de animis cover + back
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cool beans dudeTRANSCRIPT
Antonio Dowling
Dr. E. Trizio
February 7, 2011
DE ANIMIS
We will be concerned with comparing Plato's and Aristotle's views of the immortal soul
according to Plato’s Phaedo and Aristotle’s De Anima. Such as the Ancient Greeks would
(encounter first Plato, then Aristotle) so I will first establish and, additionally, argue for the
logical sensibility of Plato's view of the immortal soul: I will focus mainly on his dualism, and
then I will introduce two of his arguments for the immortality of the soul. Next, I will move to
Aristotle's view of the immortal soul, concentrating on his notion of dualism and concepts of
substance, perception, and intellect in terms of comparison to Plato.
Plato’s concept of dualism is easily summed up in one phrase: “The soul is a separate and
distinct entity from the body.” This claim, simple enough to understand when extracted from the
drama of the dialogue, lays the foundations for Plato’s concept of duality. To help explain, I will
introduce our first argument, that from recollection.
The word recollection, it seems, would imply a sort of memory, or prior knowledge. We
will keep this in mind while working through this argument. The argument from recollection first
appears in Phaedo 72e with Cebes saying, “...there is that theory which you have often
mentioned to us– that what we call learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then surely
what we recollect now we must have learned at some time before; which is impossible, unless
our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape.” Of course, the knowledge
that is being spoken of is that of the Forms. Forms, according to Plato, are absolute qualities.
“Beauty,” “tree,” “virtue.” Therefore, a non-Form (particular) can (and must) participate in the
Forms– for example, be virtuous– but can never be absolute. Simply, the Forms are not found in
the physical realm, only the particulars are. The example given in the Phaedo is that of the Form
of Equality– that is to say, the Idea of absolute equality. We see things in the material realm that
are more or less equal (in size, shape, weight, etc.) than our conception of absolute equality, but
how is it that we know of this concept in the first place (Phaedo 74a)? It must be that we have
encountered it before. Take a photograph, say, of your friend Tim. When you see this photo, you
are reminded of him. Perhaps you recall certain of his qualities or experiences you shared with
him. This does not have to be a particularly accurate picture of Tim, yet he still comes to mind
when you see the photo. But, of course, this photo is not Tim. Thus, this imperfect “copy” of him
is reminding you of the “original” Tim. It would follow that you must have met Tim prior to your
seeing the photo, in order for you to be reminded of him; someone who had never met Tim could
not be so reminded. Therefore, as things being more or less equal remind us of the Idea/Form of
equality, we must have met the Idea/Form of equality in order to be reminded of it. This
argument is Plato’s proof that the soul existed before we came into existence.
Aristotle, too, has an idea of forms, though is differs greatly from Plato’s. The form of an
object, put simply, is its essence– its being. These intelligible forms are not independent of a
substance, and may only exist whilst the substance does. This substance has one other part:
material, i.e. the matter-existing-in-space-and-time that it is comprised of. Substance, according
to Aristotle, is the compound of material and form. Let us look further into what it means to be a
substance. Material has the potential to be “something”; form is the efficient cause of becoming–
the being-at-work-staying-itself aspect of existence. We cannot have material without form. Raw
material, as it were, cannot exist on its own. And we certainly cannot have a form without
material; that would not be possible, given that the “form” applies only to matter-existing-in-
space-and-time. Thus, to be is to consist of material (potential for being) and form (cause of
being). So we can see that Aristotle’s forms are integral to being, but are not separate from the
body, as Plato’s are. This being the case, Plato’s Argument from Recollection (hinging mainly
upon his theory of Forms) is invalid in Aristotle’s eyes, given that it is impossible for a soul to
exist before a body, or indeed, without a body in any case. In essence, to study the soul is to
study the activities of the body, so having a soul prior to having a body does not make
ontological sense to Aristotle.
Having proven that the soul existed before our bodies did, all that is left for Plato is to
prove its eternal existence after death. He comes to this question with his argument called The
Argument from Affinity. In Phaedo 79e, Cebes concedes to Socrates that the soul is much more
like the divine and the invariable than the body. Having decided this, and knowing that the Forms
are invariable themselves, one can assume that the soul holds some sort of affinity to the Forms.
In the Argument from Recollection, Plato mentions that the soul is the only part of a human that
can be in contact with the Forms. Additionally, Plato works in the fact that simple things, i.e.
things without parts, are indestructible. If destruction is defined as “tearing parts apart,” the
Forms (and the soul) cannot be subject to destruction. With this additional argument for the
immortality of the soul, Plato satisfactorily proves that the soul exists before birth, and not only
after death, but eternally after human death.
Again we see that Aristotle has a contrary conception of the nature of the soul. According
to Aristotle, this soul is destructible. The soul is the form of an organic body with life as its
potency. A plant is comprised of matter (material) and form (“plantness”). Were I to eat a plant, I
would be taking in its material for my own purposes, but not its form1. In this way, the form is
destroyed; the plant is no longer a plant. Its plant parts have been taken apart and given the new
form of “food.” So, what is to say that the entirety of the human soul (the form of an organic
body with life as its potency) could not be similarly destroyed? Absolutely nothing, from what
we can tell from Aristotle’s De Anima. A being that loses its form is no longer that being, except
homonymously. For example, “an eye that has lost its sight is no longer an eye (De Anima
412b).” We will see that Aristotle soon gives an exception to this law of being.
In De Anima: book III, chapter 5, Aristotle turns the tables on his philosophical followers.
The process of perception (outlined in De Anima: book II, chapter 5) for material objects
employs terms aforementioned in this essay. In order for a material sensory organ (found in the
perceptive and intelligible souls, but not in the nutritive) to understand another material object, a
few things must happen. Firstly, the material object must actualize the sensory organ. This
sensory organ is potentiality with matter, so it is, essentially, waiting to be actualized. Secondly,
the sensory organ must “become” the material object. We do not mean to say that the eye
becomes, in a literal sense, whatever it sees. Let us understand by using another analogy. If we
think of the eye as a camera loaded with film, we can see how the photographs taken would not
be the moon or the chair or the table, but it would be a copy of such things (much as the
photograph of Tim, mentioned above, is not Tim). 3) The film waits to be acted upon, and, as
such, is potentiality with material.
How is it, though, that we know a chair, or any form, when we see one? After all, to be a
1 It might be possible for one to say that, by eating the plant, we are giving it a new form.
chair is to have the form of “chair,” and forms are non-physical. If what we are trying to sense is
non-material, certainly the means by which we sense it must be similarly matterial-less.
According to Aristotle, what allows the comprehension of an object’s form is the passive
intellect. The passive intellect is pure potentiality without material, if we see potentiality as akin
to material and actuality akin to form. The only function of the passive intellect is to understand
an object’s form– it will never encounter material, as it itself is immaterial. The job of
encountering material is one of the body, which is matter itself, and therefore in a ready position
to sense material things. This all might be to say that the material sense organs and the passive
intellect give us a comprehensive view of the visible world. Note that I do not mean to say that
the forms are visible, just that they are necessarily attached to the Aristotelean material, which is
visible.
Next, we will explore the similar process for sensing immaterial things. First let us decide
what kind of immaterial things we will be discussing. Forms of material objects are indeed
immaterial, but are necessarily attached to material things in order to give them being, and will
never exist without material. Things encountered only in thought are our concern. Such things
may be numbers, creative concepts, and other thoughts not in any way attached to material. It
cannot be that these thoughts act upon an intellect, they must be produced. This calls for another
type of intellect, so dubbed “productive intellect.” It produces these abstractions, and does so
with pure actuality. It must be pure actuality, for if this intellect were to have any potentiality, it
would require an actuality located in another intellect to actualize it, falling into an infinite
regress.
We will take a time to compare the thoughts of Plato an Aristotle on this matter of the
soul’s role in intellect. Plato states that the soul is the only thing that can communicate with the
Forms, and therefore is acting as somewhat of a passive intellect, in Aristotelean terms. However
the difference is that the passive intellect can “become” the immaterial forms, in order to
understand them, whereas Plato’s so doesn’t need necessarily do this. In fact, Plato’s
combination Argument from Affinty and Simplicity states that the soul has no parts, and
therefore cannot change. Even if we disregard this argument, the fact that the Platonic soul lives
in a wold of particulars and is constantly having to access the Forms, does not mean that the soul
is unable to stop access the Forms. The active access of the Platonic Forms is not an essential
property of the Platonic soul, as it were, whereas being eternally actualized is an essential
property of Aristotle’s productive intellect. In this way Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts are
similar in concept, but different in execution.
The similarities and differences between Platonic Dualism and Aristotelean Dualism are
clearly illustrated by their concepts of Forms and substance respectively. Plato’s theory claims
that the soul is separate and distinct from the body, and Aristotle claims that the soul is just the
form of an organic body with life as its potency, and therefore integral to the existence of a
being. This seems like an illustration of pure differences at first, but when Aristotle introduces
the passive and productive intellects, we can see that the Aristotelean soul does comprise of an
unchangeable, invisible part. Also introduced here is the concept of an immortal part of the
Aristotelean soul; a concept that he criticized his predecessors and contemporaries for believing.
Despite Aristotle’s reputation for being very contrary to Plato, we can clearly see the correlation
between the Platonic soul and the Aristotelean intellects.
Not until the Husserl-Heidegger-Sartre line of philosophers will the world see a time of
such incredible philosophical progression. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle led the change of
philosophy from the Hereclitean age, and inspired many modern philosophers to develop their
own thoughts on dualism, immortality, and the mind-body problem. As we have seen, Aristotle’s
thinking is radically different from Plato’s in many ways, yet can still rest upon Platonic
foundations in others. Though there are more differences than similarities between the theories
given in Phaedo and De Anima, it is clear that Aristotelian empiricism is very solid, up to a point.
It is at this point that Aristotle admits the immortal part of the soul, taking a page out of the book
of his old teacher, Plato.