descartes - introducere

8/9/2019 Descartes - Introducere

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Ren Descartes (15961650)

Ren Descartes is often credited with being the Father of Modern

Philosophy. This title is justified due both to his brea with the traditional!cholastic"#ristotelian philosophy pre$alent at his ti%e and to his

de$elop%ent and pro%otion of the new& %echanistic sciences. 'is

funda%ental brea with !cholastic philosophy was twofold. First& Descartes

thought that the !cholastics( %ethod was prone to doubt gi$en their reliance

on sensation as the source for all nowledge. !econd& he wanted to replace

their final causal %odel of scientific explanationwith the %ore %odern&

%echanistic %odel.

Descartes atte%pted to address the for%er issue $ia his %ethod of doubt.

'is basic strategy was to consider false any belief that falls prey to e$en the

slightest doubt. This hyperbolic doubt then ser$es to clear the way for

what Descartes considers to be an unprejudiced search for the truth. This

clearing of his pre$iously held beliefs then puts hi% at

an epistemologicalground")ero. Fro% here Descartes sets out to find

so%ething that lies beyond all doubt. 'e e$entually disco$ers that * e+ist

is i%possible to doubt and is& therefore& absolutely certain. *t is fro% this

point that Descartes proceeds to de%onstrate God(s e+istence and that ,od

cannot be a decei$er. This& in turn& ser$es to fi+ the certainty of e$erything

that is clearly and distinctly understood and pro$ides the episte%ological

foundation Descartes set out to find.

-nce this conclusion is reached& Descartes can proceed to rebuild his

syste% of pre$iously dubious beliefs on this absolutely certain foundation.

These beliefs& which are re"established with absolute certainty& include the

e+istence of a world of bodies e+ternal to the %ind& the dualisticdistinction

of the i%%aterial %ind fro% the body& and his %echanistic %odel of physics

based on the clear and distinct ideas of geo%etry. This points toward his

second& %ajor brea with the !cholastic #ristotelian tradition in that

Descartes intended to replace their syste% based on final causal

e+planations with his syste% based on %echanistic principles. Descartes

also applied this %echanistic fra%ewor to the operation of plant& ani%al

and hu%an bodies& sensation and the passions. #ll of this e$entually

cul%inating in a %oral syste% based on the notion of generosity.
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The presentation below pro$ides an o$er$iew of Descartes( philosophical

thought as it relates to these $arious %etaphysical& episte%ological&

religious& %oral and scientific issues& co$ering the wide range of his

published wors and correspondence.

Table of Contents

. Life

/. The Modern Turn

. Against Scholasticism

/. Descartes Project

0. Method

1. The Mind

. Cogito, ergo sum

/. The ature of the Mind and its !deas

2. God

. The Causal Arguments

/. The "ntological Argument

3. The #pistemological $oundation

. A%solute Certaint& and the Cartesian Circle

/. 'o( to A)oid #rror

4. Mind*+od& elation

. The eal Distinction

/. The Mind*+od& Pro%lem

5. +od& and the Ph&sical Sciences

. #xistence of the #xternal -orld

/. The ature of +od&

0. Ph&sics

1. Animal and 'uman +odies

6. Sensations and Passions

7. Moralit&

. The Pro)isional Moral Code

/. Generosit&

. eferences and $urther eading

. Primar& Sources

/. Secondar& Sources
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1. Life

Ren Descartes was born to 8oachi% Descartes and 8eanne 9rochard on

March 0& 263 in :a 'aye& France near Tours. 'e was the youngest of the

couple(s three sur$i$ing children. The oldest child& Pierre& died soon after

his birth on -ctober 6& 256. 'is sister& 8eanne& was probably born

so%eti%e the following year& while his sur$i$ing older brother& also na%ed

Pierre& was born on -ctober 6& 26. The Descartes clan was a bourgeois

fa%ily co%posed of %ostly doctors and so%e lawyers. 8oachi% Descartes

fell into this latter category and spent %ost of his career as a %e%ber of the

pro$incial parlia%ent.

#fter the death of their %other& which occurred soon after Ren(s birth& thethree Descartes children were sent to their %aternal grand%other& 8eanne

!ain& to be raised in :a 'aye and re%ained there e$en after their father

re%arried in 377. ;ot %uch is nown about his early childhood& but Ren

is thought to ha$e been a sicly and fragile child& so %uch so that when he

was sent to board at the 8esuit college at :a Fleche on or logic? and the %athe%atical arts co%prised of

arith%etic& %usic& geo%etry and astrono%y. The course of study was

capped off with courses in %etaphysics& natural philosophy and ethics.

Descartes is nown to ha$e disdained the i%practical subjects despite

ha$ing an affinity for the %athe%atical curriculu%. 9ut& all things

considered& he did recei$e a $ery broad liberal arts education before lea$ing

:a Fleche in 31.

:ittle is nown of Descartes( life fro% 31"35. 9ut what is nown is that

during 32"33 he recei$ed a degree and a license in ci$il and canon law at

the @ni$ersity of Poiters. 'owe$er& so%e speculate that fro% 31"32

Descartes suffered a ner$ous breadown in a house outside of Paris and that

he li$ed in Paris fro% 33"35. The story pics up in the su%%er of 35

when Descartes went to the ;etherlands to beco%e a $olunteer for the ar%y

of Maurice of ;assau. *t was during this ti%e that he %et *saac 9ee%an&who was& perhaps& the %ost i%portant influence on his early adulthood. *t


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was 9ee%an who reindled Descartes( interest in science and opened his

eyes to the possibility of applying %athe%atical techniAues to other fields.

#s a ;ew Bear(s gift to 9ee%an& Descartes co%posed a treatise on %usic&

which was then considered a branch of %athe%atics& entitled Compendium

Musicae. *n 36 Descartes began serious wor on %athe%atical and

%echanical proble%s under 9ee%an(s guidance and& finally& left the

ser$ice of Maurice of ;assau& planning to tra$el through ,er%any to join

the ar%y of Ma+i%ilian of 9a$aria.

*t is during this year >36? that Descartes was stationed at @l% and had

three drea%s that inspired hi% to see a new method for scientific in.uir&and

to en$isage a unified science. !oon afterwards& in 3/7& he began looing for

this new %ethod& starting but ne$er co%pleting se$eral wors on %ethod&

including drafts of the first ele$en rules ofRules for the Direction of the

Mind. Descartes wored on and off on it for years until it was finally

abandoned for good in 3/5. During this ti%e& he also wored on other&

%ore scientifically oriented projects such as optics. *n the course of these

inAuiries& it is possible that he disco$ered the law of refraction as early as

3/3. *t is also during this ti%e that Descartes had regular contact with

Father Marin Mersenne& who was to beco%e his long ti%e friend and

contact with the intellectual co%%unity during his /7 years in the

;etherlands.

Descartes %o$ed to the ;etherlands in late 3/5 and& despite se$eral

changes of address and a few trips bac to France& he re%ained there until

%o$ing to !weden at the in$itation of Cueen hristina in late 316. 'e

%o$ed to the ;etherlands in order to achie$e solitude and Auiet that he

could not attain with all the distractions of Paris and the constant intrusion

of $isitors. *t is here in 3/6 that Descartes began wor on a little treatise&which too hi% appro+i%ately three years to co%plete& entitled The World.

This wor was intended to show how %echanistic physics could e+plain the

$ast array of pheno%ena in the world without reference to the !cholastic

principles of substantial for%s and real Aualities& while also asserting a

heliocentric conception of the solar syste%. 9ut the conde%nation of

,alileo by the *nAuisition for %aintaining this latter thesis led Descartes to

suppress its publication. Fro% 301"303& Descartes finished his scientific

essaysDioptiqueandMeteors& which apply his geo%etrical %ethod to these
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fields. 'e also wrote a preface to these essays in the winter of 302E303 to

be attached to the% in addition to another one on geo%etry. This preface

beca%e The Discourse on Methodand was published in French along with

the three essays in 8une 304. #nd& on a personal note& during this ti%e his

daughter& Francine& was born in 302& her %other being a %aid at the ho%e

where Descartes was staying. 9ut Francine& at the age of fi$e& died of a fe$er

in 317 when he was %aing arrange%ents for her to li$e with relati$es in

France so as to ensure her education.

Descartes began wor onMeditations on First Philosophyin 306. Through

Mersenne& Descartes solicited criticis% of hisMeditationsfro% a%ongst

the %ost learned people of his day& including #ntoine #rnauld& Peirre

,assendi& and Thomas 'o%%es. The first edition of theMeditationswas

published in :atin in 31 with si+ sets of objections and his replies. #

second edition published in 31/ also included a se$enth set of objections

and replies as well as a letter to Father Dinet in which Descartes defended

his syste% against charges of unorthodo+y. These charges were raised at the

@ni$ersities of @trecht and :eiden and ste%%ed fro% $arious

%isunderstandings about his %ethod and the supposed opposition of his

theses toAristotleand the hristian faith.

This contro$ersy led Descartes to post two open letters against his ene%ies.

The first is entitledNotes on a Programposted in 31/ in which Descartes

refutes the theses of his recently estranged disciple& 'enricus Regius& a

professor of %edicine at @trecht. TheseNoteswere intended not only to

refute what Descartes understood to be Regius( false theses but also to

distance hi%self fro% his for%er disciple& who had started a rucus at

@trecht by %aing unorthodo+ clai%s about the nature of hu%an beings.

The second is a long attac directed at the rector of @trecht& ,isbertusoetius in the Open Letter to oetiusposted in 310. This was in response to

a pa%phlet anony%ously circulated by so%e of oetius( friends at the

@ni$ersity of :eiden further attacing Descartes( philosophy.

Descartes( Open Letterled oetius to ha$e hi% su%%oned before the

council of @trecht& who threatened hi% with e+pulsion and the public

burning of his boos. Descartes& howe$er& was able to flee to the 'ague and

con$ince the Prince of -range to inter$ene on his behalf.
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*n the following year >310?& Descartes began an affectionate and

philosophically fruitful correspondence with Princess


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and interpreted throughout the later %edie$al period. *n fact&

#ristotelianis% was so entrenched in the intellectual institutions of

Descartes( ti%e that co%%entators argued that e$idence for its the truth

could be found in the 9ible. #ccordingly& if so%eone were to try to refute

so%e %ain #ristotelian tenet& then he could be accused of holding a position

contrary to the word of ,od and be punished. 'owe$er& by Descartes( ti%e&

%any had co%e out in so%e way against one !cholastic"#ristotelian thesis

or other. !o& when Descartes argued for the i%ple%entation of his %odern

syste% of philosophy& breas with the !cholastic tradition were not

unprecedented.

Descartes broe with this tradition in at least two funda%ental ways. The

first was his rejection of substantial for%s as e+planatory principles in

physics. # substantial for% was thought to be an i%%aterial principle of

%aterial organi)ation that resulted in a particular thing of a certain ind.

The %ain principle of substantial for%s was the final cause or purpose of

being that ind of thing. For e+a%ple& the bird called the swallow. The

substantial for% of swallowness unites with %atter so as to organi)e it for

the sae of being a swallow ind of thing. This also %eans that any

dispositions or faculties the swallow has by $irtue of being that ind of thing

is ulti%ately e+plained by the goal or final cause of being a swallow. !o& for

instance& the goal of being a swallow is the cause of the swallow(s ability to

fly. 'ence& on this account& a swallow flies for the sae of being a swallow.

#lthough this %ight be true& it does not say anything new or useful about

swallows& and so it see%ed to Descartes that !cholastic philosophy and

science was incapable of disco$ering any new or useful nowledge.

Descartes rejected the use of substantial for%s and their conco%itant final

causes in physics precisely for this reason. *ndeed& his essayMeteorology&that appeared alongside theDiscourse on Method& was intended to show

that clearer and %ore fruitful e+planations can be obtained without

reference to substantial for%s but only by way of deductions fro% the

configuration and %otion of parts. 'ence& his point was to show that

%echanistic principles are better suited for %aing progress in the physical

sciences. #nother reason Descartes rejected substantial for%s and final

causes in physics was his belief that these notions were the result of the

confusion of the idea of the body with that of the %ind. *n the !i"th Replies&


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Descartes uses the !cholastic conception of gra$ity in a stone& to %ae his

point. -n this account& a characteristic goal of being a stone was a tendency

to %o$e toward the center of the earth. This e+planation i%plies that the

stone has nowledge of this goal& of the center of the earth and of how to get

there. 9ut how can a stone now anything& since it does not thinH !o& it is a

%istae to ascribe %ental properties lie nowledge to entirely physical

things. This %istae should be a$oided by clearly distinguishing the idea of

the %ind fro% the idea of the body. Descartes considered hi%self to be the

first to do this. 'is e+pulsion of the %etaphysical principles of substantial

for%s and final causes helped clear the way for Descartes( new %etaphysical

principles on which his %odern& %echanistic physics was based.

The second funda%ental point of difference Descartes had with the

!cholastics was his denial of the thesis that all nowledge %ust co%e fro%

sensation. The !cholastics were de$oted to the #ristotelian tenet that

e$eryone is born with a clean slate& and that all %aterial for intellectual

understanding %ust be pro$ided through sensation. Descartes& howe$er&

argued that since the senses so%eti%es decei$e& they cannot be a reliable

source for nowledge. Further%ore& the truth of propositions based on

sensation is naturally probabilistic and the propositions& therefore& are

doubtful pre%ises when used in argu%ents. Descartes was deeply

dissatisfied with such uncertain nowledge. 'e then replaced the uncertain

pre%ises deri$ed fro% sensation with the absolute certainty of the clear and

distinct ideas percei$ed by the %ind alone& as will be e+plained below.

b. Descartes& 'roect

*n the preface to the French edition of thePrinciples of Philosophy&

Descartes uses a tree as a %etaphor for his holistic $iew of philosophy. Theroots are %etaphysics& the trun is physics& and the branches e%erging fro%

the trun are all the other sciences& which %ay be reduced to three principal

ones& na%ely %edicine& %echanics and %orals >#T *I9 1= !M * 53?.

#lthough Descartes does not e+pand %uch %ore on this i%age& a few other

insights into his o$erall project can be discerned. First& notice that

%etaphysics constitutes the roots securing the rest of the tree. For it is in

Descartes( %etaphysics where an absolutely certain and secure

episte%ological foundation is disco$ered. This& in turn& grounds nowledgeof the geo%etrical properties of bodies& which is the basis for his physics.


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!econd& physics constitutes the trun of the tree& which grows up directly

fro% the roots and pro$ides the basis for the rest of the sciences. Third& the

sciences of %edicine& %echanics and %orals grow out of the trun of

physics& which i%plies that these other sciences are just applications of his

%echanistic science to particular subject areas. Finally& the fruits of the

philosophy tree are %ainly found on these three branches& which are the

sciences %ost useful and beneficial to hu%anind. 'owe$er& an endea$or

this grand cannot be conducted hapha)ardly but should be carried out in an

orderly and syste%atic way. 'ence& before e$en atte%pting to plant this

tree& Descartes %ust first figure out a %ethod for doing so.

. Metho

#ristotle and subseAuent %edie$al dialecticians set out a fairly large& though

li%ited& set of acceptable argu%ent for%s nown as syllogis%s co%posed

of a general or %ajor pre%ise& a particular or %inor pre%ise and a

conclusion. #lthough Descartes recogni)ed that these syllogistic

for%s preser)e truthfro% pre%ises to conclusion such that if the pre%ises

are true& then the conclusion %ust be true& he still found the% faulty. First&

these pre%ises are supposed to be nown when& in fact& they are %erely

belie$ed& since they e+press only probabilities based on sensation.

#ccordingly& conclusions deri$ed fro% %erely probable pre%ises can only

be probable the%sel$es& and& therefore& these probable syllogis%s ser$e

%ore to increase doubt rather than nowledge Moreo$er& the e%ploy%ent

of this %ethod by those steeped in the !cholastic tradition had led to such

subtle conjectures and plausible argu%ents that counter"argu%ents were

easily constructed& leading to profound confusion. #s a result& the !cholastic

tradition had beco%e such a confusing web of argu%ents& counter"

argu%ents and subtle distinctions that the truth often got lost in the cracs.

>Rules for the Direction of the Mind##T I 031& 172"173 J 107= !M * "

/& 03 J 2"2/?.

Descartes sought to a$oid these difficulties through the clarity and absolute

certainty of geo%etrical"style de%onstration. *n geo%etry& theore%s are

deduced fro% a set of self"e$ident a+io%s and uni$ersally agreed upon

definitions. #ccordingly& direct apprehension of clear& si%ple and

indubitable truths >or a+io%s? by intuition and deductions fro% thosetruths can lead to new and indubitable nowledge. Descartes found this
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pro%ising for se$eral reasons. First& the ideas of geo%etry are clear and

distinct& and therefore they are easily understood unlie the confused and

obscure ideas of sensation. !econd& the propositions constituting

geo%etrical de%onstrations are not probabilistic conjectures but are

absolutely certain so as to be i%%une fro% doubt. This has the additional

ad$antage that any proposition deri$ed fro% so%e one or co%bination of

these absolutely certain truths will itself be absolutely certain. 'ence&

geo%etry(s rules of inference preser$e absolutely certain truth fro% si%ple&

indubitable and intuiti$ely grasped a+io%s to their deducti$e conseAuences

unlie the probable syllogis%s of the !cholastics.

The choice of geo%etrical %ethod was ob$ious for Descartes gi$en his

pre$ious success in applying this %ethod to other disciplines lie optics. Bet

his application of this %ethod to philosophy was not unproble%atic due to a

re$i$al of ancient arguments for glo%al or radical s/epticismbased on the

doubtfulness of hu%an reasoning. 9ut Descartes wanted to show that truths

both intuiti$ely grasped and deduced are beyond this possibility of doubt.

'is tactic was to show that& despite the best septical argu%ents& there is at

least one intuiti$e truth that is beyond all doubt and fro% which the rest of

hu%an nowledge can be deduced. This is precisely the project of Descartes(

se%inal wor&Meditations on First Philosophy.

*n theFirst Meditation& Descartes lays out se$eral argu%ents for doubting

all of his pre$iously held beliefs. 'e first obser$es that the senses so%eti%es

decei$e& for e+a%ple& objects at a distance appear to be Auite s%all& and

surely it is not prudent to trust so%eone >or so%ething? that has decei$ed

us e$en once. 'owe$er& although this %ay apply to sensations deri$ed

under certain circu%stances& doesn(t it see% certain that * a% here& sitting

by the fire& wearing a winter dressing gown& holding this piece of paper in%y hands& and so onH >#T ** 5= !M ** 0?. Descartes( point is that e$en

though the senses decei$e us so%e of the ti%e& what basis for doubt e+ists

for the i%%ediate belief that& for e+a%ple& you are reading this articleH 9ut

%aybe the belief of reading this article or of sitting by the fireplace is not

based on true sensations at all but on the false sensations found in drea%s.

*f such sensations are just drea%s& then it is not really the case that you are

reading this article but in fact you are in bed asleep. !ince there is no

principled way of distinguishing waing life fro% drea%s& any belief based
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on sensation has been shown to be doubtful. This includes not only the

%undane beliefs about reading articles or sitting by the fire but e$en the

beliefs of e+peri%ental science are doubtful& because the obser$ations upon

which they are based %ay not be true but %ere drea% i%ages. Therefore& all

beliefs based on sensation ha$e been called into doubt& because it %ight all

be a drea%.

This& howe$er& does not pertain to %athe%atical beliefs& since they are not

based on sensation but on reason. For e$en though one is drea%ing& for

e+a%ple& that& / K 0 L 2& the certainty of this proposition is not called into

doubt& because / K 0 L 2 whether the one belie$ing it is awae or drea%ing.

Descartes continues to wonder about whether or not ,od could %ae hi%

belie$e there is an earth& sy and other e+tended things when& in fact& these

things do not e+ist at all. *n fact& people so%eti%es %ae %istaes about

things they thin are %ost certain such as %athe%atical calculations. 9ut

%aybe people are not %istaen just so%e of the ti%e but all of the ti%e such

that belie$ing that / K 0 L 2 is so%e ind of persistent and collecti$e

%istae& and so the su% of / K 0 is really so%ething other than 2. 'owe$er&

such uni$ersal deception see%s inconsistent with ,od(s supre%e goodness.

*ndeed& e$en the occasional deception of %athe%atical %iscalculation also

see%s inconsistent with ,od(s goodness& yet people do so%eti%es %ae

%istaes. Then& in line with the septics& Descartes supposes& for the sae of

his %ethod& that ,od does not e+ist& but instead there is an e$il de%on with

supre%e power and cunning that puts all his efforts into decei$ing hi% so

that he is always %istaen about e$erything& including %athe%atics.

*n this way& Descartes called all of his pre$ious beliefs into doubt through

so%e of the best septical argu%ents of his day 9ut he was still not satisfied

and decided to go a step further by considering false any belief that fallsprey to e$en the slightest doubt. !o& by the end of theFirst Meditation&

Descartes finds hi%self in a whirlpool of false beliefs. 'owe$er& it is

i%portant to reali)e that these doubts and the supposed falsehood of all his

beliefs are for the sae of his %ethod= he does not really belie$e that he is

drea%ing or is being decei$ed by an e$il de%on he recogni)es that his

doubt is %erely hyperbolic. 9ut the point of this %ethodological or

Nhyperbolic doubt is to clear the %ind of preconcei$ed opinions that %ight

obscure the truth. The goal then is to find so%ething that cannot be doubted


12/36

e$en though an e$il de%on is decei$ing hi% and e$en though he is

drea%ing. This first indubitable truth will then ser$e as an intuiti$ely

grasped %etaphysical a+io% fro% which absolutely certain nowledge can

be deduced. For %ore& see Cartesian s/epticism.

*. The Min

a. Co#ito+ er#o s!%

*n the!econd Meditation& Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in

his fa%ous reasoning= Cogito# ergo sumor * thin& therefore * a%.

TheseMeditations are conducted fro% the first person perspecti$e& fro%

Descartes.( 'owe$er& he e+pects his reader to %editate along with hi% tosee how his conclusions were reached. This is especially i%portant in

the!econd Meditationwhere the intuiti$ely grasped truth of * e+ist

occurs. !o the discussion here of this truth will tae place fro% the first

person or * perspecti$e. #ll sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the

pre$ious %editation& and therefore all such beliefs are now considered false.

This includes the belief that * ha$e a body endowed with sense organs. 9ut

does the supposed falsehood of this belief %ean that * do not e+istH ;o& for

if * con$inced %yself that %y beliefs are false& then surely there %ust be an* that was con$inced. Moreo$er& e$en if * a% being decei$ed by an e$il

de%on& * %ust e+ist in order to be decei$ed at all. !o * %ust finally

conclude that the proposition& N* a%&( N* e+ist&( is necessarily true whene$er it

is put forward by %e or concei$ed in %y %ind >#T ** /2= !M ** 3"4?.

This just %eans that the %ere fact that * a% thining& regardless of whether

or not what * a% thining is true or false& i%plies that there %ust be

so%ething engaged in that acti$ity& na%ely an *. 'ence& * e+ist is an

indubitable and& therefore& absolutely certain belief that ser$es as an a+io%fro% which other& absolutely certain truths can be deduced.

b. The ,at!re of the Min an its -eas

The!econd Meditationcontinues with Descartes asing& Ohat a% *H

#fter discarding the traditional !cholastic"#ristotelian concept of a hu%an

being as a rational ani%al due to the inherent difficulties of defining

rational and ani%al& he finally concludes that he is a thining thing& a

%ind= # thing that doubts& understands& affir%s& denies& is willing& is
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/#SH4chttp://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/#SH4c


13/36

unwilling& and also i%agines and has sense perceptions >#T ** /5= !M **

6?. *n thePrinciples& part *& sections 0/ and 15& Descartes distinguishes

intellectual perception and $olition as what properly belongs to the nature

of the %ind alone while i%agination and sensation are& in so%e sense&

faculties of the %ind insofar as it is united with a body. !o i%agination and

sensation are faculties of the %ind in a weaer sense than intellect and will&

since they reAuire a body in order to perfor% their functions. Finally& in

the!i"th Meditation& Descartes clai%s that the %ind or * is a non"

e+tended thing. ;ow& since e+tension is the nature of body& is a necessary

feature of body& it follows that the %ind is by its nature not a body but an

i%%aterial thing. Therefore& what * a% is an i%%aterial thining thing with

the faculties of intellect and will.

*t is also i%portant to notice that the %ind is a substance and the %odes of

a thining substance are its ideas. For Descartes a substance is a thing

reAuiring nothing else in order to e+ist. !trictly speaing& this applies only

to ,od whose e+istence is his essence& but the ter% substance can be

applied to creatures in a Aualified sense. Minds are substances in that they

reAuire nothing e+cept ,od(s concurrence& in order to e+ist. 9ut ideas are

%odes or ways of thining& and& therefore& %odes are not substances&

since they %ust be the ideas of so%e %ind or other. !o& ideas reAuire& in

addition to ,od(s concurrence& so%e created thining substance in order to

e+ist >seePrinciples of Philosophy& part *& sections 2 J 2/?. 'ence the %ind

is an i%%aterial thining substance& while its ideas are its %odes or ways of

thining.

Descartes continues on to distinguish three inds of ideas at the beginning

of the Third Meditation& na%ely those that are fabricated& ad$entitious& or

innate. Fabricated ideas are %ere in$entions of the %ind. #ccordingly& the%ind can control the% so that they can be e+a%ined and set aside at will

and their internal content can be changed. #d$entitious ideas are sensations

produced by so%e %aterial thing e+isting e+ternally to the %ind. 9ut& unlie

fabrications& ad$entitious ideas cannot be e+a%ined and set aside at will nor

can their internal content be %anipulated by the %ind. For e+a%ple& no

%atter how hard one tries& if so%eone is standing ne+t to a fire& she cannot

help but feel the heat as heat. !he cannot set aside the sensory idea of heat

by %erely willing it as we can do with our idea of !anta laus& for e+a%ple.


14/36

!he also cannot change its internal content so as to feel so%ething other

than heat""say& cold. Finally& innate ideas are placed in the %ind by ,od at

creation. These ideas can be e+a%ined and set aside at will but their internal

content cannot be %anipulated. ,eo%etrical ideas are paradig% e+a%ples

of innate ideas. For e+a%ple& the idea of a triangle can be e+a%ined and set

aside at will& but its internal content cannot be %anipulated so as to cease

being the idea of a three"sided figure. -ther e+a%ples of innate ideas would

be %etaphysical principles lie what is done cannot be undone& the idea of

the %ind& and the idea of ,od.

Descartes( idea of ,od will be discussed %o%entarily& but let(s consider his

clai% that the %ind is better nown than the body. This is the %ain point of

the wa+ e+a%ple found in the!econd Meditation. 'ere& Descartes pauses

fro% his %ethodological doubt to e+a%ine a particular piece of wa+ fresh

fro% the honeyco%b=

*t has not yet Auite lost the taste of the honey it retains so%e of the scent of

flowers fro% which it was gathered its color shape and si)e are plain to see

it is hard& cold and can be handled without difficulty if you rap it with your

nucle it %aes a sound. >#T ** 07= !M ** /7?

The point is that the senses percei$e certain Aualities of the wa+ lie its

hardness& s%ell& and so forth. 9ut& as it is %o$ed closer to the fire& all of

these sensible Aualities change. :oo= the residual taste is eli%inated& the

s%ell goes away& the color changes& the shape is lost& the si)e increases& it

beco%es liAuid and hot >#T ** 07= !M ** /7?. 'owe$er& despite these

changes in what the senses percei$e of the wa+& it is still judged to be the

sa%e wa+ now as before. To warrant this judg%ent& so%ething that does not

change %ust ha$e been percei$ed in the wa+.

This reasoning establishes at least three i%portant points. First& all

sensation in$ol$es so%e sort of judg%ent& which is a %ental %ode.

#ccordingly& e$ery sensation is& in so%e sense& a %ental %ode& and the

%ore attributes that is& %odesQ we disco$er in the sa%e thing or substance&

the clearer is our nowledge of that substance >#T ***# 5= !M * 63?.

9ased on this principle& the %ind is better nown than the body& because it

has ideas about both e+tended and %ental things and not just of e+tendedthings& and so it has disco$ered %ore %odes in itself than in bodily


15/36

substances. !econd& this is also supposed to show that what is unchangeable

in the wa+ is its e+tension in length& breadth and depth& which is not

percei$able by the senses but by the %ind alone. The shape and si)e of the

wa+ are %odes of this e+tension and can& therefore& change. 9ut the

e+tension constituting this wa+ re%ains the sa%e and per%its the judg%ent

that the body with the %odes e+isting in it after being %o$ed by the fire is

the sa%e body as before e$en though all of its sensible Aualities ha$e

changed. -ne final lesson is that Descartes is atte%pting to wean his reader

fro% reliance on sense i%ages as a source for& or an aid to& nowledge.

*nstead& people should beco%e accusto%ed to thining without i%ages in

order to clearly understand things not readily or accurately represented by

the%& for e+a%ple& ,od and the %ind. !o& according to Descartes&

i%%aterial& %ental things are better nown and& therefore& are better

sources of nowledge than e+tended things.

5. o

a. The Ca!sal "r#!%ents

#t the beginning of the Third Meditationonly * e+ist and * a% a thining

thing are beyond doubt and are& therefore& absolutely certain. Fro% theseintuiti$ely grasped& absolutely certain truths& Descartes now goes on to

deduce the e+istence of so%ething other than hi%self& na%ely ,od.

Descartes begins by considering what is necessary for so%ething to be the

adeAuate cause of its effect. This will be called the ausal #deAuacy

Principle and is e+pressed as follows= there %ust be at least as %uch

reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause& which in

turn i%plies that so%ething cannot co%e fro% nothing >#T ** 17= !M **

/5?. 'ere Descartes is espousing a causal theory that i%plies whate$er ispossessed by an effect %ust ha$e been gi$en to it by its cause. For e+a%ple&

when a pot of water is heated to a boil& it %ust ha$e recei$ed that heat fro%

so%e cause that had at least that %uch heat. Moreo$er& so%ething that is

not hot enough cannot cause water to boil& because it does not ha$e the

reAuisite reality to bring about that effect. *n other words& so%ething cannot

gi$e what it does not ha$e.

Descartes goes on to apply this principle to the cause of his ideas. This$ersion of the ausal #deAuacy Principle states that whate$er is contained


16/36

objecti$ely in an idea %ust be contained either for%ally or e%inently in the

cause of that idea. Definitions of so%e ey ter%s are now in order. First& the

objecti$e reality contained in an idea is just its representational content in

other words& it is the object of the idea or what that idea is about. The idea

of the sun& for instance& contains the reality of the sun in it objecti$ely.

!econd& the for%al reality contained in so%ething is a reality actually

contained in that thing. For e+a%ple& the sun itself has the for%al reality of

e+tension since it is actually an e+tended thing or body. Finally& a reality is

contained in so%ething e%inently when that reality is contained in it in a

higher for% such that >? the thing does not possess that reality for%ally&

but >/? it has the ability to cause that reality for%ally in so%ething else. For

e+a%ple& ,od is not for%ally an e+tended thing but solely a thining thing

howe$er& he is e%inently the e+tended uni$erse in that it e+ists in hi% in a

higher for%& and accordingly he has the ability to cause its e+istence. The

%ain point is that the ausal #deAuacy Principle also pertains to the causes

of ideas so that& for instance& the idea of the sun %ust be caused by

so%ething that contains the reality of the sun either actually >for%ally? or in

so%e higher for% >e%inently?.

-nce this principle is established& Descartes loos for an idea of which he

could not be the cause. 9ased on this principle& he can be the cause of the

objecti$e reality of any idea that he has either for%ally or e%inently. 'e is

for%ally a finite substance& and so he can be the cause of any idea with the

objecti$e reality of a finite substance. Moreo$er& since finite substances

reAuire only ,od(s concurrence to e+ist and %odes reAuire a finite

substance and ,od& finite substances are %ore real than %odes.

#ccordingly& a finite substance is not for%ally but e%inently a %ode& and so

he can be the cause of all his ideas of %odes. 9ut the idea of ,od is the idea

of an infinite substance. !ince a finite substance is less real than an infinite

substance by $irtue of the latter(s absolute independence& it follows that

Descartes& a finite substance& cannot be the cause of his idea of an infinite

substance. This is because a finite substance does not ha$e enough reality to

be the cause of this idea& for if a finite substance were the cause of this idea&

then where would it ha$e gotten the e+tra realityH 9ut the idea %ust ha$e

co%e fro% so%ething. !o so%ething that is actually an infinite substance&

na%ely ,od& %ust be the cause of the idea of an infinite substance.

Therefore& ,od e+ists as the only possible cause of this idea.


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;otice that in this argu%ent Descartes %aes a direct inference fro% ha$ing

the idea of an infinite substance to the actual e+istence of ,od. 'e pro$ides

another argu%ent that is cos%ological in nature in response to a possible

objection to this first argu%ent. This objection is that the cause of a finite

substance with the idea of ,od could also be a finite substance with the idea

of ,od. Bet what was the cause of that finite substance with the idea of ,odH

Oell& another finite substance with the idea of ,od. 9ut what was the cause

of that finite substance with the idea of ,odH Oell& another finite

substance . . . and so on to infinity.


18/36

and therefore ,od %ust e+ist by his $ery nature. *ndeed& any atte%pt to

concei$e of ,od as not e+isting would be lie trying to concei$e of a

%ountain without a $alley it just cannot be done.

6. The iste%olo#ical o!nation

a. "bsol!te Certaint3 an the Cartesian Circle

Recall that in theFirst MeditationDescartes supposed that an e$il de%on

was decei$ing hi%. !o as long as this supposition re%ains in place& there is

no hope of gaining any absolutely certain nowledge. 9ut he was able to

de%onstrate ,od(s e+istence fro% intuiti$ely grasped pre%ises& thereby

pro$iding& a gli%%er of hope of e+tricating hi%self fro% the e$il de%onscenario. The ne+t step is to de%onstrate that ,od cannot be a decei$er. #t

the beginning of theFourth Meditation# Descartes clai%s that the will to

decei$e is undoubtedly e$idence of %alice or weaness so as to be an

i%perfection. 9ut& since ,od has all perfections and no i%perfections& it

follows that ,od cannot be a decei$er. For to concei$e of ,od with the will

to decei$e would be to concei$e hi% to be both ha$ing no i%perfections and

ha$ing one i%perfection& which is i%possible it would be lie trying to

concei$e of a %ountain without a $alley. This conclusion& in addition to,od(s e+istence& pro$ides the absolutely certain foundation Descartes was

seeing fro% the outset of theMeditations. *t is absolutely certain because

both conclusions >na%ely that ,od e+ists and that ,od cannot be a

decei$er? ha$e the%sel$es been de%onstrated fro% i%%ediately grasped

and absolutely certain intuiti$e truths.

This %eans that ,od cannot be the cause of hu%an error& since he did not

create hu%ans with a faculty for generating the%& nor could ,od createso%e being& lie an e$il de%on& who is bent on deception. Rather& hu%ans

are the cause of their own errors when they do not use their faculty of

judg%ent correctly. !econd& ,od(s non"decei$ing nature also ser$es to

guarantee the truth of all clear and distinct ideas. !o ,od would be a

decei$er& if there were a clear and distinct idea that was false& since the

%ind cannot help but belie$e the% to be true. 'ence& clear and distinct

ideas %ust be true on pain of contradiction. This also i%plies that

nowledge of ,od(s e+istence is reAuired for ha$ing any absolutely certainnowledge. #ccordingly& atheists& who are ignorant of ,od(s e+istence&


19/36

cannot ha$e absolutely certain nowledge of any ind& including scientific

nowledge.

9ut this $eridical guarantee gi$es rise to a serious proble% within

theMeditations& ste%%ing fro% the clai% that all clear and distinct ideas

are ulti%ately guaranteed by ,od(s e+istence& which is not established until

the Third Meditation. This %eans that those truths reached in the!econd

Meditation& such as * e+ist and * a% a thining thing& and those

principles used in the Third Meditationto conclude that ,od e+ists& are not

clearly and distinctly understood& and so they cannot be absolutely certain.

'ence& since the pre%ises of the argu%ent for ,od(s e+istence are not

absolutely certain& the conclusion that ,od e+ists cannot be certain either.

This is what is nown as the artesian ircle& because Descartes(

reasoning see%s to go in a circle in that he needs ,od(s e+istence for the

absolute certainty of the earlier truths and yet he needs the absolute

certainty of these earlier truths to de%onstrate ,od(s e+istence with

absolute certainty.

Descartes( response to this concern is found in the!econd Replies. There he

argues that ,od(s $eridical guarantee only pertains to the recollection of

argu%ents and not the i%%ediate awaRenss of an argu%ent(s clarity anddistinctness currently under consideration. 'ence& those truths reached

before the de%onstration of ,od(s e+istence are clear and distinct when

they are being attended to but cannot be relied upon as absolutely certain

when those argu%ents are recalled later on. 9ut once ,od(s e+istence has

been de%onstrated& the recollection of the clear and distinct perception of

the pre%ises is sufficient for absolutely certain and& therefore& perfect

nowledge of its conclusion >see also theFifth Meditation at #T ** 36"47=

!M ** III?.

b. 4o to "oi rror

*n the Third Meditation& Descartes argues that only those ideas called

judg%ents can& strictly speaing& be true or false& because it is only in

%aing a judg%ent that the rese%blance& confor%ity or correspondence of

the idea to things the%sel$es is affir%ed or denied. !o if one affir%s that an

idea corresponds to a thing itself when it really does not& then an error hasoccurred. This faculty of judging is described in %ore detail in the Fourth


20/36

Meditation. 'ere judg%ent is described as a faculty of the %ind resulting

fro% the interaction of the faculties of intellect and will. 'ere Descartes

obser$es that the intellect is finite in that hu%ans do not now e$erything&

and so their understanding of things is li%ited. 9ut the will or faculty of

choice is see%ingly infinite in that it can be applied to just about anything

whatsoe$er. The finitude of the intellect along with this see%ing infinitude

of the will is the source of hu%an error. For errors arise when the will

e+ceeds the understanding such that so%ething laying beyond the li%its of

the understanding is $oluntarily affir%ed or denied. To put it %ore si%ply=

people %ae %istaes when they choose to pass judg%ent on things they do

not fully understand. !o the will should be restrained within the bounds of

what the %ind understands in order to a$oid error. *ndeed& Descartes

%aintains that judg%ents should only be %ade about things that are clearly

and distinctly understood& since their truth is guaranteed by ,od(s non"

decei$ing nature. *f one only %aes judg%ents about what is clearly and

distinctly understood and abstains fro% %aing judg%ents about things

that are not& then error would be a$oided altogether. *n fact& it would be

i%possible to go wrong if this rule were unwa$eringly followed.

7. Min8o3 Relation

a. The Real Distinction

-ne of Descartes( %ain conclusions is that the %ind is really distinct fro%

the body. 9ut what is a real distinctionH Descartes e+plains it best

atPrinciples& part & section 37. 'ere he first states that it is a distinction

between two or %ore substances. !econd& a real distinction is percei$ed

when one substance can be clearly and distinctly understood without the

other and $ice $ersa. Third& this clear and distinct understanding shows that,od can bring about anything understood in this way. 'ence& in arguing for

the real distinction between %ind and body& Descartes is arguing that ? the

%ind is a substance& /? it can be clearly and distinctly understood without

any other substance& including bodies& and 0? that ,od could create a

%ental substance all by itself without any other created substance. !o

Descartes is ulti%ately arguing for the possibility of %inds or souls e+isting

without bodies.


21/36

Descartes argues that %ind and body are really distinct in two places in

the!i"th Meditation. The first argu%ent is that he has a clear and distinct

understanding of the %ind as a thining& non"e+tended thing and of the

body as an e+tended& non"thining thing. !o these respecti$e ideas are

clearly and distinctly understood to be opposite fro% one another and&

therefore& each can be understood all by itself without the other. Two points

should be %entioned here. First& Descartes( clai% that these perceptions are

clear and distinct indicates that the %ind cannot help but belie$e the% true&

and so they %ust be true for otherwise ,od would be a decei$er& which is

i%possible. !o the pre%ises of this argu%ent are fir%ly rooted in his

foundation for absolutely certain nowledge. !econd& this indicates further

that he nows that ,od can create %ind and body in the way that they are

being clearly and distinctly understood. Therefore& the %ind can e+ist

without the body and $ice $ersa.

The second $ersion is found later in the!i"th Meditationwhere Descartes

clai%s to understand the nature of body or e+tension to be di$isible into

parts& while the nature of the %ind is understood to be so%ething Auite

si%ple and co%plete so as not to be co%posed of parts and is& therefore&

indi$isible. Fro% this it follows that %ind and body cannot ha$e the sa%e

nature& for if this were true& then the sa%e thing would be both di$isible and

not di$isible& which is i%possible. 'ence& %ind and body %ust ha$e two

co%pletely different natures in order for each to be able to be understood all

by itself without the other. #lthough Descartes does not %ae the further

inference here to the conclusion that %ind and body are two really distinct

substances& it ne$ertheless follows fro% their respecti$e abilities to be

clearly and distinctly understood without each other that ,od could create

one without the other.

b. The Min8o3 'roble%

The fa%ous mind*%od& pro%lemhas its origins in Descartes( conclusion that

%ind and body are really distinct. The cru+ of the difficulty lies in the clai%

that the respecti$e natures of %ind and body are co%pletely different and&

in so%e way& opposite fro% one another. -n this account& the %ind is an

entirely i%%aterial thing without any e+tension in it whatsoe$er and&

con$ersely& the body is an entirely %aterial thing without any thining in itat all. This also %eans that each substance can ha$e only its ind of %odes.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/http://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/


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For instance& the %ind can only ha$e %odes of understanding& will and& in

so%e sense& sensation& while the body can only ha$e %odes of si)e& shape&

%otion& and Auantity. 9ut bodies cannot ha$e %odes of understanding or

willing& since these are not ways of being e+tended and %inds cannot ha$e

%odes of shape or %otion& since these are not ways of thining.

The difficulty arises when it is noticed that so%eti%es the will %o$es the

body& for e+a%ple& the intention to as a Auestion in class causes the raising

of your ar%& and certain %otions in the body cause the %ind to ha$e

sensations. 9ut how can two substances with co%pletely different natures

causally interactH Pierre ,assendi in theFifth O$%ectionsand Princess


23/36

Descartes& howe$er& ne$er see%ed $ery concerned about this proble%. The

reason for this lac of concern is his con$iction e+pressed to both ,assendi

and


24/36

'owe$er& a final point should be %ade before closing this section. The

position setched in the pre$ious couple of paragraphs is not the pre$alent

$iew a%ong scholars and reAuires %ore justification than can be pro$ided

here. Most scholars understand Descartes( doctrine of the real distinction

between %ind and body in %uch the sa%e way as


25/36

*n part ** of thePrinciples& Descartes argues that the entire physical

uni$erse is corporeal substance indefinitely e+tended in length& breadth&

and depth. This %eans that the e+tension constituting bodies and the

e+tension constituting the space in which those bodies are said to be located

are the sa%e. 'ere Descartes is rejecting the clai% held by so%e that bodies

ha$e so%ething o$er and abo$e e+tension as part of their nature& na%ely

i%penetrability& while space is just penetrable e+tension in which

i%penetrable bodies are located. Therefore& body and space ha$e the sa%e

e+tension in that body is not i%penetrable e+tension and space penetrable

e+tension& but rather there is only one ind of e+tension. Descartes

%aintains further that e+tension entails i%penetrability& and hence there is

only i%penetrable e+tension. 'e goes on to state that= The ter%s Nplace(

and Nspace&( then& do not signify anything different fro% the body which is

said to be in a place . . . >#T ***# 14= !M * //5?. 'ence& it is not that

bodies are in space but that the e+tended uni$erse is co%posed of a plurality

or plenu% of i%penetrable bodies. -n this account& there is no place in

which a particular body is located& but rather what is called a place is just

a particular body(s relation to other bodies. 'owe$er& when a body is said to

change its place& it %erely has changed its relation to these other bodies& but

it does not lea$e an e%pty space behind to be filled by another body.Rather& another body taes the place of the first such that a new part of

e+tension now constitutes that place or space.

'ere an e+a%ple should pro$e helpful. onsider the e+a%ple of a full wine

bottle. The wine is said to occupy that place within the bottle. -nce the wine

is finished& this place is now constituted by the Auantity of air now

occupying it. ;otice that the e+tension of the wine and that of the air are

two different sets of bodies& and so the place inside the wine bottle was

constituted by two different pieces of e+tension. 9ut& since these two pieces

of e+tension ha$e the sa%e si)e& shape and relation to the body surrounding

it& that is& the bottle& it is called one and the sa%e place e$en though&

strictly speaing& it is %ade up of two different pieces of e+tension.

Therefore& so long as bodies of the sa%e shape& si)e and position continue to

replace each other& it is considered one and the sa%e place.

This assi%ilation of a place or space with the body constituting it gi$es rise

to an interesting philosophical proble%. !ince a place is identical with the


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body constituting it& how does a place retain its identity and& therefore&

re%ain the sa%e place when it is replaced by another body that now

constitutes itH # return to the wine bottle e+a%ple will help to illustrate this

point. Recall that first the e+tension of the wine constituted the place inside

the bottle and then& after the wine was finished& that place inside the body

was constituted by the e+tension of the air now occupying it. !o& since the

wine(s e+tension is different fro% the air(s e+tension& it see%s to follow that

the place inside the wine bottle is not the e+actly sa%e place but two

different places at two different ti%es. *t is difficult to see how Descartes

would address this issue.

#nother i%portant conseAuence of Descartes( assi%ilation of bodies and

space is that a $acuu% or an e%pty space is unintelligible. This is because

an e%pty space& according to Descartes& would just be a non"e+tended

space& which is i%possible. # return to the wine bottle will further illustrate

this point. ;otice that the place inside the wine bottle was first constituted

by the wine and then by air. These are two different inds of e+tended

things& but they are e+tended things nonetheless. #ccordingly& the place

inside the bottle is constituted first by one body >the wine? and then by

another >air?. 9ut suppose that all e+tension is re%o$ed fro% the bottle so

that there is an e%pty space. ;ow& distance is a %ode reAuiring e+tension

to e+ist& for it %aes no sense to spea of spatial distance without space or

e+tension. !o& under these circu%stances& no %ode of distance could e+ist

inside the bottle. That is& no distance would e+ist between the bottle(s sides&

and therefore the sides would touch. Therefore& an e%pty space cannot e+ist

between two or %ore bodies.

Descartes( close assi%ilation of body and space& his rejection of the $acuu%&

and so%e te+tual issues ha$e lead %any to infer an asy%%etry in his%etaphysics of thining and e+tended things. This asy%%etry is found in

the clai% that particular %inds are substances for Descartes but not

particular bodies. Rather& these considerations indicate to so%e that only

the whole& physical uni$erse is a substance& while particular bodies& for

e+a%ple& the wine bottle& are %odes of that substance. Though the te+tual

issues are %any& the %ain philosophical proble% ste%s fro% the rejection

of the $acuu%. The argu%ent goes lie this= particular bodies are not really

distinct substances& because two or %ore particular bodies cannot be clearly


27/36

and distinctly understood with an e%pty space between the% that is& they

are not separable fro% each other& e$en by the power of ,od. 'ence&

particular bodies are not substances& and therefore they %ust be %odes.

'owe$er& this line of reasoning is a result of %isunderstanding the criterion

for a real distinction. *nstead of trying to understand two bodies with an

e%pty space between the%& one body should be understood all by itself so

that ,od could ha$e created a world with that body& for e+a%ple& the wine

bottle& as its only e+istent. 'ence& since it reAuires only ,od(s concurrence

to e+ist& it is a substance that is really distinct fro% all other thining and

e+tended substances. #lthough difficulties also arise for this argu%ent fro%

Descartes( account of bodily surfaces as a %ode shared between bodies&

these are too co%ple+ to address here. 9ut& suffice it to say that the te+tual

e$idence is also in fa$or of the clai% that Descartes& despite the unforeseen

proble% about surfaces& %aintained that particular bodies are substances.

The %ost telling piece of te+tual e$idence is found in a 31/ letter to ,ibeuf=

Fro% the si%ple fact that * consider two hal$es of a part of %atter& howe$er

s%all it %ay be& as two co%plete substances . . . * conclude with certainty

that they are really di$isible. >#T *** 144= !MG /7/"/70

These considerations in general& and this Auotation in particular& lead toanother distinct feature of artesian body& na%ely that e+tension is

infinitely di$isible. The point is that no %atter how s%all a piece of %atter&

it can always be di$ided in half& and then each half can itself be di$ided in

half& and so on to infinity. These considerations about the $acuu% and the

infinite di$isibility of e+tension a%ount to a rejection of ato%is%. #to%is%

is a school of thought going bac to the ancients& which recei$ed a re$i$al in

the 4th century %ost notably in the philosophy and science of Pierre

,assendi. -n this account& all change in the uni$erse could be e+plained bythe %o$e%ents of $ery s%all& indi$isible particles called ato%s in a $oid or

e%pty space. 9ut& if Descartes( argu%ents for rejecting the $acuu% and the

infinite di$isibility of %atter are sound& then ato%is% %ust be false& since

the e+istence of indi$isible ato%s and an e%pty space would both be

unintelligible.

c. 'h3sics


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Descartes de$ised a non"ato%istic& %echanistic physics in which all physical

pheno%ena were to be e+plain by the configuration and %otion of a body(s

%iniscule parts. This %echanistic physics is also a point of funda%ental

difference between the artesian and !cholastic"#ristotelian schools of

thought. For the latter >as Descartes understood the%?& the regular beha$ior

of inani%ate bodies was e+plained by certain ends towards which those

bodies stri$e. Descartes& on the other hand& thought hu%an effort is better

directed toward the disco$ery of the %echanistic causes of things gi$en the

uselessness of final causal e+planations and how it is $ain to see ,od(s

purposes. Further%ore& Descartes %aintained that the geo%etric %ethod

should also be applied to physics so that results are deduced fro% the clear

and distinct perceptions of the geo%etrical or Auantifiable properties found

in bodies& that is& si)e& shape& %otion& deter%ination >or direction?&

Auantity& and so forth.

Perhaps the %ost concise su%%ary of Descartes( general $iew of the

physical uni$erse is found in part ***& section 13 of thePrinciples=

Fro% what has already been said we ha$e established that all the bodies in

the uni$erse are co%posed of one and the sa%e %atter& which is di$isible

into indefinitely %any parts& and is in fact di$ided into a large nu%ber ofparts which %o$e in different directions and ha$e a sort of circular %otion

%oreo$er& the sa%e Auantity of %otion is always preser$ed in the uni$erse.

>#T ***# 77= !M * /23?

!ince the %atter constituting the physical uni$erse and its di$isibility were

pre$iously discussed& a brief e+planation of the circular %otion of bodies

and the preser$ation of %otion is in order. The first thesis is deri$ed fro%

,od(s i%%utability and i%plies that no Auantity of %otion is e$er added toor subtracted fro% the uni$erse& but rather Auantities of %otion are %erely

passed fro% one body to another. ,od(s i%%utability is also used to support

the first law of %otion& which is that each and e$erything& in so far as it

can& always continues in the sa%e state and thus what is once in %otion

always continues in %otion >#T ***# 3/"30= !M * /1?. This principle

indicates that so%ething will re%ain in a gi$en state as long as it is not

being affected by so%e e+ternal cause. !o a body %o$ing at a certain speed

will continue to %o$e at that speed indefinitely unless so%ething co%esalong to change it. The second thesis about the circular %otion of bodies is


29/36


30/36

*n part fi$e of theDiscourse on Method& Descartes e+a%ines the nature of

ani%als and how they are to be distinguished fro% hu%an beings. 'ere

Descartes argues that if a %achine were %ade with the outward appearance

of so%e ani%al lacing reason& lie a %oney& it would be indistinguishable

fro% a real speci%en of that ani%al found in nature. 9ut if such a %achine

of a hu%an being were %ade& it would be readily distinguishable fro% a real

hu%an being due to its inability to use language. Descartes( point is that the

use of language is a sign of rationality and only things endowed with %inds

or souls are rational. 'ence& it follows that no ani%al has an i%%aterial

%ind or soul. For Descartes this also %eans that ani%als do not& strictly

speaing& ha$e sensations lie hunger& thirst and pain. Rather& sAueals of

pain& for instance& are %ere %echanical reactions to e+ternal sti%uli

without any sensation of pain. *n other words& hitting a dog with a stic& for

e+a%ple& is a ind of input and the sAueal that follows would be %erely

output& but the dog did not feel anything at all and could not feel pain unless

it was endowed with a %ind. 'u%ans& howe$er& are endowed with %inds or

rational souls& and therefore they can use language and feel sensations lie

hunger& thirst& and pain. *ndeed& this artesian fact is at the heart of

Descartes( argu%ent for the union of the %ind with the body su%%ari)ed

near the end of part fi$e of theDiscourseand laid out in full in the !i"thMeditation.

Bet Descartes still ad%its that both ani%al and hu%an bodies can be best

understood to be %achinesQ %ade of earth& which ,od for%s. >#T I* /7=

!M * 66?. The point is that just as the worings of a cloc can be best

understood by %eans of the configuration and %otion of its parts so also

with ani%al and hu%an bodies. *ndeed& the heart of an ani%al and that of a

hu%an being are so %uch alie that he ad$ises the reader un$ersed in

anato%y to ha$e the heart of so%e large ani%al with lungs dissected before

hi% >for such a heart is in all respects sufficiently lie that of a %an?& and be

shown the two cha%bers or ca$ities which are present in it >#T * 14= !M

* 01?. 'e then goes on to describe in so%e detail the %otion of the blood

through the heart in order to e+plain that when the heart hardens it is not

contracting but really swelling in such a way as to allow %ore blood into a

gi$en ca$ity. #lthough this account goes contrary to the >%ore correct?

obser$ation %ade by Oillia% 'ar$ey& an


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e+planation has the force of geo%etrical de%onstration. #ccordingly& the

physiology and biology of hu%an bodies& considered without regard for

those functions reAuiring the soul to operate& should be conducted in the

sa%e way as the physiology and biology of ani%al bodies& na%ely $ia the

application of the geo%etrical %ethod to the configuration and %otion of

parts.

9. $ensations an 'assions

*n his last published wor&Passions of the !oul& Descartes pro$ides

accounts of how $arious %otions in the body cause sensations and passions

to arise in the soul. 'e begins by %aing se$eral obser$ations about the

%ind"body relation. The whole %ind is in the whole body and the whole ineach of its parts but yet its pri%ary seat is in a little gland at the center of

the brain now nown as the pineal gland. Descartes is not e+plicit about

what he %eans by the whole %ind in the whole body and the whole in each

of its parts. 9ut this was not an unco%%on way of characteri)ing how the

soul is united to the body at Descartes( ti%e. The %ain point was that the

soul %aes a hu%an body truly hu%an that is& %aes it a li$ing hu%an

body and not %erely a corpse. ,i$en Descartes( une+plained use of this

phrase& it is reasonable to suppose that he used it in the way his

conte%poraries would ha$e understood it. !o the %ind is united to the

whole body and the whole in each of its parts insofar as it is a soul or

principle of life. #ccordingly& the body(s union with the soul %aes it a

li$ing hu%an body or a hu%an body& strictly speaing >see letter to

Mersenne dated 6 February 312?. 9ut& the pri%ary seat& that is& the place

where the soul perfor%s its pri%ary functions& is the point where the %ind

is& in so%e sense& affected by the body& na%ely the pineal gland.

Descartes %aintains further that all sensations depend on the ner$es& which

e+tend fro% the brain to the body(s e+tre%ities in the for% of tiny fibers

encased by tube"lie %e%branes. These fibers float in a $ery fine %atter

nown as the ani%al spirits. This allows these fibers to float freely so that

anything causing the slightest %otion anywhere in the body will cause

%o$e%ent in that part of the brain where the fiber is attached. The $ariety

of different %o$e%ents of the ani%als spirits cause a $ariety of different

sensations not in the part of the body originally affected but only in thebrain and ulti%ately in the pineal gland. !o& strictly speaing& pain does not


32/36

occur in the foot when a toe is stubbed but only in the brain. This& in turn&

%ay cause the widening or narrowing of pores in the brain so as to direct

the ani%als spirits to $arious %uscles and %ae the% %o$e. For e+a%ple&

the sensation of heat is produced by the i%perceptible particles in the pot of

boiling water& which caused the %o$e%ent of the ani%al spirits in the

ner$es ter%inating at the end of the hand. These ani%al spirits then %o$e

the fibers e+tending to the brain through the tube of ner$es causing the

sensation of pain. This then causes $arious pores to widen or narrow in the

brain so as to direct the ani%als spirits to the %uscles of the ar% and cause

it to Auicly %o$e the hand away fro% the heat in order to re%o$e it fro%

har%. This is the %odel for how all sensations occur.

These sensations %ay also cause certain e%otions or passions in the %ind.

'owe$er& different sensations do not gi$e rise to different passions because

of the difference in objects but only in regards to the $arious ways these

things are beneficial& har%ful or i%portant for us. #ccordingly& the function

of the passions is to dispose the soul to want things that are useful and to

persist in this desire Moreo$er& the sa%e ani%al spirits causing these

passions also dispose the body to %o$e in order to attain the%. For

e+a%ple& the sight of an ice crea% parlor& caused by the %o$e%ent of the

ani%al spirits in the eye and through the ner$es to the brain and pineal

gland& %ight also cause the passion of desire to arise. These sa%e ani%al

spirits would then dispose the body to %o$e >for e+a%ple& toward the ice

crea% parlor? in order to attain the goal of eating ice crea% thereby

satisfying this desire. Descartes goes on to argue that there are only si+

pri%iti$e passions& na%ely wonder& lo$e& hatred& desire& joy and sadness. #ll

other passions are either co%posed of so%e co%bination of these pri%iti$es

or are species of one of these si+ genera. Much of the rest of parts / and 0 of

thePassions of the !oulis de$oted to detailed e+plications of these si+

pri%iti$e passions and their respecti$e species.

10. Moralit3

a. The 'roisional Moral Coe

*n Part 0 of theDiscourse on Method& Descartes lays out a pro$isional %oral

code by which he plans to li$e while engaged in his %ethodological doubt insearch of absolute certainty. This code of three or four rules or %a+i%s is


33/36

established so that he is not fro)en by uncertainty in the practical affairs of

life. These %a+i%s can be paraphrased as follows=

. To obey the laws and custo%s of %y country& holding constantly to the

atholic religion& and go$erning %yself in all other %atters according to the %ost

%oderate opinions accepted in practice by the %ost sensible people.

/. To be as fir% and decisi$e in action as possible and to follow e$en the %ost

doubtful opinions once they ha$e been adopted.

0. Try to %aster %yself rather than fortune& and change %y desires rather than

the order of the world.

1. Re$iew the $arious professions and chose the best >#T * /0"/5= !M * //"

/2?.

The %ain thrust of the first %a+i% is to li$e a %oderate and sensible life

while his pre$iously held beliefs ha$e been discarded due to their

uncertainty. #ccordingly& it %aes sense to defer judg%ent about such

%atters until certainty is found. Presu%ably Descartes defers to the laws

and custo%s of the country in which he li$es because of the i%probability of

the% leading hi% onto the wrong path while his own %oral beliefs ha$e

been suspended. #lso& the actions of sensible people& who a$oid the

e+tre%es and tae the %iddle road& can pro$ide a te%porary guide to actionuntil his %oral beliefs ha$e been established with absolute certainty.

Moreo$er& although Descartes does see%s to bring his religious beliefs into

doubt in theMeditations& he does not do so in theDiscourse. !ince religious

beliefs can be accepted on faith without absolutely certain rational

justification& they are not subject to %ethodological doubt as e%ployed in

theDiscourse. #ccordingly& his religious beliefs can also ser$e as guides for

%oral conduct during this period of doubt. Therefore& the first %a+i% is

intended to pro$ide Descartes with guides or touchstones that will %ostliely lead to the perfor%ance of %orally good actions.

The second %a+i% e+presses a fir%ness of action so as to a$oid the inaction

produced by hesitation and uncertainty. Descartes uses the e+a%ple of a

tra$eler lost in a forest. This tra$eler should not wander about or e$en stand

still for then he will ne$er find his way. *nstead& he should eep waling in a

straight line and should ne$er change his direction for slight reasons.

'ence& although the tra$eler %ay not end up where he wants& at least he willbe better off than in the %iddle of a forest. !i%ilarly& since practical action


34/36

%ust usually be perfor%ed without delay& there usually is not ti%e to

disco$er the truest or %ost certain course of action& but one %ust follow the

%ost probable route. Moreo$er& e$en if no route see%s %ost probable& so%e

route %ust be chosen and resolutely acted upon and treated as the %ost

true and certain. 9y following this %a+i%& Descartes hopes to a$oid the

regrets e+perienced by those who set out on a supposedly good course that

they later judge to be bad.

The third %a+i% enjoins Descartes to %aster hi%self and not fortune. This

is based on the reali)ation that all that is in his control are his own thoughts

and nothing else. 'ence& %ost things are out of his control. This has se$eral

i%plications. First& if he has done his best but fails to achie$e so%ething&

then it follows that it was not within his power to achie$e it. This is because

his own best efforts were not sufficient to achie$e that end& and so whate$er

effort would be sufficient is beyond his abilities. The second i%plication is

that he should desire only those things that are within his power to obtain&

and so he should control his desires rather than try to %aster things beyond

his control. *n this way& Descartes hopes to a$oid the regret e+perienced by

those who ha$e desires that cannot be satisfied& because this satisfaction lies

beyond their grasp so that one should not desire health when ill nor

freedo% when i%prisoned.

*t is difficult to see why the fourth %a+i% is included. *ndeed& Descartes

hi%self see%s hesitant about including it when he states at the outset that

his pro$isional %oral code consists of three or four %a+i%s. #lthough he

does not e+a%ine other occupations& Descartes is content with his current

wor because of the pleasure he recei$es fro% disco$ering new and not

widely nown truths. This see%s to i%ply the correct choice of occupation

can ensure a degree of contentedness that could not be otherwise achie$ed ifone is engaged in an occupation for which one is not suited. Descartes also

clai%s that his current occupation is the basis of the other three %a+i%s&

because it is his current plan to continue his instruction that ga$e rise to

the%. 'e concludes with a brief discussion of how his occupational path

leads to the acAuisition of nowledge& which& in turn& will lead to all the true

goods within his grasp. 'is final point is that learning how best to judge

what is good and bad %aes it possible to act well and achie$e all attainable


35/36

$irtues and goods. 'appiness is assured when this point is reached with

certainty.

b. enerosit3

#fter theDiscourseof 304& Descartes did not tae up the issue of %orality

in any significant way again until his correspondence with Princess


36/36

resolute pursuit of what is judged to be good is to be enacted. This& in turn&

should lead us to a true state of generosity so as to legiti%ately estee%

oursel$es as ha$ing correctly used those faculties through which hu%ans

are %ost in the lieness of ,od.

descartes - introducere

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