digest constidocx

8/3/2019 Digest Constidocx

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Province of North Cotabato vs.

Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)

G.R. No. 183591

FACTS:

This is a consolidation of petitions filed by several provinces and municipalities in Mindanao such as the

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Province of Sulatan Kudarat, the City of

Iligan, the City of Isabela of Basilan and the municipality of Linamon duly represented by their respective

provincial governors and mayors and the petitioners-in-intervention Franklin Drilon, Adel Tamano, Ruy

Lopez and Carlo Gomez. Said petitioners assail in their petition a piece of writing called the

Memorandum Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP(Governement of the Republic of

the Philippines)-MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The

Solicitor General explained that this document, prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel, was merely a

codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a

Bangsamoro homeland. Still petitioner urge the court to determine completely the constitutional issues

raised in the present petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of MOAs constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no

longer justiciable by the Court.

HELD:

Yes. The issue on the constitutionality of MOA is merely moot and academic upon the pronouncement of

the Executive Department to abandon it. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all

come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing

more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable

of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no

more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by

this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite

legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable

controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former

involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal

interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in

character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The court further explained that In negotiating for peace, the Executive Department should be givenenough leeway and should not be prevented from offering solutions which may be beyond what the

present Constitution allows, as long as such solutions are agreed upon subject to the amendment of theConstitution by completely legal means.

Given a kind of situation where war and peace hang in the balance, where people's lives are at stake, and

the Executive Department, under its RESIDUAL POWERS, is tasked to make political decisions in

order to find solutions to the insurgency problem, the Court should respect the political nature of theissues at bar and exercise judicial restraint until an actual controversy is brought before it.


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**RESIDUAL POWERS- are those which are implicit and correlative to the paramount duty in

that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

MMDA VS VIRON

Facts:

This is a joint resolution of the two cases of MMDA vs Viron Transportation Co., Inc and Executive

Secretary vs Mencorp Transportation System Inc regarding the authority of the MMDA to implement

E.O. 179. On February 10, 2003, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo issues E.O. 179 addressing the problem on

traffic congestion along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares in Manila which

is allegedly caused by the provincial bus terminals and the buses located in said area. The MMDA

proposed to decongest the traffic by eliminating the present bus terminals through the provision of a mass

transport terminal facilities. The President tasked the MMDA as the implementing agency for the said

project. Respondents Viron and Mencorp filed a declaratory relief against petitioner alleging that the

MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existingbus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the

scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924. The

petitioners invoke the authority of the President to undertake or to cause the implementation of the said

project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. 125 , "Reorganizing the

Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other

Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.

They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 179 is constitutional and the delegation of the President to MMDA the task to

implement said act is valid.

HELD:

NO. E.O. 179 is unconstitutional and the MMDA is not the proper agency to implement said project.

Under E.O. 125 the DOTC is the proper department to implement the project. To quote from E.O. 125

The Ministry (now DOTC) shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,

implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in

the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks oftransportation and communication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal,

transportation and communications services.

Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for

transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the

implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for transportation.

Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as theobligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which

provides:


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SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and

offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervisionand control over the executive departments.

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation

of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there

being no legal basis therefore.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the

MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at

bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must

exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary

implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of

transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in

question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped

the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

Juan Antonio Oposa et al., v.

The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources, and the Honorable Eriberto U. Rosario, Presiding Judge of

the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

Facts:This involves a petition filed by a group of minors duly represented and joined by their parents and thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized

for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment

and natural resources against Secretary Factoran of the DENR. Among their cause of action are the

following :

11. Public records reveal that defendant`s predecessors have granted timber license agreements

(`TLA`s`) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for

commercial logging purposes.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remainingforest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs specially plaintiff minors

and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural

resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource

property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA`s is an act violative of the

rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified


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,bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the

Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.

Thus the petitioner pray for ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his

behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license

agreements.

Respondent judge dismissed the petition on several grounds. Among these is the non- impairment of

contract clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant

the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country

and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license

agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to `impairment of contracts` abhored (sic) by the

fundamental law."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-impairment of contract clause can be validly invoked by the respondent court in

dismissing the petition.

HELD:

No. The court was not at all persuaded. Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which

provides:

". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or

rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,

property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Citing Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:

". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And

it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,

and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and theforest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief

Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of

the due process of law clause [Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended.

Even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even anexecutive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non

impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been

passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the

non impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been

passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the peopleto a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. The non

impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.


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