derrida and bhartrhari's vākyapadīya on the origin of language - h. coward

7/28/2019 Derrida and Bhartrhari's Vkyapadya on the Origin of Language - H. Coward

1/15

Derrida and Bhartrhari's Vkyapadya on the Origin of LanguageAuthor(s): Harold Coward

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), pp. 3-16Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399546 .Accessed: 28/11/2011 04:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy

East and West.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1399546?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1399546?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp


2/15

Harold Coward Derrida and Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya on the originof language

Professor T. R. V. Murti, in his 1963 Presidential Address, presented a chal-lenge to Indian Philosophy-a challenge which seems to have fallen on deafears. Murti challenged the traditional schools of Indian Philosophy to rethinkthemselves, and their relationships with one another, from the perspective oflanguage. Not only would this breathe fresh air into the stale situation obtain-ing in Indian Philosophy-because the Kantian and Hegelian reinterpreta-tions of basic metaphysics had about run their course-but it would also allowa significant engagement between Indian Philosophy and the contem-porary Western concern with the philosophy of language. This article takesup that challenge by entering a dialogue between traditional Indian Phi-losophy and the modern Western deconstructionist thought of Jacques Der-rida. In approaching this dialogue I will follow the insightful suggestions ofProfessor Murti as to one point on which this dialogue should be focused,namely, the issue of the origin of language.THE ORIGINOF LANGUAGEAttempts have been made in both Western and Indian thought to derive lan-guage from nonlinguistic sources such as bodily gestures,2 interjectionalsounds,3 imitative sounds, and so forth, and to argue that convention wasused to evolve further such naturalistic beginnings. Although Professor Murtidid not speculate at length on the origin of language, he did situate the ques-tion clearly within its two extreme views: language as somehow always beingpresent, as being a priori; or, language as being a convention created byhuman beings. Murti, following Cassirer in the West and Mimaimsa n India,maintains that language is a priori. Against the argument from convention(sanketa), where the relation between words and their meanings is created byeither humans or by God, Murti agreed with the Mimaims view that wordsand their relation with meaning are eternal, underived, and impersonal.4Convention presupposes language. To make conventions people must alreadypossess words. But this is clearly circular, says Murti, and points to the eternaland beginningless nature of language. "An absolute beginning of language isuntenable. Linguistic usage is continuous."5 In India it was the Buddhist dis-covery of the constructive role of the subject in knowing that challenged theview of language as eternal. From the Buddhist perspective, language ex-presses merely imaginary constructions (vikalpah), which play over the sur-face of the real without ever giving us access to it. All language, includingeven the Vedic language, is merely a human construction. While useful fordaily affairs, language can give us no knowledge of the real. These two oppos-ing Indian views of the origin of language find some quite surprisinglinks withHarold Coward is Director of the CalgaryInstituteof the Humanities at the University of Calgary.Philosophy East & West, volume 40, no. 1 (January 1990). ? by University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.


3/15

4 Coward

the contemporaryWestern anguagedebate-particularly in the deconstruc-tionist"Grammatology"f JacquesDerrida.6Like the Buddhists,Derrida cannotacceptthe idealizingof languagethathas oftentypified raditionalhought.Like the Buddhists,Derrida ocuseshisanalysison the role of the subject n linguisticexperience.But in his analysishe also finds much that is compatiblewith the Vyakaranapoint of view assystematizedby Bhartrhari.SinceVyakaranas at manypointsa defense ofMimimsa doctrine, the apparent bridgingof the Buddhist and Mimamsapoles in Derrida'sanalysismaywell offersome new insights nto the Indianphilosophyof language.At the very least, engagingDerrida'sthoughtwillprovidea new forum romwhichIndianPhilosophy anconstructivelyngagewiththe modernWesternphilosophyandliterarycriticism.Derridaspeaksfrom a long andcomplexWesternheritage.It is a hertiagefrom which he seeks to disengagebecause it has been encapsulatedby theidealizedpole of logocentricism-languageas ana prioriexperienceof divinepresence.In his analysisDerridacites, amongmanyothers, Plato, Aristotle,Kant,Hegel, Husserl,Heidegger,Nietzsche, Marx,Saussure,andRousseau.A masterfuland concise surveyof how Derridarelates to and draws fromthese thinkers has been offered by ChristopherNorris and will not berehearsedhere.7 For our purposewe will focus on Derrida'sanalysisandcritiqueof SaussureandRousseau.8Derridabegins by pointingoutthatin the traditionalogocentricview"Thebeginningword s understood, n the intimacyof self-presence,as thevoiceofthe other,andascommandment."9 s Aristotlesawit, voice andbreathhavean immediaterelationshipwith the mindwhichnaturallyreflectsthe divinelogos.Betweenlogosand mind here s arelationship f natural ignification-the mindmirrors hings by naturalresemblance.Between mind and speechthere is a relationshipof conventionalsymbolization.Spoken languageis afirst conventionalsymbolization f the innerreflectionof the logos. Writtenlanguage s a second, furtherremoved,convention.As the firstconvention,voice or speechis closestto the reflectedpresenceof the thingitself. Writtenwords are alwayssecondaryand technicalrepresentatives f speech. Speech,beingcloser to the reflected ogos, has a strongersense of both the meaningsignifiedand the action naturallyevoked. Writing, being a furtherstep re-moved,has a weakenedsense of bothmeaningandimplicitcommandment.0From this perspective,then, writingis definitely downgraded.This wasalready vident n the thoughtof Socrates s reportedbyPlato n the Phaedrus.Socratesargues hatcontrary o expectations,writingdoes not improveone'smemoryand wisdombutin factaccomplisheshe reverse:memorywillsufferbecausepeoplewillbeginto relyonwriting:writingwill not impartwisdomtothe mindbut ratherwill only serveas a reminder;by learning hingsthroughwritingpeopleseemto knowmuch,whileforthe mostpart heyknownothing;using writingis not real teaching, for the studentsbecome filled, not with


4/15

5

wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, and as such they will be a burden totheir fellows.11 Socrates also objects to writing because of the way it objec-tifies wisdom, and because of the negative possibilities that open up: "Once athing is put into writing, the composition. . . drifts all over the place, gettinginto the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those whohave no business with it. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused, italways needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or helpitself." 12Thus, in the classical Western view the oral, already one step re-moved from the real, not only is the parent of the written, but must constantlybe pressed into service to interpret and defend the written. The origin oflanguage is located in speech, which symbolizes the clear mental reflection ofthe divine. Writing is a step further away from the divine and, being a repre-sentation of a representation, experiences a loss of meaning and power. All ofthis is very close to the traditional Vyakarana point of view, in which thespoken Veda is the real word mirroring Brahman. It is through the spokenVeda that dharma or duty is known, and it is by chanting Vedic mantras thatkarmic ignorance may be removed. Writing here has, perhaps, an even lowerstatus than it is given by Socrates. Writing in the Vedic Sanskrit tradition isfor those who are too dull to remember. Writingcan never perfectly representall the nuances of the spoken word and is therefore always secondary. To thePratisakhyas (the rules for prosody, phonetics, accentuation, and sandhi) fellthe task of ensuring that the spoken words of the Vedas were preserved andpassed on in their pristine form. 13

For both the Greek and the Vyakarana points of view, then, languageoriginates from a natural reflection of the divine which is symbolized first atthe level of speech and secondarily at the much lower level of writing.Although conventions are involved in the formulation of both speech andwriting, such conventions are totally dependent on the logos or the naturalreflection of the divine in the mind for both their meaning and power. Due toits transcendental origin, language is understood in both of these traditions tobe, at base, divinely given. Equally important for Derrida is the fact that suchlogocentric approaches locate the essence at the interior, closer to the breathand voice than to writing, which is exterior.In his discussion of Saussure and Rousseau, Derrida shows that they, too,follow the classic logocentric pattern. Both end up valuing the interior oflanguage as essence, staying within the logic of identity and the ontology ofpresence. 14Derrida engages in a thorough critique of this view of languagenot to cause it to self-destructin favor of the opposite pole-language as an ex-terior, which is unable to engage the real, the Buddhist position-but to finda way out of the polarized debate altogether. This he does throughclues pickedup first from Saussure and later from Rousseau. Derrida does not take theBuddhist move of treating language as vikalpah or mere imaginary construc-tions. Rather he makes the surprisingmove of seeing the origin of language in


5/15

6 Coward

writing-a writing which is both exterior and interior. Derrida makes thismove in the hope of escaping the ontology of presence and the ethics of goodand evil which such an ontology necessitates. The problem of stating his viewof the origin of languageso as to avoid falling back into the error of metaphys-ics is something Derrida thinks he manages "only by a hairsbreadth." Hismethod, he says, is to borrow the resources of his own position from the logicit deconstructs-and in so doing find a positive foothold.15 In this, of course,he differs from the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna,16who deconstructs on-tology, not to get a foothold from which to make statements about the realnature of language, but rather to demonstrate its ultimate sunya or lack of anysuch "footholds." Derrida's use of Rousseau's notion of an originary force ortrace of "writing" may well bring him closer to Bhartrhari than to Nagarjuna,with whom he has been previously identified.17 It will raise afresh the ques-tion as to whether Derrida's deconstruction of the origin of language reallydoes allow him to escape metaphysics by a "hairsbreadth" as he claims. Inexamining Derrida's deconstruction let us look first at the beginningless na-ture of language, and second at its pregnant quality (with time as midwife)that allows it continually to sequence itself.LANGUAGE AS BEGINNINGLESS(ANADI)The problem of asking the question of the origin of language is that it must beasked within already existing language. We cannot get outside of language toexamine its origin. Thus to attempt to think the origin of language is to arriveat a paradox which cannot be resolved. Derrida's sustained study of the originof language takes the form of a commentary on Rousseau's "Essay on theOrigin of Languages." This commentary provides the main substance of thesecond half of Derrida's Grammatology. In his reading of Rousseau, Derridaexamines the significance of Rousseau's own metaphors and arguments forthe theory he proposes. 18Indeed, Derrida states his own tactic as being a kindof literary/philosophical judo-to use "the strengths of the field to turn itsown stratagems against it."19 The aim, however, is not a simple reversal ofcategories or poles of argument-the outcome and method of traditionalmetaphysics-but rather the undoing of both a given order of priorities andthe system of conceptual opposition that makes such an order possible. Thisaspect of Derrida's approach is very closely parallel to the Catuskoti or "FourPronged Negation" method of Nagarjuna.20 But his outcome is different.Rather than seeking to reduce critical thought to silent meditation, Derridaconcludes with positive statements about "writing"as being the dynamism ororiginary force in all language.21That Rousseau cannot possibly mean what he says in his "Essay on theOrigin of Languages" is the outcome of Derrida's perversely literal reading ofRousseau's text. Rousseau argues that speech and song originate together inthe natural unity of the articulate cry.22Primatives neither sing nor speak but


6/15

7

simplyemit mutedbellowings,which their wants draw from them. The firstcriesof youngchildrenaresimilar.It is in the transcending f need by desireand the awakeningof pityby imaginationhat the primative ryis modulatedinto speech. In his Dictionaryof Music,Rousseaudefines a song as a mod-ificationof the human voice.23In speech, accents are seen as but imitativemodifications f the voice of song. Therefore, or Rousseau, anguages arry-ing more accent (for example, Italian) are closer to song and the primalsourceof speech. The differentiationsromunitativecryto song and then tospeechandfinally o writing animitationof speech)are seen by Rousseau asa descendinghierarchymarkedby an increasing oss of the good originarypresencereflected n the initialcry.24Derrida'sanalysisof Rousseau'sEssaydemonstrates hatthe modificationswhich are the birthpangsof song and speech have the very characteristicsof separationand sequencing hat Rousseau takes to typifydegenerationofthe word. "Whatemerges s the fact thatlanguage,once it passes beyondthestageof primative ry, is 'alwaysalready' nhabitedbywriting,or by all thosesignsof an 'articulate' tructurewhichRousseauconsidereddecadent."25By"writing"Derrida refersto any separationof the unitarycry into differentparts.Rousseau'snatural ry,characteristic f theunityof natureandidentityof origin,is somehow"shapedandunderminedby a strangedifferencewhichconstitutes t by breachingt .. ."26 The originof language s due to nothingbut the differencesof articulation nd structurewhichcharacterizeanguageas it is experienced.Thus, argues Derrida, Rousseau'sdescriptionof thepoint of origin as being a unitaryor undifferentiated ry of pure presencecannot be accepted.Even Rousseau"unconsciously"eems to recognize hiswhen he introduces the notion of a special "supplement"which "bothsignifies he lack of a 'presence',or state of plentitude oreverbeyondrecall,and compensates or that lack by setting in motion its own economy ofdifference."27Derrida fastens onto this "unconsciousadmission"by Rous-seau as revealing he truenatureof language.It is not a hierarchy f degrada-tion descendingfrom a "fallen"or "breached" tate of originalplentitude.Ratherit is the beginningdynamicof difference hat is characteristic f alllevels of writing,speech, and thought.Rousseau'sartifactual upplement sidentifiedby Derridaas revealing he origin-lessnatureof language.The shift from originarypresence to originlessdifference has significantimplicationsor the privileging f speechoverwriting-that hascharacterizedmuch of traditionalWestern and Indianphilosophy.But before turningtoexamine those implications, et us pause and compareDerrida'sanalysisofthe originof languagewith thatofferedbyBhartrhari.Theprima aciereasonfor undertaking ucha comparisons thatBhartrhari,ike Derrida,sees thenecessity of a continuity between the originary state and the manifestedexperience of language. Bhartrhari, n common with the Mimamsa, theYoga, and the Vedanta schools of Indian Philosophy, sees language as


7/15

8 Coward

beginningless28-this is parallel to Derrida's view of language as origin-less.And like Derrida, Bhartrharimakes use of time as the sequencer or cause ofarticulated (differentiated) speech.LANGUAGEAS SEQUENCED/DIFFERENTIATED Y TIME(KALA)Against Rousseau and all theories of creation by convention, Derrida assertsthat language has no origin. But he does maintain that language at all levels ispregnant with a force toward separation or difference. The different parts orseparations which characterize the written text are from the same dynamicwhich manifests itself in spoken words. In his analysis Derrida is attemptingto recover what is already present in language. Thus Derrida's often mis-understood statement, "There is nothing outside the text."29Just as the dyna-mic of difference (separation, articulation) is beginninglessly present in thewritten text, so it is also present in speech. There is no metaphysical "other"outside of text or speech which starts language. This insight of Derrida's isnicely paralleled by Bhartrhari's view that the dynamic of separation intoword (sabda) and meaning (artha) is beginninglessly present in language at allits levels30-from the uttered or fully sequenced speech (vaikhari vak) to theapparently unitative intuition (pasyanti vak), in which sequencing is presentonly as a pregnant force. Between these two levels, says Bhartrhari, there isthe mental speech (madhyama vdk) with its thought separation into sentencemeanings and sounds which have not yet been uttered. Bhartrhari, like Der-rida, sees sequencing or difference as the characteristic dynamic of languagein all its levels. Even the innermost apparently unitative level of speech ispregnant with the power of difference. As Bhartrhari puts it in his vrtti,pasyanti vdk, though it is One, has the power to produce sequence within it.31There is no pure presence or logos devoid of this pregnant power. For Bhar-trhari the one Brahman is the Sabdatattvaor Word-Principle. Sabdatattvaisnot a lesser Brahman, a mere upayah, but is identical with Brahman itself, theonly Brahman there is.32For Bhartrhari, Brahman, as the Word-Principle, isan intrinsically dynamic and expressive reality, and the Universe as a whole isto be understood as its manifestation under the form of temporal becoming.Both Bhartrhari and Derrida describe this immanent power of becoming interms of time and space.For Bhartrhari it is through the power of time (kala) and space (dik) thatthe one Brahman appears as many. Kala and dik are not different from Brah-man but are those aspects of Brahman which allow manifested sequence tocome into being. For example when time sequences appear as differentiatedobjects, then time as a power seems to be different from Brahman, but reallyit is not.33 It is striking that Derrida's key term "differance," which for him isthe essence of language, is described in terms of the coincidence of meaningsin the verb differer: to differ (in space) and to defer (to put off in time). Thus"differance" for Derrida invokes both space and time as being essential to the


8/15

9

originof language.34Bhartrhari'swisdomin namingboth space and time asthe powersof Brahmanby whichlanguageoccurs s highlightedn Derrida'scritiqueof structuralism. tructuralism,e says,focuseson spaceand reducestime to a dimensionof space. Derrida,like Bhartrhari, inds it necessary oavoid the simplechoice of one of the terms over the other-his goal is tobreakwith the classicalphilosophical ystemof metaphysical ppositions.35In his critiqueof Husserl'sphenomenology,Derridanotes that time func-tionsas an endlessdeferringof presencewhichdrivesyet anotherparadoxicalwedge into the abilityto experiencepurepresence.36What we experience snot the pure presence of logocentric metaphysicsbut a dynamictemporalbecoming. Bhartrhariwould seem to agree when he describes time as thesequencerthat puts off the pure experienceof presence by differentiatingthings nto statesof birth,existence,anddecay.Twoillustrations reofferedby Bhartrhari o make clearhis meaning.The powerof time in the creative

process s likethat of the wirepuller n a puppetplay.37Just as the wirepulleris in completecontrolof the puppetplay, so Kala has full control over thesequencingof language.Ordinary ause-and-effect rocessescannotoperateunless Kalainfusesthem with life force. This controlof cause and effect bytime is further llustratedn relationto the stringsa hunterties to the feet ofsmallbirdswhichhe usesas baitforlargerones. The smallbirdscanflyoveralimited distancebut they cannotgo beyondthe lengthof theirstrings.Likethe stringscontrolling he movementof birds,the wordsof languagearecon-trolledby the "stringof time." Derridadescribes histemporalization f lan-guageas the movementof differance.38t is thisintrinsicmovementof differ-ance that permits the articulationof speech and writing, and founds themetaphysical ppositionbetweensignifierandsignified,expressionand con-tent. For Derrida,diff6ranceor articulationoriginates n the experienceofspace and time.39Forboth DerridaandBhartrhariheorigination f language n the differingforces of time and space accounts for our experienceof past, present, andfuture. Derrida's analysis picks up on a comment from Saussure that"... what is natural to mankind is not spoken language but the faculty of con-structinga language .. ."40This inherentimpulseto construct anguageisnamed a "psychicmprint"or "trace"by Derridaand wouldseem to parallelBhartrhari'sllustration f the yolkof the peacock'segg. ForBhartrhari,an-guage has within itself a dynamicpresencepregnantwith the power of dif-ferentiation.Bhartrhariikens this pregnantpowerto the energy (kratu) nthe yolk of a peacock'segg, which, thoughone, has an action-likefunctionand assumes the sequenceof its parts.41Derrida uses the term "trace"toreferto thispsychic mprint,becauseof itsrooting nthe past,whichcausesusto experienceit as an "always-already-there."42erridacalls the trace an"absolutepast"to distinguisht fromour ordinaryuse of "past."As he putsit, ". .. if the trace refers to an absolute past, it is because it obliges us to


9/15

10 Coward

think a past that can no longer be understoodin the form of a modifiedpresence,as a present-past."43 he traceis not simplya passivepast, for itproclaimsas much as it recalls-it has impulsiveforce, the force of articu-lation or differentiation.Thus, althoughour conceptsof past, present, andfuture result from the articulation orce of the trace, these conceptstakenalone are not exhaustiveof the trace. The essence of the trace is a dialectic"of protentionand retentionthat one wouldinstall in the heartof the pres-ent instead of surroundingt with it."44The dialecticof the trace is whatDerrida calls "differance." t proclaimsas much as it recalls. Therefore itis in dynamicrelationshipwith past, present, and future. It is the absolutegroundout of whichthey arise.45Bhartrhari'sonceptionof the driving orceinherent n the absoluteWord-Principle Sabdtattva) earsmanysimilaritieso Derrida'sanalysis.Compar-ingBhartrhariwith Derridahelpsus to locatesignificantdifferencesbetweenBhartrhari ndganlkarawhichfrequentlyhave been missedby previouscom-mentators uch as GaurinathSastri46 ndK. A. Subramanianyer,47both ofwhom offer a decidedlyAdvaiticreadingof the Vakyapadlya.48n addition,an understanding f Derrida awakensus to pointsof close contact betweenIndianandmodernWestern houghton the natureof language.Bhartrhari iews time as apower ndependentof allspeech objects, yet alsoinherentin them, pushingthem throughsuccessivestages. Rather than thepassiveexternalsuperimposition f the successivechangesupon Brahman,the Advaita model in India and the logocentricmodelin the West, the imagein Bhartrharis one of urgent changes throughpregnant orces which com-prisethe essence of the absolute tself (Sabdabrahman).t is in Vakyapadfya3:9, verse 14, that we findBhartrhari's osition clearlystated.It reads:By means of activitiessimilar o the turningof the water-wheel, he externaland all pervasiveTime turnsout (kalayati)all the fragments kalah,objects)and thusacquires he name of kala(Time).49Like the ever renewedpushingor liftingup of waterby the waterwheel, sothe all-pervadingand all-penetratingTime drives or pushes (kalayati) allthings, releasingthem from their material causes and makingthem move.That is whytime is giventhe appropriate ame of Kdla.The distinctionbetween Bhartrhari'sonceptionof Kala and the AdvaitaVedanta view of mayais not with regard o locus of Kalaor mayabeing inBrahman for both schools seem to agreeon this), but ratherwithregard othe ontologicalpowerascribed o Kala or mady.Bhartrhari'sKala doctrineemphasizesthe driving(kalayati) power inherentin Brahmanwhich is thefirstcause of the bursting orthof the worldlyphenomena.The Advaita con-ceptionof mdyd,although t does indeed(in the Vivarana radition,at least)locate mayain Brahman,50 oes not seem to attribute o mayathe samede-gree of ontological"pregnancy" r "driving orce" as Bhartrhari scribes o


10/15

11

Kala. While it is acknowledged hat mdydhas two aspects, obscuring dva-rana)andprojective(viksepa),the stressin Advaitainterpretation eems tobe on the formermorethan on the later. Forthe Advaitin,the focus is uponmdyd'sobscuringof Brahman; or Bhartrhari,t is the projective power ordriving orceof Kalathatoccupiescenterstage. While this differencemayatfirstappear o be merelya questionof differenceof emphasis,a definitediffer-ence seems to appearwhen the ontologicalstatusof the phenomenalprojec-tion itself is analyzed.While for Advaitathe projectedworld of mdyd s nei-therrealnor unrealbutinexplicable anirvacaniya),he Kdla-drivenworld ofBhartrhari, lthough ncreasinglympureas it becomesmanifestedas worldlyphenomena,never loses its directontological indentitywith Brahman.Therelationbetween the phenomenalworldand Brahman or Bhartrhari s con-tinuousand does not have the mysteriousbreak of an "allor nothing"sortwhich both gankara'smayadoctrineand the classicalWesternphilosophyofbeing or presence require.Whereassuperimposition adhyasa) is a fittingterm for Sankara,51t does not seem appropriate o Bhartrhari r Derrida.The illustrations ffered n the Vakyapadiyaredynamic mages:of Brahmanbursting orth in illumination sphota), of pregnancy the peacock egg pro-ducingall the colorsof creation),and of a driving orcelike the pushing-up rlifting-upaction(kalayati)of the water wheel.Helaraja'sTika on Vdkyapadiya,Kanda3, karika9:62, makesclear thatthereare threeontological evels in Bhartrhari'shought:Brahman,his Pow-ers of Time and Space, and the diversityof phenomena.52Once againthiscontrastswith Sankara'sAdvaita and Westernlogocentricphilosophy.Forgankara hereis onlyone ontological evel, Brahman,withmdydas anepiste-mologicalsecond level (which s neitherrealnorunrealbutinexplicable).ForBhartrhari he highest ontological evel is Brahmanas Sabdatattvawithoutmanifestsequence). It is calledpasyanti,which also indicatesthe direct andfull perceptionof meaning-thus the culminationof our experienceof ourvdkor word.53AlthoughTime is inherent in Brahmanat this stage, no se-quencehasyet occurred-it is stillpurepotentiality.The nextontologicalevel,in descendingorder,is madhyama. t is at this level that Kalabeginsto pushor drivedelimitedportionsof Brahman nto sequence.This it accomplisheswith the help of prdnaor breath. In our experienceof languagethis corre-spondsto the separationof the unitarysphotainto the mentalsequenceofthoughts.The full-blownappearanceof diversityappearswhenTime has re-leased all the secondarycause-effectrelations which have been waitingasstored-upmemorytraces(samskdras) r "seed-states" n all the cyclesof theuniverse.It is in this third or vaikhari evel that the power of Time as thesequenceevidenced n ordinary ause-effect elations s fullyexperienced.Toreturnto Bhartrhari's wn analogy,at this stage we see the birds on time'sstringsflyingabout to the full extent of the limits that their "strings"allow.Time is thus the governingpowerof all thought objectsin the universe. It is


11/15

12 Coward

time that drives or pushes objects into action to the point where their ownsecondary cause-effect relations take hold. But it is also the behind-the-sceneactivity of time that controls the extent of the secondary actions of objects,and their moment of decay or withdrawal.The constructive power of time is also encountered in Derrida's explana-tion. Derrida's deconstructive approach seeks to recover what is alreadythere.54 What is already there in the diff6rance which is the essence of lan-guage is a dialectic of protention and retention, which provide the opposingdynamics of our experience of the present.55 Potention is the dialectic of thepresent with the anticipation of the future. Retention is the dialectic of thepresent with memory of the past. The present has no existence apart fromthese two dialectics of time. In Derrida's rather complex thought, these twodialectics of future and past are seen as implying each other:

. .in the undecomposable synthesis of temporalization, protention is as in-dispensable as retention. And their two dimensions are not added up but theone implies the other in a strange fashion. To be sure, what is anticipated inprotention does not sever the present any less from its self-identity than doesthat which is retained in the trace. But if anticipation were privileged, theirreducibilityof the always-already-there and the fundamental passivity that iscalled time would risk effacement. . . . Since past has always signifiedpresent-post, the absolute past that is retained in the trace no longer rigorous-ly merits the name "past." .. [T]he strange movement of the trace proclaimsas much as it recalls: differance defers-differs [differe].56If I understand Derrida, our experience of the present is constituted by adynamic mixing of anticipations of the future and memories of the past-allexperienced as a simple moment of the present. Past and future constitute thepresent not by dividing it up, but by being in dynamic tension with eachother.57 Derrida's thinking here has striking similaritywith the Buddhist viewthat there is no present time (vartamanakala) apart from past and future. Thepresent has no meaning except in relation to past and future.58Bhartrhari (VCikyapadiya3:9:4) uses similar notions in his discussion oftime: permission (abhyanujnd) and prevention (pratibandha). The functionof Time called permission (abhyanujnd) allows things to be born and to con-tinue in existence.59 By its other function, prevention (pratibandha), Timeobstructs the inherent capacities of objects, and "old age" is then experi-enced. It is in this way that the stage of life and the seasons are ordered.When Time is functioning under its impulse of prevention, decay or jaraoccurs. Jard (decay) and growth (krama) operate like pairs of opposites.When jart is active, krama or growth is blocked, and vice versa.60 But theunderlying substratum of all of this activity is the driving impulse of Time.61Time remains eternal although the actions of growth and decay come and go.

As a result of the activity of growth and decay, Time, which is one, attainsthe states of past, present, and future. Thus when an action ceases, Time,conditioned by that action, is called past. When something is about to hap-


12/15

13

pen, Time, conditioned by that event, is called future. When action has beeninitiated but is not yet completed, Time is then called present.62 In this waythe one transcendent reality Time is experienced, through the actions of thesecondary causes that it releases or restrains, to be sequenced into past, pres-ent, and future. Time, says Bhartrhari, is like the ever flowing current of ariver which deposits some things on the river bank and at the same time takesaway others.63 So it is that the seasons change, as symbolized by the motionsof the sun and stars. As Helaraja puts it, "The seasons may be looked upon asthe abode to Time, because it appears as the seasons. The power called 'Free-dom' of Brahman is really Time and it appears diversified as the differentseasons like Spring, etc."64 Thus the appearance of the Universe, which isreally without sequence, as something with sequence, is the work of Time.65All of this squares very nicely with Derrida's description of the temporaliza-tion of language as play-not play "in the world," but play as the free becom-ing of language itself.66 To use Bhartrhari'sterms, it is the free phenomenaliz-ing of the Sabdatattvaitself, not the action of a separated God "playing" inthe world. Nor is it a play of vikalpah, as Buddhism would have it, a play ofhuman imagination which has no touch with the true nature of the world.Derrida's play as the free becoming of language and Bhartrhari's play of theSabdatattvaare reality itself!In another analogy, past, present, and future are said by Bhartrhari to belike three paths on which objects move without any confusion.67 Helaraja'scomment makes an analogy of this view with the Sankhya-Yoga explanationof Time found in Vyasa's Bhdsya on Yoga Sutra 3:13. Here the activity ofTime is equated with the ever present movement of the gunas on the threepaths of being (adhva). The notion that objects and mental states do not alloccur simultaneously due to the prevention and permission activity of time isclearly stated. The psychological mechanism involved is that of inherenttendencies or memory traces (samskdras), which sprout like seeds whenthe conditions created by the ever changing gunas are favorable.68 The pointof this parallel between Sankhyya-Yoga and Grammariandoctrine is to showhow the three apparently conflicting qualities can coexist in harmony. AsHelaraja puts it:Just like the three ingredients, having the characteristics of serenity (sattva),activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing simultaneously due totheir eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect beingsthrough their peculiar evolution, in a proper manner in the splendour of theirown course of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magni-ficence of their own power (become) capable of effecting sequence in externalaspects.69

The past and the future hide objects, so they are like tamas or darkness(says Bhartrhari). The present enables us to see the objects, and so it is likelight or the sattva of the Sankhyas. Rajas stands for the activity of Timeitself.70 For both Sankhya-Yoga and the Grammarian, the harmonious


13/15

14 Coward

coexistenceof objectson the threepathsof timemakes the orderedsequenceof the worldpossible.Time, like an eternalroad,is the substratum n whichthe objectsof theworldcomeandgo. Theroad,liketime, alwaysremains hesame. 71CONCLUSIONIt is remarkable hat thinkersso separated n time and place should havegivensuchsimilarexplanationsof our experienceof language.Both Bhartr-hari and Derridasee time, as the sequencingof language,to be its basiccharacterandits constituting ource.Both enter into this deep discussionoftimein relation o the absoluteand the originof language,not as a fascinatingmetaphysicalaside, but to explainhow the unitaryWordmanifests tself inexperienceas the diversityof speech and writing-without recourseto anexternalother (God or Logos). Forboth, langauge s not logocentric,as it isin Westernclassicalphilosophyor in the Advaita Vedantaof Sankara,nor isit emptyof realityasBuddhismmaintains.Language, or DerridaandBhartr-hari is a dynamicbecomingthat is itself the very stuffof our experienceofreality.

NOTES1. T. R. V. Murti, "Some Thoughts on the Indian Philosophy of Language" (PresidentialAddress to the 37th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held in Chandigarh in 1963),reprinted in Studies in Indian Thought: The Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti, ed.Harold Coward (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), pp. 355-376.2. See, for example, Heintz Werner and Bernard Kaplan, Symbol Formation (New York:John Wiley and Sons, 1963).3. Frits Staal, "Oriental Ideas on the Origin of Language," Journal of the American Oriental

Society 99 (1979).4. Murti, "Some Thoughts," p. 364. Murti cites Mimdtmsd utra 1.1.5.5. Ibid., p. 365.6. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).7. Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice (New York: Methuen, 1982).8. This appears mainly in Of Grammatology, but with reflection back to several essayscol-

lected in Writingand Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).9. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 17.10. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 17.11. "Phaedrus," in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Hunting-ton Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p.520.12. Ibid., p. 521.13. See Satyakam Varma, "Importance of the Pratisakhyas," in Studies in Indology (Delhi:Bharatiya Prakashan, 1976), pp. 32-52.14. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 314.15. Ibid.

16. Naigrjuna, Mulamadhyamikakdrikd, trans. Kenneth K. Inada (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press,1970).17. Robert Magliola, Derridaon the Mend (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press,1984), p. 87 ff.


14/15

15

18. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, pp. 18-19.19. Derrida, Writingand Difference, p. 20.20. T. R. V. Murti, The CentralPhilosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin,1955), p. 121 ff.21. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 33.22. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 195-198. Animals in Rousseau's view exhibit no speechor song. Although he allows that birds whistle, humans alone sing.

23. As quoted by Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 196.24. Ibid., pp. 198-199.25. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 36.26. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 198.27. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 37.28. For a review of the views of these and other schools of Indian philosophy, see HaroldCoward, The Sphota Theory of Language (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), p. 29 ff.29. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 41.30. The Vakyapadrya of Bhartrhari with the Vrtti, trans. K. A. Subramanian Iyer (Poona:Deccan College, 1965), 1:142.31. Vakyapadrya1:142, Vrtti.32. See Madeleine Biardeau, Theorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans lebrahmanismeclassique (Paris: Mouton, 1964), p. 266 ff.33. Vdkyapadiya 1:2 and 3.34. Derrida, Writingand Difference, p. xvi.35. Ibid., pp. 16-20.36. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 247.37. Vdkyapadiya 111:9:4.38. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 60.39. Ibid., p. 65.40. As quoted by Derrida in Of Grammatology, p. 66.41. Vakyapadrya1:51.42. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 66.43. Ibid.44. Ibid., p. 67.45. Derrida notes that the pure trace is diff6rance. It does not depend on speech or writing butis the precondition for both. Although the trace as such does not exist, its possibility is anterior toall expressions. It is this intrinsic "trace" or "differance"dialectic that permits the articulation of

speech and writing, and founds the metaphysical opposition between signifier/signified, etc. (OfGrammatology, pp. 62-65).46. Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning (Calcutta: Sanskrit College,1959).47. K. A. SubramanianIyer, Bhartrhari(Poona: Deccan College, 1969).48. It should be noted that the one modern commentator on the Vakyapadtya who clearlyrejects such Advaitic readings is Madeleine Biardeau. See her Bhartrhari:VakyapadlyaBrahma-kdnda avec la vrtti de Harivrsabha (Paris: Publications de l'Institute de Civilisation Indienne,1964).49. Vdkyapadlya 111:9:14.50. See, for example, the lucid presentation of Vivarana Advaita by T. M. P. Mahadevan, ThePhilosophy of Advaita (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1969, pp. 236-251.51. See anikara's"Introduction" to his Commentary on the Brahma Sutras, trans. GeorgeThibaut, in Sacred Books of the East, vol. 34 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968), p. 3 ff.52. An English translation of Helarfja's Tikf is available in Peri Sarveswara Sharma'stransla-tion of the KdlasamuddeSa(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972).53. Vakyapadiya I:142.54. Norris, Deconstruction: Theoryand Practice, p. 41.55. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 67.56. Ibid., p. 66.


15/15

16 Coward

57. Ibid., p. 67.58. Kalasamuddesa (see Sharma's"Introduction," p.19).59. Vakyapadrya11:9:23.60. Ibid., 111:9:24.This, says Heliarja, is Bhartrhari's meaning of the term vivarta, whichappears in Vakyapadlya 1:1 and 111:3:81.

61. Vakyapadtya111:9:74.62. Ibid., 111:9:37.63. Ibid., 111:9:41.64. Ibid., III:9:45, Tika.65. Ibid., III:9:46.66. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 50.67. VakyapadtyaII:9:52.68. Pataiijali's Yoga Sutras, trans. Rama Prasada (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Cor-poration, 1978), 111:13.69. Kalasamuddesa2, p. 76.70. Vakyapadrya111:9:53.71. Ibid., 111:9:74.

derrida and bhartrhari's vākyapadīya on the origin of language - h. coward

Documents