discussion paper series - 1 · dr. suraj kumar and mr. peter siegenthaler conducted a...

Decentralisation in IndiaChallenges & Opportunities

United Nations Development Programme55, Lodi Estate

New Delhi - 110 003India

Discussion Paper Series - 1

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Paper do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This discussion paper was prepared under the guidance and leadership of Dr. Brenda Gael McSweeney, UNDPResident Representative & UN Resident Coordinator. The team from the HDRC comprises of the following:Dr. K. Seeta Prabhu, Dr. Suraj Kumar, Ms. Elena Borsatti, Mr. V. Srinivasan and Ms. Aparna Pande.Dr. R. Sudarshan developed the theme and outline of the paper.

We acknowledge with thanks the contributions of the following resource persons who prepared backgroundpapers for this study: Mr. Amitabh Mukhopadhyay, Prof. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Mr. S. S. Meenakshisundaram,Dr. Solomon Benjamin and Dr. Vinod Vyasulu.

Dr. Suraj Kumar and Mr. Peter Siegenthaler conducted a decentralisation mapping exercise of the UN system inIndia, for the India United Nations Development Assistance Framework, whose findings have been incorpo-rated into the Paper. We would like to thank all members of the UN family for their cooperation and inputs.

We thank Ms. Daman Singh, Dr. Junaid Ahmed, Dr. P.S.A. Sundaram, Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan, Dr. Rajan Katoch,Dr. Ramanath Jha and Dr. Satyajit Singh for their suggestions and input on earlier outlines and drafts of thepaper. The paper also benefited from feedback from colleagues within UNDP India Country Office.

Finally, we wish to thank all the participants at the National Consultation on Strengthening Decentralisation, heldat New Delhi on 12 December 2000 for lively debate on various aspects of decentralisation. This paper benefitedsubstantially from their views, experiences and expert comments. UNDP is grateful to Dr. Rohini Nayyar and herteam at the Planning Commission for their partnership and support to the dialogue on Decentralisation.

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CONTENTSCONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

PART I CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR DECENTRALISATION 3

1 Purpose and Background 3

2 Historical Overview 4

3 Current Status and Key Features of Decentralisation in India 8

4 Constraints in Institutionalising Panchayats: Conformity and Operational Issues 8

4.1 Legal Issues and Litigation Surrounding Panchayati Raj 8

4.2 Relationships between Panchayati Raj Institution Levels 12

4.3 Panchayats and Line Departments: Operational Issues 14

4.4 Reforms Required for More Effective Linkages 16

5 Contribution of PRIs to Governance Structure 21

6 Decentralisation and Urban Local Bodies 24

6.1 Features and Critique 24

6.2 Urban Local bodies and Poverty Issues 26

6.3 Trends in Urbanisation and Civic Participation 26

7 Women’s Representation in Local Government: Creating a Politics of Presence 32

7.1 Backdrop of Legislation 33

7.2 Women and Elections to the New Panchayats 34

7.3 Women Representatives: Social and Economic Characteristics 35

7.4 Why Women Contest 37

7.5 Women’s Awareness of Panchayati Raj 37

PART II REVITALISING PUBLIC SYSTEMS THROUGH PEOPLE’S ACTION 50

8 Panchayat and Community Finance 50

8.1 Context 50

8.2 Panchayat Budgets 52

9 Accountability of Local Bodies 61

9.1 Accountability and Constitutional Status of Local Bodies 62

9.2 Transfer of Financial Powers and Desirable Structures of Accountability 63

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9.3 Municipal Finance Reforms 67

9.4 Accountability, Accounts and Audit 69

10 Women in Power (Security through Leadership): Where Do We Go From Here ? 74

10.1 Developmental Consequences of Women’s Representation 74

10.2 Emancipatory Impact of Women’s Representation 75

10.3 Policy Reform and Capacity-Building 77

10.4 The Long, Slow but Irreversible Route to Empowerment 78

PART III POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 79

11 Strengthening Decentralisation : UN Initiatives 79

11.1 National Priorities 79

11.2 Towards Decentralisation: Results from a UN Decentralisation Mapping Exercise 79

11.3 The Decentralisation Imperative 80

11.4 Decentralisation of Development Responsibilities – The Challenges 82

11.5 Key Elements of a Decentralisation Strategy 84

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1 Mahatma Gandhi on Panchayati Raj 3

Box 2 Decentralisation: The National and Global Context 5

Box 3 Salient Features of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment 7

Box 4 Panchayats Dispense Justice 13

Box 5 The 74th Constitutional Amendment: The Urban Bill of Rights 24

Box 6 Who Will Make the Chapatis? 37

Box 7 Equity and Social Inclusion: Women’s Voices 49

Box 8 Administrative and Financial Devolution: Strengthening Local Domains 62

Box 9 Public Hearings and Accountability on Demand: Jan Sunvai 73

Box 10 UN Assistance to Strengthening Local Government Institutions 81

Box 11 UN Assistance to Community Management of Basic Services 81

Box 12 UN Assistance to Empowerment of Community Groups in Local Political Processes 82

Box 13 Grassroots Concerns for Panchayati Raj 82

Box 14 Issues for User Groups: Linkages with Communities, Civil Society Organisations

and Local Bodies 85

Box 15 Community Driven Management: Avenues for Decentralisation 86

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ABBREVIATIONS

BDO Block Development OfficerCA Constitutional AmendmentCAG Comptroller & Auditor GeneralCBO Community Based OrganisationCEO Chief Executive OfficerCr. P.C. Criminal Procedure CodeCWDS Centre for Women’s Development StudiesDDA District Development AuthorityDDC District Development CouncilDM District MagistrateDPC District Planning CommitteeDPEP District Primary Education ProgrammeDRDA District Rural Development AgencyDUDA District Urban Development AuthorityICDS Integrated Child Development SchemeIDC Inter-District CouncilILO International Labour OrganisationIPC Indian Penal CodeISED Institute for Socio-Economic DevelopmentLAD Local Accounts DepartmentMARG Multiple Action Research GroupMKSS Mazdoor Kisan Shakti SangathanMLA Member of Legislative AssemblyMMR Monthly Monitoring ReportMP Member of ParliamentMPC Metropolitan Planning CommitteeMPLADS MPs’ Local Area Development SchemeNCPRI National People’s Campaign for the Right to InformationNGO Non Governmental OrganisationOBC Other Backward ClassPRI Panchayati Raj InstitutionSC Scheduled CasteSEC State Election CommissionSFC State Finance CorporationSHG Self-Help GroupST Scheduled TribeUNCHS United Nations Centre for Human SettlementsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDAF United Nations Development Assistance FrameworkUNDCP United Nations Drug Control ProgrammeUNFPA United Nations Population FundUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for WomenULB Urban Local BodyWFP World Food ProgrammeZP Zila Panchayat / Zila Parishad

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List of Background Papers

Amitabh Mukhopadhyaya. “Accountability and Audit of Panchayats”

Nirja Gopal Jayal. “Gender and Decentralisation”

S.S. Meenakshisundaram. “Relationship of Panchayats with Other Structures of Governance”

S.S. Meenakshisundaram. “Legal Issues Surrounding the Implementation of the

Constitutional Seventy Third Amendment”

Solomon Benjamin. “The 74th Constitutional Amendment: A Livelihood &

Developmental Perspective”

Vinod Vyasulu. “Panchayat Finances”

1Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation

Executive SummaryExecutive Summary

The Context

Decentralisation and community driven manage-ment acquire special importance in the contextof the ongoing process of globalisation and as-sociated economic reforms. While the processof globalisation acts in ways in which the marketacquires supremacy to the detriment of peoplewho lose control over their livelihood patterns aswell as other choices, the process ofdecentralisation could act as a countervailing forceenabling people to acquire control over decisionsthat influence their lives in critical areas.

India’s Ninth Five Year Plan as also the recentMid-Term Review have noted that proper imple-mentation of development programmes hasbeen hampered by the fact that benefits fromthese have largely been appropriated by the lo-cal elite. Participation of women and membersof SC/ST communities in Gram Sabhas (vil-lage councils) and Panchayat meetings isfavoured to ensure representation of interestsof the poor. The 73rd and 74th Amendmentsenvisage the village panchayat/ ward council asa forum and action point where local solutionsto local problems will remedy lacunae in bu-reaucratic, top-down schemes. Although na-tional goals and aspirations are supportive ofdecentralisation, during its implementation weneed to address concerns for inclusiveness, ac-countability and effectiveness. For realising theprogressive intent of national policy, elected lo-cal government institutions must be helped tobecome vehicles for social transformation, articulat-ing the felt needs of the community, especiallythose of women and marginalised groups.Livelihood security for the poor would ensureeffective participation and better mobilisationof local resources.

This document argues that rapid human devel-opment and strong local democracy go hand inhand. Strengthening local democracy, in turn,requires support to people’s participation in themanagement of local resources and local insti-tutions. Enabling people’s action through localgovernance institutions will help overcome so-cial inequalities based on caste and gender. An-other objective of the document is to addressskepticism about the effectiveness of local in-stitutions (Panchayati Raj) as a viable approachfor poverty eradication and sustainable humandevelopment.

Macro Environment

The document attempts to articulate the con-nection (hitherto insufficiently emphasised inthe literature) between economic dependencyof vulnerable groups on the local elite, on theone hand, and effectiveness of local governanceinstitutions in delivering basic services to thepoor, on the other. Recognising the existenceof structural impediments to the effective func-tioning of local government institutions, thisdocument draws attention to the fact that thesuccess of decentralisation depends critically onthe existence of a congenial macro policy frame-work that ensures the provision of livelihoodsecurity for the poor. The ingredients of a“panchayat-friendly” macroeconomic and policyregime need to be identified. The paper attemptsthis exercise, based upon an analysis of the is-sues pertaining to removal of administrative,legal and procedural anomalies, structural de-sign of the three-tier system, panchayat financeand budgets, gender, urban poverty and liveli-hoods as also imperatives for future action, inrural as well as urban areas.

Rapid humandevelopment andstrong localdemocracy gohand in hand

2 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA

Administrative Procedures

Several constraints in the institutionalisation ofPanchayati Raj stem from the fact that therationalisation of laws, administrative proceduresand systems has not kept pace with the consti-tutional sanction to local governance bodies.There is need to tailor government rules, ad-ministrative structures and procedures so thatthe local bodies have the necessary wherewithalto carry out their mandated duties. States suchas Kerala and Madhya Pradesh have placed linedepartments in several sectors under the con-trol of local bodies, a factor that has contrib-uted to the resilience of their decentralisationinitiatives.

Strengthening the Gram Sabha is another im-portant step in this direction. Taking govern-ment closer to the people, to ensure that theGram Sabha serves as the empowered and proxi-mate forum for local democracy, especially soin regions characterized by a dispersed patternof settlement is an essential step. The PanchayatExtension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996, hastaken steps in this direction, by making the GramSabha the cornerstone of people’s empower-ment. The momentum of this initiative needsto be built upon to ensure that the village as-sembly/ ward council becomes the centre-pieceof local democracy.

Fiscal Devolution

The document addresses issues pertaining tofiscal devolution and argues that systems of duediligence must be put in place such thatpanchayat / municipal finance have sound legaland auditing underpinnings. The paper marshalsevidence that, with community-based mecha-nisms of transparency and accountability, the hardbudget constraint is strengthened, not undermined by fis-cal devolution.

In the absence of transfer of financial powers(including revenue raising) and untied funds,Panchyati Raj Institutions and Urban LocalBodies will not be able to carry out their func-tions and have credibility at the local level. The

recommendations of the Eleventh FinanceCommission, which analysed the issue of re-structuring Centre-State financial relations alsoin the light of the need to strengthen the fi-nances of local bodies become relevant here.In the absence of such an approach, the trans-fer of financial powers to the third tier of gov-ernance would ultimately become a meaning-less exercise in transferring non-existent re-sources. The issue of State finance reform can-not therefore be seen in isolation from that ofgreater and more effective fiscal devolutionthrough the national and State finance commis-sions.

Decentralisation from Below

The argument for greater devolution is basedon the experience of States such as Kerala,Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh,which demonstrate that the transfer of funds,functions and functionaries is the key to moresuccessful decentralisation. Local bodies need to beseen as institutions of self-governance not as ‘deliverymechanisms’.

For this to happen, decentralisation from abovemust converge with decentralisation from be-low. This can achieved by forging links betweenlocal bodies and informal associations and usergroups.

In brief, in order to transform present realities,it is imperative to strengthen decentralisationfrom below, so that voices of the poor couldcarry weight in village assemblies and ward coun-cil meetings. Apart from social mobilisation, thiscan be accomplished by strengthening commu-nity networks and institutions. These wouldbuild the capabilities of the poor, provide secu-rity of livelihood and a safeguard against desti-tution, hunger, disease and alienation. Initiativesthat empower the poor, especially women tomanage local resources and local institutions, aresteps in this direction. The success of the world’slargest experiment in deepening democracyultimately depends upon the success of theseinitiatives.

In order totransform presentrealities, it isimperative tostrengthendecentralisationfrom below, sothat voices of thepoor could carryweight in villageassemblies andward councilmeetings


1. Purpose and Background

In an era of globalisation, decentralisation isthe principal countervailing trend which canensure that the growth process is pro-poor,pro-women, pro-nature and pro-jobs. As mar-ket integration and technological innovationrenders the national frontiers more permeable,it is crucial to put in place and strengthen sys-tems of negotiation, regulation anddecentralised governance. These can ensurethat the voices and concerns of the poorestof the poor, in keeping with MahatmaGandhi’s message, are centre-stage in policydialogue at the global, regional andnational levels. (Box 1)

In the Indian context, economic reforms andPanchayati Raj have been the two major policyimperatives since the early 1990s. For both, itis not so much the necessity of the policy direc-tive, but its content and underpinnings that are be-ing debated. Direct local democracy has beenmandated constitutionally through the 73rd and74th Amendments. The principle of ‘Coop-erative Federalism’ (decentralised implemen-tation based upon harmonious understand-ing between the three tiers of governance –Centre, State and local - is the basic premiseof India’s Ninth Five Year Plan. However, theactual progress of decentralisation has beenuneven across States. In the absence of ad-equate financial clout, functioning of thePanchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and UrbanLocal Bodies (ULBs) have been severely con-strained. In the absence of measures tostrengthen public systems at the locallevel, panchayats run the same risk as the co-operatives of being co-opted into the

PART I

existing malaise of bureaucracy and politicswhich hinders effective implementation ofprogrammes documented in the Mid TermReview of the Ninth Plan.

It has been argued (e.g., Lieten 1996a) that thecurrent functioning of panchayats fares poorlyon the criteria of efficacy in service delivery,inclusiveness and accountability. Although na-tional goals and aspirations are supportive ofdecentralisation, the translation of aspirationsinto reality requires strengthening the institu-tions of Panchayati Raj so that there is greaterlinkage with informal people’s groups, usergroups and also greater devolution of ‘funds,functions and functionaries’.

The Eleventh Finance Commission’s recom-mendations on strengthening panchayat andmunicipal finances by including local bodiesunder the ambit of tax-base widening initia-tives through better exploitation of land based

It is crucial to putin place andstrengthensystems ofnegotiation,regulation anddecentralisedgovernance

Current Status and Prospects for DecentralisationCurrent Status and Prospects for Decentralisation

BOX 1Mahatma Gandhi on Panchayati Raj

Every village has to become a self-suf-ficient republic. This does not requirebrave resolutions. It requires brave,corporate, intelligent work…. I havenot pictured a poverty-stricken Indiacontaining ignorant millions. I havepictured to myself an India continu-ally progressing along the lines bestsuited to her genius. I do not, how-ever, picture it as a third-class or evena first-class copy of the dyingcivilisation of the West. If my dreamis fulfilled, and every one of the sevenlakhs of villages becomes a well-livingrepublic in which there are no illiter-

ates, in which no one is idle for wantof work, in which everyone is use-fully occupied and has nourishingfood, well-ventilated dwellings, andsufficient Khadi for covering thebody, and in which all the villagersknow and observe the laws of hygieneand sanitation. There is nothing in-herently impossible in the picturedrawn here. To model such a villagemay be the work of a lifetime. Anylover of true democracy and villagelife can take up a village, treat it as hisworld and sole work, and he will findgood results.

Source:R. Prabhu & UR Rao (eds), Village Republics: the Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 246-247,Ahmedabad, Navjivan Press


taxes, better administration of property taxesand other taxes, are a step in this direction asthey catalyse greater fiscal devolution. Thistransfer needs to be governed by the vision ofempowering people and reflected in comple-mentary measures, which build poor people’spartnerships in the decisions taken bypanchayats and municipal bodies, so that fis-cal clout contributes to people’s power.

Like any strategy for fundamental democraticchange (and Panchayati Raj in India is one ofthe largest such “transformational experi-ments”), the institutions of local governancetend to reflect the socioeconomic and politi-cal milieu in which they are located. In India,the poor face multiple constraints emergingfrom economic, political and social factors. Thesocial constraints often derive strength fromreligious beliefs and prevalent cultural norms.In the case of women, these are reinforced bythe pervasive discrimination based on gender.While each of these constraints is powerfulenough to impede upward mobility for thepoor, what is daunting is that the constraintsact in a mutually reinforcing manner render-ing the task of overcoming them virtually im-possible for any single individual. Governmentpolicy aimed at amelioration of the living con-ditions of the poor would have greater chancesof success if it were to be multi-pronged innature and coordinated in a manner thatsynergises the effects of interventions in di-verse fields.

It is in this context that the role of thePanchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) acquires im-portance, for they provide an opportunity toundertake the implementation of coordinatedaction at the grass root level for the benefit ofthe disadvantaged sections of society. How-ever, for such action to actually materialise, itis necessary that mechanisms to counter localpower structures are built into the process ofDecentralisation. In the absence of a rights-based approach that fosters mobilising the

poor to have a voice in governance, PRIs willalso be constrained by the pathologies that gowith entrenched power structures. Clearly,measures are needed whereby the poor canparticipate more effectively through PRIs andlocal informal groups and people’s move-ments. Measures are required for addressingthe difficulties of institutionalising the partici-pation of the poor in PRI functioning. Thisinvolves removing the legislative and proce-dural problems that constrain the Gram Sabha,greater devolution of funds, functions andfunctionaries, putting in place mechanisms ofaudit and accountability and strengthening theparticipation of women.

For realising the progressive intent of nationalgoals, elected local government institutionsmust be helped to become vehicles for socialtransformation, articulating felt needs of thecommunity, especially those of women andmarginalised groups. Livelihood security forthe poor would ensure effective participationand better mobilisation of local resources. Forthis to happen, it is imperative to strengthenDecentralisation from below, so that the voiceof the poor could carry weight in village as-semblies. Apart from social mobilisation, thiscan be accomplished by strengthening com-munity networks and institutions. These wouldbuild the capabilities of the poor, providingsecurity of livelihood and a safeguard againstdestitution, hunger, disease and alienation. Ini-tiatives that empower the poor, especiallywomen, to manage both village resources andvillage institutions, are steps in this direction.The success of local democracy depends uponthe success of these initiatives. The linkagebetween political, financial and economicdecentralisation is the key to a successfulprogramme of pro-poor reform (see Box 2).

2. Historical Overview

In order to understand the crucial dynamicsof Panchayati Raj, it is instructive to assay the

The institutions oflocal governancetend to reflect thesocioeconomicand politicalmilieu in whichthey are located


evolution of institutions of Indian village “de-mocracy”, a subject of heated debate in theConstituent Assembly.

In pre-British India, both caste and villagepanchayats existed. Caste panchayats wereconcerned with issues related to jajmani, mar-riage, and rituals. Village panchayats consistedof elders of prominent households in a vil-lage (whether family of original clearers of theland for cultivation or family of superior castewho was granted the village by a political pa-tron). They were concerned primarily with ad-judicating civil disputes of residents related torights in land and administering criminal jus-tice. They also performed regulatory functionsrelated to village commons (grazing lands,woods and water bodies). Responsibility forpayment of tithes and taxes was, strictly speak-ing, not their concern; the revenue systemsintroduced since the times of Sher Shah Suritook care of these. They did, nevertheless, havesome say by way of counseling the village resi-dents on matters related to allegiance owed todifferent political masters like zamindars/subedars/riyasats and so on.

The role of panchayats as institutions admin-istering justice was eliminated by the BritishRaj. Legislation in 1860 such as the Indian Pe-nal Code (IPC), Criminal Procedure Code(Cr.P.C.), Contract Act etc., along with Baden-Powell’s schema for land revenue settlementssupplanted the customary/traditional law.Collectorates and courts usurped powers ofcaste/village panchayats to establish the ruleof law. The impact of the IPC and Cr.P.C. ontransplanting European notions of equality toIndian soil remains under-researched; we ven-ture to suggest that it was as significant as landreforms or social movements. For now it issufficient to flag the point that the flexibilityof customary law contrasted with the rigidstructures of the rule of law.

When village panchayats were re-legislated tolife in India as ‘local bodies’, their character

had been transformed. These legislations werenot prompted by any regard for customary lawor traditional wisdom that might express it-self as the general will of the people. Theywere considered necessary as agencies for de-velopment of the rational-legal institutions ofrepresentative government. Arguing for bud-getary freedom for development functions tobe performed by local bodies, Lord Ripon’sResolution of 1880 stressed that the educa-tive principle of training people to participatein representative institutions of governmentshould not be subordinated to demands forefficiency in development activities. The Ben-gal Municipal Act of 1884 and Bengal LocalSelf-Government Act,1885 were informed bythis philosophy.

In 1919, to ease the burden on imperial fi-nances and bring to bear local supervision andvigilance on development activities, localbodies were re-legislated to life in other

The role ofpanchayats asinstitutionsadministeringjustice waseliminated by theBritish Raj

Decentralisation : The National and Global ContextBOX 2

International experience bears out theclose link between reform andDecentralisation. Apart from thetheoretical logic of a reduced role ofgovernment creating opportunitiesboth for private enterprise and forcommunity action, in many countriesactual reform programme has beenbuilt upon increasing institutionalspace for Decentralisation. Reformprogrammes in developing countries/transition economies as diverse inrange as Poland, Chile, Argentina andSouth Africa and China, the autonomyto local units in decisions on incen-tives for investment and capital mar-ket access, has given a strong founda-tion to reforms. In the case of China,the Town & Village Enterprises(TVEs) were given a wide range ofpowers in matters relating to resourcemobilisation, user fees, and recruit-ment of experts, apart from imple-mentation responsibilities that theyalready had. Clearly, economicdecentralisation has been the key to

success of reform programmes insuch contexts.The issue of sequencing and formsof Decentralisation, therefore, as-sumes much significance. In theabove-mentioned countries, onlySouth Africa has undertaken the mostcomprehensive devolution of powersto the third tier. In China, the reformswere not related to political freedom.Indeed, that is proving to be a hin-drance as China integrates more intothe global economy through institu-tions such as the World TradeOrganisation (WTO).Political Decentralisation provides amore durable ‘rational-legal’ frame-work that makes Decentralisation anintegral part of the political and civicdiscourse. India is the world leader increating space for politicaldecentralisation. Now the concomi-tant arenas of fiscal devolution andeconomic decentralisation requiregreater attention by policy research-ers.


presidencies. The taluka/tehsil served as thebasic unit for local boards, assigned subjectssuch as sanitation, education and health, withpowers to levy fees and taxes. Provincial gov-ernments in 1935 wrested the power to enactlegislation on local self-government. Acts werevoted by provincial governments to vest pow-ers of administration, sometimes includingcriminal justice, with the panchayats.

However, it is noteworthy that several of thelegislations of provincial governments onPanchayati Raj carried over to the post-inde-pendence scenario were legislated between1947 and 1950 (i.e. prior to the adoption ofthe Constitution). All of them provided forpanchayats by and large co-terminus with ad-ministrative units like the Patwari Circle,Tehsil/ Taluka and District. The provincialgovernments jealously guarded their interestsby providing for powers of the Collector tosupersede the decisions of apex level districtbodies.

While distributing powers between the Unionand the States, the Constitution of India atArticle 40 (Directive Principles of State Policy)vested local bodies and Panchayati Raj as asubject with the States but did not furtherelaborate on the relations between the Statesand this third tier of Government. PanchayatiRaj was given another lease of life in the con-text of community development projectslaunched in 1952. The Balwantrai Mehta Com-mittee Report in 1957 underlined the role ofelected Panchayat Samitis at the communitydevelopment block/tehsil level as the basicunit of democratic decentralisation. Only anadvisory role was contemplated for the ZilaParishads constituted of panchayat samitiheads chaired by the Collector. However, thelegislation that followed the Committee’s Re-port basically continued the earlier enactmentsof Provincial Governments to re-iterate thethree-tier structure and provide for over-ridingpowers of the State Government actingthrough the Collector.

Panchayati Raj was a strategy for rural devel-opment in a context of centralism that wasthen seen as a historical necessity. The moralweight of the national movement required thatthe aspirations of the peasantry to better con-ditions of life be fulfilled. The Governmentthat came to power initiated land reforms andinstitutional change to do away with nefari-ous traditions of discrimination and domina-tion based on religion and caste. This requiredthe will of strong Central and State Govern-ments to be pitted against local vested inter-ests, whether landlords or ‘superior castes’.Moreover, land revenues had to be reducedand since income levels were low and highlyskewed between individuals and regions, reli-ance on the spread of indirect rather than thenarrow incidence of direct taxes was neces-sary which naturally resulted in a centralisedsystem of finance. These constraints, alongwith others related to the legacy of the Raj,partition of the country and the enthusiasmfor a planned economy, shaped centralism.However, this centralism was not conduciveto the growth in the status of local bodies.

As the funding for Community Developmentprojects dried up by the mid-1960s, panchayatsstagnated. They languished for decades with-out funds, superseded by decisions of districtcollectors, without elections being held to re-constitute them and remained insufficient toprovide representation for women, ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes. In a few Statesefforts were made to revive them after theAshok Mehta Committee Report was submit-ted in 1978. This Committee recommendedgrouping of a number of villages to consti-tute a mandal panchayat covering a popula-tion of 15,000 to 20,000. Andhra Pradesh andKarnataka tried out such mandal panchayats.It is significant that in a dissenting note, thelate EMS Namboodiripad, a member of thisCommittee, pointed out the bureaucratic biasin constituting panchayats on the basis of ad-ministrative units instead of corporate bodies

In the 1950s,Panchayati Rajwas a CentralGovernmentstrategy for ruraldevelopment


with face to face relations as obtained in asingle village. The important place assignedto gram sabhas in the schema of participa-tion in our development Programmes in re-cent years, especially in the Panchayati Raj Ex-tension to Scheduled Areas Act 1996, vindi-cates the significance of this dissenting view.

In the absence of functioning district and sub-district level development institutions, in 1979-80, the District Rural Development Agencies(DRDAs) were jointly registered by the Unionand State Governments in each district as so-cieties under the Societies Registration Act,1860. They served as conduits of finance toby-pass budgetary procedures of the StateGovernments and implement povertyalleviation programmes sponsored by the Cen-tral Government. Similar district level societ-ies mushroomed for implementingprogrammes for industries, fisheries, adult edu-cation, primary education of children, equalityfor women, women’s employment and so on.

The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendmentsin 1992-93 have ushered in the present phasewhere panchayats are described as institutionsof local self-government, and are expected toprepare plans for economic development andsocial justice. There are now approximately250,000 Gram Panchayats, 6500 PanchayatSamitis and 500 Zila Parishads duly electedand governed by State legislation. To func-tion effectively, these require rationalisation ofthe district and sub-district administrative ap-paratus consistent with the State level Con-formity Acts.

3. Current Status and KeyFeatures of Decentralisationin India

The Amendments inserted Parts IX relatingto panchayats and IX A relating to munici-palities in the Constitution. Articles 243-243Oand 243P - 243ZG of the Constitution are inthe nature of basic provisions supplementedby laws of the respective States, which define

the details as to the powers and functions ofthe various organs. All States have enacted newActs or incorporated changes in their existingActs in conformity with the 73rd and74th Amendments. The salient features of the73rd Constitutional Amendment are givenin Box 3.

4. Constraints in InstitutionalisingPanchayats: Conformity andOperational Issues

4.1 Legal Issues and LitigationSurrounding Panchayati Raj

Although expectations have been raised byproviding Constitutional status to the PRIs,in actual practice, at the operational level, theyappear to have been saddled with a variety ofproblems. There are many impediments af-fecting the functioning of the PRIs in severalStates with regard to structural pattern, com-position of Panchayats, organic linkages be-tween PRIs, electoral process, concept of ro-tation in the case of reserved seats, devolu-tion of powers and functions, bureaucraticcontrol over local bodies etc. It is useful toanalyse some of the legal issues surroundingthe implementation of the Act and examinethe need to have a further amendment torevitalise PRIs so as to make them vibrant.

Distance from the Gram Sabha

The Gram Sabha, which was a pivot ofPanchayati Raj in the new dispensation, hasbeen sidelined in many cases. It is through theGram Sabha that the elected representative ismade accountable to the electorate. This pre-supposes two things. Firstly, if the participa-tion in gram sabha has to be meaningful thegathering cannot be large. Secondly, the gramsabha should meet periodically and the sub-jects placed before it are such that they attractpublic attention. Only then, the electorate willhave any interest to attend the gram sabha,foregoing their day’s income. Unfortunately,the Act does not appear to provide for both

It is through theGram Sabha thatthe electedrepresentative ismadeaccountable tothe electorate


these requirements explicitly. While in someStates, the gram sabha meetings take place inevery village whenever the village panchayatconsists of more than one village, in someother States only one composite gram sabhais convened for all the villages which consti-tute the gram panchayat. Since this compos-ite gram sabha is usually held in the headquar-

ters village of the panchayat, citizens from theother villages either do not attend the gramsabha or are reluctant to articulate their needs.Unless each village has a gram sabha of itsown, the purpose of accountability may notbe served, especially when the villagepanchayat serves a population of a fewthousand.

Continuity: By providing for duration of5 years for an elected panchayat and re-elec-tion of panchayats before expiry or withinsix months of their dissolution as well asnon-interference by Courts in electoral mat-ters, continuity of panchayats has been en-sured by the 73rd Amendment.

Gram Sabhas: All States have provided thata Sarpanch/Mukhia/Adhyaksha/Pradhanof the gram panchayat will convene a GramSabha, consisting of persons registered inthe electoral rolls relating to a village com-prised within the area of panchayat at thevillage level at least twice a year.

The following matters shall be placed be-fore it by the gram panchayat :

l Annual Statement of accounts and au-dit report

l Report on the administration of the pre-vious year

l Proposals for fresh taxation or for en-hancement of existing taxes

l Selection of schemes, beneficiaries andlocations

Three-tier System: A uniform structure ofthree tiers – at village, intermediate and dis-trict levels has been prescribed but the con-stitution and composition of panchayats hasbeen left to preferences of States subjectto all seats being filled by elected personsfrom the respective territorial constituen-cies of the panchayats.

Reservation of Seats: Seats have been re-served for SC/ST in every panchayat on thebasis of proportional representation andsuch seats may be allotted by rotation to dif-ferent constituencies in a panchayat. Not

BOX 3

Salient Features of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment

stipulate by rules the tenure and conditionsof their service.

Finance Commission: Governors of Statesare also empowered to constitute State Fi-nance Commissions to review the financial po-sition of the panchayats and to make recommenda-tions to the Governor as to

l The principles which should govern

– the distribution between the State and thepanchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes,duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State ,which may be divided between them underthis part and the allocation between thepanchayats at all levels of their respectiveshares of such proceeds

– the determination of the taxes, duties,tollsand fees which may be assigned to, or appro-priated by, the panchayats

– the grants in aid to the panchayats from theConsolidated Fund of the State

l the measures needed to improve the financialposition of the panchayats

l any other matter referred by the Governor in theinterests of sound finance of the panchayats.

Audit of Accounts: Audit of panchayatsare to be provided for by the State Legisla-tures. We may note that only the KarnatakaPanchayati Raj Act, 1993 has provided forentrusting audit of Taluk Panchayat Fundsand Zila Panchayat Funds to the Comptrol-ler & Auditor General (CAG) while theController of State Accounts may authoriseany officer to audit Gram Panchayat ac-counts.

less than one-third of the seats so reservedare further reserved for women belongingto SC/ST. Besides this, not less than one-third of the total number of seats in apanchayat are reserved for women and suchseats may be allotted by rotation to differ-ent constituencies in a panchayat. Similarreservations for backward classes has beenleft to the discretion of States.

Powers and Authority: It is noteworthy thatthe 73rd Amendment provides for States toendow the panchayats with powers and au-thority ‘to enable them to function as institutionsof self government’. However, the functionsof panchayats Stated in the same Art 243Gare in the nature of entrusted developmentfunctions: “(a) preparation of plans for economicdevelopment and social justice and (b) the imple-mentation of schemes for economic development andsocial justice as may be entrusted to them includingthose in relation to matters listed in the EleventhSchedule.’’

Functions that by tradition are uniquely as-signed to panchayats consist of the provi-sion and maintenance of what may betermed as ‘neighborhood’ public goods —of street lighting, sanitation, village com-mons, and water supply – as opposed to ‘na-tional’ public goods like justice and nationaldefense. The national level is also uniquelyassigned the functions of income redistri-bution and macro-economic stabilisation,which involve cross-regional issues. Thereare intermediate functions like education,which cannot be classified in either local ornational slots.

Election Commission: Governors of Statesare empowered by the 73rd Amendment toappoint State Election Commissioners and


Rigid Structure

The structure of the PRIs envisaged underthe Act is rather rigid. While the district hasbeen defined as a normal district in a State,the jurisdiction of village and intermediatelevels has not been specifically defined in theAct. While many States have more or less ac-cepted the constitutional dictum of a three-tier structure, some would like to have the free-dom to choose the pattern of decentralisationwhich, in their opinion, is most suited to them.

The institutional design for decentralisationshould take into account not only the devel-opmental thrusts built upon the capabilitiesat the local levels, but also the need to ensurelocal participation in decision-making. Theproblem of striking a balance between tech-nical requirements and possibilities for mean-ingful participation by the people in develop-ment management occurs at levels below thedistrict. The question of adequate area for aunit of administration is quite complicated inany State, owing to unevenness in terms ofeconomic resources, communication facilities,population density, level of social integration,civic commitments, etc. A uniform set of cri-teria cannot, therefore, apply throughout thecountry. It would be appropriate to leave theexact pattern of local government below thedistrict to the States/Union Territories. TheCentral Government can at best lay down gen-eral criteria for the guidance of the States,making it compulsory to have one tier closerto the people to implement the developmentprogrammes and another at a higher level tosupervise and monitor implementation.

Election to Panchayats

The constitution of Panchayats as mandatedunder the Act has also posed problems insome States. Under Article 243C (2), all theseats in a panchayat shall be filled by personschosen by direct election from territorial con-stituencies in the panchayat area. Prior to theAct, some States had intermediate level

panchayats consisting only of the elected rep-resentatives representing that area in the vil-lage as well as district panchayats. While theChairman of this panchayat was directlyelected in some States, in some other Statesthe chairperson of this intermediate panchayatwas either elected from among the membersor nominated by the State government.

There is debate regarding whether direct elec-tions should be held to constitute thepanchayats at all the three levels or whetherthe intermediate panchayat at least can be con-stituted by nomination of the concernedelected members belonging to the other twotiers. A related issue, raised in a recent Consti-tutional Amendment proposal is whether wecould restrict direct elections to the village levelonly and have the village and intermediatepanchayats elect members who will representthem in the next higher level panchayats.While this may provide an organic linkagebetween the different tiers of the system, itmay not perhaps satisfy the democratic normsfor decentralisation, by diluting the elementof direct democracy at the district level.

Reservations

l There is a mandatory provision for reser-vation of seats for the Scheduled Castes(SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs) and one-third reservation for women (includingwomen from the SCs and the STs). It alsohas an enabling provision for reservationfor Other Backward Classes (OBCs).(There is no reservation, as of now, forOBCs in the State Assemblies and the Par-liament even though reservation is pro-vided in these fora for the SCs and STs.)Reservation for OBCs in the panchayatshas led to controversies and litigation inseveral States. Even the holding of elec-tions came to be stalled on account of thisin Bihar and Pondicherry, as the identifica-tion of OBCs in these places has itself runinto difficulties.

The institutionaldesign fordecentralisationshould take intoaccount not onlythe developmentalthrusts built uponthe capabilities atthe local levels,but also the needto ensure localparticipation indecision-making


l There has also been a debate on the desir-ability of prescribing reservations to theoffices of chairpersons in the Panchayats.These reservations have, in fact, resultedin administrative problems in some States.There have been instances of the rulingparty not having even a single elected rep-resentative from the category of SC/ST orwomen, when the chairperson’s post wasreserved in their favour, and underArt.243C(5), the chairperson has to beelected from among the elected membersonly. Besides these practical problems,there can also be a question as to why thepost of the chairperson of a Panchayatshould only be reserved for a particularcommunity/sex, when a similar reservationhas not been made for any other publicoffice anywhere in the country. On theother hand, it must also be borne in mindthat, without such a reservation, the coun-try could produce only a handful of ChiefMinisters in the States who belong to thecategory of SC/ST or women.

l The concept of rotation prescribed underthe Act in respect of the reserved seats hasalso posed certain practical difficulties. Ar-ticle 243D clearly directs that the reservedseats, both for SCs and STs as well aswomen shall be allotted by rotation to dif-ferent constituencies in a panchayat. Thishas been interpreted to mean that such ro-tation should take place at the end of ev-ery five years. If this interpretation is giveneffect to, no SC, ST or women memberwill ever get the opportunity of occupyingthe same seat for a second term, as it ishighly unlikely that these persons would beallowed to contest from the same constitu-ency, when the reservation is removed.

If we accept the theory that most of the SC/ST and women members do not have any priorexperience and will find it difficult to occupypositions of power in the initial period, itwould be very difficult to support the idea that

they should not continue in such positions,beyond one term. Since this provision of ro-tation applies to the chairpersons also, it is pos-sible that the bureaucracy may take an upperhand in some places, as they are sure that thechairperson has no chance of getting re-elected. While the concept of rotation is com-mendable, it is also desirable to specifically pre-scribe the period for such rotation. This pe-riod should be long enough for the incum-bent to get acclimatised to such positions anddeliver the goods before completing that pe-riod and short enough to give all sections ofthe community a chance to get into positionsof power at the local level.

Dissolution

Article 243E specifies the duration of tenureof panchayats and makes it mandatory to con-stitute the next panchayat before the expiryof the duration of the previous panchayat orbefore the expiry of a period of six monthsfrom the date of dissolution, if any. Whilethe Constitution thus acknowledges the pos-sibility of a dissolution, it does not deal withthe running of the panchayat during the in-terregnum, that is between the dissolution andthe constitution of the new panchayat. It mayperhaps be necessary to provide for the con-tinuance of the existing office-bearers of thepanchayat to manage the day-to-day affairs ofthe panchayat during this interregnum, if nec-essary under the supervision of the Panchayatat the next higher level.

Devolution

l The Constitution expects the State Legis-lature, by law, to endow the panchayat withsuch powers and authority as may be nec-essary to enable them to function as insti-tutions of self-government and such lawmay contain provisions for the devolutionof powers and responsibilities upon thepanchayats at the appropriate level. How-ever, the devolution of powers and func-tional strengthening of the different tiers

The Constitutionexpects the StateLegislature, bylaw, to endow thepanchayat withsuch powers andauthority as maybe necessary toenable them tofunction asinstitutions of self-government


of the Panchayati Raj system have not takenplace in most States. Detailed executiveinstructions devolving powers and respon-sibilities on the different tiers of the PRIshave not been issued and a feeling is gain-ing ground that the initial momentum issomehow lost.

l In addition, a review of the provisions inthe States’ Acts reveals that bureaucraticcontrol over the panchayats continues tobe very strong. Even where direct bureau-cratic control is not visible, the panchayatshave been placed in such a position thatthe chairpersons have to make repeatedtrips to government offices located faraway, for getting approvals and sanctions.This dismal picture obtaining in most ofthe States leads us to the question whetherthe Act should have gone to the extent ofdrawing up a fourth list in the SeventhSchedule of the Constitution for districtsubjects, instead of simply outlining 29matters in the Eleventh Schedule.

l Functions go where there is money, regard-less of any list. Consequently, it is perhapsmore important to install a new financialregime than to devise new lists. That takesus to the constitution of the Finance Com-mission as prescribed in the Act. Article280(bb) and 280(cc) require the Central Fi-nance Commission to take into account therecommendations of the State FinanceCommissions (SFCs).

l The SFCs who have already submitted thereports have given their recommendationsfor the period 1996-2001 while the Elev-enth Finance Commission which has beenset up recently, will be concerned for thefive years beginning 2001. Merely project-ing the requirements based on the avail-able SFC reports by the Central FinanceCommission will be a very static way ofdealing with the issue. Some method will,therefore, have to be found to bring a

meaningful interface between the EleventhFinance Commission and the SFCs. Onesolution could be to expedite the settingup of the second SFCs. This will requirean amendment to Article 243I and 243Y,as the second SFCs cannot be set up be-fore the expiry of five years from the datewhen these were first set up. Unless thefinancial devolution from Centre to theStates and the PRIs is put on a realistic andsound footing, no functional devolutioncan become meaningful.

Summing up the above discussion, we may saythat since the panchayats have now come tostay as a constitutionally recognised tier ofgovernance, it is time to strengthen them sothat they can discharge the duties cast on themin the best manner possible. At the same timeit must also be borne in mind that even with-out a further amendment to the Constitution,it is still possible to implement the spirit ofdecentralisation in this country. In areas whichhave been left to the discretion of the StateGovernments under the Act, it is possible forthe State Governments to bring in improve-ments either through administrative orders ofthe Government or by amending the State stat-utes appropriately. Only in cases where theAct comes in the way of meeting a particularfield situation specific to a State, there is a needfor seeking a Constitutional Amendment. Suchcases do exist; but are not very many.

A paradox is that the Central Legislature was neces-sitated to bring about decentralisation in the country.While agreeing with the view that a Constitu-tional Amendment may not be the best formof bringing in decentralisation in any coun-try, we must also remember that Article 40which was in our Constitution for several yearscould not help in establishing meaningful lo-cal bodies in most States of our country. Wewill, therefore, have to live with the idea ofamending the Constitution not only to bringin but also to enhance decentralised gover-nance. Anomalies that have crept in have to

Since thepanchayats havenow come tostay as aconstitutionallyrecognised tier ofgovernance, it istime to strengthenthem so that theycan discharge theduties cast onthem in the bestmanner possible


be rectified and the challenge of the time hasto be met. These will again need a public de-bate to crystallise ideas, and political will totranslate these ideas into a workablelegislation.

4.2 Relationships between PRI Levels

We now turn our attention to the relationshipamong the different tiers of the PanchayatiRaj structure. A major area of friction betweenthe tiers has been the allocation of functionsamong them, as the Constitution has left thisentirely to the discretion of the States.

While devising the pattern of devolution notonly between the State Government and thePRIs but also between the PRIs themselves,three aspects have to be borne in mind.

l Firstly, administrative units and structures arenot uniform in every State. Each State hasits own unique historical background forthe evolution of its present administrativeand institutional patterns. It is thereforeneither feasible nor desirable to lay down auniform pattern for all States. The devolu-tion of functions among the tiers will haveto be left to the local genius, keeping in viewthe existing culture of the State and the ca-pabilities that can be created at differentlevels.

l Secondly, the Eleventh schedule of the Con-stitution, as already mentioned, covers allthe three levels of panchayats and there isan apparent overlap of functions. There-fore, demarcation of operational responsi-bility between one level of panchayats andanother has to be made specifically with ref-erence to each programme or activity. Thenumber of plan schemes, as of now, liter-ally runs into hundreds. Each of them hasto be examined to see what should be re-tained by the State Government and whatshould be entrusted to the district/interme-diate/ gram panchayat. Such demarcationcannot be a one time exercise and may callfor adjustments from time to time in the

light of experience and changes in the na-ture of governmental activities. This can bebest done under rules and notifications is-sued by the State Governments for whichnecessary provision has to be made in thestatute.

l Thirdly, while the principle of subsidiaritywill have to govern the allocation of func-tions among the different tiers of the PRIs,we must also take into account certain ba-sic principles of decentralisation, namely:(a) every activity requires a minimum sizefor functional efficiency and economy;(b) the area of benefit should not extendbeyond the jurisdiction of the panchayatconcerned; and (c) the administrative re-sources available at that particular level iscapable of handling the activity in a com-petent manner.

There is a need to establish functional link-ages between the tiers, at least for three dif-ferent reasons.

l Firstly, there is a commonality of functionsamong all the three tiers. While in any givenarea, the nature of activity entrusted to thedifferent levels could be different, such ac-tivities have to be meaningfully integratedwith one another.

l Secondly, the administrative support to theactivities of the panchayats at different lev-els is provided by different rungs of thesame official hierarchy which in any casewill function in accordance with the offi-cial hierarchy already established.

l Thirdly, there has to be some uniformity ofstandards in the provisions of basic and es-sential services within the district/interme-diate panchayats. The panchayats at thehigher level have therefore to act as coordi-nating bodies for the panchayats at the lev-els below. In some areas, as mentioned ear-lier, the latter can be the implementingagency for the programmes of the former.

The panchayatsat the higher levelhave thereforeto act ascoordinatingbodies for thepanchayats at thelevels below


The relationship between different tiers can-not be described in hierarchical terms. Dia-logue and consultation should be the moreappropriate way of interaction. For this tohappen, it is necessary to assign responsibili-ties for oversight and accountability betweenthe three tiers. Although the exact modalitiesof functioning of each tier would differ acrossStates, this implies that residuary powersshould be vested in the district tier and thepanchayat body at a higher level should havesome power to monitor the activities of thelower tier, and thus also serve as a forum ofredressal of grievances and settlement ofinter-panchayat disputes. (See Box 4)

If the local bodies ought to be distinct politi-cal entities, should each one of them be inde-pendently elected from a distinct constituencyor should there be a link in membership? Ob-viously, the lowest tier in any system has to bedirectly elected. Whether the higher level bod-ies should also have directly elected member-ships or whether they could be constituted in-directly through the elected members of thelower level bodies is a point for debate, asraised in the Eighty-seventh Amendment Bill.The issue of its implications for democraticcountervailing forces at the district level alsoneeds to be examined.

Costs

The costs of parallel forms of local govern-ment are equally high and have produced arti-ficial resource constraints. Even though ur-ban population’s need for water, land, energyand nutrients is increasing, it has not been ableto develop these resources for more equitablesharing simply because these resources areusually located outside their jurisdiction. Norhave the rural areas been able to develop thembecause of severe financial constraints. Theurban local governments have been reluctantto expand services like water supply, electric-ity, roads, transport and sewerage etc., tonearby villages because the revenue incomefrom the villages is too small to pay for even a

fraction of such services. On the other hand,the land scarcity in urban areas has given riseto problems of proliferation of slum popu-lation in unplanned settlements with severedeficiencies in basic civic amenities, forcingthe inhabitants to live in dangerously pollutedenvironments and dilapidated structures. Thecase for ending dualism in local governmentis thus strong.

Single Local Government

A single local government at the district levelcan look after the needs of its urban and ruralcomponents with a set of safeguards built intoit so as to ensure just development of the en-tire area. Such a district government can alsoplan for the entire district obviating the needto have a separate district planning commit-tee to coordinate action by various implement-ing agencies at the district level including thedistrict panchayats and the municipalities. Overa period of time, this can lead to true federal-ism with the district tier becoming as effectiveas the State government in its sphere of ac-tivities. Madhya Pradesh has initiated the ex-periment with district government since 1999,with the innovation of the district budget,which is reflected as a line item in the Statebudget. Such experiments in de-concentration

A single localgovernment atthe district levelcan look after theneeds of its urbanand ruralcomponents witha set ofsafeguards builtinto it so as toensure justdevelopment ofthe entire area

Another related issue is the revival ofnyaya panchayats to secure speedy andinexpensive justice in civil and crimi-nal matters of a relatively minor na-ture right at the village level. It is in-teresting to note that these nyayapanchayats were in existence even be-fore the British rule. The purposethen was to shorten the span betweencrime and punishment, and injury andredress as well as the hope that truthwould surface locally without elabo-rate evidentiary procedures. The in-stitution of nyaya panchayats will be avaluable aid to the development ofsocial habits of self-government andthe rule of law. If they function

Panchayats Dispense JusticeBOX 4

effectively, they could enable the dis-advantaged to seek justice in a rela-tively inexpensive manner and con-stitute an important mechanism forovercoming the various structuralconstraints facing them. Electing nyayapanchayats in a caste and communityridden society may pose problems inthe first instance. In such an event,nyaya panchayats could be entrustedwith the functions of mediation andconciliation to start with. Over a pe-riod of time and with the experiencegained, a workable system could beevolved combining the local wisdomand the required local talent.


of administrative power can help infuse greaterinterest in hitherto neglected mechanisms suchas the District Planning Committees. While,there may be apprehensions of capture ofthese by local bureaucracy and politicians, overa period of time, these will become platformsfor accountability at the local level.

The structural relationships between the vari-ous tiers of governance will, therefore, dependupon the attitude of the people manning themand their own commitment to the process ofdecentralisation. All of them should realisethat the success of the PRIs will depend onhow effectively they are able to perform. Ef-fective governance is a key ingredient for gooddelivery and all relationships should thereforehave to be designed on that basis.

4.3 Panchayats and Line Departments:Operational Issues

We examine the following issues in the con-text of the Constitution 73rd Amendment, withregard to the relationship between PRIs/ULBs and government departments, to iden-tify steps that need to be taken to ensure thatnot only the PRIs but also the other actorsplay their role in tandem for the benefit ofthe rural poor:

l Relationships between the PRIs and the Na-tional and State Governments and theirparastatals.

l The role that should be played by the PRIsin the field of development so that theirplace in the federal structure of our politygets duly integrated with the other existingstructures of governance.

The silence of the 73rd Amendment Act onthe manner in which the three tiers should belinked has resulted in a variety of practicesand some confusion in this regard. This canand frequently does result in a lack of co-or-dination between the three levels, which weak-ens the structure as a whole1 .

The lack of specification of functions andpowers between the three levels results in afeeling –at each level– that the other two havegreater powers and resources. The devolutionof powers in the States’ conformity legisla-tions is not merely seen to be inadequate, butthe Acts are also generally vague about whichfunctions are meant to be performed by whichtier. There are also no mechanisms for co-ordinating the functioning of the three tiers.The criteria of functional efficiency andeconomy, as also of administrative resources,could have been used to define more clearlythe role of each tier in the planning and imple-mentation of programmes.

Ambiguities in the Panchayat-Administration Relationship

The relationship between the panchayats andthes local administration has been interpreteddifferently across States. The Government ofRajasthan amended, by ordinance, some ofthe provisions of the conformity act to in-crease the control of government over the twohigher tiers. However, this is by no meansdefinitive evidence of the superiority of elec-tive over appointed authority. On the contrary,evidence is to be found in virtually all Statesof the dominance of the bureaucracy over thepeople’s representatives. In Haryana, the bu-reaucracy is seen to exercise inordinate con-trol, as it substantially guides and directs thedevelopmental activities of the panchayats, in-stead of merely facilitating these. This rela-tionship can become especially stifling in re-lation to panchayats headed by women, andeven more so those headed by dalit women.

Further, lower-level government functionar-ies, attached to the panchayats, are also con-fused as they are simultaneously accountableto their superior in the government as well asto the elected leaders of the panchayats. Anotable exception in this regard is the Con-formity Act of Gujarat which provides forsectoral development staff of the gazetted

The structuralrelationshipsbetween thevarious tiers ofgovernance will,therefore, dependupon the attitudeof the peoplemanning themand their owncommitment tothe process ofdecentralisation

1 For instance, the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act does not provide for the sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat to be a memberof the Panchayat Samiti, or for the Pradhan of the Samiti to be a member of the Zila Parishad.


officers’ rank to be transferred to thepanchayat institutions to carry out develop-mental work. Despite this provision, Gujarathas not been able to decentralise planningwhich Karnataka or Maharashtra have beenable to do somewhat better, arguably due to amore long-standing engagement withpanchayat institutions.

Devolution of Powers, Functions andResources in the State Conformity Acts

While structures undoubtedly predispose in-stitutions to evolve in particular ways, the moststringent test of any exercise in democraticdecentralisation is the actual powers and func-tions that are devolved to democratic institu-tions at the local level, which must enjoy au-tonomy in the exercise of these.

The relevant article of the Constitution de-scribes panchayats as institutions of self-gov-ernment, but if the scope of self-governmentis externally defined and circumscribed, theinstitutions will be limited in this role. Article243(G) itself provides for such circumscrip-tion, as it permits the States to endow thepanchayats with powers, without actually mak-ing it imperative for them to do so. An exami-nation of the powers and functions actuallydevolved makes evident the fact that the im-plications of the Constitutional Amendmentwere perhaps more radical in reservation pro-visions than in the powers and functions whichwere left to the States to determine and finance.

In fact, only three Conformity Acts – thoseof West Bengal, Bihar and Tripura – State thatthey aim to endow panchayats with powersand functions that can enable them to workas institutions of self-government. TheHaryana Act specifically States that the objec-tive of the panchayat institutions is to adminis-ter rural areas better. Indeed, Article 20, Chap-ter IV of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act of1994, specifies the “functions and duties” ofthe Gram Panchayat as follows:

“….it shall be the duty of the Gram Panchayatwithin the limits of the funds at its disposal, tomake arrangements for carrying out the requirementsof sabha area in respect of the following mat-ters….” (Emphasis added)

It is evident that many of these problems re-lating to the structure of the Panchayati Rajsystem have implications for the functioningof panchayats, but that these become espe-cially difficult in the context of panchayatsheaded by women is not often realised. Theobstacles faced by women as members orheads of panchayats tend to be evaluated interms of their own subjective perceptions, andare rarely related to the structural inadequa-cies of the Panchayati Raj framework.

Regulatory and Development Functions

The fundamental question before the institu-tions of decentralised governance has beenwhether they are there for development func-tions only or for the wider purpose of self-governance.

In his dissenting note to the Ashok MehtaCommittee Report, E.M.S. Namboodiripadsaid “Democracy at the central and State lev-els, but bureaucracy at all lower levels – this isthe essence of Indian polity as spelt out in theConstitution. I cannot think of the PanchayatiRaj Institutions as anything other than theintegral parts of the country’s administrationwith no difference between what are called the‘development’ and ‘regulatory’ functions. I amafraid that the ghost of the earlier idea thatPanchayati Raj Institutions should be com-pletely divorced from all regulatory functionsand made to confine themselves only to de-velopmental functions is haunting my col-leagues. What is required is that, while certaindefinite fields of administration like defense,foreign affairs, currency, communication etc.,should rest with the Centre, all the rest shouldbe transferred to the States and from there tothe district and lower levels of elected admin-istrative bodies”.

The moststringent test ofany exercise indemocraticdecentralisation isthe actual powersand functions thatare devolved todemocraticinstitutions at thelocal level


Article 243G of the Constitution which nowgoverns the entrustment of functions to thePanchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) makes itclear that the primary role of the panchayatswill be in the area of development. Planningand implementation of programmes of eco-nomic development and social justice oughtto be the focal points of their activities.

If the role envisaged for the PRIs, at least forthe time being, is primarily in the field of de-velopment, how are they to perform this rolealongside several other actors who are alreadyin this field? What should be their relation-ship with the other existing structures of gov-ernance – the Central Government, the StateGovernments, the parastatals, the communitybased organisations etc., who also have theirassigned roles in development. Admittedly,PRIs have entered the scene only recently. Allthe other actors have been in the field for sev-eral years by now. The rules governing themhave either been defined or evolved over a longperiod of time. Do we need to bring aboutchanges in these rules to facilitate the PRIs toestablish themselves in their assigned place ingovernance?

Secondly, since all the three tiers of thePanchayati Raj Structure have the commongoal of development, how to delineate theirfunctions and powers in such a manner thatthere is space for each one of them withoutany significant overlapping?

4.4 Reforms Required for MoreEffective Linkages

The Central Government

It has been at the instance of the central gov-ernment that panchayats came to be estab-lished in most States at different points oftime, barring one or two notable exceptions.Given this context, the Central Governmentat the highest level of our federal structurehas the responsibility to promote and nurtureeffective panchayats at the grassroots of thefederal pyramid.

For a truly rational pattern of devolution ofpowers to the PRIs, it may be necessary toreview the entire gamut of powers and respon-sibilities from the Union to the GramPanchayat levels. However, in the Indian con-text, the establishment of a strong PanchayatiRaj system has never been a ground for de-mand for greater autonomy by the States.A strong State does not automatically meanthat the State would have an active networkof PRIs.

Centralised Planning and Local Autonomy

In reality, the system of centralised planningwhich the country has followed for over fourdecades, severally constrains local autonomy.When such constraints operate at the Statelevel, it is obvious that they would also be vis-ible at the panchayat levels. Earmarking of alarge proportion of plan provisions besidescommitting a substantial outlay for on-goingactivities in the Five Year Plans does restrictthe extent to which a sectoral allocation canbe altered by the panchayats. A large propor-tion of centrally sponsored schemes with tiedfunds and national guidelines has further ag-gravated the situation.

The limited availability of untied funds andsevere restrictions in implementation tend tomake PRIs agencies of the State Govern-ments, rather than units of local government.There is a need to change the system of plan-ning at the all India level. While the need toassign national priorities in key areas cannotbe disputed, it is desirable that the scope ofearmarking by the Planning Commission issuitably reduced so that the PRIs can havesubstantial untied funds, besides some say inthe prioritisation which can make local plan-ning more meaningful. The number and scopeof centrally sponsored schemes should alsobe curtailed in terms of both range and vol-ume. A gradual shift from sectoral planningto area planning appears necessary in the con-text of people’s participation in the planningprocess.

The CentralGovernment atthe highest levelof our federalstructure has theresponsibility topromote andnurture effectivepanchayats at thegrassroots of thefederal pyramid


The quantum of powers and functions that aState would want to transfer to the PRIs woulddepend upon the extent of power the Stateitself can obtain from the Central Govern-ment. The more it receives from the Centrethe more it would be willing to transfer. It istherefore necessary to have a fresh look at therecommendations of the Sarkaria Committeedealing with Centre-State relations in the fieldof allocation of functions especially those re-lating to development sectors.

Periodic Review

A periodic review of the functions and pow-ers that are delegated to the PRIs by the StateGovernments, in the context of the freedomavailable to a State Government for implemen-tation of programmes in the developmentfield, can also be initiated by the Central Gov-ernment. The Planning Commission itself caninitiate the process of activating the DistrictPlanning Committees to perform their role indecentralised planning as envisaged under 73rdamendment. It is possible for the PlanningCommission to verify whether the districtplanning exercise has been scrupulously fol-lowed or not by the State Government, whilefinalising State Plan outlays as a part of its an-nual exercise. This will also put some pres-sure on the PRIs to prepare local level plansin time, duly taking into consideration the localneeds and aspirations.

Financial Adequacy and Discretionary Funds

Availability of adequate finances and untiedfunds is necessary for the efficient dischargeof functions assigned to any panchayat.Article 280(3) (bb) of the Constitution hadcast a duty on the Union Finance Commis-sion to make recommendations to the Presi-dent on the measures needed to augment theconsolidated fund of a State to supplementthe resources of the panchayats in the State.This would be based on recommendationsmade by the Finance Commission of the State.

It is imperative that the Central FinanceCommission is encouraged to make a liberaluse of this provision to augment the funds ofthe PRIs so that the availability of funds canbe linked to the discharge of functions as-signed to the local bodies by the respectiveState Governments. A substantial provisionof untied grants would also help in implemen-tation of innovative programmes for the ben-efit of the people by the local institutions. Itwould also encourage the gradual shift towardsarea development mentioned earlier.

Local Area Fund of MPs and MLAs

It is unfortunate that soon after the PRIs cameto be established, a discretionary developmentfund has been made available to each Mem-ber of the Parliament (MP) for local area de-velopment. The MPs’ Local Area Develop-ment Scheme (MPLADS) grants at the re-cently revised rates account for over Rs. 1,500crore per year and coupled with similar fundsavailable to the Members of the State Legisla-ture in some States, the sum of such grantsmay well exceed Rs. 2,000 crore per annum.These grants are not related to any specificdevelopment programme and as such they areuntied funds available to take up local devel-opment works, which mostly fall within thedomain of the local government institutions.It is desirable to dispense with such schemesthat create a clash of interests at the local level.On the other hand, it would be desirable toplace these funds as untied grants at the dis-posal of the PRIs themselves. A continua-tion of MPLADS and other similar schemeswill only erode the importance ofdecentralised planning through local bodiesas envisaged in the Constitution. Hence theneed for the Central Government to take alead in abolishing the MPLADS which willhopefully result in the abolition of similarschemes for MLAs now implemented byseveral States.

The quantum ofpowers andfunctions that aState would wantto transfer to thePanchayati RajInstitutions woulddepend upon theextent of powerthe State itselfcan obtain fromthe CentralGovernment


Centrally Sponsored Schemes

If the development planning process has tobe decentralised down to the panchayat level,this should go hand in hand with the Govern-ment of India reducing the range and volumeof the centrally sponsored plan schemes, andallowing the State Governments to functionfreely in their allotted spheres. It should fur-ther be accompanied by suitable devolutionof financial resources between them and fromthem to the panchayats. PRIs may lose inter-est in the preparation of plans unless adequatefunds are provided for meeting the expendi-ture. Therefore, there is a need to increase thepanchayat’s area of discretion in spending theirown funds and to ensure that the sectoralschemes of the line departments are coordi-nated and integrated by them.

State Governments

The momentum of decentralisation at theState level requires political will and an enablingenvironment, and a resolution of angularitiesin Centre-State relations, as pointed by theSarkaria Commission Report in 1986. Theaddition of the Eleventh Schedule to the Con-stitution listing out certain subjects for beinglooked after by the PRIs does not really meanthat a constitutionally independent set of func-tions have now been allocated to thepanchayats on the same lines as the allocationof functions between the Union and the Statesin the Seventh schedule.

Unfortunately there has been very little dis-cussion on the problems that are being facedby the State Governments and the PRIs whileimplementing Article 243G both in letter andspirit. The allocation of functions under thisArticle does not in any way reduce the execu-tive and legislative powers of the State con-ferred under Article 264 of the Constitutionread with the Seventh schedule relating to thesubjects over which the States have jurisdic-tion. In other words, it appears that the State

Government continues to retain both itslegislative and executive powers in respect ofthe functions entrusted to the PRIs. The man-ner in which the State Government exercisesits executive powers in these matters is deter-mined by the State Legislation on the subject.

Functions Not Specified

Similarly, the functions of each level ofpanchayats have not been spelt out in detail,especially with reference to the 29 subjects thathave been listed in the Eleventh schedule.Since this has been left to the discretion ofState governments, the progress on actualtransfer of functions (as distinct from subjectslisted in the Eleventh Schedule), there is con-siderable variation across States in terms ofprogress. In most States the principle ofsubsidiarity has not been fully observed in thedevolution of powers and functions to thethree tiers in a balanced manner. In some Statesthe government departments dealing withthese subjects have been brought under theadministrative control of the PRIs whereas inmany other States, the PRIs have not beengiven any powers to control either the staffor the budget or the schemes.

The functions to be performed at each levelof panchayats must be clearly identified. Theimplementation of such functions would callfor simultaneous amendments to subject-mat-ter legislation to enable assumption of suchfunctions by the panchayats. A clear delega-tion of powers may have to be given in mat-ters not covered by legislation such as anti-poverty programmes, preparation of localplans, construction of roads, etc. Thepanchayats must be given specific powers topool resources and undertake integrated localdevelopment. There should be no requirementto get any approval from higher levels of bu-reaucracy in the department of Panchayati Rajor in any other Government department.

The functions tobe performed ateach level ofpanchayats mustbe clearlyidentified


Monitoring Through Audit

Monitoring should be only through annualperformance reports and through audits. In-dividual decisions of panchayats should notalso be subject to review or revision by thebureaucracy or by the Ministers at the Statelevel. For the effective discharge of functions,panchayats should have control over the staffworking for them. The panchayats can be em-powered to hire their own staff over a periodof time. Until then the staff deputed to themshould work under the direct control of thepanchayat concerned.

The State Government should have powersvis-a-vis the panchayats for the followingreasons:

l The “hard budget constraint” and compres-sion of public expenditure occasioned bythe States’ fiscal crisis implies that the ef-forts to reform State finances must not beundermined by profligacy or “soft budgetconstraints” at the local level.

l State Governments have the responsibilityto carry out the agreed national prioritiesand to ensure compliance of these priori-ties, they need to have some say over theimplementation of programmes by thePRIs.

l Given the nature of available tax bases, theextent to which PRIs can raise fundsthrough local taxation, is limited. They haveto depend primarily on financial resourcestransferred to them by the State govern-ments. While devices such as the FinanceCommission awards may insulate resourcetransfer from political uncertainties, thetransfer can be effected only through thebudget, with the approval of the State Leg-islature. The answerability of the State gov-ernment to the Legislature in respect ofState funds will thus remain even in respectof the funds transferred to PRIs. To fulfilthis obligation, the State needs to have someauthority over the PRIs.

Strengthening Cooperative Federalism

The problem of overlapping functions andjurisdiction between the State Governmentsand the PRIs need not necessarily be seen asreflecting an unsatisfactory situation with po-tential conflicts and confusion. The presentsituation actually presents a challenge to ourpolity which can be met by evolving systemsof synergy between different levels of gover-nance. We already have cooperative federal-ism evolved in this country where the CentralGovernment formulates various schemes andshapes policy relating to several State subjectsbesides providing funds to implement suchschemes.

Integration of District Plans with State Plans

Another issue that has the potential of con-flict between the State Government and thePRIs relates to the integration of district planswith the State and national plans. Admittedly,the national plans have several objectives,which can be achieved only in the long runwhereas district plans reflect the immediateneeds of the people, which may sometimesoverlook the long term need. Presently, thePlanning Commission does the work of co-ordinating the State plans with the nationalplan. On this basis, Five Year Plans and theannual plans are finalised. A similar processwill have to be adopted for approving the dis-trict plans at the State level. This could per-haps be done either by the State PlanningDepartment or by setting up a State Develop-ment Council which will help in establishingthe necessary coordination at all levels bothin physical and financial terms.

While it may be easy to establish an institu-tional framework to coordinate the various dis-trict plans with the State and Central plans, themore difficult task would be how to reconcile the pro-cess of decentralised planning with comprehensive Stateplanning. A healthy interaction between thedifferent tiers of the PRIs on the one hand,the State Planning Units and the

National planshave severalobjectives, whichcan be achievedonly in the longrun whereasdistrict plansreflect theimmediate needsof the people,which maysometimesoverlook the longterm need


National Planning Commission on the otheris, therefore necessary to minimise the effectsof the inherent dichotomy between the free-dom available to the PRIs and the disciplinedemanded by national planning. If the ‘hardbudget constraint’ is not be undermined byfiscal profligacy at the local level, it would benecessary to integrate local and State plans,thereby ensuring that State level reform isdriven by local imperatives as well.

Dependence of PRIs on State and CentralFunding

The near total dependence of the PRIs onState and Central funding for their activities,necessarily limits their ability to develop intovibrant institutions of self-governance. ThePRIs at present do not have any sources oftax income worth mentioning. A dependablesystem of revenue sharing with the Union andState Governments is still not in place, eventhough Articles 243-I and 280 (3)(c) providefor allocation of resources to the PRIs throughthe State Finance Commissions. In actual op-eration what has happened is a mere transferof certain schemes with related tied grantsfrom the State Government to the PRIs. Agreat deal of streamlining is also needed inthe procedure associated with the release offunds to the PRIs, before such transfer offunds can confer any reasonable degree of fi-nancial autonomy on the panchayats. To aug-ment the available resources of the panchayats,it is necessary that all plan funds are placed atthe disposal of the concerned panchayat witha clear mandate to implement the scheme forwhich the funds are meant. The PRIs can alsobe authorised to tap the untapped resourcessuch as water rates for commercial crops etc.,The agencies working at the district level dis-charging functions that fall within the ambitof the PRIs should be abolished and their ob-jectives transferred along with the functionsand finances to the PRIs. This includes thedistrict rural development agency, the droughtprone area programme committees, etc.

Availability of Functionaries

Availability of functionaries is as importantas the provision of functions and funds to thePRIs. The overlapping control of PRIs andState Government over the administrativemachinery for implementing developmentprogrammes entrusted to the PRIs reduces thefunctional autonomy of all these bodies to aconsiderable extent. In addition, the panchayatfunctionaries, who are on deputation to theseinstitutions from the State Government, as inKarnataka, may continue to regard themselvesas government servants only and may tend tolook up to their State level seniors than theelected leaders of the panchayats for guidanceand leadership. This situation is further com-pounded in some States by the control exer-cised by the legislators over local administra-tion through the mechanism of annual trans-fer of officials which is effected by the Stateadministration largely at the initiative of thelegislators and the other State level politicalleaders. This practice of large scale officialtransfers at the initiative of legislators can se-riously undermine the functional autonomyof PRIs, besides contributing to the dilutionof administrative accountability. A series ofchanges would therefore be required in theadministrative arrangements for programmeplanning and implementation in respect of theschemes and programmes transferred to thePRIs for implementation.

Though a good part of administrative machin-ery can be easily transferred to work underthe PRIs, yet the PRIs cannot work in isola-tion of the other Government structures atthe local level. For instance, several depart-ments such as cooperation, command area de-velopment, land revenue etc., have a tremen-dous bearing on the effectiveness of the PRIs,even they are not listed under the EleventhSchedule. Institutional arrangements will haveto be made to provide for dialogue and directcommunication between the PRIs and these

A great deal ofstreamlining isalso needed inthe procedureassociated withthe release offunds to thePanchayati RajInstitutions,before suchtransfer of fundscan confer anyreasonabledegree offinancialautonomy on thepanchayats


organisations. The district planning commit-tee can perhaps play a crucial role in thisregard.

Parastatal Organisations

Many States have, over a period of time, setup a number of parastatal organisations tomeet the self-employment and economic de-velopment requirements of vulnerable sec-tions of society. Some of these institutionshave an in-built bias for social justice. For in-stance, the Finance Development and Hous-ing Corporations set up for the ScheduledCastes, the Scheduled Tribes, the BackwardClasses, the minorities and women, both atthe Central and State levels invariably deal withsubjects which have now been assigned to thePRIs. These institutions were basically con-ceived for mobilising finances from leadingdevelopment institutions such as theNABARD, the Land Development Banks, etc.Budgetary grants are also made in favour ofthese institutions by the State and Central Gov-ernment to facilitate mobilisation of furtherfinances from commercial institutions, usingthese provisions as margin or seed money.

In the context of the Eleventh schedule ofthe Constitution, these institutions appear tobe eminently suited for transfer from the Statelevel to the PRIs, mostly at the district level.All their programmes whether aimed at infra-structure or at individuals or a combinationof both, requiring forward and backward link-ages are implementable and can be imple-mented by the PRIs. The only action that isrequired is to transfer in their entirety theseinstitutions to the PRIs with all their budgetsand staff. In doing so, care should be taken toassociate all the existing technical and admin-istrative personnel in the functioning of theprogrammes concerned so as to ensure thattheir experience and expertise continue to beavailable to the decentralised local institutions.If in some cases, it is felt absolutely necessaryto keep a particular parastatal outside the

purview of the PRIs, in view of its larger areaof operation which may extend beyond a dis-trict and require coordination between the dis-tricts, it is necessary to build up working rela-tions between the District Panchayats and thedistrict unit of the parastatals. This may in-clude the constitution of monitoring/coordi-nation committees at the cutting edge levels,in addition to a legal provision compelling theattendance of the representatives of theparastatals during the meetings of the con-cerned panchayat whenever required.

5. Contribution of PRIs toGovernance Structure

Forum to Explain Development Strategies

Firstly, the PRIs, and more particularly theGram Sabhas, can be made use of by thehigher tiers of governance as a forum wherethey could explain their development strate-gies to the people and receive valuable feed-back on the problems arising out of the imple-mentation of their programmes. The GramSabha should be encouraged to invite mem-bers of higher level panchayats, legislature andeven the Parliament to participate in theirmeetings and articulate their needs in theirpresence. Higher level Panchayats and the StateGovernments can also depute a designatedofficer to each Gram Sabha to have the viewsof the Gram Sabha recorded and reported toappropriate level of governance for informa-tion and mid-course correction wherever nec-essary.

Inter-Sectoral Convergence of DevelopmentEfforts

Secondly, the PRIs can play an effective rolein convergence of development efforts at thelocal level. This convergence can be of twokinds – one, internal to the efforts of the linedepartments working under the control of thePRIs and another external by converging theefforts of the line departments with the ef-forts of the organs of the larger society

The Gram Sabhashould beencouraged toinvite members ofhigher levelpanchayats,legislature andeven theParliament toparticipate in theirmeetings andarticulate theirneeds in thepresence of theinvitees


outside such as research bodies, universitiesand voluntary organisations. The sectoral al-locations made at the Central and State levelscan be amalgamated to prepare an area-wiseplan at the local level and this can form thebasis for converging the various programmesunder implementation within the jurisdictionof the panchayat concerned. The district plan-ning committee can play an effective role inthe external convergence, by involving the aca-demicians, researchers and other non-govern-mental organisations in plan formulation andwherever necessary for monitoring and evalu-ation as well. The PRIs can ideally be themechanism by which various government ini-tiatives for the poor and disadvantaged can besynergised to yield the maximum benefits byensuring effective delivery.

Enhance Accountability of ElectedRepresentatives

Thirdly, the Gram Sabha which readily pro-vides a forum for accountability that can com-pel an elected representative to face his con-stituency periodically, can be activated so thatthe elected representatives are made to explainto the electorate what they had done and whatthey propose to do. The Gram Sabhas, if regu-larly conducted, can definitely achieve the pur-pose for which they have now been created,by providing a ready and effective forum ofaccountability not only for the GramPanchayat members but also for the electedrepresentatives of the higher tiers. This wouldaugur well for our democratic polity.

Initiate Social Audit

The existence of the PRIs can help in intro-ducing the process of social audit at the locallevels. Voluntary councils of experts and emi-nent citizens constituted by the Gram Sabhascan evaluate the work carried out by thepanchayats and judge their quality, effective-ness and conformity with accepted norms.The PRIs can also ensure wide publicity fortheir activities among the people through the

Gram Sabhas. Steps can be taken to provideaccess to official records and accounts at leastat the Gram Panchayat level and this can beextended to the higher tiers over a period oftime. Such arrangements for ensuring trans-parency in administration can be fullyoperationlised throughout the country on thebasis of the experience gained at the local lev-els. The activities of the various communitybased organisations working at the village lev-els can be effectively monitored by insistingon their reporting to the Gram Sabhas of theiractivities. These include the watershed devel-opment committees, the user groups under thewater supply and sanitation programmes, theparents’ committees constituted under the dis-trict primary education programme, the jointforest management committees etc., Even thevoluntary organisations working for the ben-efit of the poor within the jurisdiction of thevillage can make use of the Gram Sabha bothfor dissemination of knowledge and also forbetter implementation of their ownprogrammes with community participation.

Ensure Better Performance of PublicFacilities for Education and Health

If the Panchayati Raj structure takes a firmroot in our polity, one can hope for better re-sults at least in two areas, which are largelygoverned by the Central and State Govern-ments. at present – namely primary educationand rural health. It may not be out of placehere to mention that the Zila Parishad andMandal Panchayats Evaluation Committeeconstituted by the Government of Karnatakain 1989 came to the conclusion that duringthe two tier panchayat regime in Karnataka“attendance of school teachers, medical of-ficers, para-medical staff in rural institutionsimproved remarkably”. Such a conclusion canbe expected, as the lower level panchayats arebound to take an active interest in the perfor-mance of the primary schools and the primaryhealth centre operating within their domains,as compared to the State and Central

Voluntarycouncils ofexperts andeminent citizensconstituted by theGram Sabhascan evaluate thework carried outby thepanchayats andjudge their quality,effectiveness andconformity withaccepted norms


Government functionaries located far awayfrom these institutions. Since the success ofdevelopment efforts in this country largely de-pend on significant improvements in the edu-cation and health sectors, strengthening of thePRIs and devolving adequate powers on themwould go a long way in reaching our goal.

The success of this system would howeverdepend on how the PRIs integrate themselveswith the other existing structures of gover-nance, for the benefit of the people. Ofcourse, there is also the need for providing anenabling environment. What are the minimumingredients of such an enabling environment?

Ingredients of an Enabling Environment

l Firstly, local government, as we noted ear-lier, is essentially a power sharing mecha-nism. It is not reasonable to expect a na-tional regime that feels its own legitimatepowers to be threatened, to undertake anyexperiments in power sharing. Thus humansecurity and peace is the pre-requisite forsuccessful local government.

l Without a strong political will, an autono-mous local authority, even if there is one,will always remain the weaker party in anyconflict with a nationally based departmentfunctionary.

l The third pre-requisite is strengthening thepoor, so as to protect them from the con-trol and exploitative behaviour of the rich.The strengthening of PRIs must be under-taken in the broader context of measuresto empower the poor if there is to be genu-ine participation of the disadvantaged in lo-cal government activity. These steps couldinclude redistribution of assets through aneffective implementation of land reformsas was done in West Bengal and Kerala, de-velopment of common property resources,efficient public distribution system, ensur-ing the access of the poor to schools andhealth facilities and ensuring the effectivefunctioning of these facilities.

l It must be recognised that the local gov-ernments not only need guidance fromabove but they also have to be defendedagainst any erosion stemming from outside.The need to build up a local governmentsector within every higher level of govern-ment which understands decentralisation,is committed to its aims and is able to de-fend it, requires no emphasis. An associa-tion of local governments., operated by thelocal authorities themselves can also play asupplementary role in protecting the cor-porate interests of the entire sector.

l Another key element for the success ofPRIs is the change of mindset from onethat works for the people to one that workswith the people. This would require a re-ori-entation of both the bureaucrats and se-nior politicians at the central/provincial lev-els, from an attitude which is centralizing,control oriented and populist to one ofsharing authority through regular institu-tions of democracy. This can be achievedthrough a process of training and freshinstitutionalisation.

l Finally, comes the need to train local gov-ernment representatives themselves for theirnew role. The PRI representatives and lo-cal officials must devise mechanisms for col-laboration in the context of direct democ-racy. It is in their interest to understandeach others’ problems and limitations at avery early stage and in smaller territorieswhere the problems are comparatively easyand manageable. The attitudinal differencesbetween the politicians and bureaucrats canbe brought down to an acceptable level overa period of time, as both the groups gainexperience in working together and man-aging local administration. Till then, theneed to train both of them independentlyand also jointly with a view not only toequipping them for their tasks but also toco-exist harmoniously will remain.

Another keyelement for thesuccess ofPanchayati RajInstitutions is thechange ofmindset from onethat works for thepeople to one thatworks with thepeople


6. Decentralisation and UrbanLocal Bodies

6.1 Features and Critique

Main Features

The key provisions of the 74th ConstitutionalAmendment which pertains to urban localbodies are given in Box 5.

A Critique of the 74th Amendment

Several academics, administrative and consti-tutional experts have reviewed the act from acritical perspective. Drawing from these docu-ments, the following issues can be highlighted:

l The XII Schedule is not mandated and it isup to the State governments to decide as to

which of the 12th Schedule functions maybe devolved to the ULBs. Most States, haveamended their acts to include part or insome cases all of these. Studies suggest thatonly marginal changes that were regardedas mandatory have been carried out. A com-parison of the State legislation’ with cen-tral Act reveal that few State governmentshave availed of the opportunity presentedby the 74th Constitutional Amendment toclarify municipal functions listed as ‘obliga-tory’ and ‘discretionary’ and avoids overlap-ping institutional functional and geographicjurisdictions.

l In almost all States with the exception ofWest Bengal and Kerala, politicaldecentralisation has not been backed byenough financial devolution. Thus, ULBshave to depend upon the State government’spolitical and bureaucratic lobbies to accessfunds. Also, there is still very significantdependence in terms of permission seek-ing for even relatively simple matters. Thisfurther reinforces the lack of financial devo-lution.

l While provisions for reservation for SC/STs and women have been made in accor-dance with the constitutional provisions inall States, in its details this does not reflectthe sprit of the 74th Constitutional Amend-ment. For example, the decision of whichseats are reserved need not follow any setcriteria and could be used for political pur-poses by the ruling party. This situationundermines the effort to broad-base par-ticipation by women and ST/SCs.

l Similarly while legal provisions for the con-stitution of ward committees have also beenmade in most States, the actual sprit of theamendment is diffused since State Govern-ments can “club” several wards together toform a single committee. Also, while theycan be given wide-ranging powers, this doesnot necessarily co-relate with financial

In almost allStates politicaldecentralisationhas not beenbacked byenough financialdevolution

Institutions of Self-governance: Municipali-ties are visualised as ‘institutions ofself-government’, with the capabilityto prepare ‘plans for economic devel-opment and social justice’. Theywould functions pertaining to the XIISchedule and additional ones en-trusted by the State Government. TheXII Schedule is an illustrative list andnot a directive one.Ward Committees: It is mandatory forCorporations to constitute WardCommittees. These would includerepresentation from women, citizens’groups, SC/ STs etc. in cities with apopulation of over 0.3 million. Forlower level of Urban Local Bodies(ULBs), the State government candecide. The Wards Committee is tobring governance closer to the peopleand could be empowered to carry outthe responsibilities of the ULB includ-ing those of the XII ScheduleDistrict Planning Committees: To effectspatial and economic development,and also rural and urban planning, theact advises the constitution of Dis-trict Planning Committees (DPC) andMetropolitan Planning Committees(MPCs) with majority representation

The 74th Constitutional Amendment: The Urban Bill of Rights

BOX 5

of elected local representatives.State Finance Commission: To ensure fi-nancial stability of ULBs, the act man-dates the constitution of a State Fi-nance Commission (SFCs) every fiveyears. This would review the financialposition of rural and urban bodiesand recommend devolution of taxes,charges, fees, tolls, duties, shared rev-enues mid inter-governmental trans-fers to municipalities and other mea-sures. Based upon the recommenda-tions of State Finance Commission,the Central Finance Commission isexpected to suggest measures for aug-menting the consolidated funds in aState, for supplementing the resourcesof municipalitiesState Election Commission To ensure ademocratic process, the act mandatesthe creation of State Election Com-missions (SECs). This would oversee,direct, and control the preparation ofelectoral rolls and conduct electionsto rural and urban bodies. Anotherkey task of the SECs is to ensure thatelection to municipalities dissolved bythe State government, be held within6 months of the dissolution.


allocations. One could argue that the posi-tions of the councilors, the building blockof a municipal and democratic system stillremains undermined. Traditionally, theyformed critically important conduits for lo-cal priorities and also to ensure account-ability. This group finds little or nomention.

l All the States have established SFCs and byMarch 1997, 10 SFCs had submitted reportsto their respective State governments.There has been, however, a substantial time-lag between the submission of the SFC re-port and its placement in the State legisla-ture. Here again, it is up to the State Gov-ernment to indemnify funds being allocatedto ULBs against inflation.

l The SECs have been established and haveconducted elections in all ULBs except afew North Indian States. By January 1997,about 60,000 elected representatives in15 States have assumed their positions invarious ULBs. An emerging issue is that ofadequate training and grounding of newcouncilors in matters of municipal admin-istration and conduct. This happens atpresent, largely via the party system and peergroup support.

l DPCs have been set up only in Kerala,Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. Here,separate legislation has been enacted for thepurpose. As yet, no State government hasnotified a Metropolitan Planning Commit-tee. Kerala is in the process of drafting leg-islation on the issue. No State has been ableto take specific action on the situation ofDevelopment Authorities except Keralawhere the process is underway. Kerala hasalso attempted to bring various line agen-cies under the ULBs or RLBs.

l Short duration of the terms for Mayors andPresidents make for poor programmeimplementation and tighter State govern-ment control over ULBs. It is not

surprising that this is a significant issue ofdebate. Mayors in Karnataka have a termof only one year, while Presidents of aTMC, for two and a half years. Kerala andWest Bengal in contrast provide a longerterm for mayors / presidents. The lengthof terms affects the implementation ofprogrammes. This is especially when clear-ances are required by the State Governmentat each stage. Most significant, the leader-ship in ULBs would be fractured in the set-ting and implementation of developmentalpriorities. By default, project proposals andthe State political parties would influenceclearance.

Despite the growing realisation of the limita-tions of the 74th Constitutional Amendment,it is significant that there is almost no evidenceof a reversal of a democratic situation as hav-ing positive impacts. A careful reading of theopinions documented suggest that what con-strains the local elected system is the power-ful and omnipresent presence of the StateGovernment reinforced by the political partysystem. Both together suppress any local ini-tiative, promote political clientalism within thepolitical structure itself, and reward passiveparty obedience rather than actual groundwork.

This raises another important issue. Evenwhen there is an elected body in place, unsuit-ability in the local political arena can take aserious toll on local governance, which is tothe advantage of higher levels, political cir-cuits. There are obviously financial aspectsof this issue. Ghosh notes that in the case ofPunjab, municipal bodies do not get proportionate ben-efit of the growing richness of the cities because ofhigh industrial growth. While the net value addedfrom industrial production increased on anaverage by 173 percent annually in 1970s and1980s, municipal incomes have grown only by69 percent during this period. In Bengal,despite the adoption of the Mayor in Councilsystem, the State Government via the

Short duration ofthe terms forMayors andPresidents makefor poorprogrammeimplementationand tighter Stategovernmentcontrol overUrban LocalBodies


Municipal Affairs Department promoted a Re-vised grant scheme. While aimed to lay em-phasis on financial streamlining, this seems toreinforce State control over ULBs. The pointhere is to recognise that the situation is full ofcross currents. It is important to realise thatsuch amendments are part of a longer-termpolitical process – shaped by the experienceof their implementation in a diverse countryas India.

6.2 Urban Local bodies and PovertyIssues

This section addresses issues relating to the74th Amendment (principal features outlinedin Box 5) from a developmental perspectiveframed along the following two themes drawnfrom case studies and experiences from vari-ous parts of India:

l Productive Cities: Where livelihood oppor-tunities are maximised for poor and othergroups via local economies.

l Institutions and ‘Good politics’: Wherepoor groups facing competition from othermore powerful groups in society, can ac-cess resources and shape the nature of pub-lic investments. This includes povertyprogrammes that address the systemic andstructural conditions of poverty.

A common thread binds these themes - thekey role played by local bodies, and its repre-sentative agents.

l The 74th Amendment is part of a larger pro-cess of political decentralisation that in turnrelates to rapidly emerging local economies.Thus, even prior to the enactment, a closestudy of the urban terrain in both metro-politan and small town settings reveal thateffective social and economic change hashappened via civic actions pushing for po-litical decentralisation. This has in turnshaped the nature of institutions and alsoto some extent, the political process.

l The Amendment does provide institutionalopenings that respond to such on goingchanges. For instance, the stress on the sta-bility of municipal institutions, reinforcingthe ward as a focus of developmental ac-tivities, are important starting points. Per-haps the most important is the revival of alocal political and (perhaps economic) iden-tity. This revival helps to question the domi-nance of para-statal agencies over local bod-ies and State level political circuits over lo-cal ones.

l It is critically important in this respect, thatinternational development funds give seri-ous attention to processes of decentra-lisation. This is at two levels. First, to struc-ture development programmes which pro-vide a legitimate place to local elected rep-resentatives and municipal bodies; Second,to ensure that funding routes do not un-dermine their legitimate and developmen-tal functions. This attention to issues of lo-cal governance is important from severalaspects: From the point of social justice tobe responsive to the needs of those groupsin situation of severe poverty; Second, tohelp make programmes sustainable. This isboth political (to minimise a post fundingpolitical backlash) and economic (by help-ing local bodies tap the wealth created fromurbanisation).

Recognizing existing decentralisationefforts and the openings provided by the 74th.CA would go a long way in addressing theseissues and allow for greater “local ownership”in the longer term.

6.3 Trends in Urbanisation and CivicParticipation

Cities today also reveal increasing disparitiesbetween rich and poor groups manifest inneighborhoods with contrasting levels of civicamenities. Earlier, among planners, adminis-trators and economists, ways of defining anddealing with urban problems was seen to be

The 74th

Amendment ispart of a largerprocess ofpoliticaldecentralisationthat in turn relatesto rapidlyemerging localeconomies


one of management. Recent recognition ofthe complexities has shifted this view to oneof governance. Mechanistic solution to prob-lems is replaced by a closer look at economicgrowth in terms of its institutional processes,and administration in terms of the extent andform of civic participation. In this perspec-tive, the 74th Constitutional Amendment needsto be viewed from its societal and develop-mental perspective.

To respond to these complex changes gover-nance has to give space for innovation andflexibility. Urban management can no longerbe assumed to be a static, top-down, Statecentred, and set in a long-term horizon. Inthe last decade or so, policy makers and aca-demics have recognised the innovative role oflocal governments. Here, a key issue has beenof representation. Disparities of resourcesbetween rich and poor in its most fundamen-tal sense, represents a serious fracture of gov-ernance. The 74th Amendment, has to be seenas part of a larger process of political trans-formation.

In this transformation, local governments canno longer remain as passive sub-contractorsof centralised schemes. They are increasinglypushed to take on a proactive and develop-ment role. This is obviously not an easy situa-tion for higher levels of government. SinceIndependence, with the task of nation build-ing heavy on them, they have been constitutedby interest groups used to deciding on issuesin a centralizing way to ‘plan’ solutions for“problems” at the lower level. This forcedreversal of roles not only implies a differentway of working, but also very different atti-tudes and relationships. The traditional wayof centralised control needs to give way to ajudicious mix of support from higher levelsof government to ensure the stability and con-tinuity of developmental programmes, andmore than sufficient autonomy which allowsLocal Bodies to develop management strate-gies that can respond to local situations.

This raises issues in the context of broaderdevelopmental questions. To do this, we firsthighlight some key questions that confrontpolicymakers such as:

l How are cities of the future going to pro-vide livelihood to their growing popula-tions?

l How do we conceptualise increasingly com-plex urban economic processes that wouldprovide livelihood to these groups?

l What would be the form of institutionaland political processes that would underliethese economic structures?

l How are governments going to respond?Is it going to be more of the conventionalpoverty and employment projects that willaddress these issues?

l What could be the nature of governance?Will the civic process, recognised as a keyelement of urban management, be restrictedto more active roles by NGOs, or will theyform part of a broader spectrum of socialactivism?

l How would international funding agenciesrespond and at what level?

l How can public policy, at an operationallevel, tap the wealth created by urbanisationand facilitate its reinvestment in a way thatgenerates jobs, and makes cities productive?

There are three aspects in defining a directionof investigation to address issues raised by theabove questions.

First, rather than speculating about the futurestructure of cities, it seems useful to first startby understand parts of cities and towns thatsupport large numbers of people, and try andsee as to what makes these areas tick. This re-quires a fine grained and cross-sectoral ap-proach.

Second, to understand the complexities of ur-ban structure, we need to use an appropriate

The traditionalway of centralisedcontrol needs togive way to ajudicious mix ofsupport fromhigher levels ofgovernment toensure thestability andcontinuity ofdevelopmentalprogrammes


conceptual framework. It is almost certain thatthe conventional Master Planning approachto understand urban structures is inadequate.Here, various functional aspects are seen in acompartmentalised fashion as specific landuses Residential; Commercial; Recreational;and, Industrial. This approach misses out im-portant local characteristics and also to linkspatial issues with economic ones. A stricteconometric approach too seems equallyproblematic. These fail to clearly identify thecomplicated institutional and political aspectsof economic processes. This approach alsooften uses a framework centred on “Sectors”more appropriate as a form of accountingrather than conceptualizing development. Fi-nally, a key issue of urban growth is one ofland. Land has significant non-economic as-pects and important locational attributes.

In a conceptual framework, it is also impor-tant to move away from a narrow “poverty”focus, and consider the situation of poorgroups in a relative sense. This is importantsince the situation of the poor in relationshipwith other groups will shape the nature of ur-ban management, its economy, forms of rep-resentation and political structures in substan-tive ways along two broad themes of produc-tive neighborhood and good urbangovernance2

“Productive Neighborhoods” for“Productive Cities”

A close look at cities reveals an interestingparadox. Projects to promote employment andpoverty reduction have had a limited impact.Even so, poorer groups have evolved mecha-nisms and institutions that positively impacttheir livelihood situation. Of particular signifi-cance here, is the local economic structure thathas emerged in many cities and towns of In-dia. What started off as residential neighbor-hoods in fact, get transformed into significantlivelihood clusters of intensive commercial,manufacturing and service activities. The

economy generated from these livelihoodnodes, rather than being “marginal” and partof the “informal sector”, are very much partof the mainstream economy. They generatewidespread employment that reach far beyondthe physical boundary of these neighborhoodsinto the national, and at times even global level.

The Importance of Land in Livelihood Issues

A critically important issue in urban planningand management is that of land management.Detailed research in these settings reveal thatland issues form a core issue of such produc-tive settings. This is what we term as “flexiblesettings”. Such settings are found in most smalltowns and cities in India, although called bydifferent names and subject to varying localregulation. Some towns and cities have settle-ment types that are unique to their particularhistory. Baroda in the Western State ofGujarat, and Madikeri in the Southern IndianState of Karnataka for instance, have settle-ment types that were formed out of royal or-dinances. Kanchipuram, like many othertemple towns, has a bulk of its land that ex-isted under a dual form of tenure on a lease-hold basis from the various temples. Despitethis diversity, most towns and cities have verysimilar forms of land settlement types. Themost common ones, in addition to MasterPlanned sub-divisions, are

l Privately sub-divided land usually both onurban peripheries and central city areas

l Urbanised villages

l Traditional city housing

l Squatter settlements

Flexibility in these settings comes out of sev-eral aspects that allow an efficient functionaland economic relationship between economicactivities such as possibilities for incrementaldevelopment, a locally defined regulatory en-vironment and one that allows for mixed landuse, and a diversity of tenure conditions.

A criticallyimportant issue inurban planningand managementis that of landmanagement

2 These themes also incorporate other aspects like gender issues, the urban environment, finance, infrastructure


These characteristics allow for a local economyto evolve in response to changing market con-ditions and in tune with the particular mix ofenterprises locating there. Thus, just as clus-ters specialise in particular items of manufac-ture and are constituted by a particular group-ing of enterprises, their land setting also ac-quires particular characteristics. An importantaspect of these land settings is also that oftentheir incremental development contributes toa vigorous real eState market that funds thelocal economy and also acts as a source ofinvestments.

It is also significant that of the above types ofsettlement, private subdivisions are the mostcommon. These often amount to between 50percent to 75 percent of total residential land.Master Planned neighborhoods range between10 percent to15 percent of total residentialland. In metro-settings, while Master-Plannedareas increase as a proportion of total resi-dential land so does land occupied by squattersettlements. In smaller towns and cities, bothareas under squatter settlements and MasterPlan areas decrease while the proportion of pri-vate sub-divisions increases. Thus one can as-sume that a large proportion of urban land hasinherent flexible characteristics: Dependingupon locational, market, and other factors, itcould develop as a setting for local economies.

Good Urban Governance - Role of LocalBodies

ULBs have an important bearing on the evo-lution of flexible land settings. This is despitethe fact that officially, land policy is decided atthe State level. ULBs are envisaged to have amaintenance role. In reality, while it is truethat ULBs have almost no role in the MasterPlanning process, their “maintenance” in-cludes the upgrading of infrastructure,regularisation, and the provision of civicamenities. The significant point is that itis these very actions that spur economiclinkages, productivity, and livelihood

opportunities. Local government can be keymediators in this complex process.

Land issues, especially those relating toregularisation and extension of services, havebeen long recognised as having important in-stitutional and political dimensions. This is trueof almost all these flexible land settings, sincethey have evolved outside the planning pro-cess. Thus, any improvement of infrastruc-ture is highly politicised. The political aspectsare emphasised since settlers in these areas,especially poorer groups, lack any othermechanism except the elected channel of theULBs to channelise their demands. Council-lors, members of the Standing Committeesand also at times, higher level political repre-sentatives like MLAs / MLCs and MP play akey role in pressuring the administration andplanning institutions to either recognise thelocal realities. They also become importantagents to stop or diffuse actions that disruptthe essential livelihood generating character-istics.

Detailed research on livelihood clusters sug-gests rather than as a result of a particular de-sign, “flexible” aspects of land are shaped bya congruence of interests and institutions. Avery significant issue here is that ULB actionshaving a significant impact on urban poverty,productivity and livelihoods, does not comefrom any formally established developmentprogrammes for poverty alleviation and em-ployment generation. Rather, these actions re-late to ULBs being pressured by a local politi-cal process promoted by groups with a directstake in livelihood.

ULB centred programmes also ensure that lo-cal groups can use public inputs creatively inconjunction with their own locally availableresources and complimenting skills to achievea powerful force multiplier. Local representa-tion is also important to ensure the efficacyof developmental programmes concerningpoverty alleviation and employment

Land issues,especially thoserelating toregularisation andextension ofservices, havebeen longrecognised ashaving importantinstitutional andpoliticaldimensions


generation. For instance, an initial review ofthe operational structure of both successfuland less successful programmes suggests twoimportant aspects: The key role of ULBs andthe extent of local participation. It is wellrecognised that strengthened and responsivemunicipal organisations are critically impor-tant to ensure effective health and educationprogrammes, including a coordinating role forthe private sector. This is critically importantto reduce absolute poverty.

The pivotal role of ULBs in ensuring that cit-ies remain productive for poor groups whileaddressing issues of poverty alleviation isbased on two factors: First, it is primarily ULBsthat are responsible for civic improvements,which spur livelihood opportunities. Theseactions are also instrumental in addressing is-sues of health due to the direct environmen-tal linkages. At a more political level, ULBsform the key institution through which localgroups, especially poorer sections of civicsociety, channelise their demands.

Parastatal Regimes as Constraints to UrbanProductivity

Experts on public administration have writ-ten extensively over the last two decades aboutthe increasing powers of parastatal and spe-cial purpose institutions. These institutions arepromoted by State government political in-terests, and have effectively taken over sub-stantive areas of urban management. As a re-sult, ULBs have been left with maintenancefunctions. A brief historical review of gover-nance in India is useful to understand that thishas been a historical process, with the 74th

Amendment only one part of it.

India has a long tradition of urban local bod-ies dating back to 1688 when the Madras Cor-poration was constituted as the first corpora-tion in South Asia. This was followed by theCalcutta, and Bombay Municipal Corporationin 1726. The consequences were two-fold:

l First, as a political objective, it provided thepowers of governance to the local elite.These groups were set in place by virtue oftheir social standing, rather than via demo-cratic elections. This was important to en-sure political control and also for the trans-fer of resources.

l The second was a concern with publichealth. Decentralising these functionswould be more effective in controlling andpreventing epidemics that could threaten allclasses.

After Independence, democratically electedrepresentatives replaced managers and the lo-cal elite who were previously nominated bythe colonial powers. This brought opportu-nities for greater democracy and enhanced therole of local representatives. However, therewas a roll-back in the 1970s, with the settingup of special purpose institutions, which haseroded the functional and development baseof ULBs.

Initially, these institutional changes were madeto effect “comprehensive planning” centredon Master Plans. In recent times, a much widerrange of parastatal agencies – not only De-velopment Authorities, characterise urbanmanagement. These agencies, often under thehighest level of State government authorities,function as management entities for “Mega”infrastructure or urban development projects.

In this situation, it is not surprising that mostmunicipalities were and still exist in a financiallyprecarious position. In 1986-87, the income ofall municipal bodies in Class 1 towns exceededtheir expenditure only by Rs. 311 million. Theoverlapping territories and responsibilities be-tween ULBs and Development Authorities ledto problems of non co-ordination, and moreseriously increased corruption and lack of ac-countability. This criticism against DevelopmentAuthorities is very important as these develop-ments have a serious impact on livelihood gen-eration in the following ways:

Strengthened andresponsivemunicipalorganisations arenecessary toensure effectivehealth andeducationprogrammes


l Regressive land policy: The form of land policyresulting from Master Planning is highly re-gressive to local economies in two ways.First, Development Authority promote un-realistic land use regulations like unilateraland rigid land use and setbacks that goagainst the very grain of local economies.Due to this, master planning de-legitimisesmost non-master planned areas includinglivelihood nodes. Second, a key aspect of aproductive and flexible land setting is thatenterprise clusters exist in a situation of di-verse tenure regimes. This allows for a vari-ety of firms to locate in close physical prox-imity. Development authorities among otherparastatal agencies, instead promote a verynarrow spectrum of legality which is notaccessible to most poor groups. This in turnis reinforced by strict master-planningnorms.

l Burdening ULBs with financial obligations andconstraining their operational area: Most largescale funding for infrastructure and othercapital-intensive works are routed throughparastatal agencies. These institutions oftendefine the kind of projects funded undersuch allocations and the terms of borrow-ings. However, the burden of repaymentof both capital and interest falls onto ULBs.Since ULBs have little role in defining theprojects, it is not even clear if the proposedprojects actually address the needs and situ-ation faced locally. Just as the ULBs havelittle say in the matter, there is little or nopublic process involved in the decision mak-ing. Parastatals reinforce each other’s pres-ence to institutionally crowd out ULBs. Themultitude of institutions reinforces this situ-ation, by promoting developments that ef-fectively “pirate” civic services by ULBswithout adequate financial remuneration.All this means that while ULBs are hardpressed to respond to livelihood nodes, theyhave to also contend with these white el-ephants. Such centralised relationships also

impact the creative potential of localbodies to be more efficient.

l Reducing the wealth creating effects ofinfrastructure: It is important to realise thatlocal economies represent wealth created byurbanisation. Economic productivity comesfrom the action of people coming together,urbanising and whose productivity isboosted by ULB upgraded interventions. Asignificant proportion of this productivityis reflected in the active local land markets.Thus, a very significant problem ofurbanisation would be solved if ULBs canrecoup some of these surpluses to pay forinfrastructure and investments. This is noteasy. However, there is strong evidence thata regime of parastatal organisations reducepossibilities for public authorities, especiallyULBs, to use such sources. The basis forlocal political autonomy lies in financial au-tonomy brought about by tapping growinglocal economies. Possibilities for negotia-tion directly threaten higher level politicalcircuits. ULBs in tapping the wealth ofurbanisation, would be part of a highly po-litical process.

The points highlighted above suggest that ur-ban governance plays a structural part in ef-fecting livelihood settings to emerge. A regimeof parastatals not only roadblocks these ef-forts but increases the dependence of localbodies on higher levels of government. Incontrast, a regime of governance centred onmunicipal structures is critically important notonly to ensure the health of livelihood set-tings but also to generate a political processthat sustains this situation. Local bodies playa significant mediating role between differentcompeting groups in distributing infrastruc-ture that spurs the productivity of these econo-mies. Thus, strengthened local democracyhelps poor groups to represent their priori-ties to government to shape their interven-tions in infrastructure and regulation to en-sure the maximum positive impact on

A regime ofgovernancecentred onmunicipalstructures is vitalnot only to ensurethe health oflivelihood settingsbut also togenerate apolitical processthat sustains thissituation


livelihood opportunities. In conclusion, theabove discussion suggest a triangular relation-ship underlying urban productivity:

l Local economies generating vast livelihoodopportunities.

l Flexible land settings that spur and oftenfund the local economy.

l Local governance centred on political au-tonomy strengthened by local economicsurpluses.

It is important to recognise the wider terrainof interventions influenced by ULBs, ratherthan be restricted to a conventional and offi-cial view of their roles and responsibilities. Theimpact of the 74th Amendment must there-fore be viewed in this wider developmentalperspective. Not surprisingly, the fracturing ofmunicipal bodies, their finance, and functionsexists in parallel with increasing disparities be-tween poor and rich groups – reflecting theirun-equal bargaining power in access to re-sources. Thus, it is specifically important thatinternational funding agencies recognise therole of ULBs, rather than bypass them in fram-ing development priorities and programmes.

Summing Up: Urban Self-governance as theBasis for “Good Politics”

Development is inherently a political processshaped by actions of individuals, groups, andinstitutions. In this context, it is useful to de-fine “good” politics. One definition based onour discussion till now, could be those politi-cal structures that are responsive to poorgroups and strengthens their livelihood op-portunities. In other words, “good politics” isrelated to a governance regime centred onULBs. In order to understand the implicationsof the 74th Constitutional Amendment on thisperspective, we see two key aspects ofMunicipalised governance.

l Local governance via effective civic representation:This includes two aspects: The first is en-suring substantive operational spaces for

councillors and also specific parts/ posi-tions of municipal organisations – namelyStanding Committees/Mayors Presidents/Dep. Mayors and Vice Presidents. The sec-ond relates to position of civicorganisations like Associations/ Sanghs,NGOs, Federations, Ward committees. Foreffective representation, a governance re-gime must maintain institutional openingsthat allow these groups to access and di-rectly influence decision-making. This mustbe not only reactive to programmes alreadyprepared, but be pro-active in allowing areview of base information, a critique ofassumptions used to formulate actions.

l Diluting and making parastatal regimes more ac-countable: ULBs need to regain the develop-mental terrain that has been encroached byhigher level institutions. In particular, landpolicy and resource mobilisation is a criti-cal area. In parallel, parastatal agencies whilethey exist, need to be constituted on thebasis of broad-based local representation.

Our conclusion is that local democratic pro-cesses, however uneven and unruly, need tobe fostered since these are the basis for theemerging productive structure of cities, andones that directly affect the lives of their un-der-privileged. Efforts by National Govern-ments and International Aid agencies need tobe sensitive to these emerging institutions andensure that programmes and interventions donot undercut them.

7. Women’s Representation inLocal Government: Creating aPolitics of Presence

In the aftermath of the elections to panchayatiraj institutions in the various States, severalstudies have appeared, evaluating the experi-ment of women’s representation. Most suchstudies have adopted survey methods to evalu-ate the nature of women’s participation inpanchayats.

Urban LocalBodies need toregain thedevelopmentalterrain that hasbeen encroachedby higher levelinstitutions


The choice of methodology leads unavoid-ably to a focus on the subjective perceptionsand attitudes of women representatives and,at best, those of some male colleagues, rela-tives and officials. In what follows, we willsummarise the findings of these studies andseek to extrapolate from them, commonali-ties and variations relating to the participationof women in these institutions across differ-ent States.

The analysis will also overstep the customaryboundaries of such studies by crossing overinto the domain of the panchayati raj institu-tions per se, their structure, powers and possi-bilities. This will help to identify the exog-enous and institutional factors, apart from thegender-specific ones, that inhibit the properfunctioning of panchayat institutions. Thesespan a vast range from the multiple inequali-ties and forms of social discrimination thatare embedded in rural society to the lacunaein the structuring of panchayat institutions.

7.1 Backdrop of Legislation

Scenario Preceding the 73rd Amendment

It is worth remembering that, even before the73rd Amendment, women in Karnataka,Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra had, sincethe 1970s, been contesting elections, occupy-ing reserved positions and participating inpanchayats.

Indeed, the oldest known all-womenpanchayat was that which held office between1963-68 in Nimbut village in Pune district ofMaharashtra. It was observed, for instance,that the representation of women had resultedin a greater priority for issues such as drink-ing water supply and the installation ofpumps; the construction of wells, play-grounds, roads, public toilets and other com-munity infrastructure; the closure of liquorvends; more effective control over schools;and even the transfer of land from men totheir wives.

The all-women panchayats were not, ofcourse, legislated. They simply emerged,either because women took the initiative, orbecause men in factionally divided villagescould not agree with each other. InMaharashtra, they also emerged when domi-nant rural interests like sugar barons wantedpuppet panchayats they could control, or be-cause of the Shetkari Sangathan’s program-matic commitment to encourage rural womento enter politics. Generally, such panchayatscame to power without an election, simplybecause there was no opposing panel. Ofcourse, they frequently reflected the local casteand class structures, with most womensarpanches belonging to families of the ruralpolitical elite.

A study of the all-women panchayats ofMaharashtra (Datta 1998) concluded that suchpanchayats gave expression and importanceto local needs, by addressing issues like waterscarcity, or schoolrooms. It also found thatwomen used informal and often innovativemethods of getting their way. For example,the sarpanch of Bitargaon drew the attentionof a visiting MLA to the acute water scarcityin the village by telling him that they couldnot offer him tea. Similarly, in Vitner, thepanchayat instructed the women to let theircattle loose on 52 acres of common propertyland that had been encroached upon. The re-claimed land was then turned into a commu-nity orchard, the proceeds of which augmentthe panchayat’s resources.

The barriers cited, in this study, to the effec-tive participation of women, are not very dif-ferent from those in other States: patriarchy,illiteracy, lack of information, bureaucracy,lack of financial powers, and so on. Similarly,the positive contribution of these panchayats(dissolved in 1994) in terms of the empower-ment of women also suggest a picturebroadly similar to that emerging from somepost-Amendment studies: enhanced socialrecognition and respect; a feeling of

A study of theall-womenpanchayats ofMaharashtraconcluded thatsuch panchayatsgave expressionand importance tolocal needs, byaddressing issueslike waterscarcity, orschoolrooms


self-confidence; greater mobility, awarenessand knowledge; and, in some cases, even en-hanced status within the family (Datta,1998).

The quality of women’s participation in ac-tual processes of decision-making may havebeen less than satisfactory, but this is, as weshall argue, only one measure of empower-ment. The adoption of a wider perspective interms of gender needs and interests, as wellas the rather ephemeral nature of the notionof empowerment, deserves special consider-ation, and is remarked upon subsequently.

Scenario After the 73rd Amendment

The participation of women’s representativesin the panchayats elected after the 73rd.Amendment may therefore be evaluated byfirst examining the evidence of their aware-ness of panchayati raj institutions and theirformal engagement with panchayat processes,such as attending and taking part in meetings.

Several studies have surveyed these aspects inthe different States. Next, we will examine thespecific obstacles and handicaps faced bywomen which appear to them to hamper theirparticipation. These span a wide range - fromthe routine exclusion from effective decision-making to physical violence against womenrepresentatives. There are also structural ob-stacles relating to the design of panchayati rajinstitutions, such as the role of the bureau-cracy or the provisions for no-confidencemotions or the two-child norm. Another typeof structural limitation is that relating to thelocal structures of dominance - including pa-triarchy, caste and class – issuing in exclusion,tokenism and surrogate representation. De-spite these obstacles, most women surveyedreport a positive enhancement of status withinthe family and the community, and a height-ened commitment to literacy, especially for thegirl child. Though the new panchayati raj in-stitutions were not specifically designed withthis objective in mind, these are surely amongtheir most heartening achievements.

7.2 Women and Elections to the NewPanchayats

Madhya Pradesh was the first State to con-duct and complete elections to all three tiersin May-June 1994. Between 1994 and 1995,several other States – including Tripura,Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh– conducted elections under the new acts,though the lowest tier was excluded in Punjab.In Orissa, West Bengal and Karnataka, theterms of existing panchayats had not yet ex-pired. The Karnataka Conformity Act waspassed in May 1993, followed by GramPanchayat elections in December of the sameyear. Three States – viz., Orissa, West Bengaland Maharashtra - conducted elections, with33 per cent reservation for women, after theAmendment, but before the State conformityacts were enacted. Himachal Pradesh andPunjab, by contrast, held elections after theAmendment, and before the conformity Actswere passed, but without reservation forwomen.

The panchayat elections across the countrybrought over 700,000 women to panchayatiraj institutions at all three levels. The statistics(Kaushik 1998) show that, with theexception of a few States, most have met –and some have even exceeded – the one-thirdquota for women’s reservation at the GramPanchayat Level. The States which have failedto meet the quota include Assam and Punjab(where only 30 percent of women were electedto the Gram Panchayats); Sikkim(1.48 percent); undivided Uttar Pradesh(25.55 percent), and Chandigarh (20.18 per-cent). Karnataka has 43.79 percent womenrepresentatives at the Gram Panchayat level,which not only exceeds the requisite quota butis also the highest among all States. The otherStates, which substantially exceed the 33 per-cent quota, include Goa, Kerala, Manipur,West Bengal and Daman and Diu.

Most womensurveyed reporta positiveenhancement ofstatus within thefamily and thecommunity, anda heightenedcommitment toliteracy, especiallyfor the girl child


At the Panchayat Samiti level, Assam, Punjaband undivided Uttar Pradesh fall below thequota, while Karnataka (with 40 percentwomen representatives) again exceeds it. Atthe Zila Parishad level, again, Uttar Pradesh(at 25.40 percent) remains the major defaulter,apart from States like Sikkim and Union Ter-ritories like Chandigarh and Dadra and NagarHaveli.

The statistics for women chairpersons at thevarious levels of Panchayati Raj (Kaushik1998) show that only Karnataka, Maharashtra,Orissa and Tamil Nadu meet the quota at allthree tiers. West Bengal’s record in this respectis a surprisingly low 4.62 percent at the thirdtier, 3.00 percent at the middle tier, and nil atthe top tier.

State Election Commission data pertaining toMadhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have shownthat less than 1 per cent of seats in panchayatsremained vacant, and that these were not lim-ited to positions reserved for women. InMadhya Pradesh, many of these seats fall indistricts with a substantial tribal population.A study of approximately 850 women repre-sentatives, across three States, shows that 49.5percent women were elected without a con-test. Most of these were at the level of thegram panchayat and, at all levels, there weremore such unopposed elections for membersrather than chairpersons of panchayats. InMadhya Pradesh, women have even beenelected to seats which were not reserved forthem. (CWDS, 1999) A study of two districtsin Tamil Nadu, which surveyed 100 womenmembers, found that 88 of them had wonfrom constituencies reserved for women, and7 from constituencies reserved for the Sched-uled Castes, though open to both men andwomen. (Athreya et al., 1998) Similarly, a studyof Angul district in Orissa also showed that33 out of 53 ward-members were elected un-opposed, and two were elected from unre-served constituencies. (ISED,1998)

7.3 Women Representatives : Social andEconomic Characteristics

In this section, we compare the findings oftwo studies, which only partly overlap in theirchoice of States, though not at all in theirchoice of districts within those States. The firstof these (CWDS 1999) compares MadhyaPradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, with asample of 843 women, fairly evenly dividedbetween the three States. Of this sample, 200women are chairpersons of panchayats, whilethe remaining 643 are members of panchayatsat all three levels. The other study (Kaushik1998) is based upon a survey of 600 womenrepresentatives in six State-level studies – ofTamil Nadu, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh,Orissa, Rajasthan and the then Uttarakhandregion of Uttar Pradesh - have also been col-lated in an overall report. (Kaushik, 1998)

Literacy Levels

The majority of women entering the newpanchayati raj institutions are illiterate or barelyliterate. Kaushik’s study confirms this findingfor Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan,where 25 percent of the elected women sur-veyed were unable to read and write. How-ever, Kaushik’s study shows that in TamilNadu, Orissa and the Garhwal region of U.P.,there are very few illiterate women represen-tatives.3 In these States, 23 percent women areeducated upto the primary school level, while9.5 percent are college educated.

Income and Occupation

The Kaushik study does not provide data onincome or landholding, but it is heartening tofind that 40 percent of the women represen-tatives surveyed in the CWDS study belongto families with incomes that place them be-low the poverty line. 14.2 percent of them arelandless, 19.5 percent have marginal holdings,and 20.6 percent have small holdings. Only33 percent of all those surveyed had an an-nual income over Rs. 20,000. The reporting

40 percent of thewomenrepresentativessurveyed belongto families withincomes thatplace them belowthe poverty line

3 This is accounted for by distinct reasons in each case. The districts chosen in Tamil Nadu were those which had had fairlysuccessful mass literacy campaigns (Athreya, 1998:2) Female literacy in the Garhwal region of Uttar Pradesh is higher thanthe State average. In Orissa, the amended Gram Panchayat Act makes literacy mandatory for the representatives.(Panda, 1996:726)

36 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA4 6.3 percent reported that their natal families, and 14.9 percent reported that their affinal families, had political affiliations.These findings provide a sharp contrast to male representatives in these three States, 20 percent of whom in Madhya Pradeshand Uttar Pradesh and 32 percent in Rajasthan, had previous experience of panchayats. The proportion of those politicallyaffiliated is also much higher: 53 percent in Rajasthan, and 30 percent in Madhya Pradesh. (CWDS, 1999:88)

of occupational background in the two stud-ies is also not vastly dissimilar : the Kaushikstudy reports that 50 percent of the womenrepresentatives are cultivators, while 40 per-cent describe themselves as housewives (whichincludes support to the dominant householdoccupation, whether it is agriculture or busi-ness). The CWDS study also reports 37.2 per-cent women as housewives and 38.3 percentas cultivators, with 10.2 percent being cultiva-tors and labourers. Following from these data,the caste profile of women representatives isnot surprising. According to the CWDS study,the highest percentage, in terms of caste,among both members and chairpersons is thatof OBCs (28.9 percent and 30.3 percent re-spectively). The Kaushik study also shows thatwomen representatives from Madhya Pradesh,Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu were mostly fromthe OBCs. However, in the upper caste-domi-nated hill region of U.P. and in Haryana (whereYadavs are closer to the high castes), mostwomen representatives belong to the uppercastes. A district-level study of Karnataka alsoshowed the predominance of the landown-ing upper castes, the Vokkaligas. (Vidya, 1997)Similar findings are reported from a study ofOrissa, where 66 percent of the electedwomen members in the State are from theKaran and Khandayat castes, and the percent-age of scheduled castes and tribes among theupa-sarpanches is lower than that of othercastes. It is only in ward membership that thelower castes are found to dominate.(Srinivas,1998:124-5)

Age

As regards the age profile, the Kaushik studyshows that 74 percent belonged to the20-40 years age group, while in the CWDSstudy 69 percent were below 45 years of age.Thus, both studies found a marked contrastto the pre-Amendment panchayats, in whicholder women, free of their child-bearing anddomestic responsibilities predominated. Both

studies also found that an overwhelming per-centage (over 90 percent) of women repre-sentatives was married. The data relating toage are corroborated by evidence from Ban-galore Rural District in Karnataka (Vidya,1997) and Karnal district of Haryana.(MARG,1998:38-39)

Family Background

The CWDS study - especially the part of itrelating to Madhya Pradesh – contradicts thecommon assumption that the women repre-sentatives would belong to locally influentialfamilies with political connections. TheKaushik study, too, found that only30 percent of the women interviewed camefrom politically connected families. Many oth-ers however had a history of involvement withMahila Mandals, and this was especially trueof the women in Garhwal (U.P.), Tamil Naduand Madhya Pradesh. This study also foundthat political families played a greater role atthe upper two tiers.

Previous Experience

The CWDS study also shows that the major-ity of women elected to the panchayats inMadhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradeshare first-timers, with only 3 percent having anyprevious experience of participation inpanchayats. Only 20 percent reported mem-bership of a political party, with an equal pro-portion reporting the political affiliations oftheir natal or affinal families.4 It is clear thatthe prior level of political engagement amongthese women is very low. The MARG studyin Haryana also shows that, for 50 percent ofthe respondents, this was their very first ex-posure to political activity, as neither they norother members of their families had any pre-vious experience of political engagement.Again, however, there are a few women whohave been active in the campaign for prohibi-tion or in the women’s wing of nationalpolitical parties.

The studyconducted by theCentre forWomen’sDevelopmentStudiescontradicts thecommonassumption thatthe womenrepresentativeswould belong tolocally influentialfamilies withpoliticalconnections


It is interesting to observe the regional varia-tions in this respect. High levels of politicalaffiliation are reported from States like TamilNadu, where 62 percent of women panchayatmembers in two districts claimed involvementin party enrolment, addressing public meet-ings and collecting funds. (Athreya, 1998:17-18) In the study of Madhya Pradesh, UttarPradesh and Rajasthan, dalit and tribal womenare seen to consistently report higher levelsof political affiliation. (CWDS, 1999:89) InGarhwal - atypically for Uttar Pradesh as awhole - we find considerable evidence of aprior engagement in the Mahila Mangal Dal,though virtually none of political affiliationor activity. (Verma, 1998:54-55)

7.4 Why Women Contest

Studies of women’s participation in the PRIshave shown that a variety of factors leadwomen to contest in such elections. The firstand most obvious factor is, of course, the man-datory provision for reservation, in the ab-sence of which few women – except in a hand-ful of States like Karnataka and Maharashtra– had considered, or were likely to consider,contesting an election. The provision for res-ervation made women’s representation pos-sible because it compelled the men in the com-munity to take the initiative in persuading thewomen in their families to contest, whetherto keep the seat in the family till the rotationalsystem caused the reservation to lapse, or toretain their control over panchayat resources.

A study of women representatives in Karnaldistrict, Haryana documents pressure and/orsupport from family and community as beingthe main reason for contesting. The only ex-ception - a woman who took her own deci-sion to contest for the Panchayat Samiti elec-tion - was subjected to verbal and physicalabuse from her husband and family. Here, aselsewhere, the election campaign is largelyorganised and run by the men, with the womencanvassing mainly among the women of their

constituency, leaving the task of mobilisingmale votes to their husbands and other malerelatives. In sharp contrast to this is the pic-ture emerging from a study of two districts inthe Garhwal region of Uttar Pradesh where,of the hundred women representatives sur-veyed, as many as 30 reported that it was theirown decision to contest. Others cited hus-bands, family, and village community, whilesome were asked to contest by the MahilaMangal Dal.

7.5 Women’s Awareness of PanchayatiRaj

Of all the available studies that have exam-ined this issue, we may contrast the experi-ence of Karnataka, the State which appearsto have the highest levels of awareness withthat of Haryana, which probably ranks amongthe lowest in this respect. The Karnataka studyreports that 19.35 percent of the respondentsknew about the panchayati raj legislation indetail, while the remaining were aware of its

The provision forreservation madewomen’srepresentationpossible becauseit compelled themen in thecommunity totake the initiativein persuading thewomen in theirfamilies to contest

This argument (Datta,1998) is rarelyencountered in the post-Amendmentnarratives of panchayati raj. Instead,we frequently find household respon-sibilities being assumed – mainly byother women in the household, suchas mothers-in-law or unmarried sis-ters-in-law - to allow women membersof the panchayat to be free of theirdomestic commitments.There are, of course, multifarious con-straints within the home. These in-clude the ‘who will make the chapatis?’and ‘who will look after the children?’arguments, but are found to be moreweakly articulated after reservationsthan they were before. This is clearlybecause an independent initiative by awoman to contest elections is per-ceived as more threatening by men,whereas a man’s initiative on behalfof his wife or mother for a reservedseat is seen – in terms of social ac-ceptability - as par for the course, a

BOX 6‘Who Will Make the Chapatis ?’

sort of surrogate election. This isprobably why some studies (such asCWDS, 1999) report more co-opera-tive arrangements within the home,with domestic responsibilities beingmore cheerfully shared. But travellinglong distances to attend panchayatmeetings is still perceived as some-thing women cannot do unescorted.Hence, it is not unusual to findwomen members being accompaniedby husbands or other male relatives.This occurs, of course, where the lat-ter are not actually attending the meet-ings in place of the woman, an ac-tion which carries its own legitimacyin many parts. CWDS study foundthat while more than 75 percent ofthe women representatives in UttarPradesh are escorted, in MadhyaPradesh and Rajasthan the corre-sponding figures are 30.7 percent and39.4 percent respectively.


contents in general terms.5 By contrast, theHaryana study shows that the knowledge ofwomen’s representatives about panchayati rajinstitutions was limited to their traditionalfunctions only, and they were unaware of thenew Haryana Panchayati Raj Act and the func-tions assigned to panchayats under it. Theywere also found to be completely ignorant ofthe procedural aspects of welfare schemes, andthe financial powers of panchayatbodies. (MARG, 1998:87-90)

The CWDS study, however, shows that thelevels of awareness about panchayat-relatedmatters do not vary significantly according to gender.Thus, if 18.7 percent female members andchairpersons of panchayats report no knowl-edge about panchayat matters, so do 16.2 per-cent of their male colleagues. (CWDS,1999:99) Indeed, on the financial resources ofpanchayats, there is no response from an equalproportion of men and women members. Ingeneral, CWDS data reveals a high level ofawareness about reservations, but low levelsof awareness about the powers and responsi-bilities of panchayats. Indeed, the distinctionbetween powers, functions and duties wasfound to be blurred, as the respondents listed,under panchayat powers and functions, roadconstruction, water supply and land revenuecollection. Unsurprisingly, CWDS also foundliteracy and education to be correlated withhigher levels of awareness. Thus, of the threeStates studied, it is Uttar Pradesh which mani-fests lower levels of awareness than the othertwo.

The positive correlation between literacy andeducation, on the one hand, and awareness,on the other, is reinforced by data from TamilNadu and the Garhwal region of UttarPradesh. In both these regions, we find betterliteracy indicators, as well as higher levels ofawareness about the basics of the newpanchayati raj system. In fact, the lack ofknowledge generally pertains to aspects whichmost ordinary citizens would need to be

informed about. In Tamil Nadu, women inpanchayats are seen to take a keen interest inpanchayat finances, though they report someconfusion about the relationship between thethree tiers. (Athreya, 1998:22) In Garhwal,Uttar Pradesh, similarly, women representa-tives are aware of the new panchayati raj sys-tem, and affirm the value of reservation,though there are a few who believe it is mean-ingless in the absence of real devolution ofpowers. (Verma, 1998:38) Again, the lack ofknowledge mostly pertains to finances, bud-geting and accounting.

Kaushik’s study brings to the fore an impor-tant, but largely neglected, aspect of this is-sue: awareness among women representativesabout the Gram Sabhas, their powers and func-tions. In the six States surveyed by this study,Tamil Nadu and Orissa manifest the greatestignorance about the Gram Sabha. In Orissa,in fact, even most sarpanches of the GramPanchayats and Panchayat Samitis are notaware of the role that the Gram Sabha is ex-pected to play. (Kaushik, 1998:30) This igno-rance about the foundation of the entire py-ramidal structure of local democracy is surelya matter of concern. It also perhaps serves toexplain the fact that while the Gram Sabha isostensibly the most important unit in the en-tire structure of the new panchayati raj insti-tutions, it is nowhere effective as an instru-ment of direct democracy, and records a fairlylow presence of women. Proposals such asthe introduction of a sub-quorum for womenare administrative solutions, rather than po-litical ones, and are therefore unlikely to cre-ate a genuinely participatory climate.

Modes of Participation

Attendance at Meetings

From noting the varying levels of awareness,among women representatives, about the pow-ers and functions of the panchayat bodies, weproceed to a consideration of the various in-dices of women’s participation that have been

In general, datareveals a highlevel ofawareness aboutreservations, butlow levels ofawareness aboutthe powers andresponsibilities ofpanchayats

5 This may partly be accounted for by the fact that Karnataka has a long history of reservation for, and participation by,women in panchayats. Indeed, the study cited covers panchayats elected prior to the Amendment, in the period 1987-92.(Vidya, 1997)


surveyed. The CWDS study constructs a com-prehensive index of participation that in-cludes: attendance at panchayat meetings; ef-forts to carry one’s viewpoint in such meet-ings; weekly time devoted to panchayat work;petitions and problems received and attendedto; and efforts to overcome difficulties thatare encountered. The survey of MadhyaPradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh foundthat 65.5 percent of women representativesregularly attend panchayat meetings, with at-tendance being higher among chairpersons,and lower among members, especially in U.P.The reasons for failure to attend generally per-tain to domestic work or livelihood concerns,with smaller numbers citing the inconvenienceof distance or seclusion as the reason for non-attendance.

The results of other studies are not vastly dis-similar. Kaushik’s six-State study, for instance,shows that elected women are fairly regular inattending meetings, and that the phenomenonof proxy attendance – by husbands or othermale relatives – is actually on the decline.(Kaushik, 1998:28) The Tamil Nadu studyshows that 70 percent of the respondents haveattended all the meetings and all but one haveattended with a fair degree of regularity. Thepresence of male escorts to accompanywomen to meetings is generally ascribed todistance, poor public transport facilities, andmeetings that do not always end before night-fall. (Athreya, 1998:21) In Garhwal, not onlydo women attend meetings regularly, they alsogo largely unaccompanied. The evidence fromKarnataka – though it relates to the period1987-92 – confirms this trend. As on severalother counts, the evidence from Haryana isdiscouraging, with only 13 of the 128 womenrepresentatives surveyed by the MARG studyhaving attended all meetings. (1998:110)

Information about meetings is frequently noteven properly communicated. Here again, thevariations between States are considerable. InMadhya Pradesh, for instance, information

about meetings is fairly regularly communi-cated, but agenda papers are not. In manyStates, the dates of the meetings are statuto-rily fixed. But, as the Haryana study shows,though the dates of the meetings are supposedto be fixed, the schedule is generally not fol-lowed and meetings are held as and when theSarpanch or the Village Secretary deem it nec-essary. Information about the meeting is sentthrough the village chowkidar, usually to thehusband/son of the woman representative. Ifthere are factional divisions within the village,such information may simply be withheld.Even if the date of the meeting is communi-cated, it may be postponed for lack of quo-rum. Such unpredictability is naturally irksome,especially to those who have to miss a day’slivelihood for this purpose. Political differ-ences can also influence this aspect, especiallyat the two higher levels. In Garhwal, for ex-ample, one Kshetra Panchayat (middle tier)member complained that the pramukh – whobelongs to the rival political party - tamperswith the post so that she does not receive theletter notifying the meeting in time. (Verma,1998:40)

Participation in Panchayat Proceedings

As different studies use different measures ofparticipation, the available data does not sup-port precise inter-State comparisons on thisissue. It can, however, be used to create a mo-saic encompassing various dimensions of par-ticipation. Thus, women representatives – es-pecially chairpersons of panchayats - inMadhya Pradesh apparently seek to gain sup-port for their viewpoint through a variety ofmethods, both formal and informal. Theylobby with fellow-members outside thepanchayat, enlist the support of their hus-bands, and sometimes even boycottmeetings.(CWDS, 1999:105-06) In UttarPradesh, however, almost 60 percent ofwomen representatives devote no time atall to panchayat-related work; and only27 percent of women representatives in

Womenrepresentatives –especiallychairpersons ofpanchayats - inMadhya Pradeshapparently seekto gain supportfor their viewpointthrough a varietyof methods, bothformal andinformal


Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan(taken together) devote more than 3 hoursweekly to such work. (ibid.)

There are also important regional variationson the petitions received, and attended to, bywomen representatives. The three-StateCWDS study records that about a quarter ofthe petitions received by these women relateto family conflict, and approximately half toissues such as land disputes, land distribution,employment and assistance with basic needs.In terms of receiving and attending to suchpetitions, 63.6 percent of the women repre-sentatives surveyed in Madhya Pradesh ac-knowledged receiving petitions, but only 49.8percent reported having attended to them. InUttar Pradesh, by contrast, only 19 percentwomen representatives reported receiving pe-titions, and a meagre 15.6 percent reportedattending to them. In both these States, it ap-pears that women belonging to the scheduledcastes and scheduled tribes receive most peti-tions from their own groups, though such pe-titioners also appeal to representatives of othercastes for help. OBCs and upper caste per-sons, however, tend to go to people of theirown castes, and much less to members of thescheduled castes and tribes. (CWDS, 1999:107-8) It is notable that one-third of the womenreported taking the help of theirhusbands to resolve the problems presentedto them, while another third reported takingthe help of government officials attached tovarious government programmes andschemes.

The six-State study co-ordinated by Kaushikmeasures participation in slightly differentterms. The evidence from Tamil Nadu, forexample, compares types of participation interms of participating in discussions, in whichthe women members are most active; speak-ing in community meetings and putting for-ward suggestions, in which they are reason-ably active; and casting a vote in meetings

which is a small proportion, possibly becausenot all decisions are subjected to a formal vote.(Athreya, 1998:22) In Orissa, on the otherhand, some members of the Gram Panchayatand Panchayat Samiti expressed hesitation inspeaking at meetings, while others, who hadfewer inhibitions in communicating, neverthe-less felt that their suggestions were not seri-ously heard or considered. (ISED,1998:19-21)

The Karnataka study records greater partici-pation at the Zila Parishad level than at theMandal Panchayat, partly because womenmembers of the Zila Parishad are in any casebetter educated. Only one scheduled castemember of the Zila Parishad attended allmeetings but never spoke at any. (Vidya, 1997)This is an important dimension of participa-tion, because women belonging to the sched-uled castes and scheduled tribes are – virtu-ally across all States – seen to be singularlydisprivileged in such forms of participation.This is reflected even in the physicalorganisation of the panchayat space. In manygram panchayats, the women members tendto sit separately from their male colleagues,though in others men and women have gradu-ally begun to sit in a mixed fashion. Even inKarnataka, women in Mandal Panchayats aremade to sit in one corner of the room, eitherbehind the men or to one side. However, atthe Zila Parishad, men and women interactmore freely. Even if gender equations are, inthis superficial sense, changing, caste equationsremain more deeply entrenched. In a HaryanaGram Panchayat, for instance, a scheduledcaste chairperson was found sitting on thefloor with the caste members sitting on acharpoy at a higher level. In many GramPanchayats, women belonging to the highercastes refuse to eat with scheduled castewomen, though sometimes the caste objec-tion is sought to be disguised by excusessuch as that the individual is not feelingvery hungry!

About a quarter ofthe petitionsreceived by thesewomen relate tofamily conflict,andapproximatelyhalf to issuessuch as landdisputes, landdistribution,employment andassistance withbasic needs


Participation in Committees

An important aspect of women’s participationin the proceedings of the panchayats is theirrole in committees. Most panchayats have sev-eral committees, but there is no provision fora quota-based representation of women onpanchayat committees. This remains a seriouslacuna because it provides a convenient handlefor excluding and marginalising women mem-bers. The Kaushik study shows that womenare largely ignorant about the existence ofcommittees, and are mostly excluded from de-velopmental committees. Of the total num-ber of 600 women representatives surveyedin six States, 61 reported no knowledge ofcommittees, and another 134 were not mem-bers of any committee. 65 women were mem-bers of the Health Committee, and a mere 16of the Women and Child Development Com-mittee (Anganwadi Committee).

Participation in Panchayat Activities

The chief concerns of women in panchayatsare similar to those noted in the earlier expe-rience of all-women panchayats inMaharashtra. Most surveys project the inten-tions of women representatives, rather thandocumenting their actual achievements so far.One study of 16 Gram Panchayats in Ganjamdistrict of Orissa claims that the non-politi-cal background of the women panches andsarpanches surveyed was an asset in arrivingat unbiased decisions on community matterssuch as the construction of a community hall,the selection of beneficiaries under the widowallowance scheme, water supply and workunder the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. (Panda,1996:727) A very different picture emergesfrom another Orissa study of 49 GramPanchayats, 4 Panchayat Samitis and one ZilaParishad in Angul district. This suggests varia-tions (a) between the three tiers, with greaterinvolvement as we go to the higher levels, and(b) between members and chairpersons. Thus,sarpanches at all three levels were confident

of undertaking useful developmental activity,while members were less so. (ISED, 1998:Chapter IV)

The evidence from the Garhwal region is morepositive, with many Gram Panchayat membersinvolved in work related to literacy, health,roads, tanks, pensions, and forest conserva-tion. For some, the establishment of income-generating schemes and small-scale industriesfor women is also an important objective. Atthe middle tier, members reported involve-ment in water, electricity, schools and roads,though the majority of Kshetriya Panchayatmembers complained of their lack of powerand the failure of Gram Pradhans to consultthem.

The CWDS study also records that womenattempt to address the more vital needs ofwomen. As such, they work on schemes forbringing piped water into the village; inspectdevelopment works and nutrition centres un-der the ICDS; and pay particular attention tochildren’s education. They also take the initia-tive in a variety of family and matrimonial mat-ters, from counselling abusive or alcoholic hus-bands to settling land disputes. (CWDS, 1999:137) In West Bengal, Kamala Mahato, thepanchayat pradhan of Bandoan in Purulia dis-trict, numbers first among their achievementsthe 10 wells that she has had dug for drinkingwater as well as irrigation, and the income-generating schemes for women under the In-tegrated Rural Development Programme.(Panchayat Update, April 1998)

Gender Exclusion

Exclusion takes many forms, and is effectedin a variety of ways. For purposes of this analy-sis, we consider the several modes of exclu-sion under two broad categories :

l social constraints

l institutional constraints

Women attemptto address themore vital needsof women. Assuch, they workon schemes forbringing pipedwater into thevillage; inspectdevelopmentworks andnutrition centresunder theIntegrated ChildDevelopmentScheme; and payparticularattention tochildren’seducation

42 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA6 There are marked regional variations in this respect also. CWDS’s three-State study, for example, found that only 8 percentof women representatives reported the veil (or ‘ghunghat’) as a constraint. This figure is an average of widely varying Statepercentages: thus, 2 percent of Uttar Pradesh respondents, 8.5 percent of Madhya Pradesh respondents and 13.4 percent ofRajasthan respondents reported the veil as a constraint.

Social constraints include the patriarchal order-ing of society which includes commonly ob-served phenomena of tokenism and surrogaterepresentation. They also include illiteracywhich makes it well-nigh impossible forwomen to participate in processes of decision-making that are heavily dependent on the writ-ten word and the legalese of agenda, minutesand signatures. Caste is also a form of socialconstraint, insofar as it mandates seclusion orplaces women belonging to lower caste orscheduled caste groups at the twin mercies ofpatriarchy and caste position. Social constraintsvary considerably depending on the nature oflocal society, rather than on State boundaries.Where structures of patriarchy and caste aremore oppressive, the empowerment ofwomen through panchayati raj institutionsfaces formidable obstacles. Where, on theother hand, caste structures are relatively lessoppressive and patriarchy is weaker due tomale migration or social mores, the participa-tion of women in panchayat institutions is lessconstricted.

One of the most extreme forms that socialconstraints take is the physical violence towhich women and lower caste/scheduled casterepresentatives alike have been subjected. Thiscoercive mechanism of exclusion is more se-rious than the simple disfranchisement thatissues from illiteracy or patriarchal values thatare enforced or internalised. By contrast, physi-cal violence represents direct intimidation andcoercion against women and otherdispriviledged social groups, intended tothreaten them into withdrawal.

Institutional constraints include provisions suchas the two-child norm which debars womenwith more than two children from member-ship of panchayats in some States. It also in-cludes the provision for no-confidence mo-tions, which are frequently invoked to subvertthe purpose of reservations by removing dulyelected women pradhans and replacing themby male upa-pradhans. The more fundamen-

tal institutional constraints affect equally bothmale and female members and chairpersonsof panchayats. These include : the inadequatedevolution of powers, and of financial pow-ers in particular, in many States; the lack ofspecification about the relationship betweenthe three tiers; and the relationship betweenthe bureaucracy and the elected representa-tives. Institutional constraints vary acrossStates, depending mostly on the provisions ofthe conformity acts, but also on the adminis-trative and political climate, and theorganisational norms and values thatcharacterise it.

Finally, we shall examine some of the positivetrends that are discernible despite the multipleconstraints operating on the effective partici-pation of women. These signposts will helpus to identify the transition to empowermentthat is, slowly but quite unmistakably, takingplace through the representation of womenin panchayat institutions.

Social Constraints

“The Unimportance of Being Woman”:

It is neither surprising nor uncommon to findmost surveys reporting a lack of confidenceamong women representatives in panchayats.Seclusion behind the veil (purdah) is clearly acultural practice that inhibits participation6 .Even though 42 percent of CWDS’s respon-dents said they observed purdah in panchayatmeetings, 7.4 percent said they had given upthe practice of observing purdah after enter-ing the panchayats. In Rajasthan, 12.3 percentof the women representatives had discardedthe veil, while only 3.2 percent in Uttar Pradeshreported such a change. In Bilaspur districtof Madhya Pradesh, a three-day training campfor panches and sarpanches spent a whole daydiscussing the veil, particularly encouragingmen to recognise their ‘mental veils’, whichmade them keep their wives behind aphysical veil.

Social constraintsvary considerablydepending on thenature of localsociety, ratherthan on Stateboundaries


Despite their own reticence - stemming fromthe internalisation of generations of genderbias – there are many women who observeand remark upon the manifest discriminationagainst them in panchayats. Among these, theycite: the attempt by elected male colleagues todominate; the inattention to suggestions andopinions put forth by women; and the nega-tive attitude of male officials. As mentionedearlier, social custom often dictates that thewomen sit separately (with each other) and donot speak in the presence of men. This as-pect is, however, gradually undergoing achange in many regions as women get accus-tomed to sitting and even speaking in the pres-ence of men.

The MARG study of a district in Haryanabrought forth, from a scheduled caste womanmember of the Panchayat Samiti, the sugges-tion that there should be a room where womencan meet and sit together. Another suggestedthat there should be some meetings of onlythe women members of the panchayat wherethey can freely discuss certain issues, arrive ata consensus, and then place this before theentire panchayat. (MARG, 1998:183) Thisclearly shows that women hesitate to partici-pate as individuals, but that their desire to par-ticipate and have their voice heard is never-theless strong. Therefore, the mechanism theysuggest is one through which they can havethe satisfaction of expressing their opinions,possibly even having these carried, and placedbefore the whole panchayat as the now-weightier collective view of all the womenmembers. They are, it appears, often deterredby the infighting among the men, and theiruse of intemperate language, as also by theabsence of trust and the consequent inabilityto arrive at a consensus or a decision.

Tokenism and Surrogate Representation

The exclusion of women representatives fromeffective decision-making in panchayat insti-tutions has been repeatedly documented. In-

deed, several studies have concluded that theattempt to empower women through quota-based representation has issued in, at best, to-kenism. There is indeed plenty of evidenceof surrogate or proxy representation by hus-bands and other male relatives who not onlycanvass for their women, but also receive no-tices of and attend meetings in their place. Onehusband in Alwar, Rajasthan not only can-vassed for his wife’s election, but also had thebanners printed with his name on them. Hus-bands of women pradhans are all too fre-quently referred to as the pradhan, as they as-sume the authority of the pradhan and dis-charge the functions of the office. Given thepatriarchal ordering of Indian society, it is notastonishing that instances of surrogate repre-sentation are found all over the country. It is,however, important to note that while thereare regions where this phenomenon is par-ticularly strong, there are also regions where itis weak. It is important to not lose sight ofregional differentiation in social structure, in-cluding the structures of patriarchy, in orderto avoid the rather rash general conclusion thatwomen’s empowerment under the newpanchayati raj system is a complete and hope-less failure.

Studies of western Uttar Pradesh providesome of the more depressing evidence ofsurrogate representation. In an early surveyof 100 members in 7 panchayat bodies inShahpur block of Muzaffarnagar district, G.K.Lieten (1996a) argued that though the 1995elections have brought about a numerical pre-ponderance of agricultural labourers and smallpeasants, the new panchayats continue to func-tion rather like the earlier ones: with large num-bers of nominal or ‘namesake’7 members, ex-tensive corruption in development works, rig-ging of elections through the ‘capture’ of poll-ing booths, and an agenda that is devoid ofsocial concerns because it reflects only the in-terests of the dominant local elite, representedby the pradhan. While the earlier panchayats

Despite their ownreticence -stemming fromthe internalisationof generations ofgender bias –there are manywomen whoobserve andremark upon themanifestdiscriminationagainst them inpanchayats

7 The term ‘namesake’ refers not to someone bearing the same name, but is a literal translation of a Hindi phrase meaning ‘inname only’. It is used to denote membership in name only, rather than in substance.


usually had one female member nominated bythe pradhan, she was never asked to attendmeetings or involve herself with any publicwork.

Some of the women even did not know thatthey were a member. Once or twice thepradhan had dispatched a document for sign-ing, but they did not know what it was for.Without being derogatory towards women ingeneral, the impression is that women stand abetter chance of becoming a member of the panchayatif they are illiterate, frail of body and of mind andrather old. The women who at least knew thatthey were panchayat members very rarely wentto the meetings. If they did, then they onlydid so in order to put their thumb impressionor to sign and then came back. The usual pro-cedure, however, is for the pradhan to sendthe document to be signed to their house.

This procedure, as a matter of fact, applies not only tothe women, but to most of the male members as well.(emphases added) (Lieten, 1996b)

This leads Lieten to affirm Ambedkar’s cyni-cism about panchayats. They are, he concludes,inappropriate instruments of rural develop-ment or of transforming landed power rela-tions. (ibid.:2705) A recent study by Sudha Paiprovides a more nuanced understanding ofthe phenomenon of surrogate representation,though her survey of three villages in the greenrevolution area of Daurala block in Meerutdistrict echoes Lieten’s in some respects. LikeLieten, she records the changed social com-position of the new panchayats, with their pre-dominance of lower castes and shows that thepradhanis who have been elected to thepanchayats after 1995 are ‘namesake’ members.Their perception of the panchayat as a gov-ernment organisation does not encouragethem to see their participation as necessary.Indeed, Pai found that “interviewing them forunderstanding the working of the panchayatwas of little use as they are ignorant of localaffairs”. (Pai,1998:1009) In each of Pai’s

villages, the 1995 election brought a dalitwoman to the post of pradhan. Since theseare also Ambedkar villages, their grants for de-velopment schemes were doubled for a two-year period, and channelised through thepanchayat. This has enabled a great deal ofdevelopmental work to take place, and vestedthe pradhans with tremendous powers of pa-tronage. However, Pai found that it is the hus-bands of the pradhanis – locally described asthe pradhans – who take all the decisions.

Yet, the mere fact of having been elected tothe post of pradhan has provoked therealisation, among these women, of the needto acquire an education or at least literacy skills.Inspired by the example of Mayawati, the dalitwoman who became Chief Minister of UttarPradesh, they are keen that the girls in the vil-lage attend school regularly. This phenomenonof what may be called proto-empowerment de-serves to be taken seriously.

The Government of Uttar Pradesh has issuedorders intended to help women gram pradhansto keep their husbands from interfering in theirwork. Husbands, according to this order, willnot be allowed to enter their wives’ offices (ex-cept for urgent work or to take part in meet-ings of the village panchayat); to accept memo-randa from villagers; and to travel in officialvehicles. (Panchayati Raj Update, October1998)

Lack of Literacy

A recent survey has revealed that 40 percentof the 20,000 women gram pradhans in theState of Uttar Pradesh are illiterate. The re-sponses of the women representatives sur-veyed across several States show that thesewomen themselves perceive the absence ofreading and writing skills as a major handicap,which hampers their effective participation inpanchayat institutions. Without exception, ev-ery single piece of survey research on thisquestion cites the recognition of women

The mere fact ofhaving beenelected to thepost of pradhanhas provoked therealisation,among thesewomen, of theneed to acquirean education or atleast literacy skills


representatives that they would have been bet-ter able to contribute to the proceedings andactivities of the panchayats had they had theadvantage of schooling. The sarpanch is pro-vided with a secretary, whose performance shehas no authority to check. Alternatively,sarpanches appoint a secretary at a monthlysalary of Rs. 500 (which is equivalent to tendays’ wages for unskilled labour), who canhardly provide administrative support even fortasks like book-keeping.

In Haryana, the women ask for education andtraining so that they would be better equippedto approach police and government officialswith their problems. They also ask for greaterknowledge about the law on panchayati raj.(MARG, 1998:181) In Rajasthan, close to 12percent of the women link their ineffective-ness to illiteracy. (CWDS, 1999:124), while inTamil Nadu, even women who hold abachelor’s degree feel that they are not takenseriously unless they have the backing of apowerful male. In particular, there is a wide-spread feeling that, even more than their malecolleagues, it is officials who are dismissive ofthem. As one panchayat president in TamilNadu observed, “Officials are especially in-different towards women representatives, butthey respond immediately to male represen-tatives.” (Athreya, 1998:23)

A member of a Janapad panchayat inChhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh notes thatwomen members are simply told to collecttheir travel and daily allowances and leave. Theresolutions are not read out -even on the re-quest of a member who is illiterate – and theyare simply asked to append their signature.This can be particularly difficult if accountsare involved. The members invariably want acommission on the development work sanc-tioned, and ask that the sarpanch falsify theaccounts accordingly. They also ask her to givebelow-poverty-line certification to ineligiblepersons. If the sarpanch happens to be a dalitor tribal woman, she can scarcely refuse to yield

to such pressures, because the dominant castesand landholding groups manage to prevail.

There are, however, heartening examples likethe following. Ganga Devi Rawat, sarpanchof Khawada in the Bhilangana block of TehriGarhwal district in Uttar Pradesh, is high-school educated. She was asked by her rela-tives to sign on a set of suspect accounts, sherefused to do so on the grounds that she wasnot convinced of their veracity. Despite pres-sure from the extended family, she steadfastlyrefused because, as she put it, “this hand andthis signature are no longer my own. They havebeen given to me by the people of the vil-lage.” She has also consistently refused to yieldto the demands for commissions and cutsfrom the officials who sanction developmentfunds. Her efforts at transparency have beensupported by the Chetna Andolan, whichholds regular jan sunwais (public hearings) onmatters of public interest and public expen-diture, and demands the right to information.

Another heartening example is that ofFatimabee, the sarpanch of a village inKurnool district, Andhra Pradesh. She wearsthe burkha in deference to social custom, andcan neither read nor sign her name. Despitean initial lack of confidence, she has managedto get the access road to the village metalled;started work on a school; had the public wa-ter tap repaired; got land ownership pattas reg-istered; and physically led thevillage to clean up a large tank. Above all, byrefusing to oblige one of her supporters, whowas pressing her to lease him the village pondfor twenty thousand rupees, she held an openauction which has yielded a lakh of rupeesfor the panchayat fund. (Panchayati Raj Up-date, December 1997:6)

In addition to literacy, the women ask for train-ing in leadership, legal literacy, gender justice.But training remains woefully inadequate aswell as ineffective. If it imparts anything at all,it is more because its recipients are so eager to

In addition toliteracy, thewomen ask fortraining inleadership, legalliteracy, genderjustice


learn, rather than on account of any intrinsicmerit in the training itself. Trainingprogrammes need to address themselves muchmore frontally to women’s concerns. As such,they need to create a consciousness in themabout patriarchy and the social and culturalpractices that affect women, as also how toorganise and build networks and alliances.Above all, training programmes that impartgender-sensitivity to men hold the key to moreenlightened policy, even at the micro-level.

Physical Violence

Physical violence or the threat of it, as well asmany shades of intimidation and outright co-ercion, are not uncommon. As in other elec-tions, violence during panchayat elections is aroutine occurrence. In Orissa, 12 lives werelost and many persons injured, during thepanchayat elections in January 1997, apartfrom the familiar range of electoral malprac-tices, viz., intimidation, booth capturing, rig-ging and the snatching of ballot papers andboxes. It is interesting that though panchayatelections in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradeshand Rajasthan have not seen high levels ofviolence, in each of these States, more vio-lence has been reported in women’s constitu-encies than in others. (CWDS, 1999:96)

Women members of panchayats, fromHaryana in the north to Tamil Nadu in thesouth, have faced threats of violence, whenthey have expressed a desire to contest elec-tions or, once elected, have insisted upon cer-tain decisions. In Haryana, when a womanwho had a record of involvement in the cam-paign against prohibition, decided to contestelections to the Panchayat Samiti on her own,her husband and other relatives physicallyabused her and threatened to throw her outof the house. (MARG, 1998:53) In TamilNadu, a woman representative said that whenshe won the election, the opposition beat upher husband and relatives. Now she does notmove around unescorted, and always carries a

knife. (Kaushik,1998:45) A tribal womansarpanch in Pune district in Maharashtra, whoalso happens to be a primary school teacher,was beaten up by the rival male candidate (andhis hired goons) simply because she had wonthe election and he had not. (Panchayati RajUpdate, 1994)

Women representatives in Haryana have com-plained of physical abuse by drunken hus-bands, which may not be directly related totheir functioning in the panchayat, but certainlyimpairs their ability to work. In Tamil Nadu,a woman vice-president of a village panchayatsaid she was reduced to tears by abuse frommale colleagues. Another woman representa-tive was simply prohibited by her husbandfrom attending a training camp. (Athreya,1998:23)

Sexual abuse is also not uncommon. InUttarakhand, a panchayat member accused of-ficials of sexually exploiting illiterate membersbefore giving approval to the works proposedby them. (Verma, 1998:52) In Rajasthan, theadhyaksha of a panchayat samiti, who wasforced to contest the election, was subse-quently sexually abused by her brother-in-lawwho insisted on accompanying her every-where. When she resisted and complained, herhusband and family disallowed her from at-tending meetings. (Kaushik, 1998:46) InMadhya Pradesh, Kusum Bai, the OBCwoman sarpanch of a gram panchayat inKhandwa district, defeated another womancandidate, whose husband, along with threeothers, gang-raped her. Two days later, com-pletely traumatised, she tried to commit sui-cide. Other than rape and sexual abuse, it hasalso been found that women representativeswho are efficient often attract slanderous alle-gations of sexual liasions. In many States, therehave even been attempts to intimidate womeninto withdrawing from the election by insinu-ations of affairs with men.

Above all, trainingprogrammes thatimpart gender-sensitivity to menhold the key tomore enlightenedpolicy, even at themicro-level


Violence against women representatives is, ofcourse, generally worse when they also hap-pen to be members of the scheduled castesor tribes. Gundiyabai Ahirwar, the dalitsarpanch of Pipra village in Tikamgarh dis-trict of Madhya Pradesh was prevented fromperforming a ceremonial duty - hoisting thenational flag in her village on IndependenceDay – because the Yadav majority in the vil-lage did not think that a dalit should even touchthe national flag. (Sainath, 1998) In the samedistrict, in a village where the dalits are in amajority, the dalit woman sarpanch complainsof domination by the OBCs, on whom thelandless dalits are economically dependent.The panchayat meetings are held in the lateevening in the OBC area, where a dalit womanwould hardly dare to venture even during theday. She is never consulted about the agendaof the meeting, but told when to come. Whenthe decisions have been taken, she is simplyasked to put her thumb impression on paper,which she does. (ibid.)

Caste and Disadvantage

Though it is apparent that discrimination ismore pronounced in the case of women,panchayat representatives belonging to thescheduled castes and tribes are victims of dis-crimination and exclusion, irrespective of gen-der. In 1994, Manulal, a dalit panch inBarbatpur village (Raisen district, MadhyaPradesh) was beaten up, simply because he didnot provide the whereabouts of his brotherwho had had a quarrel with a young thakurwhile playing dice. In another case, inChhatarpur district (Madhya Pradesh), SarmanAhirbar, a dalit who won the election to thepost of upa-sarpanch against a rival yadav can-didate (though with the support of a high-caste sarpanch) was tortured thus :

They tied Sarman’s hands with a stick in the crossposition and poured molasses on his head. The sweetmolasses attracted black ants and he was viciously bit-ten. To add insult to injury, he was paraded aroundthe village for an hour. Helpless and humiliated,

Sarman thought he would die. No one came to hisrescue. Later, an old man intervened firmly, and hewas released.

(Matthew and Nayak, 1996:1768)

In Rajasthan, Mewa Devi, a scheduled castemember of a panchayat samiti was actuallybeaten by her fellow-villagers for ‘not gettingtheir work done’, and though a police case wasregistered, nobody came forward to help heron account of her caste. Many women repre-sentatives surveyed in the various State stud-ies have reported discrimination on groundsof caste. There are several instances of sched-uled caste women representatives who are hu-miliated and discriminated against, with theircapacity to chair the panchayats being con-stantly questioned. (Kaushik, 1998:46)

P. Sainath’s survey of several of the 104 dalit-led panchayats of Tikamgarh in theBundelkhand region of Madhya Pradesh,shows how, after the first year, dalit sarpanchesare regularly ousted by a variety of methods :rigged suspensions, manipulated votes of no-confidence, or forcing them into expensive liti-gation. Where there are two scheduled castegroups in a village, the upper castes supportand prop up the smaller one, so that they canretain their control over the panchayat. Thefact that all this invariably takes place onlyafter the first twelve months have elapsed –because the rules disallow no-confidence mo-tions in the first year – is clearly not a coinci-dence. (Sainath, 1998)

Thus, despite the reservation of seats forwomen and members of the scheduled castes,it is clear that the domination of the upper-castes endures. In intra-family disputes andsimilar conflicts, it is the upper-caste leadersthat village folk tend to approach, rather thanthe gram panchayat. These castes also tend toinfluence the choice of candidates for elec-tions, as well as voting behaviour. Hence, toexpect panchayat institutions to work in a waythat is insulated from the inequalities of local

Though it isapparent thatdiscrimination ismore pronouncedin the case ofwomen,panchayatrepresentativesbelonging to thescheduled castesand tribes arevictims ofdiscrimination andexclusion,irrespective ofgender


society may be utopian, but is it also utopianto expect that, in the long run, these institu-tions will themselves become mechanisms forassertions by these marginalised groups?

Modes of Gender Exclusion

Procedural Subversions: No-Confidence Motions

State conformity legislations specify the pro-cedures for no-confidence motions againstchairpersons and vice-chairpersons at all threetiers of the new panchayat system, and thoughmany of these require a two-thirds majorityof elected members or of members presentand voting, they are found to have been inge-niously used to effectively de-reserve a re-served seat. In various States, it has been ob-served that there is a pattern in the use of suchprovisions, which are systematically used bymale upa-pradhans to unseat female pradhans,and take control of the panchayat themselves.In many States, safeguards have been at-tempted against such misuse : e.g., in Rajasthanand Uttar Pradesh, the legislations prohibit ano-confidence motion in the first two yearsafter election, and again for a whole year afteran unsuccessful no-confidence motion. InMadhya Pradesh, no-confidence motions aredisallowed in the last six months of the five-year tenure of the panchayat.

In Uttar Pradesh, the Zila Panchayat presidentin Saharanpur district was actually thrown outby invoking this procedure, while a pradhanof a gram panchayat in Dehra Dun districtwas threatened with a no-confidence motion,only because she refused to surrender the bankpassbook to them. In a village panchayat inAlwar district of Rajasthan, the pradhan ob-tained a stay from the courts to prevent beingunseated, but once the stay was cleared, sheceased to be the sarpanch. An inter-State com-parison of no-confidence motions suggestsclearly the intersection of caste, class and gen-der. Women from the scheduled caste andOBC categories in U.P., M.P. and Rajasthan

have thus faced a larger percentage of suchmotions. (CWDS, 1999:130) A scheduled castesarpanch of a village in Rajasthan was removedby a no-confidence motion, made possible bythe abduction of her supporters. (Kaushik,1998:45) The use of such provisions is alsoseen to be more frequent in seats which arereserved for scheduled caste candidates, irre-spective of gender.

Procedural Subversions : Quorum

There are variations across States in the quo-rum required for a meeting, with some requir-ing a one-third quorum, and others half. How-ever, no State provides for the mandatory pres-ence of women representatives or membersof the scheduled castes and tribes. This fre-quently makes it possible for chairpersons toconduct the meetings with upper caste malemembers and take decisions. The absence ofwomen is particularly notable at the most ba-sic unit of democracy : the gram sabha. Sev-eral conformity legislations – e.g., those ofGujarat and Karnataka - do not specify a quo-rum for the gram sabha, though some others,like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and HimachalPradesh specify between 1/5 and 1/10 of themembers as quorum, and a less demandingproportion for adjourned meetings. The gramsabha is precisely the level at which the invis-ibility of women is the highest. Attempts toincrease the visibility of women in this foruminvariably take the unsatisfactory form of ex-ecutive diktat – e.g., a sub-quorum for women– which cannot fulfil the purpose of politicalparticipation. Any initiative for democra-tisation is bound to be less than effective ifmobilisation is enforced rather than sponta-neous, if those who are being enfranchisedvoluntarily disfranchise themselves. To makethe gram sabha a truly participatory forum forwomen and men alike, and for people of allcastes, would therefore be a necessary step to-wards democratisation.

Any initiative fordemocratisationis bound to beless than effectiveif mobilisation isenforced ratherthan spontaneous,if those whoare beingenfranchisedvoluntarilydisfranchisethemselves

49

The Two-Child Norm

What has come to be euphemistically referredto as the two-child norm is, in reality, a legalprovision rather than a norm. The Rajasthangovernment issued an ordinance barring thosewho have more than two children from con-testing panchayat and municipal elections. Ifa third child was born to a member after theelection, the person risks losing her/his seat.450 persons were so disqualified, after theirelection, 112 of these being women, mostlyat the level of the gram panchayat. Other States

have also contemplated introducing such anorm. Though challenged on grounds of itsincompatibility with the Representation ofPeoples Act and Muslim Personal Law, theHigh Courts in Rajasthan, Haryana and Orissahave upheld its validity. Such a provision clearlydiscriminates against individuals from lessprivileged social groups who might considercontesting elections for the first time. It alsoplaces at a disadvantage women who custom-arily have little or no control over reproduc-tive decisions.

Women representatives from grampanchayats said that according to their ex-perience functions have been entrusted tothe panchayats although they do not havethe corresponding powers for implementa-tion. A majority of the panchayat memberspointed out that some factors, viz. lack ofeducation, inadequate disposable finance,low access to information about the actualmanagement of the PRIs, and lack of ex-posure to the outside world inhibit their ef-fective functioning. They said that to bringabout all round development in their villages,problems related to availability of basicamenities such as water and roads should besolved.It was felt that discussions on gender andgovernance should be in the context of pow-ers and capabilities of the PRIs. As theKerala experience shows, PRIs are effectivewhen political parties give them opportuni-ties to exist and function independently. Itis urgent to look at the systems of account-ability at the panchayat level, as well as toquestion, scrutinise and study the power re-lations in society. Some were of the opinionthat gender empowerment is a political is-sue. Caste and class barriers are also reflectedin the PRIs, and result in being exacerbatedin the case of women representatives. Thuswomen representatives face various

Equity and Social Inclusion: Women’s VoicesBOX 7

problems, viz. violence, lack of political ex-perience, lack of community support andleverage. To monitor and facilitate genderempowerment in the communities, many feltthat it could be advisable to find out howmany women are actually contesting elec-tions in the unreserved seats. The group also acknowledged that in manyparts of the country women still do not havethe right to property. This disempowermentoften manifests itself in women’s lack of selfconfidence and voice.Literacy can be used as a useful tool forwomen’s empowerment, although this doesnot mean that illiterate women cannot func-tion as effective leaders. Literacy helpswomen leaders to function to their full po-tential and makes it easier to deal with fi-nancial management and legal matters.The following recommendations emerged:l Empowering strategies must be laid down

in order to help the PRIs to move for-ward. Sensitisation for government offi-cials and other area officials by electedwomen representatives should be con-ducted.

l Capacity building training programmesshould be imparted to all the actors inthe PRIs, female and male representatives,government officials, members of politi-cal parties, etc.

l To reinforce political will, which wouldempower the PRIs, ways of creating aground swell and demand for good gov-ernance through the PRIs could be ex-plored. This could be done by mobilisingthe media, facilitating discussions in civicsociety forums, gearing up activities forextensive information disseminating,documenting and sharing best practices,etc.

l An institutional framework with adequateresources from district to the nationallevel should be introduced to handle gen-der sensitive and high quality capacity-building programmes. Elected womenrepresentatives and women’s groupsshould then carry out gender audit ofthese programmes.

l Information technology may be used forup-scaling programmes at all levels andto build up women’s constituencies andfederate women’s collectives. Also, self-help groups (SHGs) and other women’sgroups could be used as solidarity net-works for elected women’s representa-tives.

An integrated approach for strengtheningvarious policy initiatives and interventionsrelated to governance, e.g. right to informa-tion, reservation for women in parliament,electoral reforms etc., could be also used.

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation


Revitalising Public Systems through People’s ActionRevitalising Public Systems through People’s Action

8. Panchayat and CommunityFinance

8.1 Context

Ideally, as units of government, thepanchayats should have full autonomy indeciding their priorities and determining theallocations to different programmes. Inreality, however, the system of centralisedplanning followed over the last four decadesseverely constrains local autonomy. Notonly is a substantial part of the outlay of aFive-Year plan committed to ongoingactivities, but ‘earmarking’ a largeproportion of plan provisions restricts theextent to which sectoral allocations can bealtered. The situation was aggravated by theenlargement, since the Seventh Five YearPlan, of Centrally Sponsored Schemes withtied funds and national guidelines.

There are broadly three sources of fundsfor panchayats:

l Own resources through direct taxationpowers or income from owned or vestedassets of a panchayat.

l Fees or assigned revenues like cesses/sur-charges/share in taxes.

l Purposive or untied grants, of differenttypes.

The only tier of the panchayats that hasregulatory powers is the gram panchayat.Conceptually, the other two tiers play onlyextension and development planning/welfare roles. Working on this principle,prior to 73rd Amendment , it was argued by

the PR Finance Commission of Karnatakain 1989 that the paradigm of the taxationrole is regulatory and coercive and there-fore does not go well with the developmentrole, much less with welfare and extensionroles. They recommended only the grampanchayats should enjoy taxation powers.

Limited Options

Insofar as options for making panchayatsinstitutions of self government in mattersof economic planning and development asenvisaged by 73rd Amendment areconcerned, it may be noted that panchayatsare not allowed to borrow and there is abalanced budget constraint on them. Priorto 73rd Amendment, Karnataka was the firstto try decentralised planning but wasconstrained by Central sectoral planning.This left a very limited scope for discretionby panchayats. It was found by the PRFinance Commission of Karnataka in 1989and later by a study team of Governmentof AP that 40 per cent of plan funds of theUnion and the States put together accountfor what may be termed as ‘district schemes’in almost all the States. The total discretionthat panchayats had in selecting their ownschemes was only 13-14 percent of thetotal Plan allocation to a district. It was alsofound that only a paltry 6 percent of thefunds intended for district schemes werebeing channelised through panchayats. InKarnataka the total of 40 percent of fundsintended for district schemes waschannelised through Zila Parishads. After agreat deal of relaxation in the planning sys-tem at the district level only 14 percent

PART II

The only tier of thepanchayats that hasregulatory powers isthe gram panchayat

51

untied funds could be made available to theZila Parishad. The earmarked schemesclaimed 86 percent of the total funds.Several scholars have argued in favour ofuntied funds for development to be grantedto panchayats. It has been Stated forcefullythat 40 percent of resources should be givenfrom total Plan allocations for districtschemes to the panchayats for spending asuntied funds on schemes and activities oftheir choice as determined by a bottom-upmicro and district planning process.

Reliance on State Legislatures

State Legislatures can grant powers to taxany of the tiers of panchayats. Though StateLegislations have provided for grantingpowers to tax or assign certain taxes topanchayats, it is quite clear from a compara-tive chart8 that the size of the fiscal domainin all States is inversely related to thepanchayat level. The largest number ofcharges and taxes are leviable at present bygram panchayats. Even where powers oflevy are vested at Panchayat Samiti or ZilaParishad levels, actual collection is done bythe gram panchayat and the revenue passedon; in some cases, these revenues are shared.Concurrent powers of levy are sometimesassigned on the same base, or the PanchayatSamiti and/or Zila Parishads are empow-ered to levy a surcharge on any GramPanchayat tax or fee. The common featuresof the fiscal domain of gram panchayatsacross the States need to be focussed onfor buoyancy – improving measures ofgeneral validity. At the same time, taxes orcharges peculiar to one or a few Statessuggest possibilities for introductionelsewhere.

Fiscal Transfers and “Gap-filling”

It has been said that gap-filling as anapproach to State local transfers must beexplicitly rejected in favour of otherapproaches more compatible with

incentives for local taxes or fees. The lev-ies by Panchayats are most often specificrather than ad-valorem because of the dif-ficulty of valuation in the rural context, andare not indexed for inflation. The onlysegments of rural property which fall withinthe taxable domain of Panchayats as definedat present are buildings, non-agriculturalland and non-motorised vehicles. Thelevies on buildings and land offer some pos-sibilities for augmenting panchayatresources. There could be a user levy onagricultural pumpsets over and above elec-tricity charges, since pump sets use groundwater, a local common resource. Scope fornew property based levies like this appearsto be indicated by beneficiary willingnessto pay in rural West Bengal. The improvedservice resulting from transfer of manage-ment of tubewells from the State Govern-ment to panchayats is a pre condition forwillingness to pay. A developmental chargeon new construction, commonly levied onlyby Municipalities, has been tried out byMaharashtra which empowered grampanchayats to charge a betterment levy onlands which have benefited from schemespaid for from Panchayat funds.

Taxes and Levies

A variant of the betterment levy is avalorisation tax, where infrastructureprojects are financed through prior collec-tions from potential beneficiaries, with theconcomitant involvement of these benefi-ciaries in the conception and realisation ofthe project. At present eight States doempower gram panchayats to collect aspecial tax for construction of public works,on agricultural land and residential struc-tures or on adult males. The tax on adultmales is also payable through a labourcontribution. This special tax could beapplied in all States. Project specificcontribution of this kind meet with less re-sistance than recurring levies and confer

8 See the useful comparative Tables presented by Indira Rajaraman, O.P. Bohra, VS Renganathan in Augmentation of PanchayatResources, EPW, May 4 , 1996

The only segmentsof rural propertywhich fall within thetaxable domain ofPanchayats asdefined at presentare buildings, nonagricultural land andnon-motorisedvehicles


8.2 Panchayat Budgets

This section reflects on the current posi-tion of the panchayat finances in India. Thediscussion is not around budget numbers,trends and proportions. It is about thegradually decentralising system in whichpanchayat finances are to be located today.

ll To elaborate, what are the links ofpanchayats to other levels of govern-ment, both above and below forfinances?

ll How are they changing?

ll Where do funds come from, and how arethey spent?

ll Who decides what is to be spent, and whocontrols spending? Are these systems andprocedures changing in a way that pro-motes local autonomy?

on the local community a sense of owner-ship that ensures better maintenance.

User charges

Water and lighting rates are most commonlyfound across the States, usually at grampanchayat level and occasionally obligatoryin nature. Where the facility has resultedfrom a scheme funded by Panchayat samitisor Zila Parishads they also levy charges insome States on water or lighting. But in allthese cases, the levy is collected by the grampanchayat and shared with higher levels.Surprisingly, empowerment to levy chargesfor street cleaning or for the maintenanceof public or private latrines is less commonand rarely obligatory. The right to levy taxeson fares, festivals ad pilgrims is also notcommonly assigned which is an obviousomission considering the strain these eventsplace upon the sanitation infrastructure.Some States also have an explicit charge forirrigation water although in other Statessuch as Tamil Nadu, a charge on irrigationis incorporated in the land revenue.

Panchayats are not commonly empoweredto levy user charges on health and educa-tion except in Bihar, Haryana, Rajasthan,UP and West Bengal. It is debatable whethersuch a user charge on students does notcome up against the constitutional guaran-tee of free education for all. The fee onweekly bazars and markets is the counter-part at Panchayat level of the sales tax ofStates. It is at present assigned to grampanchayats in ten of the fourteen GeneralCategory States.

Tax Sharing

A detailed tax wise examination of the pro-visions under present legislation in respectof both sharing of State level taxes andtaxes leviable at Panchayat level isnecessary to assist State Governments toprovide revenue additionality for

Panchayats. The other issue is major levieson rural property and common resourceswhich together fall within the natural fiscaldomain of local governments but are lev-ied by State Governments at present. Theseare: land revenue on agricultural land, stampduty on property transfer, and royaltiesfrom mineral and forest resources. Landrevenue and stamp duty are commonlyshareable with Panchayats under presentlegislation; forest and mineral resourcesrarely so. It has been demonstrated that arestructuring of sharing provisions and oftax design of the first two could lead togreater buoyancy of collections; andPanchayat shares of forest and mineral rev-enues from those State levies at presentshared only with municipalities could helpincrease the resources of Panchayats. Fornow it is sufficient to note that transfer ofstaff and funds for staff costs, augmentingpanchayat’s own resources, and grant ofuntied funds for village plans/district plan-ning are important issues requiring attention.

A detailed tax wiseexamination of theprovisions underpresent legislation inrespect of bothsharing of State leveltaxes and taxesleviable atPanchayat level isnecessary to assistState Governmentsto provide revenueadditionality forPanchayats

53

recommendations. It may be noted that aState seemed to move forward only whenthe incumbent Chief Minster took aninterest in decentralisation. Thus it wouldappear that local self government is stilldependent on the patronage of the headof the State government. The system is stillin the process of getting established. Thisalso means that these changes cannot beconsidered irreversible: a point oftenforgotten in this debate.

Status of Decentralised Budgets

The budgets of the union and Stategovernments are presented to the LokSabha and the Vidhan Sabha under consti-tutional provisions. The union budget ispresented under Article 112. The budgetsof the States are presented to the Assem-blies under Article 202. Under this Article,the Governor of a State is required to laybefore the legislature every year a Statementof receipts and expenditures for the finan-cial year – April 1 to March 31. Otherarticles9 that are relevant to the budgetprocess are 204, 266 and 267. Basically, theState must have a Consolidated Fund forits revenues and expenditures, and this canonly be operated on the basis of theAppropriation Act being passed by theAssembly. The funds of local bodies areincluded in the demands of differentdepartments that implement the variousschemes. Sometimes, supplementarybudgets are presented, but the underlyingprocess remains the same.

The State also has a Contingency Fund foremergencies. And finally, there is a PublicAccount in which the State acts as a banker.In the Public Account, the State deals withclaims and receipts, such as from theProvident Fund. The various ReserveFunds of the State are shown in this Ac-count. The State has no ownership on thePublic Account, but acts as a receiving and

ll Is the panchayat truly local selfgovernment, or is it something else: thelocal representative of the Stategovernment?

ll Is this difference important at all?

In other words, is the system that has beenushered in by the 73rd ConstitutionalAmendment something radically differentfrom that which prevailed hitherto, or is itthe old system dressed up in new clothes?

There is little literature that has looked atthis question from a finance perspective.This may not be all that there is to anefficient panchayat system. But it is a nec-essary ingredient of a new kind of localgovernment for this country, because of thefact that the impetus for local self govern-ment has not come from below – the peoplethemselves. It has come from the top forvarious reasons – chief among them beingthe question of administrative efficiency.

True devolution (as opposed to cosmeticadministrative change) to local governmentsmay be said to take place only when funds,functions and functionaries are transferred tothe appropriate level of local government.Such a transfer has to be made in substance,not in form only. And it has to go together– the mere transfer of funds without otherchanges may even worsen the situation.

This issue becomes important and relevantbecause the panchayat system has beenintroduced from above, as it were, througha Constitutional Amendment less than tenyears ago. In the Indian constitution,residual powers are with the union, notStates and local bodies, as in the UnitedStates or Switzerland. This tends to favourthe higher levels of government, which arealso well established in comparison to thenew panchayats. Those working tostrengthen panchayats have, therefore, toconstantly justify and defend their views and

True devolution tolocal governmentsmay be said to takeplace only whenfunds, functions andfunctionaries aretransferred to theappropriate level oflocal government

9 This has been well discussed in S.S. Karnik, Essentials of the Budget Process of the State Government, Centre for Budget Studies,A Vidhayak Sansad Publication, Mumbai, 1998.


disbursing agency. The approval of the leg-islature is not necessary here. Studies ofthe Public Account are few and far between.

It is the State government that is respon-sible for the finances of local bodies, be theyurban or rural. Even today, many of thepowers that have been given to local bod-ies are delegated powers, and the State gov-ernment continues to retain overall respon-sibility in this matter. This means that suit-able arrangements for the transfer of fundsand their use become necessary after the 73rd

amendment. In part, this has been lookedafter in part by the setting up of a State Fi-nance Commission on lines similar to theone set up every five years by the union gov-ernment. In Art 280. In clause (3), after sub-clause (b), the following sub-clause has beenadded:

“(bb) The measures needed to augment theConsolidated Fund of a State to supplementthe resources of the panchayats in the Stateon the basis of the recommendations madeby the Finance Commission of the State.”

The powers, authority and responsibilitiesof the three levels of panchayats are laiddown in Article 243G, 243H, 243I, and243Z of the Amendments. For finances, thekey article is 243H, according to which the“Legislature of a State may, by law…”authorise the panchayats. Few things aremandatory in these articles. They leave agreat deal of discretion to the State in whatis to be passed on to the panchayats.

The system of accounts to be used is theone approved by the Comptroller and Au-ditor General of India. This is a system thatarranges all items under clear heads of ex-penditure with unambiguous codes. Thissystem is uniform across the country. Butas it stands today, the system has been de-fined only for the union and State govern-ments. Thus, when it comes to panchayats,and local bodies, budget information is

often not available in the appropriate form.Since it is not mandatory, accounts are keptas they evolved over time. Often it is not asystem of double entry book-keeping. Thismakes budget analysis at this level rathercomplex.

We look at the question of financialdecentralisation as a necessary aspect of thefunctioning of the PRI system. Here welook at the experiences of a pioneer State –Karnataka; a State which took up PRIs af-ter the 73rd and 74th amendments – MadhyaPradesh; and a latecomer to this system,Uttar Pradesh. In each of these States, whenPanchayati Raj was on the upswing, the toppolitical leadership in the State was at theforefront of the decentralisation movement.

Karnataka

Karnataka has vested administrative controlof local officials in the Chief ExecutiveOfficer (CEO) of the Zila panchayat. Theyare not under the control of the local electedbody—as they used to be in the earlier law.They continue to be employees of the Stategovernment. The CEOs also have powers,defined in the recent law, to refer to the Stategovernment decisions of the ZP which theyfeel are not in tune with the law. The CEOis the nodal point of development effort inthe district. One indicator of this lies in thefact that about 40 percent of the State’s de-velopment budget is transferred to the Zilapanchayats after the budget is passed eachyear. While the ZP may discuss the budget,it cannot act if the CEO disagrees with itsdecisions and decides to refer the matter tothe State government.

When we speak of district budgets, it is dif-ficult to find two sides – income and ex-penditure. While there is some tax powerwith the local bodies, very little by way oftaxes is collected. Thus they have very littleby way of their own resources. They de-pend on devolutions from the State and

Many of the powersthat have been givento local bodies aredelegated powers,and the Stategovernmentcontinues to retainoverall responsibilityin this matter

55

central governments. Some have argued thatthe share of own funds to devolved fundswould be an index of autonomy of the ZPs.Perhaps. But it must not be forgotten thatthe local bodies are entitled to a share inthe tax and other revenues of the highertiers of government. Their share today isgiven in tied form – it is for untied fundsthat they must struggle. Thus share of tiedfunds to untied funds may be a better in-dex of autonomy. Today it is quite adverse.

This information on district allocations iscontained in a document called the LinkDocument of the State budget. This Linkdocument gives information on what hasbeen allocated to these bodies after the pass-ing of the budget by the State assembly.

This figure is treated as the income side ofthe district budget. The expenditure side isobtained from the ZP office after audit bythe Accountant General has been com-pleted. This often takes a long time, so thedata is not for the current year. It is oftendelayed by about three years. This in itselfreduces its utility. It is sometimes conductedon a sample basis – an estimate of standarderror is needed, but not available. This willbe an important research subject in the nearfuture.

A study of ZP budgets in two districts hasshown that often the money allocated is not spent.We can perhaps say that, money per se, isnot a (at any rate a major) constraint on lo-cal development efforts. When reasons fornon-utilisation were probed it was observedthat money was allocated in differentschemes, and could only be spent in spe-cific ways after specific approvals. There isno flexibility in the system. If a particularscheme is for some reason not relevant in adistrict, the money cannot be channelledelsewhere and it lapses. If the amount tobe spent is over a certain modest limit, thenapproval has to be sought from the com-petent authority – which is often at the State

level. This takes time, and leads to time andcost over-runs. Thus, the local body is achannel for directing expenditure, but it hasno discretion. The result is that money al-located may not get spent. If this is tochange, then flexibility at the local level isessential.

Also, not much may be designed to be spent at thelocal level. The Karnataka HDR gives a fig-ure of one thousand three hundred rupeesfor the annual per child expenditure on pri-mary education. Of this, 90 percent is onsalaries. A study of education finances atthe district level10 , reveals that, excludingsalaries, only seven rupees per year is spentat this level. But if the major chunk of ex-penditure in a district is undertaken by de-partment outside the purview of localelected bodies, then what kind of local gov-ernment have we built up?

Thus, the State spends on these subjectsmuch more than would appear from a scru-tiny of the district budgets. The point ismade that we should not draw conclusionsabout what is being spent in a district fromthe panchayat figures. This may be true, butthen the question arises: what is devolved?What role do these elected bodies play inthe budget arena? Why is the money notbeing devolved? What advantages are thereto this system? What are the advantages ofcentralised operation? Who takes decisionswhen the panchayats are not involved?

What we find is that funds are routed throughthe local bodies. The administrative proceduresfor reapportioning, approval etc are com-plex, and at a level above the district. Thepolitical bodies do not have much say inthese decisions. It is the State assembly thatpasses these budgets, and the cabinet andthe civil service that operates them. This isat best limited decentralisation.

An important question from the Karnatakaexperience in recent times relates to the role

The local body is achannel for directingexpenditure, but ithas no discretion.The result is thatmoney allocated maynot get spent. If thisis to change, thenflexibility at the locallevel is essential

10 A. Indira and Vinod Vyasulu, “Education finances—A study in five districts”, A report submitted to the District PrimaryEducation Programme, GOK, 1997.


of the civil servant. What power should heor she exercise at the local level? Why shouldthe CEO be vested with veto powers overthe elected body? If the elected body takesdecisions contrary to law, then the mattershould be settled in the courts. Why shouldwe assume that the civil servant exercisinga veto is a better option? Should not thecivil servant act on the orders of electedauthority? If the answer is yes, thenKarnataka must re-examine what it has donein recent years.

Of funds, functions and functionaries, noneis fully devolved at the district level inKarnataka. It is a case of change in form,not substance. This is a State that has feltthe effects of a backlash to a quick openingup. What lessons does this hold for otherStates? To use a cliché: Make haste slowly!

Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh has been a pioneer in thepanchayati raj movement after the 73rd

amendment was passed. Elections were heldin 1993-94, and the second round has beenconducted in 1999. Those elected to thesebodies have been involved in developmentprojects from the beginning. The Stategovernment’s Rajiv Gandhi Missions in thesocial sector were all implemented throughthe panchayat system. This gives an idea ofthe structural shift being attempted. Fund-ing at the panchayat level is then a means to facili-tate a larger change in the way government func-tions.

So far as finances are concerned, the Statehas begun exercises to devolve more ofdepartmental funds to the panchayats, apartfrom the shares recommended by theFinance Commission. Each department hasbeen asked to identify the local componentand transfer it to the district account. Anallocation of functions has been worked outacross the three local levels, and funds goto the appropriate level automatically.

Officials are also being transferred to workat this level.

Under the 74th amendment, there is a pro-vision for a District Planning Committee(DPC). The State has constituted a DPC inall the districts. The composition is in ac-cordance with the provisions of the 74th

amendment. A minister in the State gov-ernment has been given district charge –there is one for each district – and is thechairman of the DPC and the link betweenthe two levels of government. He is answer-able to the cabinet and the State assemblyon the one hand, and to the local authori-ties on the other. The DPC has been em-powered to take decisions up to three croresof rupees at its level. Thus the powers havebeen devolved substantially to local levels.For example, primary education has beenhanded over to the districts. This is referredto locally as the district government.

The State is also in the process of developing a cod-ing system for local finances. Just as the Comp-troller & Auditor General (CAG) has ap-proved a system for the State, MP is plan-ning a Part 3 document for the State bud-get which will give all information about thedistrict and lower levels in the same format.It is an elaborate format, designed for elec-tronic data processing. At the moment, dis-cussions are underway with the CAG to getapproval for this system

Once that approval is obtained, this part 3will be a part of the State government’s bud-get presented annually to the Assembly. Thisis important because such an approval willmake it difficult for individual ministers tomake re-appropriations on whim. It willenable one to trace expenditures all the waydown to the gram panchayat by item. Dis-cussions on expenditures, on promisesmade, can take place at the local level onthe basis of facts and figures. It will be amajor change in the way things are done

The State has begunexercises to devolvemore of departmentalfunds to thepanchayats, apartfrom the sharesrecommendedby the FinanceCommission

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today. The succeeding budgets are expectedto include this innovation.

In the first year, the figures will be what thedepartments have decided, in the old pro-cess. But over the years, the district gov-ernments will be in a position to send intheir priorities, which will be used in fram-ing the budgets. A process is about to be-gin in which, for the first time, local priori-ties will play a role in what is decided upon.The process of transferring funds, functions andfunctionaries has been initiated. This means adownsizing of the State government as itexists today. We have to see how the sys-tem will respond to the backlash that maybe expected. But a step forward has beentaken. If things work out as planned, thiswill be an important step in making localgovernment more meaningful in the State,and its reorganisation into two States willin no way roll this back.

Uttar Pradesh

UP is the most recent convert to thedecentralisation bandwagon. The reasoncould be the fiscal crisis of the State, whichhas left it with no other alternative. Since1999, major steps have been taken to fosterlocal self government.

The State government with a view to bring-ing in a sustained process of decentra-lisation and people’s participation in1999-2000, have accordingly devolved alarge number of more specific functionsand powers to Panchayats to enable themto play their rightful role in the process ofdevelopment. Along with functions, assetsand funds have also been devolved. Schoolbuildings will from now on be the assets ofthe gram panchayats. Teachers and otherswill work under the control of the grampanchayats. Funds required for construc-tion, maintenance etc will be directly givento the gram panchayats. Just as the State hasa Consolidated Fund, each panchayat will

have a Gram Nidhi – its own consolidatedfund, and it will be operated in the same way.

Like other States, UP has been implement-ing development and social sector projectsat the State level. The change of heart nowmay have something to do with the fiscalcrisis of the State, and the consequent needto use available funds more efficiently. Itcould have something to do with politicalcompulsions: devolving powers may bothtake pressure off the Chief Minister andbuild a new base of support for him. Bethat as it may, in the last year a number offunctions have been transferred to Gram[village] and Kshetra (taluk or intermedi-ate) panchayats in Uttar Pradesh.

The Gram panchayats have been given theresponsibility for primary education, Statetube wells, handpumps, youth welfare,medical and health, woman and child de-velopment, animal husbandry, fair priceshops, agriculture, rural development andpanchayati raj. For all these functions, fundsare being handed over to the gram nidhi,which will be operated by the pradhan andthe secretary jointly. The staff are also beingput under the control of the panchayat. The powersare being given, not to the president or an officebearer, but to the panchayat as a whole. It can actafter meetings in which the issues are de-bated and decided. Given the reservationsfor weaker sections and women, thesegroups should have a voice in decision mak-ing. At least the structure is meant to facili-tate this.

Further, sanction and disbursement of pen-sions will now be handled by grampanchayats. So also will the distribution ofscholarships, which will be done by the edu-cation committee of the Gram Panchayat.

The financial powers are substantial. First,“all assets which are related to the functionsgiven to the gram panchayats and locatedin the village will be transferred to the gram

The Stategovernment with aview to bringing in asustained process ofdecentralisation andpeople’s participationin 1999-2000, haveaccordingly devolveda large number ofmore specificfunctions and powersto Panchayats toenable them to playtheir rightful role inthe process ofdevelopment

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action


panchayats on a date to be fixed by the dis-trict magistrate after wide publicity in thisregard. The amount which was so far beingspent by the concerned department onmaintenance of these assets will be givendirectly to gram panchayats.” Further, fundswill be provided to the gram panchayat for

ll The works transferred

ll The maintenance of assets transferred

ll Paying salary of the staff transferred

ll Payment of honorarium to teachers andnew staff appointed by the GramPanchayat would be provided.

UP is the first State to have committed it-self to a non-discretionary transfer of funds.This has led to substantial resources becom-ing avail to the gram panchayats in recentyears. In 1996-97, the gram panchayats gotRs 20 crores. In 1997-98, it rose to Rs 255crores. In 1999-2000, it is expected to be328 crores of rupees – the devolution of4 percent of tax revenues.

Apart from this, rural development fundsare being transferred to gram panchayats,as also funds as per the recommendationsof the Central Tenth Finance Commission.The total for 1999-2000 is expected to be1100 crores of rupees. This is a substantialamount.

The gram panchayats have also been em-powered to collect irrigation tax and depositthe amount in the Gram Nidhi. They canimpose a surcharge on land revenue andkeep the money in the gram nidhi.

Meetings of the gram panchayat are to beheld on the second Wednesday of everymonth. Where women are pradhans, in-structions have been given that their malerelatives cannot attend any meeting. If theyvisit the woman pradhan’s office, this is tobe recorded in a register, giving the reasonfor the visit. Whether such instructions are

enough to curb gender dominance remainsto be seen. But at least the instructions showan awareness of a major problem and adesire to deal with it. This is most positive.

The gram panchayats are expected to keepproper accounts, get them audited accord-ing to norms to be set by the State govern-ment, and to present these accounts in thegram sabhas every six months. All villagersin a gram sabha area have been given theright to demand and obtain any documentfor a, prescribed fee – a modest one of fiverupees upto five pages, and a rupee per pagebeyond that. In a similar way, kshetrapanchayats – the intermediate level, havebeen given clear and defined powers, re-sponsibilities and staff. All block level of-ficers will come under this body, which willalso be given funds to meet its responsibili-ties. At the Zila panchayat level, the Pradhanhas been made the Chairman of the DRDA.A Chief Officer will be posted as its secre-tary to work with the Pradhan. The ZP willwork through six committees, and it is thecommittees in which the powers are vested,not in the officers.

To co-ordinate work, the State has consti-tuted District Planning Committees underthe 74th amendment. Four-fifths of themembers will be elected from among theZP and municipalities of the district to theDPC, in an election organised by the Stateelection commission. One fifth of themembers will be nominated by the Stategovernment. This will include a ministerfrom the council of ministers, who will chairthe committee. The DPC will have a mini-mum of 20 and a maximum of 40 mem-bers. All MPs and MLAs of the district willbe permanent invitees of the DPC. “Afterproperly considering the developmentalplans prepared by the ZPs and municipali-ties by taking into account their mutual in-terest, specially regional planning, share inwater and other physical and natural

Uttar Pradesh is thefirst State to havecommitted itself to anon-discretionarytransfer of funds.This has led tosubstantial resourcesbecoming avail to thegram panchayats inrecent years

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resources and integrated infrastructure andenvironmental development, the DPC willfinalise the district plan at the district level itself”.

What is very interesting about the UP modelis that the district plan outlay of the district willbe placed at the district level through the State bud-get. Sanctions will be given by the DPC atthis level. The need to travel to the Statecapital for everything is being systematicallyreduced – true decentralisation, even if afirst step in a larger scheme of things.

Summing Up

This quick review of the current State ofdecentralisation of local finances shows thefollowing:

First, decentralisation seems to take placewhen the State governments take an inter-est for some special reason. In Karnataka,in the first flush, it was the need to find animportant issue to fight the union govern-ment with. This resulted in far reaching leg-islation that perhaps its own proponents feltwent too far. The result was a back-lash insubsequent years from which the State hasyet to recover. Local politicians speak wist-fully of the old system, but the fact remainsthat when it was being systematically dis-mantled, there was little effective protestfrom them. Until local people develop astake in self-government, suchdecentralisation will remain at the mercy ofthe State government.

And in this process of the ups and downs ofpanchayati raj, the delegation of financial powers,and the actual transfer of funds played an impor-tant role in controlling the extent of decentralisation.Apart from higher level politicians, the lo-cal bureaucracy too resisted the process ofdecentralisation. In MP and UP too, theimpetus has come from the Chief Minis-ters. We have the interesting situation inwhich higher level politicians push adecentralisation of functions. It is not theresult of local people making a demand for

such powers. Thus when Chief Ministerschange, the system moves backwards.

Second, the experience of Madhya Pradeshshows that a carefully thought out processof devolution, in which the panchayats arethe vehicles through which a demand forsocial services is generated, begins to pro-vide a base for a genuine local government.When the panchayat is a vehicle for airingdemands, then a partnership is possible withthe State government – but only if the Stategovernment responds positively. The firststeps are crucial. Today in MP the systemmay last because the people have begun tosee the benefits. This has also made it pos-sible to go further, and use the district plan-ing committee as a vehicle to institutionalisea decentralised form of developmentproject implementation. But it is still at anearly stage.

Third, the UP example tells us that changecan be pushed through very quickly in timesof crisis. This is what the World Bank calls“big bang reform”. It does not seem to bea coincidence that the kind ofdecentralisation that UP undertook wasdone at a time of fiscal crisis. That is whenopportunities for experimentation open up– and UP has decided to do so in a decisiveway. The challenge will be to keep the mo-mentum going.

From all this, it would appear that severalthings still remain to be done.

The lead given by MP of having a part 3 to theState budget, must be followed up. If MP getsthe approval of the CAG to its system ofaccounts, then that is a model other Statescan accept. Pending such approval, a startcan still be made. It should be put into op-eration everywhere. One important impactwill be that discretionary diversions by min-isters will become much more difficult whenthe Assembly passes a budget in which de-tails, rather than totals, are clearly given.

When the panchayatis a vehicle for airingdemands, then apartnership ispossible with theState government –but only if the Stategovernmentresponds positively



Diversions will then require cabinet sanc-tion and legislature approval, so they willhave to be politically negotiated.

This will be a massive operation. Financedepartments in all the States will have togear up to the change. Other governmentdepartments will have to adapt to the newreality – from the departments ofPanchayati Raj to the Directorate of Eco-nomics and Statistics. Information will haveto flow in different ways, and be used indifferent ways and at different speeds. Thecomplexities of this should not be under-estimated. It will need careful preparation.

A mechanism for resolving disputes and conflicts atthis level is essential. Not all matters can beresolved at the level of a district. Issues ofthe use of river water, sharing of costs onprojects that spill across districts, and so onwill need to be resolved on a continuingbasis. There seem to be two ways of deal-ing with these issues. One is to refer themto the State government. This has the ad-vantage of familiarity of the process. Thisis how things have so far been handled. Butit is also true that not all are happy with thisprocess. A second could be to constitutean Inter-District Council (on the lines ofthe Inter-State Council mandated by theConstitution) with the Governor asChairperson, the Chief Minister asConvenor, and one of the Zila panchayatpresident, by rotation, as Vice Chairperson.The Planning Department could be the sec-retariat of the IDC. This body should meetat least twice a year, and it could workthrough sub-committees.

No State has tried this model. Yet, MadhyaPradesh, for example, has a District Devel-opment Council, modelled on the NationalDevelopment Council. This experiencecould be taken into account in working onthis issue. But some such institutional arrange-ment is desirable as a complement topanchayati raj functioning.

Pending the adoption of this type of modelof local budgets, access to information has to beensured. In Karnataka, we found that thereare many hurdles to getting information. Itis not just a question of obtaining permis-sion from senior officers – that is not diffi-cult. It is the structure of government functioningin which facts are normally kept from the citizen –especially the poor and illiterate one. Thisattitude will not be easy to change, espe-cially in the lower bureaucracy. It is not justa question of passing of a Freedom of In-formation Act. The existing Official Se-crets Act will have to be repealed, and gov-ernment functionaries trained in a new set-ting. In the normal course, informationshould be shared, not suppressed. It will bea massive task.

There are some other steps that seem de-sirable. If indeed functions, funds, powersand functionaries are devolved, then it willbe necessary to put in place a certain disci-pline. As in UP, plans, budgets and accountsmust be presented at all levels of the decentralisedsystem – especially the elected bodies.

In UP, the system asks for six monthly pre-sentations of accounts to the gram sabha.This is a wonderful idea, but we have to seehow it works. What is the gram sabha? Is itone meeting of all the people living in thearea of a gram panchayat? Or is it ameeting in each hamlet that constitutes agram panchayat? Will they be held in a waythat will enable women to participate freely?There are many questions that still need ananswer.

At the district level, a beginning has to bemade by having a district budget presented to theZila panchayat. The ZP should have a bud-get session. The Chairman of the FinanceCommittee should present it formally. To-day, the ZP may have no powers to amendit. But it should be discussed, and perhapsmonitored by the ZP members in a system-atic way. Once presented, regular reports

Information shouldbe shared, notsuppressed

61

should be given. The existing system ofMMRs – monthly monitoring reports – istotally inadequate – and often inaccurate aswe found in our studies. A budget sessionwill force improvements in the system.

Eventually, the DPC should be in a posi-tion to decide priorities and the State gov-ernment must respond to these priorities.The experience of UP shows this can bedone. We are a long way in the country fromsuch a situation, which should be treated asa goal to work towards. Even the work withthe people’s plan in Kerala, generally con-sidered the most advanced in India, has notgone so far11 . This will require manychanges in the attitudes and priorities oflocal politicians and a massive dose of tech-nical training for the officials concerned.Many agencies will have to be mobilised forthis task. We have a long way to go.Karnataka has yet to constitute the DPC12!The leader has become the laggard.

The suggestion that panchayats be empowered tolevy a presumptive tax on agriculture needs to bepursued. The existing legislation permits this.But a suitable method has to be worked outand implemented. This is an idea which re-quires that local productivity be the basisfor calculating the tax burden. A study ofDharwad has shown that the idea haspromise, even if it requires political will toimplement. The tax will vary across districtsand crops, and provisions for dealing withcrop failures and disasters can be built in.

Finances then, are the lubricant to the system. Whatwe learn from the three States whose expe-riences we have looked at here is this: localgovernment has still to take root. It is a pro-cess to be nurtured slowly. Financial devo-lution is like water – it can facilitate, orstrangle, this process. How to use financialpowers to facilitate decentralised local gov-ernment is the basic question facing ourStates.

11 This Statement is based on personal discussions with many involved in this process.12 There is debate about who should chair the DPC in Karnataka. One view is that it should be the president of the ZP. Butthe developed municipalities feel they will not work under the rural ZP president. On such trivialities does the fate of thesystem hang in this State.

9. Accountability of LocalBodies

The Constitutional Amendments in the1990s to revive local self government pro-vide a major opportunity and avenue forempowerment of the people if we ensurethat social audit constitutes the core of ourconcerns and is supplemented by audit ofpapers – whether conducted by professionalauditors or Comptroller & Auditor Gen-eral – instead of the other way round. Sug-gesting a framework for such a system ofaccountability, in which both social auditand that of auditors play their legitimateroles and complement each other, is the ob-jective of this paper.

In India, the citizen’s right to informationexists; the problem is that direct access isdenied. A citizen can gain access onlythrough the institutions of the legislatureswhere questions can be raised, the presswhich reports on different issues, in Courtswhere evidence is summoned or throughreports of the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral – never directly. The distortionssuffered by information when thuschannelised as well as the frustrations ofthe common citizen in the process are wellknown. A good deal of the tyranny of clerksand officials based on their custody of theprecious papers can be whittled down bythe advent of information technology. Morecan be done if the social movement for theright to information gathers momentum.

9.1 Accountability and ConstitutionalStatus of Local Bodies

Local bodies are distinguished from otherinstrumentalities of the State in India, likecommercial public undertakings ornon-commercial autonomous bodies, by thefact that they have powers to levy and col-lect taxes. They perform regulatory and de-velopment functions. ConstitutionalAmendments in 1992/93 ushered in a

In India, the citizen’sright to informationexists; the problem isthat direct access isdenied


framework for reviving them by means ofconformity legislation by State Govern-ments. They are defined today as institutionsof local self government with a develop-ment orientation. The complexity of pon-dering structures for their accountability isdue to the ambivalence in their status occa-sioned by the agency function they are

required to perform with funds devolvingto them from the Central and State Gov-ernments.

In the late 1980s, initiating the thinkingwhich culminated in the 73rd and 74th Con-stitutional Amendments, Rajiv Gandhinoted the reasons for the impulse: “If ourdistrict administration is not sufficiently

Several experts and consultation reportspoint out that an index of decentralisation,such as decentralised expenditure ratio, couldbe used by finance and planning commis-sions in transfers of funds to the States. Thishas been attempted in the Report of theEleventh Finance commission. There is ofcourse, a need to further refine indexingmethodologies

It has been argued that local bodies shouldbe recognised as local governments, al-though till now this has not been so. Thisimplies that para-statal bodies, whose func-tions overlap with local government, shouldnot be there anymore. This would be diffi-cult in the existing context, but there wasno point in talking of administrativedecentralisation if this was not accepted. Forexample, the District Rural DevelopmentAgency (DRDA) and the District Urban De-velopment Agency (DUDA) must be doneaway with. The Government of India hasalready so decided, and some governments,like Karnataka, have done away with theDRDA. Bodies headed by locally electedofficials must also replace all bodies headedby collectors. This was a necessary condi-tion for decentralisation to work satisfacto-rily. Functions like the issuing of certificatesof birth, of death and so on, must be givento these bodies. They could charge a fee forsuch services and thus augment their re-sources. These bodies really depend on ratesrather than taxes, and the number of activi-ties where they could collect such rates forclear services should be given to them.Devolution of funds to these bodies mustbe compulsory and not discretionary. Popu-

BOX 8

Administrative and Financial Devolution: Strengthening Local Domains

lism in fund transfer and use must beavoided. State schemes must be given up infavour of local schemes. State finance com-missions may be asked to consider the devo-lution of all funds with the State, not justown revenues.

It is necessary to document good and bestpractices and disseminate information aboutthem. Care should be taken that best prac-tices should not be replicated mechanicallyas local adaptations are essential. There isneed for greater debate and discussion, es-pecially at lower levels. As a first step, work-shops could be held at the State and districtlevel.

Planning, especially micro-planning, has tobe emphasised and encouraged. There ismuch to learn from the Kerala experiencein this regard. But successes that are alsoelsewhere should be documented, so thatlessons could be drawn for policy making.

At each level, the finance sub-committeemust be concerned with budgets. It is es-sential that these bodies adopt accrual basedaccounting systems, which at present are notin place. Annual accounts—and one set ofaccounts for all purposes, must be preparedand placed before bodies like the gramsabhas and its equivalent (e.g. the ward com-mittee). Priorities of micro planning mustcome from the ward committee/gramsabha. They must be more than just benefi-ciary selection bodies and the basic principleof audit, of hearing the tax/rate payer mustbe brought in and extended at the local level.This may not be necessary in commercialaudit, but it is essential in the audit of localbodies. The elected official concerned with

finance must present a budget each year tothe general body—at gram panchayat, blockparishad, zila parishad and municipality lev-els. This will help proper sharing of infor-mation and generate informed debate. Evenif there is no need for “approval” of thesebudgets as in higher level bodies, such pre-sentations must be made routine. Over time,this process must lead to a shift from schemebased funding from higher levels to themebased untied funds.

To facilitate this, data bases and managementinformation systems on budgets and devel-opment indicators must be created andmaintained at all local levels. The data canbe passed on to higher levels for analysis anduse, but analysis and use for local level bud-get and planning must be brought in. Datafrom these sources should be made avail-able to all at nominal cost. Donors can sup-port the setting up of these databases, whichwill require considerable effort in the begin-ning. NGOs could play a useful role in thisrespect and State governments should beencouraged to support this activity.

It was therefore recommended to:

ll Abolish the functions of the DRDAs andgive their money to the PRIs.

ll Revise the top down approach of plan-ning so that it is from below.

ll To shift from tied to untied funds.

ll To encourage a system of maintaining adatabase at all these levels.

ll To shift to an approval based on account-ing system.

ll To revitalise the gram sabhas and a needto set up ward committees.

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responsive, it is because it is not sufficientlyrepresentative”. The rationale for theAmendments, therefore, was to generategreater accountability of government. Lo-cating representative institutions of govern-ment closer to the people was considerednecessary for empowering them. TheAmendments elaborated the framework forrelations between State Governments andinstitutions of local self-government, a taskleft incomplete when the Constitution wasadopted in 1950. Nevertheless, in the per-ception of State capitals, the agency func-tion of local bodies for implementing de-velopment schemes still overshadows theresponsibility for self-government.

This perception of State Governments isunderstandable but not acceptable in thecontext of the current discourse on goodgovernance. The perception emerged as aresult of the chequered career of panchayatssince 1860. During 1860 – 1950 which vil-lage panchayats were transformed, frombeing judicial bodies dispensing customarylaw, to self-financing local bodies; and fur-ther, since independence, to simply serv-ing as agencies of State Governments fordevelopment. The Constitutional Amend-ments in 1992/93 reversed this trend andsought to empower people by bringing in-stitutions of government closer to them.

9.2 Transfer of Financial Powers andDesirable Structures ofAccountability

A dialogue between the Union and Stateson issues related to devolution of powersto local bodies and desirable structures ofaccountability is essential because the factthat empowerment is the core of develop-ment is not sufficiently appreciated by them.Their apprehensions about an apparenttrade-off between efficiency of service de-livery and empowerment of the people,needs to be allayed. However, without an

appreciation of the nature of the corpo-rate character of local bodies, their finan-cial viability and the old existing relationsof the State Governments and PanchayatiRaj institutions, such a dialogue may provedifficult.

Accountability is a much larger issue thanthe maintenance of accounts or audit. Tobegin with, it must be borne in mind thatthe Constitutional Amendments, in spite oftheir sweep, nevertheless remain a part ofthe Directive Principles. It is doubtful if theyare justiciable in the same way as mattersrelating to fundamental rights. They onlyprovide a framework for conformity legis-lation by States. Actual translation of pro-visions in conformity State Acts into devo-lution of powers for local bodies to carryout the functions is likely to progress at adifferent pace in different States. The pro-cess of devolution of powers to tax, plan,manage finances and implementprogrammes – initiated by the Centre, en-tailing a transfer of powers from the Statesto local levels – is being mediated throughpolitical structures of parties/governmentand public administrators. The propensityto retain controls by providing for caveatsat every step, in the name of accountability,could create a labyrinth of rules which ac-tually diffuses all responsibility. On the otherhand, populist decentralisation withoutthinking through systems of accountabilitycould prove financially disastrous.

The paradox, of systems of trust makingfor greater accountability and systems ofdistrust with obligatory checks and balancesending up in a saga of collusive corruption,is well known. There are many Sarpanchesof the informal single-village (not the offi-cial gram panchayat) who enjoy the trust ofa village and are public spirited. In severalvillages the funds collected within a villageare kept with a resident and popular schoolteacher or a retired soldier who serves as

Accountability is amuch larger issuethan themaintenance ofaccounts or audit



the treasurer, invests it prudently with a lo-cal bania , draws and disburses money when-ever required, and all is well for decades.On the other hand we have the official sys-tems, private or public, where all too oftencollusive action defeats all conceivable de-signs of checks and balances.

Without rewards and punishment, account-ability collapses into a dead heap of proce-dures on the one hand or pure sophistryon the other. For instance, surety of pun-ishment whenever a fraud is detected isimportant for sustaining any system of ac-countability. Instead of severe punishmentbeing meted out, there has been a growingtendency, perhaps an imperative of large-scale organisations in a ‘soft State’ context,to treat the errant person with kid glovesand prescribe more rules/regulations toforeclose the possibility of its recurrencein future. It is important to bear the notionof trust and eschew half-hearted delegationof powers while contemplating structuresof accountability of local bodies.

Existing Local Structures of Accountability

In theory, local bodies should be account-able to their electorate or ratepayers. How-ever, the twin infirmities, of domination bylocal elites to the extent that a panchayatis often identified with the office of aSarpanch and that panchayats are dependenton higher tiers of government for finances,renders the design of structures for theiraccountability rather complex and problem-atic. It creates an anomalous situation whereelected bodies become accountable not toa higher tier of government but to bureau-crats who oversee their functioning. In thepast, these infirmities were accepted as‘given’ and we chose to accommodate thedistorted structures of accountability thatfollowed. The perspective needs to change.The Amendments provide a framework toovercome these infirmities. Several

scholars and civil servants have argued thatharnessing the services of NGOs to gingerup the implementation of socialprogrammes can help to wear down thestranglehold of local elites on local bodies.Similarly, there is scope for augmenting thefinances of panchayats with greater assign-ment of taxes by State Governments tothem. The system of accountability to thepeople can find its feet only within such aperspective.

Rationalising Bureaucracy: Integrationof DRDAs with Zila Parishads

The merger of District Rural DevelopmentAgencies (DRDAs) and similar districtagencies (which act as conduits for financesfrom the Centre and States to the districts)with the panchayats is important for anuncluttered system of social, administrativeand financial accountability of local bodiesto emerge. Since local bodies perform regu-latory functions and are to undertake theresponsibility for implementing social sec-tor programmes – spanning education,health, employment and environment –delivery of services is a critical concern. Ifsystems for financial accountability poseproblems for the flexibility of local bodies,which could be their basic strength, thensurely a change in financial systems is nec-essary.

Local Audit Systems

The format of accounts of local bodieswere prescribed by State Governments andaudit was conducted by Examiner/Direc-tor of Local Fund Accounts Department(LADs) acting under provisions of old, ex-isting State Acts for local fund audit. Con-formity legislations by States show that, byand large, the system would continue to berelied on. The only exception to the LADsystem of audit today is in Karnataka wherethe Panchayati Raj Act of 1993 provides forexternal audit certification and transactions

Without rewardsand punishment,accountabilitycollapses into adead heap ofprocedures on theone hand or puresophistry onthe other

65

audit of Zila Parishads and TalukPanchayats by Comptroller and AuditorGeneral of India. Gram Panchayats are tobe audited by Controller of Accounts ofthe State Government.

For several reasons, the extant LAD frame-work in all other States is not adequate inthe changed scenario since 1993. The soleconcern for regularity in expenditure to theexclusion of an eye for service delivery as-pects is not suitable in the present context.Reporting audit results only to bureaucratsrather than the legislatures is unacceptable.The opaque culture of internal audit, andthe ineffectuality of the system of disallow-ances and surcharges under the LAD sys-tem, render the system inadequate to dealwith securing accountability for very largesums of money. Besides, the scope of thefunctioning of local bodies has changed.Apart from the funds to be granted on rec-ommendations of the Eleventh (Central)Finance Commission for non-plan require-ments, approximately 40 per cent of totalPlan funds of the Centre and States put to-gether (ie. about Rs 30,000 crores) are ex-pected to be spent annually by local bodiesfor ‘district schemes’.

Challenges of Fiscal Devolution

In view of the large quantum of funds tobe spent by local bodies, especially in thelight of recommendations of the EleventhFinance Commission, LADs and CAG arelikely to gear up their respective internal andexternal audits. CAG’s reports to the legis-latures on performance of social sectorschemes might lead to some refinementsin policy or design of schemes, but the ir-regularities in transactions pointed out byhim are rarely acted on despite recommen-dations of Public Accounts Committees(PACs). Therefore, the internal (StateLADs) and CAG’s audits of the transactionsof local bodies will not result in providing

any assurance by way of annual publishedperformance and financial Statementscertified to say that apart from the pointsnoted by auditors, all is well with the fi-nances of the local bodies. For such an as-surance to taxpayers/ratepayers at any levelof the people/their elected representatives/or of government, the State Acts must stipu-late a system of annual certification of ac-counts and publishing performance reportsof local bodies.

A Professional Cadre

Accounts of local bodies at sub-district lev-els could be audited by professional accoun-tants and a Court of Audit procedure couldbe established by CAG at the district level,based on suitable amendments to Comp-troller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Pow-ers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971,to hear comments and complaints of tax/ratepayers before certifying Zila Parishadand Municipal Council accounts. TheCourts of Audit must follow summary pro-cedures on the lines followed in France atthe national level.

Requisite Amendments

Since not much thought was given by StateGovernments while enacting conformitylegislations to provisions for accounts andaudit of local bodies, the decision of theStates to continue with the old LADsystems bears review by them. Amendmentto the Central Act governing CAG’s pow-ers and advocacy for introducing appropri-ate provisions for accounts, audit and fol-low up action on audit observations in con-formity State Acts, needs to be undertakenby Government of India.

Apart from the issue related to whetherpolitical structures or developments willsupport panchayats or not, the question asto their remaining largely developmentagencies implementing Union/State spon-

In view of the largequantum of fundsto be spent by localbodies, especiallyin the light ofrecommendations ofthe Eleventh FinanceCommission, LocalAccountsDepartments and theComptroller & AuditorGeneral are likelyto gear up theirrespective internaland external audits



sored programmes with tied funds or as-suming the mantle of local-self governmentwill depend on their ability to gather finan-cial strength.

It is noteworthy that accomplished admin-istrators have argued for the abolition ofexisting bodies like DRDA, DDA, DDCsand so on. Powers of revision of individualdecisions and for issue of ‘stay” should notbe retained by government or other levels.Monitoring should be only through published An-nual Performance Reports and through audit. In-dividual decisions should not be subject toreview or revision by the bureaucracy or bythe Ministers at the State level.

The fact that most of the funds for localbodies devolve to the district level from theUnion/State levels distorts the powers forself-government. The ambivalent status oflocal bodies is highlighted by the 1999Guidelines for DRDAs of the Ministry ofRural Development. It has been clarifiedin the Guidelines that the role of DRDAsis not to implement programmes but to‘oversee’ implementation by way of moni-toring and technical support. Chairpersonof the Zila Parishad would be ex-officioChairperson of the Governing Body of theDRDA and would preside over meetings ofthe Governing Body of DRDA to decidepolicies, approve the annual plans andschemes and monitor/review implementa-tion. However, the executive and financialpowers should vest in the District Collec-tor/DM/Deputy Commissioner who maybe designated as the Chief Executive Of-ficer or Executive Director. They wouldsanction and execute projects.

Even States which had boasted of stabilisedPanchayati Raj in the past, such asMaharashtra, Gujarat and West Bengal, hadchosen to keep separate identities forDRDAs though the respective PR legisla-tions had enabled PRIs to handle the mat-

ters fully. The logic given to justify this situ-ation was not sound, as noted by Karnataka,which abolished the DRDAs and trans-ferred the functions along with staff andfunds to the respective Zila Parishads.Similarly, the District Industries Centresdealing with small scale industries in urbanareas need to be merged with PRIs.

The experience with substitutes for localbodies, like district level agencies for devel-opment, which in theory were not suscep-tible to political influences, has been farfrom satisfactory. Commentators are by andlarge in agreement that they are influencedby political structures, their record of de-livery of services is very poor and the wasteof national resources in implementation bythem is enormous. Above all, they are sin-gularly deficient from the point of view ofaccountability. This is because, as agents ofState Governments, they are neither respon-sive to the voices in the district/taluka/vil-lages nor to the demands at the highestlevel of Public Accounts Committee ofParliament

Performance Audit Reviews

Results of performance audit reviews onrural development programmes imple-mented by such district agencies of StateGovernments have been reported over thepast two decades to both Parliament andState Legislatures. Deliberations of PublicAccounts Committees have led to many use-ful recommendations for refinements inpolicies and guidelines for programmes.Union Government has sincerely acted onsuch recommendations to effect improve-ments in them. However, innumerable ir-regularities pointed out in such reviews havenot been acted on with the same serious-ness. Despite protestations of Departmentsof Union Government to monitoring ofprogrammes, the fact is that they havelittle control over departments of State

Individual decisionsshould not be subjectto review or revisionby the bureaucracyor by the Ministers atthe State level

67

Governments. The only instrument in theirhands is the power not to release funds andthis is also compromised by the need toexhaust budgeted amounts by the end ofthe financial year. References of Union de-partments on audit observations related toirregularities go unheeded by State depart-ments. Thus, such district agencies for de-velopment elude accountability both to thepeople in a district as well as to the StateGovernment.

9.3 Municipal Finance Reforms

The legislations by States passed in 1994 inconformity with the Constitutional Amend-ments dealt with the mandated institutionalstructure of the municipalities, leaving as-sociated management aspects unchanged.

Apart from the electoral composition of themunicipal councils, the 74th Amendmentprovides for additional membership fromamong:

l Sitting members of the State legislatureand Parliament whose constituenciescover the municipal area.

l Chairpersons of the ward committees ofmunicipal corporations with a populationof 3 lakh and more.

l Nominated experts without voting rights.The creation of the wards committees atthe ward and zonal levels in the largercities is a novel feature. It provides op-portunities for decentralisation of mu-nicipal services and larger involvementof the citizens in municipal affairs.

The 18 functional areas for possible devo-lution to the municipalities do not alwayscorrespond to the Central, State and theirConcurrent subjects listed under the 7th

Schedule, eg.

l Slum improvement

l Cultural promotion

l Urban poverty alleviation and

l Environmental protection

There are also significant omissions in the12th Schedule – eg. basic health care and pri-mary/secondary education – although theseresponsibilities are suggested for delegationto the rural panchayats under the parallel11th Schedule. It is up to the State Govern-ments to delegate functions for the munici-palities beyond those indicated under the12th Schedule. Moreover, even when a func-tion or sub-function is delegated to a classof municipality , the State Government doesnot vacate its operative jurisdiction from thatarea with the result that all municipal func-tions in effect become concurrent. There isno municipal tax list along with the indica-tive functional list; this has been left to theState Finance Commission to recommend.

The Municipal fiscal structure ischaracterised by three distinct patterns as alegacy from the three presidencies in theBritish period:

l Predominance of octroi – a municipalimport duty – and a subsidiary propertytax, with nominal State transfers (Bombaypattern covering western and north west-ern States).

l Property tax as the major tax, supple-mented by entertainment and show taxes,non-tax revenues and limited Statetransfers (Madras pattern covering TamilNadu and Kerala).

l Property tax as the main municipal taxand major dependence on State transfers(Bengal pattern, covering the remainingStates).

Due to the abolition of octroi in AndhraPradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, UttarPradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu andKashmir, the State composition of fiscalstructures have undergone change in recent


Even when afunction orsub-function isdelegated to aclass of municipality,the StateGovernment doesnot vacate itsoperative jurisdictionfrom that area withthe result that allmunicipal functionsin effect becomeconcurrent


years. Exploitation of municipal propertytaxes is problematic due to frozen valuationbase on account of rent control; this issought to be neutralised by a system of pre-sumptive tax with the municipal role lim-ited only to tax collection. Non-tax revenuesmay not increase due to the perspective ofprivatisation of municipal services. The fu-ture of municipal finances would be mainlyinfluenced by :

l Compensation arrangements for octroiabolition

l Pace of reforms in rent control

l Rationalisation of State transfers

The District and Metropolitan PlanningCommittees, provided for by the Constitu-tional Amendment are expected to plan formatters of common interest betweenpanchayats and the municipalities, especiallyplanning of physical and natural resources,infrastructure development and environ-ment conservation. The State Governmentsare to identify the functions for these plan-ning purposes. If these planning functionsare more than the municipal revenue func-tions, then there would be need for majorassistance by State and Central Government.The existing separation between urban de-velopment and municipal maintenance tasksmay have to be re-considered.

While the reliance on State and Union Gov-ernment for assistance is likely to increase,the composition of district and metropoli-tan planning committees is heavily weightedin favour of elected members of panchayatsand municipalities. The State and CentralGovernment representatives would find itdifficult to contain over ambitious planning.The States attempted to create separate dis-trict urban development authorities(DUDA) but in the new legislative scenariothese may lose their significance.

It is difficult to gauge at present to whatextent the capital required for municipaldevelopment would be sourced from themarket rather than from directed credit ofplan assistance. Credit-worthiness may bea problem, especially for municipal coun-cils and nagar panchayats. Therefore, capi-tal grants from plan assistance is likely tobe a growing proportion of total receiptsof municipalities.

It appears that the emergence of a munici-pal political executive can be expected as aclear implication of the ConstitutionalAmendments and conformity legislationsby States. The nature of State Government–Municipal relations are changing. Apartfrom administrative breakdown, like ‘con-stitutional breakdown’ in the context ofCentre-State relations, dissolutions or su-persessions would be difficult and are likelyto be subjected to judicial scrutiny.

State control of municipal finance is exer-cised through the State examiner of localfund accounts except in Bihar and WestBengal where this operates under the CAG’sadministrative control. Municipal audit isconducted at present from the point of viewof ascertaining authorisation and regularityrather than that of propriety. The generalimpression about the functioning of the ex-aminers of local fund accounts is that theyare not effectively checking accounts fromthe point of view of detecting frauds in re-ceipts, misappropriations and errors of clas-sification. Performance audit is importantin the context of urban development. Theproportion of population in urban areas hasincreased significantly over the past decades;though metropolitan growth has sloweddown, municipal council areas are still bur-geoning. With greater involvement of Cen-tral finances in poverty alleviation schemes(eg. employment generation/slum improve-ment) in urban areas, it is necessary that

The District andMetropolitanPlanningCommittees,provided for by theConstitutionalAmendment areexpected to plan formatters of commoninterest betweenpanchayats and themunicipalities

69

certification of accounts, transactions aswell as performance audit of municipalcouncils by CAG be introduced.

Constituency accountability requires greaterinvolvement of the citizens in the activitiesof the municipalities. Information sharingto be stipulated by legislation, citizen’s ac-cess to municipal services by specifying theirentitlements and involvement in decisionmaking by providing opportunities to citi-zens are ways of fostering such account-ability. The creation of ward committees inthe larger municipalities should help in thisdirection. Such provisions for municipal coun-cil areas and nagar panchayats may also betried to uphold the neighbourhood principle.

9.4 Accountability, Accounts andAudit

Accountability is a much larger issue thanmerely a matter of accounts and audit re-ports. Unless these reports are acted on byappropriate fora to judge the delivery ofservices or bring errant officials to book andthe community or community/country ben-efits from the audit exercise, accountabilityis not secured. The ability of householdsof a village or a few villages to decide onthe merits of their elected representativesand to bring them to book in case of mal-feasance or inability to deliver appears atfirst sight to be simpler than the elaborateprocesses of accountability at the district,State or national levels. However, this de-pends, first of all, on structures of domi-nation which might stifle the voices of theunderprivileged sections in a village. For allpractical purposes, the panchayat is identi-fied with the office of the Pradhan/Mukhia/Sarpanch/Adhyaksha. Second, it depends onwhether the format of records and accountsto be maintained are easy to understand orso complex that unraveling them becomes amatter of special education.

The requirements are simple when a localbody depends only on its own resources.Where it depends on State funds or cen-trally sponsored schemes, the donorsnaturally impose own requirements of ac-counting which can make the accounts for-mats voluminous, if not complex. It is re-ported by several States that the accountingformats are cumbersome and the prescribednumber of registers and other books of ac-counts are so many that accountants find itdifficult to cope with the work. Moreover,there is paucity of staff; often, one accoun-tant works for a number of grampanchayats.

The point of departure for a discussion onaccounting and audit issues must be a rec-ognition of the fact that the framework ofaudit concerns and methodology have un-dergone a sea-change in the last fifty years.In the pre-1950 days, audit of local authori-ties was globally distinguished from auditof commercial concerns. Audit of local au-thorities was primarily concerned with de-tection of fraud, misappropriation andmisclassification. The need for gauging per-formance in providing regulatory or devel-opment services was soon felt. Techniquesto evaluate performance were developed.The framework of concerns shifted againand auditors started stressing certificationof annual financial Statements to providean assurance to the citizens/tax-payers/ratepayers that systems of control were inplace and the figures in financial Statementspresented the ‘true and fair’ view. In otherwords, the difference between audit of com-mercial concerns and audit of local authori-ties is no longer viewed as very important.

The published financial Statements remainthe single most important vehicle by whichlocal authorities/bodies can demonstrateaccountability for the stewardship of pub-lic money , ie. how the various resourcesavailable to the authority /body have been

Constituencyaccountabilityrequires greaterinvolvement of thecitizens in theactivities of themunicipalities



applied and whether it complied with itsstatutory obligations, and for performancein the provision of services ie. how the re-sources have been actually used.

Local Funds and Public Knowledge

It was generally agreed that as wide public-ity as practicable should be given to the ac-counts of local bodies and that they shouldbe published in such form as to be intelli-gible to ratepayers of average ability butwithout special knowledge of accountancy.There should be an obligation on local bod-ies to devise a means of providing the elec-torate with financial information about ser-vices in reasonably simple and straightfor-ward terms. Local bodies should be requiredto maintain a variety of separate funds andaccounts for different functions and activi-ties. In many cases all that is entailed is theneed to maintain a separate record of in-come and expenditure for control purposes.

The financial accounting and reporting oflocal authorities should be governed by aframework comprising statutes/regula-tions/orders, forms of accounts to be pre-scribed by the State and any other profes-sional guidance body. The most importantrequirements in this context should be thosethat relate to the preparation, audit and pub-lication of Statements of accounts. The pro-posed Regulations/orders should cover fourmain areas: the keeping of accounts; inter-nal and external audit matters; the public’sright to inspect the accounts and questionthe auditor; and the publication of State-ments of accounts, in addition to the prepa-ration of the Statement of accounts them-selves.

It is increasingly being realised in India thatapart from an annual performance reportincluding a financial Statement, there shouldbe no demands on panchayats to send in-numerable returns and reports even wherea large quantum of funds for social sector

programmes devolve on them from theUnion/States. Audit certification for suchan annual report should meet the require-ments.

The system of accounts prescribed in 1950sin all the States for Panchayati Raj institu-tions was the government system of not-ing receipts and payments and maintainingprimary books of accounts. Most States hadseparate Acts governing the audit of localfunds which provided for an ‘independent’departmental auditor, usually designated asDirector, Local Fund Audit. The audit oflocal bodies was not vested with CAG un-der the CAG’s (DPC) Act, 1971. Except forExaminers of Local Funds working underCAG’s administration in West Bengal andBihar on an entrustment basis, the audit ofPanchayati Raj institutions was not vestedin CAG.

The Constitutional Amendments in 1992/93 left the provisions regarding accountsand audit of panchayats and municipal au-thorities to be decided by State Legislatures.The State legislations show that by and largethe old framework of concerns of the 1950shas simply been re-iterated. The concept ofthe annual performance report with its fi-nancial Statements has not been introduced.Karnataka is the only State which has pro-vided in the State Act for audit certificationof Zila Panchayats and Taluk Panchayats byCAG. In fact, very little discussion on thissubject has occurred in other States thoughthe question of putting in place a systemof accounts and audit in keeping with bestpractices across the world is an importantone.

Moreover, audit has been vested with de-partmental auditors of State Governments.The comparative advantages/disadvantagesof departmental versus professional audi-tors have long been recognised and may besummarised as shown alongside.

There should be anobligation on localbodies to devise ameans of providingthe electorate withfinancial informationabout services inreasonably simpleand straightforwardterms

71

A qualified cadre of accountants and audi-tors for the express purposes of account-ing and audit certification of panchayatsamitis and gram panchayats needs to becreated for deployment by professionalfirms of chartered accountants.

Zila Parishad Audit

We now turn to the audit of Zila Parishads.Social sector programmes are critical notonly for local but also macroeconomic growth.Adequacy of finances for rural/urban de-velopment would require large doses offunds to continue to devolve from theUnion and States to the district and sub-district levels. CAG has a mandatory re-sponsibility to watch expenditure out ofUnion or State funds.

At present, funds for social sectorprogrammes from the Union and Statesflow to registered societies at the district lev-els, be they DRDAs/Saksharata Samitis/Fisheries Development Agencies/ Women’sDevelopment Agencies etc. The arrange-ments for their audit and accountability areunsatisfactory both from the point of viewof local residents as well as Union and StateGovernments. While their accounts are cer-tified by chartered accountants, transactionsaudit is conducted by CAG. This disjunc-ture is not conducive to proper audit, com-prehensive reporting and accountability.The possible merger of these districtagencies with Zila Parishads to implementwhat the Planning Commission termed ‘dis-trict schemes’ involving approximately40 percent of total Plan funds would re-quire putting in place proper arrangementsfor CAG’s audit of expenditure on spon-sored programmes implemented by localbodies.

Certification and transactions audit of theaccounts of Zila Parishads and MunicipalCouncils by CAG is essential to ensure thatsocial sector expenditure by Union and State

Governments are not reduced to beingmerely political slush funds13 . We cannotlook at the modalities of audit only fromthe point of view of devolution of fundsto panchayats for sponsored schemes ofUnion/States because they are envisagednot just as development agencies but as thethird tier of government as well. Localbodies need to be helped to secureaccountal of their revenues and develop aculture of accountability to the people theyserve in their areas. Since accounts of ex-penditure and activities undertaken bypanchayats below the district level shouldfeed into district level accounts (however,in Madhya Pradesh this is not likely to beso – gram panchayats are shortly being di-rectly funded by State Government), theirveracity is extremely important. It is not

Social sectorprogrammes arecritical not only forlocal but alsomacroeconomicgrowth

13 Vijay Joshi and IMD Little, India’s Economic Reforms, OUP, 1994

1. Professional auditor does not havethe judicial/executive powers ofthe departmental auditor which issometimes necessary to make anaudit effective

2. Panchayats may not be able toafford the fees

3. Does not have complete indepen-dence

4. Seldom has advantage of auditingaccounts of more than one or twolocal authorities and cannot com-pare the systems and operationsprevalent in the field

5. Not so well versed in municipal orpanchayat financial transactions

Against professional auditors For professional auditors

Has comprehensive experience of com-mercial practice in accountancy and hisknowledge in this respect can help thelocal authority to adapt their accountancymethods to modern commercial usage

Local bodies do not feel they are undercontrol of a government department

A professional auditor can usually arrangeto commence his audit during the periodof the year for which the accounts arebeing prepared and the audit can then beclosed within a short period after the con-clusion of the financial year. Useful fordetection of errors/ frauds and timelyconclusion of audit.


sufficient for panchayat samiti/grampanchayat accounts or utilisation by themof funds granted by Zila Parishads/Munici-pal Councils to be certified by State Gov-ernment appointed auditors (departmentalor professional). Complaints or commentsof local taxes/ratepayers at Gram Sabhalevel, where accounts of gram panchayatsare to be authenticated must be heard byCAG before certifying accounts of the ZilaParishad/ Municipal Council.

While CAG is able to hear the complaintsof citizens voiced through legislatures orthe press and take these into account in thecourse of audit of State and Union Gov-ernments, the voices of persons below thedistrict level on matters of developmentexpenditure do not get well reported. Theintention of the 73rd Amendment in layingdown functions of Gram Sabhas and pro-visions of State legislations which requireSarpanches/Mukhias/Adhyakshas/Pradhans to place the accounts of grampanchayats before the Gram Sabhas forauthentication would be diluted if it is notrecognised that the extent of their dissatis-faction with the accounts must be indepen-dently heard by CAG.

An important factor for the success of thePanchayati Raj system is the need for trans-parency in the functioning of these bodies.Panchayats being closer to the people, theirright to information and accessibility to thePanchayats must be ensured. This issue wasdiscussed in a meeting of PR Secretariesof States and it transpired that except in afew States such as Himachal Pradesh,Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, ordersemphasising transparency have either notbeen issued, or these are incomplete. It wasdecided in the meeting that each State mayconsider passing orders highlighting threedifferent aspects of transparency.

l First, the Panchayati Raj Institutions(PRIs), especially Gram Panchayats,should display all vital information per-taining to development projects, espe-cially receipt of funds and how they arebeing spent, in the Panchayat Offices oron a prominent board outside the school,for the information of the public.

l Second, all relevant records should beopen to inspection.

l Third, members of public should also beable to obtain photocopies of documentspertaining to development projects asalso matters of general public interest bypaying a nominal charge. In particular,all bills, muster rolls, vouchers, estimatesand measurement books, the criteria/procedure for selection of beneficiaries,as well as list of beneficiaries should notonly be available for inspection, but pho-tocopies of these relevant documentsshould be given on demand from a con-venient place, such as Block or TehsilOffice.

The Constitution (73rd Amendment) makesa provision for a Gram Sabha in each vil-lage, to exercise such powers and performsuch functions as the legislature of a Statemay, by law, provide. This is a provision ofgreat import in so far as the Gram Sabhaconstitutes the entire electorate to whomall elected representatives in the local bod-ies, State legislature as well as Parliament areaccountable. Proper functioning of theGram Sabha could ensure a vibrant democ-racy with a great degree of transparency andaccountability. However, several States havegiven short shrift to the institution of GramSabha and vested them with only ritualisticpowers of consideration of annual ac-counts, administration reports, audit notes,etc. of the Gram Panchayat. Even the sug-gestions and recommendations made by the

Proper functioning ofthe Gram Sabhacould ensure avibrant democracywith a great degreeof transparency andaccountability

73

Gram Sabha could be ignored by the GramPanchayat. For this to be averted, it is nec-essary to mobilise public awareness anddemand that accounts be made available tothe citizenry. The national people’s Cam-paign for the right to Information (NCPRI)has been an important experiment in thisreport, building up from local mobilisationsfor public accountability in Rajasthan(see Box 9 on Jan Sunvai).

Keeping the twin requirements of watchover funds for schemes sponsored byUnion/States as well as receipts and expen-diture of panchayats as institutions of selfgovernment in their own right, we suggestan amalgam of audit arrangements. StateLegislatures may provide under thePanchayati Raj Acts for internal audit byLADs concerned only with checks againstfraud, misappropriation and misclassi-fication. Certification of accounts of grampanchayats/panchayat samitis/nagarpanchayats should be a task performed byprofessional auditors. Certification of ac-counts of Zila Parishads should be vestedin CAG.

Courts of Audit should be set up in eachdistrict by CAG to check whether accountsof sub-district levels are properly feedinginto Zila Parishad/Municipal Council ac-counts, hear complaints of Gram Sabhasagainst certified accounts of GramPanchayats or to note comments by pro-fessional auditors, and then certify the dis-trict bodies accounts. They may order re-coveries/disallow any items from being re-imbursed by State Governments/ CentralGovernment. They may exercise powers ofattaching the property of any person foundguilty of fraud or misappropriation. Sum-mary procedures should be devised for this.Such powers must be laid down in amend-ments to the CAG’s (DPC) Act,1971 andnot the in the conformity State Acts.

As noted earlier, it is necessary to distin-guish issues related to irregularities frompropriety or performance issues. Theformer need to be treated swiftly and insummary fashion at the district level itself.The latter can be reported to ZilaPanchayats/Municipal Councils or State andUnion legislatures for discussion on the


BOX 9

Public Hearings and Accountability on Demand: Jan Sunvai

The experience gained from the experi-ment on Jan Sunvais (Public Hearings)in Rajasthan is instructive in this con-text. In 1987, some social activistsstarted working with rural workers en-gaged in drought relief works at a vil-lage named Devdungri, near Beawar inUdaipur District. They registered them-selves as a society called Mazdoor KisanShakti Sangathan in 1990 to fight cor-ruption related to departmentally imple-mented public works programmes. Theysupported struggles of rural workers onissues of non-payment of full minimumwages. Soon they went on to raise simi-lar issues about fabricated muster rollsin works implemented by grampanchayats under Jawahar RozgarYojana, a centrally sponsored scheme.In 1994 their work entered the phaseof a movement for Jan Sunvais in vil-lages to fight corruption in grampanchayats and educate people to de-mand accounts as well as accountabil-ity. The movement, though local, hadState-wide repercussions.The mode of public hearings initiatedby MKSS commences with the gather-ing of people in a village by beat ofdrums and then a demand for all docu-ments related to works undertaken withpublic funds. Muster rolls and bills/vouchers related to materials and trans-port are read out to the people gath-ered. These are questioned by the vil-lage residents and often found to be fic-titious/incomplete. The Sarpanches inseveral villages have paid up the recov-eries demanded by the people and JanSunvais have been highly effective inmobilising villages on the issues of

transparency and accountability. In somevillages Sarpanches were not willing tobe chastened. Criminal cases had to besought to be registered by MKSS andthese involved them in harangues withthe police, Collector and so on.It is not as if people were unaware inthe past that muster rolls are fudged andmaterials misappropriated; but thesewere general doubts and fears and in theabsence of access to hard facts they wereunable to take any preventive or reme-dial action. The Jan Sunvais changed this.Public officials like Sarpanches orBDOs/DRDA officials were always in-vited to defend themselves. While thefair practices required for meaningful JanSunvais have been established throughthe experience gained by the experimentin social audit, the stand taken by manyofficials appearing as defendents is thatthey are accountable not to the mostlyilliterate gathering of village folk but totheir superiors in a hierarchy of com-mand or to government auditors. Thisis significant because it highlights the factthat clarity about the notions and mecha-nisms of accountability pose a majorproblem at an operational level.Public officials, including Sarpanches, arenaturally accountable to the people theyserve, to the hierarchy of officials con-trolling them as well as to elected bod-ies of people’s representatives within aframework of law/rules/regulations. In-stitutional arrangements that provide foraccountability in the context ofpanchayati raj, therefore, need to be de-fined and spelt out with a judicious eyeto meet these requirements.


10. Women in Power (Securitythrough Leadership)

Where Do We Go From Here ?

The available evidence suggests that it ishard to disaggregate the impact of womenrepresentatives on the functioning ofpanchayats, overlaid as it is with a wide rangeof limiting factors : from the social realityof caste and class inequalities, on the onehand, to the institutional imperfections ofthe panchayat structure, on the other. None-theless, it is clear that both participation andexclusion, as detailed in the foregoing pages,have had a significant impact, in terms ofboth the subjective dimension (viz., the wayin which women see themselves in their newroles), as well as the objective dimension(viz., the actual developmental impact).

10.1 The DevelopmentalConsequences of Women’sRepresentation

The new panchayats are designed primarilyfor the planning of programmes of eco-nomic and social justice, and the implemen-tation of schemes that are entrusted tothem. They also contained provisions forthe representation of women, but the seedsof their ‘failure’ or inadequacies can hardlybe blamed on the inefficacy of women rep-resentatives.

They appear rather to be contained in thefact that the implementational aspect of thefounding charter has taken primacy over theplanning aspect. As local-level planning re-mains largely neglected, panchayats havetended to function chiefly as delivery sys-tems, intended to more effectivelyimplement existing, often centrally devised,development programmes. The assumptionunderlying this coheres with the orthodoxythat the only flaw of rural development

planning in India has been implementationfailure. (Chakravarty, 1987)

It is difficult to wash away the imprint ofdecades of centralised planning and bureau-cratic implementation of these plans. But itis surely even more difficult to accomplishthis through elected institutions which areinadequately endowed with the necessaryauthority, which subsist in the shadow ofexisting parallel structures of developmentadministration, and many of whose mem-bers belong to socially disadvantagedgroups, with neither the expertise nor thetraining to be able to assert themselves.

A reconsideration of the technocratic andcentralised model of development has not,of course, been a serious governmental pri-ority, but the new direction being shownby women-dominated panchayats shouldcertainly draw attention to the many inad-equacies of the traditional approach to plan-ning for development. Primary educationand health receive much more attention atthe hands of women. So also do the con-servation, as well as sustainable use, of com-mon property resources like forests andponds.

Few studies of the post-1992 period haveattempted to objectively evaluate the devel-opmental impact of women in panchayats.More often than not, they poll the womenrepresentatives themselves for their percep-tion of the improvement in basic services,the performance of poverty alleviationprogrammes, the successful completion ofdevelopment work, and so forth.

On the whole, the responses range from afeeling of satisfaction about moderate im-provements to dissatisfaction withprogrammes like the Jawahar Rozgar Yojanaor the Indira Awas Yojana. The more im-portant conclusion that is suggested by suchdata is that panchayats are not particularlyinvolved in the processes of planning or

As local-levelplanning remainslargely neglected,panchayats havetended to functionchiefly as deliverysystems, intended tomore effectivelyimplement existing,often centrallydevised,developmentprogrammes

subject and appropriate recommendationsand action by governments concerned.

75

decision-making in such developmentprogrammes. Even as developmentimplementors, their role is fairly limited.This is less a function of low levels ofawareness, and more that of inadequatedevolution of powers and resources. Afterall, it is not as if there are no claimants forprogrammes of poverty alleviation orwomen and child development. With littlefinancial or administrative autonomy,panchayats can at best aspire to beingimplementors of development schemesconceived at the central or State capitals,hedged in by all the conditions and proce-dures that go with these. As such, their de-velopmental impact is likely to be limited.

Success Stories

Despite these limitations, impressive suc-cesses – in terms of schemes for drinkingwater, playgrounds, and schools - have beenrecorded by those panchayats in whichwomen are active participants. Pre-Amend-ment all-women panchayats in Maharashtraalready had a fine record of adopting need-oriented, ecologically sustainableprogrammes, outside the purview of tradi-tional politics. Thus, addressing water scar-city was the first priority, with extra school-rooms, community toilets and smokelessstoves being the other major efforts. (Datta,1998:114-15) In the post-Amendmentphase, too, the all-woman panchayat ofKultikri in West Bengal has played a lead-ing role in the literacy campaign of the dis-trict, effected a substantial improvement inthe primary health infrastructure, raised alarge sum of money by leasing some vil-lage ponds for pisciculture, and set up train-ing-cum-production centres for women.(Mukhopadhyay, 1995:1284-85)

10.2 The Emancipatory Impact ofWomen’s Representation

In the literature on women and develop-ment, there is a well-established distinction

between strategic gender needs and practi-cal gender needs. Caroline Moser has ar-gued that strategic gender needs are the needsthat women identify because of their sub-ordinate position to men in society.Through issues like the division of labour,power, domestic violence, and women’scontrol over their bodies, they challengewomen’s subordination to men and enablethem to work towards achieving greaterequality. Strategic gender needs are con-trasted with practical gender needs which are aresponse to immediate perceived necessity.They address issues like water scarcity,health care, employment, and do not chal-lenge the subordination of women to pa-triarchal structures in society.(Moser,1993) What does the evidence onwomen in panchayats suggest in this regard?

People’s Perceptions

Several studies which have surveyed thechanging perceptions of women represen-tatives, have found that they are consciousof, and pleased about, the perceived en-hancement of their status in the family andthe local community. A sixty year oldsarpanch of a gram panchayat in Haryanasaid, “I feel honoured when people call me`Sarpanch Saab’. They give me a lot of re-spect.” (MARG, 1998:169) Many womenhave said that their husbands and familymembers too have gained in prestige. Infact, relationships within the family are get-ting transformed as their husbands havenow begun to seek and take their advice,which is a radical departure from past prac-tices. Even outside the family, they are nowconsulted on village matters. In some cases,they find a new identity as they come to beknown by their own names rather thanthose of their husbands. The perception ofchange in status varies. The more patriar-chal the society, the more likely it is that thewoman’s role would continue to be definedby men. Nevertheless, 72 percent of women

Several studieswhich have surveyedthe changingperceptionsof womenrepresentatives, havefound that they areconscious of, andpleased about, theperceivedenhancement of theirstatus in the familyand the localcommunity



representatives in Madhya Pradesh and al-most 90 percent in Rajasthan perceive anenhancement of status. However, the over-whelming majority of these perceive theirenhanced status in terms of the holding ofthe post, rather than in terms of the powerit gives them to work for the benefit of thelocal community. One panch in Haryanasaid she had sat in a car for the first time inher life, something that would never havehappened if she had not been a panch!

Many women also perceive a change in theattitude of people belonging to their ownas well as other castes: thus, OBC womenpoint to the number of invitations they nowget to weddings as an indicator of their newstatus. SC women do not perceive muchchange in the behaviour of people of highercastes towards them, though one scheduledcaste sarpanch in Jhabua district in MadhyaPradesh, said that people no longer expecther to sit on the floor, but offer her a seat atthe same level as themselves. A new senseof self-confidence is perceptible, and con-sequently a change in lifestyle and behaviourpatterns.

Perhaps the greatest potential for transforma-tion is being wrought by the experience ofwomen in panchayats, as they come torecognise the handicap of education and lit-eracy. This has an impact on the family, theimportance of which cannot be underesti-mated. The three-State CWDS study recordsthat many women report a change in the cus-tomary practices relating to the education ofchildren, especially girls; the age of marriage;and dowry. Tribal and dalit women are seento manifest such attitudinal shifts morestrongly than others. There is also a positiveimpact on the way in which the division oflabour within the household is organised. Withwomen taking on responsibilities of panchayatwork, there is a greater sharing of householdand livelihood responsibilities by husbands asalso other members of the family.

It is not, therefore, surprising that a highproportion of women representatives saythat they would like to contest electionsagain, and a few even assert that they wouldlike to contest for positions of a higher levelthan the ones they presently hold. The lev-els of aspiration in this respect are evenhigher for dalit and tribal women, which issurely a positive sign of empowerment.

Community responses are also encourag-ing, as the involvement of women inpanchayat work is seen to have effected areduction in corruption and favouritism; agreater awareness of education; and even agreater recognition of women’s rights. InBilaspur, in particular, 68 percent of thosesurveyed said that the most positive impacthas been in terms of the greater importancethat is now attached to education for girls.50 percent claimed that untouchability hasdecreased or disappeared, consequent uponlarge numbers of scheduled caste womencoming into the panchayats.

Strategic Gender Concerns

The evidence on gender and decentra-lisation in India thus suggests that whilewomen have played a positive role in ad-dressing, or attempting to address, a rangeof practical gender needs, their impact onstrategic gender needs is not remarkable.However, even in respect of strategic gen-der needs, we find some positive and prom-ising shifts. We have seen already that manywomen entering panchayats have given upthe veil. Family relationships, as also thedivision of labour within the household, areincreasingly being renegotiated. Womennow find that they and their opinionsreceive greater respect both within and with-out the household, and that their influenceon decisions regarding the age of marriagefor their children or dowry has now in-creased. The recognition of illiteracy as ahandicap leads to a greater awareness of the

Many women alsoperceive a change inthe attitude of peoplebelonging to theirown as well as othercastes

77

importance of girls’ education and higherlevels of aspirations for girl children. Thesame women who needed to be virtuallycoerced to contest the election are todayeager to attend panchayat meetings them-selves, and to participate in processes ofdecision-making.

10.3 Policy Reform andCapacity-Building

The issues not addressed in the Constitu-tional Amendment, and the deficiencies andlacunae in the Conformity Acts of the Stateshave already been discussed at some length.It is clear that there is a need for greater speci-fication in the powers and functions of theGram Sabha, as also in the division of pow-ers and resources between the three tiers andtheir inter-relationship. There is a need forgreater devolution of powers, for moreclearly stipulating the relationship betweenthe State administration and the panchayatsat various levels, and for freeing elected bod-ies from the control of State departmentsand functionaries. The relationship betweenfunctions and finances is another area thathas suffered greatly from neglect and inat-tention. In functional terms, responsibilitiesare entrusted to panchayats for local devel-opment works, but the funds which couldbe deployed for development are distributedbetween centrally sponsored schemes, Stategovernments, and Members of Parliament(under the Member of Parliament Local AreaDevelopment Scheme). Clearly, there is astrong case for more untied funds beingmade available to the local bodies. Above all,there is a need to recognise the minimumentailed by the principle of decentralisation,and so to create the conditions under whichthe panchayats can actually be involved intheir constitutionally mandated task of pre-paring plans for economic development andsocial justice, instead of being confined tothe identification of beneficiaries for cen-trally sponsored schemes.

One way of doing this is to effect a shiftfrom sectoral planning to area planning.Area plans should be formulated by thepanchayats at the village level, integrated bythe panchayats at the two higher tiers, andfinally harmonised with sectoral plans at theState level. (Jain,1994:132-33) This will un-doubtedly shake up the entire structure(from the local to the central level) of plan-ning as presently constituted, but may bethe only way in which to realise the prom-ise contained in the Constitutional Amend-ments.

These appear to be the minimally neces-sary conditions for effectivedecentra-lisation. The tasks of democratisation areequally challenging, though they cannot beattempted exclusively through legislative fiator policy reform. Having guaranteed theentry of women, as well as members of thescheduled castes and tribes, in the newpanchayats, the task of capacity building,so as to strengthen their participation inthese institutions, remains to be taken seri-ously.

Training Programmes

Though many training programmes havebeen conducted for women representatives,they appear to be severely wanting in theirconceptualisation, designed chiefly tofamiliarise women with the procedures andlaws relating to panchayats. The absence ofliteracy and formal education, however, re-mains a major obstacle. So does the absenceof any consciousness-raising componentthat can help women to identify patriarchalpractices, discern the gender biases in policy,and build alliances and networks withwomen’s movements and organisations.Conscientisation about caste discriminationis also necessary. Even male representatives– of all castes and social backgrounds –need to be trained in terms of gender-sen-sitivity. There are, of course, limits to the


There is a need forgreater devolution ofpowers, for moreclearly stipulatingthe relationshipbetween the Stateadministration andthe panchayats atvarious levels


efficacy of even the most well-designedtraining programmes, for women represen-tatives labour under multiple constraints,patriarchal and social, not all of which canbe redressed by training. These constraintscan only erode over a period of time, andthe most effective source of such erosionwill, slowly but surely, be women them-selves.

As such, policy reform for more effectivedecentralisation must be accompanied by efforts toenable and ensure the more meaningful participa-tion of women and other groups disadvantaged bytheir caste or class location. For women in par-ticular, this entails two pre-requisites : edu-cation and political mobilisation. In the tasksof political mobilisation, political partiesmay have a less useful role to play than thewomen’s movement and even some typesof non-governmental initiatives. Thus, anorganisation in Himachal Pradesh hasworked with over 300 Mahila Mandals, andsought to bring them on the same platformas the panchayati raj institutions. (Sharma,1998:40) Similarly, SEWA’s recent campaignon water in Gujarat has worked, in the firstinstance, through the Gram Sabhas, to iden-tify the water sources in the village, and thenmobilised and trained the women of thevillages for the development and sustain-able use of water resources. (Mishra, 1999)

10.4 The Long, Slow but IrreversibleRoute to Empowerment

Despite the many negative trends (such assurrogate representation and tokenism) ex-hibited in the practice of women’srepresentation in panchayats, it is clear thatpanchayats are performing a transformatoryrole, albeit one that is slow. The conscious-ness-raising function of the new PRIs isindubitable. Even the women who speak of

their powerlessness have, for the first time,squarely recognised it. It is true that, as ofnow, this recognition pertains to powerless-ness in the domain outside the domestic,but it is surely only a matter of time beforepowerlessness within the walls of theirhomes also begins to get recognised. Like-wise, the recognition of illiteracy as a handi-cap is the first step towards combating it.The transformatory potential of suchtrends is unmistakable, and their importancecannot be underestimated.

The attempt to empower women throughquotas in local institutions clearly does notalter the pre-conditions in terms of, say, pro-viding women with access to land, but itdoes provide them with a non-material po-litical resource through which they can, overtime, bring about a change in the normsand values governing the distribution ofmaterial resources. Their recognition of theimportance of education for girls and alater age of marriage, for instance, may bethe prelude to the assertion of other kindsof equality-claims. Similarly, the participa-tion of women in panchayats, as much astheir frequent exclusion from the actual pro-ceedings in these bodies, has created anawareness of alternative roles and a morepositive self-image than those internalisedover a lifetime of patriarchally-defined gen-der identity. Just as democratisation is a pro-cess, so is empowerment. Neither agency norentitlement – however circumscribed by male domi-nation – are given in perpetuity. They can be nego-tiated and altered by political action and socialchange. The participation of women inpanchayats is certainly one mechanismthrough which such change can take place,and the strategic gender interests of womenadvanced.

The participationof women inpanchayats, as muchas their frequentexclusion from theactual proceedingsin these bodies,has created anawareness ofalternative roles anda more positiveself-image thanthose internalisedover a lifetime ofpatriarchally-definedgender identity

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11. Strengthening Decentra-lisation: UN Initiatives

11.1 National Priorities

Decentralisation of development respon-sibility is a basic tenet of Cooperative Fed-eralism and the Ninth Five Year Plan. Giventhe ongoing consolidation of the institu-tional framework of Panchayati Raj laiddown by the 73rd and 74th Amendments, thechallenges before us now are the correc-tion of imbalances in local, patriarchalpower structures, and building capacity forlocal governance through adequate devo-lution of funds, functions and functionar-ies. In this light it would also be necessaryto refocus international cooperation to-wards decentralisation imperatives. In thiscontext, a “Convergence Approach” for so-cial service delivery by linking user groupsfor sector interventions with PRIs/ULBS,and indeed decentralisation within UNorganisations would be the key bridges be-tween current initiatives with future inter-ventions.

The key elements of a strategy for interna-tional support to decentralisation would bethe placing of gender concerns at the fore-front, and support to initiatives such as theRight to Information which enable in-creased participation of the poor in localgovernance and management of commu-nity assets and institutions.

11.2Towards Decentralisation: Resultsfrom a UN DecentralisationMapping Exercise

A decentralisation mapping exercise wascarried out in 1999 to benchmark and evalu-ate the status and prospects of UN systemsupport to decentralisation in India. Theissues covered in semi-structured interviewsand groups discussions included the follow-ing:

l The approach to decentralisation

l Current status of programmes related todecentralisation / community based ac-tion.

l Experience with participatory program-ming, monitoring & evaluation; concernsregarding decentralisation; blueprint forthe future, especially with regard to theforthcoming United Nations Develop-ment Assistance Framework (UNDAF)and operationalising joint action.

Salient issues arising from discussion wereas follows:

l Every UN agency is committed todecentralisation, yet there was then nocommon definition or approach todecentralisation. For some agencydecentralisation involves working closelywith PRIs and ULBs (e.g., UNICEF,UNCHS) ; for some it involves workingwith community level groups (e.g., WFP,UNIFEM); for some it involves engage-ment with district planning andimplementation (e.g., UNFPA); forothers it involves a broad focus on

PART III

The challengesbefore us now arethe correction ofimbalances in local,patriarchal powerstructures, andbuilding capacity forlocal governancethrough adequatedevolution of funds,functions andfunctionaries

Possible Directions for International Support

Possible Directions for International SupportPossible Directions for International Support


governance and partnerships with NGOsand CBOs (ILO, UNDCP). For someagencies, deconcentration or location ofoffices in States is a part of decentra-lisation. For most it involves a mix ofthese. In essence, while the concern fordecentralisation is shared, there is a plu-rality of approaches.

l For each agency, the approach todecentralisation, as with other things, isalso based on the dynamics and directionof the government counterpart ministry/agency.

Examples of direct involvement withdecentralisation include training of repre-sentatives of PRIs and ULBs (especiallywomen members), development of train-ing modules for district planning, directengagement with district planning, work-shops and seminars on decentralisation is-sues, etc. Examples of indirect linkage withDecentralisation include community basedprogrammes in education, urban basic ser-vices, reproductive health, forestry, ICDS,etc. In most of this the “user group” is thebasic unit. The content of the programmeranges from training modules to organisingworkshops and training programmesabroad, participatory planning as well asprovision of equipment and materials insome cases.

The respondents felt that Decentralisationrequired gap filling and creation of capac-ity in the several areas: more effective devo-lution of authority including financial pow-ers, improvement in quality of participationespecially by the poor through training inparticipation and leadership for represen-tatives, especially women and themarginalised communities, support topeople’s networks especially for advocacyand experience sharing, as well asprogrammes that help create social capital

in the villages and contribute to livelihoodsecurity for the poor.

Some of the suggested areas for interven-tion:

l Development of a common knowledgebase and data inventory for Decentra-lisation which would pave the way forjoint programming and convergence ofvarious initiatives.

l Inter-linkage of gender andDecentralisation initiatives.

l Training programmes for women repre-sentatives in PRIs and ULBs.

l Support for networks of women in PRIsand ULBs and community organisations.

l Support to district planning through de-velopment of manuals, modules andworkshops.

l Linkage with State Finance Commissionin effecting financial devolution.

l Linkage with NGOs and CBOs as propsfor more effective Panchayati Raj.

l Development of database and informa-tion system for decentralised planningand implementation.

11.3The Decentralisation Imperative

While the decentralisation of governancein India launched through the 73rd and 74th

Constitutional Amendment seem to havebecome an irreversible feature of far-reach-ing consequence, it is an unfinished agendato the completion of which the UN willcontribute: the challenge now is to createan enabling environment for qualitative par-ticipation of all groups of the local com-munities and a decentralised system of gov-ernment that has –at all levels- the capacityand the resources to meet the needs of thepeople.

The respondents feltthat Decentralisationrequired gap fillingand creation ofcapacity in theseveral areas

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Strengthening Local GovernanceInstitutions

In a decentralised system, the proximity ofdecision-makers to the local communityprovides a powerful opportunity for com-munity insistence on greater accountabil-ity, transparency and efficiency in the useof public resources earmarked for devel-opment. However, in order to make themost of this opportunity, it is essential tocreate awareness in local communities andinterest in decentralised institutions thatoffer avenues for active participation.

Several factors arising from economic andsocial inequalities seriously inhibit the fullparticipation of people, especially women,in local governance institutions at present.Apart from specific quotas and trainingprogrammes designed to develop leader-ship, it is important to implement policiesthat would reduce the economic depen-dence of large sections of people on a fewpowerful individuals. Local governanceinstitutions are much more participatoryand effective in regions where State gov-ernment policies have succeeded in enablingpeople’s participation in the managementof natural resources (land, water and for-est.) and creating conditions for gainful em-ployment.

Community Management of BasicServices

Decentralisation provides closer correspon-dence between the actual needs of peopleand the provision that is made by govern-ments to meet those needs. “Planning frombelow” and contextualised resource allo-cation for basic services would be more costeffective and produce better outcomes. Yetthe quality of basic services provided tolocal communities is directly proportionalto the degree of community control andsupervision. Responsiveness and account-ability to the community on the part of

service providers can be improved by giv-ing local governance institutions authorityto monitor performance and impose sanc-tions. Given India’s diverse and segmentedsocial structure, rights of vulnerable sec-tions can be best assured by giving voice tothe least advantaged. People’s sensitisationto their rights, including knowledge of pro-cedures and the responsibilities incumbenton local governance authorities, requires in-formation dissemination to the public atlarge.


l UNCHS: Urban ManagementProgrammeBuilding and strengthening thecapacity of local government andother stakeholders (Civil Societyand Private Sector) to addresscritical urban problems. [Surat,Bangalore, Hyderabad]

l UNDP: Capacity Building ProgrammeBuilding capability of State-level

UN Assistance to Strengthening Local Government InstitutionsBOX 10

institutions for more effective trainingof officials and elected representativesof PRIs.

l UNICEF: Rural and Urban ConvergenceProjects on Capacity Building in localgovernmentsProgramme Support to facilitate thebuilding of effective communityprocesses and to train members of

panchayats and nagar palikas (ULBs).

l UNFPA: Capacity building in districthealth administrationCapacity building in districts forparticipatory planning andimplementation of IntegratedPopulation Development Progra-mmes in close collaboration withother Government Departments,NGOs and the Private Sector. [In38 districts in Rajasthan,Maharashtra, Orissa, MadhyaPradesh, Gujarat and Kerala]

l WHO: Focus on community participationin Primary Health ProgrammesImprovement of Health SeekingBehaviour of Women and TribalCommunities

l ILO and UNDCP: Joint Project onCommunity Based Rehabilitationand Prevention of Drug Abuse at

UN Assistance to Community Management of Basic ServicesBOX 11

the Workplace in partnership withIndustry Associations, Trade Unionsand selected entrepreneurs

l Joint GOI/UN System EducationProgramme:Promote community ownership andmanagement of village schools [8States].

l Water and Sanitation Programme-SouthAsia : Support to Sector Reforms in Waterand SanitationTransfer of piped drinking waterscheme in Meerut district (UP) fromPublic Health Engineering Depart-ment to registered Water Users’Society.

l WFP: Project on Initiating EarlyComplementary Feeding andIncreasing Community Participation[Banswara District, Rajasthan]


Extending Services to the MostDifficult to Reach

Apart from social mobilisation and gendersensitisation of local communities in gen-eral, it is essential to focus attention on thosewho are excluded from full participation inthe decision making process of the com-munity. Democratic decentralisation andprocesses by themselves cannot correctdeep-rooted social and economic inequities.The poor and disadvantaged must be em-powered through social mobilisation, accessto information, and training in developmentadministration before they can take advan-tage of reforms which seek to bring gov-ernment closer to the people. (see Box 13)

11.4 Decentralisation of DevelopmentResponsibilities – The Challenges

Considerable headway has been made sincethe enactment of the 73rd and 74th Amend-ments, which have created PRIs as tiers oflocal self-rule. Today Conformity Acts havebeen passed in all the States for whichPanchayati Raj was mandated. Many Stateshave devolved functions and powers to lo-cal authorities, State Finance Commissionshave been constituted and have made rec-ommendations for resource allocations toPRIs. The second round of elections toPRIs are being held and in many Statespeople’s planning and district governmentare now in place. Administrative and demo-cratic decentralisation have been made man-datory, and, consequently, most States havemade arrangements for periodic electionsto local bodies, and have also indicated sub-jects over which local authorities would havea say. There are large differences betweenStates in the degree to which these Amend-ments have been implemented. States likeKerala, West Bengal and Madhya Pradeshare among the front-runners.

The Ninth Five Year Plan document hasrecognised the importance of decen-tralisation in the context of developmentand made the principle of “cooperative fed-eralism” as the cornerstone of its develop-ment strategy. In a system of cooperativefederalism, the national and State govern-ments devolve powers to and strengthen theauthority and competence of local govern-ments at the district, block and village level.Given the repeated failures of vertical gov-ernment programmes to achieve the desiredresults, the Ninth Plan document (vol. 1.Ch. 5) proposes to place the panchayats atthe very heart of development planning andaction. PRIs are the agency of change andloci of decision-making, not merely vehiclesfor performing delivery services that a dis-tant bureaucracy cannot fulfil.

l UNIFEM: Support to Networkingof Women’s Groups and theirlinkages to Urban Local Bodies in

Maharashtra

l WFP: Tribal Development Sub-programme

UN Assistance to Empowerment of CommunityGroups in Local Political Processes

BOX 12

Sustainable food security schemes aimedat self-reliance of people from ScheduledTribes, Scheduled Cases and otherbackward casts, with active participationof village communities [Orissa, Bihar,Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh andRajasthan]

BOX 13Grassroots Concerns for Panchayati Raj

The panchayat members of the Alwardistrict in Rajasthan reinforced theissues raised during a December 2000workshop on strengthening Decentra-lisation. Mrs. Leelavati Goel, GramSarpanch, said that there is very littledevelopment work under way as fundsare extremely limited. Problems ofthat area are related to roads, water andwomen’s development. Mr. RahguvarDayal Meena, Pradhan, emphasisedthat there are very strong panchayattraditions in the Rajasthan villages, andspelt out the need for finances. Mr.Ashok, the Deputy-Sarpanch of Kararpanchayat in Alwar, mentioned that inthe last five years panchayats have

faced problems as the Patwaris andmembers of the cooperative societies didnot give importance to the Sarpanch. Inaddition, the approval of the programmesand of the grants has to be given by theTehsildar and District Collector. Mr.Ramlal Meena, a Gram Panchayatmember, pointed out that powers havebeen given to the panchayat institutionsonly on paper and not in reality. Thepanchayats have very little funds and thatthey have no other source of revenue.The MPs and MLAs have their quotas tospend in their constituencies but herefavouritism and politics are in play. Thus,a lot of debts have piled up over the yearsin each of the village panchayats.

83

A main challengeahead is creatinglinkages betweenuser groups andappropriatelystrengthened localbodies andcommunityorganisations

One can argue that despite the problemsof corruption, incapacity, non-participationof the poor and local conservatism,decentralisation is the key strategy for In-dia today. PRIs are now mandated by theConstitution, and the ills they suffer fromare also found in the erstwhile bureaucratic-parliamentary dispensation. However, it isimportant to address the remaining chal-lenges in decentralisation, which are out-lined below, through a series of initiatives,which create an enabling policy environ-ment and macroeconomic frameworkwhere the poor and marginalised groups areable to participate more actively in the func-tioning of local democracy.

Correcting Imbalances in Local PowerStructures

There is also considerable scepticism aboutthe ability and feasibility of PRIs as a ve-hicle for progressive social transformation.It has been argued that transfer of respon-sibilities and authority to local institutionsstrengthens local prejudices and the localelite. PRIs are seen as agents of caste domi-nation and gender oppression and subjectto surrogate representation, where theelected representatives are actually con-trolled by local “big men”, and women rep-resentatives are a front for their husband,father or son. In many cases, economic de-pendence is the root of this problem, pre-venting people from using their politicalfreedom. Consequently, the Ninth Plandocument (vol. 1, ch. 1-4) has outlined thenational thrust improving livelihoods andfood security and empowering womenthrough improved access to land, credit andcommon property resources (pasturage, wa-ter, fuelwood, forest produce, etc.).

Adequate Devolution of Resources,Authority and Responsibility

Fiscal decentralisation, an essential precon-dition for adequate devolution of

authority, powers, responsibilities, has notmade much headway. There is a large agendato be addressed for strengthening the rev-enue base of the third tier of governance.Similarly, more attention is needed to cre-ate conditions for more synergy in the op-erations of the central and State govern-ments, while strengthening the capacity oflocal governance institutions to progres-sively overcome the challenges posed bypoverty and social inequalities. In this con-text, the Ninth Plan document (vol. 1.,ch. 6) mentions support to State FinanceCommissions and support to District Plan-ning as two critical areas for strengtheningPanchayati Raj.

Refocusing International CooperationTowards Decentralisation Imperatives

In the light of the emphasis placed upondecentralisation in India’s national plans, in-ternational cooperation must seek to iden-tify areas of intervention that help lendmore substance and credibility to PanchayatRaj and Urban Local Bodies. There is a needfor interventions that help counter scepti-cism and promote local democracy, whichis consistent with the objectives of sustain-able human development. Many UNorganisations have already taken the lead intraining and leadership development forcommunity based development action.While international agencies, especiallymultilaterals, face many constraints in work-ing flexibly with communities and civil so-ciety organisation, it is also true that manyprogressive principles of community in-volvement and participatory planning havereceived a boost in internationally assistedprojects pertaining to forestry, education,reproductive and child health, etc. A mainchallenge ahead is creating linkages betweenuser groups and appropriately strengthenedlocal bodies and community organisations.Many international organisations havestarted to assist convergent community



action, aiming at supporting the local po-litical systems to address development is-sues in a cross-sectoral way.

The trend towards projects andprogrammes that directly involve people atthe grassroots level increasingly demands adecentralised management of activities inInternational Development. Manyorganisations are responding to this chal-lenge by decentralising their own structures,such as UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA by es-tablishing State offices. Further, the devel-opment of State and district levelprogrammes with project managementcounterparts at the State and district levels,such as Joint GOI/UN System EducationProgramme, UNFPA’s Integrated Popula-tion and Development Programme and theWorld Bank’s District Primary EducationProgramme (DPEP) is a step in thisdirection.

11.5 Key Elements of aDecentralisation Strategy

Through a process of dialogue with civilsociety and State government partners, in-ternational development organisations canformulate a concerted strategy ondecentralisation and thereby provide sub-stantial inputs to the nationaldecentralisation efforts. This will involvecoordinated initiatives of individual UNOrganisations and Specialised Agencies aswell as joint initiatives. The strategy will usethe experiences and expertise of eachorganisation and the comparative advantageof the UN System of operating close to theground and its close working relationshipswith the Government, Civil Society andother partners.

In a mapping exercise on decentralisation,conducted among all resident UNOrganisations in India, key elements of anUNDAF strategy on decentralisation wereidentified. These elements, presented in the

following, are regarded as most conduciveto leverage strong UN support todecentralisation.

Capacity Building at the Local Level

Capacity building in local political systemsis regarded as the area of highest relevancefor UN interventions in decentralisation. Atthe same time, this is the area in which theUN organisations have already conductednumerous activities and hence can draw ondifferent experiences. Traditionally capac-ity building focused on planning, implemen-tation and monitoring in local political andadministrative bodies. Capacity building ofelected members of local bodies is impor-tant, particularly for representatives, espe-cially women, who are entering the publicand political sphere for the first time. An-other key area is support to district andpanchayat planning through training ofPRIs/ULBs and district planning commit-tees. Yet, capacity building should not beconfined to formal political and adminis-trative institutions, but include the “demandside” (rights awareness) in local processes– the communities that formulate theirneeds and exert control over the perfor-mance of the local governments, line de-partments and service delivery. Here, theUN System has an important role to playthrough strategies such as support to aware-ness campaigns about legal, political andeconomic rights and obligations andstrengthening the position of Civil SocietyOrganisations (see Box 14).

The mapping revealed that the UNorganisations feel the need to approach ru-ral and urban areas in a different way. Whilein rural areas the governance structures arerelatively clearly demarcated and receivesupport from different developmentorganisations including from internationalorganisations, the urban areas arecharacterised by unclear division of

Through a process ofdialogue with civilsociety and Stategovernment partners,internationaldevelopmentorganisations canformulate aconcerted strategyon decentralisationand thereby providesubstantial inputs tothe nationaldecentralisationefforts

85

Decentralisation canbe regarded as animportant means foraddressing genderinequality andempowermentof women

responsibilities, a lack of resources and littleawareness about existing problems.

Gender and Decentralisation

As in Part 2, Decentralisation can be re-garded as an important means for address-ing gender inequality and empowerment ofwomen. Likewise, a focus on women in ca-pacity building efforts is a powerful strat-egy to achieve more quality in participation:firstly, through improving the involvementand the clout of women in local politicalprocesses and secondly through altering thetraditional forms of leadership by support-ing the emergence of women leaders.Women should therefore be at the heart ofcapacity building efforts at the local level.

Advocacy for Adequate Devolution ofResources, Authority and Responsibility

In order to contribute to the national ef-forts of improving quantity and quality ofparticipation, service delivery and empow-erment through decentralisation, the inter-national community has to target its advo-cacy efforts at micro-, meso and macro level.Support to people’s networking at the grass-

roots level, collaboration with the State Fi-nance Commissions and with variouscitizen’s fora is equally important. Advocacyinstruments such as the State Human De-velopment Reports and the India Develop-ment Forum should be used to flag key con-cerns regarding decentralisation.

Information

Access to information is a crucial successfactor for a decentralised system. This holdsequally for planing in district administra-tions as for participation of marginalisedgroups in local political processes. The pro-motion of IT for information of peopleabout their rights and obligations is a prom-ising field. Strengthening district and com-munity level data systems and training theusers is another area where a concertedinternational strategy could make a differ-ence. The State Human Development Re-port initiative led by the Planning Commis-sion and the DevInfo developed by the UNInter-Agency Working Group on CommonDatabase are promising steps in this direc-tion. It would be important to ensure thatthese initiatives become relevant for PRIs/


Issues for User Groups: Linkages with Communities,Civil Society Organisations and Local Bodies

Interest groups are activity and serviceoriented. As they are social formations, theirdefinition has to be situational due to theheterogeneous nature of the local society.

Bypassing local bodies have weakened themand not helped them build any capacities.Moreover, if all funds were routed throughthe local bodies, it would only reinforcecorruption and restrict the opportunityavailable for civic groups. Elected peopleshould be made more accountable, and partyaffiliations that come in the way should notbe taken into consideration.

There is “patronage” at various levels. Statelevel groups often bypass local level patrons,raising issues of exclusion and also that ofrights in a democratic structure. There isneed to empower civil society to be moreresponsive to local issues. Given the varied

BOX 14

type of civil society groups, the issue ofbeing accountable to the poorer groups isimportant. Given the quality and capacityof decision making in PRIs/ ULBs, there isa need to improve their capacities in viewof increased responsibilities. However, thisshould not be a constraint on local leveldemocracy.

At the PRIs/ ULBs levels, not just thepresident, but others, viz. the ward membersand the counsellors, matter. Democracy ismore broad based. Nevertheless, it wouldbe counterproductive to depoliticise theinherently political issues. At times, untidypolitics opens up space for pro-poorprocesses to evolve and operate.Participatory structures and processes aredifferent when influencing policy vis-à-visenabling groups to access resources. It is also

important to understand how high- incomecorporate groups access resources andinfluence policy. Local level groups do notusually have access to levels of decisionmaking at the State and national level orforums to influence this.

The recommendations that emerged are:

l Elected representatives should also be heldaccountable.

l The civil society should be empowered tobe more responsive to local issues.

l The capacity and quality of decision-making of the PRIs/ULBs has to beimproved.

l More time and resources should beallocated to the PRIs/ULBs.

l There should be a system of right torecall the elected representatives of thePRIs.


Panchayats at the village, block and districtlevel represent the community, which alsoincludes user groups, self help groups,traditional and self initiated groups andNGOs. He explained that the communityacts as a unit of management by virtue ofthe fact that water, forests and uncultivatedlands are held as common propertyresources. Community control over localgovernment functionaries has improvedaccountability.The problem of implementation in drinkingwater, watershed, irrigation and forestryprogrammes arises because participation ofthe local people is poor, and there is no feltneed, pressure to spend substantial resourcesby a fixed deadline, unclear criteria forselecting areas and villages, and poormaintenance.To illustrate challenges that India is facing,he referred to the situation existing in CentralIndia, where there is a single croppingsystem. Because the land productivity is lowand vast areas are uncultivated due to soiland water erosion, the tribal populationfaced tremendous hardship leading toforced/distress migration. It is thereforenecessary to integrate land and watermanagement. Social cohesion in rural

BOX 15Community Driven Management: Avenues for Decentralisation

Source: Dr. N.C. Saxena

communities makes it easier to promotecommunity participation and fosters NGOs’action.Development projects can be successful onlyif they can devote significant resources topeople’s participation, and recruit staff thathas skills in social organisation. Projectleaders have to be committed and the donorsor senior officials need to exert pressure toadhere to participatory approaches.Incentives for staff members to ensureparticipation and community influence onthe work of the field staff could also help inthe implementation of these projects.The limitations of the legislation facing thePRIs are:Inadequacies of 73rd Amendment Act:l The powers and functions of gram sabhas

are not defined.l Actual devolution of powers to

panchayats are left to the discretion of theState governments.

l The expression ‘institution of self-government’ is not elaborated.

l Re-election is not dependent on the goodwork done by the office bearers.

l There is no provision for nyaya panchayat.Inadequacies of PRIs:l Meetings of the gram sabhas are held rarely.

l Harassment by block level officials.l Elected members behave more or less as

contractors.l Despite excellent work by some village

level panchayats, many panchayat electedleaders as well as officials see developmentprogrammes as an opportunity to makethemselves richer.

Inadequacies of State Acts:l Most States view PRIs as agents.l No autonomy to PRIs to function as

institutions of self-government.l Political reluctance to give up control over

implementation and funds.l Finances of PRIs remain fragile.The correct approach to the question“Should the panchayats get a share in taxesor have the right to levy and collect taxes?”would be to provide PRIs with revenueraising powers. PRIs also hesitate to levy andcollect taxes.There is need for a large multi-sectoralproject on rural livelihoods based oncommunity management with a mandate tooperationalise the Scheduled Areas Act.Effective panchayats/user groups wouldrequire an effective district and block leveladministration, hence need for greatercoordination and better governance.

ULBs and decentralised programmes at thedistrict and community levels.

Convergence Approach for Social ServiceDelivery

Many international agencies are already sup-porting programmes that involve commu-nity mobilisation, participatory planning andlinks with PRIs. It is now important thatsome of these interventions go beyond the“user group” approach, and forge more ef-fective partnerships of accountability to thecommunities at the sites of intervention andtransparency, moving away from the “ver-tical intervention” approach. (see Box 15)The procedural dimensions of this wouldneed to be worked out in close consulta-tion with the Government of India andState governments.

Decentralisation within the UN System

Decentralisation of structures within theUN System is an area which offers a largescope for improving the efficiency and ef-fectiveness of its operations. Equal to anyother decentralised systems, there is a needfor a balance between devolution of re-sources, authority and accountability withinthe different layers of UN Organisations(e.g. Headquarters, Country Offices, StateOffices). Enhanced international collabo-ration at the State or district level could leadto great value addition. Inter-Agency Work-ing Groups at the State level as could serveas fora for exchange of information and ex-periences and for joint activities such astraining, documentation and advocacy.

87

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