desparate stand the battle of buena vista

8/7/2019 Desparate Stand the Battle of Buena Vista

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The U.S. Army CAmpAignS of t mexiCAn WAr

DeSperATe STAnDTh BATTLe of BUenA ViSTA


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Introduction

The Mexican War (18461848) was the U.S. Armys rst experiencewaging an extended conict in a foreign land. This brief war is oftenoverlooked by casual students of history since it occurred so close to theAmerican Civil War and is overshadowed by the latters sheer size andscope. Yet, the Mexican War was instrumental in shaping the geographicalboundaries of the United States. At the conclusion of this conict, theU.S. had added some one million square miles of territory, including whattoday are the states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California, aswell as portions of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada. This newly

acquired land also became a battleground between advocates for theexpansion of slavery and those who fought to prevent its spread. Thesesectional and political differences ripped the fabric of the union of statesand eventually contributed to the start of the American Civil War, just thir-teen years later. In addition, the Mexican War was a proving ground for ageneration of U.S. Army leaders who as junior ofcers in Mexico learnedthe trade of war and later applied those lessons to the Civil War.

The Mexican War lasted some twenty-six months from its first

engagement through the withdrawal of American troops. Fighting tookplace over thousands of miles, from northern Mexico to Mexico City, andacross New Mexico and California. During the conict, the U.S. Armywon a series of decisive conventional battles, all of which highlightedthe value of U.S. Military Academy graduates who time and again pavedthe way for American victories. The Mexican War still has much to teachus about projecting force, conducting operations in hostile territory witha small force that is dwarfed by the local population, urban combat, the

difculties of occupation, and the courage and perseverance of individualsoldiers. The following essay is one of eight planned in this series toprovide an accessible and readable account of the U.S. Armys role andachievements in the conict.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of MilitaryHistory by Stephen A. Carney. I hope that this absorbing account, withits list of further readings, will stimulate further study and reection.A complete list of the Center of Military Historys available works is

included on the Centers online catalog: http://www.history.army.mil/catalog/index.html.

JEFFREY J. CLARKEChief of Military History


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Portions of the U.S. Army (nearly half of the Regular Army) underthe command of Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor achieved an unbroken seriesof battleeld victories during the rst nine months of the war withMexico. From 8 May to 23 September 1846, Taylor defeated Mexicanforces at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterrey. These victoriesvindicated the oft-scorned U.S. Regular Army and demonstrated the

competence of the graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. In themonths following these victories, Taylor became a popular hero, andnewspapers speculated that he would win the Whig Party nomination forpresident in 1848. This prominence infuriated President James K. Polk,a Democrat, who was angry with Taylor both for making his presidentialambition known publicly and for granting overly generous cease-reterms to the Mexican Army after the battle for Monterrey.

Meanwhile, on the basis of promises from former Mexican

strongman Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna that he would settle theTexas border issue and sell California to the United States, Polk hadallowed him to return from exile in Cuba through the U.S. navalblockade in July 1846 to resume power. Polk hoped this would hastenthe end of the war. Instead, Santa Anna seized control and hurriedlyassembled a large force with the intention of driving the AmericanArmy out of northern Mexico. His attack struck Taylors force at aplace the Americans called Buena Vista.

Strategic Setting

In early October 1846, after the Americans capture of Monterreyin September, Santa Anna moved some 220 miles from Mexico Cityto San Luis Potosi, 250 miles south of Monterrey. Resisting demandsfrom threatened Mexican cities that he immediately confront theinvading forces, he instead concentrated most of his forces at this loca-

tion in the northern part of the country. From this core, he immediatelybegan rebuilding theArmy of the North into a massive force that mightbe capable of driving the Americans out of Mexico.

The problems Santa Anna faced in accomplishing this task seemedinsurmountable, but his enthusiasm and personal charisma won

Desperate Stand

The Battle of Buena Vista


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acceptanceif not agreementfor his decision, even from bitteropponents of concentration.The generalissimo ordered eachMexican state to recruit a quotaof troops from among men agedsixteen to fty years. Because nonational mechanism existed toenforce conscription, he approvedvarious coercive measures topressure states to comply. Healso recruited jailed criminals,

bandits, and any other availableable-bodied men. In the end, heincreased the Army of the Northto some 25,000 men, concen-trated around San Luis Potosi. Heaccomplished this remarkable featby late December, in less thanfour months. It was the largest

force Mexico would eld during the entire war, but the reconstituted Army of the North was largely untrained and untested, with fewveteran units left from the early months of the war.

Santa Anna also faced nancial problems. He needed many moretroops and had to purchase supplies and arms, all of which requiredsubstantial funding. He drew on his personal fortune and coercedmoney from state governments, the federal coffers, and the cash-richCatholic church. He threatened and cajoled Catholic archbishops to

provide loans, grants, and even church property to pay for the cause.On the other side, President Polk and Secretary of War WilliamL. Marcy had both fumed at Taylors seemingly generous terms ofsurrender at Monterrey when they received his report on 11 October.[See CMH publication Gateway South: The Campaign for Monterrey.]The fact that Taylor allowed the Mexican Army to vacate the city withits rearms was bad enough, but they could not forgive his grantingan eight-week armistice. The president pushed ahead with his plan

to discredit Taylor, questioning the generals loyalty and vigor incontinuing the war. Finally, Marcy ordered Taylor to terminate thearmistice, an order the general received on 2 November.

President Polk also decided to give sixty-year-old Maj. Gen.Wineld Scott, general-in-chief of the U.S Army, a eld command.

Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna(Library of Congress)


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Scott was clearly not his firstchoice; in fact, the presidentdisliked him personally. ButPolk hoped to divide publicsupport between these two politi-cally ambitious Whig generals,thereby frustrating any hopesof a successful presidential bidby either in 1848. Polk wantedto promote a Democrat to takecharge, but he could not find asuitable officer. Earlier, he had

schemed with Senator ThomasHart Benton of Missouri (aninuential, egotistical, and politi-cally ambitious Democrat) to givehim command of U.S. forces inMexico, but the mere suggestioncaused a stir even among Polksstaunchest supporters. Therefore,

he had to settle on the highly professional and experienced Scott andbe satised with appointing Democrats from civilian life to generalofcer billets. Scott met with Polk on 19 November and receivedorders to take command in the eld immediately.

In mid-November, when Santa Anna received the message fromTaylor that the armistice had been terminated, he responded byhurriedly completing the defenses around San Luis Potosi. He wascertain that the Americans would attack that strategically important

city. He dispatched cavalry units northward to destroy all water tanksand wells along likely American lines of advance. Santa Anna alsosent strong detachments to watch for signs that Taylor was beginningto move south.

But Taylor believed that to force Mexico to accept a peace treatythe Polk administration would have to invade the coastal harbor ofVera Cruz and then move on to Mexico City. He believed that SantaAnna would never cede Mexicos northern territories (especially

modern New Mexico, Arizona, and California) unless the United Statesattacked what Taylor saw as the center of gravity: central Mexico andits capital, Mexico City. Taylor argued that it was impractical to attackMexico City from Monterrey: Nearly 650 miles of mostly inhospitableland would stretch American supply lines too thin. He further pointed

Thomas Hart Benton(Library of Congress)


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6 Dec 1846San Pascual

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out that his force did not havethe manpower to launch such anoperation. President Polk andSecretary Marcy agreed with thisassessment and directed Scottseld command to undertake thecampaign against Mexico City.This split American combat oper-ations into two sphereswhatwe would now call two separatetheaters of operation.

In keeping with his role of

directing the northern theater ofoperations, Taylor chose a closerobjective, the town of Saltillo,fifty miles west of Monterrey.Saltillo had considerable strategicimportance because major north-south and east-west thoroughfaresran through it. The town guarded

the southern approaches toMonterrey, Taylors main head-quarters. Saltillo also commandedthe road to the agriculturallyrich region around Parras, someseventy-ve miles farther west.

Taylor and a force of 1,000,composed mostly of regular artil-

lery companies and dragoons, lefttheir camp outside Monterrey atWalnut Springs on 12 November1846 to take Saltillo. Aftermoving off the plain in front ofMonterrey, the column rapidlyascended into the Sierra Madrefoothills. This rugged country

was quite different from the atand oppressively hot and humidregion around the Rio Grandecorridor. Along the way, theAmericans supplemented their

8 May 1846

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foodstuffs with fresh grains andfruit from numerous apple andcherry orchards. Taylor quicklyentered Saltillo and took thetown without firing a shot. TheMexican Army that had surren-dered at Monterrey had long sinceabandoned the town and movedsouth to San Luis Potosi.

Taylor directed Brig. Gen.John E. Wool to abandon hisoriginally planned expedition

in mid-November. SecretaryMarcy had ordered Woolwithsome 3,400 men organized intothe Division of the Centertomarch from San Antonio, Texas,to Chihuahua, in north-centralMexico. Wools command left theUnited States on 23 September

1846 on what proved to be a ve-month expedition. The divisionconsisted of a small core of Regular Army companies (from the 1stand 2d Dragoons, the 4th Artillery, and the 6th Infantry) as well asthree regiments of volunteers.

Wool, an excellent tactician and leader, was a strict disciplinarianand a veteran of the War of 1812 and numerous Indian conicts. Onthe march south through Mexico, he instituted harsh measures to keephis men under control. Unpopular though these measures were, they

succeeded in maintaining discipline.Taylor redirected Wools division to Monclova, 120 miles north ofSaltillo. From that position, Wool could protect rich agricultural landsthat extended through the area, occupy an alternative route to San LuisPotosi, and be in position to move on either Durango or Zacatecas,both located several hundred miles to the southwest. In addition, theforce could provide support if Taylors army were attacked. Wooloccupied Monclova without incident on 29 October and stayed in that

town for most of November. In early December, Wool marched toParras, some seventy-ve miles west of Saltillo, to close the distancebetween Taylors force and his own.

Taylor also sent a detachment of Maj. Gen. Robert Pattersonsdivision to support the Navys occupation of the Gulf Coast town

Wineld Scott(Library of Congress)


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of Tampico in early November.Patterson, a native of Irelandand one of the presidentscivilian appointees, had servedas a Regular Army captainduring the War of 1812. Afterthe war, he retired and becamea wealthy businessman andinuential Democrat. After VeraCruz, Tampico was the mostimportant port on the Gulf ofMexico. There had been calls

in that region to break awayfrom Mexico City and createan independent state. The Polkadministration hoped that anAmerican presence would furtherencourage the separatist agenda.More important, Tampico wouldmake an outstanding base for the

Navys Gulf Squadron and could be used to support an assault onVera Cruz. Pattersons men arrived on 23 November and providedsecurity until more troops could occupy the port town.

Once the Americans completed these moves, they settled intogarrison duty, an extremely unpopular mission with the volunteers.They found the daily routine boring, resented the hierarchy of thechain of command, and felt that the inaction robbed them of theopportunity to win acclaim on the battlefield. As they had on the

Rio Grande, depredations against the local populace became a majorproblem. Mexican citizens charged volunteers with theft, assault, rape,and other violent crimes. Volunteers often slipped away from campto drink and gamble at local establishments, which made them easytargets for Mexican bandits and irregulars, who took every opportu-nity to attack isolated soldiers. These attacks led volunteers to justifyvarious forms of retaliation, creating a cycle of violence that rapidlybecame a major cause of guerrilla activity that would plague American

lines of communications in northern Mexico for the next year.Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. (as of 30 June 1846) Stephen Watts Kearnyenjoyed great initial success on his march toward California. Kearnyled a column of about two thousand troops from Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, to San Diego, California, through the important commercial

John E. Wool(Library of Congress)


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center of Santa Fe in what is today New Mexico. The force thatdeparted Fort Leavenworth on 5 June 1846 included troopers fromthe 1st Dragoons, as well as several volunteer units: the 1st MissouriMounted Volunteers, the St. Louis Volunteer Artillery, the MissouriInfantry Battalion, the Laclede Rangers, the 2d Missouri Volunteers,and the Mormon Battalion. The Mormon Battalion had been raised inIowa after the Polk administration authorized church leader BrighamYoung to recruit a battalion of volunteers to serve in California.Kearny captured Santa Fe on 17 August without ring a shot. Becauseof news that American settlers had taken control of California duringthe Bear Flag Revolt, Kearny did not expect any opposition andcontinued on to California with a contingent of only 100 dragoons. But

as it turned out, he had to ght his way to the Pacic Coast, includinga major engagement at San Pascual, where he lost eighteen men killedand thirteen wounded. In January 1847, the survivors launched a jointArmy-Navy offensive in an effort to regain control of California afterthe Bear Flag rebels were themselves overthrown in September 1846.

In Mexico, Santa Anna planned his next step while Taylor consoli-dated his forces. Santa Anna gained valuable intelligence by readingU.S. newspapers, which reported that an attack on Vera Cruz was

probable. In early December, he also received information from inter-cepted message trafc that Taylor would lead an expedition to Victoria,150 miles southeast of Monterrey, and that Wool would continue hismarch to Chihuahua. These examples show that Santa Annas intel-ligence collection was impressive, if at times only partially correct.Beginning in early December, Taylor did march with Brig. Gen. DavidE. Twiggs division of volunteer regiments to Victoria, primarily tobreak the monotony of garrison duty. However, the Mexican general

did not realize that Taylor had canceled Wools march to Chihuahuaand had instead ordered the column to Monclova.On the basis of this faulty information, Santa Anna planned an

attack on Taylor before Christmas 1846. He decided to march some13,000 troops (just less than half of his total force) north to hit thesmall American force at Saltillo, some 280 miles away. Brig. Gen.William J. Worth, whom Taylor had left in command at Saltillo whilehe marched with the volunteer regiments to Victoria, heard rumors

from Mexican traders of the impending assault and hurriedly calledfor reinforcements. Taylor, already more than halfway to Victoria,hastened back to the main American position with General Twiggsentire complement of regulars, while Brig. Gen. John A. Quitmansvolunteers continued on to Victoria. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. William


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O. Butler, commander of the Monterrey garrison, called troops upfrom the Rio Grande corridor. The 55-year-old Butler had served withAndrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 andwas one of the most capable of the volunteer generals President Polkrecruited from civilian life.

At 1400 on 17 December, General Wool received an urgent pleafor assistance from Worth. Less than two and a half hours later, hiscommand struck out toward Saltillo with more than 350 wagons,400,000 musket cartridges, 400 rounds of artillery ammunition, fty-ve days worth of provisions, and about 3,400 men. His men madethe 100-mile forced march from Parras to Saltillo in less than fourdays. Wools maneuver was a textbook example of a supporting force

rapidly moving to the decisive point to concentrate and lend aid.On his arrival at Saltillo, Wool (who outranked Worth) assumed

command of the U.S. forces. He immediately began searching for thebest defensive position to make a stand. On 23 December, he selecteda pass through the Sierra Madre mountains twelve miles north of AguaNeva; the pass was called La Angostura, which means the narrows.He began planning for operations, but the preparations proved unnec-essary for the moment, as Santa Anna canceled his attack when he

heard of Wools movement. After Taylor learned of Wools arrival inSaltillo, he resumed his march toward Victoria with Twiggs divisionand took that provincial capital on 5 January 1847.

Although the danger of an attack against Saltillo had temporarilypassed, other developments made that position even more precarious.Scott, eager to take his eld command, left Washington, D.C., forthe theater of operations on 28 November 1846. He needed time toassemble troops to launch an assault against Vera Cruz before the

wet spring months, when the yellow fever season would return to thelow-lying coastal regions. En route to southern Texas, Scott wroteTaylor to reassure the popular general that he would not supersedehis command. He offered no other details but suggested they meetto discuss future operations. When Scott arrived on the Rio Grandeon 26 December, he found that Taylor was leading the expeditionto Victoria and was not available. Scott had wanted to tell Taylorpersonally that he was requisitioning Worths regulars as well as the

volunteers of Twiggs and Patterson for his Vera Cruz expedition.Instead, he sent copies of the orders to Taylor and to General Butlerat Monterrey. That decision would leave Taylor with fewer than5,000 volunteer troops, a few regular artillery companies, and twosquadrons of dragoons.


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When he received Scotts letter on 14 January 1847, Taylorexploded. He was outraged that Scott had breached protocol by requi-sitioning the units instead of requesting them from Taylor. AlthoughScott had done this to save time, Taylor took it as a direct insult. Hewas infuriated that Scott had taken most of his regulars and nearlyall of his veterans, leaving him with only a handful of green troops.Taylor considered Scotts decision a personal affront and an effort tomarginalize Taylors role in Mexico. Their relationship never recov-ered. Finally, Taylor had no intention of following Scotts directive toabandon Saltillo, return to Monterrey, and avoid sending detachmentssouth of that town.

More important, on 13 January 1847, Mexican irregulars

ambushed and killed Lt. John A. Richey, the courier carryingScotts orders to Butler. The communication methods available tocommanders during the Mexican War relied primarily on mountedmessengers. While Richey had a small guarding forceapproxi-mately ten mencouriers generally lacked an armed escort andwere easy targets for guerrillas and highway robbers. (The WarDepartment did use an early telegraph during the conict, but onlybetween the Ofce of the Quartermaster General in Washington,

D.C., and a quartermaster depot in Philadelphia. Not until theAmerican Civil War did army commanders have access to both stra-tegic and eld telegraphs.)

With this crucial intelligence, Santa Anna reinstated his plannedoffensive against Saltillo, this time with his entire army of some25,000 men. His strategic plan was simple: He would sweep theAmericans out of northern Mexico with the attack against the Armyof Occupation at Saltillo and then swing southeast to Vera Cruz to

repel Scotts invasion force before it left the coastal yellow fever zone.Santa Anna dispatched a strong force of cavalry from hisArmy of theNorth: He sent some 3,500 cavalry, with perhaps as many as 3,000additional irregulars, under Brig. Gen. Jose Urrea to disrupt Americanlines of communications between Monterrey and Matamoros. Fromhis position behind the Americans, Urrea could block their retreatfrom Saltillo and perhaps even compel their surrender. (In 1836,during the War for Texas Independence, Urrea had led a sizable

cavalry force into Texas and captured some 300 Texans at Goliad; theTexans were subsequently executed by Urreas second-in-commandon Santa Annas orders.) Santa Anna sent another cavalry force underBrig. Gen. Jose Vicente Minon to serve as a covering force in frontof Taylors force at Saltillo. Minon, a native of Spain, had originally


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fought with the Spanish Army but later changed sides and fought withthe Mexicans during the war for independence. After the MexicanWar, he put down a number of peasant rebellions. Minons objectiveswere twofold: He would screen the main body of the Mexican Armyon its march northward and, if necessary, prevent the Americans fromwithdrawing until Santa Anna arrived. With strong cavalry forces toscreen his advance and cut the Americans off from the Rio Grande,Santa Anna planned to use his superior infantry numbers to destroy theAmerican Army at Saltillo.

Operations

Santa Annas advance guard departed San Luis Potosi on 27January 1847 to clear a path northward. Over the next four days, theremaining six infantry and cavalry brigadesa force of some 21,500menbegan their march toward Saltillo, 280 miles north across astretch of dry, barren land. Santa Anna himself left the town on 2February with his personal escort, an elite, loyal unit known as theRegiment de Hussars.

The Mexican Armys weak logistics system created terrible

hardships during its three-week trek toward Saltillo. Santa AnnasNovember decision to order wells destroyed in order to delay Taylorsmove against San Luis Potosi now cost his force dearly, as his soldiersmarched with barely enough water to survive. Cold weather grippedthe region, and, because they lacked heavy coats and shoes, manyof the troops were incapacitated by illnessthe raw recruits fromtropical regions of Mexico were especially unaccustomed to boththe inclement weather and the hardships of army life. Finally, the

Mexicans lacked sufcient wagons to carry rations for their largeforce, and the land was far too barren to fully support their movement.As a result, the men were half starved by the time they reached theirdestination. Conditions were so bad that Santa Anna ordered any manfound more than one and one-half miles from camp to be shot as adeserter, even if he had fallen behind foraging for food or because hewas too weak to keep up.

Despite the appalling state of affairs, the Mexicans made remark-

able progress. Without being detected by Taylors men, Santa Annasforce began assembling in Encarnacin, less than forty miles south ofSaltillo, on 18 February. They had conducted a winter march of 240miles in about twenty-one days through a desert, averaging nearly 11 miles a day on starvation rations.


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Most Americansincluding Taylor, who had been bombardedby constant rumors of attack since before Christmasdiscountedthe latest reports. Taylor did maintain regular patrols to the southbut doubted they would nd anything because of the difculty the

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Mexican Army would have in crossing the dry plain between SanLuis Potosi and Agua Neva, a town approximately seventeen milessouth of Saltillo. One of his patrols had actually made contact withGeneral Minons cavalry screen on 16 February, a few miles northof Encarnacin. The American scouts failed to realize that they hadlocated the leading edge of Santa Annas army and instead reportedthat they had seen a few mounted irregulars.

As Santa Anna marched his army northward, Taylor moved hismain body of approximately 4,650 men seventeen miles south ofSaltillo to Agua Neva, arriving on 5 February. The move helped breakthe monotony of garrison duty and, more important, would depriveSanta Anna of the areas crucial water supply in case the Mexican

leader actually was moving north in force. The Americans enjoyedmaking camp on the wide plain surrounding the town. It offered anabundance of water and a welcome change of scenery. The position,however, was not as good for defense as they rst thought. Engineersconducting a reconnaissance of the area discovered bypasses throughthe hills both to the east and west.

Although General Wool dispatched cavalry patrols on reconnais-sance missions into the hills and to the south, Santa Annas luck in

marching undetected with such a vast army did not run out until 20February, when Lt. Col. Charles A. May and a detachment of 400 mencaptured a Mexican soldier who was sending signals at a ranch southof Agua Neva. The prisoner reported the approach of Santa Annawith a large force.

At roughly the same time, a reconnaissance party of TexasRangers, composed of volunteers under Capt. Ben McCulloch, discov-ered the main Mexican camp at Encarnacin. On receiving this news,

Taylor ordered Wools force at Agua Neva to fall back to the strongdefensive position at La Angostura.Col. Archibald Yells mounted Arkansas volunteers remained at

Agua Neva to screen the withdrawal of men and supplies. Yell andhis men, often called the Arkansas Ransackers, were among the mostundisciplined and violent volunteers serving in northern Mexico.Although popular with his soldiers, Yell had been arrested by GeneralWool in early December for disobeying orders. After midnight on

the morning of 21 February, Yells pickets made contact with SantaAnnas advancing force. His volunteers burned the remaining storesand pulled back to the new American position at La Angostura.

General Wool had rst considered defending La Angostura on 23December 1846, during the pre-Christmas attack scare, and had used


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the area as his headquarters in early February when Taylor moved hisarmy to Agua Neva. The pass lay slightly more than a mile south ofhacienda de Buena Vista, for which the Americans later named thebattle. In stark contrast with the broad plains around Agua Neva, atLa Angostura the strategically important Saltillo road descended into a2 -mile-wide valley in the Sierra Madre mountains. Steep rock wallslined the road on either side, and steep gullies and ravines ran perpen-dicular to the road, which limited lateral mobility across the valley.

The Saltillo road ran roughly north-south through the valley on itswestern edge. The road itself traversed three miles of the narrow passof La Angostura and at one point contracted to a mere forty feet wide.South of this contraction, a small hill dominated the SaltilloAgua

Neva road, while deep gullies with steep slopes made any ankingmovement to the west impracticable. On the eastern side, fty-foot-high bluffs led up to what was known as the plateau, a piece of highground approximately a mile and a half wide. These bluffs preventedartillery, cavalry, or large infantry formations from exiting the valleyexcept where the ravines cut the heights.

Deep, steep-sided ravines ran perpendicular to the road andextended eastward to the foot of the Sierra Madres. Although small

groups of infantrymen could climb the rugged sides of the cuts ontothe plateau, it was much more difcult for larger infantry units tryingto maintain their formation to do so. Cavalry and artillery could gainaccess to the plateau only at the head of one of the many ravinescutting through the terrain.

The area was ideal for a defensive operation, which is exactly whatWool needed to maximize his limited manpower. If Wool could defendthe Saltillo road, he would rob Santa Anna of the only high-speed

avenue of approach through the valley. Since it would be very difcultfor Santa Anna to move onto the plateau in numbers, Wool hoped toturn the battle into a regimental ght. After Scott requisitioned mostof Taylors troops, the American presence in the north was little morethan a skeleton force of 4,750 men and thirteen cannon at Buena Vista.With American forces in central Mexico drastically reduced, few rein-forcements were available to Taylor. Outside the SaltilloBuena Vistaforce, there was only the garrison force in Monterrey, fty-ve miles

away.Taylors force at Buena Vista consisted primarily of volunteerinfantry, of whom only Col. Jefferson Davis, Taylors son-in-law, and his1st Mississippi Ries had experienced combat. The remainder of the forcecomprised Brig. Gen. Joseph Lanes Indiana Brigade (which consisted


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of Col. William A. Bowles 2dIndiana Infantry and Col. JamesH. Lanes 3d Indiana Infantry);Col. John Hardins 1st IllinoisInfantry; Col. William Bissells 2dIllinois Infantry (to which Capt. P.Edward Conners Texas VolunteerCompany was attached); Col.Humphrey Marshalls 1st Kentucky(which contained a mixture ofmounted and dismounted troops);and Col. William McKees 2d

Kentucky Infantry. Yells Arkansascavalry regiment and McCullochsmounted Texas Rangers constitutedthe volunteer cavalry. The onlyRegular Army troops under Taylorscommand were three companiesof artillery (Capt. Braxton BraggsCompany C, 3d Artillery; Capt.

Thomas W. Shermans Company E,3d Artillery; and Capt. John M. Washingtons Company B, 4th Artillery)and two squadrons of dragoons (Capt. Enoch Steens and Lt. Col. CharlesA. Mays squadrons of the 1st and 2d Dragoons, respectively). Commandand control was problematic, as no units other than Lanes brigade of tworegiments were organized into larger formations; instead, all reporteddirectly to General Wool, whom Taylor had designated as the forwardcommander. Three cannon and seven infantry companies remained at

Saltillo to defend the American line of communications; they did notparticipate in the battle.Santa Annas army dwarfed its American counterpart. More than

15,000 men had completed the 280-mile march to La Angostura, thelast fty miles of which were through a waterless desert. In SantaAnna, the Mexicans had a charismatic leader who continually exhortedhis soldiers to liberate Mexico. Although many of his troops were half-trained and all were physically taxed, they were highly motivated and

ready to ght.Unlike Taylor, Santa Anna organized his more numerous regimentsinto brigades and divisions. Maj. Gen. Francisco Pachecos VanguardDivision consisted of regiments of the 1st and 2d Active Militia ofGuanajuato. Maj. Gen. Pedro de Ampudias Light Infantry Brigade

Jefferson Davis(National Portrait Gallery,Smithsonian Institution)


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was made up of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Light Infantry regiments. Maj.Gen. Manuel Lombardinis Center Division consisted of the 1st, 3d,5th, 10th, and 11th Line Infantry regiments, mostly veteran troops.Maj. Gen. Jose Maria Ortega commanded the Rear Guard Divisions12th Line Infantry, also lled with veterans, as well as assorted militiaunits. The cavalry riding with Santa Annas force was divided into fourbrigades commanded by Generals Minon, Julian Juvera, AnastasioTorrejon, and Manuel Andrade. Santa Anna also had an artillery train,engineers, and other militia and sapper (zapadore) units at his disposal.Finally, General Urrea commanded an observation division consistingof Brig. Gen. Ciriaco Vasquezs infantry brigade supported by nearly3,500 cavalrymen and various irregulars; however, this unit was not

involved at Buena Vista and instead attacked Taylors line of supplybetween the Rio Grande and Monterrey.

Santa Annas chief of engineers, Ignacio Mora y Vallamil, person-ally commanded the Army of the Norths heavy artillery (approxi-mately ten pieces), while the remaining thirty guns were interspersedamong the various divisions. The Mexican guns were for the mostpart heavier than the American ones and not nearly as mobile. Thenumerous ravines and rough terrain prevented the heavier guns from

moving forward to remain in range of the Americans as the battleprogressed northward.

Santa Anna had two other units of note. TheRegiment de Hussars,the best-trained unit in Mexico, was Santa Annas personal guard. TheLegion de Extranjeros were mostly Irish Catholic immigrants who haddeserted from the U.S. Army; they were perhaps the most highly moti-vated troops on the battleeldthey knew that if they were captured,they might be hanged for treason. Later in the conict, they became

known as the San Patricio (Saint Patrick) Battalion.Wool realized that Santa Anna had only four options: (1) advanceup the Saltillo road, overwhelm the force there, and catch theAmerican forces in the ank; (2) gain the heights of the plateau toattack the American center; (3) advance across the ground betweenthe plateau and the Sierra Madre, which afforded a direct approachto Buena Vista, where the Americans had an advanced supply depot;or (4) attempt a combination of the three, hoping to break the U.S.

line at some point. On the afternoon of 21 February, in anticipationof these moves, Wool began deploying his troops in an irregularline. To defend the Saltillo road approach, he positioned CaptainWashingtons five-gun battery (Company B, 4th Artillery) on asmall hill facing south down the narrows and ordered wagons lled


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with rocks pushed across the path to preclude any Mexican attemptto charge the battery with cavalry. The 1st Illinois, commanded byColonel Hardin, supported the guns from hastily constructed posi-tions. One of Hardins battalions was entrenched on the right at thenarrowest point of the roadway and extended to the natural ravine;Hardins main body, with a single cannon from Washingtons battery,occupied breastworks on a high hill a short distance to the left andin front of the battery. Colonel McKees 2d Kentucky, on the armysfar right ank, provided additional security from a large hill westof Washingtons position. Wool posted Colonel Bissells 2d Illinoisto guard McKees left ank. Bissell took up position approximatelyone-half mile behind the Kentuckians. General Lanes brigade of the

2d and 3d Indiana regiments formed additional lines behind Bissell.Yells Arkansas cavalry and the 1st Kentuckys mounted companiesguarded the path that led up to the plateau farther to the east. Twodragoon squadrons and Texas volunteers made up a mobile reserveforce. The remaining American troops remained in Saltillo to protectthe trains there and to serve as a reserve force.

While the Americans moved into position, Santa Anna had acrucial decision to make at Encarnacin, nearly thirty miles south of

La Angostura. Although he had lost the element of surprise, SantaAnna doubtless felt that his superior numbers would win the day, sohe committed his forces to the only offensive he would launch duringthe entire Mexican War. At 1100 on 21 February, his weary soldiersmoved onto the Saltillo road for the march north, each carrying a fullcanteen and three days rations. He was determined to make a forcedmarch to Agua Neva, approximately twenty-three miles north overwaterless ground, by nightfall. Pushed to the brink of collapse, the

Mexican soldiers dragged themselves into camp at the end of themarch. There they spent a bitterly cold night without benet of resfor fear of detection by American patrols. Before dawn, they begantheir approach over the nal twelve miles that lay between them andthe U.S. Army at La Angostura.

Buena Vista: The Battle Begins22 February 1847

Santa Annas cavalry screen made contact with the Americans at0900 on 22 February and began reconnoitering the eld. Wool notiedTaylor, who rushed to the eld with most of the Saltillo garrison. Taylorgave Wool direct tactical command over the American position, as Wool


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OPENING POSITIONS

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was much more familiar with theground. Taylor would serve as amotivator and calming influenceon the outnumbered Americansand would retain responsibility forprotecting Saltillo. As the tacticalcommander, Wool decided to keepthe newly arrived troops in reservefor the time being.

As the Americans watchedthe Mexican Army concentrate,Taylors veterans realized that

this ght would be very differentfrom those they had fought earlierin the conflict. During the twoprevious battlesat Resaca dela Palma and Monterreyit wasthe Mexicans who had chosenstrong defensive ground that theAmericans overran. Here the

roles were reversedit was theAmericans who were forced tomake a desperate stand against anattacking army.

It took Santa Annas largeforce several hours to drawtogether and move into posi-tion. Santa Anna placed three

sixteen-pound guns supportedby the Regiment de Hussarson the Saltillo road and Brig.Gen. Francisco Mejia's infantrybrigade father west (acrossdeep gullies) to protect his left.Pachecos Vanguard Division,along with Lombardinis CenterDivision

and fourteen pieces ofartillery, made up the Mexicancenter, while Ortegas RearGuard Division was held inreserve just behind the others.

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Santa Anna positioned Maj. Gen. Pedro de AmpudiasLight Infantry

Brigade, Brig. Gen. Julian Juveras 2d Cavalry Brigade, and twobatteries on the right.

The Mexican forces were in position and ready to initiate contactat 1500, but Santa Anna decided it was too late in the day to undertakea concerted action and instead determined to probe the American left.He sent Ampudias light brigade to the base of the Sierra Madre on theeastern side of the pass, where they began scaling one of the peaks insearch of a path onto the plateau.

Wool observed the movement and responded by sending threecompanies of Kentucky cavalry, Lt. Col. John S. Roane with fourcompanies of dismounted Arkansas riemen, and Maj. Willis A.Gorman with four companies of infantry from the 3d Indiana, allunder the command of Col. Humphrey Marshall. He also sent the 2dIndiana and Capt. John OBriens section of guns into the large gapbetween the main American position centered around Washingtonsguns on the Saltillo road and Marshalls command a mile to the

south.A deep ravine hampered the Mexicans forward progress andseparated the two sides. They exchanged sporadic re over this topo-graphic feature for several hours, but neither was able to advance inany numbers. A small Mexican contingent did manage to work its way

Carl Nebel's Battle of Buena Vista (Library of Congress)


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across the ravine before nightfall, but the American position remainedintact. Fighting quickly tapered off, but both groups remained on themountainside throughout the night.

The night of 22 February was a miserable one for the soldiers inboth armies. A cold drizzle fell for several hours. Neither commandallowed campres, so the troops huddled together for warmth. Manyof the Mexican soldiers consumed their nal rations. They would haveto overwhelm the defenders and capture their supplies if they hoped toeat another meal at Buena Vista.

At 0200 on 23 February, Wool and Santa Anna began to reposi-tion their units for the coming ght. Ampudia received a number ofadditional troops to make a concerted effort against the American left.

Santa Annas chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Manuel Micheltorena, tookdirect control of ve eight-pound artillery pieces and posted them ontoa knoll overlooking the plateau. Santa Anna augmented his troopson the Saltillo road and placed them under the command of GeneralSantiago Blanco. With these moves, Santa Anna positioned himself tooverwhelm the American left, assault its center, and smash through itsdefenses on the Saltillo road.

Wool anticipated Santa Annas all-out effort and shufed his own

troops. Washingtons battery with the 1st Illinois in support remainedin its original location on the Saltillo road. Wool reinforced Marshallsposition on the left side of the line with Maj. Xerxes F. Trialscompanies of Illinois troops and Captain Conners Texas VolunteerCompany. Wool also strengthened his presence on the plateau bysending Bowles 2d Indiana, supported by OBriens three guns, somethree-quarters of a mile south and east of Washingtons position on theSaltillo road and just north of Marshalls men on the mountainside.

Bowles anchored his left on the edge of a deep ravine. Bissells 2dIllinois and Capt. Thomas W. Shermans battery guarded Bowlesright. Colonel McKees 2d Kentucky moved to Bissells right, butMcKees own right ank simply ended in the middle of the plateauwithout any protection. Wool held Captain Steens troops of the 1stDragoons, McCullochs Texas Rangers, and the 3d Indiana in reserveto the rear of the main line. After the troops moved into their new posi-tions, the American line stretched roughly a mile from north to south.

Shortly before dawn, Santa Anna ordered each of his regimentsto play reveille at a different time to emphasize the size of his forceand intimidate the Americans. His men quickly moved into theirpredetermined jump-off points and prepared to strike across the entireAmerican front.


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the Mexicans from immediatelyoutanking the entire Americanposition. Shermans and Braggsguns ripped into the attackingMexican infantry, inflictingheavy casualties on the massedranks and temporarily haltingthe advance. Meanwhile, theAmericans managed to retainsome of the plateaus critical highground.

With the American left

collapsing, Marshalls men onthe mountain faced encirclement.He quickly ordered them ontothe plateau, but a large numberof his cavalry remounted theirhorses and rode north toward thehacienda de Buena Vista, openingan unopposed avenue of attack

directly to the supply depot atthe hacienda. Fortunately forthe Americans, a brief lull inthe fighting gave each side anopportunity to regroup. But thesituation did not look promisingfor Wool: In less than forty-veminutes of ghting, his entire left

had collapsed.

Buena Vista: Second Day, LateMorning

23 February 1847

Taylor reached the eld withthe 1st Mississippi shortly before

1000 As soon as he arrived, Woolwent to the threatened sector andbegan collecting as many troopsas he could find to establishanother line. While Washingtons

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battery and the 1st Illinois heldtheir original location, the rest ofthe position was in disarray. Woolcobbled together the 2d Illinois,2d Kentucky, Shermans andBraggs batteries, and remnantsof the 2d Indiana into a brokenline that ran from Washingtonsguns on the Saltillo road acrossthe plateau to the northeasttoward Buena Vista. As a result,he forfeited much of the plateau

to the Mexicans. Wool sent the1st Mississippi and later the 3dIndiana, as well as the Arkansasand Kentucky cavalry, to the eastto intercept Juveras horsemenbefore they reached Buena Vista.

After taking a few momentsto rest, Juveras cavalry slipped

past the plateau before theAmerican blocking force couldtake position and rode quicklytoward Buena Vista. OnlyYells Arkansas and MarshallsKentucky cavalry, along with asmall group of Steens dragoons,made the one-mile trip north

to the hacienda before theMexicans struck. The volunteersdismounted and formed a defen-sive ring around the outside ofthe hacienda. Inside the build-ings, civilian teamsters, as wellas remnants of the 2d Indiana andother units that had fled north

after the initial Mexican assaulton their left, made up the defense.Juveras first attack caused

many of the dismounted Arkansasand Kentucky volunteers to ee.

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re only when Torrejons force came within seventy yards of his ownmen. The deadly effectiveness of the close-range volley brought theMexicans to a standstill. Additional musket volleys and canister fromShermans gun discomted the surviving lancers still further. Seeingthat the advance had stalled completely, the Mississippians chargedforward and drove the lancers away.

Torrejons force, along with some of the infantry swept up in hislancers retreat, took shelter in a nearby ravine. Once there, however,they became trapped and were unable to return to the main Mexicanline. At approximately 1300, as the Americans prepared to attackthe isolated force of some 2,000 men, Mexican ofcers approachedwith a white ag. Taylor ordered all ring stopped and Wool met

with the ofcers. They asked what General Taylor wanted. Wooltook the ag and tried to meet with Santa Anna but was greeted byartillery re. The ag of truce had been a ruse that allowed the bulkof Torrejons and Ortegas men to slip past the Americans and regaintheir own line.

After nearly seven hours of desperate ghting, another lull fellover the battleeld. Both sides recovered as many of their woundedas possible and rested their tired men and horses. While the Mexican

attacks had turned the American left, threatened the American forwardsupply depot at the hacienda de Buena Vista, and cost Taylor a numberof casualties, Santa Anna had failed to drive the U.S. Army out of LaAngostura. The Mexican general decided to take a nal gamble withhis superior manpower. He sent General Minons cavalry brigade on awide sweep eastward around the American position to capture Taylorsprimary supply center at Saltillo. Minon never attacked, however,because he found the depot too well guarded. Meanwhile, Santa

Anna massed as many men as possible to drive through the center ofthe American line. He moved his artillery forward, called up all hisreserves, and created a new unit out of the wreckage of Ampudias,Lombardinis, Pachecos, and Ortegas divisions. He placed this unitunder the control of Brig. Gen. Francisco Perez, the only Mexicanleader not yet engaged. The newly formed command began movingtoward the plateau at approximately 1500.

Buena Vista: Second Day, The Final Attack23 February 1847

The assault forces vanguard reached its objective at 1700. TheMexicans emerged from one of the ravines and immediately ran


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into fire from several sectionsof OBriens and Thomas guns,which were guarding the centerof the plateau. The Mexicansquickly backtracked into theravine to escape the artillerysconcentrated fire and awaitreinforcements.

The Americans viewed this asa general retreat. Colonel Hardin,apparently without receivingdirections from Taylor or Wool,

ordered the 1st and 2d Illinois and2d Kentucky regiments forwardin pursuit. But instead of ndingthe Mexicans falling back, theystumbled directly into the mainbody of Perezs force. Shockedand too close to use their muskets,the American volunteers were

drawn into a bloody hand-to-hand melee. Hardin and Lt. Col.Henry Clay Jr., son of the famousSenator and outspoken critic ofthe war against Mexico, were bothmortally wounded while ghtinga holding action to allow theirmen to fall back to the plateau.

The American artillerymen firedround after round of canister intothe Mexican lines at point-blankrange but were overwhelmedby the seemingly inexhaustiblemanpower. Two of OBriens gunswere overrun when the majorityof their crews were wounded and

the horses necessary to pull themto safety were shot. The situa-tion was criticalit appeared thatSanta Anna would break throughand win the day.

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Braggs battery and the remainder of Shermans, some tenadditional guns, raced forward toward the breach on the plateauwith orders from Taylor to maintain the position at every hazard.Lacking infantry support, the two audaciously unlimbered theirguns a mere fty yards from the Mexican line. Desperate to wreakas much havoc as possible on the approaching Mexican formation,they loaded the cannon with double canister and red. The Americanguns cut down scores of Perezs men. Each discharge from themassed artillery blew gaping holes in the tightly packed columns,and the attack stalled in the face of the murderous cannon re. Thesevere undulations of the terrain prevented the numerically superiorMexican force from shifting from column to line formation, which

kept all but the most forward troops from ring while maximizingthe destructive effects of the American artillery. When the lead unitsrecoiled from the point-blank re, the soldiers behind them wereunable to deploy.

One of the most famous quotes from the Mexican War was utteredat this time. As Bragg began ring, he sent an aide to Taylor for addi-tional instructions. Taylor responded with Tell him to give em hell!This exchange has been romanticized and altered by many writers.

The most common altered version has Taylor calmly informing hissubordinate to add, A little more grape, Captain Bragg. This versionalmost certainly is inaccurate, as the American guns were firingcanister rounds, not grapeshot. Another version has Taylor saying,Well, double-shot your guns and give em hell, Bragg.

Seeing his attack wavering, Santa Anna committed Torrejons andAndrades cavalry to try to break the American line. As the lancerscharged, Captain Washingtons battery began lobbing spherical shell

(exploding shells) into their formations. The accurate ring forced thecavalry to break off and try to reform out of range of the artillery.An unexpected rain squall in the valley stopped all hostilities at

approximately 1800. By that time, both sides were exhausted. TheMexican assault had spent itself. While they had managed to gain afoothold on the plateau, the Mexican infantry had suffered signicantlosses at the hands of the U.S. artillery. American artillerymen hadalso checked the cavalry advance.

Taylors force had fared little better. Many of his infantry regi-ments suffered signicant losses. His artillerymen were fatigued afternearly twelve hours of constant maneuvering over broken ground.They had lost a number of guns, horses, and other equipment duringthe close-quarters combat on the plateau.


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During the lull, the Mexican forces slowly withdrew toward theiroriginal line. Taylor and Wool collected what men they could andbegan piecing together another defensive line. The American troopsspent another sleepless night on the plateau and braced themselves foran assault in the morning. Most realized that in their current state theycould not repulse another Mexican advance. When dawn broke on themorning of 24 February, they were stunned to nd that Santa Anna hadwithdrawn his army toward Agua Neva during the night. The soldierscheered as word spread, while Taylor and Wool embraced each other.The U.S. Army had withstood Santa Annas onslaught.

Santa Annas decision to retreat was a major tactical blunder. Hestill had a huge numerical advantage over Taylor, and he had pushed

the Americans to the brink of collapse. Taylor and Wool could nothave withstood another assault on the plateau. On the other hand,Santa Annas force, although numerous, was tired and hungry after itslong forced march and had sustained heavy casualties, primarily at thehand of the U.S. artillery. Santa Anna apparently decided that the risksof another attack at Buena Vista were too great. Instead, he decided toescape and prepare to meet Wineld Scott in Vera Cruz.

The costs to both sides were great, especially compared with the

opening battles of the war. Taylor lost 272 men killed, 387 wounded,and 6 missing in action. This represented some 14 percent of his totalforce engaged. Santa Annas men fared even worse: Mexican lossesamounted to 591 killed, 1,048 wounded, and some 1,894 missing ordesertednearly 18 percent of his army.

Shortly after the battle, Taylor felt it necessary to defend his deci-sion to engage Santa Annas force south of Saltillo against charges ofpoor military judgment leveled by members of Polks administration.

Many also questioned Taylors failure to follow Scotts directiveto remain in Monterrey. Taylor argued that whatever his losses atBuena Vista, the consequences would have been far more severe hadSanta Anna caught the American force in Monterrey. It became clear,however, that administration ofcials no longer supported Taylor andthat he would not play a signicant role in the remainder of the war.

War Ends in the NorthSanta Anna stopped to rest for a short time at Agua Neva before

beginning the long trek back to San Luis Potosi. Taylors men brieyadvanced as far south as Encarnacin to monitor the Mexican retreatand make sure they did not turn back toward the American camp.


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6

By March, however, Taylor abandoned his advanced positions andconsolidated all his forces at Monterrey.

While the ghting raged at Buena Vista, General Urrea had led hiscavalry brigade around the American position into its line of commu-nications and united with irregulars under General Canales, who hadbeen conducting guerrilla operations. Together, on 22 February theysevered the strategically important Monterrey-Camargo road, whichcarried supplies to Taylors force from the Rio Grande. For the nexttwo weeks, they terrorized the local population and ambushed severalsupply trains, killing all the teamsters and drivers. Urrea also launchedraids against many of the isolated American garrisons along the route,especially Marin, the main link between Camargo and Monterrey.

American forces were able to defend themselves, but the flow ofsupplies ceased. On 2 March, Taylor sent a large relief force north.They caught up with Urreas forces outside Marin on 16 March, butthe Mexican general slipped away before he became fully engaged.Taylor reopened the Monterrey-Camargo road but did not completelyeliminate the threat to his line of communications.

Taylors forces spent the remainder of the war in various garri-sons around Monterrey. They fought no other major engagements

and instead focused on counterinsurgency operations. Taylor himselfstayed in Monterrey through 6 November 1847, when he transferredcommand of the Army of Occupation to Wool. Granted leave by theWar Department, Taylor returned to his plantation in Baton Rouge,Louisiana, in time to mount his successful bid for the presidency in1848.

Wool maintained command over the Army of Occupation for theremainder of the conict and ultimately succeeded in limiting guerrilla

attacks against his forces. He also worked to normalize everyday lifefor Mexican citizens by reopening schools and other public places.

Analysis

The Buena Vista campaign offered the U.S. Army a variety oflessons, none of which was formalized into doctrine until WilliamHardee, a captain in the Mexican War, wrote a new tactics manual

in 1855. The practical experience of the junior ofcers, most WestPoint trained, influenced their thinking up to and in many casesthroughout the American Civil War. The battle of Buena Vista illus-trated the importance of being able to concentrate forces quickly whenconducting operations deep in enemy territory, especially when you


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are outnumbered. The battle further reinforced the informal doctrineof deploying artillery in advanced positions without infantry support,which many ofcers who fought in the Mexican War attempted to usein the Civil War fteen years later. The Army learned that divisionsand their subordinate brigades, under experienced commanders, werenecessary to control the actions of multiple regiments.

In terms of operational movement, General Wools 800-milemarch from San Antonio, Texas, to Buena Vista was one of the best-conceived and best-executed maneuvers of the war. Wools strictdisciplinary measures kept his three thousand soldiers well in handduring the march, and he continually planned for future operationsthroughout his expedition. For example, Wool reconnoitered the route

from Monclova to Saltillo long before he received General Worthsmessage to hurry south in December 1846. Wool put his entire forceon the road toward Saltillo within hours of receiving Worths call foraid and marched his men 120 miles in less than four days to reachthe threatened American position. Wools action, which forced SantaAnna to abandon his rst planned attack against Taylors army, was atextbook example of rapidly concentrating divided forces. Wool alsochose and defended La Angostura pass. He deserves great credit for

being the architect of the American victory.Artillery was a key factor in Taylors victory at Buena Vista. The

artillerymen used their access to the plateau and the Saltillo road tomove rapidly across the battleeld and reach critical points wheretheir repower was needed. Furthermore, they audaciously unlimberedtheir guns close to advancing Mexican forces, often without infantrysupport. They used this aggressive tactic to stem several attacksthat could have easily enveloped and decimated the small American

force. Without the artillery, Taylors inexperienced and outnumberedinfantrymen would probably not have withstood Santa Annas offen-sive. However, while the use of unsupported artillery proved verysuccessful against Mexican intlock muskets, Civil War artillerymenwho faced ried musket re found deploying forward without infantryto be deadly.

The circumstances leading up to the battle at Buena Vistaalso led to internal divisions within the American officer corps.

During the initial phase of the war, the U.S. Armys small groupof professional ofcers fought well, bonded, and helped vindicatethe importance of the Regular Army. A rift developed, however,between Generals Taylor and Scott that many of their subordinatesperpetuated in the following months. Taylor never forgave Scott for


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requisitioning the bulk of his troops without formally requestingthe transfer. Ofcers under both commanders took sides and helpedsow the seeds of discontent. Throughout the remainder of the war,relationships remained politically charged, and ofcers often leveledpublic and unsubstantiated attacks against their fellow ofcers fromthe other camp.

Buena Vista had several implications for the United States. First,the battle was politically important for Zachary Taylor. He survivedPresident Polks plan to discredit him and limit his public appeal.Instead, Polk unknowingly set the stage for Taylors greatest victoryand helped him easily secure the Whig nomination and ultimately winthe 1848 presidential contest.

The victory also had a powerful effect on the American view ofvolunteer soldiers. Although some units had broken and run, othersstood and fought well. For some, the Armys success at Buena Vistaconrmed the widely held belief that an army of citizen-soldiers couldtriumph in the face of any enemy force, no matter its size. This popularbelief ignored the fact that it was American artillery, commanded bytrained professionals, that had ultimately won the day. Without theconstant movement of well-served American guns to each crisis point,

Santa Anna and the Mexican Army could well have won their victory.While the artillery deserves much of the credit for the U.S victory,

Santa Annas failure to carry the eld at Buena Vista was principallydue to the eminently defensible terrain held by U.S. units, whichforced the Mexican Army to fight in column rather than line andgreatly hindered Mexican efforts to quickly reinforce the successtheir units had on the battleeld. Because of the terrain, Santa Annasattacks occurred at isolated points and irregular intervals along the

American front, which gave the U.S. artillery time to race to troublespots and repulse the Mexican advances. Santa Anna also suffered afailure of will on the night of 23 February, when he decided not to riskanother attack and the possible disintegration of his army because oflack of food and water.

Santa Anna remained undeterred in his ght against the invadingYanqui, even as he and his force limped back to San Luis Potosi.When he learned of the coming American offensive at Vera Cruz,

he shifted his attention from the defeat by Taylors small Army ofOccupation and began preparations to meet General Scotts army. Hefocused all of his considerable energy on stopping the new Americanassault aimed at the heart of Mexico.


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After the battle of Buena Vista, Santa Annas supporters managedto convince the Mexican public that the battle and subsequent with-drawal from Buena Vista constituted a victory. In so doing, theywere able to rally public support for both Santa Anna and the conictagainst the American invaders. Indeed, the reported success atBuena Vista ensured Santa Anna of a strong military reputation amonghis compatriots throughout the war. As for his soldiers, they had doneeverything asked of them. They had marched nearly ve hundredmiles in forty days over grueling terrain; fought a dispiriting battle thatthey had nearly won; and suffered 10,500 casualties from battleeldlosses, hunger, disease, and desertion. The men had been let down bytheir commander, not the other way around.

Santa Anna took several of the elite units that had been part of hisArmy of the Northincluding theRegiment de Hussars, theLegion deExtranjeros, and General AmpudiasLight Infantry Brigadesouth toMexico City. These units formed the core of his newly created Armyof the Eastto meet Scotts invasion. Later, the remaining organizationsfrom the Buena Vista campaign marched eastward to Mexico Citysdefense, but the Mexican Army never again came as close to successas it had at Buena Vista. For the Mexican Army, the campaign and

battle at Buena Vista was one of the great might-have-beens of theMexican War. With great effort and self-sacrice, Santa Annas Armyof the North came close to making the cost of the war perhaps morethan the United States was willing to pay. However, with the Mexicandefeat, the United States was poised to strike deep into Mexico in abold attempt to win the war in a single stroke.


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COVER

The Battle of Buena Vista (Library of Congress);

below,A Little More Grape Capt Bragg (Library of Congress)


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BUENA VISTA 1847

CMH PUB 734

desparate stand the battle of buena vista

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