they h:1d cx:i--:;1nL·d ~,h:I3ridc's statements closely and found n,,: :1in,; wrong with them. · \ arious other allegations were made against \!J..:13ridc at a-mcctirn~ of the Council for Namibia duri11~ 1\fad3ridc's absence in Zambia. Reports of these c,Ji11ptaints were leaked to the press. Even an internal Lnited N;1tions budgetary document which was never intern.led for circulation was officially circulated and icakcd to the press. At the same time a rumor was fo!sel}: put out in the U.N. corridors to the effect that Via.-:Driue h,:d resigned. MacBride denied this publicly frnm Lusaka. ·
These events caused some comment at the time. Reporters and delegateS saw the pressures and rumors a~ ran of an attempt to undermine MacBride: One · retioner asked at a noon briefing whether, in view of th~ growing pressure against MacBride, it might not be amiss to enauire whether he had been made the target of some CI/\ operation.
In recent months pressure for MacBride's resignati1m has ba::cn growing. The situation has become much more r.:n.sc in southern Africa since the .sprin&. The Cr.ited Siates Ambassador has made representations to the Secretarv•General about MacBride's statement on southern African affairs. These received considerable attention in the press and naturally raised questions about MacBride's future. At the same time, officials in the Department of State were putting about the story that they were determined to g_et MacBride and that they would. They accused MacBridc of "complicating negctiations which the U.S. had in hand" to ensure a peaceful transition to majoritr rule in southern A ffica. Ir seems fairly clear that they were in fact concerned to neutralize r.-1acBride because he would make it difficult to implement the Kapuuo-Mudge gambit.
By summer, und~r constant pressure and facing constant and unnecessary difficulties at the U.N., MacBridc decided to resign. He began to write his report to the General Assembly and, in it spoke frankly of the problems which he faced. The Secretariat of the Council for Namibia resisted circulation of this report. It became clear that the report would be suppressed.
As it became known tha't Mac Bride had decioed not tn ·~,)ntinue as Commissioner for Namibia, nev/ moves
f wer<.! initiated either to secure a pliable Commissioner r to r..:placc l\fac Bride or to suppress the post completely f :.1nd hand over the functions of the Commissioner to \
1
. lht Hrazilian Secretary of the Council for Namibia. In pur~uance of this scheme the Mexican Ambassador to th<.! U.N., who is one of the Vice-Presidents of the ClHJncil for ·Namibia, and the Zambian Ambassador,
1 wbo is the President of the Council, both made apJ pro.1chcs to the South W~t Africa People's Organiza-
48 CountnSpy
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"It appears there has been a planned systematic attenuJt tu undennine the Commissioner, to force him out of the United Nations and abolish the Office altogether."
~--'°".""! . .,.. .. ..._ ________ ,
tion (SW APO) in an effort 10 do away with the post of Commissioner. These approaches were rejected by SW APO, who have throughout support~c\ MacDride. The personalities involved, includin_g the Sccret:iry of the Council f(')r Namibia, suggest a concc~tw effort which is much more than mere diplomatic maneuve;--ing. • ·
There appears to have been a Ion;,;, carefully pbnned campaign of pressure. rumor and m:>:1ipuhtion to ensure 1'bcl3ridc's departure.from the United Nations. This has at! the appearance of a classic "bt•ck pro1>;:0 '.!nda" campaign The use of distortion ;'.ncl officb: f'l!L1lic pressure in a systenutic way is one of the- most po·,•:cr-f ul weapons in the arsenal of covert or::r,:ti(ms a[':iin::;t a political figure. The Agee book docun~cn,s a nu,nbcr nf I cases strikingly like those or MacUritk. Tl,crc can be iit• / tic doubt 1b.11 bo11J r:.oss and the u.;0 /;;;Ye been involved in this campaig,n. · . . r 1
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Note for the ~cre~-General
~l~ ~'\~ Subject: Namibia ~
I met with Ambassador Dun an w. Kamana of Zambia today on his request. He said he in ended to ask for a meeting with the Secretary-General in the very near future to discuss the following matters, but wanted me to apprise the SecretaryGeneral of the subject matter to facilitate the discussion:
1) Proposed UN conference on Namibia in Geneva
Ambassador Kamana said that reports were circulating that a conference should be convened by the Secretary-General in which both South Africa and SWAPO would be represented. He understood that the proposal which was put forward in the Security Council by Ambassador Baroody to that effect had in fact originated at the suggestion of Mr. MacBride. Ambassador Kamana said that some felt that such a conference should be convened in the name of the U.N. and that its modalities should be worked out in consultation between the Secretary-General and -the eeuncil.
2) Successor to Mr. MacBride Ambassador Kamana said that there appeared to be a general
consensus among the parties directly concerned that the Finnish Ambassador to Tanzania would be the most suitable candidate to succeed Mr. MacBride. He said his Government would agree to this candidature provided it was proposed by SWAPO. He understood that SWAPO supported the candidature. Furthermore, Ambassador Kamana said that the Finnish Governmen t had told him that they would be prepared to release the Ambassador should his candidature be accepted.
Ambassador Kamana felt that the sooner the matter was resolved the better for the interests of Namibia. However, in view of the Council•s experience with Mr. MacBride, he hoped the Secretary-General would ensure that a proper formula for the working relationship between the new commissioner and the council for Namibia would be found before the appointment was made.
3) Mr. MacBridets Report
Ambassador Kamana said that the Council disagreed with many of the conclusions and recommendations contained in Mr. MacBride•s report to the Council on Namibia. Since he understood that copies of the report had been cireulated unofficially, the Council had decided not to suppress its publication but to publish it with its own comments. 1 /] v! ~;;-
A. A. '-fai:-ah 14 October 1976
AAF/aa cc: RA/KH
,. I
CONFIDENTIAL
Note for the Secreta;y-General
The African Group has discussed the implications in the request by Mr. Clemens Kapuuo that he be allowed to make a statement before the Security Council when it next meets to consider the Namibian question.
The majority view was that Mr. Kapuuo•s request be opposed. To do otherwise, the Group argued, would be to give tacit recognition to the National convention of which he is the leader, and lend legality to the Constitutional Conference of which he has been a prominent supporter.
Mr. Kapuuo, who is expected in New York sometime this week, will no doubt endeavour to see the SecretaryGeneral while be is here.
A.A. Farah
21 September 1976
cc: Messrs. Ahmed/Herndl
UNITED NATOONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distr. GENERAL
S/12195
~
3 September 1976 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH
LETTER DATED 30 AUGUST 1976 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GUINEA TO THE UNITED ,NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Upon the instructions of my Government I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of~ message addressed to you by Comrade Ahmed Sfkou Toure, Supreme Leader of the Revolution and President of the Republic of Guinea, on the eve of the immediately forthcoming Security Council meeting on the question of Namibia:
"At the moment when the Security Council is seized of the burning question of Namibia, whose independence is of particular importance for the Af~ican peoples and the forces dedicated to peace and justice all over the world because of the odious and inhuman character of the domination imposed by the South African authorities, the Government of the Republic of Guinea, faithful to its ideals of freedom, social justice and dignity in responsibility, hopes that under your presidency the Council will take effective measures which will give expression to the hopes of international public opinion to see the African people of Namibia accede to an era of unconditional freedom under the leadership of SWAPO, the sole and legitimate representative of this people. At this decisive turning-point in the national liberation struggle and especially in view of the current facts of Namibia's history, the Unitea-Nations, in order to respond to the noble aspirations of 13,11 mankind, must fully meet its responsibilities by ensuring and guaranteeing the immediate independence of this T~rritory. The Government of the Republic of Guinea is convinced that you will make all necessary efforts to place the discussions in the context of the aspirations of the Namibian people to exercise immediately and fully their right to independence and to national sovereignty over the whole of their territory.
"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
11Ahmed Sekou Tour~ nPresident of the Republic of Guinea"
I should be grateful if' you would have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mamadou Maxime CAMARA Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Guinea to the United Nations
CONFIDENTIAL
.Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on Thursday, 2 Seotember 1976 at 12:00 noon
·Present: Secretary-General
Secretary of State Kissinger
Jmlbassador Tapley Bennett
Mr. Rowe, U.S. Mission
Mr. William Buffum
.Mr. Roberto Guyer
Mr~ Brian. Urquhart
:LAW OF -THE SEA CONFERENCE
·The Secretary-General noted the good reaction to Dr. Kissinger's
.. :-proposals made yesterday.
Dr. Kissinqer said he also believed some progress was being
-.~ade. Other countries would be making a mistake if they felt
.:they were doing the United States a favour in adopting its "paralleln
-~approach. Although there was a possibility of a compromise in
:committees 2 and 3, Committee 1 was the crucial question. He
·::.hoped it was now clear that the United States would proceed
::1JI1ilaterally if no ag~eement was reached. The United States was
--mow offering to put half of the mineral wealth of the seabed under
-a -regime for international exploitation, would help finance it
·.and provide U.S. technical assistance with provision for a review
·-of the agreement in 25 years. There w."?re approximately 500 site:s
in the ocean to be developed, and approximately $700 million
·---would be required in capital investment just to start the drilling.
1n practice, only the United States, Western Europe, Japan and
:perhaps the Soviet Union could undertake this during the next
forty years, There£ore, other countries should understand that
they were not doing the United States a favour in accepting its
-proposal.
!l:'he Secretarv-General said he believed Dr. Kissinger's talks
~had had a good e£fect. He was confident Ambassador Amerasinghe
!WDuld make a real effort to produce a consolidated text.
- 2 -
AFRICA
Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the current U.S. efforts are
not related to domestic politics or the forthcoming Presidential
election. On the contrary, his recent efforts to help resolve
this problem had met with highly.critical reactions in the United
States. He had received over 1,700 critical letters and only a
handful of laudatory letters about his efforts. The black
members of Congress had not had a single word of praise for what
he was trying to do, and he was being strongly criticized by
Congressman Diggs. Black Americans would in any event vote over
whelmingly for the Democratic Party, and therefore the Administration
had nothing to gain domestically from its African efforts. It
was motivated solely by its concern for future peace and stability
in southern Africa and was concerned that, if some solution was not
found, there would be another Angola.
The· Secretary-General expressed his appreciation for the
courageous attitude on southern Africa taken by the United States,
which was a crucial element in making progress.
·Dr.Kissinger said that this was why the United States was
doing what it could. Although in some ways it would have been
tempting to le~_nature take its course, Southern Rhodesia could
become another Angola in two years and the question would arise as
to why no effort had been made to avoid it. There was a time limit
for bringing Namibia to independence, and the wrong development
could poison the Assembly. He considered the chances for success
in Rhodesia were less than fifty-fifty since so many diverse
elements, including the liberation movements, would have to be
brought together in a common programme. He was also not sure
anyone could obtain the essential assurance that guerrillas would
stop fighting after majo~ity rule in Southern Rhodesia. The
white population would either accept majority rule of would not.
He did not expect to talk to the Southern Rhodesia leaders before
he had clarification about South Africa's position. Whether he
went to Pretoria would depend on the situation after his forth
coming meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. He would not make a
courtesy visit and would consider going only if ·vorster indicated
/ ..
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this would be the only way he could provide satisfaction on the
.future of Namibia and whether Kissinger concluded that a solution
-was possible.
The· Secretary-General mentioned the importance of the United
Nations role, especially in supervising the elections.
· Dr.· Kissinqer commented that the United Nations representative,
Sean MacBride, "had an unusual capacity for infuriating people 11
.-and his public statements tended to inflame the situation and were
a big obstacle to a positive United Nations role. The United
States favoured the 'participation of SWAPO in the election process
-and also the setting of a date for elections.
-The· Secreta::!:"v-General mentioned that he had discussed this
~question with th~ SWAPO representative in Colombo who attached
..importance to the participation, but had also said if there was
no possibility, he would be willing to negotiate directly with
Vorster. ·Dr.Kissinger said he was not sure he could get immediate
.agreement on a date·for elections, but undertook to urge the
-:South African Government to accept United Nations participation
.~ the election process.
The· Secretary-General said he would talk to Mr. MacBride
'-=when he comes to New York next week about the impact of his
·public statements.
THE MIDDLE EAST
The Secretary-General said that in his discussions with
President Sadat at the non-aligned conference, the latter had
expressed deep concern that the negotiating machinery had broken
down. Although the Secretary-General had noted that the Lebanese
situation made the resumption of negotiations difficult, Sadat
insisted that he could not wait forever and that if nothing happened
by next year, he must take "certain measures". The Secretary
General_had tried, in a follow-up conv~rsation with Foreign Minister
Fahmy, to get clarification of this remark, but Fahmy also spoke
only in general terms. Fahmy requested the Secretary-General to
make a proposal for convening an international conference on the
Middle East. When the Secretary-General asked if he meant.Geneva
or a peace conference, Fahmy said the important thing was some
kind of a United Nations initiative-. The Secretary-General
told him he was reluctant to take any steps at this time with the
Lebanese situation complicating the picture and with the continuing
dispute over PLO participation in the neogtiations. Fahmy would
resume discussion of this question when he came to New York
for the General Assembly.
· Dr. Kissinger agreed fully that the negotiating process
must start again next year. He was confident that the Adminis
tration would initiate new moves after the election and believed
this would be both essential and acceptable no matter which party
won. It would be better if the Arabs did not insist on initial PLO
participation since Israel either would not attend or would insist
on a high price. The best approach would be to proceed with the
same delegations as in the pa 9t and to begin with frontier questions,
but to agree that the Palestinian issue must be discussed at a
later stage.
The Secretary-General asked if he believed the creation of
a separate Palestinian state, for example, on the West Bank
a~d in Gaza, was a practicable solution of the Palestinian problem.
I
- 5 -
·nr. Kissinaer said this would be a nightmare. Such a state
would put pressure on both Jordan and Israel. It would not be
viable, and would become an appendage of Syria or Jordan.
- For this reason, federation with Jordan or even Syria would
seem more practical. However, there was no U.S. national interest
--to preclude any particular formula.
The Secretary-General mentioned that in his talk with President
Assad of Syria, the latter had defended his a~~~ons in Lebanon and
.had said his troops were there only to restor0:: order and to
-maintain the unity. of the country, after which they would :-;i thdraw.
lie had some confidence in Lebanese Presi~ent-elect Sarkis.
\Dr'.· Kissinger said that any new initiatives were bet::c::r left
-alone until after the United Stat~s election, at which tir.,e he
--would be glad to discuss the subject with the Secretary-General
.again.
With regard to current problems in the buffer zone in
'Sinai, it was his view that such matters should be worked out
in the joint coromiss~on.
... ' ' - 6
CYPRUS
Dr. Kissinaer said it was desirable to make progress or
-at 1east to have further rounds of talks. The United States,
in conjunction with the Western Europeans, might possibly put
.:£orward some principles as a basis for further talks. Another
.idea was that a study group of three Members, designated by
~key, Greece and the Secretary-General respectively, should
address itself to the issue.
The Secretary-General explained that the completely different
-views of the two sides was the real problem. The Turks wanted
-··Only a general discussion in the talks, which would immediately
.set up two sub-collli~ittees. Makarios said this was out of the
-question an<;2-that the talks must discuss the substance and reach
-basic agreement before referral to sub-committees of the
·.outstanding details. Furthermore, Makarios would not be willing
to have a bland communique at the next round, but would denounce
1t as a failure if no progress were made. This would in all
-probability be the end of the talks. The Secretary-General had
suggested holding the -talks after the Greek Cypriot elections
- -on 5 September, but Makarios oppos~d such a move if there was
to be no discussion of substance. He had also suggested
-preparatory meetings between the two interlocutors under his
Special Representative in Cyprus, but this too had run into
obstacles. He was now thinking of inviting the interlocutors
to New York for consultations before the General Assembly.
~£ there was any agreement on procedure, a sixth round might
be held forthwith, or it would be agreed that there was no
.basis for calling a sixth round.
Dr. Kissinaer expressed great interest .in this proposal
and would be discussing it with the British and French in the
coming week. The United States Mission will transmit to the
.Secretary-General the text of the suggested principles mentioned
.:by Dro Kissinger.
. ·_;'·· "' . I
I - 7 -
VIET NAM
!rhe Secretarv-General said that he was prepared to talk
to the Vietnamese representative about the American missing
in action.
Dr. Kissinaer said this would be most helpful. It would
..be possible to change the United States position on membership
if the Vietnamese were prepared to give clear-cut assurances
-....and that the Secretary-General could quote Kissinger to the
Vietnamese in this sense. He could also explain that some
.assurances of this kind were necessary if the United States
~was to change its position during an election year. He asked
that the High Commissioner might take up with the Governments
·concerned the refusal to receive Vietnamese refugees by
Singapore, Malaysia and several other Asian countries.
cc: Secretary-General ✓ ·Mr. B-..i f furn ~- Guyer Mr. Urquhart
UNITED f\lATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Distr. GENERAL
A/31/190 1 September 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Thirty-first session Item 85 of the provisional agenda*
Letter dated 31 August 1976 from -the Permanent Repre·sentati ve of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General
I have the honour to transmit to you a statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Declaration of the Windhoek Constitutional Conference dated 18 August 1976.
I should be grateful if you could have this statement issued as an official document of the General Assembly under item 85 of the provisional agenda.
* A/31/150.
76-16358
(Signed) Baron Rudiger van WECEMAR Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany
to the United Nations
I . ..
A/31/190 English Page 2
AIHJ:2X
Statenent issued on 25 August 1976 by the Government of the . Federal Republic of Germany on the Declaration of the
\Jindhoek Constitutional Conference
The Federal Government has taken note of the fact that, on 18 August 1976, the Hindhoek Constitutional Conference announced for the first time a date for Ifami bi a I s independence and declared that Nauibia's territorial unity is to be naintained. The Federal Government takes this as a sign of progress 3 yet it regards the date of 31 December 1978 as too renote.
At the same time, it regrets that the Declaration of 18 Auc;ust does not provide for either free elections under United Nations supervision or any participation of the existing political forces 3 including the South Hest Africa People's Ore;anization (S1:-JAPO). The Federal Government, in conformity with its partners in the European Cor,rrnunity and the majority of United nations Members, continues to regard the fulfilment of these requirements as imperative for Namibia 1 s peaceful transition to independence.
It is already obvious from the first critical reactions of the United Nations and of African States that it will not be possible to reduce the tensions in the area or to acllieve any genuine progress unless these essential questions are settled. The Federal Government vill therefore continue its efforts towards this soal on a bilateral and multilateral basis in order to assist in solving the conflict.
UNITED NATBOt~S
SECURITY COUl'JCIL
Distr. GENERAL
S/12188 24 Aur;ust 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 24 AG"JUST 1976 FrtC'1': 'rHE PERMMIBHT fu..,.,FRESENT.A'.J.1IVE OF SRI LANKA TO 'EIS UNITED l'iATIONS ADDP.ESSED 'l'O TEE
SECRETARY-GE!'f.ZRAL
I have the her.our to trans:rr.it to you herewith t:ie text of resolution No. 3, concerning Namibia, adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Gove-rnment of Non-Aligned Co"tmtries, which was held in Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, and to J:·equest you, in terms of operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, to distribute its text as an official document o~ the Security Council before its next mee~ing on the question of Namibia, scheduled to be held on or before 31 August 1976.
(Signed) H. S. AMEMSINGHE Permanent Representative
I . •.
Tel: YUkon 6-7040
i ! _i ·.,( I ', • ..(_ .·
PERMANENT MISSION or, THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
1io. NAC/5/Res. 3
Excellency,
6.JO TIIIRD AVENUE l?v,h FlO()ll.1
NEV'/ YORI:. N. Y. 10017
24 ·August 1976
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of Resolution No. 3, concerning Namibia, adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of Sta~e or Government
·of Non-Alisned countries which was held in Colombo from 16 - 19 Ausust 1976, and to reques-f? you, in terms of operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, to distribute its text as an official document of the Security Council before its nex't meeting on the question of Namibia, scheduled to be held on or before August 31, 4976.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my
highest con~ideration.
His Excellency Dr. Kurt 1.--/aldheim Secretary General United Nations New York
,r
,~ ~---< H.S. Am singhe
Permanent Representative
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Resolution Hu1nber ?j - Namibia
The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of -.:Non-Alii:;ned Countries r:1eeting· in Colombo (Sri Lanka) from
16 -. 19 August 1976,
Recallin~ 3.esolution Number Five on 1:a:c:d. bia c.dopted at the Fourt2 Goni' erence of iieads of State or Governnent of 1:on
-·Aligned Countries held in Algiers :from 5 - 9 Septerrber 1973,
Recalling General Assembly Resolution 2145 (:~a) of 27 October 1':;)66 which terminated South l1frica 's mandate over the territory of I,amibia and 3esolution 22~8 (S-V) of 19 Lay 1967, and subsequent resolutions on ifo.mibia including Resolution 3399 (XX:X) of 26 November 1975,
Recallin,; all relevant Security Council resolutions in particular .:-1.esolution 385 of 30 January 1976 which demands that South Africa ur5ently makes a solemn-declaration for t:::ie holclins of free elections in l~a!tlbia under the United :i.\ations supervision and control,
. __ Recallin2: the advisory opinion ·of the International Court of Justice of June 1971 which put South Africa rmder
-.o"bligation to withdraw from Namibia.,
Gravely concerned at ·South Africa 1 s militarisation of Namibia and t.b.e use of that territory as a base for attackii:g neighbourir-; African countries as evidenced by the condec:.ation of South Africa by the Security Council for her aggression against the People's Republic of Angola and Republic of Zambia,
1. Strorndy condenns the continued illeg~l · occupatior1 o:f Namibia by the uouth ;i.frican regime i·1hich has mili tariseci.
_the inter.n2,tio.nal territory in order to repress tb.e ind.iGenous people of Nam-oia and has used 1.;ar::1i bia as a base for laur:.c:::..i::J.g :.military attacks against neighbouring ~frican States,
--especially Zambia and .Angola, thus constituting a threat to .international :peace and security;
2. Commends the advance of the heroi·c strusgle of the Namibian people under the le&dershi~ of their authentic National Liberation hovenent, s·JAl:'O, for their inalienable right to self deter2inntion·and national independence, and ])ledges to increase political and diplomatic support, rn~~erial and financial assistanc.e to s:v"'AFO to enable it to effectively prosecute the stru5gle for national liberation;
3e Denounces the so called constitutional talks arranged by the racist re~ime in order to perpetuate its domination of the territory with the re;:::irnented collnbo::-2.tio!l of tribal chiefs, and calls upon the int;ernatior-al community
I I ,
-i
- 2
to refrain from accordin5 any recognition to any puppet regime which the racists may instn.l in Har.iibia and declares that any meaningful talks for the transference of power can only be with the e_:Bnuine representatives of the l~amibian people, SiiAro, under the auspices of the United Nations;
4. Calls uDon the Security Council to live up to its Resolution 365, of 30 January 1976 which calls, inter alia, for the holding of free elections in Namibia under the supervision and control of the -Cnited lia~ions and that in the ever.t of non-compliance by South Africa of the provisions of Resolution 385, the Security Council will
·meet again to consider appropriate measures includin~ · recourse to chapter VII of the United 1,iations Charter;
5. Mandates the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Conference to bring this resolution to the attention of the Security Council when it ~eets again to consider the questi?n of Namibia on or before 31st August 1976.
0
I f i I
l i
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distr. GENERAL
S/12180 19 Augus~ 1?76
ORIGINAL: E:im:::::-:
LETTER DATED 18 AUGUST 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOU~H AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GEHE?.A~
I have the honour to enclose the text of a statement issued in Windhoek :,oc.2.y by the Constitutional Committee of the South West African Constitutional Co~feren:e.
I should be glad if this letter and the enclosed text could be issued as e. document of the Security Council.
76-15766
(Signed) V. W. S'TEWARD For R. F. BOTHA
Permanent Representative
I : ...
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distr. GENERAL
S/11992 23 February 1976 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: SPANISH
LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 197 6 ?nO~.:; THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
On instructions from the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, I refer to the communications which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the South African regime addressed to you on 22 January (S/11938), 6 February (S/11970) and 13 February 1976 (S/11980), in which it refers to the problems of the "refugees;' and "displaced persons" in Angola and seeks, in an exercise of cynicism as clwnsy as it is futile, to confuse public opinion and to conceal the aggressive and totally illegitimate actions which the racist authorities are taking against the peoples of Angola and Namibia, and to disguise them by invoking so-called 11humanitarian" objectives.
The whole world - and particularly the African peoples - knows the true nature of the Pretoria regime and the brutality of its' conduct towards the African populations, and therefore understands the value that can be attached to its clumsy claims. It is a secret to no one that that regime is founded upon the most merciless exploitation of the African masses inhabiting the territory of South Africa, who have been subjecte~ to the infamy of apartheid. Motivated by the selfsame desire for exploitation, the South African authorities are illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia, in which it has also introduced its _abominable racist practices. From the Territory of Namibia, seeking to extend their odious system of oppression, the South African authorities invaded the People's Republic of Angola and launched the most dastardly and criminal aggression against its heroic people.
What moral authority could a Government such as that of the South African racists have - condemned by the United Nations for its systematic violation of the most elementary rights of the peoples that it subjugates - to speak of "humanitarian" questions? Whom does that regime believe it can deceive with its hypocritical expressions of concern for the fate of the "refugees" or the "displaced persons 11? Might such persons not be victims of a war unleashed by the same South African authorities? Is it not a fact that millions of Africans have been brutally dispossessed of their lands and transformed into refugees _and displaced persons, discriminated against and hounded wi~hin their own country, in South Africa and Namibia, as a result of the ignominious practice of apartheid?
76-04117 I . ..
UNITED NATIOe\lS Distr. GENERAL
S/11948
i :.,,_ .r,:._ t -~-• l
SECURITY COUNCIL 27 January 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
I write to you in connexion with the current consideration by the Security Council of the question of South West Africa. Your Excellency will recall that on 27 May 1975, my Foreign Minister wrote to you setting out my Government's position with regard to this question as well as providing information on the latest developments in the Territory. The negative reaetion of the United Nations to that letter was a source of great disappointment to the South African Government.
There can be no doubt that if Member States, and in particular membe1·s of the Security Council, were to have a clear grasp of the fundamental realities of South West Africa, and the principles underlying ~E:" Govern:r:1e:1t I s a.pproach to the whole issue, they would develop a proper appreciation of the impressive developments which have been achieved and which continue to be achj_eved in the Terri.tory and 2.
better understanding of South Africa's objectives. With that object in view, I now wish to deal with some of these-fundamentals. In doing so, it is incumbent on ne to revert briefly to certain important aspects of the background to this issue so that it can be considered in correct perspective.
Issues of law
It is conveniently forgotten that there is no legally binding instru.'"tl.ent or determination giving the United Nations a right of supervision of the administration over the Territory. Nor is there any legally binding decision giving the General Assembly or the Security Council the right to impose its will on the administration of the Territory or on the peoples of the Territory. Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council can arrogate.to themselves such a power. Their powers are strictly circumscribed by the Charter of the United Nations and they cannot do as they like however m~ny. times they may decide they ca~. The 1971 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on which many States take their stand, is not only entirely untenable but is clearly and demonstrably the result of political manoeuvring instead of objective jurisprudence. An advisory opinion is, as its name indicates, advisory only. The weight to be attached to it depends ultimately on the cogency of its reasoning. Every State which accepts the 1971 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should indicate clearly whether it accepts the reasoning of the Court on which ,t-:'.~at opinion was based. And how many States would unequivocally declare that they accept the Court I s conclusion concerning the powers of the General AsseIP.bly which necessarily
76-02032
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distr. GEi'!BRAL
S/11945 27 January 1976 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH
LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATI~ OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
I have been requested' by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which country currently exercises the function of President of the European Community, to transmit to you the outlines of the deflarcheundertaken on the eve of the debate in the Security Council on Namibia by the Netherlands Ambassador to South Africa on behalf of the nine countries of the Community.
i;The nine countries of the European Cormnuni ty have had an exchange of views on the problem of Namibia within the framework of their normal consultations on political co-operation. With reference to what has emerged from the Windhoek constitutional conference and from the debate which took place recently in the United Nations General Assembly, they deem it advisable to set forth to the Government of the Republic of South Africa their position on the question of Namibia.
"As they inq._icated in the message addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of 'Namibia Day', the nine countries of the European Community consider that South Africa should'withdraw from Namibia as soon as possible and that the inhabitants of Namibia should have the opportunity to exercise at an early date their right to ~elf-determination and to independence. The exercise of this right should consist of the opportunity of expressing their opinions on the political and constitutional future of the Territory as a whole, through a fully democratic process under the supervision of the United Nations •
.. "They accordingly feel that all the political grcups.should be free to
engage in peaceful political activities throughout the Territory during the process of self-determination.
"Consequently, they consider that the release of all Namibians detained because of their political opinions and the return to their territory of the Namipians at present in exile could contribute appreciably to ensuring this democratic and peaceful participation in the process of self-determination.
76-02045 I • .•
S/11945 English Page 2
· :'In the light of the foregoing, the nine countries consider the indications that have emere;ed thus far from the Windhoek constitutional conference inadequate. As its representativity is limited to ethnic groups, not all the political forces have been able to participate in it. It therefore does not appear to guarantee the fully democratic character of the process of self-determination. Furthermore, it still does not appear to provide for the constitutional future of Namibia to be determined by the :::iJamibian people through a single consultation organized on a Territory-wide basis.
11The nine countries of the Community therefore feel that it is essential for the Republic of South Africa to promote the process of self-determination of Nami-oia on the basis of the above--mentioned principles and by applying modalities which should be determined through ·negotiations between the South African GoverrL~ent and the Secretary-General of the United Nations so as to ena""ule the United Nations to exercise supervision. 11
I have the honour to request you to transmit this letter to the President of the Security Council and to have it circulated as an official document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Johan KAUFMANN Permanent Representative of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations
Distr. GENERAL
S/11946
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 27 January 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1976 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I., OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to forward to you in connexion with the forthcoming Security Council debate on Namibia, the following message which I am informed 'reflects the official OAU position:
"1. nrnEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA CANNOT BE COMPROMISED; ~EEREFORE, SOUTH AFRICA MUST WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY HER ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY AND MUST REPEAL HER OPPRESSIVE LAWS.
"2. THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA IS A THREAT TO PEACE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL !VilJST PRONOUNCE ITSELF ON THIS. THE THREE PERMANENT MEMBERS, NAMELY, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHOULD EXAMINE THEIR CONSCIENCE .AND FACE REALITY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR THE .APPLICATION OF CH.APTER 7 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CH.ARTER.
113. THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA MUST BE PRESERVED AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF BANTUSTANISATION CANNOT BE TOLERATED.
"4. SW.APO IS THE SOLE REPRESENTA'rIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA. CHIEFS ARE PUPPETS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME AND, THEREFORE, ANY MEP.NINGFUL TAL.{S MUST Il\JVOLVE SW.APO REPRESENTATIVES. illfLESS THE WORLD BODY AND SOUTH AFRICA RECOGNIZE SW.APO'S POSITION, THE OAU AfJD ALL PEACE-LOVING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WILL ASSIST HER IN ATTAINING AND DEMONSTRATING HER LEGITIMATE RIGHTS THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE.
115. THE ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NAMIBIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES MUST BE STOPPED. MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ABIDE BY DECREE NO. 1, PROMULGATED BY THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN HAVE STRENGTHENED SOUTH AFRICA'S ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY AND, THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD BE CALLED UPON TO CUT OFF THEIR DTPLOMATIC AND TRADE Lil'JKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH AFFECT THE TERRITORY. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF-GERMANY SHOULD IN PARTICULAR CONSIDER WINDING UP-HER CONSULATE IN NAMIBIA AS THIS IS THE MOST TELLING DIPLOMA.TIC .APPROVAL OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA.
116. INCREASED ARMS SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE CONDEMNED AS IT STRENGTHENS HER STRONGHOLD ON THE TERRITORY.
76-01991 I •••
s/11946 English Page 2
117. THE USE OF THE TERRITORY OF NAMIBIA TO CARRY ON AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA MUST BE CONDEMNED."
I should be grateful if this communication were circulated as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) H. E. L. ACEMAH Charge d'Mfaires, a.i.
UNITE,D NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distro G:C:rrnRAL
S/11945 27 January 1976 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH
LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVS OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE lITJITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
I have been requested'by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which country currently exercises the function of President of the European Community, to transmit to you the outlines of the deMarche undertaken on the eve of the debate in the Security Council on Namibia by the Netherlands Ambassador to South Africa on behalf of the nine countries of the Community.
11The nine countries of the European Community have had an exchange of views on the problem of Namibia within the framework of their normal consultations on political co-operation. With reference to what has emerged from the Windhoek constitutional conference and from the debate which took place recently in the United Nations General Assembly, they deem it advisable to set forth to the Government of the Republic of South Africa their position on the question of Namibia.
"As they indicated in the message addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Natrons on the occasion of 'Namibia Day', the nine countries
. of the European Community consider that South Africa should'withdraw from Namibia as soon as possible and that the inhabitants of Namibia should have the opportunity to exercise at an early date their right to self-determination and to independence. The exercise of this right should ~onsist of the opportunity of expressing their opinions on the political and constitutional future of the Territory as a whole, through a fully democratic process under the supervision of the United Nations.
"They accordingly feel that all the political grcups should be free to engage in peaceful political activities throughout the Territory during the process of self--determination.
"Consequently, they consider that the release of all Namibians detained because of their political opinions and the return to their territory of the Namibians at present in exile could contribute appreciably to ensuring this democratic and peaceful participation in the process of self-determination.
76-02045 I . ••
s/11945 English Page 2
I: "In the light of the foregoing, the nine countries consider the indications tliat have emers;ed thus far from the Windhoek constitutional conference inadequate. As its representativity is limited to ethnic groups, not all the political forces have been able to participate in it. It therefore does not appear to guarantee the fully democratic character of the process of self-determination. Furthermore, it still does not appear to ~rovide for the constitutional future of Namibia to be determined by tl1e {iJamibian people through a single consultation organized on a Territory-wide basis.
11The nine countries of the Community therefore feel that it is essential for the Republic of South Africa to promote the process of self-determination of Nami-oia on the basis of the above-•mentioned principles and by applying modalities which should be determined through negotiations between the South African Govern_111ent and the Secretary .. General of the United Nations so as to ena"i:lle the 'united Nations to exercise supervision. 11
I have the honour to request you to transmit this letter to the President of the Security Council and to have it circulated as an official document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Johan KAUFM.Af-Jl'if Permanent Representative of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations
Distr. GENERAL
s/11946
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 27 January 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1976 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I., OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to forward to you in connexion with the forthcoming Security Council debate on Namibia, the following message which I am informed 'reflects the official OAU position:
"l. INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA CANNOT BE COMPROMISED; ':HEREFORE, SOUTH AFRICA MUST WITHDRP..W IMMEDIATELY HER ILLEGAL OCCu'PATION OF THE TERRITORY AND MUST REPEAL HER OPPRESSIVE LAWS.
"2. THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA IS A THREAT TO PEACE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST PRONOUNCE ITSEL'F ON THIS. THE THREE PERMANENT MEMBERS, NAMELY, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF .AMERICA SHOULD EXAMINE THEIR CONSCIENCE AND FACE REALITY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 7 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.
113. THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA MUST BE PRESERVED AND SOUTH AFRICA'S. POLICY OF BANTUSTANISATION CANNOT BE TOLERATED.
114. SW.A.PO IS THE SOLE REPRESENTA'rIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA. CHIEFS ARE PUPPETS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME AND, THEREFORE, ANY MEANINGFUL TALV.S MUST INVOLVE SWAPO REPRESENTATIVES. UNLESS THE WORLD BODY AND SOUTH AFRICA RECOGNIZE SWAPO'S POSITION, THE OAU AND ALL PEACE-LOVING COUNTRIES IN THE WOflLD WILL ASSIST HER IN ATTAINING AND DEMONSTRATING HER LEGITIMATE RIGHTS THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE.
"5. THE ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NAMIBIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES MUST BE STOPPED. MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ABIDE BY DECREE NO. 1, PROMULGATED BY THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN HAVE STRENGTHENED SOUTH AFRICA'S ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY AND, THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD BE CALLED UPON TO CUT OFF THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH .AFFECT THE TERRITORY. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF-GERMANY SHOULD IN PARTICULAR CONSIDER WINDING UP-HER CONSULATE IN NAMIBIA AS THIS IS THE MOST TELLING DIPLOMATIC APPROVAL OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA.
"6. INCREASED ARMS SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE CONDEMNED AS IT STRENGTHENS HER STRONGHOLD ON THE TERRITORY.
76-01991 I • ••
s/11946 English Page 2
117. THE USE OF THE TERRITORY OF NAMIBIA TO CARRY ON AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF MTGOLA MUST BE CONDEMNED. 11
I should be grateful if this communication were circulated as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) H. E. L. ACEMAH Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.
(FOR USE OF I}J"FORMATION Iv.tEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release SG/SM/2289 _NAM/220
7 January 1976
TEXT OF :MESSAGE BY S:SCRE~_EY-GENERAL TO OPENING SESSION
OF IN'l'EPJJATIONAL CONF'ERE.l'JCE ON NAMIBIA AND h'Ur-!:AN RI']H':'S
Following is the text of a message from Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
I' t.\
to the opening session of the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights,, which was read at its opening rne0tinc; on 5 Jam:ary in Dakar, Senegal, by I ssoufou Dj ern,a koye, Under Secretary-:¾eneral:
Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
In view of your profound respect fer lm:nan dignity and your constant activity for the protection of hu:.1an rights and the emancipation of the peoples of Africa, it is quite natural that you, V.r. President, should be serving as host for this i:nportant conference on Namibia. I sincerely regret that I am unable to be with you on this occasion, :but I should like you to know that the United Nations places a high·value.on this meeting. It is fer that reason that I have designated Under-Secretar~,r-General .Issoufou Djermakoye to attend this Conference on my behalf arid to convey tp you my best wishes for the success of its deliberations.
Southern Africa-ls currently passing through a most cr~cial phace of its histo;ry. While many of its States achieved their independence as a result of relatively peaceful processes, this.has not been the case in Angola where a fratricidal war is taking place, nor has it been possible, so far, to bring about:peacefully the transfer of power in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia •. Because of the close inter-relationships between the problems of southern Africa, developments in one territory can affect acutely the situation in the others. In recent weeks, we have seen how events in Angola have affected Namibia and have compounded the complexity of its problems. It is rr.y hope that the forthcoming Su.·nmit Conference of t~e Organization of African Unity will be able to find a speedy solution for the problem of Angola which will not only lead to peace and national unity but will also promote stability in that important region of Africa.
It is more appropriate that the inter~ational co~Jn.unity should concentrate attention on the problem of the hu..~an rights of the·Na::dbian people since the political, legal and social aspects of the problem·pre~ent a challenge of.the highest order. We in the United Nations feel that the Gontribution and cooperation of non-governmental organizations is essential in the search for solutions and in the education and mobilization of public opinion on the issues involved.
(more)
- 2 - Press Release SG/s~/2289 NAM/220
7 January 1976
It is appropriate too that I should pay special tribute to the initiative taken by the International Institute on Human Rights in Strasbourg for sponsoring this Conference and to the supportive actions of the International Commission of Jurists and the International Association for Democratic Lawyers.
The status of Na'llibia in international law is quite clear. Following the General Assembly's termination of South Africa 1s mandate over the Territory in 1966, Namibia has become the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The position of the United Nations is that the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia must be maintained and that any action designed to destroy that unity should be opposed. The responsibility of the United Nations over Na~ibia and t4e legality of its action concerning the Territory were confirmed by the advisory opinion delivered. by the International Court of Justice in l97l. · ·
At the request of the Security Council, I visited the Territory in 1972. I found that the overwhelming majority of individuals and groups consulted by me clearly favoured Namibia's accession to national independence and the preservation of its national unity and territorial integrity.
In keeping with its responsibilities,,the Unitr;::d·Nations established the Council for Namibia to be the pivotal, b.ody for all matters relating to_the Territory. The Council's task has been facilitated through the consideration of the various aspects.of the Namibian.situation by several other United Nations bodies. As a result of all these efforts, considerable information has been collected on the Territory and in~depth inquiries have been conducted into many of its problems. Their reports have also kept international opinion informed of policies and practices which continue to violate.the human rights of the Namibian people.
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have repeatedly called upon :the Government of South Africa to fulfil its re_ponsibilities under the Charter and to take the necessary steps to eff,ect the withdraw-al of its administration from the Territory so that power, may be transferred to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations.
· Pending the transi'er of such power, the Security Col,lncil has unanimously called u_pon South Africa to implement a m.cr.ber of essential measures. South Africa must comply fully, in spirit and in practice, with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rigb.ts. It should release all Namibian political prisoners, including those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal -security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried o:r are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or.South ·Africa~ It must abolish the.application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and praGtices, _particularly Bantustans and homelands. Finally, south Africa must accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. ·
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Distr. GENERAL
S/11918 24 December 1975
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 16 DECEMBER 1975 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of resolution 3399 (XXX)* concerning the question of Namibia, adopted by the General Assembly at its 2419th plenary meeting, on 26 November 1975.
In operative paragraph 11 of this resolution, the General Assembly
"11. Urges the Security Council urgently to take up again the question of Namibia, which is still on its agenda, and to act to give effect to its resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974; :, .
(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM Secretary-General
* Not reproduced in the present document; for the text see document A/RES/3399 (XXX).
75-29834
UNJTED NATIONS
GENERaA.l ASSEMBLY
Thirtieth session Agenda item 87
Distr. GENERAL
A/RES/3399 (XXX) 11 December 1975
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
{on the report of the Fourth Committee (A/10358jJ
3399 (XXX). Question of Namibia
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Namibia,
Having examined the report of the United Ifations Council for Namibia 1/ and the relevant chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, '?J
Having heard the statements of the representative of the South West Africa People's Organization, who participated in an observer capacity in the consideration of the itenf by the Fourth Committee, JI
Having also heard the statements of the petitioners, l:::J
Rec_alling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, containing the programme of action
· for the full implementation of the Declaration,
Recalling, in particular, its resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and subsequent resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council relating to the question of Namibia, as well as the
ij A/10024 (vols. I and II).
'?:_/ A/10023 (Parts I-IV), chaps. I-VI, A/10023/Add.3, chap. X.
3/ See A/C.4/SR.2151 and 2155.
4/ See A/C.4/SR.2145, 2146, 2156 and 2165.
75-28690 / .•.
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
NOTE TO COIIBESPOHDEI'.'TS
Note No. 3927 19 August 1975
The United Nations Council for Namibia will hold a solemn meeting on Tuesda..,v, 26 August, at 10.30 a.m. in the Trusteeship Council Chamber in commemoration of Namibia Day.
The meeting will be followed by the screening of a film on Namibia. All members of the press are invited to attend.
In 1973 the Council declared that Namibia Day would be observed on 26 August "as an annual event for as long as will be necessary, a.s a reminder of the critical time in August 1966 when the people of Namibia ,,ere forced to begin their resistance against the aggression of the illegal occupation".
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.
( FOR USE OF INFORMATION HEDIA -- NOT .AN OFF:~CLI\.L P.ECORD)
Press Release N1'.IJII/192 15 Jul:'/ 1975
PHO'l10GR.JtT·J!IC DISPLP1.Y ON NA;viJ:'JIA UNVEIIBD AT HS,\DQUARTERS
A :rhotographic display on Nruuibia, which will remain on view "so long as the probler.1 of Namibia re111ains to jar the conscience of the internE.tional co;mnunity 11
, was unveiled at ll a.m. today at the Visitcrs' Entrance of the General Asse:nbly building.
Tie disp:1...ay, consist~ng of four separate pa...'1els, vas prepared at the request of the Cenera.~- Asser.11-ly by the U11ited Naticns Office of Public Information (OPI), in consultation with the United Nations Council for Namibi9 ...
The display was unveiled by the President of the Council for Namibia, Rupiah B. Banda (Zambia).
D~L~ribing the display at the un•reilin,; cere:'lony, Mr. Banda said the first panel sho~·red the geographj.c set'ving of tl1e Terri to:ry in relation to the rest of the Af1-ican cont:i.nent) and i'cs physicc.l features. The secor:d showed the wealth of the Territo:.:y wh:i.ch was bei1 1g exploited by Sou-'.;,\ Africa and foreign compani,:,s based in Western countries. TI·1e third panel illustrated tlle South African repression of Namibians, and the people's resistance throu1;h their liberation movement, the South Uest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The last panel shoued the United Na·cions action end assistance to Namibians in their struggle for national liberation, freedom ru1d independence.
Mr. Banda said the display was a living testimony to the fact that the United Nations had a unique and di:tect responsibility for the Territory of Nam\bia. 'Ihe responsibility that the United Nations had assumed for Namibia would never end until the question of Namibia was solved. 11However, this dis_r:,lay will remain in this public lobby of the United Nations building so long as the problem of Namibia remaira to jar the conscience of the international cor:nnuni ty1', he stated.
"Moreover, this display will remain here pen:1anently to epitomize and symbolize the responsibility that the United Nations has for Namibia. It Hill be a constant reminder to everybody uho sets foot here·that the peoples of the world have a moral obligation to-assist and support the :people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom and indepe!1cl.ence. r,
Mr. Banda said the Namibian :people demanded that South Africa quit their country and that the United Nations supported that demand. The demand was just and deserved total support by all the peoples of the world, he stated.
(more)
- 2 - Press Release NAM/192 15 July 1975
"It is the Cm.mcil I s hope and belief that this display will help to disseminate :c,ecesi:ary j_~fo:rmation to the publ.ic in order to help bring about more support and ~ .l.e,?,rer understanding for the cause of Namibia 11
, he continued.
The display should convey a clear message to all visito~s that the Government of South Africa was guilty of a crL~e of international trespassing and that it would continue to be guilty so long as it occupied Namibia illegally, Mr. Banda added.
11I mu_.c;t souna. a not.<:! of warnin:3 i;o a.11 those ·who collaborate with South Africa by financ:'..ng and suppo:r.t:7.ng Sc..;.th Africa's illegal presence in Namibia, that they must stop the looting and h:)arding of Namib1an goods", he stated. Companies that were at present investing and doing business in Namibia should knou that they were engaging in an illegal and criminal activity.
Mr. Banda said that there Fas no need for companies and Governments to be doinc; businet~s ir.. N8llli1J:l.c1. "wllsn they can see the handvri ting on the wall that Nanrlb.a will noon b,;.? fi:ce ancl iHdependent tmder a legitimate government".
r!Jr. B2.nda said that the pictures, some of which 1-rere taken under the most dangerous circunstances involving high risks, covered almost the entire spectri.lm of -~he Namibinn _people I s humiliati:1g existence under the a:Jartheid systc~,1 of C01J.t.~1. Africa ai1d its ::epressi ve m,~C:-1inery.
In introducin:; Mr. Randa, the Chairman of St2ndin8 Committee III of the Council for Nan1ibia, Aru~. K. Ht;.dhiraja (India), expressc,i appreciation to OPI I s .F::10tographs and Exhibits Sect:i.0~ which, he said, 1':..d 110rked b::i,rd with two outsid8 designers, Felix Gula and Karel Zed.11icek to make the display a reality.
In requesting the display last Decemb2r, the General Assembly a1,ked the Secretary-General t_o direct OPI 11to set up a photographic display in the public areas of the United -Nations Headquarters with a view to maldng visii:.ors informed of developments in Namibia" §esolution 3295 (XXIX17-
Attending the ceremony this i,1orning ·were the Chainnan of the Special Co:rpmittee of 24 on decolonization, Salim A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania) and representatives of other United Nations bodies; representatives of the Secretary-General, of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization and of the Assistant Secretary-General for Public Information; and members of the press.
J UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release NAM/195 15 July 1975
TEXT OF STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA
AT Ul\'VEILI~G OF PHOTOGRAPHIC DISPLAY ON NAMIBIA
Follm,ing is -~he text of a statement made by the President of the United Nations Council for Na.raibia, Edwin Ogebe Ogbu (Nigeria), on the occasion of the unveiling of the.photographic display on Namibia, held at United Nations Headquarters on 15 July 1975:
The Representatives of the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-Genera: of the Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization and of the Office of Public Information, my colleagues the Chairmen of the Special Committee of 24, the Special Committee against Apartheid, the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, members of the Council and members of _the Press corps.
We are gathered here today, the 15th July 1975 to witness the unveiling by the Council for Namibia the Photographic Display on Namibia. This display, in the public lobby of the United nations, is a living testimony to the fact that the United Nations has a unique and direct responsibility for Namibia. The responsibility that the United Nations has assumed for Namibia will never end until the question of Namibia is solved. However, this display will remain in this public lobby of the United Nations building so long as the problem of Namibia remains to jar the conscience of the international community •. Moreover this display will remain here permanently to epitomize and symbolize the responsibility that the United Nations has for Namibia •. It will be a constant 'reminder to everybody who sets foot here that the peoples of the world have a moral obligation to assist and support the people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom. and independence.
By resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 15 December 1974, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Office of Public Infonnation (OPI) to set up a photograr display in the public area of the United Nations Headquarters building. Thus the Council for Namibia and the Office of Public Information have worked together in a spirit of co-operation, to ensure that the elements of this display are accurate and do convey a basic message to the public. That message is that Namibia is occupied and exploited by a foreign country, South Africa, and this occupation is illegal.
The Namibian people demand that South Africa quit their country and the United Nations supports that demand. This demand is just and deserves total support by the peoples of the world.
(more)
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Pllblic Info:::mation
United Nations, :N.Y.
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION l'-IE.DIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
NOTE TO COR.i.-qE;SPONDENTS
Note l:o. 3924 11 July 1975
_,,,----...1
In consultation with the United nations Council for Namibia., the Office of Public Information (OPI) has prepared a photographic display on Namibia 1·1hich will be unveiled a~- 11 a .m. on Tuesda~_,Ll1..._ July, at the Visitors 1
Entrance of the General Ass2mbly bUJ..ldin3.
The display •,;as requested by the Gene1·al Assembly in a. resolution adopted last December. The Assembly asked t!'le Secretary-General to direct OPI 11to set up a. photographic display in the _public 8.1:'eas of the United Nations Headquarters with a view to making visitors informed of developments in Hamibia 11
{resolution 3295 (XXIXl7.
The display will be unveiled by Rupiah B. Banda (Zambia), President of the United Nations Council for Namibia.
Atten6ing the ceremony will be the Secretary-General or his representat~v:e; the Unde1·-Secreta.1--y-·Genera.l of the Department of Poli ti cal Affairs,
· ·Trusteeship and Decolonization or his representative; the Assistant Secretary-General for Pu.blic Information or his representative; the Chairman of the S_pecial. Concittee of 24 on decolonization, Salim. Ahmed Saliru. (United Republic of Tanzania); the Chairman of the Special Com.mi ttee against Apartheid, Edwin Ogebe Ogbu. (Nie;eria); and the Chairman of the Commission on Human· Rights, Ghu.lam Ali Allana (Pakistan) •
"Rep:resenta.tives of Member States and members of the press are invited to atter.d.
.,,..-·, '·-
Mr. Tang Ming-c..'l-iao., Ul1der-Secreto.ryGeneral for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization
Rafeeuddin Ahmed., :e,.:ecuti ve Assistant to the SecretartJ-Ge..l1eral
MF/BPJ
20 Jw,.e 1975
l. I enclose a copy of a letter dated lo Jtu1e 1975 addressed to t11e Secretary-General by the Secratru:y-Gene.ral of the African t-?ational Congress.11 announci,.,g the nppointment of Mr. Thrurii trfhalarnbiso as its Chief Representative in the united States, with. particular responsibilities at t:l:1e United Nations as well as with the Specializec1 Ag~,cies ..
2. In view of the reqi1est for assistance :made under the terms of operative paragraph 6 of General. 2-\Sser,ibly resolutio..'1 3220 (iOCD::), it. wouJ.d be appreciated if' you -would indicate what particular facilities could be r.1ade available to e.nsure the effective participation of the 1,10veroe..'lt in the releva.n.t work of the main cocmd. tt.ces of the General Assewly and its pcrtine..Ylt. subsidiary orga.11.s.
3.. Your recom.1:\endations il1 t11.is regard t."Oulc1 be appreciated~
8H/F1J! 1..,--' ~{_1
ci (.) z CV) ..J
~~ 0 u
Tel. Nos.:
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (SOUTH AFRICA)
RECEIVED IN REC8RDS CONTROL
Office: 74768 After hours 7271127
Your Excellency,
I have the pleasure to advise that the African National Congress (South Africa) established an office of its external missions in the United States of America during 1972, with Mr. THAMI MHLAMBIS0 as Chief Representative. He is also charged with special duties to represent the interests of our Organisation at the United Nations as well as at all its specialised agencies.
I have now been instructed by my National Executive Committee to request you, as I hereby do, to grant Mr. Mhlambiso the necessary credentials in terms of the General Assembly Resolution Number 3280 (XXIX), operative paragraph 6, in order to facilitate his work at the United Nations Headquarters •
We wish to assure His Excellency that at the end of Mr. Mhlambiso's current tour, your office will receive prior notification and the name of his successor communicated to you.
In the meanwhile, we shall eagerly be awaiting to hear what steps are being taken in this matter.
Accept, Your Excellency, the considerations of our hi 6hest esteem.
The Secretary-General, United Nations Crganisation, New York, N.Y. 10017, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Yours respectfully,
0. ~·ZA., /V~ /)~/ .. y I Alf ed Nz,,
Secre ary:~
UNITED NATIONS (8) NATIONS UNIES ~
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
FROM: S.N.GRANITSAS-OPI OE:
SUB.JECT: NAMIBIA OB.JET:
MEMORANDUM fNTERIEUR
DATE, __ 3_o __ MA_Y..,a.,_I_9_7_5 __
II.30 REFERENCE: ______ _
*As UN deadline expires, R reports from Windhoek that there was 11little
perceptible change in the scene 11•
"We1 11 wait until we see the UN Navy sailing in", was the comment of an ancnymous trader, while S.Africa Commissioner-General, Jannie de Wet, is quoted as having said that any intervention by the UN would meet with opposition from 11all people 11
•
*AFP reports: Pretoria continuera d 1 administrer la Namibie en depit
des ultimatums des Nations Unies, annonce-t-on officiellement. Le retrait de 1 1Afrique du Sud n 1 interviendra que sur la demande des repre
sentants authentiques des diverses nations de Namibie.
*EDITORIALLY, NYT says in appearance, negotiations seem remote but 11the gap between the UN position and that of S.Africa ••• has clearly na
rrowed since the Sec. Council made its most recent demands". Yet, Vorster "will have to accept UN supervision 11
• The us, Britain and France have 11every right to expect a further concession from Mr. Vorster".
.. -..,,. ,.
CONPIDEl\°'rJJ;.L
NOTE FOil 'rI-IE FILF.
Meeting of the thn~e Hcstern Ambassadors v1ith the Secretary-General on 24 April 1975 concerning Nl\..!'-1.IBI.A
After the rnecU.ng of the thrse v!estcrn Arr-.b;:J.ssadors with the Secreta.ry--General, I had nn oppo:ctunity to look at the documen'l:s regarding the tripart..ito approach to Poreign Minister Huller of South Africu.o The contents of the demarche ,,;ere :
1) That the i;amibia.n populi::!.tion shonJ.d, under United Nations supervision, express freely its. vicx·rn ·within 2. short time on the future of the territory ..
2) All Nar,d..bian political groups should be allm.,red to pa.rticipateo
3) The territory should not be split up but beccrnc one s·ciJ.te .. South Africa together ,-rith the United Nations should bring independence to the people of the t.erritory if they do not decide othe:r..T:j_se.
The three l\r:1bassadors r:<Lso e::p.i:.--esscd the desirability of an earl_''{ public s·cateruent of intcnt::Lo::-i., To this end, the South African should qet in cont..:ict ,-.rith the United nations. Furthc.:r.r2orc, the . th:i~--ee 2\.mbass,;_do:;::s tmd2:i..-lined "i:o the South African Fo:;:-eiq:rt,,tllili.:vu:rgent. a·ttenti.on should be aiven to
h• ) .. - I. ' • ;,; t is pro ::i.t0m. 'i'nere vms no 1211:1.1ed.1.ate commentfj by the
Foreign µinister.
cc: Br ft Fara.11
! IC ·' ' ' I ' ~-. , ' '•-
Notes of a nccting held in the Office of the Secrctarv-Gcncral on 31 Janu~rv 19,5
Present: The.Secretary-General k:.bassador Sali;:1 2\. Salim of Tanzania A.A. Farah
Ambassador Salim said the purpose of his visit ,...,.:i_s t'i.·mfold: a) to keen th2 SccrctcJ.~v-Gcncral i:1:'.:or:::-2d o:: the outcorne of the OAU Liberation.,, Cor:1.i;1i ttee Is r.1ecting in Dar-es-Salaam and b) to provide inforr.1ation on the 1975 work prograra.-nc of the Comrnittec of 24.
OAU Liberation Cor.1r.1ittce
(i) A.:nbassador Salin said there had been u. shi:'.: t in priorities~ At the Accra ncct.ing of the Co,:,miti:cc in 1973 it had been decided to accord priority to the PoJ:tusue,::e Territorieso Since the Territories had achieved or ·1.-?c.::rc about to achieve independence, the Dar-cs-Sa.J.aa.r.1 r:tc0tL1g decided to concentrate on Southern Rhodesia and 1'Tc18ibiu...
(ii) lv.ith r'?crard ~t?. South?rn PJ1ocksi<1 Z\::ib<;1-s?zi:lo:= _ S2.li::·. said thut tnc union o:.: liberation r:1.ovc.:c::it.s s·::iLL 11-:::.t.c.., despite i:atcrncl.l p::ro:.)lc;·::s and the j_JOs :~ 1·.i_o;i, ·:::-..j:cn ::, :, -.: .. ~:::!
Smith regir: 1.ce ~-The minority rcgfr·,c1:::; rc:'.:us:•l to rcl.o;.':~.;~ .:111 political priso~2rs and li:::t rcst~2ints on ::cs~~~- Si.~ol~
· and Nkomo, together \·Iith its :t"cfusal to acc~:-c~,t zt cc_:.n:: :.::. t."c: ·:.:iu:1;::;_l conference, hc:..d given rise t.o co:1::.;i(.1::;.:::c:·.:-J.c ,:·~-:..~~:_,_,c:i:1 :.::.-~-:1'.::. Ar.lbassador Salin said in i..ionc":on he 112.ci ::)22,-: ::01, .. ·:-_;1~1.·t .~;:.1it:1 had al30 rcjcct:c;..i u.. l)~c:):>s2..l jJ~' t:1c tJni Lc:6. ~._i.11;-:,-~_-i:·.1 ~·:c~~: u representative to ;)c st2ti-::,:·1:::c:. i_n S.::-.J.i:;;Y.1::::-_• t.o ~~oJ.J.0·,: 1,:J o,: the Lusaka Agrcc~:-,:cnt~ ·· ·
AL1..°:.J~ s s u.c.-:_or S2..l :i_ :·.1 s ~-2..c":_ ·::..1-1<1 t t:~ ~C.! J? 1: 1.._·. ~; i(°:_.:.-: ~ \ -~: :·; c1 :~ Botswana, Z2:.~)i~: 2:1~: ~;\'_;,:,,·::~ .. :· ,.-,.~~::: zc.].:::, c.:o' .·: ~-::: · t:11::: Rhodesian si JcuG.-tio:1. 'J.'~:-:,_-~ .. :.-~:...:-:.: 2. ic::.-.r c::..-.:-_· .J ~---~ t.c_-:. J_-_·..,..r 2- ~-··.·.1
latest dcvelopr.,cntso In rc~~li, to 2. cw:.::;tio:: :Jy t.>c, S;.."'C~~2-::~:~·.-"Gcncral, ill.1:.Jas s2tc1c:: S L~l i:~1 s E~ i.cJ. C!.1 u;; · -'c__.) •: · :i.J,~,_·:: ~~~: zi .···.< · ~~ .:--c:~· ... ::-:"l ~ c..iC.:-.. not stipulate a co::~plctc -and i:::::v::C::ic1tc cc;:::_::.;c,-:circ; it \.·.::.:~; tied to the c~atc for a cons ti tu'.:.ionctl co:1.:::::~~ -2;1cc. ;?ur~:l1e::::-:.:urc, South Africa, \·,·hich wus rcquircc.1 -to \·1ith6.ro.\.' its o.r:.1c(. personnel, continued to keep thcra in Rhodcsiv..
-.. ---~ ---------
2 -
{iii) On the question of Namibia, Ambassador Salim said the matter had not been discussed in detail in Dares-Salaam nor in Lusaka since it was felt that it should be dealt primarily within the UN. He anticipated a Security Council meeting in the first we~c of June follm·ling the deadline of 30 May set for the South Af:1=ican reply.
cormnittee of 24ts work prograrmne for 1975
Ambassador Salim said it was intended to despatch a mission to the Cape Verde Islands in Narch. Another mission may visit the Spanish- Sahara in April and a full meeting of the Corrunittee of 24 may be held in Lusaka in May. Ambassador Salim thanked the Secretary-General for the co-operation which he had received and undertook to keep him inform8d of any new developments ..
. 0 MF/aa vL cc: Miss Broo]~
IK GH/AP
',
I
ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION . ,
To, The Secretary-General A:
FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER
I NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER
I FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION r For your inf'ormation I send herewith
two papers on A a.rthe K Namibia,
4~ r'✓ L--i
Date: FROM: DE:
A.N. Shevchenko
CR,13 (7-73)
-
- .
~ tt~ 1/--6 December 1974
NAM:CBIA
In terms of the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.1072/Rev.l) adopted by the Fourth Committee on 29 November, the Assembly
would urge the Security Council "to convene urgently in
order to take without delay effective measures, in accordance with the rele'Want Chapters of the Charter of the United Nations, and with resolutions of the Security council and
of the General Assembly regarding Namibia, to put an end to
South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia." This draft is due to be taken up in the Plenary on
The African Group intends to request I Tuesday, lo December. that the Security Council meet, as soon as possible, after
the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly.
The African Group has not yet prepared a draft resolution for the Security council
•
--1974
APARTHEID
The apartheid debate this year was greatly influenced by
the atmosphere created by the action in the General Assembly under the credentials item, and the debate in the Security council on South Africa's membership in the United Nations. The African proposals received much larger votes than they
had anticipated. Efforts to obtain a consensus in the
Security Council failed, however, and the proposal for the
expulsion of South Africa was vetoed by the three Western
Powers. The African Group felt that they should continue
pressure on the Western Powers, both to express dissatisfaction and to hold the three Powers responsible for bringing about changes in the situation which, they had claimed, could be accomplished by persuasion.
One of the draft resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee calls on the Security Council to take action under Chapter VII on the arms embargo. This is apparently meant to confront the Western Powers again in the
council, especially as they are unwilling to accept that the situation is a threat to the peace.
Another resolution includes a more explicit criticism
of the three Western Powers than in the past and a condemnation
of Israel for its collaboration with South Africa. A third resolution entitled "release of political prisoners"
is partly in response to recent speculation on possibilities
of peaceful change. It reaffirms United Nations concern for peaceful settlement in accordance with the OAU Manifesto, and lays down prerequisites for a solution such as release of prisoners, end to repression and exercise of the right of
self-determination by all the people.
,.
- 2 -
A fourth resolution on the programme def work of the
Special committee requests the Committee to hold consultations
with governments and organizations and promote public campaigns
for the total isolation of South Africa. The title of the
Committee is to be changed to 11Special Committee against Apartheid" and the membership is to be expanded.
In the light of these resolutions, it may be anticipated
that the activities in 1975, especially by the Special committee,
are likely to be focussed on the following: (a) convening a meeting of the Security Council to
discuss the arms embargo (the timing of the request will be decided by the African Group in due course);
{b) action against South Africa by all specialized agencies and other international organizations;
(c) promoting greater recognition of liberation movements (the two South African aiberation movements obtained observer status in the Special Political Committee at this session); and
(d) expansion of publicity and encouragement of action by non-governmental organizations in Western countries against all collaboration and contacts with South Africa.
As regards South African reactions, it may be noted
that the recent hints from South Africa refer mainly to modifications of policy on Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. Inside the country, the South African Government envisages only an amelioration of conditions of the Black people. It
is trying to rush the establishment of the Bantustan of Transkei as an independent State by 1976, to present the world with a fait accompli.
REFERENCE:
< '- \- (,V' ~ /~ I ~/-,
'l / ,_/ v., UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
POSTAL ADDRESS-ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, NY. 10017
CABLE ADORESS-ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE· UNATIONS NEWYORK
Dear Secretary-General,
5 December 1974
I enclose herewith copy of a document, translated from
Afrikaans, which was appended to a letter addressed to you and
received by this Office, dated 13 November 1974, from Mr. A.A.W.
Erasmus who is a member of the Executive Council of the Volksparty
of Namibia which is the principal organ of the Coloured people in
the Territory. I am also enclosing herewith the letter and my
reply to it. The document and letter are of interest as this is
the first time, I think, that they have written to us directly.
Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations
Yours sincerely
<;:: <? ~ .,:::.,_. ~ ~ ~ Sean Mac Bride
Commissioner for Namibia
0 w QJ
The SRcret~ry-Gen ra1
UNl'.L''';D N A'rlONS
oir
;) ,,,/;/.,,c~/".z it
P.u. J:lox J:> H'.;FJ.i ·.oU'J.H-'l'U''iJ\l 'jUU'J.-.1:i '0/_!:;' '.L' F.l:''H.lG i\
.1...:: .• Novmber l~f/ 4
_uec.1a:i:·2:t1on 1·rom the VOLK::iPAH'l'Y sen"t 1·or your body's in:t'or·mation
Eie Volksparty maak die volgende dew;- die plaaslike pers, die w~reldpers en die V. V .o. bekend: · ·
l. T.6.v. kontak met die ~$reld en die v.v.o. herbevestig die Volksparty die V'ierk gedoen deur Mnr. Koos Beukes (Samuel), Mnr. H.C. Beukes en v;yle Mnr. Allan Louw, en die Rehoboth Raad. Dit behoort nou vir almal opsigte-lik te wees dat Rehoboth aJ.tyd die regte pad gevolg het. .
2. Die Volksparty vestig die aandag van almafd~ enige instensie lidmaat van die Nasionale Konvensie kan wees. Dat ~ie Nasionale Party, die Verenigde Party, en§ nie aan die Konvensie behoort nie is uit eie bewe-. ~ . g1ng.
3. Dus, vestig die Volksparty die aandag daarop dat waar mense in ons land opgebreek ~ord in rasse en dan uitgenooi · ~ord om oor die toekons van die land te praat dit maar net 'n swaksinnige regverdiging van apart-heid is. ·
4. Die Volksparty.bevestig die standpunt dat slegs met v.v.o. aanwesigheid daar enige beweging van hulle kant sai. en kan v.ee s.,
5. Die Volksparty in sy grondwet ondersteun 'n federale begrip ni'e gebasseer op etniese verdeling nie. Dit impliseer 'n magtiger vooropgestelde verantwoordelike staatsinstelling gegenereer uit die pla'slike en sender inmengning (werklike inme~ing van die kant van Suid-Afrikaanse recering).
6.T~o.v. die onderwys sedie Volksparty dat daar onmiddellik Gekonsolideer moet ~ord. D.½.s. onde!"\>\ys moet geplaas ½Ord ender een sentrnle ligaam met sy hele bestuur gevestig in Sui½es-~~rika. Doar ken slegs verant~oordelike vooruitgang intervolklik gemaak: ~ord_as daar weggedoen ~ord met rasse skole. Dus, s~art, ~it, geel bruin en anderskleuriges moet in dieselfde skole geplaas v,;ord. .
· (.~) Om kontak te bevorder moet daar onimddcllik 9 n lingm.a franca in allc skole ingevoGr V\Ord. Engels saJ. die doel die beste dien •
. ( !!" ) Daar rnoet onmidclellik 'n sv,;art of 'n bruinsf,fpcr .. -intendent-Gcncraal van onderwys aangestel V\Ord (hierdie reeling sal nie :rassistics v..ees n:ie).
7. T.o.v. die toepassing van Suid-.ll:frikaanse Vielhte. Die Volksparty eis da.t op stokers· \Ii at V\i tfronte hier ·v1,il kom stig oh $uid- lrfrika.anse Keurlingc hier kom beledig om sodoende bloedv9rGieting rum te moedig onmiddellik verhoor v'iOrd anders meet Jerry Ekanjo en andere onmiddellik vrygelant \\Ord.
8. Die Volksparty V1.ens ook te v 'rkla.ar dat n'Inr. Pik Botha ~e vertoe aan die V. V .o. met betrekking tot vrede 7 mensvi;aardighcid en garcgtigheid binne Suidv~es nie verband hou met die wcrklikhcid nie 7 en, dat die Volksparty as verant~oordelike politieke liggaam die huidige O½erhede vra om V'ieg te do"om me·t v\ettc soos 9 pasv\cttc, ontugvrnt, paskontrakstclsel, groepsGebiGde Vliet 0n sove.cl mcer diskriminerende V\otte om aan te pas by die nmrn Suidvrns soos gesicn deur voora~:>nstaande SuidVliesters,cn mnr. Mudge.
The Volkparty makes known the followin,; t11 rout:h the local and international press and the U .:C-1.
1. With respect to contact(s) with the world and the United Xations
Organization the Volksna~ reaffirms 't~1e work done by l1essrs. Koos
Beukes (Sanuel), i:-1.C. Beukes and the late Allan Louw, and the r,ehoboth
(Baster) Council. It ~hould now he clear to everyone that Rehoboth
has always followed the correct path.
2. The Volksparty would like to bring to everybody's attention tl1at;
membership in the National Convention is open to every or 0anization.
The fact is that the National Party and the United Party are not
members of the Convention nor have they a?plied for mewbership.
3. Therefore, the Volksparty would like to state that it is but a
feeble-minded excuse for apartheid to invite people to come and participate
in talks over the future of our country after they have been divided
into races.
4. The Volksparty would lil~e to affirra its stand that only with the
U .:-J. presence could there be and then~ 1-10uld he movenent on its part
(towards talks).
5. In its constitution the Volksparty supports a federal structure,
not based on ethnic division. This ira)lies a more powerful but responsible
constitutional system, based on local institutions without interference
(that is without actual interference by the South African z;overn!7lent).
6. With respect to education the Volksparty is in favour of ir:1mediate
consolidation. In other words education 1aust be placed under one ccn tral
body based in South West Africa. Responsible progress in race relation
can only be made when se;rcgated schools have been abolished. Thus, black,
white, yellow-brown and other colours must attend the same schools.
(i) To promote contacts a lingua franca must ir.1-nediately
be introduced in all schools. English uould be the most
suitable one.
(ii) A black or bro~-m superintendent-general must be aj_)pointcd
immediately (this arran 6ement should not be racist).
7. Hith respect to the application of South African lm-,s, the Voll::.sparty
demnnds that agitators who come here to establish white fronts and those
who cor.i.e here to ins.ult South African Co~loureds, thus encouraging blood
shed must be tried .immediately; otl1erv1ise Jerry Ekandjo and otliers r;-,ust
be set free forthwith.
8. The Volks_party wishes to state that l·~r. Pik Botha' s statcr.1ent
at the United Nations·or;;anization with regard to peace, human dignity
and justice in South West does not correspor..d with reality. The Volksparty
as a responsible political body, requests the present authorities to -
abolish such laws as the pass laws,. the irm:iorality act, nigrant labour
system, Group Areas Act and the many other discriminatory laws in order-
to create a new South 1-;est as envisaged by pro;ninent-~outh Hesters, and
Mr. Hudge.
. '
· 5 December 1974
Dear Mr. Erasmus,
The Secre·tary-General has asked me to acknowledge
receipt of your letter of 13 lfovember 197li , to which the
recent Declaration of' the VOLKSPARTY was attached. This
Declaration will be brought to the attention of the Members
of the United Nations Council for Namibia.
Needless to say, I was most interested to learn of the
views of the VOLK,SPARTY and should always be glad to receive
a:ny communication from you.
You may be interested in receiving copies of recent
United Nations publications on Namibia, which I am sending
under separate cover.
Yours sincerely
Sean Mac Bride · United :Nations Commissioner for Namibia.
Mr. A. A. W. Erasmus P. o. Box 33 Rehoboth - Town Namibia
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} ' # •• i. UNITED NATIONS l~ I NATIONS UN I ES
NEW YORK
With the compliments
of
Sean Mac Bride
United Nations Comm_issioner for Namibia
-~;.~.-~-.. - . , .. . t:_· ;.~;·t::· - ctfve Cowley,-s~~th ·we~t Afd~ Bureau
WiNDHOEI~---- Abruptly, it is all different. After 56. years a~ a niaridated territorv under South-African rule, South West Afnca
)s·-fin~ily to grapple ~ith its o\vn· destiny.
The Star (Johannesburg) 17 September 1974
Its p~oples are to be ·_ given a chance -to carve ··out, agairist huge odds, an _-independent future · for themselves - in a multi• .nationaI-sta te. : Gone is -the . idea that _
' :swA. will -be fragmented · under the apartheid pol· icy into ethnic mini-states. Gone the old dream, that it will become a fifth pro• vince. of South Africa -even_ .the so-called White part:
Policymakers and offi•· cials inet · _behind closed doors fi:u: m<mths l;>efore . the secret leaked out. An offi'cial . annpuncement is expected _ within weeks, possibly coinciding with the SW A debate in the United Nations. ·
It became obvious that change was in the air last week when Nationalist leaders - twice flew from Windhoek to Care Town for talks with the Cabinet,_ . The. leadci: of the SWA Legislative Assembly, Mr Dirk_· Mudge, his second· in-command, Mr Eben van Zljl, · . and • the Commissioner-General for Indigenous Peoples. Mr Jari de Wet, returned with a firm decision on the broad approach. The details remam - to be sorted out.
RlS8-m PROJECT
· ···Three considerations · : r.ro~~~!y_ J)\~}·()r · a large f,i!tt in their tliiP!.;.l1,g. ·
,-,~---~-~v-,--~ ----~~,, ... '1(,Ui ..... ,--)"
( . . 0 {ln . tbe · _-northern· ~ ,border; An,;ola i~- abrrnt to·' •berome · an independent"
state with majority ml~. '" ·. This jeopardises the
. Rl88-million · Kunene . hydro-electric proj~t., on : which SW A will depend : · for the next phase in its . !: economic. development. It r- also affect:! .the i.-. R595-millioo master .plan · {or watc-r sup-ply, which 1
will be·· 'based on border : rivers. ·_ : • . . - " .,,
worse. ~t;·ll, '._ i.t . e~tehds the· potential· : battlefront in thi> bush war against I
, SWAPO ( Snulh West Africa Pe-ople's Organisation) insurgents along the Pntire · 1 60/J km frontier from the Zambezi -to - the Atlanti.<;. ·:., ·.
_ e !ntern2lly, the 'home-• ,tands policy is in ruins -
r·except -in . Kavango and-· l I :,eastern Capri vi. The exo-: : ~-dus ~ _-from l)Opu!ous ; I" Owambo,· with 46 percent 1- of .the population, empha- ·
sised its failure. In -ot~r homelands the ·policy had ha~ly a ~oehold.
@ In· · the · UN -the Government faced eco-
.· no-mic and political sane•- lions. possibly · explusion,
for its allegedly imperialistic po.Jicy in the mandat~d ·.tcrritory.- - ·.
--1\IORE-AUTONOIUY
The. new, deal for SWA i! designed to neutralise the dangel's on the North-er_n border, to loosen the political ·logjam within trc territory. and to revh'e· dialogue with the UN. •
. 'It would be· ·wrong to -envisage - ·, a provisional. ~overnment along the lines· adonted in Am:ola
·and Mozambique. A tlme:table for inde-nendence is
· out of _\he qu,estion.
It would also be wron~ to imagine that racial dis-• .crimination will · be dumned overnight.
What wll! happen , is· that the. territory will be given greater autonom:v -to prepare for se!f•-defennination and in• -dependenr,; as a multina• tiona I state.
·A -~enior official savs: : "It is absurd to think
SWA will be able to ex"'!"· Mse - its right to sc If.
· determination while all the lmnortant depart.. ments are under Pretor·.ir.::.
A formula is reportedly ' being sought, perhaps in · the shape or an aH-race consultative body. to administer the returned de
' partments.
UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Twenty-ninth session FOURTH COMMITTEE Agenda item 66
QUESTION OF NAMIBIA
Request for hearing
Distr. GENERAL
A/C. 4/771 27 September 1974
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Note by the Secretariat: The following communication is distributed to members of the Fourth Committee in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee at its 2079th meeting on 23 September 1974.
Letter dated 25 July 1974 from Mr. Charles Kauraisa, South West Africa National Union (SWANU). addressed
to the Chairman ot· the Fourth Co:111.mittee
Stockholm
I am instructed by the National Executive of my party, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) to request a hearing for Mr. Gerson Veii, President of SWANU and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the National Convention, before the Fourth Committee during the coming twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.
74-25951
(Signed) Charles KAURAISA Secretary for Foreign Affairs
SWANU External Council
\ \
UNITED NATIONS. NATIONS UN IE S NEW YORK
With the compliments
of
Sean Mac Bride
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia
\.
~ THE WASIIE\'GTON POST J A 20 Wl:'dnesday,~ept.25,197-t
i Q ,~ if 0
( Oo ftlrlC3.
By Peter Younghusband Special to TM Washington Post
CAPE TOWN, Sept. 24-In a dramatic turnaround of previous' policy, South. Africa's ruling National Party announced today that it would take part in multiracial talks to determine the future of Namibia. (Southwest Africa).
The announcement was made through the party's regional bffice in Windhoek, capital of the trust territory in which South Africa has for years appped its policy of apartheid, the separate development of ethnic groups.
The surpnsmg · initiative, which was enthusiasticaliy welcomed by South African opposition parUes, was seen here as certain to provoke sharp criticism from rightwing elements in P:.-ime Minister John Vorster's National
, -Party. The National Party leader
in Namibia, A. H. Du Plessis, in announcing the decision today, said all population groups in the territory would be· allowed to choose their own representatives for the talks. Blacks outnumber whites by more tlum 7 to 1 in the ·white-ruled territory.
"All options arc open," Du Plessis said. "It would be prematul'e to say if the future pattern of political development would be independence as a confederation, federation or unitary state." He said it would also be premature to say that the itlea of incorporating Namibia into the Republic of South Africa had been scrapped.
The announcement was seen here as timc.<l to achieve maximum impact at the U.N. General Assembly, which just opened.
South Africa, which received the mandate to administer the trust territory from the League of Nations, has resisted repeated U.:\'. resolut,ions since the mid-1960s demanding that it relinquish control of the ti::1 ritory and i:.l I ]O\V it: to l:•~~lt~~Jf:' lt.:.!P'l)f'.rcL.. •1!.
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mibia. tSouthwcst Africa). The announcement was
made through the party's regional office in Windhoek, capital of the trust territory in which South Africa has for years applied its policy of apartheid, the separate development of ethnic groups.
The surpriswg initiative, which was enthusiasticaliy welcomed by South African opposition parties, was seen here as certain to provoke sharp criticism from rightwing elements in Prime Minister John Vorster's National
• Party, The National Party leader
in Namibia, A. H. Du Plessis, in announcing the decision today, said all population groups in the territory would be · allowed to choose their own representatives for the talks. Blacks outnumber whites by more thr.n 7 to 1 in the white-ruled territory.
"All options are open," Du Plessis said. "It would be premature to say if the future pattern of political development would be independence as a confederation, federation or unitary state." He said it would also be premature to say that the idea of incorporating Namibia into the Republic of South Africa had been scrapped.
The announcement was seen here as tim~l to achieve maximum impact at the U.N. General Assembly, which just opened.
South Africa, which received the mandate to administer the trust territory from the League of Nations, has re. sisted repeated U.N. resolutions since the mid-1960s demandinp; that it relinquish control of the territory and allow it to become independent.
A semidesert area rich in diamonds, copper and cattle, Southwest Africa is almost as large as South Africa and wfls a German colony until World War I. Its population today is 750,000, of whom· whites number 90,000, and it has 12 ethnic groups·
'l'oday•s·::rnnouncement comes as South Africa and neighboring Rhodesia find themselves increasingly Isolated by the patt<!rn of rcct•nt events in Africa, notably the s\vift move toward independence of Portuguese te1"Titories.
It goes well beyond developments in Rhodesia, where Prime Minister Jan Smith has been resistin:; this sort of black-white talks to atl1ic\·P a constitutional sc'ttleni0nt \';lth his country's i.Jb<"k rrkjority.
SEP 2 4 1974
UNITED NATIONS. NATIONS UN IE S NEW YORK
With the compliments ~ of
Sean Mac Bride
United Nations Comm_issioner for Namibia
.. \
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(FOTI USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release NA.l-1/129 29 August 1974
ATIG~ CONI'RIBUTES $5. 000 TO UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR NAMIBIA
Sec1~etal"J-General ICurt 'l,faldheim has received a contribution of $5,000 from the Government of Argentina to the United Nations Fund for Namibia.
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TO: A:
UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
The Secretary-General
NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR \J:? DATE: ~2~3.,___.A=u,,.g'""'u=s~t=--=l=-9 .... 7"""4.,___
REFERENCE: ______ _
THROUGH: 5/C OE:
FROM: DE:
Marc Schreiber, Director #,,1._,,A.. Division of Human Rights / )
i// SUBJECT: Statement concerning human rights in Namibia issued by the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights OBJET:
The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts established under resolution 2 (XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights adopted yesterday, at the closing meeting of its field mission to Europe and Africa, the statement set out below, and requested that it be drawn to your attention as well as to the attention of the Commissioner for Namibia. The statement, as cabled from Geneva, reads as follows:
"Groupe special experts a ete informe par de nombreu.x temoignages detailles et concordants re~us lors de sa mission en juillet et aout 1974 des·pratiques atroces auxquelles seraient soumis a l'heure actuelle les africains en Namibie. Groupe special experts est profondement emu et choque par telles pratiques et vous Pr?-e _prenc;l,:r~_:to~tes mesures que jugerez approprj..ees en vue obtenir leur cessation, en particulier· porter present telegramme a attention tous organes Nations Unies competents 11•
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations} N.Y,
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release HR/1176 22 .August 1974
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP COMPLETES BEARINGS IN GENEVA,
CONDEMNS FI.OGGINGS IN NAMIBIA
(The following was received from the United Nations Information Service, Geneva.)
The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights today, 22 August, completed its hearings of evidence regarding alleged violation of human rights in southern Africa. -The final witness heard today was John Alexander (United Kingdom), Secretary-General of the International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations (ISMUN), whose headquarters are in Geneva.
Mr, Alexander gave further evidence of illegal floggings in Namibia. This evidence was based on sworn affidavits of victims and was reproduced in a 14-page report recently published by ISMUN entitled 11Floggings in Namibia", copies of which were available to the press.
After hearing Mr, Alexander's testimony, the Ad Hoc Group issued the following statement:
11The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights wishes to draw attention to the incontrovertible evidence that illegal floggings of both men and women continue in Namibia. The Group is deeply distressed by this brutal and savage treatment of persons innocent of any crime, the more so as an appeal against the legality of this type of punishment in Namibia is still pending in the South African courts."
Mr, Alexander was the last of more than 100 witnesses examined by the Group in the course of a tour of investigation which began in London on 15 July this year.
The Group heard witnesses in London, Nairobi, Lusaka, Gaberone, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Dakar and Geneva.
The witnesses came from all the countries of southern Africa where racial oppression is rife or was rife at the relevant time -- South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau. All the major liberation movements presented witnesses, as well as a number of non-governmental organizations such as the International Defence and Aid Fund, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.
(more)
- 2 - Press Release HR/1176 22 .August 1974
The Group is expected to meet again in Geneva in January 1975, to adopt two reports, one to the Commission on Human Rights and the other, dealing with violations of trade union freedom in South .Africa, to the Economic and Social Council.
;/
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Inf'ormation
United Nations, N.Y.
., , L
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press ~elease HR/1171 2i. August 1974
I-ITWillN RIGHTS GROUP IN GENEVA HEARS EVIDENCE ON "CAPRIVI STRIP :MASSACRE
(The following was received from the United Nations Information Service, Geneva.)
The Ad Hoc Worldng Group of Experts on Human Rights, at two meetings in Geneva yesterday (20 August), continued receiving evidence on alleged violations of' human rights in southern Africa.
At yesterday morning's meeting, Per Sanden, a journalist from Stockholm, Sweden, ·aescribed what he and a colleague, Rudi Spee, had seen when they visited the Caprivi Strip in NamiM.a to make a film f'or Swedish Television with the co-operation of' the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). }:Ir. Spee spoke .at.the afternoon meeting.
The two journalists spent a month last January in parts of Namibia that had been penetrated by SWA;pO_ forces.
In his statement, Nr. SANDEN observed that when they approached villages., the inhabitants ran into the bush in fear, believing them to be South Africans, until reassured by the'SWAPO escort.
With about 25 SWAPO soldiers,· he said, they .had visited the remains of a village in Kalonga in the Caprivi Strip whose inhabitants.had allegedly been massacred by South African forces in September 1973. All the buildings had been burned to the ground.· Human skulls and other relics lay about, partly hidden by the lush grass which had grown since the raihs. , Out of respect for the dead, they did not count the relics. Mr. Sanden estimated that there were 20 to 30 skulls on one patch about the size of a tennis court.·
Subsequently, he went on, the two.journalists had met a man named Aaron Hangula, age 74, who wa.s said' to be the sole survivor of the massacre and was living on a ·swAPO refugee farm in Zambia.
Mr. Hangula had said that he had taken ~art in a SWAPO attack on a South African base in which two whites were killed and two gue=rillas wounded. The next day, South African soldiers came to his village 1 herded the villagers together, killed them, soaked their bodies with petrol and burned them. He himself had escaped after being warned by a Portuguese of the impending massacre, but his wives and children were among the 105 who perished.
(more)
- 2 - Press Release HR/1171 21 August, 1974
later, Mr. Hangula had said, he was caught and tortured to reveal the whereabouts of SWAPO guerrillas, but had held out. He had shown to the two journalists wounds where, he declared, South African soldiers had thrust knives into him, Mr. Sanden stated.
Three photographs taken by the Swedish journalists on the site had been sent by the British newspaper The Guardian to the editors of a publication entitled War Monthly-for an expert opinion on a ·spent canister shown in the photographs amid relics of human bodies.
The expert had stated that the canister was apparently an American smok_e grenade of 1950-1960 manufacture, Mr. Sanden reported. The discolouration of the skulls, he had added, suggested a much greater age, possibly over 20 years, and the fact that only skulls were shown could mean that they had possibly come from a burial ground in the vicinity.
Mr. Sanden had shown this statement to a doctor, who had observed that the age of' the skulls could not be determined from a mere photograph. Mr. Sanden had accepted the fact that he himself was not able to judge, he added.
Asked about the validity of his evidence, Mr. Sanden stated that he and Mr. Spee personally had seen the burned-out· village with its human remains. As to the explanation of what they had seen, they accepted the testimony of their SWAPO informants in preference to the denials of' the South African authorities.
After their film was shown on Swedish Television in July, he went on, the South African Govern~ent had invited a group of press correspondents.to visit Kalonga to investigate the site at a date during this month (August). Through the South African Legation in Stockholm, the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) was invited to_send Mr. Sanden and Mr. Spee on this mission. The SBC had replied that Sweden, in accordance with a Security Council resolution and the rulipg of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, did not recognize South Af'ricafs jurisdiction in Namibia. The Corporation could accept the invitation provided that the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia was also invited, that an African guide under his protection was provided and that the SBC paid all the expenses of the two journalists.
In reply, Mr. Sanden said, the South African Legation in Stockholm had sent the text of a speech delivered ·by South Africa's Foreign Minister, in which he had declared that the South African Government did not recognize the status of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and that the two journalists were apparently unwilling to verify their charges.
(more)
( 1
- 3 - Press Release HR/1711 21 August 1974
At yesterday afternoon's meeting, Mr. Sanden 's colleague, Rudi Spee, a Dutchman working in Stockholm, confirmed Mr. Sanden's evidence.
Some 50 slides were projected for the Working Group, with a commentary by :t,fr. Spee. The pictures showed bayonet scars on Aaron Hangula 's arm, weals said to be the result of beatings received by other Africans, and scenes of SWAPO activity.
On 21 August, in the World Health Organization's cinema, the Group was to view a film made by a SWAPO cameraman in Ovamboland, showing victims of alleged torture. At its final meeting in the afternoon, at the Palais des Nations, the Group was expected to hear further witnesses from Namibia and Mozambique.
... ;-l •
.. :..;._. . . •, . . ,. :,., .....
~ .:'!.. I.,., ~ .,-~;
,,• .. I , .
.... _______ .
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Subject: Namibia Bulletin
f;/ ~l'-:) CONFIDENTIAL
,fff) j/« /flll/ cc: GH/ ~
1fr c~ , M1. (\r~ cJJv .,l .1 ·
~~eJi-~ ·1 r In General Assembly Resolution 3031 (:XWVII), the Secretary
General was requested to take effective steps for the publication of
a regular bulletin on Namibia. In General Assembly Resolution 3111
(XXVIII), the Secretary-General was requested to continue the issue of
the Bulletin, but "in consultation with the United Nations Council for
Namibia".
The Secretary-General acted on the first resolution by publishing
di~ectly the first issue of the 'Namibia Bulletin', No. 1/73. This
brought an immediate reaction from the Government of South Africa in
the form of a letter of protest which was circulated as a document of
the General Assembly. The letter charged that the Bulletin was,
"riddled with distortions, misrepresentations and in some instances
outright :falsification of the facts".
t I
Following that protest, I understand the the Secretary-General's
Office contacted the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia and suggested
that future numbers of the publication be produced under the auspices
of the Council for Namibia. As a result, the second issue of the
Bulletin, after having been drafted by the Office of the Commissioner,
was submitted to the Council for approval. It has been before the
Council for the past four months because each member had something to
add or to ammend. Many felt that the Bulletin was not bold enough in
its language and its contents did-not reflect the attitude and activities
of the Council. At its last meeting, some members of the Council held
the view that so long as the Council was in some manner responsible for
the Bulletin, then it must be drafted in a way which would meet its
approval.
.. ·• ..
1
., '
- 2 -
The situation is clear: if the Secretary-General takes on
responsibility for the Bulletin and doe~ot ensure that the Bulletin
Qecomes more than a factual account of events, then he is likely
to be criticized by members of the Council. If he should colour the
contents, then he is likely to receive complaints froin the South
African Government.
The Special Committee on Apantheid was faced with a similar
situation several years ago, but solved the problem by establishing
its own unit on apartheid. The publication is under the authority
·;r~tee and the material circulated contains the most
controversial data and the most outspoken views. This procedure
has saved OPI much embarrassment and is quite popular with the
Committee members. The Committee of 24 is about to establish a
similar unit. Perhaps the Council for Namibia might wish, in the
future, to create similar machinery. Apart from the political ( --------------advantages, the great drawback to these units is that there is much
overlapping and unnecessary expense.
Mr. MacBride's proposal that the Bulletin be issued under the
name of the Commissioner for Namibia, in consultation with the Chairman
of the Council, is a good compromise, but one which would require an ~.....-,.------ -
amendment to Generai""Assembly Resolution 3111. I can see no difficulty
in affecting this change, provided it has the advance approval of the
Council. But until it is done, the Secretary-General must continue to
bear a measure of responsibility.
I have had a further talk with Mr. Ma.cBride since his last meeting
with the Secretary-General and he will let me know whether the President
of the Council agrees in principle to the procedure he has suggested.
If the President gives his agreement, the matter will be taken to the
Council for endorsement. And if everyone is satisfied, then there is
no problem! But it is s·· .. J.l too early to say what the outcome vill be.
3 April 1974
• I.
/J--l' \ r
CONFIDF.:i'rIAL
GH/AP 1,·
,/
cc:
11-t
NOTE FOR THE FILE
/ ,__..,... ·/l;v
/ 1, ,; /,'
Subject: Nm:1ibia Bulletin
In General As'sembly Resolution 3031 (XXVII), the Secretary
General was requested to take effective steps for the publication of
a. regular bulletin on Namibia. In General Assembly Resolution 3111
(X}0rrrr), the Secretary-Gener.al was requested to continue the issue or the Bulletin, but "in consultation with the United Nations Council for
Namibia".
The Secretary-General acted on the first resolution by publishing
dir.ectly the first issue of the 'Namibia Bulletin', No. 1/73. This
brought an i.rmnediate reaction from the Government of South Africa in
the form of a letter of protest which was circulated as a document of
the General Assembly. The letter charged that the Bulletin was,
nriddled with distortions, misrepresentations and in some instances
outright falsification of the facts".
Following that·protest, I understand the the Secretary-General's
Office contacted the Office of" the Commissioner for Namibia and suggested
that future numbers of the publication be produced under the auspices
of the Council f'or Ifa.mibie. As a result, the second issue of the
Bulletin, after having been drafted by the Office of the Commissioner,
' vas submitted to the Council for approval. It has been before the
Council for the past four months because each member had something to
add or to annnend. ~!any felt that the Bulletin was not bold enough in
its language and its contents did-· not reflect the attitude and activities
o'f' the Council. At its last meeting, sone members of the Council held
the view that so long as the Council was in some.manner responsible for
the Bulletin, then it must·be drafted in a way which would meet its
approv~.
;; ,·
The situation is
responsibility for the
Qecomes more than a
- 2 -
clear: if the Secretary-General takes on
Bulletin anu doe~ot ensure that the Bulletin
factual account of events, then he is likely
to be criticized by members of the Council. If he should colour the
contents, then he is likely to receive complaints from the South
African Government.
The Special Committee on Apa11theid was faced with a similar
situation several years ago, but solved the problem by establishing
its o~'Il unit on apartheid. The publication is under the authority
of the Comr:1ittee and the material circulated contains the most
controversial data ~nd the most outspoken views. Thi~ procedure
has sayed OPI much embarrassment and is quite popular with the
Committee members. The Committee of 24 is about to establish a
similar unit. Perhaps the Council for Namibia might wish, in the
future, to create similar machinery. Apart from the political
advantages, the great dravback_to these units is that there is much
overlapping.and unnecessary expense.
Mr. MacBride's proposal that the Bulletin be issued under the
name of the Commissioner for Namibia~ in consultation with the Chairman
of the Council, is a good compromise, but one which would require an
amendment to General Assembly Resolution 3111. I can see no difficulty
in affectine this change, provided it has the advance approval of the
Council. But until it is done, the Secretary-General must continue to
' bear a measure of responsibility.
I have had a further talk with Mr. MacBride since his last meeting
with the Secretary-General and he will let me know whether the President
of the Council agrees in principle· to the procedure he has suggested.
If the President gives his agreement, the matter will be tak~n to the
Council for endcrsernent. And if everyone is satfsfied, then there is
no problem! But it is s·· .. n too early to say what the outcome will be.
3 April 1974
·'
UNITED NATIONS
Press Section Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.
(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release GA/4953 5 April 1974
ADVISORY COMl'17.:TT~E ON EIUCP.TIOJ>TAL .AND TRAJNING PROGRAMME
FOR SOUTHTRN AFRICA ELECTS CHAilli\1AN
The Advisory Committee on the United Nations Educational and Training Program!:le f"tir i':c~thern ,'\frica, at a closed meet::.ng today, elected Saul F. Rae (Canade)a~ its Ctoi~man.
* *** *
FOR: a. C I POUR:
~ ,. FROM: A---:Ac DE:
Telephone No,: Exter.sion: Room No,: No de telephone : Poste : No de bureau :
RETURNED YOUR CALL YOUS A RAPPELE (E)
WILL CALL YOU AGAIN YOUS RAPPELLERA
WOULD LIKE YOU TO CALL YOUDRAIT C.UE VOUS L'APPELIEZ ~
r CAME TO SEE YOU EST YENU ( ) ~S YOIR
WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU YOUDRAITj 01 IS VQ},R I
" ~
/h
~ Received by - Re~u par : Dote: Time - Heure :
T n F o n s r. n \. r n 1 ') \ l ·\ R C IT 1 9 'l -~
by COLIN LEGUf,1
our Cermrnonwealih
I Conaspondont I
! SCOTLAi\D YARD and Inter! pol are im·cst igating a threat i to kidn,1p :n leading Euro-
p.:.•an industrialists, 22 of them British.
The in,lustri,ilisr s were 11·ar.1<'<l last wt•ek b\· a 1ww clandc~1i11e
_ group that ihey, or their seninr ._!'company exesu:ivcs, \1·crc Ji.1_hlc : 10 lw tal:cn as hostage;; a11r.;· · i 1 August u•1Iess, before :har date, •• the~• publidy_ undt'rtook tn _p:,y
taxes for their firms' operations in South \\'e~t Africa din:ctlv tr> the liuitd ~arious Council io:Namihia instead of, as at present. tn the South Airic;1n antlrnritil!s.
Letter~ pDSI cd in \lancl1c,t,·r ]a,t \,eek addn•s,cd the w..irning
1 to the chairmen of 22 Briti,h,
I three frc11ch ant.I six German rur,1pJ.ni1..'."l \\'h:rh ha\·c- t:'rg~ husi1H·s, i11tl'rt·,1, in tl!C' rlispnt.:·d
! f,wmt>r C"-: tnt<ac,~ship territor~'. '. I The warnin:~ i~ issued in tlle • t name of • The Frknds of the · I United '.'iatimis txecutive' wlw
: describe them,cl\·cs as 'a r!,,n• Jestine nt'l·,-;ink of conccrnr,! individuals.' They claim to be 'a ne\\" organisatinn formed 11> enforrc re·;pen for in1erna1ion.il
J law, ancl to w.rrn, re-educate, and. if Jlt'C(•,,ar:v, arre,t ;111d imprison - I some uf th,, persons jn pmrcr
i respomible for tl1e worst violation~.'
\ Thrir str.Hegy is clearly 1 I inspired hy tl11· ,ucccss of Latin ~~ . A1J11,rica11 gruups whirh, over
rpce,11 v,,ar,. lian• abducted )edciing e~;ec11t1v,'s of inrern:itional
I: li.rms in Argentina. Brazil, Uru
gllilY ;..trld \'c::ni:.7 uela. .,. Frlnn tlw scanrv inforni..itin,1
,1\'ail,1hlP ;,ho:H ihe group, it I ,,ppe.u·, that it, members ar,1 · i cn111mit:,'d "oun,- En~opc>3II
\
. ra<lir,.d i111c1:,ictuals who h:ive been inn,l\·,•d in prote5.t mO\·e• ml'nts in \\'.:·,t Germany, Ho\•
' laud. Belgium and Britain. Tli,•v i11,tif\· their action 011
th,• gl'i,ui1d rhi1t 1hc UN Scc11riry Council i II l 'l11S declared S!luth .\friC'a to lw in illcg:il occup,ition
e oi Sout.h \\'r,t Afr1ca, re11am,•d :~amil,i:1 ,•,-:It'll the Cc:wr:11 i\s~c>mhly, t .s·o ypars c:1rlicr, termin:ttt'd South Africa's m,1n-
S date over the for111l'r tru,r Jp re:Titorv. The UN had, at the re ~.une tiine, r11lrd that all inreii::n er firms in ,;.1111ibia were op,!ra'.;: 1i11:; ilk;:rliv and that tht"/ 11.: ~1i,,uld 1•.-iti:,ir.1·s aho;:,·: 11cr o!· ~- \ p.1y 1!1t·1r ~.1\~:~ '-:ir~·1.::\·.-,.1 ~h•.•
I·"~ ('n·;1:~-·:: i ?'~.:.~:n:1)i·1. c r,· ·· d
- ------ ·- - ·-• --- ·- ----------- ..
/('n:11n111,·,/ j,,,,,: /'<1.~<' I) f1 1! \' f•' •' f, 1, 11ur ·1 !1t• \\'en Jd C'11_1.:-1 '\t1h ... t•11111..·:l!r\" .L!.,H't.• as i!·-i (lj',~lit)ll ill.11 1:1(· l "\ \\",l~ l'l~'iiilL(i 1" nil,· 1!,.-,1 1,11·,•i:;,1 tirin~ 1,-e, ,. o;i,·,·.,::11~ ill••,c'.,illy ill 1hc te1r1· 1t1rv.
T!1~• U:-l rl'ccntly aprrnintcd ~-lr !'-P:111 1\lrllr;de, the former ln,li l-'r_,n-ig11 .'.'din,,.1,·r a11d cl1;1:r-111.,n ol ,\m:11.!,tY I::kr11;itio11.-d, .is rlw Co1111nis,ir.rn.:r of th,, c~,1111~-il for :\itn1ih1.t ~
T\;.,_ nc\\'_ cl.•11t!!'':":11c? gn,up', c.1mp;ng11 1s dl·s1:.:11dl to put pn.•..;qIr::.~ nn I-:PrP;'.._•c.n Iirins to ~IIPi'')I'! :\lr :'lkll1ic!c'., ~ctil'itic;. IJLLt 1h,) grnnp cxrl.1i11 1·,1at it is 'C(lit1Pl1·1cl,· indt>re11d-211t of ;\Jr St•;i11 :\kllrid,.·.·
. '!'he 1• .. m1:n~•. rend~: • Ttie l n~nd,_ oi t!•l' t'.:\ Exerntin: w1:n _:hi~ lctk1· ~iv<~ yn11 notice :h.-n 11, b_\· I .\u:.;t1st 19,-1. vo11r c_nmp~n;: has not dcc!arcd ·puhli_d.v-:-:·1;1 11:e 1:\ Council fo,· \,:1111b1a-1b.11 ir wiil no lunn,•r y111i.11e in_t'-'_rn~rion,1! Lt,, rc,;~~-J-111:.: \a11:1b:a. 1!1c11 YOlJ \\'ILL J:l-: ~l' BJFCT TO A!WEST AND J\ll'lUSO\::\.lE'.\T AS OF 1 Al'f~l-ST 197-1.'
\\'hen I 1e!c;1ho11cd \Ir :\lcllr;de a1 his '.'\,'1\· Ynrl-: office yc,tc'rdav, lie said he' l1ad nf"lt
'/ pr,·,·ii:ilslv heiird of r:1:s ;:?,ro11p or of 11, \l'arn1ng. lk ,1dded: 'I
::. C!ll \\'l\lr dn<lcrqand the attitlH .. h.: ~ ul y,11111'.!, p•~ople 1,·ho fcl'l
f!·ustra1, 0 d ovl:!r the proc1·a,tinat1011s nf th,, 1,·nrld cnmmunit·, ~1·er ckci,ion, iakr,1 by rl1e r :-,;
; 1,1 re,1'eC'! of .Suutl!L'rn AfriCit'l J tjll<'St:011,.' t , .. _~1e w:1rnin~ gu_e\_ 011 tu sa:v:
r t d
1 he absolllie. !ll!n ,mttm force will be u,Pd to a1-re·,t :111d detain ~-ou. _and tire co11di1i,,11~. of your 1111 pn,1111111l'nt 1,·jl[ he comparal~le \\llh tlic wo:-kin~ coudirion, or tht· worker$ in '.IJ..1111ihi.1 rou
11 :.r_c exploitill~. Your companies :I ll'il_l be :ih_lo) to ;:?,d your relc•,1,L.! r quite t'as:Jv bv p1,titiouin~ th,•
l 1~ _Counci"I for ~an:ibia. ~ Im: n,,,cJ,at ely that this bndy puhlk]v d<;clarcs that thcv are sati~lied w11!1 .. vot1r comp:i ny's future
e P'!l1l'l,'S 1·1•garding N,1r11ibia, you :l 1\·111 uc rdcased ... .' t· Among the British chairmen d to whom the \\·,1r11:11~ h.1~ h:r.11
· n sent ar0 ,1r A. F. T11ke of Bare cl,:,·., Ha:1k Internatio11al; Sir \'al y DllnCJ.11 of Rio Tinto-Zi11c; Lord a !Lircoun of 1he l.c·~;rl and n G('lll'ral .\ ,,11r.u1ce Snci,:1 v; Lo,·u ,r Stokes of Driti,h f.p\·Lrnci \lotor ,e Corpor,1tion; :\Ir\\'.·,\. :-!i.irl.in-1 I' •e o_f !llac!:wood ![,,dge; ~Tr L. I-. i
Smith of I'.riti,h Oxv·•en· D--J,I. :'.Ir. Finni~ton of ti'1J I;~iti<, Steel CorporatiDn; lllr S. Spir" of Ch:i rt Pr Consoli J.1 t ,•d; Al · J. n. ~lcCall of Clihtilidatctl Gnlc.1 F1Pld,; \Ir,\. W. ('J;_:L.! o · \letal DoJ<:; \Tr J. K. Diel: 0 1·
:'\l;tchl'll Cotts Grnuµ; ~.lr r. K. i\hcl-.wcn of t\;,r•.,ich l.in:011 Liie li]~"!''rncc_; !\fr A. Cli,:,tcr Bearn· u~ ~,dcctwn Trir.,,; .\Ir F. S. :,.,_cF.:~h?n of Sh!'ll Tr:rn~port 01.•\ 1_1 ',•1 Llllg, and ~,:r 0odfrc~· \\'. f ~l1,~,1~ll of Gcor;:.-:? \\ 1rnpl!y and 11 Sor:•:. h
., .
. ~._.._..::.~~:L
Fri,::ncl::, of tJ1c uni t-~:d i Jaticns :i;; u r.. :,-r orr-r,-1.ni~;aticn f.-;:1:rrv~ lo E::n Furo, rcsncct for intc:111aticn.:-tl l:1:-1, and to u;1~:, re ,:r:uc:1t.: 1 c1rd .. if 11~.,:·,~;:-:c1r':', ar:-r,~st and- :i_r.T:,riscn sc:'l'..::-of tr:...:: _,.x:rscn!:> in no-r;:r r(..!>'10n.~il1lc for Uk •:n:c.;l vioLition:: ..
T11\~ Fri,_nds of th:.: Gnitc<l I·Ta.tion:, :i-x._;cu!:iv., in ~~liru•1-:: is c-;tartjfJ .il~~ c:xi:-.-:.tirn:; in CGl ... '1\...ct.icn with tl1.c ccntinuinq Cc\r,~,1ic:,1 ;~(J,:;_i_11st t'K: i.ll .. !ql.l c,ccu1,1t ic.~ o!: ~·c:: 1.3..h:'. ·: (Soutl,-:··,..:st i\.fric.:) 1:iy Scut..1--i 1\frict1.
P-,rhZ!·~,s ycu ::.:c-.:; not c:.r-1,tro of t:,,:: f.-...ct,. t:..h,t your ccnTJ,:ny .is on.-' of ,1t l, .. ,•.:0,l' 30 in =urc?,J 1•.1h.i.ch l:v1.v.:J illcge:1 ;:m.d. irr.r:or .. l ,Jlr,:ct or indirect inv,--:-stl,· :nL, ir, :~,7.m.i.J.:,.i.,--,_. ri't•.xcs ,-ire b-Jing n:-'.id hy your cor-r-:->..."1:!, not to the; U T--Cou:1cil for 11,-1!l.ihi. -:1
(th:? l~TJ.l c~nJ:~:cr••;:,_u'chcrity for IT2T:1.ibi-"l 1,1hic:1 issuLs its 0· 1n st=-.r,(-:x-:, ~ n;1ssrxJ.:t., e:Lc) but to the ilk']'ll South i\fric2..,.'1 occur:v1tion rcqiEr~. 'JJ.113 :i.s in v_i_,)lc1ticn of tJ 1.: u.~ -. resolution Mc~ th,..:: ruling of the Horld Court.
.Si.no:2 tJ1,.; l. Feb. 197 tl, nr Su1n '. 1:1cr:',ri< 12, forr-:cr. dnin:>111 of a',rrn(;S ty Intorn--:i..tionc1l c'..,,7d r,ccrctc:.ry cpncral 0f t."12 :i.:nt.irn:1tiorv1l Crnnir,sic:1 for ,Jtirists,, t:'JOk his nlc1.c.:: ,--:.s th:! U:~--C~rrr.usicn2r for ,.!?Jllibiu. Prrrt of his j•J,:, will b~ b) :r::,ul: 1:1alc1 r-•ssure: 011 cc-ry,2.r1ics liJm ycurs. You h;,w.1 over ,1 rrnths tc• lT!k") YC'DT 1x.;,::c-.2 ':li th hin ~
F;r.. ccr,plctcly incc.r:-.-2nce:ntly of Mr. Sc.-"n 1·12.cnric~,::, 1 s ~,10rk I the: Friends nf iJLc Unitcil :1~ticns -~~~xutivo ~,-iith this L::tt1..:r givo yc.11 n0tic~ th=:'.t, if by .i\US'U.:;i: 1, l'.J7,1., y""ur c-:::,::nny h::s n~t d.:;cl:rr-.:d :?U~licly - ·vi,:: th; TJ.:l~Cr.uncil f·.T :·J2.ffi.i.bia - that it wlll :,~ J,.cn~--L- vi•:::,1-:-:t;~ ir1t;.:1:.1V:!ticno..l l,~1,>~ rC1Jt1.rdin0 :1-::rtit)i"l, lht::n
Th,? ,".'.;1,sr·lut.-; ninirr.ur:1 'force ncccss,:ry ~.•ill !.,!.:: us::rJ. to crrrcst nnd c,..:?t"lin yC'u, ?.nd th....; cr-nciti:'nr, cf y~'ur i..---pris,r:rLnt , :ill h: CT:).-\F'l--,l:.:. ,,1iU1 thl3 1:·1::,rk.ing-c,nc..:..ti•-:ns 0f th.::: ~nrk-::rs in :,1.1r1i~)i•: ycu ur:2 cxnl,itin0,.
Y()tJr cr:-r:rxmic t.-Jill h) ilblo to c_;c::t yr~ur F;l:-:::1;;;..; qeitc u:sily,, by pt.;titiC'ning th2 UU ·Cruncil fnr ,:,Jc1J;d.hi2. Irrm:::di2toly th,.t this !Tc1y nublicly d.:xl2.rcs that thc:y ill'(~ s.-...tisfL:d 1,d.th y,:,ur cr:-nnny's future ~~r~lici,::s rcrpnlinc 1 f'hnibilf you will )::-:~ rcle:?s...:d by th~ Pri:mcJs 0f thci Unit~cl ;,1.-::i.ti;-n:=;.
Fnr furth.::r ir1f0m---::ticns r th:, fr,ll:~'.1inry "r<"f,1nis,7.ti,,...ns c;-,n be crnt2ctc<l ( they ere ir1 nr~ w,--:-.y cnnnxtcd wi ti"-1 this :r.'ricnrlc; ,-f th:.: Uni l,x"!. ; J,:tic-ns c~,1.ign) -;
··· f-:-:-r d:..:tc1il<'i c--f tho lJlT-rcs, lutirn --:.nc the: ~ 'nrld c---.urt rtLling r:.:07.rdjng 1'.J.•nibi 1.,
c-nt:".ct the: lK1 ·C"W1Cil fer !Jill'Ubi2.f tho u::- l_mildin~, 1 J!1lt.xl :·Tt1.ti0 ns PJ.f!z,'.'!, Ni.:w Y~rk, IY 1-~·:,17. ·
-· fnr liLcr7tUr-:) rn frroiC"TTI inv~.:stm.,nts in ~hr7..L½i,71 c:-:nt.:=i.ct th(.'! ;\nt.i-!'.1_xu.-thoid •·Irvu,L:1.t., 8:) Ch7rl.-,tt(~ Strc.~t, Lr.·nJ.-n ~n.
- f,- ·r n,};,s , ,f' c.~ndHicns in ;r,~r:ibi..., , crntoct the i.~i.sh,..n C--·lin T·Tint,-.T (in c}d.lc frc-r,1 d~1.:RJ_;1.) re/'"· St Eo.r~um: th,: :•.zin0, Ch 1.Jrci1., Trr,l'J,~rd Stn,t.:t; :!.:'11C1--n EC3, {62G 26,1'.J).
fnr,t.h_r li t.::.r--UT.::.: crno.:n1i•1~: '::1 Li· >i-:: 1 c~nt·;cL lh . .: lnlcrn,.,_t.i,n1l Fcllr\,Ship r,f :·:.-~c-:-ncili.,ti;-rlJ D ·317.1 Gr' S!> c~~~rc., Pr Gn,. ''c.:st G:.nn..:r.y.
Th0 o:--nc:::rne:c.1 fFP1 i :1 i..s '.1.;•,J ·"., Ci~ .
Fri.:nr}=; c,f t!x.-: Uni tc<.1 ; T,--:.licn,, ::x,_cuti '-F.: is L c 1-Lm:t~stinc network 0f inclividu;-:Js ,:']1C.1 !lc1S D" ;-,_c]r;_ss r,F C".i -r--r<.Jirv:tir--n, c-,r.rc"r:x-:nc1:.::na:.:: rccuring L..:tL-r tlk-rc f ·,n: :;ly·_,11lcl l.< ;;:-:nL r2.i.J·; Tt t,, t.lt..• F 1--C ·•ur~cil f-,r t,J,1.t'lli.bi;:-:. .in
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This l0tter is ,1 "':·ublic \-.'arnin("'f to ccr~"'.7nies t.hrour1hcmt the ·.;orld. vor c1
sta1.--t" for iri,;;t0Tice 1 _i'l: Is ':ein;r sent-to the foll01i1i"· ·~urc,·:~:.n cc:---,·z_7ic~_;-_
.c.emany:
Lt!.ri_'fi n~.sr:>llsc:he1f tcn· r :etalJ c csellsc: 1aft ·.c Otavi 7 ili12n '!"norer· i, ;-'oll'.?nc;er ':.:'ietlxJ1r-'/cthnick Q"b'! ·n Co Urari','2selbd1a.f:t r.h:i:. ~ JCo ,.· _
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,-,qci!Dine (Scciete ; fationale . ccs Petroles) Scciete = 1:i.niere et . ~ '.l:2tal1lli.""0is.ue · frt3 , :r.e:nnarroya Total ··-.car-q_,ac:ne F,ra11ca.ise de Distriliution
En<jlanc:.:
:'atccck · P...t • Jilcox ~ ',:u;clays ··:an}~ Int0inatic11al ~ -lad:t.-;occ1--~ :o_1,:e · · i .~ri tish G:0.7c_:;en Ltd ~1ritish '.Jt~el Car-oration C:1arter Ce:1soli(]at2d Ltc": Ccnsolicl.:;L:cl Cold Fields -~asb.Jocc1 Cr !:·01t l.,td I-)_ilso:1 's .ay G, i ,.imin'-!S Ltd. :i:.ecal ?1 G2l1er;J.l -,ssurance Society :r.,td Leyland .I;otor Cor~oration '.G1c ~ :etc1l -:ox Con ~any Ltd ~ il. tcl1ell Cotts f~rou · Lb:-~ ; .roD-1id1 tJnicn Li fo Insurance Societv S":h3 Po,1cr--Gw.S Cororation Ltd nio '..'.'into Zinc Selcctioi1 ~,~ru~t Lt,1 S'.1ell Co i,V Sirc~-:rr Ykd South 1 i2st "\frica C9 Lt6 • Standurc1_ r, C:hartercc~ ;;o_nJdnJ Grou.-1 Ceor0e : um:--e" l'~ .';ons L tc ~ •
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J::C.Q'Llest of t:1c r.Gu ~-Torth N'Bd.cw1 :crit~nc\, c,f U1° r;:1it·::.'c! ·1dti,~ 1 ):; ·:,.,.:;c:t:i.tvv. ,._·,.: ;i.n.:
alGo spccificc1lly \·1,3..;.:n5.1Y! tJ1e Ccr,ony Cl1.JiJ-rcn of tl:c !."oll,-' ,_[ nr~ : :-c1 lc,,n L C ...:le Ji,~1
fin-rs.
Lethlchen St:21 CCl:)
ft!lTCt:~!1s ;--,a.chines Ltd
Ccntir..::..11tul Ore Corr).
Ccntin0.ntal Oi.r2rseas "il Co
Fires tcr:.e Tire & nuober Co
Philli1:1s Petrc,foun Co
Ct2113ard Oil Co of. ~ali fornia
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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNiTED NATI~
PRESS RELEASE
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY
799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017
Press Release USUN-131(73) December 11, 1973
Statement by Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Acting Permanent United
States Represe~tative to the United Nations, in the Security
Council, on Namibia, December 11, 1973.
Mr. President:
Given recent events, it is entirely fitting and, in fact, necessary that the Council again review the unique role of the United Nations with regard to Namibia, and that we examine the situation in the territory. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary General for his conscientious efforts in carrying out his mandate under the terms of Security Council Resolutions 309, 319, and 323, and to express our appreciation for the detailed report of April 30 on his contacts with representatives of the Government of South Africa. With hindsight, perhaps it would have been more useful had the Council met sooner to consider the conclusions reached by the Secretary General in his report.
It ha~ been nearly two years since the Council first invited the Secretary General to initiate contacts to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination. The situation in Namibia today appears on the surface much as it was when resolution 309 was passed. It has been said, accordingly, that the contacts between the Secretary General and the South African Government have not been successful in meeting the· objectives set by the Council.
Rather than simply accepting this assertion, however, let us examine what has taken place. Through the Secretary General's consultations, United Nations officials visited Namibia, examined conditions firsthand, and met with Namibians. These visits were a concrete illustration to the people of the territory and to the world of the United Nations' concern and responsibility for Namibiac
-more-
BENNETT -2..J
We should not undervalue the Secretary General's achievement in obtaining South Africa's assurances on Namibia. Foreign Minister Muller stated that South Africa would respect the wishes of the whole population in Namibia and would allow all political parties "full and free participation in the process leading to selfdetermination and independence." He added that South Africa had no intention of delaying self-determination and would cooperate with the Secretary General to determine measures to achieve this goal. The South African Government also asserted that it did not foresee the sudden independence of individual population groups. On balance -- and I believe that history will support this view -we believe that the Secretary General's efforts have been beneficial to United Nations• involvement in the Namibian question.
We have followed recent events in Namibia, however, with deepening concern. We believe that the South African Government could have avoided and still can avoid such developments which call into question its good faith. We have in mind in particular that government's persistence·· in implementing its so-called homelands policy in evident contradiction to previous assurances given the Secretary General. The numerous arrests, the arbitrary suppression of political activity, and the public floggings of dissidents conflict sharply with the tenor of South Africa's statements to the Secretary General.
The reaction of my own government to South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia in fact predates these moves. Since May 1970, we· have followed a policy of discouraging further American investment there and have advised potential investors that we will not intercede to protect their investments against· claims of a future legitimate government in that ter~itory.
As Council members will recall, it was on July 29, 1970 that the Security Council requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question:
"What are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Af'r:laa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)?" ·
The United States participated in both the written and oral phases of the argument of the case. The United States position was that the United Nations had succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League of Nations over the mandate granted South Africa to administer Namibia, and that therefore the General Assembly had validly terminated that mandate by its resolution 2145 of October 27, 1966. The United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for the territory and South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw its administration. Until it did so, however, its responsibilities to the people of Namibia continued. On June 21, 1971, the Court handed down its advisory opinion, the conclusions of which were consonant with the United States position.
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BENNETT -3-
The United States regrets, Mr. President, that South Africa has not abided by the spirit of its discussions with the Secretary General. Yet, we are reluctant to eliminate the possibility of future talks. As we are all aware, a number of seemingly intractable international conflicts and problems have been solved during the past several years by patient, dogged negotiations. Are the people of Namibia not deserving of similar efforts? The United States continues to believe that such discussions are also the most realistic way of gaining self-determination for the people of Namibia. A number of questions concerning South Africa's plans for Namibia require more specific replies. What timetable does South Africa propose for Namibia's self-government? What steps is South Africa willing to take now to improve political and social conditions in the territory? The Secretary General should be free to seek answers, and to look into the welfare of Namibians reportedly arrested for speaking with visiting United Nations officials.
We should not delude ourselves that progress toward Namibian self-determination will be quick. As the Secretary General has cautioned, time and protracted discussion will be required. Nonetheless, we believe contacts between the Secretary General and South Africa are valuable in illuminating South Africa's policies and actions. It is negotiation on Namibia, as on other differences, which holds the promise of ultimate success.
No matter what one might think of the sincerity of the South African Government, responses already given to the Secretary General by Foreign Minister Muller represented important departures from previous policy. They signal openings which are admittedly narrow but which we believe to be worth further exploration.
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