division of elections system review report prepared by...

Division of Elections System Review Report

Prepared by

Bureau of Voting Systems Certification

Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.

Sequoia/WinEDS, Release 3.1.077, Version 1(Revised 2)

Municipal Election

Village of Wellington

March 13, 2012 ______________________________________________

April 17, 2012

Florida Department of State of 20

Executive Summary

Abstract: This report includes an evaluation of Dominion Voting System‟s (DVS) Sequoia-

WinEDS Election Management System (EMS), along with an inspection of the

Ballot Printing System (BPS) and the BPS/WinEDS Bridge tool application

(Bridge). No evidence of a software flaw was found in any of the elements

assessed; however, the system‟s task sequences and operator manuals showed

some lack of clarity with regard to the steps required to create an election

definition and the general usability of the software.

Purpose: To evaluate the DVS-Sequoia Voting System, Release 3.1.077, Version 1

(Revised 2), which was certified in Florida under certification #070907-

SEQUOIA-Ol (Revised2) and approved on July 22, 2008, to assess whether the

system‟s software when employed as expected exhibits a flaw in contest order.

This assessment includes an examination of the WinEDS database, Ballot Printing

System (BPS), and Bridge tool application.

Background: On March 13, 2012, an issue was encountered with regard to the certified vote

results for a municipal election held in Village of Wellington. After certification

of the official results, the county performed the post-election voting system audit

(on March 19, 2012), which includes a manual tally of the votes cast in a

randomly selected race. This audit revealed that the vote totals as stated in the

certified election results differed from those reached with the manual tally.

A review of the WinEDS election definition indicated that this election did not

have the correct contest order. The order should have been: Mayor, Council –

Seat 1, and Council – Seat 4. However, the contest order for this election was:

Council – Seat 1, Council – Seat 4, and Mayor. The vote totals within each given

contest were accurate, but those votes were not reported within the correct

contest.

On March 19, the same day that the anomaly was discovered, an employee of

DVS worked with a Palm Beach County election official to reorder the contests

and to produce an election definition for use with the Optech 400-C central scan

tabulator. With this updated definition, Palm Beach‟s election staff rescanned the

Wellington ballots on the central count scan tabulator and concurred that the

recount produced election results that differed from those originally certified on

March 13 and, further, that the central count tabulator recount represented the true

totals, as obtained in the manual audit.

Scope: This limited examination is for DVS-Sequoia‟s EMS that contains the WinEDS

Release 3.1.077 application; Ballot Printing System (BPS), Release 40L, Version

3; and the BPS/WinEDS Bridge application, Version 3.1.19D. It will not include

a review of the Optech Insight Plus or the Optech 400-C tabulators. BPS and the

Bridge are optional applications that provide the user with a less cumbersome way

to create an election, but the WinEDS software is capable of producing an

election, without the use of either of these applications.


Note that in the state of Florida there are two counties using this voting system,

Palm Beach and Indian River County. Currently, Palm Beach is the only county

that uses all three of the referenced Sequoia applications (BPS, Bridge tool, and

WinEDS), as Indian River uses only WinEDS.

Examination: The Bureau of Voting Systems Certification (BVSC) examined the voting system

using two groups, working independently. The first group used a system with the

three applications (BPS, Bridge, and WinEDS) installed on only one laptop and

the second group worked on a system which included the same applications, but

with a client/server configuration.

Vendor provided documentation was used to validate required procedures for

performing the test activities to follow. Specifically, the systems operations user

manuals were used as a basis for instruction and to perform process steps. Each

group restored an election profile and definition, which included data such as

precincts, city information, offices, etc. Then the BPS application was used to

create elements for a new election, including contest and candidate information,

after which the Bridge tool was employed to import the „dummy‟ data into the

WinEDS database. The groups also used Palm Beach County‟s 2012 Municipal

election definition as a „base election‟ for WinEDS and BPS databases.

Various components in BPS were edited and the Bridge tool was again applied to

import into WinEDS. Each group verified the accuracy of the expected contest

order and also tested various permutations to uncover a contest order mismatch.

In addition, as indicated in Sequoia‟s WinEDS Election Data System Software

Release 3.1.074C Reference Guide and the online help option within the software,

the groups performed the tedious tasks of reordering contests as is sometimes

required when edits have occurred. The manual explains that list order affects the

ballot and report appearance. Instruction manual and reference guide clarity

issues will be reviewed and addressed during the certification process for

Dominion Voting Systems Inc./Sequoia WinEDS Release 4.0.175, Version 1.

Conclusion: After testing, no evidence of a software flaw was found in any of the elements

assessed and neither testing group was able to replicate the software contest issue

that occurred in the March 13, 2012 Village of Wellington Election. Since no

software flaw occurred, the contest order was changed in the WinEDS database to

verify that the user can reorder a mismatched contest order. Existing event logs

did not provide sufficient data to determine what occurred in this election.

The manuals and the software were extremely difficult to use and/or understand.

Moreover, sometimes steps required to complete task sequences were not

included, thus creating not only a delay in the amount of time needed to create an

election, but also hinders a user‟s ability to verify that the election data is correct.

In most instances, once the correct documentation passages were found, staff was

able to perform a given activity. However, the manuals were cumbersome to

interpret, time consuming to comprehend, and instructions were difficult to locate.


Recommendations: Election officials need to review the contest list order in WinEDS, for both paper

and the AVC Edge II ballots, to verify that contest data is in sync, as explained in

the vendor‟s Product Advisory Notice. Additionally, a more enhanced test deck

should be used during Logic and Accuracy testing as the enhanced patterning

would allow the tester to see contest order errors before the election is finalized.,

The user manual and reference guide clarity issues will be reviewed and

addressed during the current certification process for Dominion Voting Systems

Inc./Sequoia WinEDS Release 4.0.175, Version 1.


Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.

Sequoia/WinEDS, Release 3.1.077, Version 1 (Revised 2)

System Review

Purpose:

Evaluation of the Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) Sequoia-WinEDS, Release 3.1.077, Version

1 (Revised 2), which was certified in Florida under certification #070907-SEQUOIA-Ol

(Revised 2) and approved on July 22, 2008 [See Appendix A], to assess whether the system‟s

software when employed as expected exhibits a flaw in contest order.

Scope:

This assessment includes an examination of DVS-Sequoia‟s EMS that contains the WinEDS

Release 3.1.077 application; Ballot Printing System (BPS), Release 40L, Version 31; and the

BPS/WinEDS Bridge application, Version 3.1.19D. It did not include a review of the Optech

Insight Plus or the Optech 400-C tabulators.

Certification Process:

A voting system configuration, certified for use in Florida, consists of a specific set of hardware

and software components that as a whole, meets the requirements of Florida Statutes and the

Florida Voting System Standards. A voting system configuration has three main elements: the

election management system, the precinct count system, and the central count system.

Section 97.021(44), Florida Statutes, defines a voting system as

“…a method of casting and processing votes that functions wholly or partly by use of

electromechanical or electronic apparatus or by use of marksense ballots and includes,

but is not limited to, the procedures for casting and processing votes and the programs,

operating manuals, supplies, printouts, and other software necessary for the system‟s

operation.”

Sections 101.5601 through s. 101.5614 Florida Statutes are known as the “Electronic Voting

Systems Act.” As stated in s. 101.5602, the

“…purpose of this act is to authorize the use of electronic and electromechanical voting

systems in which votes are registered electronically or are tabulated on automatic

tabulating equipment or data processing equipment.”

The Department of State must conduct public examination of all electronic or electromechanical

voting systems submitted to it and must determine whether the systems comply with the

requirements of s. 101.5606. As per s. 101.5605,

1 The BPS and Bridge tool applications are optional supplemental applications that provide the user with a less

cumbersome way to create an election, but the WinEDS software is capable of producing an election, without the use of

either of these applications. In the state of Florida, there are two counties using this voting system, Palm Beach and Indian

River County. Currently, Palm Beach is the only county that uses all three of the referenced Sequoia applications (BPS,

Bridge tool, and WinEDS), as Indian River uses only WinEDS.


“Testing for certification shall include, but is not limited to, testing of all software

required for the voting system‟s operation; the ballot reader; the rote processor, especially

in its logic and memory components; the digital printer; the fail-safe operations; the

counting center environmental requirements; and the equipment reliability estimate. For

the purpose of assisting in examining the system, the department shall employ or contract

for services of at least one individual who is expert in one or more fields of data

processing, mechanical engineering, and public administration and shall require from the

individual a written report of his or her examination.”

The first provisional certification of a voting system was issued January 28, 1994. In June 1998,

the Division of Elections, Voting System Section, published the “Florida Voting Systems

Standards” in an attempt to make the requirements for, and process of, certification and

provisional certification easier to understand. The Florida Voting Systems Standards were

published January 2005 and have continued to be revised to include updates in legislation.

The Department of State Division of Elections has adopted uniform rule 1S-2.004 regarding the

purchase, use, and sale of voting equipment in the state. Governing bodies (supervisors of

elections) in the State of Florida may only purchase equipment that has been certified for use in

this state by the Department of State as specified by s. 101.294, F. S. and in accordance with this

rule.

Certification Information for DVS Sequoia-WinEDS, Release 3.1.077:

The voting system under review was first certified as Sequoia-WinEDS, Release 3.1.077,

Version 1, on September 7, 2007. The version currently in use in Palm Beach County is

Sequoia-WinEDS, Release 3.1.077, Version 1 (Revised 2), certified on July 22, 2008. The

certification team for this effort included two staff members from the Division of Elections, a

Government Operations Consultant and a Government Analyst I, with assistance from an

employee from the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Election‟s office.

Village of Wellington Election:

On March 13, 2012, the Village of Wellington held a Municipal Election and the Palm Beach

County Supervisor of Elections published election results for the election:

Mayor

2,411 Darell Bowen

3,341 Bob Margolis

Council Seat 1

2,877 John Greene

2,946 Shauna Hostetler

Council Seat 4

2,956 Al Paglia

2,745 Matt Willhite

After publication of the election results, the county performed the post-election voting system

audit, which includes a publicly noticed manual tally of the votes cast in a randomly selected


race2. This audit revealed that the vote totals as stated in the certified election results differed

from those reached with a manual tally.

A review of the WinEDS election definition indicated that this election did not have the expected

contest order. It showed that the vote totals within each given contest were accurate, but that the

votes were not reported within the correct contest. On March 19, the same day that the anomaly

was discovered, an employee of DVS worked with a Palm Beach County election official to

reorder the contests and to produce an election definition for use with the Optech 400-C central

scan tabulator. With this updated definition, Palm Beach‟s election staff rescanned the

Wellington ballots on the central count scan tabulator and concurred that the recount produced

election results that differed from those originally certified on March 13 and, further, that the

central count tabulator recount represented the true totals, as obtained in the manual audit. Those

results are as follows:

Mayor

2,877 Darell Bowen

2,947 Bob Margolis

Council Seat 1

2,956 John Greene

2,745 Shauna Hostetler

Council Seat 4

2,412 Al Paglia

3,341 Matt Willhite

The voting system vendor, Dominion Voting Systems, was then provided with a „backup‟ copy

of the election database. DVS Director of Product Development, Eric Coomer, performed an

analysis of the database to determine a root cause for the abnormality. On Tuesday, March 27,

2012, Dr. Coomer visited the Florida Department of State/Division of Elections, where he

discussed the findings, provided a scenario of the type of activity that could cause this variance,

suggested best practices for Logic & Accuracy testing, and illustrated software updates which

would lessen the probability of such an event occurring in the future.

Below is a more detailed discussion of Dr. Coomer‟s presentation.

Dominion Voting Systems Findings (Root Cause)

The analysis indicated that the anomaly was caused by dissimilar data that resided in two

WinEDS tables containing contest order data. For the purposes of this discussion, the

two tables will be called: „base order‟ table and „ballot contest order‟ table. When

election data is imported into the WinEDS database, the base order and ballot contest

order tables are populated with the same data, in the same sort order.

When the database was received by DVS, the database contained contests orders that

were atypical from the expected order. To guarantee that the Ballot Contest Order table

data matches the Base Order table data, the user is required to perform several time

consuming steps. If a step is missed or done out of sequence, it could result in a problem

with the ballot data. The misstep could cause an anomaly if not addressed with proper

2 Per section 101.591(1), Florida Statutes.


contest order sequencing. The reference guide and “online help” informed users that

contest sequencing should be addressed when making additions and/or deletions to the

election database. The issue had been seen before in some Dominion/Sequoia user

jurisdictions, but in those jurisdictions the issue was detected and corrected during L & A

testing or earlier since this can be part of a normal election preparation process.

Hypothesis of Election Database Activity

Three statements were released by Dominion pertaining to the Village of Wellington

election event (See Appendix B, C, and D). While the exact cause of the variance

between the tables could not be unconditionally determined since the complete chain of

events leading up to the anomaly is not known, Dr. Coomer theorized that the dissimilar

data appeared to have occurred due to actions taken to create the AVC EDGE II contest

titles or because of a physical change to the EDGE‟s ballot „artwork.‟ He stated that

either of these scenarios could result in the contest order becoming „out of sync‟ between

the two tables of data.

Procedures used to create the paper ballots, which are cast using the Optech-Insight

Precinct Scanner and which can later be processed with the Optech-400C Central Count

Scanner, differ from those that are used to create the ballot for the AVC EDGE II. These

differences may have caused the ballot contests to be presented in an order which varied

from the originally imported listing.

It is important to note that the apparent incongruity of the two tables is not an indication

of a system error. Given the state of the database at the time the election results were

uploaded, the behavioral processes functioned correctly and as programmed.


Best Practices – L&A Testing

Ordinarily, Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing activities conducted in accordance with

section 101.5612, Florida Statutes, would have revealed possible anomalies. In this

instance the L&A test did not do that because of the combination of the fact that the

ballot had three contests that were precisely the same and sequential and because the

ballot test deck 1-2 pattern was not sufficient to uncover the contest order variance.

It is common to use a 1-2 or 1-2-3 pattern when preparing test decks. This type of

marking means that one test ballot is marked on the 1st oval (“vote target”) in each

contest on the ballot. Then two test ballots are marked on the 2nd

oval in each contest on

the ballot. Using this scenario, the test deck for the example provided in this report

would have had a total of three test ballots. When the test ballots were cast and the

results tapes/reports were printed, the vote totals were displayed in the expected 1-2

pattern. Because of this, pre-audited test deck count expectation is met:

Candidate

Ballot

Pos. Order

CONTESTS AS THEY APPEARED ON

PRINTED BALLOT

Expected Vote Totals

(Simple Test Deck)

CONTEST 1: MAYOR

1 CANDIDATE 1: Darell Bowen 1

2 CANDIDATE 2: Bob Margolis 2

CONTEST 2: COUNCIL – SEAT 1

3 CANDIDATE 1: John Greene 1

4 CANDIDATE 2: Shauna Hostetler 2


5 CANDIDATE 1: Al Paglia 1

6 CANDIDATE 2: Matt Willhite 2

A more enhanced test deck, with a pattern such as 1-2-3-4-3-2 would have demonstrated that

the database was not handling vote totals as expected:

EXPECTED CONTEST VOTE TOTALS –

USING BALLOTS MARKED USING AN

ENHANCED TEST DECK

EXPECTED

Vote Totals

CONTEST 1: MAYOR

CANDIDATE 1: Darell Bowen 1

CANDIDATE 2: Bob Margolis 2


CANDIDATE 1: John Greene 3

CANDIDATE 2: Shauna Hostetler 4


CANDIDATE 1: Al Paglia 3

CANDIDATE 2: Matt Willhite 2


ACTUAL/EXPECTED CONTEST VOTE

TOTALS COMPARISON AFTER

COMPLETION OF L&A TESTING – USING

AN „ENHANCED‟ TEST DECK

EXPECTED

Contest

Vote Totals

ACTUAL

Contest

Vote Totals

CONTEST 1: MAYOR

CANDIDATE 1: Darell Bowen 1 3

CANDIDATE 2: Bob Margolis 2 2


CANDIDATE 1: John Greene 3 1

CANDIDATE 2: Shauna Hostetler 4 2


CANDIDATE 1: Al Paglia 3 3

CANDIDATE 2: Matt Willhite 2 4

The enhanced patterning allows the tester to see that something is incorrect in the way the

election data is being processed in the database.

Software Updates

The Division of Elections is currently reviewing an upgraded version of the WinEDS

software, which includes several enhancements to the currently certified version. One of

the improvements to the system is the addition of a more „user friendly‟ way to deal with

the large number of items in the task sequence required to ensure that the Base Order

table and the Ballot Contest Order table are in sync.

After the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification‟s review of the system, the team agrees with

Dominion‟s conclusions as presented by Dr.Coomer.


Bureau of Voting Systems Certification Review of Voting System

The review team for this effort included three staff members from the Division of Elections

Bureau of Voting Systems Certification (Bureau Chief, Senior Management Analyst II, and

Systems Project Analyst, Systems Programmer II) [See Appendix E]..

The Bureau of Voting Systems Certification (BVSC) examined the voting system using two

groups, working independently. The first group used a system with the three applications (BPS,

Bridge, and WinEDS) installed on only one laptop and the second group worked on a system

which included the same applications, but with a client/server configuration.

Vendor provided documentation was used to validate required procedures for performing the test

activities to follow. Specifically, the systems operations user manuals were used as a basis for

instruction and to perform process steps. Each group restored an election profile and definition,

which included data such as precincts, city information, offices, etc. Then the BPS application

was used to create elements for a new election, including contest and candidate information, after

which the Bridge tool was employed to import the „dummy‟ data into the WinEDS database.

The groups also used Palm Beach County‟s 2012 Municipal election definition as a „base

election‟ for WinEDS and BPS databases. Various components in BPS were edited and the

Bridge tool was again applied to import into WinEDS. Each group verified the accuracy of the

expected contest order.

Below are specific details of the permutations tested to uncover a contest order variance.

1. Set up WinEDS 3.1.077, Version 1 system according to the certified voting system

specifications, on both a laptop and a using client/server configuration. Activities included:

“Scrubbing” and imaging servers, workstations, and laptops

Loading commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software

Loading voting system specific software, namely WinEDS, BPS, BPS/WinEDS Bridge

Tool application, and Election Reporting software modules.

Networked the client / server system

No problems were encountered with the required installations.

2. Inspection of the Ballot Printing System (BPS) application:

Using an existing Palm Beach County election database, activities were carried out to

create ballots, add and delete contests and candidates.

The 2007 certification database that was originally used as a 2006 Palm Beach County

election was set up as a Municipal Election. Modifications were made to the base election

cycle year; candidate‟s names were edited with no change to the ballot artwork.

Created two new elections:

Election one was created using the client/server system and included a fictitious

jurisdiction, with three contests, having two candidates each.

Election two was created using the laptop and included creation of the following

fictitious data:

o Jurisdiction

o District type and district

o Office types, masters, and offices

o Polling places

o Precincts


o Municipality

o Contests.

NOTE: Prerequisite activities were needed before and during this process. Many

of these tasks were not found in the documentation or, in some cases, additional

steps were required to complete the activity. These tasks included items such as

assignment of precincts and district types to an election cycle, assignment of

components (forms, jurisdictions, regions, users) to groups and of groups to

components, partisan classifications, etc. All election settings were set up to mirror

Palm Beach, and when applicable, the Wellington, Municipal Election settings.

All of the activities above were satisfactorily completed and election data, including contest

order, was presented in the expected condition.

3. Inspection of the WinEDS database:

Using the Palm Beach County 2012 Municipal Election:

Performed tasks in the following areas to „force‟ (change) a contest mismatch.

o Edited election data contest order

o Edited profile contest order

o Edited Edge II (ballot management) contest order

o Edited profile & election data contest order

o Edited profile, election data, and Edge II (ballot management) contest order

For each of the edited contest order items, performed tasks necessary to „re-order‟

contests as is sometimes required when edits have occurred, as indicated in Sequoia‟s

WinEDS Election Data System Software Release 3.1.074C Reference Guide and the

online help option within the software. The steps to re-order contests are not complex,

however, it is an entirely manual process and, therefore, labor intensive and tedious.

Review of all permutations yielded the projected outcome and also allowed a user to

make contest order corrections/edits as needed.

4. Inspection of the BPS/WinEDS Bridge Tool application:

Using the WinEDS Palm Beach County 2012 Municipal Election database and

accompanying BPS database files, edited the BPS data files. Then used the Bridge Tool to

import that data into the WinEDS database and examined the Village of Wellington contest

list order.

Contests were ordered as anticipated.


Conclusion:

Within the scope of this review of the WinEDS database, the Ballot Printing System (BPS), and

the WinEDS/Bridge Tool application, no evidence of a software flaw was found in any of the

elements assessed and neither testing group was able to replicate the software contest issue that

occurred in the March 13, 2012 Village of Wellington Election. Since no software flaw

occurred, the contest order was changed in the WinEDS database to verify that the user can

reorder a mismatched contest order. Existing event logs did not provide sufficient data to

determine what occurred in this election.

It is worthy to note that the manuals and software were extremely difficult to use and/or

understand. Moreover, sometimes steps required to complete task sequences were not included

manual and/or online instructions, thus creating not only a delay in the amount of time needed to

create an election, but also a hindrance to a user‟s ability to verify that election data is correct.

The manuals were cumbersome to interpret, time consuming to comprehend, and instructions

were difficult to locate.

In addition, the vendor published a Product Advisory Notice in order to re-educate users about

the contest order issue [See Appendix D.].

Recommendations:

1. Election officials need to review the contest list order in WinEDS, for both paper and the AVC

Edge II ballots, to verify that contest data is in sync, as explained in the vendor‟s Product

Advisory Notice.

2. Supervisors of elections should include a more enhanced test deck during Logic and Accuracy

testing as the enhanced patterning would allow the tester to see contest order errors before the

election is finalized. This recommendation will be discussed at the next Florida State

Association of Supervisors of Elections (FSASE) Conference in May 2012 and reminders will be

given periodically to supervisors of elections preceding the Fall 2012 elections.

3. User manual and reference guide clarity issues will be reviewed and addressed during the current

certification process for Dominion Voting Systems Inc./Sequoia WinEDS Release 4.0.175,

Version 1.


APPENDIX A – Sequoia Voting Systems WinEDS 3.1.077 Certificate of Approval.


APPENDIX B – DVS – March 20, 2012 Statement


APPENDIX C – DVS – Dominion Letter to Secretary of State


APPENDIX D – DVS – Product Advisory Notice, WinEDS Database Edits/Ballot Order


APPENDIX E – Florida Department of State Voting Systems Review Team

David R. Drury holds Bachelor degrees in Mechanical Engineering, History and Political Science

along with a Masters in Business Administration. Mr. Drury has thirteen years of aerospace

experience with Boeing and GE Aircraft Engines which included computer modeling of jet engine

performance and an extensive test background that included model tests, wind tunnel tests,

production engine tests, and flight tests. Mr. Drury earned several “GE Outstanding Achievement

Awards” and was nominated for “GE Aircraft Engines Product Quality Award” during 1990 at the

Evendale, OH facility. Mr. Drury also acquired experience in the electronics industry while at

General Dynamics Tallahassee Operations where he served as a Sr. Industrial Engineer - ISO 9000

Management Representative, and Lead Auditor. During that time, Mr. Drury also served as an

adjunct professor at FAMU – FSU College of Engineering where he taught statistical quality control

for two semesters. In his last position prior to joining state government, Mr. Drury was Director of

Quality Assurance for Martin Electronics, Inc. In March 2004, Mr. Drury joined the Bureau of

Voting Systems Certification as a Sr. Management Analyst II and was promoted to Bureau Chief in

December, 2005. Mr. Drury is experienced with process audits, performance audits, and voting

system audits.

Linda Hastings-Ard graduated from Florida State University with a Bachelor‟s Degree in

Information Science & Technology. Prior to joining the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification, she

was the Systems Manager for the Florida Medicaid Reform Enrollment Broker Contract at

ACS/Xerox Corporation and previous to that held positions in both the public and private sectors,

including Florida Departments of Natural Resources and Revenue, Florida State University-College

of Business, University of Florida-College of Law, Pensacola Jr. College, Computer Aid, Inc. and

Camber Corporation. Ms. Hastings-Ard has diversified experience in systems/user acceptance

testing, business process and user specifications analysis, development, testing, and documentation.

Her primary responsibility is to manage and provide oversight for the Bureau‟s functional testing

and source code analysis activities during certification events and to conduct Election Day

observations as needed.

Cathy Cook joined the Bureau of Voting Systems in November, 2011. She comes to BVSC with a

background in business analysis in educational, government, and private-sector fields. Her

specialties are requirements gathering, database design and management, integration and black box

testing, and project management. She has conducted business research for budding entrepreneurs and

inventors, helped design a new unified system for a state law enforcement agency, managed a

project to raise awareness for the Florida Organ & Tissue Donor Registry, and implemented system

changes to both the Florida Medicaid Health Care Enrollment and the Florida Prepaid College

Tuition programs, among other projects. As Systems Project Analyst, Cathy functions as the

Bureau's database systems expert, providing input for all technical projects as they relate to

relational databases. Cathy is a certified Project Management Professional (PMP®) and earned a

Master of Science in Library and Information Studies from Florida State University.


APPENDIX D – Florida Department of State Voting Systems Review Team (Cont‟d)

Rondal “Jim” Halter earned a Bachelor‟s degree from Oberlin College with a double major in

Physics and Mathematics. He spent 5 ½ years in the US Navy as a surface line officer, assistant staff

civil engineer, and public affairs officer. Prior to joining the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification

in July 2011, Mr. Halter had nineteen years‟ experience in Software Engineering, Systems

Engineering, Configuration Management, and Quality Assurance. Mr. Halter is a member of the

certification source code analysis group. His primary responsibility is election system software

source code review, with corollary duties assisting the certification functional test group, and

participation in Election Day observations and attending election recounts as required.

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