document of the world bank...document of the world bank report no: icr00003041 implementation...

Document of the World Bank

Report No: ICR00003041

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-47970)

ON A CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.6 MILLION (US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

FOR THE

SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

June 17, 2016

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice (GSURR) Country Department AFCS2 Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective Feb. 8, 2016)

Currency Unit = New Mozambique Metical (MZN) US$1.00 = MZN 42.50 US$1.00 = SADR 0.72

FISCAL YEAR

January 1–December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

FAD French Development Agency AusAID Australian Agency for International Development AT Administrative TribunalCAS Country Assistance Strategy CMU Country Management Unit COCEP Coordination Commission for Studies and Projects CPS Country Partnership Strategy DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa DC Development Corridor DFID UK Department for International Development DOF Department of Finance FDI Foreign Direct Investment FM Financial Management GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information System GOM Government of Mozambique IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IERR Internal Economic Rate of Return IFR Interim Financial Report IMCC Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee ISR Implementation Status Report KPI Key Performance Indicator M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDC Maputo Development Corridor MEF/MPD Ministry of Economy and Finance (formerly Ministry of

Development and Planning) MTC Ministry of Transport and Communication MS Moderately Satisfactory MTR Mid-Term Review PAD Project Appraisal Document PARPA Poverty Reduction Strategy Program PDO Project Development Objective PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

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Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Mark Lundell Global Practice Senior Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Sameh Naguib Wahba Project Team Leader: Andre Herzog ICR Team Leader: Andre Herzog

QEA Quality at Entry Assessment QSA Quality of Supervision Assessment RSDIP Regional Spatial Development Initiative Programme SC Steering Committee SDI Spatial Development Initiative SDP-TA Spatial Development Technical Assistance Project SESA Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment TA Technical Assistance TOR Term of Reference TTL Task Team Leader

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REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 33. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 94. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 145. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 146. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 177. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 22Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 29Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 30Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 32Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 33Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 34Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 37Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 40

MAP IBRD 33451R2 ………………………………………………………………...42

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Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

Country: Mozambique Project Name:

MZ - Spatial Development Planning Technical Assistance Project

Project ID: P121398 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-47970

ICR Date: 6/13/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 13.60 M Disbursed Amount: XDR 8.12M

Revised Amount: XDR 8.12M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC)

Co-financiers and Other External Partners: United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 03/25/2010 Effectiveness: 12/31/2010 02/15/2011

Appraisal: 05/19/2010 Restructuring(s): 9/17/2014

Approval: 09/30/2010 Mid-term Review: 07/10/2013 04/30/2014

Closing: 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately

Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision:

Unsatisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:


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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:


D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Public administration -Transportation 30 30 Public administration - Agriculture, fishing and forestry 20 20 Public administration - Industry and trade 20 20 Public administration - Energy and mining 20 20 Sub-national government administration 10 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other economic management 30 30 Infrastructure services for private sector development 20 20 Regional integration 20 20 Trade facilitation and market access 20 20 Climate change 10 10 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli K. Ezekwesili

Country Director: Mark Lundell Olivier Godron (Acting)

Practice Manager: Sameh Naguib Wahba Subramaniam V. Iyer

Project Team Leader: Andre Herzog Boris E. Utria /

Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia

ICR Team Leader: Andre Herzog

ICR Primary Author: Cecilia Zanetta

F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve national social and economic development planning through the introduction, institutionalization and mainstreaming of multi-

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sectorial spatial development planning methodologies and practices (p. 5, Schedule 1, Credit Agreement; p. 6, Project Appraisal Document).

(a) PDO Indicators

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target

Years

Indicator 1 Number of climate-change resilient spatial development initiatives (SDIs) for transport and trade corridors elaborated at pre-feasibility stage.

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 4 Dropped n.a.

Date achieved 02/18/2011 12/31/2015 09/08/2014 12/31/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Dropped and not achieved. A General Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) was prepared to integrate climate change considerations into national policies. SESAs for individual SDIs were cancelled due to time constraints.

Indicator 2 Number of spatial development initiatives with high impact on youth employment and women elaborated at pre-feasibility stage.


0 4 Dropped n.a.


Dropped and not achieved. Within the seven spatial development initiatives, 78anchor projects have been identified. However, their impact on employment generation for youth and women has not been quantified.

Indicator 3 Number of projects under SDIs adopted for feasibility and subsequent investment. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 20 Dropped 2


Dropped and not achieved. The identification of investment projects under the SDI sector scans was completed just before project closing. Feasibility studies are being conducted for only two of the 78 projects that were identified.

Indicator 4 Investment conference / dissemination meetings/workshops held. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 3

(Added) 3

Date achieved 02/18/2011 09/08/2014 12/31/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Added and achieved. Three investment conferences were carried out to disseminate investment opportunities in the Maputo, Nacala, Beira and Zambezia SDIs, with1025 participants representing public and private stakeholders.

Indicator 5 SDIs completed.

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0 3

(Added) 7


Added and achieved. PDO Indicators 1, 2, and 3 were reformulated/merged into PDO Indicator 5 during the MTR. A total of seven SDIs have been completed, including one (Zambezia) with DFID financing.

(b) Intermediate Indicators

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Component One: Institutional and Capacity Development Component

Indicator 1 Number of SDP Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee (IMCC) meetings per year (i.e., MTC, key ministries).

Value quantitative or qualitative)

0 50 Dropped 10

Date achieved 02/18/2011 12/31/2015 09/08/2014 12/31/2015

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Dropped and not achieved. In the first two years of the Project (2011 and 2012), the IMCC met quarterly (3 times each year). From 2013 onwards, the meetings were less regularly with 1 meeting each in 2013 and 2014, and 2 meetings in 2015.

Indicator 2 Number of interactive multi-sector GIS-based SDI planning database modules accessible to key planning stakeholders.


0 6 Dropped 0


Dropped and not achieved. The GIS system was not deployed before the closing of the project on December 31, 2015. At the time of the ICR, it was not yet defined when the six modules would be available to key planning stakeholders.

Indicator 3 Number of workdays provided through technical exchange visits under a formalized South-South Cooperation (Memorandum of Understanding signed).


0 75 Dropped Approx. 240


Dropped but achieved. Two study tours were conducted: one to Vietnam, Japan and Indonesia with 11 participants for three weeks in December 2014, the other one to South Korea with 12 participants for six days in December 2015.

Indicator 4

# of government staff trained on: (i) spatial development planning; (ii) social & environmental safeguards; (iii) social & environmental impact analysis; and (iv) climate change resilience; (v) specify training days provided by universities.


0 (i) 45 (ii) 22 (iii) 22

Dropped (i) 56 (ii) 20 (iii) 26

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(iv) 22 (v) 200

(iv) 24 (v) n.a.


Dropped but partially achieved. A large number of training activities were supported under the Project (see Annex 2 for a detailed description).

Indicator 5

# of programs operationalized for SDIs: (i) HIV/Aids prevention and mitigation; (ii) Traffic Safety and Standard Improvement; (iii) Cargo load management studies per corridor; (iv) Rural Mobility Strategies and Pilot Programs per corridor.


0

(i) 6 (ii) 6 (iii) 6 (iv) 10

(i) 3 (ii) 3

(iii) Dropped (iv) Dropped

(i) 4 (ii) 4 (iii) 1 (iv) 1

Date achieved 02/18/2011 12/31/2015 09/08/2014 12/31/2015


Achieved as modified during MTR. Crosscutting programs on (i) HIV/Aids prevention and (ii) road safety were conducted in four SDIs. Studies on (iii) cargo load management and (iv) rural mobility were conducted only at the national level.

Indicator 6 Work Plan for South-South Cooperation prepared. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes

(Added) Yes


Achieved.

Indicator 7 Hardware and Software for GIS in place and functional. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes

(Added) No


Not Achieved. The equipment has been acquired, but assembly and final testing of the GIS platform was still underway at the time of the ICR and no official launch date had been communicated to the Bank.

Indicator 8 Coordination Commission for Studies and Projects (COCEP) at the MTC is functional.


No Yes

(Added) Yes


Achieved. The COCEP was active at the early stages of the Project, when it was responsible for producing the overall strategic vision. It was later replaced by the newly established SDP Unit.

Component Two: Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) Indicator 7 Number of spatial development initiatives elaborated at pre-feasibility stage. Value quantitative or qualitative)

0 4 Dropped 7

Date achieved 02/18/2011 12/31/2015 09/08/2014 12/31/2015

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Dropped but achieved. Seven SDIs, including sector scans, have been carried out under the Project.

Indicator 8 Number of spatial development initiatives elaborated at profile stage. Value quantitative or qualitative)

0 2 Dropped 0


Dropped and not achieved.

Indicator 9 Number of projects prepared up to pre-feasibility in the Maputo, Beira, Nacala and Lubombo SDIs for investment by government, the private sector and/or PPPs.


0 20 Dropped 39


Dropped but achieved. A total of 39 projects were identified in these four corridors (i.e., seven in Maputo, five in Beira, five in Nacala, and 22 inLubombo).

Indicator 10 Number of projects identified with high employment generation for youth and women per each spatial development initiative.


0 20 Dropped n.a


Dropped and not achieved. Within the seven development corridors, 78 anchor projects have been identified. However their impact on employment generation for youth and women has not been quantified.

Indicator 13 Number of projects adopted for feasibility by government, the private sector and/or PPPs.


0 20 Dropped 2

Date achieved 02/18/2011 12/31/2015 09/08/2014 12/31/2015


Dropped and not achieved. Feasibility studies are being conducted by the private sector for two projects: a production plant for ethanol and electric energy utilizing sugar cane in Sena; and an iron and steel production plant in Kazula.

Indicator 14 Completion of Master Plan on Maritime Cabotage. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes

(Added) No


Not Achieved. This activity was cancelled after the Inception Report in August 2015 due to delays in the procurement process.

Indicator 15 Roadshows in each corridor. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No 3

(Added) 6

Date achieved 02/18/2011 09/08/2014 12/31/2015

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Achieved. A total of six road shows were carried out to raise awareness on the importance of integrated transport development and spatial planning.

Indicator 16 Availability of satellite images for corridors. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No 3

(Added) 4


Achieved. Satellite images have been collected for all Development corridors.

Indicator 17 Completion of Study on Lobby and Advocacy for SDIs. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes

(Added) Yes

Date achieved 02/18/2011 09/08/2014 12/31/2015


Achieved. Advocacy and Lobbying studies were undertaken for the development corridors of Beira, Nacala and Zambezia to identify the main bottlenecks in the business environment and to propose interventions to address them.

Indicator 18 Completion of Study on the Management of Commercial Cargo. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes

(Added) Yes


Achieved. The study was completed.

Indicator 19 Social and Environmental Strategic Assessments. Value quantitative or qualitative)

No 3

(Added) 1

Date achieved 02/18/2011 09/08/2014 12/31/2015


Not Achieved. The Umbrella SESA was completed and disseminated. The SESA North (covering Nacala, Zambezia, Mueda and North-South) and South (covering Maputo, Lubombo, Beira and North-South) were cancelled due to procurement delays.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 03/29/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/12/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.53 3 07/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.77 4 03/13/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.90

5 07/10/2013 Moderately SatisfactoryModerately

Unsatisfactory 4.38

6 01/26/2014 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 4.62

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Unsatisfactory 4.62


Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.70


Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.41

10 06/22/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.39



Unsatisfactory 11.88

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

09/17/2014 MU MU 2.23 (*)

Level 2 restructuring, which served to scale down the Project to what was achievable within the remaining implementation period. Modifications were introduced to: i) the Project description; ii) the Project Results Framework (i.e., both outcome and intermediate indicators); and iii) the Project costs, including the cancellation of US$8.0 million.

(*) Actual expenditures as of June 2014 (Restructuring Paper, p. 3).

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. While Mozambique had already been a strong economic and social performer in Africa since the end of its civil war in 1992, economic activity had further accelerated in recent years due to a surge in the exploitation of natural resources. At the time of project preparation, it was estimated that private sector investments in infrastructure projects that were either under implementation or under consideration could reach between US$15 and US$30 billion, including several “mega projects” in the energy and mining sectors. In this context, maximizing the potential positive benefits associated with these massive investment projects while minimizing the potential negative effects was a top government priority. Specifically, the Government of Mozambique (GOM) correctly identified these large infrastructure investments as an opportunity to advance the country’s development prospects, including maximizing sustainable economic benefits on a shared growth basis and further promoting regional integration. At the same time, there was growing awareness among GOM leadership of the critical importance of having in place proper planning and management systems to be able to capitalize on the potential benefits of major infrastructure investments while avoiding the risks associated with undertaking them in an uncoordinated manner.

2. The GOM requested the support of the World Bank Group to build upon its previous experience with Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) as a way to strengthen its spatial planning capacity. SDIs were first implemented in the South African region under the auspices of the Government of South Africa. In 1995, the first SDI focused on the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) that connected the Port of Maputo to the Gauteng region in South Africa. In the late 1990s, the MDC experience was expanded under the Regional SDI Program (RSDIP) to include other countries in the region, such as Tanzania, Angola. and Namibia.

3. The Spatial Development Technical Assistance Project (SDP-TA) constituted a natural next step in assisting the GOM in the mainstreaming and institutionalization of various ongoing related efforts, including a multi-donor Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic as well as support for policy dialogue on growth poles and spatial analysis of poverty and growth in Mozambique.1 It was fully consistent with the country’s National Transport Sector Development Strategy. The critical role of infrastructure in reducing poverty was also underscored in the GOM’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PARPA II) as well as the Bank’s 2008-2011 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). Specifically, Pillar III of the CPS identified adequate access to infrastructure resources and services as a key driver of growth and poverty alleviation. Additionally, the SDP-TA Project was expected to be a key support point and facility for any subsequent investment work resulting from the ongoing Economic Sector Work efforts.

1 Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program - (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/about); “Supporting the Policy Dialogue on Growth Poles in Mozambique” was a ESW technical assistance activity that supported the preparation of the Mozambique - Integrated Growth Poles Project (P127303, approved on April 2013 in the amount of US$100 million); World Bank-funded Economic Mozambique Poverty and Growth Diagnostics – Technical Assistance Activity, World Bank.

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1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

4. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve national social and economic development planning through the introduction, institutionalization and mainstreaming of multi-sectorial spatial development planning methodologies and practices.2

5. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) selected to measure the achievement of the PDO were the following ones: KPI 1 - Number of climate-change resilient SDIs for transport and trade corridors elaborated at

pre-feasibility stage; KPI 2 - Number of SDIs with high impact on youth employment and women elaborated at pre-

feasibility stage; and, KPI 3 - Number of projects under SDIs adopted for feasibility and subsequent investment by

government, the private sector and/or private-public partnerships (PPPs).

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

6. The PDO remained unchanged throughout the Project’s lifetime. The original KPIs, however, were modified as part of a Level-2 Project restructuring in September 2014 as follows:

Dropped: KPI 1 - Number of climate-change resilient SDIs for transport and trade corridors elaborated at

pre-feasibility stage; KPI 2 - Number of SDIs with high impact on youth employment and women elaborated at pre-

feasibility stage; and, KPI 3 - Number of projects under SDIs adopted for feasibility and subsequent investment by

government, the private sector and/or private-public partnerships (PPPs).

Added: In view of the implementation delays and the short implementation period remaining, as well as the consequent scaling down of the Project, the new outcome indicators referred to outputs as opposed to outcomes: KPI 4 - Investment conference/dissemination meetings/workshops held; and KPI 5 - SDIs completed.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

7. The main Project beneficiaries were not explicitly identified at Appraisal.3 However, based on the Project design and its PDO, the main direct beneficiaries were national government agencies and their technical staff, the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) in particular. With Project support, national agencies were expected to strengthen their institutional and technical capacity to conduct social and economic planning by incorporating spatial development planning methodologies and practices. In turn, enhanced social and economic planning was expected to benefit the entire population living in the six development corridors to be included under the Project, including youth, women, as well as the private sector.

2 Credit Agreement, Schedule 1, p.5; Project Appraisal Document, p. 6. 3 As noted in footnote 20, p. 30, PAD, the identification of Project beneficiaries was not deemed meaningful given the TA nature of the Project.

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1.5 Original Components

8. The Project had two main components:

9. Component 1 - Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Development (US$13 million), which entailed three sub-components: (i) Strengthening and capacity development of the Coordination Commission for Studies and Projects (COCEP); (ii) South-South cooperation schemes; and (iii) cross-cutting institutional development programs.

10. Component 2 - Spatial Development Initiatives- SDIs (US$5.98 million), which entailed the preparation of six SDI “portfolios” (pre-feasibility level), and was intended to serve as the principal practical training and capacity and institutional development activity of the Project.

1.6 Revised Components

11. Although activities that were deemed unfeasible within the remaining implementation period were either scaled down or eliminated, the original components were maintained under the 2014 restructuring that followed the Mid-Term Review (MTR). Specifically, Component 1 continued to cover the staffing and operational costs of the Spatial Development Project (SDP) Unit, as well as training, South-South cooperation activities, and crosscutting institutional development programs. Likewise, Component 2 continued to focus on the SDIs for the six corridors, with the addition of three studies that were considered relevant to achieving the PDO.4

1.7 Other significant changes

12. In view of low disbursements, the Project was restructured in September 2014 to reflect the findings of the MTR. Project activities were scaled down, limiting them to those that could be completed by the closing date of December 31, 20155. Approximately US$8 million were cancelled, with remaining funds totaling US$10.77 million. The Project Result Framework was also modified to reflect modifications in the activities to be financed under the operation (see Sections F (a) and (b) – Datasheet, pp. iii).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

13. Overambitious scope and expectations. The PDO of strengthening national development planning, through spatial planning in particular, was highly relevant given the massive infrastructure investments in Mozambique at the time of preparation. It also had an important strategic dimension from the Bank’s perspective, as it was envisioned as a point of entry into other potential future operations. However, in retrospect, a more narrow focus on spatial planning in relation to the transport sector would have been more adequate given the challenges in ensuring cross-sector coordination. Likewise, a more limited focus on more mature corridors (particularly the MDC) could have been more conducive to showing early gains in the implementation of the SDI model rather than spreading limited resources into six new corridors, most of which lacked the necessary conditions for success, including

4 (i) Study on the Management of Commercial Cargo; (ii) Legal Framework on Maritime Cabotage; and (iii) Lobbying and Advocacy for Investments in the Corridors. 5 The Restructuring Paper does not specify individual activities that were eliminated or scaled down during the 2014 restructuring, but the activities included those that: (i) could not be completed within the remaining implementation period; (ii) represented activities or consulting positions that have been financed by DFID; (iii) were related to salaries originally allocated to staff for the SDP Unit that were not utilized over the last 38 months of implementation; and (iv) represented an original over-dimensioning of activities.

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basic infrastructure and platforms for dialogue between public and private stakeholders. Finally, the expectations of how much progress could be made towards institutionalization and mainstreaming of spatial planning practices during the Project’s lifespan were overly optimistic.

14. Truncated regional dimension. The Project design was inspired by the SDI approach first conceived in South Africa as an integrated development effort within a region defined by its economic potential rather than its political boundaries. 6 This approach had been successfully tested in Mozambique with the MDC initiative in the mid-1990s, which linked the port of Maputo with South Africa. However, in the context of the SDP-TA Project, the territorial focus of SDIs was on regions within the country’s boundaries,7 which constituted a limitation given that one of Mozambique’s most significant economic competitive advantages lies in the potential to provide logistical and transport support to neighboring land-locked countries, including Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

15. Lack of preparedness. The preparation stage resulted in a conceptual sketch rather that a robust project design ready for implementation. The original project design exhibited significant weaknesses and was missing critical elements, such as a supporting annual operation plan and a procurement plan, hindering successful project implementation from the outset. In addition, capacity-building activities under Component 1, which represented 65 percent of the credit proceeds, were only broadly defined at appraisal. A clearer identification of capacity-building activities and the corresponding roadmap for their implementation would have been necessary to ensure their relevance and the Project’s overall implementation readiness.

16. Excessive procurement burden. As originally designed, the Project included an unduly large number of small activities, particularly within Component 1. This, in turn, generated an excessive burden in terms of procurement. In retrospect, particularly taken into consideration the limited procurement experience within the MTC, consolidating and contracting the provision of institutional strengthening and capacity development to an external provider may have been a more adequate strategy.

17. Changes in leadership within the MTC. The SPD-TA Project saw three different Ministers since its conceptualization. Those changes in leadership translated into different levels of political support, project visibility, and proactive leadership. As result, it may have influenced the capacity of the Project to establish spatial planning as a core function within the MTC and across other line ministries. Although the Project initially had full support of the Minister of Transport, a champion in promoting spatial development planning in the country, this did not translate into effective implementing capacity. After the first change in leadership, spatial development planning lost some visibility and it took long for the implementation problems to be flagged internally. The last Minister of Transport revived the importance of spatial planning, increased visibility of the Project, and strove to find financial and institutional arrangements to ensure its continuity after the end of Bank finance.

6 PAD (p. 41). 7 In 2008, the Country Management Unit (CMU) had unsuccessfully requested support from the Regional Integration Unit (AFCRI) for the preparation of a regional multi-country program (including Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia) to provide technical assistance to the main infrastructure sectors with a view to supporting the development of multi-sector development corridors across the region, with particular emphasis on the Nacala and Beira transport corridors (PAD, p. 14).

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18. Inadequate institutional arrangements. In view of the strong support from the former Minister of Transport during project preparation, the Project was housed within the MTC.8 The decision to house the Project in a line ministry, however, resulted in two significant shortcomings. First, it dissociated spatial planning from the larger planning function within the country, which at the time of preparation lay with the former Ministry of Development and Planning (MDP, presently the Ministry of Economy and Finance, MEF).9 Second, it weakened cross-sector coordination that, in hindsight, would have required the support from the highest level of government authority (such as the Presidency, Prime Minister or the MEF) rather than a line ministry.

19. Incomplete risk assessment. The risk assessment at appraisal was incomplete and underestimated the risks, focusing mainly on potential reputational and fiduciary risks, probably due to the rush in preparing the project and overestimation of the role of the former Minister of Transport as a champion to move the agenda forward. Specifically, the overall and reputational risk of the operation was rated “Low”, and the risks associated with lack of technical and institutional capacity and the complex institutional arrangement were completely overlooked.10 Although technical support from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was a critical input during the preparation stage, it may have obscured the limited technical and institutional capacity within the MTC. While some amelioration measures were taken, including requiring basic technical resources to be in place as a condition for effectiveness, they failed to address these risks adequately.

2.2 Implementation

20. Protracted project start-up. Reflecting the sketchy project design, lack of conditions of appraisal, and limited implementation capacity in the MTC, for the first three-and-a-half years after effectiveness, the project made almost no progress. As of the end of June 2014, actual expenditures totaled only US$2.23 million (11 percent of the original commitment), of which over 60 percent had been used to finance staff salaries, vehicles, and operating costs of the SDP Unit. The Project had made little progress towards its PDO, with no progress towards expected outcomes, and progress towards intermediate outcomes being mostly in terms of training and exchange visits. 11

21. Lack of implementation capacity within the MTC. Real project implementation did not materialized until late 2011, when the first project coordinator was replaced.12 Project implementation gradually set into motion afterwards, with the formal launching of the SDP initiative in March 2012. However, with few exceptions (such as the multi-sectoral GIS system) progress in substantive areas continued to stall. One of the key contributing factors was the delay in the hiring of key technical

8 As reported in several interviews during the ICR mission, the MDP was identified early on in the preparation process as the natural Project counterpart given the cross-sectoral nature of the operation. However, true ownership and commitment for the SDI was within the MTC, which also exhibited a willingness to promote cooperation and coordination across the other sectors. 9 The lack of integration of the project with the country’s core function is illustrated by the lack of coordination with the Bank’s Integrated Growth Poles Project (IGPP). The IGPP was approved in 2013 for US$100 million and is being implemented within the MEF. While the IGPP and the SDIs being supported under the SDP-TA had considerable overlaps in terms of territory, stakeholders as well as objectives, there was little connection between them.9 Other donors have also supported spatial planning and corridor development initiatives, such as the Zambezi Development Corridor without close coordination and collaboration. 10 In the Risk Assessment Section, the PAD (p. 18) noted, “To date MTC has developed the experience and capacity to implement the proposed SDP-TA program of activities. MTC is fully committed to the successful execution of the project and has taken all the necessary steps to ensure the achievement of the Project’s proposed PDO. “ 11 Project Restructuring Paper (2014, p. 3). 12 Although the SDP Unit coordinator was in her post since the end of 2011, there were persistent difficulties in processing her contract, which resulted in her working without a contract for seven months.

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positions within the SDP Unit, which was not fully staffed until early 2014.13 Likewise, lack of procurement capacity coupled with the large number of procurement processes constituted a serious bottleneck. As a result, substantive activities did not begin implementation until mid-2004, when the contracts for the three main SDIs—the Maputo, Nacala and Beira corridors—were finally signed.

22. Lack of integration of Project activities within the MTC. Contrarily to what had been originally envisioned, institutional support of the MTC to the project was limited. The SDP Unit, which was responsible for project implementation (formerly COCEP), operated without much interaction with the permanent structure of the MTC.14 This independence undermined the potential of the project to strengthen the MTC’s planning capacity permanently, as primarily external consultants and staff from other government agencies on temporary assignment constituted the SDP Unit.

23. Ineffective cross-sector coordination. An Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee (IMCC) headed by the Minister of Transport and integrated by other key ministries and government agencies was established to foster cross-sector coordination. However, it proved to be ineffective. Contrarily to what had been presumed at preparation, the Project lacked the necessary capacity to induce high-level coordination across other ministries and national agencies. Quickly, the IMCC became mainly a pro forma platform, ineffective to mainstreaming spatial planning across sectors. It is interesting to note that—albeit ad-hoc—cross-sectoral cooperation at the technical level was achieved in well-defined areas of work, particularly in the exchange of data and technical cooperation for the creation of the National Inter-Agency Spatial Platform.

24. Limited integration of DFID parallel finance. The Project received additional support through an US$9.5 million grant from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). At the project preparation stage, the DFID grant still lacked clarity in terms of the specific focus and activities.15 The administration of the DFID grant required different procurement and reporting practices, which created inefficiencies and unnecessary burden to the SDP Unit.16 Moreover, the Bank and DFID failed to collaborate in an effectively manner, for instance each donor undertook mid-term review and project restructuring separately.

25. Uneven implementation support from the Bank. The quality and intensity of project implementation support provided by the Bank varied greatly and was hampered by many changes in team task leaders and sectors in the Bank. While the Bank team provided hands-on support during the early stages of implementation, the lack of readiness and implementation capacity suggest that the level of accomplishment of effectiveness conditions (which called for the necessary technical resources being in place) was overly optimistic.17 In addition, implementation bottlenecks were not adequately 13 With the exception of the procurement and FM specialists, most of the remaining critical technical positions, such as SDI managers and the M&E specialist, were filled only in late 2012 or later (e.g., the environmental specialist did not join the SDP Unit until January 2014). 14 There were a few exceptions, mainly the development of the multi-sector GIS that benefited from the participation of an MTC counterpart, and the financial administration, which was embedded within the MTC’s administrative unit (UGEA). 15 DFID grant aimed to strengthen the MTC in the areas of transport policy, planning, and regulations, without competing with IBRD funding. Thus, the DFID grant was originally conceived as a general fund to provide MTC with access to flexible capital support for infrastructure and spatial planning and the creation of an effective surface transport regulator. However, in 2013, despite lower execution than anticipated of the SDP-TA Project, the MTC decided to allocate most of the DFID funding to the financing of SDI activities for Zambezia corridor, where a new railway line from Moatize to Macuzi port was going to be built. 16 For instance, the Project coordinator’s original contract and renewal took excessive time to be approved by DFID (about four months in each case) and, during that time, salaries were not paid. Moreover, the Bank’s restructuring was undertaken separately from DFID’s restructuring, unnecessary adding to the workload of the SDP Unit. 17 Conditions of effectiveness called for COCEP to be fully established with in terms of its mandate, functions, and resources, both in form and substance. Likewise, these conditions called for the recruitment of a Procurement Specialist with adequate qualifications and

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flagged until mid-2013, when the project implementation ratings were downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory. It took another year until the Project was finally restructured, losing precious time to revert its outcomes. The change in task team and sector management after restructuring was followed by a period of particularly strong implementation support, resulting in a turn-around in performance with roughly 80 percent of the revised credit proceeds being disbursed between September 2014 and the Project’s closing in December 2015.

26. Late and incomplete restructuring. Despite the slow project implementation, the MTR, originally planned for July 2013, was delayed until April 2014.18 During the MTR, the Government and the Bank agreed to restructure the Project to address its poor performance and retain only the most relevant activities that could be completed by the closing date. The MTR entailed an assessment of the SDP Unit’s implementation capacity, a review of pending project activities and the terms of reference of pending studies, as well as the adoption of detailed processes for continuous project monitoring, including a detailed procurement plan subject to monthly reviews by the Bank team. The agreements reached as part of the MTR were effectively reflected in a Level 2 restructuring that was endorsed in September 2014. However, the restructuring had two significant weaknesses. First, both the MTR and the restructuring took place too late, leaving only 16 months for the implementation of most project activities during the post-restructuring period. Second, the original PDO was not revised, even though it was clear that it was not going to be achieved given its emphasis not just on the introduction of spatial planning practices but also on their mainstreaming and institutionalization. Most KPIs were modified away from mainstreaming and institutionalization outcomes to more narrow outputs reflecting mainly the introduction of such practices, thus not measuring the outcomes in terms of institutionalization and mainstreaming.19

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

27. Design. Although the Results Framework provided a sound set of Intermediate Outcome Indicators that captured the anticipated products of the project20, the KPIs did not provide an effective measure of the project impact. Project implementation was also to be supported by an ambitious M&E system, including a database for each component to periodically monitor the evolution of expenditures, implementation, outcomes and results, and a system to regularly gather the data and process information required to monitor progress.

28. Implementation. Long delays in hiring an M&E expert, which only happened in 2013, hindered implementation of M&E practices early on. As aforementioned, PDO and intermediate outcome indicators were modified during the restructuring to focus on outputs only.

experience. Although the position was filled, the Specialist was inexperienced with Bank Procurement procedures. The Project was declared effective in February 2011, four months before the time limit imposed on effectiveness. The high visibility of the Minister of Transport within the GOM and his personal endorsement for the Project may have been an additional factor affecting the decision to declare the Project effective. 18 The MTR was first to be conducted by a consultant hired by the SDP Unit, but in view of procurement delays in the hiring of the consultant, the Bank Team decided to contract an independent consultant utilizing supervision funds and carry out an independent assessment of the Project’s performance to avoid further delays. 19 The Restructuring Paper (p. 4) noted the following: “The Project’s PDO remains relevant and achievable, but the outcome and intermediate outcome indicators to measure progress were reformulated to avoid repetition, make these more realistic, and better aligned to possible project outcomes. In view of the implementation delays and the short implementation period remaining, as well as the consequent scaling down of the Project, the new outcome indicators refer to outputs as opposed to outcomes.” 20 e.g., Number of climate-change resilient spatial development initiatives for transport and trade corridors elaborated at pre-feasibility stage.

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29. Utilization. From mid-2013 onward, particularly during the post-restructuring period, the Bank team put in place more stringent M&E tools focusing on implementation, such as the time-bound action plan, which proved to be appropriate given the overall lack of progress exhibited in the past.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

30. Safeguards. The Project’s Environmental Category was “C” and there were no safeguard policies triggered. As a Technical Assistance Project with no material investments and no detailed plans or feasibility studies that could trigger investments, the Project had no adverse direct or indirect environmental impacts. Rather, it was expected that strengthening of spatial development planning and analytical capacity within the Government would generate national and sub-national environmental and social benefits as a result of improved development and investment planning and policy making in the country. The project set out to finance: (i) technical assistance for the COCEP to ensure that environmental and social dimensions would be fully addressed and become integral elements as qualitative and quantitative filters in the SDI preparation process; and (ii) the preparation of SESAs for each of the SDI packages to help the Government analyze, at a strategic level, the possible environmental and social issues affecting the development of SDIs. While a general umbrella SESA was prepared and concluded in 2015, the regional SESAs for the North and South spatial development corridors were cancelled due to time constraints.21

31. Financial Management (FM). The Project’s financial arrangements, including budgeting accounting, reporting, and auditing were conducted utilizing the government systems. The Project remained adequately staffed in terms of FM throughout its implementation, with a combination of contracted personnel embedded within the administrative unit at the MTC, which also provided training and capacity building to ministry staff. Quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and audit reports were received on time. While there were generally no issues identified on the review of the IFRs, some issues related to government funds were raised under the audit reports, which eventually were satisfactorily resolved by the SDP Unit. The overall FM performance of the Project was satisfactory.

32. Procurement. Procurement constituted a significant implementation bottleneck, particularly during the pre-restructuring period. First, as is the case in all operations in Mozambique, procurement processes are subject to a double approval by both the Bank and the GoM’s Administrative Tribunal (AT). The initial procurement plan underestimated the necessary time for this double approval, which could add six or more months. The Restructuring did not fully consider this in the revised procurement plan, and three planned contracts (SESA North, SESA South, and Maritime Cabotage) were cancelled in the last year of implementation due to excessive time for AT approval. The SDP Unit also struggled with Bank procurement guidelines (despite intensive procurement support from the Bank), resulting in lengthy back and forth until conditions for no objection were met. Third, the large number of small procurement processes envisioned in the original project design took a toll on the already limited procurement capacity. As the SDP Unit’s procurement performance began to improve after Year 3, the Bank utilized the post-procurement review mechanism not just for verification purposes but also as a

21 Two major factors led to the cancelation of the two sub- SESAs. First, the two sub-SESAs (North and South corridors) could only be procured after the conclusion of the Umbrella SESA, since the later set the framework for the SESA’s North and South. This sequencing was not well planned to allow sufficient time to prepare the SESA’s North and South after finishing the Umbrella SESA’s. Second, the long time for approving contracts in the Administrative Tribunal was not properly accounted for in the planning of the activities. In average, just the TA approval took six month, with another 4-6 months for the normal procurement process, resulting in an average of 10-12 months for each contract to be approved.

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training tool, identifying weaknesses and addressing them in a Procurement Action Plan that was regularly monitored by both teams.

33. Loan Covenants. There was compliance with all legal covenants expect for one (i.e., “Carry out a strategic environmental and social assessment - SESA for each SDI package”). Due to implementation delays, it was decided to include the environmental assessment for the Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Zambezia corridors under the general SESA umbrella, which was concluded in June 2015. However, the SESAs for the remaining two SDIs (i.e., North and South corridors) were cancelled due to time constraints (see above).

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

34. The current Minister of Transport has reaffirmed the relevance and high priority of ensuring sustainability of the Project.22 The Minister allocated its own budget to keep the core project team in 201623, while a three-year budget request for the continuation and expansion of the SDP Unit and its activities is being assessed by the MEF. The launch of the National Inter-Agency Spatial Planning Platform has not yet been scheduled as the MTC is undertaking technical tests to ensure the platform is completely reliable. In addition, the SDP Unit has entered in agreements with the National Statistics Institute, the National Communication Institute, and the Zambezi Development Agency to provide spatial analysis services. However, by the time the ICR was finalized, the Bank was still awaiting a formal decision by the GOM on the medium and long-term financing, institutional arrangements, and mainstreaming of the tools and capabilities in spatial planning across national agencies as envisioned in the PDO. According to the Minister, the reason for postponing this decision is the ongoing restructuring of the MTC, and related national transport agencies, which needs to be finalized before the decision is taken on where the SDP unit shall be housed24.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: Modest

35. Relevance of Objective: The relevance of the objective remains high today. Strengthening spatial planning capacity at the national level continues to be a necessary condition for ensuring that public and private investments are well targeted in the territory and synergies promoted across sectors. Despite the recent ceiling in GDP growth with the end of the commodities boom, a large share of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) has been channeled into infrastructure investments since project design. FDIs reached almost US$5 billion (equivalent 31 percent of GDP) in 2014 compared to US$1.3 billion in 2010 (equivalent to 12 percent of GDP) in 2010.25 The PDO continues to be fully consistent with the latest Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy FY 2012-2015 (Report No. 66813-MZ; Feb. 8, 2012), specifically with the pillar focusing on competitiveness and employment that, among other things, seeks the prioritization of investments through spatial planning. Likewise, the PDO is consistent with Mozambique’s latest Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011-2014 (PRSP) that aims to reinvigorate the poverty reduction agenda to foster more inclusive growth by undertaking an economic strategy to boost productivity in labor-intensive sectors and unleash the structural transformation of the 22 Letter from Minister Carlos Mesquita to the World Bank Country Director (157/GM/MTC/15; Dec. 2015). 23 As of the closing of the MTR Report, the MTC had allocated sufficient resources (MZN 9 million) from its annual budget to retain most of the SDP Unit staff. 24 A new government took office in January 2015, which resulted in new authorities being appointed in several line ministries, including the MTC. 25 World Development Indicators (accessed on Feb. 6, 2016).

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economy. The PDO is particularly relevant for two of the three main PRSP pillars: (a) increasing production and productivity for the agricultural and fisheries sectors; and (b) promoting employment.

36. Relevance of Design: The relevance of design (before and after restructuring) is considered poor particularly due to the broad scope of activities, ineffective institutional arrangements, and unduly high expectations for institutionalization and mainstreaming within a limited timeframe for project implementation. The scaling down of project activities during the Restructuring was not consistent with the PDO that remained unchanged. The weak institutional arrangements remained; though in the last year of project implementation the MTC started a series of studies and consultations to review the institutional set-up for the project. Perhaps, a more flexible TA would be more effective, better targeting sector specific capacity development needs within the MTC in the short term, possibly with support from the International Finance Cooperation, and more ambitious, cross-sectoral, and multi-stakeholder capacity support on spatial development planning throughout the national government agencies in the medium and long term.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Modest

37. The assessment of the Project’s efficacy in terms of PDO achievement is complicated by the fact that, as mentioned above, the Level 2 Restructuring in September 2014 modified the KPIs to focus more narrowly on the completion of revised project activities but did not change the PDO. In other words, while the change in KPIs seemed to give a larger relative weight to the introduction of spatial development planning practices, the unchanged PDO definition continued to reflect a seemingly equal weight on the introduction, institutionalization, and mainstreaming of such development practices.

38. This ICR tackles this inconsistency by focusing on both the PDO definition and KPIs. Based on the PDO definition, the Project is deemed to have achieved its PDO only partially, as it was able to “introduce” new spatial planning systems, tools, and approaches, but fell short of “institutionalizing” and “mainstreaming” them. Even though the Project exhibited a drastic turn-around and revised KPIs were largely achieved, efficacy is deemed only modest in relation to the level of achievement specified at restructuring by both the original PDO definition and revised KPIs. Correspondingly, given the poor level of achievement of the original KPIs, efficacy is deemed unsatisfactory with respect to the level of achievement specified by the original PDO definition and original KPIs. Thus, the overall achievement of project objectives is considered moderately unsatisfactory given the relative weight of disbursement during the pre- and post-restructuring periods (see Table 1 for details on the split rating).

Table 1: Calculation of weighed score of PDO achievement

Original PDO Definition + Original KPIs

Original PDO Definition + Revised KPIs

Rating Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Point score (i) 2 3 Disbursements US$2.23 million equivalent US$9.65 million equivalent Weight 18.8% 81.2% Weighed score 0.38 2.44 Total score 2.82 equivalent to Moderately Unsatisfactory (score rounded to 3) (i) On a rating scale with Highly Unsatisfactory 1, Unsatisfactory 2, Moderately Unsatisfactory 3, Moderately Satisfactory 4, Satisfactory 5, Highly Satisfactory 6

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39. Overall, the Project was effective in introducing multi-sector spatial development planning methodologies and instruments, such as the SDI approach to spatial planning and the multi-sector GIS platform. These practices have a reasonable chance of being properly institutionalized and mainstreamed and, if so, they have the potential of improving national social and economic development planning. Specific achievement in terms of the introduction of spatial development planning practices and progress toward their institutionalization and mainstreaming is reflected in the achievement of the secondary objectives anticipated under the Project (pp. 6-7, PAD), which can be summarized as follows:

40. Establishment of a fully functional COCEP at the MTC. The COCEP was established at the MTC in March 2010 by Ministerial Resolution with the aim of establishing a sustainable institutional capacity on spatial development planning and elaborating a series of concrete proposals for SDIs. The COCEP was particularly active at early stages of implementation, when it produced, among others, a strategic Vision for Transport Development. The COCEP, however, was later replaced by the SDP Unit that took over the same responsibilities under the orbit of the SDP-TA Project.

41. Develop the methods and human capacity to mainstream spatial development planning as a core function of the MTC and of the GOM as a whole. The SDP-TA has contributed toward capacity building in terms of both methods and human resources through training and hands-on experience. Specifically:

Training and South-South cooperation activities – There has been significant training provided under the Project in: (i) spatial development, (ii) Project-related topics (e.g., transport, GIS, communications, HIV/Aids mitigation and prevention strategies), and (iii) management skills (see Annex 2). Training has been provided mainly to staff within the SDP Unit, the MTC and the IMCC. While training activities have likely been beneficial in building technical capacity among individual staff, their impact is expected to be limited in view of the lack of an institutional framework supportive of the spatial development planning function. The same applies to the study tours conducted under the South-South cooperation.

Spatial development crosscutting programs – The Project provided support to five crosscutting programs to be implemented within the individual SDIs (See Annex 2). Two of these programs were fully implemented in the four main development corridors. Specifically, a traffic/road traffic and standard safety program was conducted jointly with INATTER, the national agency responsible for road safety. In addition, HIV/Aids prevention and mitigation programs were carried out by two NGOs with significant expertise in the area, resulting in innovative approaches that responded to the dynamic nature of the development corridors. The two programs serve as a successful illustration of focused cross-sector collaboration in the context of SDIs and, in the case of INATTER, parts are likely to be mainstreamed. The remaining three programs resulted in studies focusing on the development of a lobbing and advocacy strategy for SDIs and the design of a commercial cargo load control and management strategy.26

42. Although spatial development planning has not been mainstreamed and is far from being a core function of the MTC or the GOM, there are some indications that technical capabilities developed with Project support have the potential to improve national planning beyond the MTC. Specifically, in early 2016, the SDP Unit signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the National Communication Institute of Mozambique to provide a US$200,000 fee-for-service spatial analysis. The SDP Unit is

26 Another crosscutting intervention had been planned (a revision of the Maritime Cabotage Legal Framework), which was cancelled due to delays in the procurement process.

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also finalizing another MoU with the National Institute of Statistics to provide spatial analysis services during the preparation of the next national census (2017).

43. Assemble existing geo-referenced data for Mozambique and develop a standardized and comprehensive set of interactive multi-sector GIS-based SDI planning databases. The multi-sector GIS platform is conceived as a central information repository for all government spatial needs and is expected to improve the dissemination of spatial information and reduce data duplication. As such, it has the potential to have great impact in terms of enhancing Mozambique’s public sector capacity for spatial development planning. Unlike in other areas of intervention, there was sustained progress toward the development of the multi-sector GIS system since the Project’s inception, gradually building support and cooperation across different institutions through training activities, study tours, and working groups. Currently, the multi-sector GIS system includes geo-referenced information from the most important line ministers on, among others, geology, agriculture, environment, climate, population demographics, as well as social and physical infrastructure. In addition, satellite images for all areas of the country were collected. While equipment and software was acquired to support the inter-sector GIS platform, the system was not officially launched in late 2015 as expected due to delays in delivering some equipment27. While various government agencies (MEF, MITADER, INE, INCM, Zambezia Agency), including the MTC, expressed their interest in absorbing the inter-sector GIS platform within their structures, its permanent institutionalization is yet to be announced. In addition, the MTC and the Zambezi Development Agency agreed to share data and to utilize the National Inter-Agency Spatial Planning Platform as the GIS tool for the Zambezi Development Agency. All these are indicators that the Project is now achieving traction towards sustainability of its investments.

44. Identify and elaborate multi-sector SDIs with private sector participation and based in socially and environmentally sustainable and climate change-resilient investment programs/projects. The Project supported sector scans aimed at promoting economic diversification and densification in two existing national/regional SDIs (i.e., Maputo and Beira), as well as two new main SDIs (i.e., Nacala and Lubombo). In addition, the Project provided support for the identification of three new secondary SDIs (Lichinga/Pemba, North-South and Zambezia, the latter one with DFID support). Sector scans were completed for the seven SDIs and 78 anchor projects were identified. Complementary to the seven sector scans, three investment conferences were carried out to disseminate investment opportunities in the Maputo, Nacala, Beira and Zambezia Development Corridors. 1025 participants attended with representation from government agencies at various levels of government, the private sector, non-government organizations and development partners. The Project supported the preparation of a General Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (so-called “Umbrella SESA”) to integrate key environmental and social considerations at the national level into the development corridors sector scans. While the SDIs have generated an opportunity for practical learning in spatial development planning and the SDI model, its capacity building impact has been limited by the implementation delays, which resulted in the sector scans being completed just a few months prior to the project closing date.

45. Promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the leveraging of private sector investments. As mentioned above, due to implementation delays, the results of the sector scans were presented to key stakeholders, including the private sector, during investment conferences that took place in late 2015, not long before the project closing date. Thus, there have not been any tangible results in terms of generating public sector involvement in the investment opportunities identified in the sector scans. Feasibility studies are being conducted for only two of the anchor projects that were identified under

27 The GIS Platform is operational and functioning, but by the time the ICR was prepared, the formal launch had not been scheduled.

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the Project, compared to a target of 20 projects.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Modest

46. The Project’s efficiency is considered modest, as anticipated outcomes have not (yet) materialized even though the revised loan proceeds were largely translated into the anticipated outputs. The Project was originally supported with a US$20 million IDA credit. During restructuring, the Project was scaled down and US$8,053,200 were cancelled. The revised IDA credit of US$11,946,800 was fully disbursed.

47. The adjustments made to the Project costs as part of the 2014 restructuring had a positive impact on the Project’s efficiency. Activities were either scaled down or eliminated, including those that: (i) could not be completed within the remaining implementation period; (ii) represented activities or consulting positions that were financed from alternative sources (i.e., DFID); (iii) were related to salaries originally allocated to staff for the SDP Unit that were not utilized over the past 38 months of implementation; and (iv) represented an original over-dimensioning of activities. The largest cost reduction was in Component 1 on Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Development (i.e., 41 percent of the original amount), which, as noted earlier, appeared to have been over-dimensioned and lacking in terms of definition and focus.

48. The Project also received financial support from a grant from DFID, which financed, among other items, salaries of the SDP Unit staff, associated studies and the SDP related activities of the Zambezia SDI. Of the original grant amount (i.e., roughly US$9.5 million equivalent), only 24 percent was disbursed, signaling the Project’s low implementation in general, regardless of the source of funds.

49. Economic and financial analyses were not undertaken during appraisal, as the operation was a TA credit with no tangible investment activities. However, some of the Project’s intermediate outcomes can be expected to have a positive impact on improving the planning function in Mozambique, spatial development planning in particular, if adequately mainstreamed and institutionalized.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Unsatisfactory

50. The Project’s overall performance is deemed Unsatisfactory, reflecting the modest ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

51. Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development. Under the sector scans, special attention was given to the generation of employment opportunities for vulnerable groups, such as women and youth. Although there has been no actual impact in terms of employment generation among vulnerable population groups, having emphasized social sustainability as part of the implementation of the SDI model may have positive impacts in the future.

52. Institutional Change/Strengthening. As described above, the Project contributed in terms of introducing spatial development planning tools and practices that have the potential to enhance Mozambique’s planning function, if successfully mainstreamed and institutionalized.

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53. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative). The Project provided technical assistance to support the establishment of INATTER, the newly established regulatory agency for train and road transport.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

54. N.A.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: High

55. There are several concerns regarding the sustainability of the specific outcomes of the Project. As mentioned above, the Government has yet to take measures to ensure the sustainability of the main project outputs. Although it has recently started to take initial steps towards sustainability by allocating its own funds to support the costs of the SDP Unit in 2016, there is still a need for the Government to take a final decision on institutionalization and secure long-term funding for mainstreaming. Specifically, it is important to ensure the continuous development and institutionalization of the Inter-Sectoral Platform for Spatial Development Planning, the multi-sector GIS system in particular. The lack of definition on part of the authorities with regard to the future of the GIS platform, including maintenance budget, poses a significant risk to the development outcome.28 Likewise, it is critical to monitor and foster the gradual development of SDIs supported under the Project. In addition, the absorption of spatial planning capabilities within the permanent structure of the MTC is still pending, given that the SDP-TA Unit operated independently from the MTC under the Project.

56. More generally, the lack of institutional capacity exhibited by the MTC in the context of the SDP-TA as well as the lack of effective mechanisms for cross-sectional coordination within the GOM as a whole continue to pose severe challenges to the strengthening of social and economic development planning capabilities, including spatial planning. A broad consensus across line ministers or the influence of a powerful champion within the GOM would be critical for ensuring the needed cross-sector coordination. Moreover, ongoing platforms for dialog between the public and private sectors would be required, as it is the case, for example, in the MDC.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


57. While the project design exhibited some strengths, the Bank’s overall performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated Unsatisfactory, as there were major shortcomings in project design that hindered PDO achievement. In terms of strengths, the Bank adequately identified the high stakes associated with the massive infrastructure investments flowing into Mozambique and, through the SDP-TA, provided a technical assistance instrument to help the GOM capitalize on such a unique window of opportunity. In addition, project preparation was short, with only six months between identification and approval, in an attempt to respond in a timely manner to the request for assistance of the head of the MTC, a

28 The GIS platform is based on commercial software (i.e., ESRI) that requires payment of annual licenses.

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champion for spatial planning within the MTC.29 The preparation process, however, provided only a schematic project design that lacked an adequate level of preparedness and overlooked critical risks associated with the potentially limited implementation capacity within the MTC. While the conditions of effectiveness ameliorated some of these risks, they were not an adequate substitute for more in-depth project preparation. In addition, the Project’s scope was overly ambitious in terms of the number of SDIs initiatives adopted for feasibility and subsequent investment being supported. Likewise, the potential for cross-sector coordination as well as institutionalization and mainstreaming of newly developed spatial development tools and practices was overestimated. Finally, the Project appears to have been declared effective prematurely, without ensuring its readiness.

(b) Quality of Supervision


58. The Bank’s overall performance in terms of supervision is deemed Unsatisfactory, as it exhibited major shortcomings, particularly during the pre-restructuring period. During the earliest stages of implementation, the Bank team worked closely with the MTC and provided close support and guidance on substantive issues, with frequent supervision missions.30 However, as time elapsed and the pace of implementation continued to be slow, the Bank team failed to effectively identify, flag, and resolve threats to the achievement of relevant outcomes. Specifically, Implementation Status & Results (ISR) ratings did not adequately reflect the lagging disbursements.31 Until mid-2013, “Progress towards Achievement of PDO” was consistently rated Satisfactory and “Overall Implementation Progress” fluctuated between Satisfactory and Moderately Satisfactory. Likewise, the overall tone of the Aide Memoires and ISRs was generally positive and may have failed to adequately convey the complexity of the situation. Implementation bottlenecks were not adequately addressed, particularly the lack of a fully staffed project implementation unit. More decisive and prompter action on the part of the Bank would have been necessary.

59. In early 2013, Project ratings were downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory (PDO Achievement) and Moderately Unsatisfactory (Overall Implementation). Implementation support efforts focused more on finding strategies to accelerate implementation, with substantial support being provided in the area of procurement in particular. An in-depth review of the project activities was conducted and supervision tools were developed, including time-bounded action plans that were closely monitored. The strengthening of the SDP Unit became a top priority, ensuring that the technical positions were filled and bringing on board additional technical resources, such as a National Program Coordinator who supported the Project Coordinator with the execution of project activities. The emphasis on implementation was reflected in increased disbursements, with US$2.6 million being disbursed during the last two quarters of FY13. The improved performance, however, did not last. Project performance was further downgraded to MU/MU for both PDO achievement and implementation in early 2014 after disbursements stalled once again, which resulted in an increased involvement of the Country Management Unit (CMU).

60. The MTR, which was originally scheduled for July 2013, did not take place until April 2014 and focused on addressing issues that affected implementation adversely to avoid continued problems during the remaining implementation period. Following the MTR, a Level 2 restructuring of the Project

29 Both the Country Director and the Lead Sector Specialist were scheduled to leave their posts in Mozambique within a few months after Project identification, which prompted the rapid preparation of the Project to avoid risking delays in project preparation as a result of the transitioning of Bank staff. 30 There were four supervision missions during 2011. 31 By March 2013, actual disbursements amounted to USD1.9 compared to an anticipated US$10 million (i.e., 19 percent).

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was approved in September 2014. Bank management, particularly the CMU, was closely involved in the restructuring. While the restructuring and the cancellation of US$8 million in the credit amount were justified as they reflected what could be realistically achieved in the remaining implementation period, an earlier restructuring would have been warranted in order to resolve implementation challenges and put project performance back on track. Moreover, the Bank failed to revise the PDO as part of the restructuring even though it had become clear that there was not enough time to fully achieve the PDO and the KPIs had been scaled down to outputs as opposed to outcomes.

61. After a change in sector management and task team after the restructuring in September 2014, implementation support to the project improved substantially. Seven implementation support missions were fielded between September 2014 and December 2015. This resulted in the drastic turn-around of the Project during the last year of implementation, as shown by both disbursements and activities being completed. In addition, to help achieving the specific aspects of institutionalization, mainstreaming, and sustainability, the Bank team placed strong emphasis on requesting the preparation of an Institutionalization Strategy as well as a Strategic Plan and Budget for the key aspects of the Project, such as the multi-sector GIS platform, the SDIs, and the technical assistance for the three subsequent years after project completion. The Bank mission also recommended, and it was agreed that high-level technical assistance would be given to the senior government officials in five key ministries and national agencies (Presidency, Prime Ministry Office, MEF, MITADER, and MAEFP) and GIS workstations would be installed in order to start mainstreaming spatial planning in national policymaking, monitoring and analysis before project closing.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


62. The Bank’s overall performance is rated Unsatisfactory, reflecting the unsatisfactory performance in ensuring quality at entry and uneven quality of supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

63. The Government’s performance is deemed Moderately Unsatisfactory, as there were significant shortcomings in ensuring the timely resolution of implementations bottlenecks. There were three Ministers at the MTC during the Project’s lifetime, all of whom offered their political support for the Project. Surprisingly, the weakest project performance was under the tenure of the first Minister (from identification to September 2013) who was the original champion behind the Project. Thus, the lack of project performance during the pre-restructuring period is attributed to the MTC’s limited institutional capacity rather than lack of political support. Swift action would have been required at the time to break the stalemate in implementation, including enhancing internal coordination and ensuring the adequate staffing of the SDP-TA Unit in a timely manner. The Project continued to have the political support of successive Ministers of Transport. By early 2014, the SDP Unit was fully staffed and, later that year, the Project was restructured with full support from the MTC authorities, after which it experienced a drastic turn-around. The current Minister has also demonstrated strong commitment to ensuring institutionalization of the project. He has brought it to discussion in the Council of Ministers and allocated MTC budget funds after the closing of the IDA credit to ensure the continuous operation of the SDP Unit until the GOM has taken a final decision on the institutionalization of spatial development planning, including the inter-sectoral GIS system. This decision was still pending at the time of the ICR.

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64. Inter-institutional arrangements did not work as envisioned. Members of the IMCC increasingly delegated their responsibility to subordinates and, overall, provided little guidance to project implementation. Although regularly held in early stages of the Project, meetings became less frequent and less regular. The lack of inter-sectorial cooperation could have been predicted given the Project’s location in a line ministry and the absence of a top-government champion.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


65. The performance of the SDP-TA Unit is deemed Moderately Unsatisfactory, as it exhibited significant weaknesses that severely affected PDO achievement, especially in the first phase of project implementation. The weak performance of the SDP Unit is clearly reflected in the negligible level of disbursement during the first half the Project’s lifetime. Management capacity was particularly limited in early stages of the Project, as denoted by the lack of progress during the first year of implementation. Key Project activities appeared not to have been adequately prioritized. For example, the official project launch, which eventually took place in March 2012, and other dissemination activities took much of the SDP Unit’s attention at the expense of more critical tasks, such as the recruiting of key technical staff, developing a detailed procurement plan, and preparing TORs and procurement process for the key activities. For example, the corridor manager positions remained vacant until late 2012 and even mid-2013 in the case of the Beira. Likewise, other critical positions such as the M&E, GIS, and media specialists were not filled until early 2013, and even later as in the case of the environmental specialist who joined the unit in January 2014. There were also delays in the appointment of the Steering Committee, which was not completed until mid-2013. Prior to the MTR, when a training plan and a South-South cooperation strategy were developed, capacity-building activities under Component 1 did not appear to respond to a clear strategy toward the achievement of the operation’s PDO. In addition, the SDP Unit operated largely independently, with little interaction with the permanent structure of the MTC, which limited the sustainability of the capacity building efforts beyond the Project’s lifetime.32

66. The performance of the SDP Unit exhibited a drastic turn-around during the post-restructuring period. Under close supervision and with the full support of the Bank team, including Bank procurement staff, the SDP Unit succeeded in implementing the large majority of the revised activities and fully disbursing the revised credit proceeds.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


67. The Borrower’s performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory to reflect the moderately unsatisfactory ratings for the performance of the Government and the SDP Unit.

6. Lessons Learned (a) Lessons of wide general application

68. Ensuring project readiness is critical to its successful implementation. In the case of the SDP-TA, the Project design was too generic and the institutional building activities were not adequately sized, clearly defined and sequenced, and were not supported with a feasible time-bounded roadmap. Projects like this one should have longer periods of preparation in order to ensure that all key design aspects are fully developed, the capacity of the implementing units is in place and fully appraised, and 32 The Project staff interacted with MTC staff only in the areas of FM, GIS, and procurement.

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at least all procurement documents for the first year of implementation have been prepared. Likewise, the Project appears to have been approved and declared effective prematurely, before ensuring that the needed technical resources and institutional arrangements were in place. Project effectiveness is a highly visible landmark that should be capitalized on to ensure the adequate allocation of implementation resources on the part of the Borrower.

69. Spatial development planning needs to be institutionally embedded within the broader planning function of the Government. Regardless of their level of commitment, line ministries are not conducive to leading multi-sector efforts, such as spatial development planning. While the support of a political champion can be a determinant of success, it is not a sufficient condition and, as such, should not overshadow institutional considerations. In the case of the SDP-TA, having the Project in a line ministry resulted in its dissociation from the country’s main planning function, and the political support did not go hand in hand with adequate capacity to ensure effective cross-sector coordination nor foster mainstreaming and institutionalizing of new instruments and methodologies. The institutional arrangements of cross-sectoral projects or platforms (like the national GIS) should be fully discussed during project preparation, and housed in the highest institutional level necessary to ensure that it will be mainstreamed by all relevant national agencies. As such, it is recommended that a non-sectoral ministry houses such projects.

70. Strong political support within the MTC. The Project had the full support of the Minister of Transport, who had served as the coordinator of the SDIs of the DBSA. In addition to being a strong champion for spatial planning within Mozambique, he was also an influential figure within the GOM, and conceivably may have had the influence to establish spatial planning as a core function within the MTC and possibly promote inter-sectoral coordination with other line ministries. It would be important that political support is obtained from a broader scope of high-level decision-makers to minimize the impact of changes in governance structures, including academia.

71. TA lending operations seem to generate less traction and have more limited success than other investment loans. While providing TA to enhance client capacity in key areas - such as spatial planning - is important and can potentially have high pay-offs, financing of infrastructure activities tends to generate more implementation momentum and political commitment from counterparts. Given the lack of complementary strategic infrastructure investments, the SDP-TA appears to have had a similar fate of marginalization as previous TA lending operations in the urban sector in Brazil and in housing in Mexico. While TA operations are important, it would be important to consider an investment of program for results lending instrument which could ensure not only stronger support for the project, but also an instrument to allocate funds based on the introduction of spatial planning in national government planning functions.

72. Proactive implementation support remains an effective tool for ensuring project success. Close monitoring of project implementation and the utilization of effective supervision tools are critical determinants of Project performance, as evidenced by the remarkable reversal in project performance from mid-2013 onward, particularly after the 2014 restructuring. Conversely, the lack of proactive engagement at an earlier stage of project implementation that resulted in a late restructuring hindered the project’s success by not allowing sufficient time for institutionalization and mainstreaming of project results. The Bank needs to provide more support to project design and during early years of project implementation in order to quickly identify non-performing project aspects and support the Government to make corrections before they become complex and time runs short.

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73. Even in the case of TA operations, the complexity of the project has to be in line with the capacity of the Borrower. In this case, the design was excessively large and open-ended in the case of the institutional development activities (Component 1) and too ambitious in relation to the SDIs (Component 2). It is recommended to better assess the technical capacity of the implementing unit to manage complex contracts.

74. When designing a project, it is important to take into consideration the procurement burden it will generate. As originally conceived, the SDP-TA involved an excessive large number of small institutional development activities that generated an excessive procurement burden for the SDP Unit and contributed to the lack of project progress. Consolidating and contracting the provision of capacity development to an external provider may be a more adequate strategy in settings with limited procurement and management capacity. It is also recommended to consolidate small activities into larger contracts, reducing the transactional costs of many small procurement processes.

75. Self-standing Project Implementation Units seriously limit long-term capacity building. As illustrated by the SDP-TA experience, they do not guarantee improved implementation performance either. Thus, taking the more arduous route of conducting project implementation within the permanent public administration structure appears to be a more effective strategy, particularly in operations for which capacity building is an objective in itself.

(b) Project-Specific Lessons Learned

76. In the context of Mozambique, a regional cross-country dimension is critical in the case of development corridor initiatives. One of Mozambique’s significant economic competitive advantages is its potential to provide logistical and transport support to neighboring land-locked countries, including Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Thus, in the context of development corridors, it is important to adopt a multi-country and long-term perspective.

77. Different approaches should be taken depending of the level of “maturity” of the specific development corridor. In the case of the MDC, it is reasonable to focus the sector scan on the identification of investment projects with potentially high economic impact, as it is already a functioning corridor endowed with basic infrastructure and a well-established platform for dialogue between the private and public sectors. In the case of less mature corridors, such as Beira or Nacala, in which basic infrastructure is not yet in place, the sector scans should focus on economic potential to inform infrastructure planning. Thus, it is unfeasible to expect investments.

78. Strategic approaches can maximize the chances of success of SDIs. Specifically, SDIs should be firmly anchored in actual demand. Moreover, it is important to identify and take advantage of low-hanging fruits to show early gains and consolidate support (e.g., in the MDC).

79. A fully cross-sector approach is not indispensable for spatial planning within the context of development corridors. If a fully cross-sector approach that simultaneously involves multiple sectors is not feasible, there is much that can be done from a spatial planning perspective to optimize the use of existing infrastructure assets and leverage unused capacity along Mozambique’s development corridors. Likewise, there are opportunities for more limited cross-sector interventions, as illustrated by the HIV/AIDS prevention activities supported under the Project.

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7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

80. Borrower/implementing agencies. The Borrower is satisfied with the ICR, and reiterated its commitments and ongoing efforts to ensure that the project is sustainable, and its objectives will be fully achieved. The Borrower noticed that the Bank’s ICR did not make recommendations that differed from the Government’s evaluation report. The Borrower would like that the Bank’s ICR report includes also recommendations to address the challenges faced by the project, for similar projects in the future. The MTC would like to clarify again that it is concluding its internal organizational reform, and the SDP Unit will be part of the new MTC structure. Looking back, it is clear that the PDO was overambitious when the Project was conceived as it is not possible to achieve mainstreaming of a complex spatial planning instrument that still needs to be developed in only five years. The Borrower observed that a stronger partnership between the MTC and the MITADER should have been suggested at the beginning of the Project, as the law defines that there should be a national plan for territorial development. The Borrower would like to highlight that there has been a strong inter-sectoral cooperation during the implementation of the Project, particularly regarding the development of the GIS platform, and this cooperation should continue, but there are concerns that, after the initial results of this inter-sectoral collaboration, the future of the program is still uncertain. The Mozambique Railway Company (CFM) recognizes the relevance and initial results of such spatial planning support tool, and is concerned about the lack of clarity regarding the future of the project. The MTC shares similar concerns and hopes a solution to ensure the continuity of the spatial development framework can be identified jointly between the Government and the Bank. The Borrower is very interested in the future of spatial development planning. As such, the GOM recently decided that the Project should stay in the MTC and the final institutional form is waiting for the completion of the new organizational structure of the Ministry. The Borrower believes that the Bank had a greater responsibility for the design and implementation problems. It also believes that, if the Project had a second opportunity today, it would have a much better performance, as the ideal situation was not in place when the Project was designed and during the first phase of its implementation. The Borrower expressed that it would be with great sadness to see the Bank leaving this important national policy agenda. The MTC team explained that they are still doing tests with the GIS platform. After they installed new state-of-the-art equipment, some aspects of the data migration still need to be adjusted and thus the system is not yet fully functional to be released. When everything is ready, the MTC will schedule the launch of the GIS platform. Finally, despite the GOM decision on institutionalization in the MTC, and the decision of the Minister of Economy and Finance to seek sources of funding for the continuation of the program, the resources have not been fully approved due to the new fiscal reality in the country.

81. See Annex 7 for a summary of the Government’s completion report.

82. Cofinanciers. The co-financier DFID shared a written contribution addressing key points for the ICR, which is included in Annex 8.

83. Other partners and stakeholders. Not applicable.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Note: as of December 15, 2015.

(b) Financing

Note: as of December 15, 2015

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Annex 2: Project Outputs by Component Component 1 – Institutional and Capacity Development Component 1. Institutional Development 33 Spatial Development Planning (SDP) Unit - The Project provided technical assistance to the MTC with the creation of the SDP Unit to: (i) manage the activities under the Spatial Development Planning Technical Assistance Project; and (ii) to provide on the job training for related areas within the MTC. The Project provided financial support for key technical staff as well as physical infrastructure, including office furniture, computer equipment and four vehicles. Coordination Commission for Studies and Projects (COCEP) - The COCEP was established at the MTC on March 2010 by Ministerial Resolution with the aim of establishing a sustainable institutional capacity on spatial development planning and elaborating a series of concrete proposals for SDIs. The COCEP was particularly active at early stages of implementation, producing a strategic Vision for Transport Development. In addition, selected COCEP staff received participation in the study tours and other training activities. The Project also financed COCEPs’ physical infrastructure. The COCEP is no longer functional and has been replaced by the SDP Unit. National Institute of Land Transport (INATTER) - The Project provided technical assistance to INATTER, the newly created regulating agency for Land Transport (Road and train traffic) established in 2011 and launched in 2014. Specifically, the Project provided support for a functional analysis as well as the creation of a Commission. The Commission produced 12 legal documents that were key inputs in the design of the agency’s institutional framework. In addition, support was provided for the Commission’s physical infrastructure (including furniture and office equipment) and selected staff received capacity building with the participation in the study tours and other specialized or generic trainings. Spatial Development Geographic Information (GIS) platform - The Project provided financial support to a GIS spatial information platform within the MTC, which is expected to allow users from various government departments and other organizations to find and share maps, draw reports, upload and download data and perform spatial analysis at national level in Mozambique. The System is conceived as a central information repository for all government spatial needs and is expected to greatly improve the dissemination of spatial information and reduce data duplication within the government. The Project also funded a study about the GIS Network Institutionalization within a National Policy Framework and mapped several line Ministries on where the crosscutting and multi-sector planning tool could be housed. Support was provided for the acquisition and installation of equipment for GIS Network, acquisition and installation of GIS Software for inter-ministerial committee institutions as well as capacity building for technical staff. In addition, the Project supported the acquisition of satellite images of urban areas of four development corridors and the printing of Development Corridor Atlases.

33 DFID provided financing for the following studies: (i) Advocacy and lobbying study, (ii) the functional analysis of INATTER and the (iii) study on institutionalizing the inter-agency GIS into national policy making. Moreover, in terms of specific financial support for the SDP Unit, DFID funded the position of the project coordinator (2011-2013 in form of a salary top-up, from 2014 onwards completely), the project manager of the Zambezia corridor, the GIS specialist and two administrate support staff. SDP Project activities in the context of the Zambezia corridor were also financed by DFID, including: (i) sector scan and analysis of investment opportunities, (ii) HIV/AIDS education and awareness campaign along the corridor, and (iii) prevention and road safety campaign.

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South-South Cooperation - As most of investment coming to Mozambique originates from emerging markets in Brazil, Asia and South Africa, the Project provided support for knowledge and information sharing through a South-South Cooperation with countries that faced similar experiences in transport infrastructure development. In line with a Project supported South-South Cooperation Strategy, two Study tours to Asia have been conducted. The 2014 Study tour to Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia benefitting 12 participants allowed for a comparative analysis of regional and integrated infrastructure planning. The 2015 Study tour to Korea, benefitting 12 participants from MTC, the Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER), Ministry of Finance, the National Roads Administration (ANE) and two provincial directors (Sofala and Inhambane), provided insights of Korea’s already proven and efficient transport solutions. Within both study tours, relevant public and private partnerships contacts have been established and shall be further explored. 2. Institutional Capacity Building The Project provided institutional strengthening through extensive capacity building in the various related areas (i) spatial development, (ii) Project-related topics, and (iii) management skills (see Table 2.1 – Training Activities). The focus of some of the individual training activities can be summarized as follows:34 (i) Spatial Development Training

Spatial Development Planning: Staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC staff received training on the fundamentals of spatial data infrastructure, network analysis, and dynamic segmentations including techniques and commands for performing simple spatial analysis and map products using digital cartographic principals. In addition, through the Information and Communication Specialist, the Unit created the SDP/Spatial Development’s Website. Furthermore, the Project supported the production of five videos about Spatial Development and the Unit’s mandate. In addition, the Project financed also SDP’s

Economic and Environmental Assessment for Spatial Planning: Staff from MTC and IMCC received training on how to integrate economic and environmental considerations into strategic spatial planning processes and how to use them as a basis for policymaking and spatial planning for sustainable development.

Impact Assessment for Social and Economic Development: MTC staff received training on the potential role of impact assessment in project management and studied the preparation of environmental management plans and the role of effective follow-up tools, with an emphasis in environmental supervision of construction activities.

Environmental and Social Safeguards (including Mozambican legislation): Staff from environmental departments within the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC received training on how to apply strategic environment assessments (SESAs) in support of sector (transport and communication) planning processes, and project-level environmental and social assessment good practices.

Climate Change Resilience: Staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC was trained in how to build resilience to climate change.

34 These training activities were included under the 2014-2015 training plan.

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(ii) Project-related Training - Transport Planning of Infrastructure Development: Staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC was trained

in the latest functional knowledge and developments of transports management, multi-modal transport technology and logistics.

Logistics and Transport Management: MTC and IMCC staff members received training on the state-of-the-art techniques for improved management of logistics processes including procurement, inventory management, warehousing and transportation.

Staff from MTC, INATTER, and IMC participated in the Modern Railway Conference that offered experts the opportunity to analyze different facets of transportation supply and provision within Africa. It equally provided a platform for stakeholders in the transportation sector to share best practices and formulate goal-driven policies to improve transportation infrastructure within the continent.

Staff from Mozambique’s Ports Authority, MTC Logistics Department and the SDP Unit participated in a Conference on Sea Ports, Logistics and Shipping, covering global transportation and logistics topics.

- Communication Information and Communications for MTC Managers: MTC staff in decision-making positions

received training on the importance of information and communications as a contributing factor to institutional development and media relationship management to promote and disseminate the MTC plans and achievements.

Training in E-communication: Staff from the SDP Unit and MTC’s Communication Department received training on Website creation and administration, as well as periodic updating of information.

- Public Private Partnerships Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Policies: Five MTC and IMCC staff and two technical staff

from the Ministry of Finance and Economy received training on the life cycle for public investments including cost benefit analysis for PPP financed projects versus the traditional public funding approach. They further examined the fiscal challenges transportation agencies face and how PPPs and other innovative financing solutions can be utilized to help overcome these challenges.

- GIS In terms of training, 25 technical staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC have been benefitted

from capacity building in Advanced QGIS, including geo-environmental analysis using satellite images and multi-temporal analysis, Introduction to ArcGIS, as well as ArcGIS 3 Performing analysis focused on advanced GIS analysis techniques, including integrated spatial analysis and pattern recognition; Exploring ENVI for geo-environmental analysis using satellite images and multi-temporal analysis; Oracle and Database Management training on leveraging several database products, as well as a 4 Model Training program on GIS applied Spatial Analysis, which covered, among others, the application of GIS, quantum software, use and application of vector data and raster, creation of thematic maps, creation and calculations of tables, geo-referencing, import and export of data from/to Google Earth, "CAD". In addition, the Project financed the participation of five MTC technical staff at the ESRI User seminar, which assembled more than 15,000 specialists from all over the world, sharing the use of GIS technologies and responding to daily spatial analytical problems.

- HIV/AIDS Mitigation and Prevention

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Development, implementation and evaluation of HIV workplace programs: Staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC received a training on how to analyze the impact of HIV/AIDS within the labor force, including the development of a tool kit for non-health sectors on how to effectively respond with HIV/AIDS prevention and care policies in the workplace.

Research, Monitoring and Evaluation of HIV/AIDS programs: Staff from the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC, received training on a broad range of research tools and methodologies on how to incorporate HIV/AIDS impacts into research proposals and applications.

(iii) Management Skills - Finances and HR Management Integrated Training in Financial Management and Budgeting Control: Staff from SDP and

MTC was trained in the principles of accounting, taxation and report standards. Financial Managements for Development Projects: Staff of the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC was

trained in the design and operation of project financial management systems in accordance with professional standards and requirements of donors and governments.

Management and Human Resource Development: MTC managers received training on how to improve performance management, coaching, and performance planning.

Finance for Non-Financiers: MTC managers received training on accounting terms and concepts and the write up of financial statements.

- Project Management and Impact Assessment Impact Assessment and Theory of Change: Staff of the SDP Unit, MTC and IMCC received

training on how to understand and use impact assessment techniques for project final evaluations and how to interpret their findings.

Project Management: Staff from SDP Unit and MTC Heads of Department received training in tools for project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation as well as management of resources.

Results-Based Managements Performance Indicator: Staff from the SDP Unit and MTC received training on the rationale for RBM and how to better understand and apply results-based management policies and principles.

- Personal skills Leadership and Motivation skills: Staff from the SDP Unit and MTC received training on

understanding and addressing employee requirements through proven techniques for effective personnel management.

Training on Information and Communication: Staff from the various MTCs Communication departments (including provincial directorates) received training by the information and communication expert of the SDP Unit.

English course (various levels): MTC and IMCC staff received language courses.

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Table 2.1 Training Activities under SDP-TA Project

Source: Author

based on data

provided by SDP Unit (2016).

3.

Spatial Development Crosscutting Programs HIV/AIDS Prevention and Mitigation – While transport corridors are economic lifelines serving as pathways for trade and engines for expanding local economies, they are major transmission routes for AIDS/HIV for the communities that live and work along those corridors. For this reason the Project funded HIV/AIDS prevention activities to increase awareness, access and support to HIV/AIDS care services for vulnerable groups in four development corridors (i.e., Beira, Nacala, Zambezia, Maputo). Specific activities included awareness raising campaigns accompanied by distribution of free condoms through cinema nights, theatre plays, community debates, radio programs as well as door-to-door counselling. In addition, the Project financed production and dissemination of brochures targeting specific work groups such as truck drivers, market sellers, port and railway workers, taxi drivers, nightclub frequenters as well as billboard advertising along the roads. Moreover, in all four corridors, the Project financed promotional materials such as T-shirts, caps, key chains, bags and stickers that have been distributed. In addition to enhancing awareness about HIV/AIDS and fighting the stigma, the Project’s activities have increased knowledge about the importance of HIV testing, disseminated accurate information about the transmission of sexual diseases and care treatments of people living with HIV/AIDS. Other outputs are summarized below (see Table 2.2).

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Table 2. 2 Outputs corresponding to HIV/Aids Prevention and Mitigation Activities

Maputo and Beira Development Corridors

Residential treatment - More than 400 people living with HIV / AIDS are identified for home treatment

Community cinema - More than 300 people sensitized to condom use with community cinema

Health routes - More than 800 people sensitized regarding HIV / AIDS and condom use

Discussions with girls - More than 100 people sensitized regarding HIV / AIDS and condom use

Counseling - More than 1,500 people received counseling on HIV/AIDS

Zambézia and Nacala Development Corridors Residential treatment - 30 people living with HIV / AIDS were provided with medical care and counseling on food and care in general Awareness campaign - Direct and indirect beneficiaries were sensitized on condom use

11,604 residents from three districts (i.e., Nacala, Cuamba and Lichinga )

387 staff MTC and other agencies Discussions with girls - More than 544 women and girls sensitized regarding HIV / AIDS, condom use and vertical transmission from mother to child. Health routes - Counseling and testing awareness was provided to:

2,165 truck and taxi drivers

336 sex workers 2,318 car passengers 8,475 users of public transport

Source: SDP Unit (December 2015)

Traffic/Road Traffic and Standard Safety - In order to prevent accidents and fatalities resulting from the increased volume of traffic that is expected from the development of transport and trade corridors, the Project provided support for the production of road safety materials that were jointly developed jointly with INATTER, the national agency responsible for road safety. In addition, the Project supported the production of four Road Safety Videos (TV spots) that were screened on national TV to educate the public on basic road safety practices. Finally, training on traffic regulations has been carried out in selected schools within the four main development corridors. Lobbing and Advocacy in Development Corridors - The Project supported development of a Lobbing and Advocacy Strategy in three corridors (i.e., Zambezia, Beira, Nacala) to help identify the barriers that the private sector may encounter in conducting business, and produced solutions and recommendations for policy changes necessary to attract national or foreign investments and unleash economic growth. Cargo Load Management - Given the increased and uncontrolled mobility of people and goods along the development corridors and the fact that Mozambique has no management system for cargo loads, the Project funded a commercial cargo load management study and the piloting of a Commercial Cargo Load Control and Management Center. Once completed, the new center is expected to enhance the rationalization of cargo loads, including the monitoring of vehicles and goods along the corridors, accident rates as well as commercial transport to help improve efficient transport through planning. Rural Mobility Strategy and Pilot Program - The Project supported the development of a rural mobility strategy with the overall objective to increase spatial mobility within the existing infrastructure

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constraints. The strategy highlights the example of how agricultural production can be increased through the introduction and piloting of special rural mobility vehicles. Component 2 – Spatial Development Initiative Component Spatial Development Initiatives – The Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) is an integrated planning tool aimed at promoting investment in regions of the country that were underdeveloped but have potential for growth. The SDI methodology involves a process in which the public sector develops or facilitates conditions conducive to private sector investment and PPPs. The Project funded sector scans in order to identify and assess the economic potential of the corridors in seven development corridors (i.e., Beira, Maputo, Nacala and Zambezia, Lichinga/Pemba, North-South Great East African Barrier Reef and Lubombo). Within each development corridors, anchor projects have been identified aimed for investment opportunities to reinforce economic inter-sector linkages, with particular attention to the development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as well as employment generation for vulnerable groups, including women and youth. The sector scans for the Maputo, Beira, Nacala and Zambezia SDI’s and corresponding anchor projects were presented to possible stakeholders at Investment Conferences. Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) - The SESA is a systematic process that integrates environmental and social sustainability considerations into the formulation, assessment and implementation of policies, programs and plans at the appropriate level of decision-making. The Project supported the Umbrella SESA to integrate key environmental and social considerations at the national level into the development corridors sector scans, by considering a long-term perspective in which improved wealth and well-being should be based on the sustainable use of natural resources.35 Road Shows - The Project supported road shows in six of the ten provinces to disseminate the concepts and methodological approaches to integrated transport development and spatial planning at various levels of Government and sectors. The road shows also promoted the Inter-Ministerial GIS Platform by demonstrating its potential advantages as a new planning tool. The roads shows were conducted in Maputo, Nampula, Beira, Xai-Xai, Tete and Pemba and had over 600 participants. Investment Conferences - The Project supported organization of three Investments conferences to disseminate the findings of the sector scans corresponding to the four SDI supported under the Project (i.e., Maputo, Beira, Zambezia and Nacala). All conferences hosted plenary sessions focusing on potential investment opportunities in the framework of the SDIs as well as parallel technical workshops. Among the audience were representative of national government agencies, sub-national authorities, private sector representatives, DPs, as well as foreign diplomats.

35 The projected had originally envisioned supporting also two SESAs focusing on individual corridors (North and South). However, due to time constraints and delays in the procurement process, those had to be cancelled. The Project still benefitted largely from producing the Umbrella SESA, as it established the framework for future individual corridor SESAs to identify development-relevant environmental and social considerations at the corridor level.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The Project was originally supported with a US$20 IDA credit. During restructuring, the Project was scaled down and US$8,053,200 being cancelled. Consequently, the revised IDA credit was US$11,946,800, which was fully disbursed. The adjustments made to the Project costs as part of the 2014 restructuring had a positive impact on the Project’s efficiency. Activities were either scaled down or eliminated, including those that: (i) could not be completed within the remaining implementation period; (ii) represented activities or consulting positions that were financed from alternative sources (i.e., DFID); (iii) related to salaries originally allocated to staff for the SDP Unit that were not utilized over the past 38 months of implementation, and (iv) represented an original over-dimensioning of activities. The largest cost reduction was in Component 1 (i.e., 41 percent of the original amount), which, as noted earlier, appeared to be over-dimensioned and lacking in terms of definition and focus. The Project also received financial support from a grant from DFID. Of the original grant amount (i.e., roughly US$8 million equivalent), only 24 percent was disbursed, signaling to the Project’s poor implementation in general, regardless of the source of funds. Economic and financial analyses were not undertaken during Appraisal, as the operation was a TA credit with no tangible investment activities. If adequately mainstreamed and institutionalized, some of the intermediate outcomes resulting from the Project, such as the inter-sector GIS platform, can be expected to have positive impact on improving the planning function in Mozambique, spatial development planning in particular. This impact cannot be quantified at this point.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Boris E. Utria Sector Leader/TTL AFCS2 Ivo Imparato Sector Leader AFCS2 Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia Sr. Infrastructure Economist/Co-TTL AFTEG Ali Alwahti Urban Development Specialist

Economist AFTSN

Anne Louise Grinsted Economist ATFUW Jose Domingos Chembeze Transport Specialist AFCS2 Jutta U. Kern Sr. M&E Specialist AFTTR Mohamed Arby Ben- Achour Lead Social Dev. Spec. AFTRL Robert Robelus Environmental Spec. AFTCS Antonio Chamuco Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTUW Amos Malate Procurement Analyst AFTPC Elvis Langa Financial Sector Specialist AFTPC Marjorie Mpundu Senior Counsel AFTFM Suzanne Morris Sr. Disbursement Specialist LEGAF Arlete Q. Comissario Team Assistant CTRFC Regine Mpoyi Program Assistant AFCS2

Supervision/ICR

Eduardo Brito Senior Counsel LEGAF-

HIS

Andre Herzog TTL GSU13 Chloe Oliver Viola TTL GWA01 Richard Damania TTL GWADR

Dirk Bronselaer Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE -

HIS

Cary Anne Cadman Senior Environmental Specialist GENDR Antonio L. Chamuco Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Nilsa Ricardina Joao Come Program Assistant AFCS2 Nicolette K. DeWitt Lead Counsel LEGOP Anne Louise Grinsted E T Consultant AFCS2 Jutta Ursula Kern Country Operations Adviser LCC1C

Katherine Kuper Sr Urban Spec. AFTU1 -

HIS

Elvis Teodoro Bernado Langa Financial Management Specialist GGODR Amos Martinho Malate Procurement Specialist GGODR

Suzanne F. Morris Senior Finance Officer CTRFC-

His

Bontje Marie Zangerling Urban Specialist GSU13

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Maria Isabel Nhassengo-Massingue

Procurement Assistant AFCS2

Lourdes N. Pagaran Senior Evaluation Officer IEGPS Uri Raich Sr Urban Spec. GSU12 Rildo Santos Language Program Assistant GSU13 Renaud Seligmann Practice Manager GGODR Joao Tinga Financial Management Specialist GGODR Paulo Sithoe Environmental Specialist GEN01 Alfredo Zunguze Consultant GPSQP Julia Oberreiter Consultant GSU13 Salma Chande Program Assistant AFCS2

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY09 4.25 43.90

FY10 8.25 60.76 FY11 4.02 16.86

Total: 16.52 121.52

Supervision/ICR

FY10 9.42 72.78 FY11 28.61 175.64 FY12 37.48 216.52 FY13 38.71 256.35 FY14 42.37 263.35 FY15 25.46 189.98 FY16 4.68 74.43

Total: 186.73 985.70

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Not Applicable

33

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not Applicable

34

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Government of Mozambique, namely the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), prepared a Project Completion Report for the SDP in Portuguese, which was shared with the World Bank on March 15, 2016. The below is a summary of the key points raised in the government’s completion report.

Key factors affecting implementation and outcomes

The report raised concerns about the delayed start-up phase of the project, with the recruitment of key personnel for the PIU concluded only in 2014, instead of 2011. Similarly, the report notes that the project took a long time to establish efficient lines of communication between the different stakeholders, beneficiaries, funders, and service providers. These initial delays consumed more than two years of the project implementation period and were a key factor affecting implementation of project activities. The delays in implementation were reflected in the Bank’s ratings of implementation progress (rated MU) and resulted in a rigors cancellation of funds and activities following the midterm review of the project. Despite a notable improvement in project implementation in the years after the projects restructuring, several key activities were either completed only shortly before the project closing date (such as the additional three corridors), or cancelled due to time constraints (such as SESA). The report suggests that an extension of the implementation period by 1.5 to 2 years could have contributed to greater coherence and mainstreaming of the project activities. The report noted negatively the performance and poor functioning of the several committees (Inter-ministerial Technical Steering Committee, Donor Committee, etc.) that were created during the project to ensure active presence of key decision-makers to jointly guide the project activities. In practice, however, these Committees ended up being technical encounters rather than decision-making bodies, which did not support ownership of the project among the participating government entities. Moreover, the report highlights that repeated leadership changes within the leading Ministry (MTC had three different Ministers during the project’s lifetime) contributed to the loss of institutional memory and distinct project vision.

Assessment of Outcomes

The report noted positively that the overall concept of spatial development initiatives (SDIs) as an integrated planning tool for promoting economic growth within the regions was and remains highly aligned with Mozambique’s development priorities. Comparing the program’s development objectives to the results achieved, the report highlights the importance of the actual outcomes but also concludes that these do not entirely correspond to the results aimed for in the original project documents. Only the umbrella strategic environmental and social assessment (SESA) was produced, which, contrary to the SDI’s concept of in depth studies, is kept general and of limited practical value to illuminate specific actions for each of the development corridors. The planned but due to time constraints cancelled specific SESAs (North and South) would have offered more detailed analysis on climate change and resilience enhancement measures for each region and would have allowed to elaborate concise response plans. Another critical point that the report emphasizes is the “lost opportunity” regarding the three additional corridors of Lubombo, Lichinga-Mueda and North-South. With the exception of the Zambezia Corridor, the potential of the other three main corridors (Maputo, Beira and Nacala respectively) had already

35

been relatively well known and there was possibly a lesser need for new studies and interventions. The SDP Project provided an opportunity to explore new corridors, such as the Lubombo, Lichinga-Mueda and North-South corridors, and the potential of the project to reverse the trend and unleash economic growth within other areas. The report equally shares concerns about the activities related to the creation of the GIS platform. It highlights positively that the basis in terms of hard and software acquisition as well as GIS specific capacity on the central and provincial level has been established. However, this basis was expected to be consolidated with further capacity building of sector technicians, for their specific purposes. While the consolidation efforts are currently ongoing, the report shares concern that these are implemented outside the initial term of the project. Sustainability of the Project

The report highlights that the overall impact of the project is questionable, as essential aspects of the project have not been appropriated by the designated sectors. Consequently, there is a significant risk to sustainability of project achievements in terms of spatial development interventions that were based on synergies between different the various sectors. The report further highlights that due to the lack of a clear decision on the project’s future, each sector may return to their traditional way of doing things and most of the efforts of the multi sectorial spatial planning may be lost. Regarding ownership of the project outcomes, the report laments that the main products of the project remain with the PIU instead of having been appropriated by the various sectors. In terms of component specific sustainability aspects, the report highlights that for Component 1, the project’s capacity building plans were especially for technical staff at the central level of the various ministries involved in the program, as well as some technical personnel of the provinces. In order to sustain these efforts, the report advocates developing and implementing advanced training packages to: (i) continue the learning process for trained beneficiaries; and (ii) provide advanced training for targeted audiences who are part of the program but “field based” meaning along the corridors or within the provincial administrations. Regarding Component 2, the spatial development initiatives, a diverse range of sector opportunities and anchor projects has been identified with great potential for employment generation among youth and women. In terms of sustainability of these identified and developed projects, the report recommends that the relevant ministries to make use of the already existing synergies shall appropriate these. Lessons Learned

- The most important lesson learned of the Project is about the institutional arrangement of a multi-sectoral project and its coordination difficulties among the different ministries. The report shares concerns about the current subordination and relative “isolation” of the SDP Unit within the MTC but also acknowledges that no ministry alone would be able to accommodate a multi sectorial project. Hence, the report recommends that given the SDP’s multi-sectoral nature and its geographic scope, the location of the SDP Unit within the Prime Minister's Office, would give greater political weight to the SDP, promote better coordination among the various ministries involved and allow integrated spatial planning models at central and provincial levels. This should be accompanied with the strengthening of sectorial project interventions, with each sector leading inherent issues according to their core mandate (e.g. territorial planning and

36

social environmental assessments under the leadership of MITADER; promotion and marketing of investments under the leadership of MEF etc.). Furthermore, the sectors involved should receive training and equipment for the use of spatial management tools and data management of the GIS platform. This data shall be harmonized and processed by a central entity for the purpose of prioritizing interventions and decisions regarding planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

- Some basic project preparations, such as a functioning PIU and established lines of communication, efficient coordination between technical levels and policy decision makers, need to be in place before the start of a project and should be included in project design.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders The Project’s co-financier, the Department for International Development (DFID) Mozambique, prepared a contribution addressing key points for the ICR in English language, which was shared with the World Bank on March 30, 2016. Background/Rationale of DFID funding DFID’s overall assistance was to provide funds to improve transport, energy and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) infrastructure grids operating under an improved/complementary regulatory environment to serve Mozambique, as well as countries in the wider region, for which Mozambique serves as a transit hub for international trade. DFID Mozambique had a total allocated budget of £6.5 million (corresponding to approximately US$9.5 million) through the Spatial Development Planning (SDP) Unit to strengthen the work of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) in the areas of transport policy, planning and regulations. The main outputs were: i) a well-functioning spatial planning/infrastructure unit based in MTC with cross-ministerial support; ii) an effective surface transport regulator; and iii) effective donor coordination. The project is closing (project end date 31st March 2016) with an underspend of £4.68 million (corresponding to approximately US$7 million). At the beginning of the program (FY2011/2012), DFID allocated £500K (corresponding to approximately US$750 thousand) to jointly fund with the World Bank the SDP Unit’s activities. Due to a lower program execution rate, exacerbated by a slow staff recruitment process and a lack of initial management and procurement capacity within the SDP Unit, an adjustment to the initial planned budget was made, and consequently, disbursements were being issued on a quarterly basis, after comprehensive dialogue between DFID and the SDP Unit. In addition, given the World Bank restrictions of using common funds, and lack of clarity from the SDP Unit on the use of DFID funding, the Ministry decided to only use DFID funding to support the Zambezia corridor and the transport regulator. In terms of staff, DFID supported the National Program Manager, the GIS Specialist, the Zambezia Corridor Manager, and two admin staff. In addition, DFID started to pay for the services of the SDP Project Coordinator from January 2014 onwards. This was previously covered by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), whose program support was limited to two years and ended in late 2013. Given the termination of DBSA support to the program, and recognizing the relevance of the SDP Project Coordinator’s post, DFID decided to cover the coordinator’s salary until the end of the program implementation. Regarding SDP activities, DFID supported the same activities being undertaken in other corridors but focused on the Zambezia corridor. This included: Diagnostic Study on Communications, Social and Environmental Strategic Assessment (SESA) for the Zambezia Corridor, Sector Scan for the Zambezia Corridor, Prevention and road Safety campaign and HIV education and awareness campaign along the Zambezia corridor, as well as the Advocacy and Lobbying Strategy. Regarding the support of INATTER, DFID funded the Functional Analysis of the agency. In late 2016, DFID also agreed to fund the study on the Institutionalizing Inter-Agency GIS into the National Policy Making, given the importance of the completed work on GIS platform.

38

Key factors affecting implementation and outcomes

The project had a slow start. For a long period at the beginning of the project, the SDP unit was operating with short technical staff with limited experience in managing a complex program, including providing strategic direction, managing procurements, and providing admin support. Regarding implementation, key factors that affected implementation were:

- Constant staff changes – both at the Minister level, WB TTL and DFID project lead. Whenever there were staff changes, each time the project had lost its momentum, as it would take time for the new staff to familiarize themselves with the projects portfolio. The Project was initiated with strong support from the former Minister Paulo Zucula, who championed this initiative. After Zucula, two new Ministers were appointed and therefore the project equally lost momentum, due to capacity, constraints of SDP Unit team to continue drive the vision of the project. The fact that there were three different TTLs over the course of the project, who were based in Washington DC, has led to difficulties in implementation. The complexity of the project would have required very close support, engagement and monitoring from the TTL. Within DFID, the project lead also changed during project implementation and equally contributed to the loss of institutional memory.

- The SDP Unit’s capacity - in order to deliver a fully competent spatial development planning unit, it would require the full breadth and the full levels of competency from the required staff. The project did not have an experienced spatial planner. This was exacerbated by further changes of the SDP program staff where two senior corridor project managers have not completed the full term of their contracts. On procurement, the issue is more complex, with weak capacity of the SDP Unit to comply with procurement rules, and long waiting times for approval from the Supreme Audit Institution resulting in extensive delays to implement SDP activities.

The project has been underperforming for two consecutive years. On that basis, DFID commissioned the redesign of the project, which confirmed that the original intention of producing spatial development and corridor development plans within the SDP Unit/Ministry of Transport of Communication (MTC), has not succeeded. It also confirmed that initial project design assumptions are no longer valid and that the current outputs and delivery mechanisms are unlikely to deliver the stated outcomes. Consequently, DFID decided to phase-out their support to the SDP unit and pursued with the redesign, the ambition to deliver the expected outcome. Moving forward - DFID's future assistance in spatial development planning The issues that the program was attempting to address remain critically important for Mozambique. However, DFID believed that continuing supporting the current model, the project is unlikely to achieve concrete grassroots results neither increase demand for spatial/infrastructure planning. This has been also exacerbated by low government capacity as well as lack of coordination across ministries and provincial governments. For remainder of the project, DFID recruited a technical service provider to engage more directly with a range of stakeholders in the corridor to deepen the understanding of barriers to competitiveness, and test/pilot interventions to address these specific impediments. The intent was to set out more strategically and consciously, the sequencing of interventions that will bring up opportunities for local economic development along a selected corridor.

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Lessons Learned The program was heavily depending on a champion without backing support of specialized and professional capacity in spatial planning and procurement. The project started with strong support from the former Minister of Transport who championed this initiative. He had previously headed the Regional Spatial Development Initiative of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. He was replaced in October 2013, and the program lost a key driver in terms of its strategic direction, and therefore lost momentum due to capacity constraints. Although, training was provided to the SDP Unit and other staff in MTC, this has not resulted in a sustainable spatial planning capacity. The SDP Unit does not comprise the relevant technical professionals, nor is it headed by a spatial planner (or similar) to provide the required technical leadership and direction. Central spatial development planning along identified corridors has proven hard to deliver results - since the project’s inception in early 2013, the objective of building capacity within the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) to plan and prioritize spatial development along identified corridors has proven hard to deliver some results. Equally, the central level corridor-planning model has not yet demonstrated effectiveness and limited ownership by the local provincial stakeholders, given the misalignment of central and provincial planning. Provincial government also developed their own strategic planning, including the needs for infrastructure, which mostly is not reflected by central planning. However, given that investment decisions are made on central level, better planning mechanism are crucial.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents World Bank. 2015. Mozambique - Spatial Development Planning Technical Assistance Project

(P121398) - Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 1 thru 1, Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/12/25715221/mozambique-mz-spatial-development-planning-technical-assistance-project-p121398-implementation-status-results-report-sequence-11

Nadeem, Mohammad. 2014. Official Documents- Amendment No. 1 to the Financing Agreement for Credit 4797-MZ. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20277450/official-documents--amendment-no-1-financing-agreement-credit-4797-mz

World Bank. 2014. Mozambique - Spatial Development Planning Technical Assistance Project: restructuring. Washington, DC; World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20351539/mozambique-spatial-development-planning-technical-assistance-project-restructuring

World Bank. 2012. Mozambique - Country Partnership Strategy for the period FY2012 - FY2015. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/02/15931993/mozambique-country-partnership-strategy-period-fy2012-fy2015

Republic of Mozambique. 2011. Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014, Approved at the 15th Regular Session of the Council of Ministers, Maputo, May 3, 2011.

World Bank. 2010. Mozambique - Spatial Development Planning Technical Assistance Project. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/09/12762051/mozambique-spatial-development-planning-technical-assistance-project

List of People Interviewed during ICR Mission - December 7-19, 2015 Ministry of Transport and Communications Carlos Mesquita - Minister Gabriel Muthisse, Former Minister Sergio Hortencio Rodrigo, former SDP Unit Rui Carlos Sitoe, former SDP Unit Spatial Development Project Team Odete Semião – SDP Project Coordinator Vicente Saveca, Procurement Joaquina Rufino, Financial Administration Sara Taibo –National Program Coordinator and later Zambezia Corridor Manager Deolinda Nunes – Safeguards Specialist Yvonne Semente – M&E Specialist Felisberto Tinga - Especialista I&C Salomão Matsule – Maputo Corridor Manager Augusto Ferro – Beira Corridor Manager Paulo Covele – GIS Specialist Hermenegildo Luis – GIS Technician Mariamo Assumane – GIS Technician Jorge Tinga – Project Elaboration Technician Celia Chachine - Project Elaboration Technician Monica Viera, Procurement Manuel Ruas - Former Nacala Corridor Manager

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INATTER Ana Paula Simões, General Director Vasco Daniel Tovela Filipe Mapangane Manuel Antonio Joaquim Luis ANE Marco Vas, SDP Steering Committee, South-South Cooperation Jose Bonde, GIS Manuel Tangune, GIS Consultants and Service Providers Manuela Dalas, Team Leader of HIV/SIDA Prevention and Mitigation in Maputo Corridor, Amafeda Marcelo Kantur, Amafeda Sebastiao Musitte, Amafeda Dulcio Machava, Amafeda Dominico Liuzzi, Team Leader of HIV/SIDA Prevention and Mitigation in Nacala Corridor, Kulima Alcides Tulcidas, Kulima Graham Smith, Consultant, Nacala Development Corridor Sector Scan, Mott MacDonald Vanni Cali, I&I, Commercial Cargo Control Center, Institutionalization of GIS System Graziela de Souza, Indigo Dourado, Commercial Cargo Control Center, Institutionalization of GIS System Hugo Maluvade, Indigo Dourado, Institutionalization of GIS System UK’s Department for International Development Sergio Dista - Inclusive Growth and Programme Manager, DFID World Bank Mark Austin, Program Leader, Mozambique Country Office Isabel Soares, Former Senior Operations Officer, Mozambique Country Office Andre Herzog, TTL Richard Damania, Former TTL Chloe Viola, Former Co-TTL Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Former TTL Boris E. Utria (TTL) Elvis Langa, Financial Administration Amos Malate, Procurement

Montes Namule(2,419 m)

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INHAMBANE

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Montes Namule(2,419 m)

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IBRD 33451R2

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MOZAMBIQUESELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

GSDPMMap Design Unit