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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001096

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-46070)

ON AN

ADAPTABLE PROGRAM LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF YEN 3.8 BILLION (US$ 32.6 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

FOR THE IRRIGATION BASED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE

IRRIGATION BASED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

June 2nd, 2009

Sustainable Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2008)

Currency Unit = MAD MAD 1.00 = US$ 0.127 US$ 1.00 = MAD 7.89

FISCAL YEAR

January 1-December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APL Adaptable Program Lending CAS Country Assistance Strategy CIPDR Permanent Inter-Ministerial Rural Development Council CMU CNC

Central Management Unit National Coordination Committee

CPRDR Core Provincial Rural Development Committee CT Centre de Travaux (Government extension center) Douars Villages EA Environmental Assessment EMP Environmental management Plan ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FDR Rural Development Fund IBCD Irrigation-Based Community Development INDH Initiative nationale de développement humain INRA National Institute of Agricultural Research KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoF Ministry of Finance O&M Operation and Maintenance ONE National Authority for Electricity ONEP National Water Supply Authority PAGER National Program for Water Supply PDA/DPA Provincial Department of Agriculture PMU Provincial Management Unit PPT/EPP Participatory Programming Team SEAT Territorial Development Secretariat SMI/PMH Small and Medium Scale Irrigation WUA Water User Association

Vice President: Daniela Gressani

Country Director: Mats Karlsson

Sector Manager: Luis. F. Constantino

Project Team Leader: Hassan Lamrani

ICR Team Leader: Christopher Ward

KINGDOM OF MOROCCO Irrigation Based Community Development Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 33. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 34. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate ........................... 85. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ....................................................... 96. Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................ 127. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........... 13Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 15Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 16Annex 3. Financial and Economic Analysis ..................................................................... 20Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 26Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey results ................................................................................ 28Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 29Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 30Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other partners/Stakeholders ........................... 60Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 61Annex 10. Assessment of the participatory process ......................................................... 62MAP .................................................................................................................................. 76

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A. Basic Information

Country: Morocco Project Name: IRRIGATION BASED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Project ID: P056978 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-46070

ICR Date: 06/23/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

Original Total Commitment:

USD 32.6M Disbursed Amount: USD 27.8M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 12/09/1999 Effectiveness: 07/24/2002

Appraisal: 03/29/2000 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 05/31/2001 Mid-term Review: 05/08/2005 04/11/2005

Closing: 06/30/2006 12/31/2008 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:


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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):


DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 57 65

General public administration sector 12

Other social services 8 8

Roads and highways 15 19

Water supply 8 8

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Decentralization 25

Participation and civic engagement 25 9

Rural services and infrastructure 25 35

Water resource management 25 56 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Daniela Gressani Jean-Louis Sarbib

Country Director: Mats Karlsson Christian Delvoie

Sector Manager: Luis F. Constantino Petros Aklilu

Project Team Leader: Hassan Lamrani Douglas W. Lister

ICR Team Leader: Christopher S. Ward

ICR Primary Author: Christopher S. Ward F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) As the first-phase Project of a 13-year Program covering 15 provinces, expected to be supported by 3 Adaptable Program Loans (APL), the PDO are:

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(i) to improve the incomes and quality of life of rural communities centered on small and medium irrigation (SMI) in 3 provinces (Azilal, Khenifra and Al Haouz), (ii) to pilot new institutional arrangements designed to ensure greater community participation and integration of sectoral programs through Rural Development Fund (RDF). Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : % increase in fruit tree, vegetable, forage, cereal and other production from SMI

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

100

fruit tree: +50%; vegetable: +110%; forage:+85%; cereals:+65%

fruit tree: +36% vegetable: +236% forage: +186% cereals: -12%

Date achieved 04/30/2001 04/30/2011 12/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Original target values were not defined in the PAD; the figures above corespond to hypothesis considered in the economic analysis. Actual values are the results of the impact evaluation study carried out by FAO.

Indicator 2 : No of villages equipped with additional infrastructure and social services Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 239 257


Indicator 3 : number of meetings of the Core Rural Development Committees (CRDC) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 30 44


Indicator 4 : share of financing of investments by the beneficiaries and rural communities (number of WUAs having provided cash or kind contribution)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0

69 66

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The values above are related to the number of WUAs sharing cost. Information about the amount of WUAs contribution is not available

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Irrigated areas rehabilitated and improved (ha) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 9450 11022


Indicator 2 : number of Water Users Associations formed Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 66 69


Indicator 3 : Additional access roads achieved (km) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 256 209


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/28/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/21/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 05/14/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 4 11/13/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.33 5 05/08/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.47 6 06/26/2003 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.47

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7 12/23/2003 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.47 8 04/20/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.77 9 06/22/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.77

10 10/19/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.15

11 05/26/2005 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 4.67



Unsatisfactory 5.91



Unsatisfactory 5.91

14 04/06/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.82

15 11/27/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 9.29

16 05/03/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 10.56

17 10/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 12.96 18 05/28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.62 19 12/31/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.30

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal The project was identified in the context of Morocco’s serious problem of poverty, and of a widening gap in living standards between the better off and the poor, especially the rural poor. At the time the project was identified, about 27% of the rural population were living on less than $1 a day. The disparity between the better off and the poor had been dubbed by the Bank – controversially at the time - “the Two Moroccos”. Rural poverty was primarily due to stagnant productivity in agriculture and low levels of rural infrastructure, contributing to low standards of living. Part of the Moroccan response was to develop a new “2020 Rural Development Strategy” that adopted new approaches. A participatory and demand driven approach was to be introduced, articulated bottom-up through community organizations and communes rurales (the lowest level of local government). Investment programming and execution were to be decentralized, with the actions of the various ministries integrated “horizontally” at the level of the province and below At the time of identification, Government was setting up the oversight structures and a new rural development fund (Fonds de développement rural, FDR) for the 2020 Strategy, and wanted to test out implementation mechanisms. The role of “champion” was assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture, which had for some time been investing in upgrading small and medium-scale irrigation (SMI) but had encountered problems due to the “top down” nature of the implementation model. The ministry therefore took the opportunity of grafting on the new approach in integrated and participatory rural development to its plans for a more bottom-up approach to development of SMI in poor mountain areas. The logic was that the decentralized participatory approach would create more ownership and sustainability for the SMI program and thereby raise the incomes of the poor, and that the integration of a broader range of rural development investments would vitalize the bottom-up planning process and produce a significant development impact on standards of living for the rural poor.

Government therefore decided to develop a long term program over a thirteen year period for “irrigation-based community development” (IBCD). In a first five year phase, the approach would be tested in an IBCD project in poor areas of three provinces, with subsequent scaling up to a further twelve provinces in two phases. Government requested Bank support for this IBCD project as a first phase of a long-term program.

The Bank had long been the partner of Morocco in agriculture and rural development, had financed SMI investments, and had helped through considerable sector work with the development of the 2020 Strategy. In addition, the 2020 Strategy matched the main thrusts of the Bank’s recently published paper Rural Development – from Vision to Action, and the Bank had selected Morocco as one of four focus countries for promoting and monitoring the implementation of the recommended approaches. The IBCD project also had a clear fit with the new CAS (which was presented to the Board along with the project), meeting the CAS priorities of reducing disparities between urban and rural areas, reducing rural poverty and improving access to basic economic infrastructure and social services. The program concept also matched the CAS goal of greater decentralization and integration of the planning, design and execution of rural programs and services, and of beneficiary participation. In addition, the long term program approach to be implemented in three phases was very appropriate for the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) instrument that the Bank had introduced.

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1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The objectives and key indicators set for the overall thirteen year program and for the five year first phase project were as follows: Hierarchy Objectives Key Performance Indicators Sector-related CAS Goal

To reduce disparities between urban and rural areas and reducing rural poverty

Sector indicators: Improved socio-economic indicators in rural areas

Program purpose

To improve incomes and quality of life of rural communities centered on SMI in 15 provinces over a 13 year period (2001-2013)

End of program indicators: Increased incomes from SMI (20%) Greater access to basic economic

infrastructure in selected rural communities

Project Development Objective (PDO)

To improve incomes and quality of life of rural communities centered on SMI in three provinces 2001-6 To pilot new institutional arrangements designed to ensure greater community participation and integration of sectoral programs through the FDR.

Outcome/Impact Indicators: - % increase in fruit tree, vegetable,

forage, cereal and other production from SMI

- Number of villages equipped with additional infrastructure and social services

- Extent of beneficiary participation and integration of sectoral programs.

In addition a focus of the first phase project was to provide evidence that the newinstitutional arrangements designed to achieve greater participation and integration of sectoral programs through the FDR had been piloted successfully. Triggers for the second phase were set, to be reviewed before the end of the first phase. Trigger Indicator Experience from Phase I that the Project’s institutional arrangements are successfully piloting greater beneficiary participation in the selection, design, execution and O&M of Project works in the selected communities.

Participatory Programming Teams (PPT) supported by technical assistance are established in each province, and are engaging the beneficiaries in a dialogue on their rural development priorities.

Experience from Phase 1 indicates that the Project’s institutional arrangements are successfully piloting greater integration of sectoral programs through flexible budgeting of activities financed by the FDR in the selected rural communities.

The Core Provincial Rural Development Committees (CPRDR), under the chairmanship of the Governor, is established in each province, and is calling on the FDR to finance investments not included in ongoing sectoral programs in an integrated way. Continuation of ongoing sectoral programs, as evidenced by continued funding of these programs at pre-Project levels.

Experience from Phase 1 indicates that there is demand from farmers for the support services offered by the Project.

Number of farmers seeking advice from extension workers

1.3 Revised PDO There was no revision of PDO or key indicators. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries The target population consisted of the roughly 58,000 inhabitants of rural communities in three poor mountainous provinces (Azilal, Khenifra, al Haouz) where standards of rural development were low and agricultural water supplies uncertain. The beneficiaries were poor families farming small irrigated plots, and other inhabitants of poor benefitting communities.

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1.5 Original Components The project consisted of four components: 1. IImprovement of SMI schemes serving an area of approximately 9,450 ha, including: (i) 21 SMI

perimeters in Azilal, serving 3,450 ha; (ii) approximately 3,000 ha each in the provinces of Khenifra and al Haouz.

2. Improvement of complementary community infrastructure not covered by ongoing sectoral programs, including (a) rural roads, (b) water supply systems, (c) electrification, (d) schools and (e) health centers.

3. Institutional support for (a) participatory, integrated investment programming through a training and technical assistance program, and (b) agricultural development activities to intensify production practices and thereby increase farmers’ incomes.

4. Preparation of Phase II through participatory programming of IBCD activities in six additional provinces to be selected. Feasibility studies will also be carried out.

1.6 Revised Components There was no revision of project components. Component 4, Preparation of Phase II, was not implemented as, up to the end of the project implementation period, Government had not decided on a follow-on operation (see 2.5 below).

1.7 Other significant changes Following the mid-term review (MTR), Government and Bank agreed in May 2006 to extend the Loan closing date by two and a half years, to December 2008, and to cancel the equivalent of $6.0 million from the Loan.according to revised execution and disbursement schedules.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry The project, the first phase of a three phase APL, was prepared in 1999 and appraised in March/April 2000. Board presentation was not until one year later, and a further fourteen months passed before effectiveness in July 20021. In the PAD, the case for a participatory, decentralized and flexible approach to rural development in Morocco is well argued, based on the lessons learned and incorporated in national strategy, and linked to global strategic best practice (see Section 1.1 above). There was thus a fit with strategy and an appropriate set of objectives. The organizational design, although elaborate, is clearly set out in the PAD and proved largely realistic. Although design greatly underestimated the time it would take to set up such a complex set of institutions, the structure, once set up, proved surprisingly workable. Cost estimates were based on actual experience in Bank-financed and other projects, and proved quite accurate. However, many aspects of the project were under-prepared. The participatory programming process and the procedures for integrated provincial level decision making and execution were only sketched

1 Delays between apparaisal and board were due to late decision from Government on the use of the FDR for financing the community infrastructure component. Delays between Board and effectiveness were due to delays on the Government side in issuing a circular requested by the Bank establishing national and provincial committees (CNC and CPRDR).

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out (with just eleven lines in a PAD annex devoted to them) and had not been tested. Design provided for the preparation of guidelines on integrated participatory programming. Given that the typically long participatory programming process would not in principle begin until the guidelines were available, and teams set up and trained, it is surprising that preparation of draft guidelines was not a priority, even before appraisal. No assessment was made of institutional capability for the participatory approach nor of the availability of the needed staff. A major role was assigned to the communes rurales, but this does not seem to have been based on evidence of capacity, and how this role for the communes would work in practice was not spelled out. Technical preparation was uneven. The irrigation engineering component was based on existing technical packages, but the key agricultural productivity package for the specific conditions of the mountainous project area had not been developed. One neglected aspect was the need to protect most of the project schemes against the impacts of erosion in the catchments. In addition, the institutional measures for agricultural development were not fully designed. The Ministry of Agriculture extension centers - Centres de Travaux (CTs) - were to “play a vital intermediary role”, but there was no appraisal of their capacity. In addition, the PAD proposes “contracts with development organizations (e.g. NGOs)” to provide extension support. There was no evaluation of the availability or capacity of such organizations, nor any development of model contracts or terms of reference. The time required to get the project started was greatly underestimated. The sketchy and unrealistic implementation schedule in the PAD was based on the time taken to design and implement SMI upgrading, of which there was good experience. It did not take account of the slower rhythm of implementing the participatory approach, particularly when there was little methodological or institutional base from which to start. Although the Log Frame was well structured and appropriate, the indicators selected were inadequate to capture project results, and no baseline data were collected. Several of the risks analyzed in the PAD were correctly identified, as they did arise during implementation. The risk that the FDR would not function as designed dogged the project for several years, although the mitigation measure mentioned in the analysis– that Government had already assigned resources from the Compensation Fund – did nothing to mitigate future risk. Similarly, the risk that there would not be staff with knowledge of the participatory approach was not really a risk – it was a fact – and the mitigation measure that “the project would assign staff” was poorly conceived, as the project had no means to do this, and the staff scarcely existed. Ironically, the most important problem encountered was not picked up as a risk at appraisal: lack of a full fledged project design and related institutional capacity. For this the appropriate mitigation measure might have been intensive technical assistance at the start of the project to prepare implementation manuals and to train staff. The project was thus not ready for implementation at the time of Board approval. The two years that intervened between appraisal and effectiveness might have been used to complete preparation and even to begin piloting the approaches, especially as the irrigation component in one province (Azilal) was ready to implement, and ministry staff in that province had relevant current experience of participatory programming under the Bank-supported Lakhdar Project. However, little seems to have happened during this long delay. Although QAG did not specifically review quality at entry, in its Seventh Quality of Supervision Assessment (December 2006), QAG (Q3) passes a bleak judgment: “a badly prepared project”. With hindsight, this judgment appears exaggerated, as in the event the project was implemented largely as designed and achieved its objectives without the need for restructuring. The problem was that the extent to which this was a pilot and innovative project was not fully recognized at the preparation and appraisal stage, and the areas of institutional design that needed to be further elaborated and tested immediately after appraisal were not identified. As a result, little was done to complete and test design until well after the project was supposed to have started.

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Commitment within Government could be concluded from the 2020 Strategy, and this is emphasized in the Letter of Development Program that Government sent to the Bank. . There were, however, tensions. The three provinces and the beneficiary communities were enthusiastic, but some line ministries, used to working on top-down national programs, were skeptical about the bottom up approach, fearing loss of control over the planning process. The 2020 Strategy was never in fact adopted by government as a whole and remained a Ministry of Agriculture document. The Ministry of Finance also had doubts about the fiscal orthodoxy and the delivery mechanism of the FDR. Borrower commitment at entry has, therefore, to be characterized as “mixed”.

2.2 Implementation After Loan effectiveness, implementation seemed to get off to a brisk start. Even before effectiveness, the irrigation component was already underway in Azilal Province on retroactive financing. Terms of reference for support to participatory programming and for the writing of the participatory programming guide had been prepared, the Bank was providing materials for the writing of an implementation manual and had sent materials on how to design the participatory M&E component. However, after this promising start the project soon became mired in delays, and by mid-2003 was being classified as a problem project. At this stage, the principal implementation problems included weak capacity, particularly in the provincial management units (PMUs), slow contracting, and slow decision making on key aspects such as the community infrastructure programs and the FDR, and on how to implement the agricultural development component. Only a year later, in mid-2004, were these start up problems beginning to be resolved: by that time, four years after appraisal and two years after effectiveness, the project institutions were all set up, the teams were in place, and field work was underway in all sites. The institutional mechanism for the participatory process (Annex 10) was operational. Under this, Participatory Programming Teams, supported by consultants, helped communities to develop plans and investment programs at irrigation scheme level and then at Commune level. The plans and programs were then validated at provincial level by the Core Provincial Rural Development Committee (CPRDR) chaired by the Governor, implemented, and monitored by the community. The mid-term review (MTR) took place in April 2005. The overall conclusion was that it was likely that objectives would be met, provided that the one key issue, replenishment of the FDR, could be solved. However, a long extension (two and a half years) would be required to complete project implementation. Following the MTR, the closing date was extended (Section 1.7), justified by the (correct) argument that the project could, with delays, still achieve objectives. Provincial teams were up to strength, lessons had been learned, the participatory and integrated programming process was now working, and the FDR issue was being satisfactorily resolved. A final, important argument was that it would be wrong to scale down the project as commitments had been made to the beneficiaries Following the MTR, the pace of implementation began to pick up. The “institutional dynamic” continued to develop and proved promising. At the Loan closing date, implementation was substantially complete, with remaining investments being financed during 2009 on the Government budget. Key factors influencing implementation Six major factors influenced implementation. Of these, five were negative: (1) the inadequate preparation of key innovative aspects of the project; (2) weak institutional capacity; (3) incomplete institutional design; (4) slow government procedures; and (5) the specific challenge of working in poor mountain areas. The positive factor was the very strong commitment of key stakeholders to make the project work. The inadequate preparation of key innovative aspects of the project

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Already at the time of “project launch” in February 2002, it was clear that certain aspects of the design needed further work in order to become operational. These included: (a) the need for a detailed and practical implementation manual; (b) the operational design of the participatory approach; and (c) mechanisms to implement the agricultural development component. A draft implementation manual was prepared in March 2002, before effectiveness, but it was judged insufficiently detailed by the Bank. Due to administrative and procurement problems, the final version was not issued until more than four years later, in June 2006. The operational design of the participatory approach was to include technical assistance and training, and the preparation of a Participatory Programming Guide. The technical assistance to support the participatory programming teams, and provide training in participatory approaches for all stakeholders was finally in place only in mid-2003. Even when delivery started, phasing was a problem as participatory programming had already started before the technical assistance was in place or training had been conducted. The Participatory Programming Guide was only finalized in 2004, after the participatory process and the investment programs were substantially complete. Fortunately, the mechanisms for setting up and training water user associations (WUAs) were already designed, thanks to the existence of a specialized team and training modules that had been put in place with the support of a KfW project. These models were adapted for the project, and WUA support units were set up in each province. The participatory approach for the drinking water component should have been straightforward and easy to implement, following the well-proven demand-responsive approach under the national PAGER program. One additional PAGER team was to be assigned in each province. However, there was no mechanism to ensure this, and in the event the PAGER delivery model lost impetus once the Bank-financed project supporting it came to an end. Institutional responsibility for the potable water component became fragmented, with ONEP taking responsibility for one province, and the provincial authorities assuming responsibility in the other two. As a result, the participatory model was implemented haphazardly. The user associations were formed and some of the required financial contribution was mobilized. However, training and supervision were not conducted to PAGER standards, some social problems within the user associations were not followed up, and financial management was not always according to the rules. In addition, design provided only for standpipes , whereas when offered freedom to choose, the communities all opted for house connections. In some cases, the consequent need for waste water drainage was neglected. The agricultural development component was to be implemented through three activities: (i) preparation of a technical handbook; (ii) applied research adapted to conditions of poor mountain agriculture; and (iii) extension of adapted technology packages. Only in 2003 was it decided that the first two activities should be carried out by the Government’s agricultural research institute, INRA, and the third through the Government extension centers, the Centres de travaux (CTs). Even then the implementation modalities, procurement and budgeting took some time. Contracting with INRA took a long time to become effective, and the CTs did not receive the needed extra staff, equipment and operating budgets until late in 2006. The technical handbook was only produced in July 2006. Weak institutional capacity The lack of institutional capacity, particularly the lack of experienced staff and the delays in posting staff to the project, was apparent from the start of the project. Project management and staff were assigned to the project later than expected, particularly in the key PMUs. Only three years after effectiveness was the project fully staffed. The teams were of good quality but initially lacked understanding and experience of participatory approaches. The tools needed to implement so complex and innovative a project, such as the Participatory Programming Guide, were very late in being provided. The projected training of project staff was never carried out. Later in the project, after the MTR, Government’s downsizing and early retirement policy began to reduce the availability of key technical staff, especially in al Haouz province.

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The project took an excessive length of time to mobilize consultants effectively. In the end, a blanket technical assistance contract was concluded with FAO only in March 2006. This allowed the project to at last finalize the implementation manual, an M&E handbook and the environmental management plan, but it proved too late to implement the staff training plan. Incomplete institutional design The project introduced four innovations to Morocco: (1) field-level bottom up participatory programming; (2) inter-ministerial joint programming at provincial level; (3) deconcentrated budgeting delegated to the provincial governor; and (4) the operation of the FDR. The resulting institutional design was exceptionally complex and much of it was new. Not surprisingly, there were teething problems in getting the multiple implementation and coordination mechanisms to work. This affected the efficiency of implementation and contributed to implementation delays. Particular areas of difficulty were the FDR, and the respective authority and roles of the various mechanisms of coordination and approval. The FDR was designed to be the mechanism for funding the integrated rural development programs at the provincial level. However, two aspects of its operation had not been clearly worked out. First: How, after the initial funds had been transferred, was it to be replenished on a regular basis? After years of uncertainty, it was only following the MTR that the issue was solved: in March 2006, Government finally transferred 97 million dirhams from the balance of the drought program. Second: Who was actually to have the use of the money? Only in 2004 was it decided that this should be the provincial governors, which was logical and effective, as scheme and communal level plans were integrated at provincial level and implemented by the provincial departments. Integration of various line ministry investments within a single program at provincial, commune and scheme level required mechanisms of coordination and approval. At central level, an inter-ministerial committee, the CIPDR had been set up to steer implementation of the 2020 Strategy. At provincial level, an inter-ministerial committee under the governor, the CPRDR, was to approve programs, assign the budget and oversee implementation. These new structures took some time to find their role. As late as June 2003, decisions of the CPRDR were being questioned by the CIPDR. As a result, the socio-economic infrastructure component was very delayed, through a combination of slow validation of the program and delays with the FDR. For example, the Azilal investment program was approved by the CPRDR in June 2002 and validated by a committee of the central CIPDR in March 2003 Slow government procedures Implementing participatory development through a governmental structure was inevitably a challenge and the project was predictably affected by contingent and structural implementation constraints, including: (1) slow procurement procedures; (2) delayed approval of work programs; (3) heavy studies, particularly with studies for the roads component which were too detailed considering that most were upgrading of existing tracks; (4) long review procedures within ministries, again particularly for roads; and (5) delays in the opening of budgets at the spending level. In addition, travel allowances for government staff were typically inadequate, and facilities generally were sometimes inadequate. These factors were not specific to the project, as they resulted from overall government policy and procedures, but they had a heightened effect on implementation efficiency, as the project required efficient field operations and the processing of very many, mostly small contracts.

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The specific challenge of working in poor mountain areas Government had little prior experience in implementing an integrated rural development project in poor and remote mountain areas, and a number of unforeseen challenges arose. First, it proved hard to find quality contractors, and firms retained sometimes proved unable to deliver: the SMI component was delayed due to the need to cancel and re-award some contracts. Some works had to be redone. Second, climatic conditions made for a very short construction season, sometimes no more than half a year. Third, physical conditions required roads of a higher standard than expected, with resulting effect on costs. Stakeholder commitment Despite these constraints, all hurdles were eventually overcome. In large measure, this was due to the commitment of government, project organizations and the Bank to implementing the project successfully. Evidence of this is the high level of effort devoted to diagnosing problems, to finding options, and to agreeing and implementing solutions. Evidence is also provided by the willingness of agencies to adopt flexible and pragmatic changes, including:

Introduction of revenue earning activities and the promotion of related women’s groups Inclusion of environmental protection measures against erosion not foreseen at appraisal Development of a partnership approach with other agencies working on participatory rural

development, notably NGOs, the Social Fund and INDH The development of a broader concept of the investment programs prepared as general

development plans, that could become an instrument of negotiation with other financiers and partners.

The promotion of an extended role for WUAs, encouraging them to branch out into input supply, marketing, and purchase of equipment.

QAG In 2006, a QAG supervision review was carried out. This broad-ranging and well staffed review picked up all the points that were affecting implementation and was useful in highlighting corrective measures, including for environment and M&E. The review rated overall project implementation progress up to mid-2006 as “moderately unsatisfactory”2

2 See Section 5.1 (b) below for an assessment of the quality of supervision subsequent to the QAG review, and of the overall contribution of supervision to outcomes.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization The project design required two types of M&E. The first was regular tracking of implementation to report on inputs, contract progress and outputs. The project appointed M&E officers in the central management unit (CMU) and in the three provincial management units (PMUs), and this implementation reporting was satisfactorily carried out. In addition, participatory monitoring of outcomes, beginning with a baseline survey, was to be conducted. From the beginning, this activity posed extraordinary conceptual and practical problems. The M&E specialist appointed to the CMU was fully occupied with implementation reporting, and several attempts to develop and pilot participatory monitoring, with consultants support, proved fruitless. Finally in March 2008, the CMU produced a detailed M&E plan including an updated results framework with additional and more relevant indicators. The baseline study was never conducted, and project implementation drew to a close with little information on key outcome indicators. Overall, stakeholders showed a weak understanding of the value of participatory, results-based M&E. However, Government did use the revised result framework and indicators in its own evaluation of the project (see Section 7 below)3carried out with FAO support. The system designed will provide a sound starting point for a follow-on operation.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance The project triggered the environmental and pesticide safeguards. The project was classified Category B for environment, and the PAD reports that the required EA and EMP had been prepared and appraised for one province, Azilal. There was provision for EMPs to be prepared for the other two provinces. The CMU was to have an environmental specialist, and in each province, the Agriculture Department would be responsible for monitoring environmental impacts. Training would be provided. In the event, none of this happened until very late in the project. The EMPs were finally produced in July 2007, noting a short list of negative environmental impacts and recommending mitigating measures. Of these impacts, two of the most important were erosion of catchments above the SMI schemes, and the pollution of irrigation water at one site (Lahrouna) by wastewater. On both of these impacts, action was taken: the project had already in fact begun to invest in erosion control and had formed a partnership with the Forestry Department to improve watershed management. Also, the Water Supply Authority (ONEP) launched a study on waste water treatment to be conducted for the town concerned (Demnate). However, one important action was not taken: to ensure that septic tanks were constructed to take wastewater from the potable water systems where house connections were being provided. Overall, the delays in conducting the EMPs were excessive and were partly to blame for the late identification of the negative environmental impacts. The project did, nonetheless, respond in the two most important cases. Concerns over the effect of increased use of pesticides were met by the incorporation of integrated pest management approaches into extension advice. Regarding fiduciary aspects, procurement, although slow, was satisfactorily carried out, as confirmed by regular post-reviews conducted by the Bank. Financial management was adequate, Financial management reports and audit reports were accurate and sent to the Bank in time, Bank follow-up was regular and thorough..The only fiduciary issue encounterd concerns the delays recorded for the replenishment of the designated account.

3 The revised results framework and indicators are reproduced in Annex 5.

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2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Arrangements for transition SMI investments have been handed over to WUAs, which will be responsible for O&M. Government, through the PDAs, intends to provide follow up training and supervision. Experience with other schemes in Morocco suggests that users are committed to sustainability as their livelihoods depend on it and they will indeed ensure O&M, although not necessarily according to a blueprint. O&M of these simple gravity schemes is in any case straightforward and low cost, and the risk is small except in the case of major flood damage, when Government would normally have to intervene. Access roads have been handed over to the communes rurales, which are responsible for maintenance. Arrangements and capacity vary by commune. In most cases arrangements are in place to use pooled equipment for maintenance, and the communes are likely to have the resources to finance maintenance operations. In some cases, the Ministry of Works is intending to adopt and surface the roads. There is, however, a risk that the communes will neglect or defer maintenance. Continuing M&E and follow-up is indicated. Drinking water facilities are handed over to the associations, which under PAGER had a good record of sustainable O&M. However, there have been significant departures from the PAGER model under the project – household connections instead of standpipes, less rigorous capital cost sharing, incomplete training and supervision of the associations. There is therefore a risk that some schemes will not prove sustainable. Again, continuing M&E and follow-up is indicated. Schools and clinics have been taken over, staffed and equipped by the line ministries. The facilities are reported to be all operational. Electricity investments have been handed over to the ONE and are functioning on normal commercial terms. Institutional capacity The participatory approach pioneered by the project is captured in the Participatory Programming Guide, which is already being used by other programs. The institutional capital created by the project in participatory and integrated rural development programming is in the provincial level structures set up for the project, the three CPRDRs, the inter-ministerial participatory programming teams (PPTs) and the PMUs. Unless there is a follow-on operation, this institutional capacity is vulnerable to rapid dissipation, although other rural development operations with a participatory approach such as the INDH will profit from the experience acquired. After many hesitations, the FDR worked as designed under the project, successfully enough that Government, at parliamentary insistence, has greatly increased the resources allocated in 2008 and 2009. However, its funding mechanism (see below) make the future of the FDR as the financier of integrated rural development uncertain. Continuing M&E Most project investments were completed only at the end of the implementation period, so that results of productive investments are below what can be expected at full production, and evidence for the institutional sustainability of the community infrastructure is still emerging. Therefore, it is important that M&E of key performance indicators continue, and this should be a priority under any follow on project. Follow on project As discussed in Section 1 above, the project was intended as the first phase of a long term development program, and APL support was to be provided in three phases over a thirteen year period. Triggers for the second phase were set, to be reviewed before the end of the first phase (see 1.2 above).

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Measured against the triggers and indicators, conditions for a second phase were, by the end of the project and after much effort, largely fulfilled: The bottom-up, participatory programming model that was progressively developed has worked

successfully Integrated investment programming at provincial level has proved in the end functional and

efficient After many uncertainties, the FDR has proven an effective mechanism, although its funding is not

from a dedicated source, being dependent on annual transfers from the general budget. Agricultural development has proven a profitable and popular complement to irrigation

improvement Despite continuous dialogue during first phase implementation, no decision has yet been taken on a second phase to Government’s program, nor on a follow-on project to support it. One major reason for this is that in the last two years of the project, government began a rethink of both its rural development and agriculture strategies. Two changes to rural development strategy have been introduced. First, a new program for financing grass-roots community development has been set up, the INDH. Second, responsibility for rural development has recently been assigned away from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Territorial Development Secretariat (Secretariat d’état chargé de l’aménagement territorial, SEAT), and the use of the FDR is currently split between the Ministry of Agriculture and SEAT. Government has also produced a new agricultural development strategy, the Plan Maroc Vert, which is based on two pillars. Pillar one gives priority to commercialization of agriculture through partnerships between agroprocessors and farmers. Pillar two of the new strategy aims at improving agriculture in marginal areas. This second pillarshould be complementary to the IBCD approach and add value to it, by helping small farmers to group into associations at an economic scale and helping downstream markets to develop for the rising cash crop production from irrigated mountain farms. Recently, Government has requested Bank support for this new agricultural development strategy. Although Government has not yet made a decision, it seems that this might include a request for Bank financing for a second phase IBCD project within the “pillar two” of the new strategy as set out above. This would likely comprise just the three components directly relevant to SMI (i.e. irrigation improvement, agricultural development, and access roads), delivered through a somewhat simplified participatory process and institutional structure and linked to downstream processing and marketing. Partnership agreements with FDR, INDH, the Social Fund and other public and NGO programs would likely be employed to deliver the complementary community infrastructure within an integrated framework. This set up is well justified by experience under the first phase, and implementation would be considerably more efficient.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The goal, program purpose and PDO described in Section 1 above remain relevant to both country and global priorities, and to the Bank’s assistance strategy. Reducing rural poverty and improving incomes and quality of life in poor rural areas are still key objectives of policy in Morocco and for Bank support, and rightly so. The model of an integrated package of income-generating investments combined with socio-economic infrastructure and the development of community associations has certainly been appreciated by the benefitting communities. “We never dreamed that all of this would come to us at once. It has changed our lives forever,” said a leader in Ait Wiksane in al Haouz province. The testing of bottom up participatory programming methodology has been conclusive, and the methodology has already been transferred and scaled up in other programs in the country, including

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the INDH, to the design of which IBCD staff contributed. The integration of investment programs at provincial level under the coordination of the governors has been effective. The use of the FDR to finance socio-economic investments, after an over-long and difficult mobilization period (see Section 2 above), has demonstrated the workability and value of the FDR model, and that model is available for scaling up if Government so decides.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives The goal, program purpose and PDO all set poverty reduction through income growth and enhanced quality of life as targets. However, the key performance indicators in the PAD are neither specific nor comprehensive, and lack of a baseline survey and a working M&E system (see 2.3 above) means that end-of-project assessment can only be based on the limited parameters tracked during supervision and on the FAO evaluation study carried out at completion. Project results measured against the PAD indicators are listed in Annex 2 and summarized and discussed below. Increase in incomes was measured at completion by a sample survey. 4 Typically, incomes from SMI were estimated to have gone up from Dhs 24,000 annually to Dhs 61,000, an increase of 160% (the PAD had targeted an increase of only 20%, and that over the entire program to 2013). The increase in incomes results from a high increase in production of three categories of higher value products (see table). These increases are exclusively

Production increases under the project

Crop Measured increase

Tree fruits and nuts + 36% Vegetables + 236% Fodder crops + 186% Cereals - 12%

attributable to the project and result from project-financed improvements in water availability (Component 1), farm to market access roads (Component 2a), and agricultural production technology development and transfer (Component 3b). Reported increases in income from livestock production stemming from increased availability of fodder and marketing of products, especially milk, are also attributable to the same three components. In addition, the introduction under the project of revenue generating activities targeted at vulnerable groups, notably women, had the effect of increasing incomes for the poorest. These impacts have not been quantified. Improvement in the quality of life. In the PAD and the ISRs, the number of douars (villages) equipped with socio-economic infrastructure and services is taken as a proxy for improved quality of life. The result measured is 257 douars (target 239 douars) with access to operational health clinics, primary schools, safe water source, and electricity. All douars are also served by rural roads. Certain intermediate outcomes indicators (Annexe 2) confirm the impact, with the burdensome chore of water fetching eliminated, a 60% increase in traffic on project roads, and an average 50% reduction in journey times. In many communities, a three day return journey to the local market centre has now become a one day affair. The outputs of Component 2 – improved access to basic rural infrastructure and social services – have produced this satisfactory outcome. In addition, Component 3(a) – institutional mechanisms to ensure beneficiary participation and integration of sectoral programs at the provincial level – ensured that the investment program corresponded to need, was owned by the community, and was integrated at commune and provincial level. The outcome is thus attributable to project investments.

4 Production increases were measured on a sample of 135 farms on 9 schemes. There was no sampling of a control but the input/output relationship was evident throughout the field visits of the completion mission: increased production has resulted from agricultural improvements + improved water availability and control + improved incentives due to market access. There were no extraordinary factors that could have produced these changes. However, M&E throughout the project would clearly have helped here.

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New institutional arrangements for greater community participation and for integration of sectoral programs at local and provincial level. In the PAD, this outcome was to be measured by the number of meetings of the CPRDRs and by the level of cost sharing. However, the project was unable to monitor cost sharing consistently, and the not very instructive indicator “Number of WUAs

Institutional arrangements Indicator Actual Meetings of the CPRDRs

3 times a year (6-12 times in Khenifra)

Number of WUAs sharing costs

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sharing costs” was used as a proxy. Against these rather limiting indicators, performance was satisfactory, as shown in the table. More generally, the project was certainly successful in developing and testing models both for community-based participatory programming and for integrated investment programming and implementation at the decentralized provincial level. Sixty nine contracts for participatory development plans were signed with WUAs, and 25 contracts were signed for commune-level development plans. Although the arrangements for working with communities to develop investment programs were not clearly defined at the outset and varied between the three provinces, the resulting programs were well owned by the communities and towards the end of the project a consolidated methodology had been worked out and recorded in the Guide. Similarly, after some trial and error, the PPTs worked well, and under the supportive chairmanship of governors, the CPRDRs, attended by project staff, sector agencies and community representatives, became a first class forum for agreeing and following up on the integrated investment program. Although there is no indicator in the PAD or ISRs, the performance of the FDR is mentioned in relation to the objective of piloting new institutional arrangements. Once the FDR became operational, it financed the entire socio-economic investment program. As mentioned above (2.5), this successful experience has encouraged Parliament to require increased resources for the FDR. Whether cost sharing arrangements, also mentioned in the PAD in relation to the institutional objective, were successful is more debatable, as is the appropriateness of cost sharing as an indicator. The principle evoked in the PAD is that capital cost sharing demonstrates ownership, and varying rates of capital cost participation were expected.

Cost contributions under the project Commune Beneficiaries SMI 0 10 Water schemes 5 15 Roads 33 0 Electricity 20 25

For irrigation works, it was envisaged that the irrigators would contribute (in cash and/or kind) the equivalent of 10% of the rehabilitation costs of the irrigation structures. Contributions should in principle have been paid to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), but no mechanism existed to do this. In some cases, a contribution in kind was agreed: in Azilal for example, four associations contributed in kind the equivalent of 2,286 working days. However, contributions in kind proved not always feasible where work was being carried out by contractors. Where financial contributions were agreed, performance was also uneven, and by the end of the project, it had been agreed to align on a formula worked out in two other SMI projects (PMH Nord and PMH Dades), under which the 10% capital cost contribution is paid in installments, with 2.5% up front and the balance over six years, deposited in a blocked account as a reserve fund for major works. It is clear that the issue of capital cost recovery for SMI was not coherently handled during the project. In fact, if capital cost recovery is required only as a demonstration of ownership, this is amply demonstrated by the ownership generated through the participatory process. Clarity on both objective and mechanisms is required for any follow-on project. The contribution of the communes rurales to IBCD investments also proved problematic as a number of communes lacked the necessary resources. In addition, cofinancing of a number of small contracts was inefficient. In some cases, communes financed separate contracts (for example, the connecting pipeline for a drinking water scheme). In one province (Khénifra), it was decided to lump the communes’ contributions to all project investments together and to pay the equivalent amount towards the construction of the roads only. Seven communes disbursed a total of MAD 1.9 million this way, which represents 73% of their calculated contribution. In Azilal, six communes did not contribute to

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the capital costs, but set aside an equivalent sum of MAD 2.0 million for road maintenance5. On the whole, it is estimated that the communes paid only 34% of the aggregated total contribution expected from them at appraisal. 3.3 Efficiency At project appraisal, an internal Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was calculated only for the irrigation and agricultural development investments in one province (Azilal) because feasibility studies were available only for that one province at that time. For comparability, therefore, the ERR for the same investments in that province has been recalculated. The costs included in the calculations consist of those benefiting irrigated agriculture: rehabilitation/modernization of irrigation structures, rural roads, research and extension services, and institutional and logistical support provided for setting up WUAs. The benefits calculated consist of the value of the incremental crop production only. The financial costs and benefits have been converted into economic values using conventional rules.

The results are based on field surveys carried out by an FAO team, which found that following the rehabilitation works, with the increased and more stable supply of irrigation water to plots, there has been a small increase in cropping intensity, a noticeable evolution from relatively low value crops (mainly cereals) towards higher value crops (horticulture and tree crops), and significant yield improvements, particularly for maize for fodder (up more than 100%)), and horticulture (e.g. peas up 40%). Moreover, the construction of rural roads has facilitated access to markets, resulting in greater marketed volumes and higher prices. Average net revenue per hectare cultivated almost doubled 2004-8 as a result of project investment. The incremental (average) net revenue increase in Azilal province is close to 90% 2004-8 for all irrigators.

The ERR is calculated at 21% over 30 years, above the 13.5 % estimated at appraisal (see Annex 3). In addition, the substantial benefits from incremental livestock production and new income generating activities such as bee keeping promoted under the project have not been included, as reliable information was not available.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory As discussed above (3.1), the project’s objectives remain relevant to both country and Bank priorities. The project’s outputs are in line with targets and cost estimates, and have directly contributed to project outcomes, which are almost entirely attributable to the project. Efficiency as measured by the ERR is above expectations, and is satisfactory for an irrigation improvement project. It is likely also that the project-related income streams for livestock and off-farm activities will continue to grow. No measure of the efficiency of the delivery model has been possible. Clearly there was a long and inefficient development period, lasting at least until the MTR, to set up the institutional structure and work out methodologies and working practices. Frank assessment of the delivery model once it became fully operational was that it certainly worked and contributed to the successful project outcomes, but that efficiencies were possible, particularly in the participatory planning process, in the integrated programming at provincial level, and in the process of technical preparation and tendering of investments. Clearly these possible efficiencies should be explored for any follow-on operation. The rating of satisfactory is based on the assessment that, despite the problems with incomplete preparation and the lengthy implementation period, the project was relevant and achieved its objectives, with a satisfactory rate of return. The development of the new institutional arrangements for greater community participation and for integration of sectoral programs was slow, and the resulting “delivery model”, although functional, was somewhat unwieldy and could perhaps have been

5 For the water supply networks, five communes paid for the installation of individual connections as well as some other works (MAD 1.95 millions). But these were not planned under the project and had therefore to be financed in full outside of the project.

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more cost-effective. This shortcoming in efficiency, however, is minor in the light of overall project results. It should be noted that the lack of a baseline survey, the lack of substantive M&E data during the project, and the absence of a control on a “without the project” situation weaken the information base for the rating. However, the FAO sample survey was professionally carried out and succeeded in largely reconstituting the baseline situation, and the measure of confidence that can be accorded to the results is judged to be adequate to underpin the rating.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Overall, the project has a positive impact on the incomes and quality of life of the poor target population. Beyond the direct benefits recorded above (Section 3.2), the project brought three contributions to the development of social capital. First, the project improved participation and access of beneficiaries to decision-making processes and investment opportunities, thus not only enhancing ownership for project investments and their sustainability but creating an awareness and demand for further development. Second, the project increased organizational capacity for the user groups involved, contributing to the formation of social capital. Third, the project created both physical and imaginative access to markets and to the world. Previously cut-off communities began to see themselves as part of a larger economy and society, and to act accordingly. For women and girls, the impacts were mixed, largely positive. Access to clean water in or near the house reduced the daily drudgery of water fetching, and this together with the provision of nearby schools with latrines permitted greater girls’ school enrollment. In the participatory programming, women – and sometimes younger people - were consulted, but the list of investments on offer was fixed, and it is not clear whether women’s specific requests could always be taken into account. The decision to include income-generating activities in the project was, however, a flexible response to women’s expressed demand. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The project was successful in showing how the participatory process for rural development could be institutionalized. Overall the process added value, creating bottom up identification of needs and developing in the associations the embryo of formal development counterparts for the administration. The associations found it useful and empowering to be involved in the identification, planning and design of their own development. The process also created institutional capacity on the government side, in the CTs and the DPA in field level relations with user associations, and in the EPP and the CRPDR in bottom up integrated programming and integrated decision making at provincial level. All stakeholders benefited from the forum of the CPRDR, which brought community representatives in regular contact with public services at the provincial level under the chairmanship of the Governor. Despite these successes, the project encountered risks common to all participatory planning projects: a limited menu of investments on offer, consultations made difficult by an incomplete understanding of local power dynamics, the risk of elite capture etc. In addition, the WUAs suffered from the typical risks of power play and differential benefits along the canal and between upstream and downstream, although there is no evidence that this compromised benefits or produced seriously inequitable outcomes. These aspects of risk deserve more thorough study in the preparation of any follow-on operation. Two other positive institutional impacts also deserve mention. First, progress was made in creating an agricultural growth momentum for poor mountain economies previously locked in a subsistence trap. The involvement of INRA for the first time in the development of mountain agriculture packages and applied research programs, the productive partnership between INRA and the CTs, and the positive

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response of farmers to new opportunities and incentives are a step forward. For the future it will be important to decide how to finance and sustain INRA involvement, and to clarify the future of the CTs in the Ministry of Agriculture’s new strategy (Section 2.5).

Second, the IBCD project has already contributed to the development of participatory rural development outside the project. The project helped with preparation of the INDH concept. The Departments of Agriculture (DPAs) in the three project provinces are working with INDH. Some of the IBCD WUAs are already benefitting from INDH projects, and some IBCD project actions are to be completed on INDH financing.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey/Stakeholder Workshops: Not applicable

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate The sustainability of income gains under the project is likely, as early income increases are very attractive and farmers are committed to maintaining and improving their gains. Endogenous risks are institutional: the income increases require sustained O&M efforts from functional WUAs, market access preserved by road maintenance, and continued technology transfer and training. These risks are moderate, but should be tracked under a follow-on operation. In particular, further strengthening of WUAs through training, and a more active role for the Government member (the “septieme membre”), are indicated. Exogenous risks are mainly climatic: drought and floods both occurred during the implementation period, for which the mitigation measure is inherent in the project’s introduction of concrete structures capable of improving water availability and control and withstanding floods. Some measure of risk nonetheless persists that will have to be dealt with through Government disaster mitigation programs. In addition, the environmental risk of siltation from erosion in the catchments exists. The watershed management measures agreed between the project and the Forestry Department are the appropriate mitigation strategy. The sustainability of gains in quality of life depends on the continued O&M of project-financed socio-economic infrastructure (Section 2.5). In the case of schools, clinics and electricity, sustainability is highly likely. Risks attach to the O&M of roads and drinking water facilities, and as discussed, continuing M&E and follow up are indicated, particularly for the drinking water facilities where further strengthening of the associations and their financial management is indicated. Sustainability of the institutional approach is uncertain. The organizational structures and methodologies have been well developed and proven (Section 3.2) but there is a risk that the institutional capital created under the project will dissipate if there is no follow on operation. More generally, the approach is at risk from changes in Government policy. If responsibility for rural development and for programming the FDR is to be shifted to another agency, it seems unlikely that the Ministry of Agriculture will be able – or motivated – to continue cross-sectoral participatory planning or integrated inter-ministerial programming at the provincial level on the IBCD model. However, Government’s intentions are not yet clear. What is required is a concerted process to review the policy changes in the light of experience, including that of IBCD, and to forge a new approach, shared between Government and donors, that is built on the empirical base of the IBCD project. The preparation of a follow-on project would be a good opportunity to conduct this concerted review. Overall, the risk to development outcomes is moderate, with the most significant risks stemming from the immaturity of some of the user associations (both irrigation and drinking water), and from the current flux in Government’s rural development strategy.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory As discussed above (Sections 1 and 2.1), IBCD was the “right project at the right time”, and relevant to Government and Bank objectives. Based on previous involvement, lessons learned and fit with the Bank’s global strategy, the case for a participatory, decentralized and flexible approach to rural development and for the Bank to finance the project was persuasively made at appraisal. Project design was well structured and appropriate to demonstrate the financial and economic case for SMI development in poor mountain areas and to develop the institutional delivery model for government’s new 2020 Strategy. The PAD is a clear guide to the project as it was finally implemented, and the Bank helped develop the outline organizational design. However, appraisal of key aspects was sketchy, particularly of the participatory programming process, the procedures for integrated provincial level decision making and execution, and the institutional capability to implement the project. The implementation schedule was unrealistic, and the key performance indicators were inadequate to capture project results. The risk assessment failed to note the key problem: that this was essentially a large scale pilot project that should have started with intensive technical assistance and capacity building to operationalize the delivery model. These failures at appraisal were the direct cause of the subsequent slow implementation of the project right up to the time of the MTR. Two specific aspects of appraisal were particularly weak. The environmental appraisal is wordy but lacks specificity, resembling a desk review. For example, it mentions that an EA was prepared by the Borrower, but neglects to state what the EA said. The social appraisal is extraordinarily skimpy for a pioneering participatory project. Despite the relevance of the project and its sound structure, Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated unsatisfactory due to the shortcomings in appraisal. The Bank had the option of either postponing the project and working with Government to complete preparation, or of building in substantial extra technical assistance at the start of the project to develop all the necessary institutional structures and procedures. However, neither of these options was explored. Instead, the PAD declared the project ready for implementation, which was plainly not the case. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory From the outset it was recognized that the project would require intensive supervision – and this was requested by Government at negotiations. Early Bank missions, including the Launch Mission, were staffed to help operationalize the design, and they had an effective input into this. The October 2002 mission, the first after effectiveness, made a major input to arrangements for setting up the participatory process, including WUA training and participatory M&E, as well as implementation of the agricultural component, The intensive rhythm and depth of supervision continued throughout the implementation period. Missions were “hands on”, spending considerable time in site visits and meeting with stakeholders at all levels. Regular meetings with governors, CPRDRs, WUAs etc did much to explain the project to stakeholders, to define implementation procedures and to foster ownership. In general, a pragmatic problem identification and solving approach was adopted: implementation problems were identified and assessed in a timely manner, and much effort was put into providing appropriate advice and proposing solutions – to good effect. Various missions provided training on procurement and financial management procedures and on M&E and environmental aspects.

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There was good staff continuity, and supervision benefitted from the presence of the team leader in the Morocco Office. The skill mix was quite broad, and the team did well to invite the occasional participation of other Bank team leaders for the Education and Administrative Reform Projects. There was good interaction with the team leaders of the Rainfed and Roads Projects, although there was little contact with the teams responsible for other donor projects (IFAD, KfW) in the SMI sector, which could have been a fertile linkage. One shortcoming was that missions could from time to time have benefitted from specialist expertise in environment, M&E, and institutional development. Aide memoires were thorough and clear, and management letters were concise and focused on the main issues. ISR reporting was clear and to the point, although the recording of progress against indicators was erratic and not very revealing, reflecting the unsatisfactory nature of the indicators (see 2.1 above). Supervision of safeguards was inadequate, with little attention paid to the failure of the project to complete EMPs, which was a breach of a dated covenant. Not until after the QAG review picked up the shortcoming was any real attention paid to environment during supervision. Supervision of procurement was regular, with frequent post-reviews and comprehensive discussion in the aide memoires. Financial management supervision was appropriate in frequency and quality. Issues were identified and dealt with in a timely way, and supervision reporting was comprehensive. Review of audits was prompt and clear reactions were given to the client in writing. A QAG review of supervision was carried out in 2006. The review rated supervision overall “3” or “moderately satisfactory”, concluding that “the team has done a good job of putting this difficult project on track.” The main criticism concerned the shortcomings on

QAG assessment of supervision Overall 3 Development effectiveness 2 Fiduciary/safeguard 3 Supervision inputs 3 Candor 3

environmental aspects (see above) and the need to bring in expertise on M&E and institutional development. Subsequent supervision paid considerable attention to all three aspects and responded well to QAG’s critique. One failing during the implementation period should perhaps be laid more at the door of Bank management than of the supervision team. This was the failure to sustain sector dialogue and to ensure that the linkages between the IBCD project (and its sister Rainfed Project) and the evolving reflexion on rural development strategy within Morocco were constantly drawn. There seems to have been little continuity in supporting government in its rural development strategy. Links to other rural development operations and donors in Morocco were weakly drawn both in the PAD and in practice.6 Even linkages with – and lessons from - the small Bank-financed pilot project in Oued Lakhdar, in the IBCD province of Azilal, were weak. It appears that, whilst the Bank was helping the implementation teams to struggle with the project, Government was rapidly rethinking its rural development strategy and going on a somewhat different track

On the same lines, the PAD made much of the importance of the project for the Bank’s own global strategy (see Section 1), but there seems to have been little or no follow up on Morocco as a “Focus Country”. Despite promises in the PAD, the Bank’s input to the IBCD project provided little or no “facilitation of access to global experience on rural development”, and in general links to global expertise and experience were not evident.

This distancing of the Bank from evolving strategy is the more surprising as the project was a first phase of an APL, so should have been constantly reviewed in the context of longer term strategy. In fact, an APL is supposed to provide greater flexibility in dealing with client needs and local conditions

6 IFAD-financed rural development operations in al Haouz, an IBCD province, are mentioned in the PAD but there is no indication of linkages, lessons etc

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as they evolve, and the Bank could have engaged with Government on this basis during the life of the project. In 2009, after completion of the project, Government did request Bank cooperation in reviewing the new agricultural strategy (see 2.5 above) and this may lead to a follow-on operation to the IBCD project. However, Bank engagement on the new rural development strategy remains limited. Bank performance on supervision is rated satisfactory. There were shortcomings on the supervision of the environmental component and more could have been done to link the project to evolving sector strategy, but these shortcomings were outweighed by positive aspects, notably: the participatory approach adopted with the very broad range of stakeholders, including beneficiary representatives; the field-oriented empirical problem-solving approach; the focus on development impact; the quality and frankness of project reporting; and the attention to sustainability and to the possibility of a follow on operation. The ICR thus rates supervision quality through to completion somewhat higher than the judgment of QAG in 2006, as during the three years that elapsed between the two evaluations, the supervision team acted on the QAG recommendations and supervision had helped to guide the project to successful achievement of its outcomes, a result not secure at the time of the QAG review. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

In accordance with Bank guidelines, overall Bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory, as although performance on quality at entry was unsatisfactory, the quality of supervision was satisfactory, and the outcome, to which the Bank contributed enormously, was also in the satisfactory range.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The mixed Government commitment to the project at entry (Section 2.1) persisted throughout the implementation period. The Ministry of Finance was committed to the project objectives but was concerned about the slow pace of implementation, and the corresponding costs from commitment fees and the opportunity cost of FDR funds tied up unused. The delegation of budgets for the FDR and to the CTs was initially slow, but once the project was fully operational after the MTR, this speeded up. Compliance with fiduciary requirements was satisfactory. The line ministries involved in programming and implementing investments under the FDR in general showed willingness, particularly at provincial level where they participated actively in the PPTs and the CPRDRs. Only for the roads component was the needed flexibility sometimes lacking. Governors, as chairman of the CPRDR and budget holder (sous-ordonnateur) of the FDR, showed commitment and enthusiasm, and dynamized the participatory and integrated programming process at provincial level. The Ministry of Agriculture committed the necessary human and financial resources to the project (albeit late), and at least initially showed leadership. However, little was done to link the project to the strategic framework of the 2020 Strategy or to monitor its progress in parallel with other integrated rural development projects, including the Bank-financed Rainfed Areas Project. Towards the end of the implementation period, the ministry became preoccupied with the development of its new agricultural strategy, and seems to have participated little in the reflection that led to the changes in rural development strategy that in a sense undermined the rationale of the IBCD project (see Section

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2.5 above). This shortcoming is, however, to be balanced against the likelihood that Government will in fact build on the successful outcome of the project in a second phase operation (see 2.5 above). Overall, Government performance is rated moderately satisfactory, as although there was commitment to implementation, Government was sometimes slow to make the needed human and financial resources available. Government did not properly consider the lessons of the IBCD project as it was developing new strategic approaches to agriculture and rural development, but it is expected that those lessons will be incorporated on the basis of the implementation completion evaluations carried out by Government and the Bank. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Implementation arrangements for the project were complex and performance varied. At project management level, the CMU and three PMUs were energetic and pragmatic throughout, although they suffered from shortages of qualified staff. At the provincial programming level, the CPRDRs were a privileged meeting place between technical services and the communes rurales, and acted as both a decision making and problem solving forum, and the PPTs performed well. At implementation level, the Provincial Departments of Agriculture carried out the SMI component competently; INRA and the CTs performed well on agricultural development, after a very slow start and with a particularly big delay in al Haouz province; and the socio-economic infrastructure components were in general competently executed by the provincial services. In view of their commitment to objectives and to the participatory process, and taking account of the problem solving approach and hard work of the agencies, performance is rated moderately satisfactory. Shortcomings in the pace of implementation - particularly on key aspects like the implementation manual, the design of the participatory approach and the agricultural development component – preclude a higher rating. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The ratings of moderately satisfactory for both Government and agency performance, combined with an outcome in the satisfactory range (Section 3.4), justify a rating of moderately satisfactory for overall Borrower performance.

6. Lessons Learned The project demonstrated that participatory community-based planning and integrated local level investment programming anchored in SMI are feasible in rural areas of Morocco and add value in terms both of appropriation by the beneficiaries and of development impact. In fact, SMI proved the optimal entry point for integrated development in mountain areas as all social and economic life in these zones is organized around the irrigation perimeter. The project also demonstrated that Government agencies are both able and willing to implement this approach, and that fiscal decentralization – the FDR under the management of the Governor – aids the approach. The lesson is that the IBCD model is an effective mechanism for reducing rural poverty and the project model is ready, subject to some adjustments, to be extended to other areas and scaled up. A second lesson is that the model of participatory planning and integrated investment programming developed under the project (see Section 2.2 above and Annex 10) is workable and can be implemented even through Government agencies which typically do not possess the flexibility and grass-roots touch required. However, many more detailed lessons and recommendations about the possible adjustments to the project model also emerged (see Annex 10). They can be grouped under: Methodological The consultation process was too heavy for the relatively simple matter of getting community

choice from a limited menu of investments: match the methodology to the objective.

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The vulnerable or poorly empowered groups, especially women and youths, were not adequately included: adapt the consultation process to meet specific needs.

The participatory process was uneven and sometimes out of sequence: get the phasing right and allow enough time.

Institutional Too much knowledge was left with short term consultants: create permanent institutional

capacity in CDD. There was not enough cross-fertilization with other projects: create mechanisms to exchange

and capitalize experience. Training was too limited and too late: for any follow on project, build local capacity early in

the process and build in continuing training. Cost sharing was haphazard and did not meet the stated purpose: clarify the objective and

mechanism for cost sharing. No progress was made with participatory M&E: draw a baseline and develop procedures,

including for community involvement, as a first step during preparation. Some preparation and procurement processes were extremely heavy: agree streamlined study

and procurement procedures appropriate to a CDD-type project at the outset. These lessons can be used to adapt the IBCD approach (documented in its participatory planning manual) to other programs such as the INDH which are adopting the participatory approach. A negative lesson concerns the long term nature of the program. The IBCD program was designed to run over thirteen years, backed by a Bank APL. In the event, Government never responded clearly to the Bank’s enquiries about the future of the program and a second phase project has not been prepared, although there was provision in the first phase to finance it. At the end of the project, there was enthusiasm to continue at the decentralized level and within the Ministry of Agriculture’s Infrastructure Department, but higher level policy makers seemed to have lost interest in the 2020 Strategy. This disappointing situation is now being corrected through the Bank/Government review of the new agricultural strategy and also by a proposed workshop to examine the results of the IBCD project, due to be held early in the second half of 2009. The lesson is that Government and donors needed to maintain a continuous dialogue based on empirical findings from the various projects so that the long term strategic context was kept constantly in view. A “joint annual review” forum would have been appropriate. A related lesson is that a project such as the IBCD project, introduced to pioneer the implementation of a new strategy, should not only invest in M&E from the outset so as to provide empirical evidence of results but also have an inbuilt communications program to ensure that emerging messages are passed to decision makers and other key stakeholders, and so are fed back into the policy, strategy and programming cycle.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The Borrower submitted a thorough summary report (March 2009). The report finds the project relevant and coherent, with good qualitative and quantitative results. Prospects for sustainability are rated good, but there is a need to continue to support and monitor the user groups. The report recommends a second phase project, focused largely on income generation: SMI, roads, agricultural development, processing and marketing, and watershed protection. The socio-economic infrastructure would be carried out under sectoral programs or though the INDH within an integrated programming framework.

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The report also makes a number of operational recommendations designed to improve the efficiency of management for a follow-on project, to strengthen field operations and the links with local governance, to reinforce the agricultural development component, to involve women more, and to link upstream production with downstream marketing and processing. These recommendations are all eminently sensible, and provide a good platform for starting preparation of a second phase project. (b) Cofinanciers Not applicable (c) Other partners and stakeholders Not applicable

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component

a1. (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

REHABILITATION OF SMI 20.90 23.12 111% COMPLEMENTARY COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

13.34 14.61 109%

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

5.87 3.83 65%

PREPARATION OF PHASE II 1.97 0.00

Total Project Costs 42.08 41.56 99% Front-end fee IBRD 0.32 0.32 100%

Total Financing Required 42.40 41.88 99% a2. In MAD millions

Components

Appraisal Estimate

(MAD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(MAD millions)


Actual estimates including

commitments (MAD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

REHABILITATION OF SMI 227.48 192.8 85% 233.4 102% COMPLEMENTARY COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

145.21 121.8 84%

146.8

101%

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

63.91 31.9 50%

39.3

61%

PREPARATION OF PHASE II 21.4 0 0

0

0

Total Project Cost 458.00 346.5 76% 419.5 92

(b) Financing

Source of Funds

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)


Borrower 6.63 8.66 131% Local Communities 3.20 1.08 34% International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

32.57 31.82 98%

Total Financing 42.40 41.56

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Rehabilitation and improvement of SMI schemes SMI areas rehabilitated and improved (in hectares)

Province PAD Actual % of PAD Number of schemes

Azilal 3,450 4,100 119% 19 Khenifra 3,000 3,400 113% 14 Al Haouz 3,000 3,522 117% 22 Total 9,450 11,022 117% 55 Actual outputs were 17% above target outputs. Beneficiaries took part in the identification, preparation and supervision. Whilst this added value in terms of both “ownership” and quality of design, it did contribute to delays in implementation. Works were on the whole well done, but the inexperience of some contractors and the harsh climatic conditions led to further delays and to some works having to be redone. Performance indicators show good improvements in water control for a sample of SMI schemes: Indicators of improved SMI performances (in %)

Indicators Ait Bouguemez Ait Hamza Lahroun Ait Wiksane

Taggart Tassant

Improved flow at entry to the farm

60 70 30 40 40 10

Reduction in time for water to reach the farm

67 75 56 67 67 25

Increase in irrigated area 10 15 0 20 0 0 Reduction in frequency of cleaning

83 60 50 75 60 30

Component 2: Improved access to basic rural infrastructure and social services 2(a) Rural roads Rural roads (in km)

Province PAD Actual % of PAD Azilal 116 78 67% Khenifra 70 61 88% Al Haouz 70 70 100% Total 256 209 82% Actual outputs were 18% below targets as actual costs in the difficult mountain terrain were higher than estimated at appraisal. Also, the Ministry of Equipment insisted on a high standard of construction. In al Haouz, targets were met by simply improving “black spots” rather than upgrading the entire road. The component suffered long implementation delays, due in part to the heavy study and checking procedures required by the Ministry of Equipment. A sample of five communities showed excellent improvements in access due to the component.

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Indicators of improvements due to the roads component (in %) Indicators Ait

Bouguemez Ait

Hamza Lahroun Ait

Wiksane Taggart Tassant

Increase in traffic 60% 60% 40% 80% 60% 50% Reduction in journey time

67% 67% 67% 96% 67% 50%

Reduction in closures 60% 70% 50% 80% 80% 80%

2(b) Drinking water schemes Drinking water schemes

Province PAD Actual % du PAD Azilal 30 12 40% Khenifra 15 8 53% Al Haouz 15 28 187% Total 60 48 80% Actual outputs were 20% below target as costs were under-estimated at appraisal. Implementation was delayed because of: Responsibilities were unclear between ONEP and the provincial services Complex financing packages had to be negotiated between the project, the commune rurales

and the beneficiaries There was a lack of follow up and training Problems arose in one or two places in finding an adequate water source

In addition, some schemes failed to develop systems for capturing waste water flows. However, the results of the operational schemes were found by the FAO survey to be excellent:

Indicators of the impact of potable water supply

Indicators Ait Bouguemez

Ait Wiksane Taggart

Reduction in water fetching chores 100% 100% 100% Reduction in water borne disease infection

50% 50% 50%

Percentage of households with individual connections

60% 100% 100%

In addition, school enrollment for girls has risen, with the elimination of the water fetching chore, which in some cases was taking up to six hours a day. 2(c) Electrification Only seven electrification schemes were carried out. All are functioning well. No target was set in the PAD. Electrification schemes

Province Actual Khenifra 7

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2(d) Schools There was no PAD target for this sub-component. Educational infrastructure was programmed according to community requests, and agreed according to the “carte scolaire” with the Ministry of Education. Each classroom is staffed with a teacher. Some investments were to add fencing, latrines etc to complete existing schools. The FAO study found excellent impacts already, with an estimated increase of 25% enrolment in the catchment area, largely girls. Schools, classrooms and other educational infrastructure (units)

Province Actual Azilal 41 Khenifra 27 Al Haouz 49 Total 117 2(e) Health centers There was no PAD target for this sub-component. Health centers were programmed according to community requests, and agreed according to the “carte sanitaire” with the Ministry of Health. Each center is staffed, equipped and supplied. Health centers

Province Actual Azilal 1 Khenifra 7 Al Haouz 12 Total 20 Component 3: Institutional support 3(b) Support Services for Agricultural Production

The objective was to intensify production systems for cereals, fruit trees, garden produce and livestock products, thereby increasing yields and farm incomes. The specific actions planned for achieving this objective in each of the three provinces were as follows :

Preparation of a technical manual (référentiel technique) for agricultural production in each of the three agro-ecological zones, taking into account all agricultural activities. This manual was to be prepared with the assistance of international and national consultants, in close collaboration with the target-groups.

Carrying out of an applied research program aimed at enriching the technical manual, including the financing of research materials and travel allowances for researchers.

Carrying out of demonstration activities on irrigators’ plots, based on the technical manual plus the results of the applied research program. For crop production, this would involve better varieties as well as improved cropping patterns and farming practices. For livestock production, the demonstrations would focus on animal health and improved breeds.

These actions were to be realized in close collaboration with the existing associations (for water, marketing, etc.) in the region. It was intended that bids be solicited for contracts with local organizations to provide technical support to producers. Training, transport and financing of operation costs were to be provided to the DPAs and CTs for monitoring and evaluation.

Bids for contracts were indeed solicited and received but found unsuccessful. It was decided instead to make bilateral agreements (conventions) with the Institut national de la recherche agronomique

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(INRA) for applied research, and the Centre des travaux (CT) for the extension work (demonstration plots, training visits, etc.). Because of the relative uncertainty at project start about the exact nature of the research to be conducted and also the novelty of preparing agreements with other public entities such as the INRA, the applied research program in each province as well as most of the extension work started in 2004 only. One technical manual was prepared by the INRA for each province (international consultancy was found unnecessary) but a number of planned field trials still remain to be carried out in Khénifra and Haouz, due to the delays in starting the activities. The manuals will have to be enriched later on the basis of these future results.

The CTs were given training as planned and some logistical support (essentially vehicles and some field equipment). The interaction of these centers with the INRA, which also provided technical/material support during the extension work, had the beneficial effect of “revitalizing” them, although they were still always constrained by their structural shortage of human resources (above all technicians to assist the engineers). Another initial constraint was the scarcity of technical packages (adapted to the mountainous areas) to be disseminated. But once the applied research programs and extension work gathered momentum towards 2005, they proved to be very popular with the irrigators as well as successful in terms of outcomes. The following table illustrates the main extension activities carried out in each province and the number of beneficiaries involved.

Extension activities Nbr of activities Nbr of beneficiaries

Contact visits 7 251 7 251

Sensitization days 771 16 964

Demonstration plots 1 000 10 825

Training visits for irrigators 42 1 260

Income generating activities 41 511

Training of technicians 30 1 037

The demonstration plots and training visits were the activities most valued by the irrigators. The main topics treated revolved around cereal crops (particularly maize for fodder), fruit tree crops (particularly for olives and apples) and animal feeding/husbandry (particularly for cattle in the case of Haouz). In addition, the promotion (mainly by the CTs) of off-farm income generating activities was very popular with women ; for example beekeeping in Azilal.

The project helped the INRA extend its research activities into the mountainous areas where it was not really active before, especially in Azilal7 . This resulted in the present availability of several technical packages truly adapted to these areas, which were lacking previously. Furthermore, the project provided an occasion for the INRA and CTs to work closely and productively together. In fact, the INRA also assisted the CTs in the extension work; as already indicated, this had the effect of “revitalizing” the CTs.

There is a wide consensus that the combined efforts of the INRA and CTs have resulted in a more professional attitude among the irrigators. The general quality of their farming practices has improved; for instance, they now prune and maintain otherwise the fruit trees more systematically and much better. Also, new crops have been introduced – for example: saffron in Azilal, sesame and garlic in Khénifra, and apples in Haouz. The annex 3 (financial/economic analysis) discusses the overall impacts on the irrigators in terms of improvements in agricultural production.

7 It is estimated that the farmers in the mountainous areas of Morocco account for around one third of the total number.

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Annex 3. Financial and Economic Analysis

Introduction

This annex summarizes the methodology used and results obtained in analyzing the estimated costs and benefits of the Irrigation Based Community Development Project (DRI-PMH in French). Being part of an ICR, the analysis must first replicate the calculations carried out at appraisal to compare the results. But it will also provide some additional insights into the prevailing financial and economic situation as well as the expectations for the future.

At project appraisal, an internal Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was calculated for the investments in the province of Azilal (one of the three covered) ; mainly because only the feasibility studies for this province were available at that time. In the present annex, this ERR will therefore be recalculated and discussed. Furthermore, various financial calculations in the case of the three provinces will be presented and also discussed. These calculations are generally based on the findings of an FAO post-evaluation report which was carried out in March 2009.

It must be kept in mind that the calculations and their results are still indicative for the most part. This is because the bulk of the rehabilitation works for the irrigation structures, as well as the agricultural services provided to the irrigators, started in 2004 only. Therefore, the potential benefits – in terms of increased cropping intensity, evolution of the cropping patterns towards higher value crops and yield improvements – are not yet at full development. The results achieved until now must therefore be considered as minimums.

Working Assumptions

The project was expected to “improve the incomes and quality of life of rural communities centered on small and medium-size irrigation in the three provinces of Azilal, Khenifra and Al Haouz over a five-year period (2001-06) ”. These are remote communities – often almost land locked – with small holdings (reportedly less than three hectares) which are highly fragmented into even smaller plots (several irrigated and others rainfed). The main sources of income are irrigated agriculture, livestock raising and off-farm activities in commerce, masonry, woodwork, etc. Because of the very limited size of the plots and the difficulty of physical access to the communities, low input/output farming is the norm with low coverage in terms of research and extension services.

The financial and economic calculations presented hereafter are generally based on the findings of the FAO report mentioned in the introduction. The financial results should only be seen as illustrations and examples; they have limited statistical value (the financial/economic impacts not having been monitored properly during project implementation) and moreover do not reflect the final situation (the potential benefits not being at full development yet). Nevertheless, these results are sufficiently specific to demonstrate the substantial benefits for the irrigators so far with the project. The economic calculations are based on verifiable information and, as indicated previously, the results should be considered as minimums. They assume a continuation of the benefits at the same levels, beyond the investment period and into the future, which implies the sustainability of the project’s achievements within the communities. This question will be dealt with by a discussion of the circumstantial evidence collected so far.

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For the calculation of the ERR, the following assumptions are made. Similarly to the analysis carried out at appraisal, the costs included in the calculations consist of those directly benefiting irrigated agriculture with the project – i.e. the rehabilitation/modernization of irrigation structures (mainly the lining of 142 kilometers of main canals [seguias]), the construction of 78 kilometers of rural roads, the research and extension services provided to the irrigators by the Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) and two Centre des travaux (for Azilal and Demnate) as well as the institutional/logistical support provided for the setting up of the Associations d’usagers des eaux agricoles. In conformity with the appraisal report, the benefits calculated will consist of the value of the incremental crop production only.

The financial costs and benefits will be converted into economic values using the following rules :

There is no substantial economic distortion in the exchange rate of the Moroccan dirham (MAD); therefore no shadow pricing of the currency.

All taxes are removed from the project costs; the value added tax (TVA) was 14% until 2007 and 20% afterwards (there is no direct taxation on the irrigators’ benefits as well as for the costs incurred by the INRA with the project).

The manual labor in the rehabilitation works is estimated at 30% of the total cost and is shadow priced at 75% of its paid value.

The manual labor in the construction of rural roads is estimated at 10% of the total cost and is shadow priced at 75% of its paid value.

It is assumed that 20% of the maintenance costs for irrigation structures and rural roads consists of materials and is subject to the VAT.

Except for wheat (which is marginal in the irrigators’ cropping patterns), the market values of the various agricultural produce are acceptable proxies of their economic values; therefore no shadow pricing of the incremental production, similarly to the appraisal report.

The manual labor in the irrigators’ direct production costs is estimated at 13% on average and is shadow priced at 75% of its paid value.

In conformity with the appraisal report, the ERR will be calculated over a period of 30 years.

Financial Results

The financial results are based on field surveys carried out by the FAO post-evaluation team in nine irrigation perimeters (three in each of the three provinces). These surveys covered 135 households with an average size close to nine persons per household. Despite the limited size of their holdings, the livestock that the household owns is relatively important ; two heads of cattle and 37 sheep and goats on average. The FAO survey results show that following the rehabilitation works, with the increased and more stable supply of irrigation water to plots, there has been on the whole a slight increase of the cropping intensity (from an overall increase of 128% in the cropping season 2004/5 to 136% in 2007/8 8), as well as a noticeable evolution from relatively low value crops (mainly cereals) towards higher value crops (horticulture and tree crops). But most of the incremental crop production generated comes from yield improvements, particularly in the case of maize for fodder and horticulture.

8 This calculation is including tree crops although other crops are grown under the trees, resulting (strictly speaking) in some double counting of the same surface.

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Examples of yield improvements (in quintals)

Crops Average yields in 2004/5

Average yields in 20007/8

(%)

Wheat 13 16 23 Alfalfa 310 361 16 Maize/fodder 116 309 166 Small peas 15 21 40 Potatoes 100 169 69 Walnut trees 5,000 nuts per tree 6,000 nuts per tree 20 Olive trees 48 49 2

N.B.: See FAO report for further details.

Moreover, the construction of rural roads has facilitated access to markets, which resulted in intensified marketing for the produce and at higher prices. As an overall result of these achievements, it is estimated that the average net revenue per hectare cultivated (for all irrigators surveyed) has almost doubled between 2004/5 (when the rehabilitation works and provision of agricultural services really started) and 2007/8 – i.e. from the equivalent of around MAD 8,410 to 16,757 9.

This net revenue represents a wide ranging average taking into account the evolution of the irrigators’ cropping patterns as well as their yield improvements between 2004/5 and 2007/8. It is also after accounting for all the production costs including family labor 10 . However, it does not integrate the value of the fodder production given to the households’ livestock (maize and alfalfa), neither the consequential improvements in the livestock’s physical conditions (mainly more weight) due to better feeding 11 . More importantly, the calculation is in current MADs and does not therefore account for inflation. When adjusted using the cost-of-living indexes available 12, the incremental (average) net revenue would still be very attractive with an increase close to 90% over the period for all irrigators, or an average of almost 24% (compounded) form one season to the other.

As already pointed out, this result must be considered as a minimum since all the potential benefits – particularly improvements in cropping patterns – are not yet at full development. This is also relevant for livestock production, especially since the new rural roads have facilitated marketing, including milk sales in neighboring towns. Finally, a number of off-farm income-generating activities have been initiated under the project. Although not planned at appraisal and not closely monitored in terms of their impacts, some of these activities – for example, bee keeping in the Haouz – are now in great demand, suggesting that they are financially attractive.

It must be added that the financial calculations do not show the occasional disparities between perimeters, sometimes due to inadequate availability of irrigation water. The following table illustrates the most extreme disparities.

9 From US$ 1,051 to 2,095 per hectare at the going exchange rate of MAD 8 for US$1.

10 Manual labor is calculated at the going paid rate of MAD 40 per day. Labor can be difficult to find at peak times during the cropping seasons, mainly because of migration to cities.

11 Particularly if supplements in the form of concentrates are used in combination with fodder.

12 The cost-of-living indexes were provided by the World Bank office in Morocco.

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Average net revenue for some perimeters

MADs per hectare

Perimeters 2004/5 2007/8 % ∆

Ait Wiksane (Haouz) 2,616 14,362 5.49

Ait Bougemaz (Azilal) 12,250 24,760 2.02

Tahassante (Haouz) 6,470 7,654 1.18

Taggarte (Haouz) 10,106 10,932 1.08

For example, the FAO report relates the extreme cases of Tahassante and Taggarte in the Haouz where an insufficient supply of water at times has constrained production development and resulted in average net revenues of only 18% and 8% (respectively) for the irrigators over the period 2004/5 to 2007/8.

This reflects the importance of selecting carefully the perimeters for rehabilitation and the need to promote alternative sources of incomes (including off-farm) in areas where the potentials for irrigation are limited.

Economic Results

The DPA of Azilal reported that the rehabilitation works carried out in the province under the project have a direct impact on 4,000 hectares. The FAO surveyed three perimeters totaling 1,800 hectares which represent 45% of the impacted area. For each perimeter (Ait Bougemaz, Lahrouna and Ai Hamza), an incremental (average) net revenue per hectare was calculated for all irrigators surveyed, taking into account the evolution of their cropping patterns as well as yield improvements. After shadow pricing for manual labor (see working assumptions) and adjusting for inflation, the incremental net revenues for the three perimeters were then consolidated into a single incremental weighted average net revenue (per hectare and per year) on the basis of the degree of “ representativeness ” of each perimeter in the impacted area, as discussed with the DPA staff involved in project implementation. The revenues stream for the calculation of the ERR is therefore the product of this all-inclusive net revenue by the number of hectares benefiting from the rehabilitation works each year 13 (see summary table on last page).

The project costs were calculated on the basis of the working assumptions discussed earlier. The costs of the rural roads were shadow priced at 75% of their financial values, to reflect the fact that not all of them facilitated directly the incremental crop production under the project. The maintenance (recurrent) costs for the irrigation structures and rural roads were estimated at conservative levels of 2% and 5% (respectively) of the investment costs, with a two-year time lag. In addition ; all investment, replacement and recurrent costs were converted into (constant) MADs of 2008 by inflating the amounts from project start up to that year, using the cost-of-living indexes provided by the World Bank (see summary table and working sheets).

Based on these assumptions, the ERR is calculated at 21% over 30 years. This result compares advantageously with the 13.5 % estimated at appraisal. In addition, as mentioned before, the revenues stream calculated here does not include the substantial benefits from incremental livestock production and new income generating activities. For example, the FAO estimates that the average net revenue (per household) derived from livestock production, has increased from MAD 6,562 in 2004/5 to 9,810 in 2007/8 – i.e. by close to 50%. It is reported that this increase amounted to 70% in the case of Ait Bougemaz. Unfortunately, the absence of a fully functioning monitoring/evaluation system during project implementation does not allow for a systematic and reliable quantification of these revenues.

13 A one-year lag is introduced because the irrigators will not see improvements on their farms before the next cropping season after rehabilitation.

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Contribution of beneficiaries

At project appraisal, it was envisaged that the irrigators would contribute (in cash and/or kind) for the equivalent of 10% of the rehabilitation costs of the irrigation structures. This was not systematically achieved although such contributions were made sporadically by a number of users associations. In Azilal for example, four associations contributed in kind for the equivalent of 2,286 working days. Generally speaking, the existence of similar projects, where beneficiaries’ contributions were not required, clearly de-motivated the irrigators. However, it must be said that following the rehabilitation works, less labor than before will normally be required for maintaining the canals. Only the repair of occasional breaches with cement constitutes a new expense and this seems to be well within the financial reach of the irrigators. The sustainability of the structures seems therefore to be probable.

It was also envisaged that the rural communes would contribute for 5% of the construction costs of the rural roads. To simplify matters in Khénifra, it was decided to lump the communes’ contributions with other required contributions for the water supply (5%) and electrification (25%) networks. The communes then paid the equivalent (aggregated) amount towards the construction of the roads only. Seven communes have disbursed a total of MAD 1.9 million this way, which represents 73% of what was calculated. Instead in Azilal, six communes have set aside a total of MAD two millions, but to be used for road maintenance14. On the whole, it is estimated that the local communes have paid 34% of the aggregated total contribution expected from them at appraisal (see the second table of the annex 1). The financing of the maintenance of the rural roads remains therefore an outstanding issue to be resolved.

14 For the water supply networks, five communes paid for the installation of individual connections as well as some other works (MAD 1.95 millions). But these were not planned under the project and had therefore to be financed in full outside of the project.

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Y 2001 Y 2002 Y 2003 Y 2004 Y 2005 Y 2006 Y 2007 Y 2008 Y 2009 Y 2020 Y 2030Cash inflow- Nbr of HAs impacted 0 157 415 445 1771 2830 3218 3622 4000 4000 4000- Revenues stream (in constant MADs) 0 0 0 1251785 6233608 14194398 21994847 27201710 33756000 33756000

Cash outflow- Investment costs 4237706 4026005 2323498 19115958 19295842 9935001 21319496 12232030 4736645 0 0- Replacement costs 759840 759840- Recurrent costs 103559 201944 258725 704304 1136990 1438363 2670476 3721766 3721766- Total in current MADs 4237706 4026005 2427057 19317902 19554566 10639305 22456486 13670393 7407121 4481606 4481606- Total in constant MADs 4949641 4573541 2725585 21365600 21412250 11277663 23332289 13670393 7407121 4481606 4481606

Net cashflow -4949641 -4573541 -2725585 -21365600 -20160465 -5044055 -9137891 8324454 19794589 29274394 29274394

ERR 21%

N.B.: See working sheets on file for details of calculations.

Summary of ERR calculation

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending

Supervision/ICR Anas Abou El Mikias Sr Financial Management Specia MNAFM Abderrahmane Ben Boubaker Consultant MNSSD Meryem Benchemsi Consultant MNCMA Marie-Helene Collion Lead Agriculturist LCSAR Pierre J. Demangel Consultant AFTP4 Ousmane Diagana Country Manager AFMNE Fatou Fall Social Development Analyst MNSSD Jaafar Sadok Friaa Sr Environmental Spec. MNSSD Abdelghani Inal Consultant MNAPR Mohamed Khatouri Lead Monitoring and Evaluation AFTRL

Douglas W. Lister Consultant MNSRE

- HIS

Moez Makhlouf Consultant MNAFM Mohamed Medouar Senior Rural Development Speci MNSSD Alaleh Motamedi Senior Procurement Specialist MNAPR Laila Moudden Program Assistant MNCMA

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY98 0.70 FY99 37.45 FY00 83 425.07 FY01 28 90.48 FY02 3 8.27 FY03 21.25 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 114 583.22

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Supervision/ICR FY98 0.00 FY99 0.00 FY00 0.00 FY01 1 3.09 FY02 19 67.17 FY03 25 77.77 FY04 19 60.50 FY05 25 80.89 FY06 22 56.69 FY07 20 77.42 FY08 21 89.56 FY09 6 0.00

Total: 158 513.09

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey results Not Applicable

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not Applicable

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

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PROJET DE DE VEL OPPE MENT RURAL INTE GRE CENTRE SUR

LA PET ITE ET MOYENNE HYDRAULIQUE (DRI-PMH)

- Mars 2009 -

S Y N T H E S E D U R A P P O R T D ’ E V A L U A T I O N

D U P R O J E T

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Le présent rapport fait la synthèse des résultats et conclusions de l’évaluation rétrospective du projet de développement rural intégré centré sur la petite et moyenne hydraulique. Ce rapport est préparé conformément à l’accord de prêt n°04607/MOR conclu entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc et la Banque Mondiale. Cette synthèse, qui traite les aspects suivants et met l’accent sur les leçons à tirer pour le futur, sera annexée au rapport d’achèvement à élaborer par la Banque Mondiale :

Evaluation des objectifs du projet, de sa conception, de son exécution et de son exploitation;

Evaluation des résultats du projet vis-à-vis des objectifs fixés;

Evaluation des performances de l’emprunteur durant l’exécution du projet;

Evaluation des performances de la Banque Mondiale et des autres partenaires engagés dans la réalisation du projet.

I. RAPPEL DES OBJECTIFS ET DES COMPOSANTES DU PROJET :

Le projet de développement rural intégré centré sur la petite et moyenne hydraulique (DRI-PMH) a été conçu et mis en œuvre dans les provinces de Khénifra, Azilal et Al Haouz en visant deux objectifs de développement représentés par i) l’amélioration des revenus et de la qualité de vie des populations bénéficiaires et ii) le pilotage de nouveaux dispositifs institutionnels pour assurer une plus grande participation communautaire et l’intégration des programmes sectoriels par le biais du Fonds de Développement Rural (FDR).

Le projet DRI-PMH comprend 4 composantes dont le coût total est estimé à 42.4 M$ :(1)Réhabilitation des périmètres sur 9450ha (20.9M$); (2)Infrastructure communautaire complémentaire (13.34 M$); (3)Renforcement institutionnel et Développement agricole (5.87 M$) et (4)Préparation de la phase 2 du programme (1.97 M$).

Le projet a été préparé et évalué au cours de l’année 2000 et a été approuvé par la Banque en mai 2001. L’accord de prêt d’un montant de 32.6 M$ a été signé en avril 2002 et est entré en vigueur en juillet 2002. Un financement rétroactif a été accordé par la Banque pour les activités réalisées et payées dans l’année qui précède la signature du prêt dans la limite de 10% de son montant total.

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II. PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONS DE L’EVALUATION :

1. Un bon niveau de pertinence et de cohérence dopé par le montage institutionnel et la mobilisation du Fonds de Développement Rural

La pertinence politique du projet DRI-PMH est soutenue par la pertinence opérationnelle qui se base sur l’approche adoptée pour assurer son pilotage institutionnel. A ce titre, le cheminement adopté pour l’élaboration des plans d’investissement communaux (PIC) a été le meilleur moyen garantissant dans une large mesure la participation de la population cible à la détermination de ses besoins prioritaires.

La réussite de cette approche montre désormais que même si le contenu est important, en l’occurrence les composantes du projet, la méthode prend systématiquement le dessus puisque basée sur l’amélioration des capacités de gestion du capital humain.

D’autre part, l’intégration des actions se situe au centre d’intérêt du projet qui s’est attelé à engager les principales composantes liées au développement rural. Cependant, certains domaines d’intérêt auraient pu être programmés dans le montage initial dans le but de compléter davantage l’action du projet dans l’esprit du développement durable. Il s’agit notamment des activités liées génératrices de revenus pour les femmes et les jeunes et la valorisation technologique de certains produits agricoles qui peuvent contribuer à une meilleure réalisation des objectifs de développement socio-économique envisagés.

L’approche adoptée par le projet en matière d’intégration peut être qualifiée de pionnière. La résultante des différentes actions intégrées ne peut que conduire à l’amélioration du niveau de vie des populations cibles et la réduction de la pauvreté dans les trois provinces de cette première phase du programme DRI-PMH.

Sur le plan environnemental, les objectifs spécifiques du projet DRI-PMH sont en adéquation avec les objectifs de la stratégie nationale pour la protection de l’environnement et le développement durable. Les impacts négatifs des activités du projet sur l’environnement sont peu significatifs et dans tous les cas réversibles dans leur grande majorité.

En ce qui concerne la cohérence du projet, l’appréciation du niveau de l’adéquation entre les objectifs visés et les moyens humains mobilisés montre que le montage de ce projet a été conçu de telle manière à assurer un encadrement rapproché des activités sur toutes les étapes d’intervention. Certes, certaines insuffisances humaines (sous-effectifs, manque de motivation matérielle, multiplicité des tâches)

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ont limité le niveau d’adéquation souhaité, mais les déclarations recueillies sur le terrain auprès des différentes équipes de gestion à l’échelle provinciale (CPGP, EPP, CPRDR) et centrale (CCGP) s’entendent d’une manière unanime sur l’importance de l’implication des moyens humains en matière de participation à la mise en œuvre du projet.

S’agissant des moyens financiers engagés pour la réalisation des actions, la logique du projet a été respectée notamment en ce qui concerne sa concentration autour de la réhabilitation de la PMH (près de 50% des crédits) et aussi l’importance accordée au renforcement institutionnel (près de 14%). Le FDR a permis de rompre avec la verticalité de l’approche sectorielle en matière de développement rural pour insuffler une dynamique de concertation et de coordination transversale entre tous les partenaires du projet. Cependant, l’absence de rubrique réservée à la protection environnementale constitue un écueil qu’il faudra éviter lors de la conception des phases suivantes du programme DRI-PMH.

2. Un niveau élevé des réalisations physiques et d’encadrement des producteurs agricoles en dépit du retard accusé au lancement du projet et des limites en ressources humaines

Le taux des réalisations physiques est assez élevé et dépasse même les prévisions pour certaines composantes :

a. Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique :

le bétonnage d’environ 395 km de séguias principales, la construction des ouvrages de dérivation, des ouvrages de prises, des captages de source, des bassins d’accumulation et divers ouvrages d’art.

Le nombre de périmètres touchés par la réhabilitation s’élève à 55 périmètres avec une superficie totale de près de 11.022 ha (4100 ha dans la province d’Azilal, 3522 ha dans le Haouz et 3400 à Khénifra), ce qui dépasse de loin les prévisions du projet (9500 ha).

69 AUEA ont été constituées et formées.

b. Pistes rurales :

La longueur des pistes aménagées pour le désenclavement des périmètres et douars est de 209,4 km (78 Km à Azilal, 61,4 Km à Khénifra et 70 Km à Al Haouz). Elle reste en dessous des prévisions initiales des PIC en raison des sous-estimations des couts d’aménagement des pistes au niveau de ces PIC. (Le taux

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de réalisation global se situe à 75,6% avec 93% à Khénifra, 67,2% à Azilal et 73,7% à Marrakech).

c. Autres infrastructures :

Le programme d’alimentation en eau potable a concerné la réalisation de 40 SAEP (sur 57 initialement prévus). La construction de 41 unités scolaires pour la province d’Azilal, 49 unités pour le Haouz et 27 unités pour Khénifra. Les réalisations 20 formations sanitaires ont été construites ou réhabilitées dans les 3 provinces sur un total de 22 prévues dans les PIC. Pour l’électrification des douars, le projet a permis d’électrifier 7 localités dans la province de Khénifra.

d. Réalisations comptable : Composantes Montants engagés (DH) Montants émis (DH)

1. Réhabilitation 233,384,535 192,809,205

2. Infrastructures de base 146,797,275 112,829,496 3. Renforcement institutionnel 39,306,550 31,916,499 4. Préparation de la Phase II Total (*) 419,488,360 337,555,200

(*) Non compris la contribution des communes rurales estimée à 9.000.000 DH

e. Décaissements :

Designation Montant en DH Montant en Dollars Montant en Yen %

Montant décaissable 265,413,780 31,139,010 3,070,000,000 100 Montant décaissé 261,264,565 30,652,214 3,022,006,679 98 Montant en instance de décaissement(*) 4,149,215 486,796 47,993,321 2

(*) Les pièces justificatives ont été transmises par la Direction du Budget à la BIRD en date du 5/3/2009 (Référence de l'envoi :DB1/Dfmfa/n°1942/E).

3. Un taux élevé d’efficacité et des effets quantitatifs et qualitatifs grâce à l’engagement et la coordination des équipes de gestion du projet (cf. annexe 1).

Le bon fonctionnement de la coordination des actions et de la participation des partenaires est une réalité indéniable et très encourageante. Grâce à l’intervention responsable des équipes de pilotage (EPP, CPRDR, CPGP, CCGP) qui ont pu rattraper le retard accumulé au cours des premières étapes de démarrage des activités, l’appréciation globale de l’efficacité du projet est jugée satisfaisante.

Le projet a, en effet, atteint l’ensemble de ses objectifs à des degrés divers. Ainsi, les producteurs agricoles reconnaissent et louent les effets de réhabilitation de la PMH

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dans tous les périmètres. L’extension des superficies irriguées et l’augmentation de la fréquence d’irrigation a conduit à l’adoption de cultures économiquement plus rentables. Globalement les superficies des céréales ont diminué au profit de celles des cultures fourragères, du maraîchage et de l’arboriculture fruitière. La mobilisation des AUEA pour la participation aux travaux de réhabilitation a été très positive pour certains périmètres où les bureaux sont dynamiques et actifs.

L’extension des superficies irriguées et l’augmentation de la fréquence d’irrigation témoignent de l’efficacité de la composante réhabilitation de la PMH. En effet les enquêtes exploitations montrent que 45% des enquêtés ont augmenté leurs surfaces irrigués, 63% ont augmenté la fréquence d’irrigation et 97% affirment la diminution du temps de curage des ouvrages.

Il faut également noter que le temps d’arrivée de l’eau en tête de parcelle a été globalement réduit d’une manière satisfaisante. Le taux de réduction varie entre 25% et 75%. L’efficience du réseau s’est également améliorée à un taux qui se situe entre 20% et 60%. Le débit en tête de parcelle a augmenté avec un taux situé entre 10% 70%. Avec le temps de curage des ouvrages et séguias qui s’est considérablement réduit de 30% à 83%

En matière d’introduction de nouvelles productions agricoles dans la zone du projet, de nombreuses actions ont été menées par les CT au profit des agriculteurs. Elles concernent notamment l’introduction du safran au périmètre d’Ait Bouguemaz, celle du sésame, du safran et de l’ail à Fellat, et celle du pommier à Ait Wiksane. Aussi, les aménagements de pistes réalisés dans le cadre du projet et l’encadrement des producteurs se sont traduits par une meilleure intégration des exploitations au marché.

Le revenu global estimé (y compris le revenu annexe) est passé de 23.785 DH à près de 61.530 DH par ménage et par an, soit une augmentation de près de 159%. Ce résultat est dû à l’amélioration des trois composantes du revenu de 300% pour les productions végétales, de 50% pour les productions animales et de 49,5% pour les revenus annexes. Le niveau élevé de l’amélioration du revenu végétal est dû essentiellement à l’augmentation de la production des cultures maraîchères et de l’arboriculture fruitière.

Concernant la composante environnementale, les objectifs escomptés à travers la mise en place du PGE n’ont pas été atteints puisque les mesures proposées n’ont pas accompagné les activités réalisées. Même si les effets observés sur l’environnement sont pour la plupart réversibles, la détermination tardive de ces

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mesures (18 mois avant la date officielle de clôture du projet) n’a pas aidé à l’atténuation de leur ampleur.

Par ailleurs, la réalisation du projet a permis un renforcement des capacités des agences d’exécution. Ce renforcement est une réalité observée sur le terrain. Elle est bâtie sur les deux piliers de gestion adoptés par le projet DRI-PMH et représentés par l’intégration et la participation.

En matière d’intégration, les agences d’exécution ont agi dans un cadre multifonctionnel qui a accompagné le projet durant ses différentes étapes.

En ce qui concerne la participation, les agences ont renforcé leur apprentissage en matière de gestion partagée des affaires en mettant la population cible au centre d’intérêt de leur action. En effet, l’approche participative a été appliquée par le projet en respectant les principes de sa conception et de son exécution grâce au fondement de l’écoute que l’ensemble des intervenants a pris soin de privilégier et d’adopter.

Un des résultats tangibles issus de ce renforcement est l’assimilation de l’approche méthodologique de gestion des projets par les cadres et techniciens des agences d’exécution. Que ce soit à Khénifra, à Azilal ou à Marrakech, les équipes impliquées dans la gestion du projet DRI-PMH ont profité du processus d’apprentissage managerial mis en place depuis le lancement des premières activités. Forts de leur expérience acquise dans le cadre du projet, nombreux sont les agents qui ont contribué à la mise en œuvre des actions relatives au programme de l’Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain (INDH) au niveau des provinces. D’une manière évidente, les compétences acquises dans le cadre du projet DRI-PMH vont aussi servir dans l’accompagnement d’autres projets de développement qui pourraient être envisagés dans l’avenir.

4. Des indices de durabilité encourageants mais dépendants de la volonté et de la capacité des organisations professionnelles et des communes rurales en matière de gestion des ouvrages :

L’eau d’irrigation et les pistes rurales constituent deux composantes de grande importance pour la population cible du projet et, de ce fait, l’entretien et la maintenance de leurs réseaux devraient jouer un rôle central pour la durabilité des actions qui ont été mises en place. Certes les AUEA ont montré des indices très encourageants pour assumer leur responsabilité en matière de gestion des infrastructures en s’impliquant activement dans la conception, le suivi et l’exécution des travaux. L’approche partenariale développée par les DPA avec les associations est de nature à améliorer la durabilité des réalisations du projet et leur prise en

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charge par des acteurs locaux directement intéressés. Les discussions, constatées, entre les bénéficiaires et les membres des associations et leur implication effective dans les choix techniques et les aménagements à mettre en place sont des signes d’appropriation des réalisations et présagent de leur durabilité, bien que le retrait prématuré de l’appui de l’état pourrait encore remettre ces acquis en cause. Dans la réalité, l’efficacité de leur mission reste largement tributaire de leurs capacités financières qui sont globalement déficitaires. Pour atténuer les effets pouvant découler des difficultés de financement, les agriculteurs et les AUEA auront besoin d’un encadrement rapproché par les CT et les DPA en ayant pour objectif d’assurer un suivi technique permanent des exploitations agricoles, principal garant de l’amélioration de leurs revenus.

Concernant les pistes rurales, en dépit des problèmes budgétaires dont souffrent les communes, leur entretien reste toujours une priorité des élus soucieux du désenclavement des douars et de la dynamisation de l’activité économique dans leur zone d’action. A défaut du budget propre aux communes, les responsables communaux ont généralement recours aux budgets de la Promotion Nationale pour la réhabilitation et l’entretien des ouvrages. Aussi, avec le développement de l’activité économique projetée dans la zone du projet, certaines pistes seront classées par le Département de l’Équipement qui pourrait prendre en charge leur entretien.

III. PRINCIPALES RECOMMANDATIONS

Sur la base des résultats obtenus et des forces et faiblesses relevées au niveau de chaque composante d’évaluation, deux catégories de recommandations sont proposées pour orienter l’action en préparation de la mise en œuvre de la phase II du programme DRI-PMH.

1. Recommandations d’ordre stratégique

Tout en reconnaissant les efforts investis dans le but d’adopter une meilleure gestion du développement rural, l’évaluation invite les acteurs de développement à poursuivre cette stratégie d’action et recommande de :

i. Réviser l'intégration des programmes : Assurer une meilleure intégration du projet en mettant l'accent sur la concentration de l’action autour de la PMH et des pistes, d’une part, et la promotion des activités génératrices de revenu au profit de groupes les plus vulnérables d’autre part, en accordant une attention particulière aux ressources naturelles et à l’environnement. Il conviendrait, en effet, de faire ressortir l'avantage significatif qu'il y aurait à réviser l’approche adoptée lors de la phase I du programme DRI-PMH en procédant aux ajustements suivants :

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La réhabilitation de la PMH et des pistes : Ce volet constitue un des principaux leviers de développement économiques des zones de montagne. Son renforcement mérite une mobilisation accrue des moyens humains et matériels dans le cadre du programme DRI-PMH. Par contre, et en dépit de son importance pour les populations locales, l’intégration des autres composantes liées à l’infrastructure de base, notamment la réhabilitation des écoles et des formations sanitaires, l’adduction en eau potable et l’électrification, pourrait être omise dans les prochaines phases du programme DRI-PMH. En effet, ces composantes sont inscrites au niveau des programmes sectoriels des différents départements ministériels et organismes publiques de tutelle qui se chargent de leur programmation et leur exécution.

Les composantes de l’aval agricole : Il conviendrait d’intégrer, dans les nouveaux projets, des composantes concernant l’accès aux marchés et la transformation des produits agricoles (ex : Partenariat avec l’agro-industrie pour le développement de nouvelles filières), la valorisation des produits du terroir et des productions biologiques (céréales, fruits et légumes, lait, viande, ..) ;

ii. Renforcer l’approche de gouvernance du développement local adoptée lors de la première phase à travers une meilleure densification du tissu institutionnel et la déconcentration de la prise de décision. Les arrangements institutionnels et les modalités de mise en œuvre des actions de la phase II du programme devraient refléter les principes d’implication effective, de participation et de responsabilisation de l’ensemble des acteurs de développement. Il convient donc de :

Concevoir et mettre en place des nouvelles relations de partenariat dans l’esprit du Plan Maroc Vert notamment en ce qui concerne son pilier II de l’agriculture solidaire ;

Prévoir un programme de formation des équipes de pilotage du projet aussi bien au niveau central que provincial en mettant à profit l’expérience d’organismes internationaux, comme la FAO, dans les domaines de programmation participative, de suivi-évaluation, de gestion financière et de suivi environnemental ;

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2. Recommandations d’ordre opérationnel

L’évaluation formule plusieurs recommandations d’ordre opérationnel qui peuvent être présentées comme suit :

i. Entamer le plus vite possible la phase II du programme DRI-PMH : Il conviendrait que les acteurs de développement mettent en place, dans les meilleurs délais, un dispositif institutionnel pour la préparation d’un plan d’actions de la phase II. Les points suivants sont particulièrement importants :

Assurer la mise en place rapide de structures de gestion, de programmation et de concertation, dans les zones concernées par la phase II dans le but d’éviter le retard au niveau du démarrage et l’exécution des activités du projet. Il conviendrait, ainsi, de mettre en place des CPGP qui devraient être consacrées à plein temps à l’exécution du projet. Pour les aider à assimiler rapidement les objectifs et les dispositifs de mise en œuvre du projet, il est conseillé de les faire accompagner par la CCGP et des membres des CPGP de la phase I durant toute la période du démarrage ;

Entreprendre le plus vite possible l’identification des périmètres et la validation des PIC concernés par la phase II pour éviter le retard dans l’exécution des actions du projet. Le guide de programmation participative déjà élaboré durant la phase I pourrait grandement aider à passer rapidement cette étape moyennant des ajustements éventuels de sa structure. La priorité devrait continuer à être donnée aux périmètres ayant des ressources suffisantes en eau pour que les investissements consentis par l’Etat soient le mieux valorisés ;

ii. Adopter des approches innovatrices pour assurer une meilleure gestion du projet et surmonter les obstacles et lever les contraintes qui pourraient entraver le bon déroulement de la phase II, en particulier :

Affecter les ressources (matérielles, humaines et financières) requises aux cellules de gestion du projet et recruter de l’assistance technique ponctuelle pour leur appui et leur permettre de travailler d’une façon permanente. Il conviendrait aussi d’œuvrer à ce que les crédits mobilisés pour les actions d’encadrement soient octroyés dès le début de l’année fiscale pour que les institutions d’encadrement (notamment les CT) puissent intervenir pour l’ensemble des spéculations, et agir avec plus d’efficacité ;

Etudier les meilleures modalités de délégation des crédits du FDR dans le but de leur affectation rapide aux provinces concernées par la phase II du projet,

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Prévoir un budget destiné à la mise en place d’un système de suivi-évaluation du projet ;

Prévoir un budget destiné au renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de l’environnement et à l’acquisition du matériel d’analyse nécessaire au suivi environnemental du PGE ;

Réserver un budget pour la visibilité du projet compte tenu de la diversité et l’importance des actions entreprises au profit des populations de montagne. Cette visibilité sera opérée à travers la mise en place des panneaux signalétiques d’information, la distribution d’affiches, dépliants, etc, pour mieux faire connaître les actions et travaux réalisés.

iii. Renforcer et valoriser davantage l’action de proximité en veillant à:

Trouver notamment, des solutions au problème de relève, qui se pose en raison des départs en retraite des agents des CT ;

Renforcer les conventions avec l’INRA pour la mise en œuvre des activités de développement agricole ;

iv. Améliorer le processus de prise de décision par:

Le soulagement des procédures administratives et la mise en place des mécanismes qui éviteront de répéter les retards enregistrés dans la signature et la mise en vigueur du prêt (une année) lors de la phase I ;

L’appui et la collaboration des services du Ministère de l’Agriculture pour le renforcement des capacités en ressources humaines et moyens matériels des équipes affectées au projet et le renforcement de la coordination entre les différents services concernés par la mise en œuvre de la composante de développement agricole ;

L’intégration des aspects environnementaux dès les premières phases d’identification des activités de la phase II du programme. En effet, l’expérience acquise lors de la phase I du programme DRI-PMH a montré l’importance de l’intégration de ces aspects (développement de critères environnementaux pour le choix des périmètres).

v. Capitaliser sur les leçons de la phase I pour la programmation et la gestion de la phase II en accordant suffisamment de temps et d’énergie en particulier à :

L’élaboration des ententes relatives aux prestations intégrées de services en cas de partenariat ;

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L’élaboration des référentiels et procédures afin d’assurer une meilleure coordination des actions ;

Le renforcement de l’organisation des agriculteurs et des compétences au niveau local. En effet, la décentralisation et l’autonomisation des composantes de la société civile, en particulier les associations et les communautés locales, passe par la formation continue et l’assistance technique assurée par des équipes itinérantes qualifiées. L’initiation des associations des agriculteurs à la bonne gouvernance et aux bonnes pratiques en termes de gestion revêt une importance considérable à ce sujet;

L’intégration des actions de formation et de recherche-développement dans le système de suivi-évaluation pour assurer une meilleure capitalisation par l’application et la diffusion des résultats de la recherche ;

l’encadrement des agriculteurs et la vulgarisation de nouvelles techniques de production, en prenant en considération que :

o la recherche agronomique, en zones de montagne, devrait recevoir le même niveau d’intérêt que les zones de plaines de la part des décideurs ;

o des moyens humains devraient être mobilisés avec une formation adaptée, aux systèmes de productions des zones concernées. Le système d’encadrement devrait comporter des équipes pluridisciplinaires pour encadrer et compléter les travaux des vulgarisateurs ;

o les zones de montage devraient être différenciées des autres zones de production agricoles en ce qui concerne les aides accordées dans le cadre du Fonds de développement Agricole.

La promotion de nouvelles technologies de production agricole en renforçant les équipes pluridisciplinaires au niveau des DPA. Les sujets d’intérêt sont notamment :

o Le suivi et l’équipement des parcelles de démonstration des nouvelles techniques d’irrigation qui permettent l’économie de l’eau (goutte à goutte) ;

o La fertigation ; o La lutte intégrée contre certains ravageurs et maladies ; o Les techniques de conservation de produits agricoles ; o La commercialisation des produits agricoles.

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Le renforcement de l’encadrement technique des femmes : En dépit des efforts déjà enregistrés au niveau de certains CT, la femme rurale, vu son statut social dans les ménages, devrait bénéficier davantage d’un encadrement technique qui lui est spécifique en mobilisant du personnel féminin (vulgarisatrices) ;

L’étude et la définition des circuits de commercialisation des principales filières de productions agricoles ;

L’organisation d’ateliers d’information des agriculteurs sur les subventions accordées par l’Etat au secteur agricole en les aidant dans la constitution des dossiers de subvention afin de les encourager à reconvertir le système d’irrigation traditionnel aux systèmes économes d’eau ;

La coordination des actions avec les programmes de développement en cours d’exécution dans les zones concernées, notamment ceux relevant de l’INDH.

En définitive, cette évaluation appuie et recommande le renforcement de la stratégie d’action mise en œuvre dans le cadre de la phase I du programme DRI-PMH. Elle réitère l’importance de l’approche participative et intégrée, le renforcement institutionnel et la mobilisation du FDR adoptés lors de cette première phase dans le but d’atteindre les objectifs de développement. La conception des phases suivantes du programme devrait s’inscrire dans la même approche avec des ajustements notamment au niveau de l’intégration des actions, de la gouvernance et du système de suivi-évaluation.

IV. PERFORMANCE DES PARTENAIRES

Malgré les retards enregistrés dans le démarrage des activités du en partie une insuffisance de préparation, de conception et d’évaluation du projet (Manuel de procédure n’a été préparé que 3 ans après le démarrage du projet, les modalités d’exécution de la composante « développement agricole » n’ont été arrêté qu’en 2003), le projet a enregistré, grâce à l’effort conjugué de tous les partenaires impliqués dans son exécution, des taux élevés :

(i) des réalisations physiques et d’encadrement des producteurs agricoles ; (ii) d’efficacité et des effets quantitatifs et qualitatifs.

Banque Mondiale :

Les missions techniques de suivi et d’appui réalisées par la Banque Mondiale, à partir de 2001 (2 missions par an), ont été d’un intérêt capital et de bonne qualité du point de vue analytique. Elles ont permis :

45

la bonne compréhension, par les divers intervenants dans le projet, des concepts

de base dudit projet et du programme DRI-PMH;

L’accompagnement des partenaires concernés par le projet dans sa mise en œuvre à travers l’appui des DPA et des services techniques des trois provinces concernés. Cet appui a concerné :

- les procédures de passation des marchés selon la réglementation de la banque Mondiale (préparation des appels d’offres, évaluation des offres techniques et attribution des marchés);

- les procédures de gestion financière du projet ;

la résolution rapide des problèmes de gestion du projet en concertation avec tous les partenaires concernés par le projet (Ministère de l’agriculture et de la Pêche Maritime, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances etc ……..);

La définition, en concertation avec la direction nationale du projet, les modalités d’exécution de certaines composantes du projet;

L’identification des difficultés et proposition de recommandations pertinentes pour surmonter ces difficultés et permettant ainsi l’accélération et l’amélioration de la mise en œuvre des activités du projet.

La Banque Mondiale a contribué également à l’amélioration des compétences et le renforcement des capacités des équipes impliquées dans le suivi et la gestion du projet à travers les formations dispensées à ces équipes en matière de :

Passation des marchés en application des Directives de la Banque mondiale ;

Gestion financière des projets ;

Suivi-évaluation des projets de développement rural intégré ;

Procédures d’évaluation environnementale et plan de gestion de l’environnement.

Performance du gouvernement et de ses structures créées dans le cadre du projet.

Les performances des DPA et des autres structures ayant contribué à la réalisation du projet peuvent être considérées comme globalement satisfaisantes comme en témoigne le niveau des réalisations physiques, les taux de consommation des crédits et la pertinence de la majorité des composantes mises en œuvre. D’une manière générale, le montage institutionnel mis en place dans le cadre du projet a bien fonctionné. Les structures de gestion du projet (cellules centrale et provinciales qui ont été bien renforcées en 2004), les structures de programmation et de suivi du

46

projet (EPP, CPRDR et CNC), les structures de mise en œuvre du projet (services techniques) et les structures de gestion des infrastructures (Communes et AUEA) ont accompli leurs missions respectives de manière satisfaisante.

Cellules de gestion du projet :

- Au niveau central :

La CCGP instituée au sein de la DAHA le 20 juin 2001 a été constituée de deux ingénieurs. La dite CCGP n’a pas cessé de jouer un rôle très actif et essentiel de coordination d’appui aux DPA (agences d’exécution) et de suivi du projet.

- Au niveau provincial :

Les directeurs provinciaux de l’agriculture ont été chargés de la direction du projet au niveau provincial. Ils ont été assistés par des cellules provinciales de gestion de projet (CPGP). Ces CPGP ont été créées au cours de l’année 2002, mais leur mise en place effective n’a a eu lieu qu’au début de l’année 2004, après l’affectation du personnel nécessaire. Chaque équipe est formée de 4 ingénieurs et d’un cadre chargé de la gestion financière et comptable. Les CPGP, rattachées directement aux DPA, se sont acquittées de leurs tâches de manière satisfaisante.

Structures de programmation et de suivi du projet : EPP, CPRDR et CNC :

- Au niveau national :

Le Conseil National de Coordination (CNC) s’est réuni à 5 reprises, principalement pour valider le PIC d’Azilal, de Khenifra et du Haouz et faire le point sur l’état d’avancement du projet.

- Au niveau provincial : Les Comités Provinciaux Restreints du Développement Rural (CPRDR) ont

été institués dans les trois provinces en 2002 (17/01/2002 à Azilal, 31/01/2002 à Khénifra et le 31/10/2002 au Haouz). Ils ont joué pleinement leur rôle dans le processus de programmation participative (suivi des étapes d’élaboration des PIC, arbitrage et validation des PIC, établissement des contrats de partenariat entre la province et les CR pour réaliser le PIC). Les communes rurales ont été systématiquement représentées par leurs présidents dans le CPRDR et ont participé à toutes les réunions d’information et de concertations concernant le projet. L’adhésion des autorités locales et provinciales à l’approche du projet et les efforts déployés par les DPA et la CCGP ont permis de dynamiser le rôle des CPRDR. De

47

nombreuses réunions et séances de travail ont été organisées pour le suivi de l’avancement du projet.

Les Equipes de Programmation Participative (EPP) ont été mises en place dans les trois provinces au cours de l’année 2002 (17/1/2002, 31/1/2002 à Khénifra et 31/2/2002 au Haouz). Ces équipes, formées d’un ingénieur de la DPA et d’un cadre ou technicien représentant chacune des délégations provinciales (DPE, ONEP,ONE, DPS, DPEN) et appuyées par l’assistance technique, ont préparé les programmes d’investissement communaux au niveau des provinces de Khenifra et du Haouz.

Structures de mise en œuvre du projet

Globalement des études et les travaux d’aménagement hydro-agricole ont été réalisés dans les règles de l’art par les services d’aménagement des DPA appuyés par l’assistance technique.

L’exécution de la composante « développement agricole a été confiée aux services de la production agricoles, CT et aux directions régionales de la recherche agronomique. Le choix de cette option visait l’inscription les actions de vulgarisation et de recherche-développement dans une logique de complémentarité, de continuité et de durabilité et soutenir la mise en œuvre des orientations nationales en la matière :

- L’implication des CT, qui ont été renforcés en personnel, en moyens de travail et financiers, a permis de redynamiser leur rôle, en tant que structure d’animation et d’appui-conseil.

- L’implication des chercheurs de l’INRA dans le processus d’appui-conseil, mené en collaboration étroite avec les CT, a engagé une dynamique de recherche-développement multidisciplinaire dans des zones montagneuses, écartées jusque là de toute action en la matière.

Globalement, ce choix a été judicieux au niveau des provinces d’Azilal et de Khenifra. Dans la province du Haouz, l’exécution de cette composante a accusé un retard considérable (cf. Réalisations physiques du projet).

La mise en œuvre de la composante Infrastructures a relevé de la responsabilité des gouverneurs, en tant que présidents des CPRDR et sous-ordonnateurs du FDR. Les services techniques provinciaux (équipement, santé, éducation, ONE, ONEP) ont apporté l’appui et l’assistance nécessaires aux services desdits provinces pour la préparation des CPS, la dévolution des marchés et l’exécution des travaux.

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Gestion financière du projet :

La procédure de décaissement mise en œuvre directement par les services de la Trésorerie (imputation sur le fonds spécial de fonds de roulement n° 71-27) a enregistré durant l’exécution du projet des retards considérables. A ce titre, il y a lieu de préciser qu’en fin 2007, les instances de décaissement par imputation sur ce fons ont atteints 28,6 millions de Dh, soit environ deux fois le montant du compte spécial. Ce montant comptait les dépenses réglées par les comptables assignataires pendant les exercices budgétaires 2006 et 2007. La procédure de décaissement, mise en œuvre directement par le recours à l’établissement des relevés de dépenses par les agences d’exécution, n’ a pas soulevé de remarques particulières.

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ANNEXE 1

Tableau 1 : Indicateurs de réhabilitation de la PMH dans les périmètres de l’échantillon (%)

Indicateurs Périmètres AB AH Lah AW Tag Tah

Amélioration du débit en tête de parcelles 60 70 30 40 40 10

Réduction du temps d’arrivée d’eau en tête de parcelle 66,7 75 55,6 66,7 66,7 25

Taux d’augmentation de la superficie irriguée 10 15 0 20 0 0

Taux augmentation de la fréquence d’irrigation 15 10 15 20 15 5

Amélioration efficience réseau 50 60 37,5 40 30 20Réduction de fréquence de curage des ouvrages et seguias 83 60 50 75 60 30

AB : Ait Bouguemez; AH : Ait Hamza; Lah : Marouna; AW : Ait Wiksane; Tag : Taggart; Tah : Tassant. Tableau 2 : Variation des rendements des productions végétales avant et après projet

Cultures Unités Rendements avant projet

Rendements actuels

Taux de variation(%)

Blé tendre Qx 13 16 23,1 Blé dur Qx 12 16 33,3 Orge Qx 12 15 25,0 Mais grain Qx 16 20 25,0 Bersim Qx 388 438 12,9 Luzerne Qx 310 361 16,5 Mais fourrager Qx 116 309 166,4 Petit pois Qx 15 21 40,0 Carotte Qx 145 175 20,7 Navet Qx 160 175 9,4 Pomme de terre Qx 100 169 69,0 Pommier Qx 147 144 -2,0 Noyer Noix/arbre 5000 6000 20,0 Olivier Qx 48 49 2,1 Pêcher Qx 98 99 1,0 Pépinière Plant 31 750 33 500 5,5 Pépinière olivier Plant 34 333 35 000 1,9

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Tableau 3: Indicateurs liés aux effets de l’aménagement des pistes (%)

Indicateurs AB AH Lah AW Tag

Tah

Taux d’amélioration du trafic 60 60 40 80 60 50

Réduction de la durée du trajet (souk ou centre)

66,7

66,7

66,7

96,5

66,7

50

Taux d’amélioration approvisionnement et écoulement des produits

60 30 10 80 30 10

Réduction de fréquence d’impraticabilité de la piste

60 70 50 80 80 80

Réduction du coût du transport 30 10 75 50 0 0

AB : Ait Bouguemez; AH : Ait Hamza; Lah : Marouna; AW : Ait Wiksane; Tag : Taggart; Tah : Tassant

Les effets des aménagements des pistes peuvent être appréciés à travers le taux d’amélioration du trafic qui se situe entre 40% pour Lahrouna et 80% pour Ait Wiksane. La durée du trajet habituellement nécessaire pour se rendre au souk le plus proche s’est réduite dans un intervalle compris entre 50% à Tahassante et 96,5% à Ait Wiksane. La fréquence des périodes où la piste devient impraticable s’est également réduite entre 50% à Lhrouna et 80% à Tahassant, Taggart et Ait Wiksane.

Ces conditions d’amélioration des accès se sont traduites par une réduction du coût de transport entre le souk et le centre du périmètre à un taux compris entre 10% à Ait hamza et 75% à Lahrouna. De même, l’approvisionnement en produits de nécessité (y compris alimentaires) et l’écoulement des produits agricoles se sont nettement améliorés avec un taux compris entre 10% à Tahassant et Lahrouna et 80% à Ait Wiksane.

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Tableau 4: Indicateurs liés aux effets de l’adduction en eau potable

Indicateur Ait Bouguemaz Ait Wiksane Taggart

Réduction de la corvée d’approvisionnement en eau (%) 100 100 100

Réduction d’affection par les maladies hydriques (%) 50 50 50

Coût du m³ d’eau (DH/ m³) - 3 7

Taux de branchement au réseau d’eau potable (%) 60 100 100

Figure 1 : Coût de production et marges dégagées par les productions

végétales (DH/Ha assolé)

2 9254 201

8 410

16 757

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000

18 000

Charges Marges brutes

Avant projet 2007-08

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Tableau 5: Evolution des coûts et de la marge brute des productions végétales (Cas d’Ait Bouguemaz et Tahassant)

Périmètre Coût de production/ha Marge brute/ha

Avant projet

Campagne2007-08

Variation%

Avantprojet

Campagne 2007-08

Variation%

Ait Bouguemaz 3620 4200 16,0 12250 24760 102,1

Tahassant 3373 4779 41,7 6470 7654 18,3

La marge brute à l’hectare a augmenté de 102% à Ait Bouguemez contre 18% à Tahassant. Comme pour la diversification des assolements qui s’est nettement améliorée à Ait Bouguemez, le facteur de disponibilité de la ressource en eau explique ces différences entre les deux périmètres. Le développement de la culture du pommier dans ce périmètre a joué un rôle prépondérant dans la formation de la marge brute moyenne par hectare assolé. Cette marge a en effet augmenté de 31610 DH/ha avant projet à 57240 DH/ha actuellement, soit une amélioration significative de 81%.

Figure 2: Coût et marge brute des productions animales (DH/exploitation moyenne)

Tableau 6: Evolution du revenu global

Source Revenu/ménage Revenu/actif Revenu/membre Evolution

% Avant projet

2007- 08

Avant projet

2007- 08

Avantprojet

2007- 08

6098 65626853

9810

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

DH

Avant projet 2007-08

Coût Moyen Marge brute

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Production végétale 10390 41446 2474 9868 1181 4710 298,9Production animale 6562 9810 1562 2336 746 1115 49,5Revenus annexes 6833 10275 1627 2446 776 1168 50,4Total 23785 61531 5663 14650 2703 6992 158,7

L’amélioration du revenu global serait due essentiellement à celle des productions végétales qui ont enregistré une augmentation de près de 300%. Certes cette évolution paraît énorme compte tenu de son ampleur pour une période de 6 années (entre 2002 et 2008). Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que l’effet du projet au niveau des productions agricoles s’est fait beaucoup plus sentir pour les productions fruitières et maraîchères. Avec une disponibilité accrue en eau d’irrigation en plus de l’extension des superficies qui ont atteint la mise à fruit, l’offre en ces produits a augmenté avec des répercussions positives sur les revenus de mise en marché. Ces revenus ont également évolué suite à l’augmentation des prix de tous les produits végétaux durant la période de mise en œuvre du projet.

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ANNEXE 2 Cadre des résultats du projet

Objectif de Développement du projet n°1 : Amélioration des revenus et de la qualité de vie des populations bénéficiaires

Résultats et Produits Indicateurs de Résultats Avant projet Après projet

R.1 : Revenus des agriculteurs améliorés

- Taux d’augmentation des revenus des agriculteurs ( Dh/ménage) 23785

61531

(158,7%) R.2 : Qualité de vie des bénéficiaires améliorée.

- Taux de réduction de la corvée de l’approvisionnement en eau potable. - 100%

Résultats Intermédiaires (niveau 2) Indicateurs de Résultats Intermédiaires (niveau 2)

R.1.1 : Production agricole améliorée

- Evolution du TIC. TIC 1 : 128 % TIC 2 : 93 %

TIC 1 : 136 % TIC 2 : 97 %

- Evolution des Rendements des principales productions. (Qx/ha)

Blé dur : 12 Blé tendre : 13 Mais grain : 16 Bersim : 388

Pomme de terre : 100 Noyer : 5000 noix/arbre

Olivier : 48

Blé dur : 16 Blé tendre : 16 Mais grain : 20 Bersim : 438

Pomme de terre : 169 Noyer : 6000 noix/arbre

Olivier : 49 R.1.2 : Accès aux marchés amélioré

- Valeur des productions commercialisées (Dh/exploitation) 31140 48200

(54,8%) R.2.1 : Accès aux services sociaux et administratifs amélioré

- Taux de fréquence de déplacement aux centres les plus proches. - Entre 40 et 80%

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R.2.2 : Accès à l’eau potable amélioré - Taux d’accès à l’eau potable Entre 60 et 100%

R.2.3 : Amélioration de la scolarité - Taux d’amélioration de la scolarisation 25%

R.2.4 : Service sanitaire amélioré

- Taux de fréquentation de la formation sanitaire aménagée. -

Résultats Intermédiaires (niveau 1) Indicateurs de Résultats Intermédiaires (niveau 1)

R.1.1.1 : Performance améliorée du système d’irrigation.

- Taux d’amélioration de l’Efficience hydrique du réseau d’irrigation. Entre 20 à 60%

- Taux d’augmentation du temps effectif de l’irrigation lors du tour d’eau pour les utilisateurs à l’aval.

Entre 25 et 75%

R.1.1.2 : Nouvelles techniques et technologies agricoles adoptées par les agriculteurs.

- Taux d’adoption des techniques culturales nouvelles

Adoption de la taille des arbres Introduction de nouvelles espèces et techniques (Safran, aille, sésame, mais ensilage, sorgho fourrager, semences luzerne,

- Evolution des superficies de cultures à HVA (% de la superficie moyenne emblavée)

Maraichage : 9 Rosacées : 11 Fourrage : 10

Maraichage : 16 Rosacées : 16 Fourrage : 15

R.1.1.3 : & R.2.1.1 : Meilleure praticabilité de la route d’accès au périmètre.

- Taux de diminution de la fréquence de rupture d’accès au périmètre.

- Taux de réduction de la durée du trajet.

Entre 50 à 80%

Entre 50 à 96%

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Produits (Extrants) Indicateurs de produits Composante 1 Réhabilitation des périmètres de PMH

Réseaux d’irrigation modernisés

- Superficie irriguée réhabilitée (ha). 9450 11022

- Longueur de seguias revêtues (Km). 395

- Nombre d’Ouvrages de Prise construits/réhabilités. 395 Composante 2 Infrastructures de base complémentaires

Pistes aménagées - Longueur de pistes aménagées (km). 209

SAEP construits - Nombre de SAEP aménagés. 40

- Nombre de SAEP fonctionnels. 40

Ecoles qualifiées - Nombre d’écoles construites / réhabilitées. 117

Formations sanitaires réhabilitées - Nombre de FS construites / réhabilitées. 20

Localités électrifiées - Nombre de localités électrifiées. 7 Composante 3.1 Appui à l’intégration et à la participation

Guide PP établi - Guide validé et utilisé 1

57

PIC établis - Nombre de PIC validés 11 au Haouz 7 à Khénifra

7 à Azilal

AUEA constituées et formées - Nbre AUEA 69

- % AUEA fonctionnelles 70%

AUEP constituées - Nbre AUEP

- % AUEP fonctionnelles

CPRDR constitués - Nbre CPRDR - Nombre de décisions importantes prises par le

CPRDR 3

EPP constituées - Nbre EPP 3

Composante 3.2 Appui au développement agricole

RTE établis et utilisés - Nombre RTE validés 2

Actions d’animation et de vulgarisation réalisées

- Taux de réalisation des activités d’animation. 100%

- Taux de réalisation des activités d’appui. 100%

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Objectif de Développement du projet n°2 :

Pilotage de nouveaux dispositifs institutionnels pour assurer une plus grande participation communautaire et l’intégration des programmes sectoriels par le biais du Fonds de développement rural (FDR).

Résultats et Produits Indicateurs de Résultats Avant projet Après projet

R.1 : Approche pilotée par le projet est adoptée par le programme de développement de la PMH et par d’autres programmes de développement.

- Taux d’adoption de l’approche par le programme de développement de la PMH.

- Taux d’adoption de l’approche par d’autres programmes de développement.

- 100% - Adoption par le programme INDH notamment au Haouz et Azilal

Résultats Intermédiaires Indicateurs de Résultats Intermédiaires (niveau 2)

R.1.1 : Dispositifs de participation sont fonctionnels

- Nombre de conventions signées.

- 69 avec AUEA - 25 avec Communes rurales - 1 avec INRA - 1 avec FAO

R.1.2 : Dispositifs d’intégration fonctionnels.

- Nombre de réunions du CPRDR. - Montant du FDR alloué (DH).

- 3 à 6 fois par an (Pour Khénifra, 6 à 12 fois par an) - 146.902.393,77

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Produits (Extrants) Indicateurs de produits Composante 3.1 Appui à l’intégration et à la participation

CPRDR constitués

- Nbre CPRDR/nbre réunions - Nombre de décisions importantes prises par le

CPRDR

- En moyenne : 6 réunion/CPRDR/an

-

EPP constituées - Nbre EPP/nbre réunions - En moyenne : 20 réunions/EPP/an

CCGP et CPGP constituées - Nbre CGP. 1

Guide PP établi - Guide validé et utilisé 1

PIC établis - Nombre de PIC validés 25

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other partners/Stakeholders Not Applicable

61

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Evaluation retrospective des résultats du projet DRI-PMH. FAO, Mars 2009. Etude réalisée par MM. A. Aït El Mekki (Agroéconomie), K. Anouar (Environnement), M. El Khattabi (Génie Rural), A. Ezzamiti (Agronomie) et Y. Ouadi (Suivi-Evaluation)

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Annex 10. Assessment of the participatory process15 Outline

1. Context 2. Participatory approach: contextual definition and process 3. Impact of the participatory and integrated approach 4. Assessment of sustainability of the community based associations: financial and

institutional 5. Achievement of PDO through the integrated participative approach? 6. Lessons learned on integrated participatory approach and looking forward

Methodology of the report This study attempts to analyze the impact of the integrated participatory approach as a tool and as a process in the context of the DRI-PMH project. The methodology was based on the analysis of the project appraisal document (PAD), aides memoires, the project midterm review, the completion report prepared by the government, reports from the Agricultural Provincial Departments and the Central Project Management Unit16. Field visits were organized in the three provinces targeted by the project to discuss with project partners, stakeholders, water user associations and other beneficiaries. The mission logistics and time constraints did not allow for in a depth social assessment thus this analysis relies on general discussions with focus groups and individual meetings with the DPA/CT staff to get a sense of the process, impacts and lessons learned on the participatory approaches and integrated participative programming. 1. Context The SMI areas targeted for the first phase Project are home to some of the poorest people in Morocco who have historically benefited little from previous development initiatives. The Irrigation Based Community Development Project (referred to as DRI-PMH in the text) was an "entry point" for the implementation of the Moroccan Government's "2020 Rural Development Strategy" which called for a more participatory integrated approach to rural development. The project sought to improve the incomes and quality of life of rural communities centered on small and medium irrigation (SMI) in the provinces of Azilal, Al Haouz and Khénifra, primarily through demand-driven coordinated investments in SMI rehabilitation and improvement, improved access to complementary community infrastructure not covered by ongoing sectoral programs including rural roads, water supply/sanitation, electrification, health and education facilities. Activities in these areas include dairy cattle raising, animal fattening, artisanal activities and small-scale transformation of agricultural products. The SMI areas are also where most villagers

15 This annex was prepared by Fatou Fall, Social development analyst (MNSSD)

16 See annex of documents consulted

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live, and roads tend to serve these areas. These conditions explain why investment in SMI provides an opportunity to improve the entire economic and social life of the community. 2. Participatory approach: contextual definition and process Contextual definition: Apart from the poverty reduction objective, two expected social benefits of the project were an improved participation and access of beneficiaries to decision-making processes and investment opportunities, thus enhancing ownership for project investments and their sustainability; and increased organizational capacity for the user groups involved, contributing to the formation of social capital. To achieve these benefits, the project required the creation of agricultural water user associations (AUEA in this text) around the irrigation perimeters where irrigation canals were to be improved and drinking water user associations, around the drinking water systems installed in the project areas. Process: 1. Participative programming guide At design, the proposed project implementation took into account the fact that the project was based on a "community-driven development"(CDD) approach. Project implementation arrangements were designed to incorporate two new dimensions: - beneficiary participation in the planning, design, execution, operation and maintenance of project works and equipment (use of participatory decision-making mode) - integration of the various sectoral programs into a more coherent whole. With the objective to grasp and entrust a bottom up participative approach, the central management unit anchored at the Administration du Genie Rural hired a consulting firm (Conseil Ingenierie et Developpement – CID) to undertake a participative programming guide (PPG) for the activities of the project. This guide was supposed to be the guiding management tool for community based participatory approaches. The guide was to help the participatory programming teams (equipe de programmation participative- EPP) and the Provincial Agricultural Teams in identifying needs and priorities of targeted communities, in conceiving the communal investment plans (PIC) and Perimeter Development Plans (PDP). Thus the constitution of the EPP, the training of project management units at local, provincial and central levels to the use of the manual were imperative prior to any action aiming at the implementation of the project. In reality, after several commented drafts, the final version of the PPG was delivered in 2004, two years after effectiveness of the loan. This was also widely posterior to the elaboration of the PIC which took place in 2003 for Al Haouz and Khénifra. In Azilal, activities were started much earlier. The typical participatory approach was not used. Perimeters and rural communes were identified on paper based on criteria set the EPP, the DPA and local authorities. Consultations were limited to the rural communes to select the social and basic infrastructures. SMI plans were determined at perimeters levels though recollection of this process differs depending on the interlocutors. The DPA team was able to utilize prior experience of participatory approaches used in the Oued Lakhdar project. In Khenifra, the DPA team indicated that the guide had not much served either given that the participative diagnostic and the PIC had been already elaborated. CDD elaborated the GPP by associating at different stages the project management teams at DPA level and the other consulting firms involved in the preparation of PIC. All representatives of

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implementation agencies in the three provinces then participated completely or partly in readapted training sessions given that capacity building on GPP was originally planned prior to elaboration of the PIC, with sessions lasting three to five days each. Participatory Programming team members were particularly targeted though the trainings often took place after launch of project activities. It is necessary to note however that the starting of activities in Azilal before the two other provinces contributed to fine tuning the elaboration of the GPP and to obtain a better sense of an adapted dynamic approach to all components. In Azilal and Al Haouz, the consulting firms involved in the elaboration of the PICs took part also in the GPP training. Although plans were not followed rigorously and timely, the involvement of these firms played a corrective role in finalizing project activities envisaged as part of global and specific objectives. 2. Communal investment programs (PIC) The PIC were established for Al Haouz and Khenifra through the contracting of consulting firms and without a firm in Azilal. In order to gather relevant primary information, the EPP, DPA staff and consulting firms followed several steps including the identification of communes and perimeters; a participative diagnostic and identification of needs and priorities; the elaboration of feasibility studies; the elaboration of perimeters development programs; and elaboration of the final PIC 17 . This participatory methodology involved several meetings with focus groups, discussions about the project activities and restitution of the discussions. In Azilal, the consultation process seemed lighter and faster. It is important to note that one of the selection criteria of the perimeters was the group cohesion. In terms of bottom up participation and decision making, the approaches taken seemed to have been initiated and achieved with different levels of success. One, communities were consulted but the modalities of the choice of priorities remain unclear. Secondly, it is hard to establish whether community consultations were widely participatory given that different firms were engaged in the two provinces. In Al Haouz, SCET Maroc was contracted to lead the elaboration of the PIC. A different firm was contracted to deliver training modules. It appears that women of several douars in Al Haouz were sensitized on the role of the AUEA, were given the opportunity to raise issues of concern and discuss them with committees’ members of these AUEA. Yet these demands, unless matching those provided in the context of the DRI-PMH, were not reflected in the development plans for the perimeters. Thirdly, though consultations were wide, it seemed that unnecessary expectations were raised. Fourth point, the PDD and PIC consulted during the mission refer to communities as a whole (‘population ‘) and do not distinguish women from men nor report any consultations of women separately nor of youth. One association met during the mission indicated that they reported back to women of their community regarding the community consultations. Similarly for the GPP, the matrix action does not refer at all to specific socioeconomic and gendered categories of population. Rather it refers only to the’ population’ or villagers and agricultors. Another point to make is that the PIC reviewed during the ICR mission indicated similar community priorities leading to the conclusion that communities might have had a menu on the basis of which they could select activities to be financed. In the PIC from the commune of Oum Er Bia, a line indicated that the PPT retained a proposal from the Health delegate to rehabilitate the health center. The objectivity of the priorities expressed could also be easily influenced by the

17 SCET Maroc reports on assistance to DPA Al Haouz, Mission I, II and III, 2004-5

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composition of the interviewed groups in the douars. Instead of community representation, in fact, the declarations can correspond to individual opinions therefore priorities and needs not necessarily representatives of the community. Last but not least consideration to have is the political and elite capture dimensions of the stakeholders including AUEA members which are not discussed here but surely existent. Our interactions during the field visits were mostly limited to committee members of the AUEA however the midterm review points to cases of mistrust, misunderstanding and lack of recognition of the AUEA role in certain communities thus posing the sustainability question of these structures. Secondly, the geographical coverage of the AUEA has important implications for their inclusiveness. AUEA typically include several douars along the irrigated perimeter but the AUEA are by law only allowed to have six committee members. Hence some farmers may not have considered the AUEA to be competent and aware to address their needs, and do not feel represented in it. Yet others consider it only to be responsible for the village where its premises are based. However, in the other AUEA, it seems that an agreement was reached that one committee member would represent several villages so as to cover all villages associated with the irrigated area among them. At the level of every province, the PICs were validated by the Restrained Provincial Committee of Rural Development chaired by the Governor in the presence of the presidents of the communes and turned into contractual agreements. In Azilal and Al Haouz, the PDP were translated in Arab and transmitted to the AUEA. On the other hand in Khénifra, the PDP were not validated because of a disagreement between the DPA and the consulting firm. In some instances, PDP were apparently not widely discussed nor shared with the local population. In short, important opportunities were missed to improve the quality of participation and debate at this initial stage of the project by ensuring a transparent and fair process.

3. Capacity building of the AUEA

All AUEA benefitted from a capacity building program designed with several modules18. All AUEA committee members met during the mission expressed their satisfaction on the training modules which enabled participants to familiarize with organization and financial management, accounting, conflict resolution and planning, among others19. Other impacts of this training are the acquisition of a legal status, representativity vis a vis the administration, knowledge gained on management and SMI maintenance20. Nevertheless several noted the necessity for a second phase of capacity building and a more constant follow up. It was also noted that the implementation and follow up of the AUEA action plans and other acquired tools abruptly stopped with the end of the

18 participative diagnosis and establishment of AUEAs, distribution and management of water , technical management of irrigation networks, sustainability of AUEAs, monitoring and evaluation

19 Rapport du bureau d’ etudes SCET Maroc, Province d’ Al haouz.

20 Presentation of project activities to CPRDR, DPA de Marrakech, March 2009

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training sessions. Two principal reasons were evoked to explain this situation: - the technicians (7th members), that participated in the training cycle of the AUEA did not follow up on the first trainers to consolidate the learning process and replicate it. The retiring of an important group of the CT staff weakened this supervision. -The modules were not transmitted to the new members after renewal (partial or total) of the management boards of the AUEA. In certain cases, the training documents and the AUEA administrative documents were not transferred to the new members.

3. Impact of the participatory and integrated approach The key innovation of the project was participatory decision making in respect of irrigation and the complementary infrastructure yet many government staff had to be trained on how to make it work. Limited availability of government staff with a good knowledge of the participatory approach was identified as a substantial risk in the PAD. Implementation of the institutional framework and coordination mechanisms necessary for a sustainable integrated and participative development at local and regional level asked for much more time than envisaged. Also, the elaboration of participatory tools and planning and programming methodological support (PIC, PDP) and the adhesion of target groups and stakeholders to the process of participative development demanded a lot of effort and time. The chosen approach seemed too complex for the investment plans originally planned with a result of raising expectations from communities especially women which were not fulfilled. Nevertheless, project institutional gains are very important in all 3 provinces despite slowness in the implementation of the project. It campaigns in favor of the use of a participatory approach while either improving its implementation process or adapting the approach contextually taking into account time and context constraints. The participatory decision-making process had not been piloted and the resources required to get it working was greatly underestimated. There were no baseline data and outcome indicators were poorly chosen. However, given the pioneering nature of the participatory approach as proposed by the project, in the communities involved, it can be widely assessed that associations found it useful, empowering and rewarding to be involved in the identification, planning, implementation and design of their own development. As a tool, the integrated participative approach seems to have been relatively successful as a tool in creating formal associative counterparts vis a vis the administration, in enabling bottom up identification of needs and priorities yet the tool remains to be strengthened in creating sustainable structures able to drive their own development. The institutional arrangements designed to achieve greater beneficiary participation and integration of sectoral programs has been piloted quite successfully. Greater decentralization of the planning, design and execution of rural programs and services in an integrated way was achieved with involvement of the beneficiaries. As a process, the development logic of an integrated approach, though relatively new in these areas, proved useful in implementing components which took into account improvement of agricultural production, improvement of access to markets and amelioration of health and

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education conditions. In short, the integrated approach proved essential to achieve the improvement of living conditions (one of the development objectives) and poverty reduction in the three provinces. The integrated composition of the EPP with representatives from various ministries is another positive outcome in the technical implementation of the project. In addition, the law requires that an extension officer (i.e. a technician from the local agricultural extension centre) occupies the function of the ‘seventh member’ on the AUEA board; his task is to support the AUEA members in technical matters. The institutional reporting mechanism paid also much attention to fostering stakeholder ownership and accountability by involving governors and water users associations among others in provincial-level supervision meetings. Nevertheless, it is necessary to signal certain insufficiencies to this approach, as a process in order to derive lessons. Some of these limitations were mentioned by AUEA as well as execution agencies.

Insufficiency of community consultations including non systematic integration of women and youth in consultations.

Insufficient technical monitoring human resources: additional fully trained and dedicated staff to the project would be essential to the success and sustainability of a CDD type project, which necessitates constant and close contact with communities. The staff background would need to also be reinforced by social profiles so as to ensure closer and adequate supervision of the activities of the project.

Lack of availability of Government staff with a good knowledge of the participatory Programming approach21

lack of training and learning opportunities of involved staff lack of inter consultation and capitalization from other projects (Lakhdar)

4. Assessment of sustainability of the community based associations: financial and institutional 1. Financial Together with integration, beneficiary participation constituted one of the basic concepts underlying the DRI-PMH Project. However, the reluctance of water users to contribute to capital

21 In Khenifra, the monitoring and institutional follow up of the associations was supposed to be coordinated between the CT, represented by the seventh member and the DPA, in particular the Cellule d’ Appui aux AUEA. Based on our discussions in Khenifra, it appears that most support to the AUEA was provided by the CT. It is important to note that the four CT of the province of Khenifra have different staffing situations ranging from one seventh member covering one AUEA to one covering 11 AUEA. In the DPA, the cellule d’Appui is composed of four staff, one from the services des Amenagements and four from the CT. The role of the Cellule d ‘ Appui remained unclear; the mission did not obtain clear answers regarding its mandate, framework of intervention, and the associations met cited the CT as sources of support rather than the cellule d’appui.

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costs was identified as one of the substantial risks in the PAD. This participation implied on one hand, that the beneficiaries be involved in programming, designing, constructing and operating the infrastructure called for under the project, and on the other hand that the beneficiaries committed to contribute to the initial investment and took responsibility for ongoing operating and maintenance costs, in order to ensure the sustainability of the improvements. Financial contribution meant also engagement and appropriateness of the project, a sense of ownership and one of the conditions for a sustainable improvement in incomes and living standards. For the SMI rehabilitation program, the rate of contribution was determined and agreed as a flat rate of 10 percent in the contractual agreements between the administration and the water users' associations. For rural roads, the community was required to contribute at least 5% to the capital cost. For potable water and sanitation, the required capital cost contribution by the community and beneficiaries was 15% and 5% respectively. Cost recovery from users has not been 100% effective in all AUEA. Results are mitigated. Discussions with AUEA members and other stakeholders during the ICR mission led to several explanations. In certain douars, the 10% contribution was possible after the achievement of the works through progressive repayment amount (Aït Akka, Assif Aït N’Jaâ, Tigardi). In other AUEA, it was not possible to honor on time the contribution due to a certain mistrust among users (considering difficulties generated by the delay taken in launching the works), the lack of revenues caused by two successive years of drought, the late construction of rural roads leading to difficulties in marketing agricultural products), lack of sensibilisation of the users and the insufficiency of supervision of the AUEA and their support.

In the past, the World bank had recommended that the DPA intensify their efforts to mobilize beneficiary financial contribution which could be blocked in a bank account in order to face repairs works if needed. Nevertheless, the focus on the financial contribution of users towards the investments costs has often hidden the other forms of contribution and their participation to development efforts in spite of their importance which is harder to measure. In addition to contributions to investments, AUEA members must pay yearly dues. Most AUEA seem to have been successful in collecting dues rather than the initial contribution to investment costs. Given the importance of user contributions and dues as proof of their commitment of the project and as means of financial sustainability, the partial cost recovery may indicate limited opportunity to succeed in this regard. It is also useful to pose the question of beneficiary contribution to investment costs as an efficient measure of appropriation of beneficiaries, its timeliness, the institutional mechanisms of accounting and collection and its relevance to a project timeframe. Moroccan Law 84 stipulates that irrigation schemes beneficiaries contribute in nature or cash to investments yet it appears that in national SMI programs, beneficiaries do not contribute. In future projects, the Bank should seek to harmonize its practices with the national programs. 2. Institutional AUEA The constitution of AUEA remains one of the gains of project. If positive impact is measured by the capacity to maintain and repair SMI, it is believed that AUEA can succeed and play sustainably this role, granted the AUEA are in fact a formalized version of traditional and long established water organizations. If AUEA are evaluated on their institutional capacity and

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autonomy to generate income generating projects and ultimately the development of their areas, it seems that many associations have yet to succeed in this path. The majority of the members of the AUEA met in the field are well conscious of the relevance of their current role and future after the achievement of the project. They are motivated to preserve and consolidate the project gains as some testify the numerous initiatives taken by the associations to consolidate infrastructures set up (rural roads installation, protections and discussion of certain sections). But they are also conscious of the limits of their current capacities and they do not hide their worry as for the insufficiency of the supervision in comparison with the needs and the challenges. This drawing was shared by many met during the field visits. They underlined the importance and relevance of the economic, social and institutional outcomes of the project (in terms of integration) but were unanimous about the fragility of these, given the very short length of the project in comparison with the important needs in technical support, in organization and in supervision of the farmers living in difficult areas and long isolated from the administrative and technical services. In Khenifra, Azilal and Al Haouz, AUEA members have indicated the need for continued support from the DPA and CT. In particular, the training sessions, the monitoring and follow up from the CT, the dynamism and vested interest of the members constitute strong basis of sustainability and capacity to continue their DRI-PMH related activities. Most associations met, indicated continuous support to strengthen either the cohesion of the group, the learning processes or the capacity to build financial stability. Strengthening AUEA‘ s institutional capacity goes in pair with reinforced human resources in the CT and provincial Departments of Agriculture (DPA), adequate and continuous use of participatory tools and training (such as the Participatory Programming Guide- GPP). In other AUEA, the principles of participation, community mobilization and cohesion will need to be reinstated because the AUEA do not either represent the interests of the community nor play their management role. It is worth noting that in Azilal, the DPA has initiated discussion on ways to consolidate the institutional capacity of the AUEA by seeking financial and capacity building opportunities with non governmental organizations and state initiatives.

Enlarged role of AUEA From an integrated rural development perspective, the AUEA will be called to play a more active role. Certainly AUEA have showed very encouraging indications to take their responsibility in management of SMI infrastructure by getting involved actively in the conception, monitoring and execution of works. However, in reality, the effectiveness of their role remains broadly dependent on their financial capacities which are on the whole showing a deficit. To attenuate potential weakening effects that can rise from financing difficulties, AUEA will need a closer technical monitoring by CT and DPA. Also, their capacities of administrative, technical and financial management remain still rudimentary and require an additional support on behalf of the administration. A positive experience and which could be duplicated with AUEA has been led in the PABVOL project (development plan of the Oued Lahdar). Committees of douars (similar to AUEA) were structured in associations of local development (ADL) with identification and preparation of various plans. Two structures operated as part of this project: ADS (social development agency)

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as a state structure for financing and capacity building and AADEC (Azilal association for environment and marketing) as local structure of supervision and monitoring of the ADL. This partnership allowed training and sustainability of 14 ADL out of 26 pre-existing committees. Some elements of this success include knowledge of the ground and permanent presence in the communities of AADEC as a local structure of intermediation, continuous monitoring, a wider mandate of the ADL (than that of the AUEA) and adequate repartition of several douars per field staff.

AUEP (association d’ usager d’ eau potable/ drinking water user association) AUEP associations were constituted and responsible for use and management of drinking water systems. As stipulated by the conventions signed between AUEP and rural communes, management includes oversight of the functioning of pumps, maintenance and service of equipment. AUEPS committees undertake also meters notation and bill establishments however many have not benefited from training as have the AUEA. Management performance differs based on financial capacities, committees’ memberships and the nature of the service provided. The mission visited only one AUEP in the province of Azilal. Overall, it seems that AUEP do not benefit from enough supervision to allow them to manage sustainably and properly drinking water systems. Financial and administrative management is in the majority of the cases unpredictable and not correspondent to regulation in force. To put right this situation, it is necessary to provide AUEP with a basic training allowing them to set up a transparent system of financial management (opening of accounts, invoicing, and accounting) and basic technical knowledge for service and maintenance. Income generating activities From a participative point of view, one of the limitations of the DRI-PMH has been the limited inclusion of women and youth. Income generating activities were conceived at a latter stage and entrusted mostly to women. Though not planned as a component, IGA have somewhat enabled impacts in social and economic dimensions. Some positive outcomes are: increased revenues, empowerment and capacity building. In the three DPA, 41 IGas were set up, an average of one IGA per CT and year. Most activities were around sheep and goat raising and apiculture. The design and planning of activities, their management and degree of success differ between regions. In several localities, these structures not only targeted very few women but seemed occupational and informal hence allocated budget and human resources were deficient to generate sustainable impact. These associations did not benefit from trainings. Lessons learned are that adequate staffing and budget must be programmed in order to set a strong developmental basis for IGAs. Similarly an integrated approach would be crucial and incorporate financing, production, valorization, capacity buiding and marketing. 5. Achievement of PDO through the integrated participative approach? Achieved social benefits include: - Improved rural incomes and living standards, - Improved participation and access of beneficiaries to decision-making processes and investment

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- Opportunities, enhancing ownership for project investments and their sustainability; and - Increased organizational capacity for the rural communities involved and user groups, contributing to the formation of social capital. Acces to markets

Better roads have translated into improvement of access to markets for agricultural products, either by farmers themselves or by means of intermediaries. Better access has meant thus increased sales and revenues.

Access to drinking water

Access to drinking water contributed to improving the health of communities as it diminished risks of spread of water related diseases. Individual connections constituted a radical change inside houses and in the behaviour of women and girls. Surveys in certain douars have indicated that housewives and girls have saved much time in daily water chores22. The fact that more girls can now attend school can be attributed in part to the home access to water. However, home connections has encouraged users to consume more water than before which has led to increased wastewater. None of the localities visited envisaged the building of a sanitary network. Thus, wastewater is evacuated in individual wells or simply rejected outside. This situation risks polluting natural water sources, especially since these wells are constructed without sceptical pits and in a traditional way. Children schooling Rural roads have eased the travel of school children. Construction and rehabilitation of school facilities (electrification, connection of water and building of latrines) had a very positive effect on enrolment and attendance.

Access to health services The rehabilitation of health facilities was principally centered on the rehabilitation of health centres and the building of accommodation for nurses made easier care conditions for targeted communities.

Impact of the project is notably appreciated in terms of improvement of incomes and of living standard of the target populations. In addition to data review23, focus groups discussions enabled to draw the conclusion that access to school, health facilities and drinking water had a positive impact, sometimes one activity reinforcing the effect of the other, in comparison with the reference situation. 6. Lessons learned on integrated participatory approach and looking forward

22 FAO

23 the implementation of socio-economic facilities (rural roads, schools, drinking water, health structures and electrification)

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Lessons learned from past rural development programs indicate that flexibility and grass-roots, demand-driven approaches are key in building ownership, defining local priorities and laying the foundation for better implementation and sustainability. However, community-based demand-driven approaches have had mixed success in the promotion of rural Infrastructure and social investments because of excessive involvement of local authorities. With the DRI- PMH, the participatory approach was a gain but may have proved to be more successful and sustainable if:

adequate human resources were planned and made available to enable the participaroty approach to be implemented,

the mechanism for beneficiary commitment was better designed and understood, the budget and contracting process was less highly centralized thus more conducive to

community driven development, a participatory feedback and informative process for the beneficiaries to express their

priorities and see that they are implemented was in place, additional and flexible resources were made available to the participating provinces to

respond to the incremental needs of the beneficiaries in an integrated way, the participatory approach was itself better fit to respond to project objectives.

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ANNEX OF REVIEWED DOCUMENTS. 1. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA D’Azilal, Programme de DRI, centré sur la petite et moyenne hydraulique : Rapport d’achèvement. 2. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA D’Azilal, Programme de DRI, centré sur la petite et moyenne hydraulique : Rapport de la Composante développement agricole. 3. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz : Plan D’investissement Communal (Commune Rurale de Ait Adel). 4. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz : Plan D’investissement Communal (Commune Rurale Tamagarte). 5. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH : Rapport principal. 6. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH : Fiches Projet et Périmètres. 7. Décembre 2008. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Service de la Production Agricole. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH: Rapport sur l’Etat d’avancement du projet DRI-PMH. Composante Développement Agricole. 8. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Marrakech. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH: Annexes. 9. Mars 2009. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime, DPA de Khenifra. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH: Rapport sur l’Etat d’avancement au 7. 03. 2009. 10. Mars 2005. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime. Administration du Génie Rural. Direction des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH: Rapport d’évaluation à mi parcours : rapport principal. 10. Mars 2005. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Pêche Maritime. Administration du Génie Rural. Direction des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles. Projet de Développement Rural Intégré centré sur la PMH: Rapport d’évaluation à mi parcourt : annexes

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11. Novembre 2004. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural. DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz. Mission II : Programme d’Investissement Communal (PIC) et Programme D’investissement Provincial (PIP). SCET-Maroc 12. Novembre 2004. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural. DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz. Mission II : Identification des besoins et priorités. Mission II. 1. Fiches périmètres et douars associes/ Communes Rurales : Ait Adel, Abadou et Tazarte. SCET-Maroc 13. Novembre 2004. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural. DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz. Mission I : Identification Communale. SCET-Maroc 14. Mai 2004. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural. DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz. Mission III : Programme d’Investissement Communal et Provincial : Etude De Faisabilité. SCET-Maroc 15. Novembre 2004. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural. DPA de Marrakech. Assistance Technique pour l ‘ Etablissement des Programmes d’Investissements Communaux de D.R.I centré sur la petite et moyenne Hydraulique dans la province d’Al Haouz. Mission II : Identification des besoins et priorites. Mission II. 1 : rapport de présentation. Edition provisoire. SCET-Maroc 16. Mars 2009. FAO. Assistance Technique aux cellules de gestion du projet de développement rural centré sur la petite et moyenne hydraulique (DRI-PMH). Consultation pour l’évaluation rétrospective des résultats du projet DRI-PMH : rapport principal. SCET-Maroc 17. Mars 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 1 : sensibilisation concertation. A.D.I, groupe ONA. 18. Juin 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 et 2: rapport d’exécution de la phase 3 : session spécialisée : gestion administrative et financière de l’AUEA. A.D.I, groupe ONA 19. Mars 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 1 : session 1 : Fondement de l’AUEA et diagnostic participatif. A.D.I, groupe ONA

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20. Mars 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 2 : session 2: Valorisation de l’eau a la parcelle et répartition et distribution de l‘eau. A.D.I, groupe ONA 21. Mars 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 2 : session 3: gestion technique et entretien des réseaux. A.D.I, groupe ONA 22. Juin 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 3 : session 4: vie de l’AUEA. A.D.I, groupe ONA 23. Octobre 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 2 : rapport d’exécution de la phase 3 : session 5: Suivi évaluation. A.D.I, groupe ONA 25. Juin 2006. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Agriculture, du Développement Rural et des Pêches maritimes. Direction Provinciale de l’Agriculture de Marrakech. Formation- Animation des Associations d’Usagers des Eaux Agricoles (AUEA) des Périmètres de Petite et Moyenne Hydraulique d’Al Haouz - Lot 1 et 2: Implication de la femme a la vie de l’AUEA. Rapport d’exécution des séances de sensibilisation auprès des femmes. A.D.I, groupe ONA 26. World Bank. DRI-PMH supervision mission aide memoires 27. World Bank. DRI-PMH =roject Appraisal Document