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David Dubinsky and thelabor movementPhilip Taft aa Professor of Economics , Brown UniversityPublished online: 03 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: Philip Taft (1968) David Dubinsky and the labor movement,Labor History, 9:S1, 26-42, DOI: 10.1080/00236566808584059

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DAVID DUBINSKY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT

By PHILIP TAFT

For almost forty years, David Dubinsky has been one of the mostinfluential leaders of labor in the United States. He played a major rolein the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization, in thegreat organizing drives of the mid-1930s, and in reuniting the frag-mented ranks of labor. He was the first head of an A.F.L. union todemand action against organized racketeering and he initiated the firstintervention in forty years by the A.F.L. against a corrupt international.He was also the first to call attention to American labor's need for anexpanded international program to meet the Communist challenge inall parts of the world, to provide aid to trade union victims of totalitar-ianism, and to assist in the establishment of democratic labor organiza-tions wherever such assistance was necessary. He has been a leadingadvocate of greater political participation by labor and of support formore extensive legislative programs in the state legislatures and incongress.

Dubinsky's influence in the general labor movement was based uponsolid achievements as a leader in a difficult industry, and upon hisflexibility, sympathy, and understanding of the views and problems ofothers. Dubinsky became a socialist in his youth when he joined theJewish Socialist Party of Poland (Bund), and was an active socialist inthe United States. He was, however, never afflicted with the ideologicalblindness of so many apostles of radical change. In part his pragmatismand knowledge made him an ideal representative from the garmenttrades in the top councils of the general union movement. His old ideasand early experiences have not been completely discarded. Instead theyhave been modified, and have exercised a permanent influence upon hisoutlook; they have not been repudiated, but adapted to the needs of a

PHILIP TAFT is Professor of Economics at Brown University and author ofOrganized Labor in American History.

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DUBINSKY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT Ï1

larger constituency and to the changing temper and conditions of thetime.

Dubinsky was first elected in 1918 to an unpaid office in Cutters Local10, one of the more powerful units in his organization. Within threeyears, he was the union's full-time manager. His entrance into theofficial family coincided with the first assault upon American labororganizations by the organized legions of the Communist Party whenthe garment industry seemed a favorable terrain for infiltrating andgaining control of the union. Dubinsky worked closely with PresidentMorris Sigman to repel the attack. He became known throughout theunion as a man marked for the highest leadership. The Communistcampaign reached its peak with the disastrous 1926 Cloak Makers'strike which lasted more than six months. Mismanagement and callousdisregard for the interest of the members, as well as of the union,forced the international to take over the New York joint board in adifficult salvage operation. Deeply in debt, much of its market controleroded, and faced by a Communist-controlled dual organization—theNeedle Trades Workers Industrial Union—the I.L.G.W.U. outlookwas bleak. It was an uphill struggle and a testing ground for manyreputations. Dubinsky's name rose above most others engaged in thelife and death battle for the union's survival. It was virtually inevitablethat the office of secretary-treasurer would be filled by Dubinsky whenthe veteran Abraham Baroff retired as secretary-treasurer in 1929 ; andless than three years later, by appointment of the general executiveboard, he succeeded President Benjamin Schlesinger, who had died inoffice.

Dubinsky came into office in the depths of the Depression and onthe eve of great organizing opportunities. His appointment came at atime when the union had already begun to recover some of the groundlost in the 1926 debacle. More important than the relatively small gains,however, was the changed organizing climate ushered in by the firstRoosevelt administration. Facing an unparalleled industrial and agri-cultural depression, the new administration sponsored the NationalIndustrial Recovery Act, which allowed industry to regulate itself underthe aegis of government. Most traces of the NIRA have long disap-peared. But not the impact of Section 7 (a) upon union membership andcollective bargaining, and this legislation, not industrial managementof public regulation, was its most important influence. The changed sit-uation represented a challenge to the union and to its new president

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28 LABOR HISTORY

who had been in office less than a year. Section 7 (a) was important be-cause it declared that workers had a right to organize and bargaincollectively through organizations of their own choosing without inter-ference by the employer. It was a path-breaking declaration, but at bestonly partially enforceable against any employer determined to avoidrecognizing a union of his employees. Nevertheless, Section 7 (a)aroused and encouraged hundreds of thousands of workers to enrollin unions, some of them in the face of threats of discharge by theiremployer.

Wide differences soon appeared in the relative and absolute gainsmade by different unions. The readiness of leaders to take advantageof these burgeoning organizing opportunities was, at the time, of crucialimportance in determining immediate growth and influence. It is ameasure of Dubinsky's abilities that he fully met his first importanttest. By the time the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935, theI.L.G.W.U. had organized a large part of the New York market, aswell as many out-of-town unions, and it also established "beach-heads"in a number of formerly unorganized centers of the industry. WhileNew York remained the heart of the organized industry, the unionbroadened its base to many areas of garment manufacturing that hadnever come under union control. The organizing feats needed to enrollalmost two hundred thousand garment workers was not, to be sure, aone-man show. Even at its lowest point, the union had availabletalented, experienced, and devoted officials on all levels as well as manyseasoned members able to take on the organizing and administrativechores for an expanding union, but leadership fell on David Dubinskyas its executive head.

The union's rapid revival and its growth to peak membership is es-pecially noteworthy when considered from the point of view of theexperience of the 1920s. Only those with great faith could have believedin the instant revival of the union. Nonetheless, in the space of severalyears, it was transformed from a dispirited, uncertain organizationfacing an annoying and sometimes destructive rival in its major market,to one of the great labor organizations of the day.

The change in status was important for future survival and growthbut also for the recognition it brought to the union. In 1934, Dubinskywas appointed to the A.F.L. executive council, the first garment workerchosen from the ranks of a union which had a socialist tradition andwhose leaders came largely from abroad. It represented formal recogni-

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DUBINSKY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 29

tion of the union's achievement in ousting its communist rival from theNew York market—a tribute not only to its energy and expanded size—but also to Dubinsky's leadership.

Membership in the A.F.L. executive council has never automaticallybeen given to officers of large unions, although members of the car-penters and coal miners usually served. Large unions were frequentlyunrepresented while members of smaller organizations would fill someplaces. The basis for selection has never been publicly revealed nor cancriteria be found in the archives. It appears that members of the councilhave been chosen because of their interests and abilities, and in thebelief that they would devote time and energy to solving problemsconfronting the movement at large.

The executive council periodically issued policy statements andoffered advice on a range of questions. Customarily it did not indicatethe views held by particular members on controversial subjects. Despitethe facade of unity which the council presented to the outside, debateson internal differences were never absent. In inviting Dubinsky to serve,it is not likely that the older members expected mechanical acquiescenceto all their decisions. Dubinsky's views on political and economic issueswere well known. In choosing him for a seat on an expanded executivecouncil, no doubts could have been existed about the positions he waslikely to take on a number of questions. President William Green andMatthew Woll, who worked with the I.L.G.W.U. after the 1926 strike,knew their man but it is not likely that the A.F.L. leaders nor, for thatmatter anyone else, foresaw the role he was to play in the events to come.

Dubinsky was the first garment worker of European background toserve on the executive council. Thomas Rickert, of the United GarmentWorkers of America, who was also of European origin, had served onthe council for many years but the members of his union were largelynative Americans employed in the manufacture of work clothes. Theunion sold labels to employers who recognized it as the bargainingagent for their employees. In contrast, the Ladies Garment WorkersUnion was established largely by Jewish and Italian immigrant workers,and while the A.F.L. was never hostile to the I.L.G.W.U., no memberof that union ever occupied a high place in the Federation councils.Dubinsky's elevation to a seat on the council represented a significantchange, for he became a member of the labor movement's highestpolicy-making body on the eve of the greatest challenge of its fifty-year history.

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30 LABOR HISTORY'

Dubinsky's appointment came in the midst of a dispute over the roleof industrial organization in the mass-production industries. The 1934convention, which elected Dubinsky to the council, wrestled with theproblem and endorsed a compromise solution which failed to end thecontroversy. It was the main topic of debate at the 1935 convention atwhich a minority report signed by Dubinsky and five other membersof the resolutions committe advocated the A.F.L.'s chartering industrialunions in the mass-production industries. The resolution was defeated,but polled over 38 percent of the vote.

Normally the defeat of a resolution at an A.F.L. convention meanteither an end to the issue or its resubmission to the next meeting. Theleaders in the fight for industrial unionism, including Dubinsky, wereconvinced that only through industrial organization could the mass-production industries be organized. Impatient with the convention de-cision, and with normal procedures, eight unions established the Com-mittee for Industrial Organizations under the leadership of John L.Lewis. As a founding member whose views were fully supported by hisunion, Dubinsky believed that the "purpose of the committee is to bethe encouragement and promotion of organization of the unorganizedworkers in mass production and other industries upon an industrialbasis, as outlined in the minority report of the Resolutions Committeesubmitted to the convention of the American Federation of Labor atAtlantic City . . . to counsel and advise unorganized and newly organ-ized groups of workers; to bring them under the banner and in affilia-tion with the American Federation of Labor." In addition the Committeeexpressed a desire "to modernize the organization policies of the A.F.L."Dubinsky believed that such a Committee, espousing views of its ownon matters of interest to the labor movement, had a right to exist. Herejected the charges of dualism leveled against the unions supportingthis Committee, and he believed that unions should cooperate in thepromotion of common views. Dubinsky had always been an advocateof industrial unionism, and now he strongly urged the adoption of thispolicy in the mass-production industries. He saw no conflict betweensponsorship of industrial unionism and loyalty to the A.F.L. Whateverplans other C.I.O. leaders may have had for the future, Dubinsky re-garded the campaign for industrial organization as a means of strength-ening and enriching the A.F.L., not a scheme for splitting the labormovement.

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In this regard Dubinsky differed from Lewis and Sidney Hiliman ofthe Amalgamated Clothing Workers, although it is by no means clearthat Lewis, in the beginning of the campaign for industrial unionism,sought a division in the ranks. Hillman's position was quite different.Almost his entire trade union experience had been spent as a leader ofan independent union outside the A.F.L. He had developed an influ-ential position and a large and devoted following. The loss of A.F.L.affiliation held no terrors for him. The I.L.G.W.U.'s and Dubinsky'sposition was different. Dubinsky's experience had always been in a unionclosely affiliated with the A.F.L. Despite differences on political andsocial issues, the I.L.G.W.U.-A.F.L. relationship was always cordial.Samuel Gompers and A.F.L. Treasurer John B. Lennon came to NewYork to help in the great strike in 1910 and Gompers, rather than LouisD. Brandeis, suggested the preferential union shop as a basis of settle-ment.1 The A.F.L. was also sympathetic to the LL.G.W.U.'s problemsafter the 1926 disaster. The Federation even appointed a committeeto assist in the re-establishment of the union. It did not provide muchfinancial support, to be sure, but it was of some assistance. Gompers,Green and Woll understood the problems of the garment workers, andwere friendly and helpful towards their efforts to organize.

Aside from personal attitudes, Dubinsky knew from experience thedangers inherent in a divided labor movement. Like most of thosepresent at the C.I.O.'s launching, he believed that their action wasproper and legal. That position was supported by ample historicalprecedent. The A.F.L., it will be recalled, showed scant enthusiasm forforming a building trades department, but made no effort to interferewith it. The strength of the building trades, in 1907, was no greaterthan that of the C.I.O. unions in 1935. Cooperation among unions forthe promotion of political or other purposes not endorsed by the A.F.L.had never been challenged, nor did unions always accept the decisionsof conventions on jurisdictional matters. It was therefore with somesurprise that the leaders of the C.I.O. read President Green's November23, 1935 warning, that their new organization might lead to seriousdissension within the labor movement. The I.L.G.W. executive boardwas not of one view on the issue. Some members agreed that the C.I.O.could not be confined within its initial bounds and that it would eventu-

1 For details on this point see the letter of Samuel Gompers to Abraham Rosenberg, Aug.3, 1910. Rosenberg was president of the I.L.G.W.U.

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32 LABOR HISTORY

ally lead to a secession movement; others spoke out for its continuedsupport. In the end, the meeting adopted a statement by Dubinskysupporting the "purpose of the Committee to encourage and promoteorganization of the workers in the mass production and unorganizedindustries of the Nation and affiliation with the American Federationof Labor . . . If we neglect to organize them into the bonafide Americanlabor movement, there is imminent danger that these masses of workerswill either be forced into company unions or will be lured by othersubversive or dual movements."

Dubinsky was convinced that the C.I.O. was necessary if an effectivecampaign was ever to be launched to organize the mass-productionindustries. More than lip service was paid to this idea, for theI.L.G.W.U. supported the C.I.O. by contributions of more than $400,-000. Dubinsky was not only largely responsible for the initial decision,but he participated in the planning of some of the organizing cam-paigns and used his influence and efforts at the automobile worker'sconvention to prevent a split among the warring factions. He wasamong those who worked out the compromise at the 1937 U.A.W. con-vention which enabled the warring factions to live temporarily together.In this particular instance, Dubinsky the pragmatist is seen at his best.He recognized the need of unity and forecast that the "auto union wasbound to become one of the most powerful, one of the largest organi-zations in our country."

Dubinsky was loyal to the d . O . , and strongly objected to the sus-pensions and eventual expulsions from the A.F.L. He appeared at theexecutive council meeting considering the charges of dual unionismpreferred by John Frey, the president and spokesman for the A.F.L.metal trades. Dubinsky believed the charges and suspensions were ausurpation of authority, and said so. Some of the members of the execu-tive council were displeased by his appearance at the session. JohnCoefield of the Plumbers Union and William Hutcheson of the Car-penter's told him so. Dubinsky, however, held his ground. Green andTobin defended his right to be there; and he cast the only vote againstexpulsion.

Resentful of the executive council's action and convinced it was un-wise and futile, Dubinsky did not favor a permanent division in thelabor movement. Even at the beginning, he expressed his disagreementwith the "tone and approach employed by some of the leaders of the

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C.I.O. with regard to its opponents," but he continued to support theprogram of industrial unionism. At the same time, he regarded theI.L.G.W.'s separation from the A.F.L. as temporary, and he tried toprod the C.I.O.'s leaders into serious negotiations on ending the rift.An exchange of telegrams between them and the A.F.L., during theFederation's 1937 convention, led to the first formal peace discussionsby representatives of both organizations. It appeared that the meetinghad reached a workable solution for ending the split, but the terms wererejected by John L. Lewis.

Speaking before the New York local executive boards on June 11,1938, Dubinsky denied rumors that he intended to lead his union outof the C.I.O. On the other hand, he criticized the C.I.O. leaders, makingit clear that he was not entirely satisfied with their tactics. Industrialunions, he reiterated, could have been built within the A.F.L. withouta split, and the large minority vote at the 1935 A.F.L. convention wasproof of this view. In his opinion, "with some enlightenment, education,propaganda and the proper approach, there could have been a chanceof converting additional unions to this idea in a reasonable time." Hepraised the C.I.O.'s achievements in supplying the organizational forms,funds and manpower for the huge campaigns that "performed a historicmission for the labor movement of this country."

Yet Dubinsky feared a permanent split in the labor movement, andundoubtedly was concerned with the growing communist influenceamong C.I.O. staff members and in many of its newly establishedorganizations. While he appreciated, and contributed to, the achieve-ments of the C.I.O., he did not do so at the expense of downgradingthe solidarity and durability of the A.F.L. It was, at this time, fashion-able to write off the A.F.L. as moribund, and to regard the C.I.O. asrepresenting the "wave of the future." The C.I.O.'s great organizingachievements were fresh in the public mind, but Dubinsky saw the harmof widespread rivalry and recognized the basic strength of the A.F.L.unions. He pleaded with the A.F.L. executive council to lift the sus-pension of the C.I.O. unions so that all could be represented at the1938 convention and help decide the issues in debate. Dubinskyultimately sought a settlement. Recognition of industrial organizationand protection of the newly organized were for him unbargainable,but he believed other differences could be compromised.

The union faced another decision when the d . O . , in October 1938,called a constitutional convention to meet in Pittsburgh for the purpose

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34 LABOR HISTORY

of establishing a new labor federation. The I.L.G.W.U., having joinedthe committee for other reasons, declined to be a party to the creationof a permanent split in the ranks. Recognizing the great contributionsof the d . O . , it nonetheless would not participate in a movement whichwould mean the "perpetuation of the division of labor through theexistence of two national competitive labor bodies [that] would proveruinous to the well being of the workers as well as to the generalcommunity."

This was, in fact, the first step in the return to the A.F.L. ManyI.L.G.W.U. leaders were not happy at the separation. The initial stepin launching the C.I.O. was taken by Dubinsky by and large of his ownvolition. The December 1935 general executive board meeting votedby only 12 to 10 for affiliation with the C.I.O., and it is not possible toestimate the number of affirmative votes cast so as not to repudiate thehead of the union. Now it was outside of both organizations. However,it was only a stort time before the I.L.G.W.U. was back to its old affilia-tion. The union did not return to the A.F.L. as an errant penitent, buton conditions that the A.F.L. cancel the one-cent assessment voted atthe 1937 convention for combating the C.I.O., and that it abolish thepower of the executive council to suspend international unions. Theunion also sought to have the A.F.L. take more forceful action againstcorrupt elements, but no guarantees were given as, according to Green,this was a matter for the convention.

Dubinsky explained the union's action as induced by fear that ex-clusion of progressive elements from the A.F.L. would tend to make itmore conservative, while the C.I.O. "will continue to go too far to theleft, falling under the domination of destructive elements [communists]that should have no place in the labor movement. . . were both groupscombined and exercising a spirit of tolerance, balance and consideration,these would not be two distinct, separate attitudes, which are so harm-ful to.the cause of labor." The I.L.G.W.U. returned to the A.F.L. in1940, but as Dubinsky noted, without any rancor or regret; rather, de-termined upon the rapid reuniting of the separate segments of the labormovement. In and out of season, it was the theme and goal to whichDubinsky devoted himself until unity was finally achieved in 1955.He maintained friendly relations with the A.F.L. during the separation,and never publicly criticized Lewis or other leaders when withdrawingfrom the C.I.O,

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Dubinsky grew up in a union which always recognized the logic andneed for political action. Although the American labor movement wasmore active politically than A.F.L. pronouncements tended to indicate,the I.L.G.W.U. was never content to accept the narrow goals which themovement followed. As a matter of fact many I.L.G.W.U. leaders weresocialists and favored an independent labor party. That politics was animportant instrument of social and economic change, and that a rangeof reforms could be established through legislation, was always partof Dubinsky's philosophy.

With Roosevelt's first New Deal, the socialist-oriented unions faceda crisis. The NIRA gave a powerful assist to the re-establishment ofunion power. The minimum wage, the systems of relief and socialsecurity, and the protection of the right to organize, were major contri-butions to labor's welfare. With the election of 1936 Dubinsky had tomake a decision whether to continue the old third-party politics or sup-port the greatest social reformer occupying the presidency in the twen-tieth century. It was not easy to break with a tradition that went backto the union's beginning.

That the New York Democrats, where a large part of the member-ship lived, were dominated by Tammany Hall was another complica-tion. For that political machine, in 1936, was not only corrupt butscarcely enthusiastic about Roosevelt's New Deal. It would not be easyto convince members who had supported the Socialist Party over theyears to vote the Democratic ticket. Being the nation's most populousstate, New York's electoral vote might well determine the outcome ofthe national election. Under Dubinsky's leadership the American LaborParty (A.L.P.) was launched and it performed effectively in nationaland state elections for more than a decade. It was organized when theA.F.L.-C.I.O. split was already a serious source of division, and hencefew A.F.L. leaders would rally to its side. But the A.L.P. provided avehicle whereby socialists and others who found it distasteful to vote theregular party tickets could vote for their own qualified candidates. Itsvote made a difference in one of Roosevelt's campaigns, and it acted asan important restraint upon the old parties both in the selection of can-didates and in their support of legislation.

The American Labor Party was in some sense a new type of politicalorganism. It was a hybrid of independent and old-fashioned politics.It differed from a party faction in being an independent entity, but it

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36 LABOR HISTORY

did not function as a full-fledged political party. Rather it tried toinfluence the selection of candidates and policies of the old parties. TheA.L.P. and its rival bidder for the left-of-center vote, the Liberal Party,have carried on, in modified form, labor's old political pressure tactics.The A.L.P., however, did not always run a slate of candidates. It was anindependently established bargaining group ready to support thosemeeting its minimum standards. When the communists and their alliestook over the A.L.P. in the primaries in the early 1950s, Dubinsky, AlexRose and their followers withdrew and established the Liberal Partywhich generally followed the same domestic policies. The Labor andLiberal parties might be regarded as local ventures reflecting the specialconditions of New York state and city politics but Dubinsky's influence,hardly limited to these areas, extended to the national labor movement.

Dubinsky was reappointed to the A.F.L. executive council in 1945,largely at the insistence of William Green who had sponsored hiscandidacy for a vacancy the preceding year. At the suggestion of DanielTobin, the Teamsters' head and a council member, the vacancy wasgiven to another (over Green's protest) in 1944. No objection wasmade to Dubinsky's appointment the following year. With his renewedmembership on the council, Dubinsky continued to push for what heregarded as the labor movement's most important objectives—a mergerof the two federations and expanded political action. The council wasalways a relatively small group, frequently résistent to the influence ofpublic pronouncements made before intellectuals or television cameras.Realism, ability, and quiet persuasion were the governing qualities ofits members. Contention, too, for council members were not always ofone view on major issues. Some who served with Dubinsky—GeorgeHarrison, George Meany and even Dan Tobin among others—wouldbe close to his political views.

Long-established functioning organizations like the A.F.L. and itscouncil do not change rapidly. Nor did Dubinsky's views of the im-portance of political action and the involvement of organized laborundergo any fundamental revision. But he accepted, on the nationallevel, the traditional tactics devised by American labor. Although thedream of a third party was long gone, he did not altogether believethat A.F.L. efforts on the level of political action were adequate.Dubinsky knew that the policies advocated by his union—among them,the minimum wage, protection of the right to organize, public-supported

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housing—could not wait for the emergence of a political party; but hefelt that politics was sufficiently important for organized labor to war-rant the establishment of a permanent, year-round department to carryon political education to aid in registering labor voters and to supplyunions and their members with relevant political information. Whilethis department resembled the form developed almost one hundredand fifty years ago, the range and "intensity" of its activity were muchgreater. The A.F.L. actively campaigned to defeat anti-labor candidatesin the past, but these efforts represented merely a temporary increasein political effort and then only at election time.

Establishment of the Labor's League for Political Education repre-sented a new departure, since it was intended as an all-year roundactivity with a director and staff. Undoubtedly the enactment of theTaft-Hartley Act, incorrectly labeled as a "slave labor law," gave themain impetus for this League. Some on the council finally realized thatthe older level of political action was no longer suitable. Had the Taft-Hartley Act not passed, it is likely that this political department wouldhave come about later, rather than in 1947. Its establishment involveda sharp rise in political expenditures, and the council was inclined togo slowly on such matters since it meant raising the costs of affiliationfor all unions, some of whom had limited resources. Nevertheless, theinfluence of Dubinsky and others holding the same views pointed tothe inevitable adoption of a more active political policy. His presence onthe council made it easier to transform this League into a permanentdepartment.

The business and the technological makeup of the garment tradesmade it, until recently, a center for the small entrepreneur and con-tractor. Wages were a large ratio of total costs. The attempt of theunions to equalize competition insofar as hiring was concerned couldbe circumvented by an unorganized shop. Thus gangsters could selltheir services and act as protectors of the non-union producer. Gang-sters also entered by another route, initially through selling their ser-vices to employers to assault pickets and to help open the doors forstrikebreakers. The I.L.G.W.U., composed largely of immigrant menand women, was itself forced to hire another group as protectors.Notorious underworld figures often acquired a garment industry back-ground. Beginning with Jack Zelig and Dopey Benny Fine and endingwith Little Augie and Lepke, many notorious New York gangsterswere associated with the garment industry.

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30 lABÖR WlSTÔRY

One of the difficulties involved in hiring these worthies is that theirservices could not be dispensed with. Once called in, they soughtpermanent places in the industry as non-union entrepreneurs. Racketeer-ing has been a serious problem in the industry, and the I.L.G.W.U. hada hard task trying to control it. As a condition for its return to A.F.L.affiliation, Dubinsky sought to incorporate into the constitution aproposal giving the Executive Council power to intervene in cases ofpublic disclosure of racketeering in an affiliated organization. Greenclaimed this was a matter for the convention, and the I.L.G.W. spon-sored such a proposal in 1940. While the proposal was pending in theresolutions committee, Dubinsky was attacked by Joseph Fay, a vicepresident of the International Union of Operating Engineers, who wassoon to be convicted of extorting thousands of dollars from contractorsand sentenced to a long prison term.

The I.L.G.W.U.-sponsored resolution on racketeering was notadopted but the 1940 convention did take a forward step, one whichwould prove to be extremely important. Dubinsky and the I.L.G.W.U.delegation also refused to vote for the re-election of George E. Browne,of the International Association of Theatrical and Stage Employees,who was eventually exposed as an extortionist. At Dubinsky's insistencethe convention authorized the executive council to investigate a tradeunion whose officials were charged with corruption if the internationalrefused to take action. To be sure, this was only a hesitant forward step,and the council subsequently interpreted its role as merely advisory.Dubinsky, therefore, continued his activities, and the 1941 conventiondecided upon more vigorous opposition to corrupt elements. It alsodirected affiliated state federations and central bodies not to seat dele-gates convicted of serious crimes since this would dishonor the tradeunion movement.

Dubinsky demanded action against several well-known racketeerswho carried on their activities in the New York area, and efforts weremade to disassociate them from the A.F.L. In 1952, he initiated aninquiry which eventually led to the temporary expulsion of the Inter-national Longshoreman's Association from the A.F.L. During the NewYork State Crime Commission investigation of conditions on the docksin 1952, Dubinsky inquired whether some action might not be takenby the A.F.L. executive council in the spirit of the 1940 anti-racketeeringresolution. George Meany, the newly elected president, agreed that the

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DUBINSKY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 39

A.F.L. was obligated to act in the face of serious revelations of cor-ruption. Eventually the I.L.A. was expelled, and the agreement betweenNew York and New Jersey made possible the introduction of manyreforms in the distribution of longshore labor in New York harbor. Afairly effective job was accomplished by these state reforms, but theelimination of corruption required continuous and persistent efforts byorganized labor as well.

With the 1955 merger, one of Dubinsky's major aims was realized.To him and his union, twenty years of friction, raiding and misunder-standing had finally ended. The unified federation announced the pro-tection of "the labor movement from any and all corrupt influences"as one of its objectives. In addition, a Committee on Ethical Practiceswas established to keep the federation "free from any taint of cor-ruption." This committee, which Dubinsky served, subsequently formu-lated and published a code of ethical practices for the guidance of unionofficers. It set up standards for issuing charters, for accounting, and forthe purchase of supplies, and it called for doing away with conflicts ofinterests by those bargaining with employers. It was this heightenedawareness of the problem which made possible the ouster of theTeamsters, Bakery and Confectionery, and Laundry Workers' unionsfrom the merged federation, which resulted in probationary status forseveral others until satisfactory evidence was persented that undesirablepractices had been eliminated.

Dubinsky played a major role in compelling the general labor move-ment to take action against corrupt elements in its ranks. He wouldalso be the last to assert that corruption had been wholly eliminated.Even the Landrum-Griffin Law, with its hundreds of guardians, has notbeen able to touch, let alone erase, many problems. Corruption arisesout of a variety of causes and the general labor movement can onlymake a small contribution to its repression. Nevertheless, under theprodding of Dubinsky and others, the A.F.L. showed itself unwillingto tolerate flagrant violations of trust or the exploitation of members.

Dubinsky also played an important role in expanding the interestof the A.F.L. in foreign affairs, in the elimination of the communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions as a significant influenceupon unions in the United States, Canada, England and other westernEuropean and Latin American countries; and he helped make possiblethe International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

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40 LABOR HISTORY

Under Gompers' leadership before World War I, the A.F.L. affili-ated with the International Federation of Trade Unions. The labormovement of each country was allowed the right to pursue those pro-grams and policies it found desirable. With labor in an isolationistmood after World War I, the A.F.L. withdrew from participation inan international affairs and did not rejoin the I.F.T.U. until 1937.Ironically, when it was ready to rejoin international labor, C.I.O.leaders threw their influence against having the American delegateseated at the Warsaw meeting in August 1937. When asked for hisadvice, Dubinsky assured the head of the clothing workers' secretariatthat the A.F.L. represented the major federation and, moreover, arguedthat the C.I.O. was only a committee. The A.F.L. affiliation with theI.F.T.U. would be shortlived, however, for the communist programcalled for the destruction of the I.F.T.U. and its replacement by a pli-able international organization that could be more easily controlled.These developments, vigorously opposed by the A.F.L., occurred in1945.

A number of A.F.L. leaders recognized the need for a more activeforeign affairs policy, but it was not possible to move too rapidly. TheA.F.L. convention of 1944 endorsed the Free Trade Union Committeewhich was to provide "prompt practical assistance" to the workers ofEurope, Asia, and South and Central America in their attempts to or-ganize free trade unions. Dubinsky's candidate, Jay Lovestone, waselected executive secretary, and the I.L.G.W.U. paid his salary as well asthe office rent, light, and telephone expenses. This appointment placedan extremely well-informed man in international labor relations, forLovestone, having been a communist official, broke with the Party in1929. Several of those closely affiliated with him also departed, andthey had become long-time and highly effective I.L.G.W.U. leaders.Dubinsky knew Lovestone, appreciated his energy, knowledge and keenintelligence, and convinced Matthew Woll that he would be an idealexecutive secretary.

Gompers, Green, Woll, Meany and George Harrison, A.F.L. leadersover the years, were outspoken anti-communists from 1917 to 1955.The A.F.L. opposed recognition of the Soviet Union by the UnitedStates, the admission of the Soviet trade unions into the I.F.T.U., thebroadening of the Anglo-Soviet trade union committee to include repre-sentatives of the A.F.L., and resisted pressure from the Roosevelt ad-ministration for affiliation.

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DUBINSKY AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 41

The period immediately following World War II was one of hopeand illusion. It was possible to believe momentarily, as it was duringthe euphoria of war, that cooperation between all countries in the anti-Hitler effort was assured. Dubinsky knew better. He had initiated theprotests against the execution of Heinrich Ehrlich and Victor Alter,two Polish-Jewish socialists executed by Stalin's orders, and he knewthat the communist objective was to dominate the emerging Germanlabor movement and through it that of western Europe as well.

Although he pressured the executive council for a more aggressivepolicy in the field of foreign relations, Dubinsky did not make manyspeeches outside of the confines of his own union and of the council,and wrote only occasionally on foreign affairs. He was nevertheless oneof a small group who urged greater support for European trade unionsand their separation from the W.F.T.U. Dubinsky was also activeagainst the attempts of the communist international apparatus—withthe support of such American allies as George Wheeler, who defectedto Czechoslovakia—to dominate the allocation of manpower and labororganization during the post-war occupation of Germany. He himselfwent to Germany during the Berlin airlift and, with Green, Woll,Meany and Harrison, was active in trying to protect German labor andemerging democratic institutions.

Dubinsky's main task, however, continued to be the administration ofthe I.L.G.W.U. and participating in the union-employer negotiationsin the New York market. Yet he was one of the more influentialleaders of the general labor movement from the onset of his presidency.This influence springs from his pragmatism, as has been noted, hisrecognition of the diversity of conditions and problems which affect theseparate union organizations. These qualities have produced a basicconsistency in his outlook. Dubinsky was never doctrinaire. He neverassumed that there was only one road to change. While favoring indus-trial unionism, he did not wish to split the movement. While endorsinggreater participation in political activity, he did not necessarily want athird party. While supporting the movement for autonomy of affiliates,he opposed any opinion that interpreted such support as tolerance ofcorruption. Dubinsky's influence was exercised in those councils of laborwhere his persistence and understanding gained him converts to hisview. He seldom criticized those union leaders with whom he differed,recognizing their sincerity and honesty, but believing that their differ-

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42 LABOR HISTORY

ences set up no automatic opposition to his program. Small wonder,therefore, that only John L. Lewis and George Meany had as wide orprofound an influence as David Dubinsky upon the general labor move-ment in the last thirty years.

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