D.3.4. Workshop on value dilemmas in security policing

Deliverable submitted April 2010 (M25) in fulfillment of requirements of the FP7 Project, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security

Continuum in Europe (INEX)

International Peace PO Box 9229 Grønland T: +47 22 54 77 00 www.inexproject.eu

Research Institute, Oslo NO-0134 Oslo, Norway F: +47 22 54 77 01

D.3.4. INEX workshop: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing

Work Package 3

VU University Amsterdam 15-16 April 2010

D.3.4. INEX workshop: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing

Work Package 3

VU University Amsterdam 15-16 April 2010

This workshop brought together a number of European academics and practitioners to have a debate about the role of value dilemmas and ethics in different security contexts. The workshop was integrated with a conference organised by the Security Laboratory in the Department of Governance Studies of the VU University. Despite a very early announcement of the date and repeated calls for participation from abroad, the conference mainly drew domestic participation. The conference took 1,5 days and included five sessions, including two public lectures. The conference started on Thursday 15 April with a public seminar entitled ‘Ethics in a Military Context’, whereby Mr. Eimert van Middelkoop, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, gave a keynote speech (Annex II). The Minister discussed a number of fundamental ethical dilemmas the armed forces are faced with by focusing on the following questions:

1. What is the raison d’être of the armed forces? 2. On what grounds must, or may, the armed forces be deployed? 3. How do effective operations by armed forces in modern-day, asymmetric conflicts

relate to international humanitarian law? 4. How do we prepare the individual soldier for the ethical dilemmas he or she will face

in practice as a professional?

Dutch Minister of Defence Eimert van Middelkoop takes the floor for his plenary address

The discussants included security specialists from the academic and practitioner community: Dr. Koos van der Bruggen, Iraq Investigation Committee, Leiden University / Rathenau Institute The Hague, Prof. Dr. Mient-Jan Faber, VUA, Cdr Jean Paul Pierini (CINCNAV, IT Navy). Their interventions were succeeded by a question and answer session. As there were over one hundred bachelor students present in the seminar room, the panel discussion contributed to a fruitful exchange of ideas as well as knowledge dissemination beyond the realms of the INEX-community.

On Friday 16 April we were hampered by the ash cloud which prevented Prof. Peter Burgess from attending (and which made it difficult for some of our speakers and participants to travel back to their home destinations). We started with a closed session in which the two post-doctoral researchers of Workpackage 3 gave presentations. Dr Isabelle Ioannides and Dr Matteo Tondini each presented their methodology and preliminary research findings, which allowed the attendees to raise detailed questions about their approach. Ioannides presented her work on an internal agenda linked to external co-operation of the EU, with a focus on SSR-policy at European level. She has done a case study in the Balkans, where she undertook qualitative empirical research. She conducted a one-page survey and particularly sought to map “little stories” on value dilemma’s of policy and security professionals. Issues emerging from preliminary research included ownership, financing, conditionality. Between the institutional levels – both hierarchically and vertically – there are shifts in the understanding of ethical conduct. Dr Tondini then presented his research, and focused particularly on the methodology and the questionnaire (Annex III) The second session – which was chaired by Ioannides - focused on the issue of value dilemma’s in the EU Internal Security Architecture. The leader of Workpackage 3, Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam and Police Academy of The Netherlands presented questions pertaining to the ethics in the security theatre, given several developments such as internationalization, multi-lateralization and privatization. A crucial question was whether (ethical) values are transforming as a consequence of shifting security challenges. Ethics and values are implicit in the transposition of good governance through various EU-programmes, including external JHA policy and the European Neighbourhood Programme Instrument. The development of an ethics-based good governance policy is in the hands of governing actors. Together, they establish a complex chessboard. Den Boer argued that we should move from the descriptive level (where values and value dilemma’s of security professionals are mapped empirically) to a level of analysis which seeks to deconstruct and unpeel the ethical dimensions of security strategies for the future. An ethics agenda for the future includes items suchs as security organization leadership, culture, legitimacy, accountability and moral self-reflection. Mr. Gijs de Vries, former EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator and currently member of the Dutch Court of Auditors, presented his response to this paper. He focused on the challenges emerging from transatlantic co-operation and made a plea for upholding human rights as a central value in security co-operation. He compared “soft” ethics and “hard” ethics, and also referred to the issue of “tied hands” in the fight against terrorism. The counter-terrorism strategy should be more long-term and aim at undermining the terrorism narrative. For that, we need to address the grievances about injustice. If we do not include human rights and practice what we preach, counter-terrorism will be counter-effective. We face real dilemma’s: a) how to ensure a fair trial?; b) what about the right of freedom (of speech)?; c) what about rights when there is no situation of war? In the (European) counter-terrorism strategy, hard choices have to be made. In the ensuing discussion, de Vries argued that we are not very good in adapting and implementing. Moreover, he is concerned about the use of databases, which according to him seem to generate a cumulative effect.

Workshop: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing ‘The EU Internal Security Architecture’, 16 April 2010 The third session of Friday focused on value dilemma’s the field of counter-terrorism, intelligence and surveillance. The session featured one speaker and two discussants. The keynote speaker at this session was Wil van Gemert, Director Democratic Legal Order of Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). The discussants were Prof. Dr. Bob Hoogenboom, VU University / Nyenrode University and Sophie In ‘t Veld, Member of the European Parliament. For Van Gemert (whose paper is (Annex IV), it was important to stress that ethics is and should be a guiding principle for intelligence activities. Hence, he argued intelligence should not be adjusted to political agenda’s. A challenge for the intelligence and security services is that one has to work by closed procedures (e.g. source protection), as intelligence can be a matter of life and death. This also applies to police practices in view of organized crime investigations (e.g. infiltration). In ‘t Veld was of the opinion that there may be “lofty goals” in security work, but how do these things actually work in practice? In het position in the European Parliament, she gets to see the excesses in intelligence work, with which she referred to the outsourcing of illegal practice and the difficulty to verify whether or not evidence was obtained through torture. She advocated an approach whereby we come away from our comfortable academic coach as “we have seen some major cock-ups in the intelligence services”. Her conclusion was that there are still several question marks and that there is a need for strong checks and balances.

After lunch, the conference moved back to the main building of the University in order to conclude with a public seminar entitled ‘Preventing Crime and Radicalization: Effectiveness versus Ethics’. This keynote speech – which was entitled the “010-020” lecture in order to symbolize a sportive encounter between Amsterdam and Rotterdam - was presented by Mr. Ahmed Aboutaleb, Mayor of Rotterdam. His speech (Annex V) laid out the new approach in Rotterdam with respect to social marginalization and radicalization, based on the principle of active choice. An approach which is merely based on participation is insufficient, he argued. Referring to a recent trends report, it emerges that only a very limited group of people living in Rotterdam have turned to the islamist ideology. In general, Rotterdam juveniles are doing well, and the new action programme is not based only on social-economic deprivation. Dilemma’s for the Rotterdam authorities are the feeding soild: exclusion and a frustration about low education can be a problem. Relating to values and ethics, the Mayor of Rotterdam argued that the anti-radicalization approach should not be too wide, but that a polarizing influence on society must be deterred. Prof. Dr. Hans Boutellier acted as respondent. Based on research which he conducted in the context of his Franks Denkers Chair (a chair supported by the police and the municipality of Amsterdam), Boutellier argued that anti-radicalization policy in Amsterdam is based on three layers of citizenhood. Safety and security policy much evolves around the building of trust and fostering inclusiveness. “Smart” anti-radicalization policy is intelligent, focussed and hence “surgical” in character.

Discussion between the Mayor of Rotterdam, Mr Aboutaleb, and Prof. Dr Hans Boutellier, VUA

Monica den Boer (VU University Amsterdam, WP3) concluded the conference by reflecting briefly on the outcomes demonstrating the need for a repetition of such an event. She thanked the speakers and respondents, as well as the organizers and the sponsors, which included the European Commission sponsored FP7 project INEX, and the VU University Department of Governance Studies and the Security Lab, who kindly offered to sponsor the two receptions.

Public Seminar ‘Preventing Crime and Radicalization: Effectiveness versus

Ethics’, 16 April 2010

Keynote speech by Mr. Ahmed Aboutaleb, Mayor of Rotterdam, 16 April

2010

ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN THE SHIFTING

SECURITY LANDSCAPE

INEX Conference

VU University Amsterdam, 15-16 April 2010

Programme

Thursday, 15 April 2010 – Room KC-07, Main Building

16.00 Public Seminar (with students): Ethics in a Military Context

Welcome and Introduction: Prof. Dr. Willem Trommel, VU University

Amsterdam

Chair: Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

Keynote Speech: ‘Ethics in a Military Context’, HE Eimert van Middelkoop,

Minister of Defence and Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration

(20 minutes)

Discussants:

Dr. Koos van der Bruggen, Committee of Inquiry Iraq, Delft University of

Technology (10 minutes)

Prof. Dr. Mient-Jan Faber, VU University Amsterdam (10 minutes)

Cdr Jean Paul Pierini (CINCNAV, IT Navy) (10 minutes)

Question and Answer Session 10-25 minutes

Closure of the session & Drinks

Friday, 16 April 2010 – Room Z-009, Metropolitan Building

9.45 INEX Research Seminar: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing (Closed Session)

Dr. Isabelle Ioannides, VU University Amsterdam: First Research Findings

Dr. Matteo Tondini, VU University Amsterdam: First Research Findings

Discussant: Prof. Dr. Peter Burgess, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

10.45 Coffee/tea

11.00 Welcome and Introduction

Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

Prof. Dr. Peter Burgess, Peace Research Institute OSLO / Project Leader INEX

11.15 INEX Workshop: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing: The EU Internal

Security Architecture

Chair: Prof. Dr. Peter Burgess, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Speaker: Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

Discussant: Mr. Gijs de Vries, former EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator

Discussion

12.15 INEX Workshop: Value Dilemmas in Security Policing: The Field of Counter-

Terrorism, Intelligence and Surveillance

Chair: Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

Speaker: Drs. Wil van Gemert, Director Democratic Legal Order, Dutch

Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)

Discussant: Prof. Dr. Bob Hoogenboom, VU University Amsterdam / Nyenrode

University

Discussant: Drs. Sophie In ‘t Veld, Member of the European Parliament, D66,

Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe

Discussion

13.15 Lunch (in Z-009)

14.15 Transfer to Main Building

14.30 Public Seminar (with students): “Preventing Crime and Radicalization: Effectiveness

versus Ethics” – room KC-07, Main Building

Welcome and Introduction: Dr. Karin Lasthuizen, VU University Amsterdam

Chair: Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

Keynote Speech: “010-020”-lecture, Ing. Ahmed Aboutaleb, Mayor of

Rotterdam (20 minutes)

Discussants:

Prof. Dr. Hans Boutellier, VU University Amsterdam (10 minutes)

Question and Answer Session 10-25 minutes

15.45 Concluding Remarks

Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, VU University Amsterdam

16.00 Closure of the seminar & Drinks

Annex II: Speech by Minister of Defence, Mr Van Middelkoop “Ethical aspects of the contemporary military”

Keynote speech by the Dutch Minister of Defence, Eimert van Middelkoop, at the international seminar “Ethical Dilemmas in the Shifting Security Landscape”, Free University Amsterdam, 15 April 2010, 16.00 – 17.15 hrs. Duration: 20 minutes, followed by questions and discussion Ladies and gentlemen, The subject of your seminar is by no means unfamiliar to me. Hardly a day goes by without issues which have a significant ethical component requiring my attention. Let me give you three specific examples. During the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, a number of people have been taken prisoner. For how long can they be detained? When should they be handed over to the Afghan authorities? Or should they be allowed to go free? Second example: should we or should we not conduct an operation against the Taliban if there is a risk of civilian casualties? It is a well-known fact that the Taliban often hide among civilians, or even use them as human shields. This increases the risk of civilian casualties if operations are carried out against the Taliban. For that reason, in his recently adopted strategy, US General Stanley McChrystal insisted that every effort be made to limit the number of casualties among the civilian population. A third example: what are the views of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence on a ban on cluster weapons? On the one hand, cluster weapons are particularly effective for the elimination of certain targets. On the other hand, however, limits must be set on the use of force, in order to ensure that “normal life” can resume after the war is over. The latter consideration was decisive for me in forming my opinion on the ban on cluster ammunition. These questions of responsibility are everyday occurrences. And in those questions, the distinction between good and evil, in other words the ethical question, plays an important part. Knowledge and awareness of ethics and ethical behaviour is a necessity, therefore, not just for the political and military leadership, but for the individual soldier as well. It is often not even a question of choosing between good and evil, but of identifying the lesser of two evils. Life-and-death decisions, and decisions regarding a legitimate mission in which force is used, make it all the more necessary for all Defence personnel to be well aware of the ethical side of matters. In the armed forces, ethics is not a soft subject in the margins of the action, it is part of the hard core of the organisation. I would now like to discuss a number of the fundamental ethical dilemmas the armed forces are faced with. They concern the following four questions:

1. What is the raison d’être of the armed forces? Is the fighting force of the government a necessary evil, or is it also a force for good?

2. On what grounds must, or may, the armed forces be deployed? Does it only concern one’s own survival (defence) or is one also permitted to strive towards more idealistic goals? And what can be said about the justification of military action on the basis of interests or of values?

3. How do effective operations by the armed forces in modern-day, asymmetric conflicts relate to international humanitarian law?

4. How do we prepare the individual soldier for the ethical dilemmas he or she will face in practice as a professional? I will discuss a number of points concerning each of these questions.

1. What is the raison d’être of the armed forces?

For decades now, opinion polls have been asking people in the Netherlands what they think about the existence of the armed forces. Over the years they have shown that some 80 per cent acknowledges the existence of the armed forces, but that many consider the army to be a “necessary evil” rather than a “force for the good”. On the one hand, this result reflects a sense of reality: there are almost no states without armed forces except Costa Rica and Iceland (but then they have well-armed police forces and coastguards). On the other hand, it may also reflect a lack of patriotism in the Netherlands, if you compare us to countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In the Christian world view, there is little room for pacifism as a principle. On the contrary, the army and politics are legitimate and necessary instruments for any authority or power. That power “beareth not the sword in vain” (Romans Ch. 13). Nor do I believe that the use of force – no matter how contrary it might be to the ethos of the Sermon on the Mount – is at odds with God’s work with and in this world. Nor do I consider the Lutheran use of the power of the sword to be the work of God’s left hand. While it is true that the actual work of the authorities is aimed at peace and justice, it does not detract from the legitimacy of the use of the power of the sword. In my mind, therefore, the armed forces are not so much a necessary evil, but also, to a certain extent, a force for good.

This brings me to the second question. 2. On what grounds must, or may, the armed forces be deployed?

During the Cold War, the ethical debate on security problems was dominated by the issue of nuclear weapons. Is it acceptable to possess nuclear weapons, to threaten with their use in order to deter an opponent, and even use them if necessary? In those days, the Netherlands armed forces were fully occupied with the tasks of deterrence and defence against the Warsaw Pact. After 1989, the grounds for deployment of the armed forces shifted towards the enforcement and promotion of international law. The Constitution was even amended accordingly. Article 97 was to

acknowledge the enforcement and promotion of the international rule of law, alongside the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, as reasons for deployment of the armed forces. Regarding deployment for the purpose of the international legal order, the government is obliged to inform Parliament in advance of the deployment abroad of military units. This involves an elaborate procedure, beginning with a notification and culminating in the discussion of a so-called Article 100 letter in the House of Representatives. This procedure, during which the so-called Review Protocol is followed, has since proven its worth. This does not alter the fact that the ius ad bellum, i.e. the grounds for justification of the deployment of troops, continues to be the subject of debate on many occasions. In 2008, in a speech in Utrecht, I also discussed the theory of the just war at some length. In the 2007 coalition agreement the government stated the following: “An adequate mandate based on international law is required for participation in missions with deployment of Dutch military personnel”. After debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate, on 22 June 2007 the government sent a memorandum to Parliament, with a further elaboration on the quoted passage from the coalition agreement. Two months ago, the government’s response to the report by the Davids Commission confirmed that the mandate on the basis of international law is also required for lending political support to a military mission conducted by other countries. I would like to focus, however, on two other points. In the first place, the promotion of the international rule of law, as well as such matters as development cooperation, is often rated as part of the idealistic tradition in Dutch foreign policy. The Netherlands’ own interests, however, are also encapsulated in that international rule of law. For instance, Dutch participation in antipiracy missions off the coast of Somalia also specifically serves Dutch trade interests. A second comment I would like to make in the context of this question concerns the vast importance attached in the political debate to the decision to start a conflict in comparison with the goals one wishes to achieve during that conflict. At the start of a mission, the goals are often set high and too little account is taken of stubborn reality. I therefore concur with the Advisory Council on International Affairs in their call for a modest and practical approach to crisis-response operations. Especially in the event of an intervention in a failed state, the primary goal should be to create elementary public order and security (“security first”), although the necessary work on development and diplomacy should also be undertaken as soon as possible.

3. How do effective operations by the armed forces in modern-day,

asymmetric conflicts relate to international humanitarian law? As Minister of Defence, I am naturally involved more with the conduct of operations under the ius in bello, than with the question whether it is justified to start a war (the ius ad bellum). After all, the task of the

armed forces is to use force where necessary and to do so in a controlled and measured manner.

The rules of international humanitarian law, drawn up in order to regulate the use of force, are laid down in agreements between States. For instance, there are rules for the treatment of prisoners of war and casualties, force should only be used against combatants, and the use of certain weapons (e.g. the cluster ammunition I mentioned earlier) is prohibited. The question arises whether a country such as the Netherlands is always able to adhere to these rules in modern conflicts, for instance against the Taliban or other non-state entities. What’s more, sometimes the assumption is made that a military victory in an asymmetric conflict is impossible if the state adheres to international humanitarian law, while the irregular opponent flouts those rules. In the case of the Taliban, such an unjust manner of warfare certainly exists. In this respect, I would first like to say that a military victory in the traditional sense is impossible in today’s type of conflict. In Afghanistan, ISAF is striving to enhance the capability of the Afghan government to provide its own security. We do not have to be the ones who defuse the very last IED; the Afghans will in time take care of this themselves. Secondly, I would like to emphasise that especially in modern-day conflicts, which are fought out in close proximity to the civilian population (in the words of British General Rupert Smith “wars among the people”), the West still has an obligation to adhere to international humanitarian law. We, as it were, take the concept of the rule of law with us on our missions to Afghanistan and Somalia. In conducting military operations, you cannot violate the fundamental values which you set out to defend and promote. The third point I would like to make concerns technology. It is beyond doubt that technological superiority makes it easier for Western forces to adhere to the law of war in today’s warfare in all its complexity. Even then, however, dilemmas present themselves. For instance, the existing Rules of Engagement provide for a thorough process with which to ensure that civilians do not come under fire during operations and that the risk of civilian casualties is limited to the greatest possible extent. We can do this if we have good intelligence and high-precision weapons at our disposal. In this respect, I am intrigued by a quote from Sterker, cited in the basic study of the IN-EX research: “Most likely, if there is no way to fight a war justly, the war itself is unjust” (p.50). The preventive role of nuclear weapons demonstrates that the possession of weapons can be justified from an ethical point of view. And international humanitarian law must not be allowed to result in defencelessness. This dilemma also played a role in the assessment of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip. Israel argued against the report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the

Gaza Conflict that it took no account of Hamas’ deliberate strategy of operating in built-up areas. This brings me to my fourth subject.

4. Training in ethical dilemmas If one underscores the necessity or value of armed forces, in principle one also accepts the legitimacy of the use of military force by the state. This says nothing, however, about the ethical dilemmas experienced by the individual soldier who must decide to pull the trigger, drop the bomb, or stand aside. In the end, what is important is that the soldier is well prepared for his deployment on military operations, so that during the mission he is able to deal with ethical dilemmas and able to act in an ethical manner. Precisely because soldiers are faced with many such challenges during missions abroad, over the past years, the Netherlands Defence organisation has been focusing a great deal of attention on ethical issues. For instance, there is currently a Bill under review in the Senate to establish grounds for exemption from criminal liability for military personnel on missions abroad. Such an exemption does require professional conduct on the part of our military personnel, however. We therefore focus strongly on dilemma training for commanders and military personnel. For that purpose, in 1999 the Ethics and Armed Forces Office was established, which has since seen considerable growth as centre of expertise for military ethics. In 2002, this centre of expertise published an introductory book, which was followed in 2004 by the publication of, a practical guide to military ethics. With this practical guide, which will soon see the publication of a revised edition, instructors and educators instruct officers and NCOs, using a wide variety of examples, in how to deal with ethical dilemmas. This involves the following four goals: 1) Fostering sensitivity to ethical aspects: the soldier must recognise that there is an ethical choice to be made. 2) Being able to deal with moral dilemmas, so that the soldier is enabled to make responsible decisions. 3) Offering resistance to incorrect decisions as a result of making light of moral and legal guidelines. 4) Offering resistance to violations of international humanitarian law. Dilemma training is the practical side to the importance which the Netherlands Defence organisation attaches to ethical aspects. I have shown you four aspects in which ethics constitutes an integral part of the armed forces organisation: 1) The question of the raison d’être of the armed forces. 2) The question of the grounds for deployment of the armed forces. 3) International humanitarian law must be adhered to during combat. 4) In preparation for deployment on operations using force, military personnel must be made aware of what are in every respect ethical

choices which they may be faced with. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, the American philosopher Michael Walzer said that the reason he wrote the book was that “one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or seem to act morally”. We must indeed safeguard the ability to act ethically, now and in the future. That is a job which we as an armed forces organisation must take seriously. Time and time again.

ANNEX III: Significant Results Presented by Dr Tondini

Ethics in EU Member States’ Security Policies Significant Results as of 20 April 2010

Dr Matteo Tondini

INEX Project – WP3, VU University Amsterdam

To date, a few preliminary results can be drawn from Dr Tondini’s study. The answers received highlight significant cultural differences, depending on the country of origin/service of interviewees. Since interviewees ticked almost the same ethical values in the questions on the codified and non-codified values, it is possible to affirm that self-perception of professional ethics results fundamental, reminding of the famous Daryl Bem’s ‘Self-Perception Theory’. In this context, self-reflection on ethical values (i.e. the type of ethics we refer to in this study) is therefore more significant than normative ethics (as included in codes).

Officers generally showed a strong focus on accountability (to the leadership) and transparency (to the public), being under more pressure on both fronts. This also entails an increasing role of political and organization leaderships in regulating their service. The role of professional ethics is perceived as fundamental by almost all the interviewees, although they recognise the existence of a considerable shift in the ethical values characterising their job. Such a shift is mostly due to budget constraints, interagency cooperation and the attention of the media. Answers underlined a possible conflict between professional ethics and/or personal moral beliefs and the activities carried out by the respective organizations. According to most of interviewees, ethical dilemmas should be solved having in mind the ‘common good’ also through internal debates within their organization. This clearly implies a widespread confidence in ‘the system’ (i.e. the organization they belong to and the society they live in).

With regard to the perceived objectives of selected security policies, security & order result among the most ticked answers. This could entail a perceived strong ethical role by ‘security professionals’ (attempting to restore good/fair order against evil/disorder). Unsurprisingly, interviewees considered spreading anger/fear as the main goal of ‘opponents’ (extremists and irregular/illegal migrants). On the other hand, the latter are deemed rather vulnerable subjects but their reaction ends up jeopardizing ‘the system’ (namely the social order), which has in turn to be protected. Although differently, extremists and irregular/illegal migrants are thus both perceived as a threat.

Answers also revealed a general confidence in technology/modernization and sometimes in the support of the EU through dedicated agencies (EUROPOL and FRONTEX), although the European Union is mostly perceived a means to spread common practices and standards, rather than an ‘ethical actor’ as such. Concerning the case study on terrorism & radicalization, most of interviewees stated that they are both rising in their country, although responses highlighted differences between the Netherlands and the UK: reportedly, while in the latter country extremism would be mainly due to socio-cultural differences – as amplified by outer events (such as, for instance, the British involvement in military campaigns in Islamic countries), in the Netherlands it should be considered as an endogenous process with a few links with external realities.

Anti terrorism/radicalization measures and the interception of migrants on the high seas are both mainly perceived as exceptional practices, aimed at providing order and security, although most of respondents do not consider the measures in question as examples of ‘normalization’ of exceptional security policies. Respondents tend to admit, however, that political interests and media have played a role in their adoption. This could reveal that ‘security professionals’ deem ethical dilemmas as inherently transitional, as transitional by definition are the threats faced and the measures adopted to tackle them. Once again, this would also imply, on the one hand, a perceived strong ethical role and, on the other hand - in parallel - a practical sense of reality, when they admit to be aware of the self-generating ‘spiral of fear’: media/people/politicians/security professionals. In this chain they figure as the last link. Ultimately, officers look motivated by the adoption of these measures. This could mean that facing new challenges and dilemmas (good vs. evil) is generally seen as professionally rewarding and stimulating.

ANNEX IV Speech by Wil van Gemert, Director at the General Intelligence and Security Service

A contradiction in terms? The professional ethics of ‘democratic’ secret services LECTURE by Wil van Gemert, Director Internal Security, Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service, April 16, 2010 I thank the organizers of this conference for inviting me to put forward some thoughts on a subject that is of central importance to the functioning of the organization I work for, the Dutch General Intelligence en Security Service (AIVD), where I am Director of Internal Security. At first sight, it may seem strange to relate professional ethics to the work of security and intelligence services. I should like to begin by assuring you, on the basis of my own experience, that ‘democratic’ I&S services consciously face poignant ethical dilemma’s every day. Obviously, there are services whose task it is to prop up dictatorships. Arguably, they follow professional ethics of their own. I shall not concern myself with their ethics. I shall concentrate on the functioning of security and intelligence services in a democratic legal order, in other words, my kind of service. I shall, however, near the end of my speech address the question whether and under which specific circumstances ‘democratic’ services can, or even should cooperate with ‘dictatorial’ services in good conscience. The guiding principle: respecting the truth Monica den Boer quite rightly points out that professional ethics in the context of gathering and using intelligence is a matter not just for I&S services but also for the political leaders who use intelligence to define or justify their security policies. I should like to take the position here that the overriding principle in professional ethics for the services as well as for political decision makers in their endeavours to protect national security ought to be respecting truth – finding it, recognizing it, telling it and building upon it. In her article, Den Boer has used the by now familiar example of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to explain what may go wrong if services or politicians follow false guiding principles, if services try to hide the limitations to their intelligence-gathering possibilities and offer speculation in stead of facts or knowledge, if politicians conclude that the intelligence that services offer does not fit their preconceived strategy and consequently ignore it or manipulate it so that the outcome may fit their bill. Basically, I agree with her interpretation and I think services and politicians should learn from this episode. Precisely because Monica den Boer has already quite ably used this particular example, I prefer, however, to use a few other issues by way of illustration of my argumentation. Three sets of interlinked values Starting from the premise that dealing respectfully with the truth is the core of sound professional ethics for secret services, I should like to argue that professional ethics are security and intelligence services in a democracy are operate under three pairs of potentially frictional guidelines of values:

1. Subservience to the democratic legal order versus independence of mind and research or operational action

2. Secrecy versus transparency/openness 3. Security versus respect for constitutional liberties

I elaborate. Subservience to the democratic legal order versus independence of mind and of action The AIVD works within the democratically established framework of the Law on Intelligence and Security Services (Wiv). It serves national security. It serves the democratic legal system. It serves the politically responsible minister (the function, that is, rather than the person fulfilling it). This means that the AIVD does not indulge in political or ideological partisanship. It will not allow itself to be forced into partisan choices. It will perform its main function of gathering and interpreting and presenting intelligence in a manner independent of political or ideological pressure. The minister decides what the specific areas of operational work will be for the service. The service decides how it will implement its operational tasks. It will, finally, independently establish the outcomes of its investigations and present them to the minister or others with political responsibility. It will not adjust these outcomes to fit political preferences. For brevity’s sake, I refer to Monica den Boer’s account of the Iraq case and its implications for professional ethics. Secrecy versus transparency Intelligence and security services can only perform their tasks responsibly and efficiently if they protect their sources. Human sources - individuals, that is, who provide the service with relevant secret information - will only be willing to take the risk of cooperating with the service if they can be certain that their identity will not be revealed or even hinted at. Their well-being and indeed their life and that of their relatives and friends may depend on secrecy. Monica den Boer writes in her article that ‘intelligence can be a matter of life and death’. She is right. I add that source protection can be a matter of life and death as well, for the cooperating individuals involved. Without intelligence, particularly so-called human intelligence, services are blind and cannot protect society against potential enemies. Officers of I&S services are allowed to, indeed, if necessary should lie even in court in order to cover their sources of information. Upon entering the service, all employees of the AIVD take an oath not to reveal sources or operational data. They are aware that if they violate this oath, they may well blind the service and possibly endanger sources and colleagues and the national security. Source protection is essential from yet another angle: that of professional cooperation between I&S services. The common threat of jihadist terrorism, which arguable knows fewer borders than more traditional types of terrorism, has highlighted the necessity of structural cooperation between services. Certainly within Europe, services regularly and in a setting of collegiality exchange information about developing threats. They inform each other of the movements of individuals who are under serious suspicion of being terrorists. This essential cooperation, however, is only possible under an unconditional guarantee of source protection. A service that has to conclude that its intelligence has been made public (leaked) by a recipient service, will shut down cooperation. This mechanism applies regardless of whether the publicity occurs in a newspaper or on television or in a court of law during judicial proceedings or in a cabinet meeting. To professionals, the reason is obvious: the publicity may endanger operational work. It may endanger a service’s sources. A leaking service will run dry of intelligence. As a consequence, it will not be able to perform the duties with which it is tasked under the law. In short, professional ethics as well as considerations of a more

practical nature compel services to strictly observe its secrecy regime, even if an official committee of inquiry wishes to know exactly what sources a service has depended upon when coming to controversial evaluations. If need be, secret agents must lie to protect their source’s identity. This combination of reasons goes some way to explain why the AIVD has reacted rigorously to the leaks that occurred last year, when, first, part of a preliminary internal report on the service’s handling of the ‘Iraq case’ was published in the Telegraaf newspaper, and then the gist of an internal report on the security of the Dalai Lama who was due to visit the country was spelled out by the Telegraaf as well. Regardless of the question whether in these cases the information published by the newspaper pointed directly to sources of the AIVD, the fact that an employee of the AIVD may have passed confidential information to the press should be considered as detrimental to the professional reputation of the service among colleagues and as a consequence, potentially detrimental to the AIVD’s ability to receive information or tap sources. The second leak could arguably have infringed on the ability of the Dutch authorities to protect their guest and thus on the security of the Dalai Lama. An officer of the service violates his oath of secrecy when he leaks classified information. It may be argued that he also betrays his professional ethics and damages his organization. There are practical and moral limits to the secretiveness of I&S services. The AIVD invests in operational work largely to enable others (ministers, parliament, the national coordinator for counterterrorism, the public prosecutor, the police, and so forth and so on) to contribute to national security on the basis of the service’s findings. It should therefore be prepared to share relevant and usable findings with valid partners. The AIVD, a ‘democratic’ service, is held accountable to society for its activities. There are various official control mechanisms to check and evaluate how it has functioned and should function. The minister of the interior receives thorough and frank intelligence analyses by the AIVD and has access to all its information. The independent Supervisory Committee has access to all the AIVD’s information and is allowed to speak with all the service’s members. It publishes an annual report and may also publish interim reports. These reports have at times been quite critical. I come back to this when I discuss the third and last pair of guidelines: security and constitutional liberties. Parliament has various means at its disposal to hold the AIVD accountable, through its special committee on Security and Intelligence Services and by using its right to question the minister of the interior. The Law on Intelligence and Security Services entitles citizens to inspect under specific conditions data they believe the service has collected on them. The AIVD itself provides openness to the general public by publishing annual reports and occasional ‘open’ publications, which are meant to give an account of its work and its areas of concern and to draw public attention to trends and developments that in the judgement of the AIVD should be widely noticed and understood. Security versus respect for constitutional liberties The AIVD’s rationale is to protect the democratic legal order, the security of the state and other important state interests. In the implementation of its work, however, the service will infringe upon constitutional rights of individuals (‘targets’) or organisations who by their aspirations or activities may present a danger to de democratic legal order and state security. This is regularly described as a problematic discrepancy, but is it? The (temporary) infringements upon a suspect’s constitutional rights are circumscribed by law and their use is

controlled and judged, be it a posteriori. It is the AIVD’s responsibility to protect society rather than the individual. That imperative should guide its choice of action. In its operational work, while gathering intelligence on a target or a target group, the AIVD is legally bound by the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The full intrusiveness of its intelligence gathering instruments may only be deployed if lighter means have failed to provide sufficient answers. This process is strictly controlled. I briefly turn to the opportunities and difficulties connected with a new instrument in the services’ tool box, data mining and profiling. I leave aside the practical advantages and disadvantages of this new instrument. I would like to emphasize, however, that from the perspective of professional ethics, the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity fully apply. Ethical issues may arise when AIVD sources are asked to facilitate or participate in illegal of criminal activities of the target group they are informing upon. The Wiv provides some leeway in such a situation, but how far is a source, or is the AIVD, to go before the balance tips to the wrong side? One question frequently raised under this paragraph’s heading is, whether a ‘democratic’ secret service may collaborate with a ‘dictatorial’ one. In fact, the AIVD’s contacts with ‘dictatorial’ services have been the object of a recent inquiry by the Supervisory Committee. The easy answer to this ethical question would appear to be: do not collaborate. Yet how sensible and ethically sound is that really, in practice and effect? Summing up What is the essence of professional ethics for the AIVD? The Law on Intelligence and Security Services allows the services quite a lot of room to further the effectiveness in their work. It allows the services to do things that ordinarily would be judged illegal. The Law counterbalances this relative freedom of action with quite strong checks and balances, be it that these are mainly applied a posteriori. It offers guidelines, but it does not provide the AIVD with all the answers to ethical dilemma’s it faces every day. In daily practice, choices will have to be made within the areas of tension I have discussed with you, subservience versus independence, secrecy versus transparency and openness, and security versus constitutional liberties. All things considered, it is far from easy for a security service to deal with ethical questions. At the same time, I would agree with our chair that it is essential that services do face such questions anyway, with courage and an open mind.

Annex V: Plenary Speech “010-020” by the Mayor of Rotterdam, Mr Aboutaleb

Bestuursdienst Directie Veiligheid <SET:richting;Intern;1>

Spreektekst Van: MSc. L. Wesselink E-mail: veilig@bsd.rotterdam.nl Fax: (010) 2673163 Telefoon: 7010-4173036 Bezoekadres: Coolsingel 6 Rotterdam Postadres: Postbus 70012 3000 KP Rotterdam

Aan: Burgemeester Aboutaleb

D.t.v: Ciska Scheidel

Seminar on the Ethical Dilemmas in the Shifting Security Landscape, to be held on April 16, 2010. Sub-subject: Preventing Crime and Radicalization: Effectiveness vs. Ethics Ladies and Gentlemen, The recent attacks in the Moscow subway have once again brought home to us, the serious threat posed by a handful of individuals. These terrorist attacks are difficult to predict and even more difficult to prevent. The Dutch government’s counter-radicalization policy aims to prevent this sort of political extremism from emerging in the first place. In my speech, I’d like to explain how Rotterdam’s counter-radicalization policy has been evolving in recent years. First, I’d like to say a few words about the lessons we’ve learnt so far. And then, I will shed more light on some of the difficult choices we need to make in giving shape to an effective counter-radicalization policy. The City of Rotterdam began tackling the problems of radicalization in 2005. The effort began in the aftermath of two shocking events that remain etched in our memories. I am talking about the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. In one stroke, those two assassinations made it abundantly clear what the consequences could be of radicalization. These watershed events took place against a backdrop of terrorist attacks in cities across the world. Central to our local efforts to prevent and reduce radicalization was an action program called Taking Part or Falling Behind. This program made visible, which groups and individuals are most receptive to extremist ideology. On top of that, the program showed which measures needed to be taken to prevent people from taking up radical ideology in the first place or nudge them away from that type of thinking.

These measures were meant to ensure, above all else, that the people we’re most concerned about begin to fully participate in Rotterdam society. That would make the breeding ground for terrorism less fertile. Those failing to make a real effort to integrate into Dutch society would be denied access to social benefits and other government services and facilities. Since then, we have gained much better insight into the situation. One of the first problems that emerged was that it’s very difficult to pinpoint the precise target group. In other words, who are the people you need to engage with and also monitor closely? We wanted to get a handle on the group posing the biggest risk and particularly those who were about to radicalize. To that end, we looked for effective risk analyses and profiles. We first thought we had found an effective tool in the so-called Early Warning Indicators. But these soon turned out to be far too simplistic. The mere fact that someone has started wearing a long beard and ankle-length trousers or, conversely, had suddenly stopped doing so is not the most reliable of indicators. What further complicated matters is that the process of radicalization can differ sharply from one individual to the other. One person can become a militant in a brief period of time, while another will take years to radicalize. The same variation can be found in the factors that push people in the direction of extremist ideology. It could be emotive events in their personal lives, such as the death of a loved one or an incident of discrimination. Others are being influenced by the political views of friends and acquaintances. Peer pressure – so the strong urge to find acceptance by your own group – is a very strong force among young people. All in all, the process of radicalization proves to be so complex as to make it impossible to draw up a single risk profile. Having gained a better understanding of the whole subject, we therefore feel that is it time to update our current counter-radicalization effort. But our learning curve is not the only thing prompting us to change our policy. What has also come into play are new important developments that require new thinking. The Trends Report – published by the Information Switchpoint Radicalization in January – outlines the situation found in Rotterdam. One of its findings is that we no longer need to feel the same sense of urgency we had in 2005. Fortunately, the number of young Muslims in Rotterdam who have become radicalized is limited. We can take pride in the fact that large groups of young immigrants – so second- or third-generation – are now doing well. With respect to employment and education, young immigrants are closing the gap with native youngsters. When it comes to the Far Right, matters are also getting better. Since 2008, political parties with a far-right ideology have fragmented and lost influence. Indeed, recent years have seen no demonstrations or other public events staged by rightwing extremists. But there is no reason for us to put up our feet and pat ourselves on our backs. Individuals and smaller groups continue to stir up trouble in Rotterdam. For example, certain individuals who took part in an anti-Israel demonstration last year tried to pour oil on the fire. And on the far-right front, you still have an organization called Voorpost, which holds meetings in cafés. On top of that has come a growing presence of far-left activists in Rotterdam. One case in point was the direct action taken by leftwing militants at the Rotterdam-The Hague Airport last month. Their target was the deportation center for asylum seekers there. Earlier, far-left activist had set fire to that building. Perhaps even worse, they had also paid visits to the

family homes of the building’s architects. This clearly crosses the dividing line between peaceful demonstration and violence and intimidation. But what has also come into play are more peaceful forms of protest, some of which can be quite disruptive. Just take the recent Greenpeace demonstration in the port of Rotterdam, which stopped the delivery of whale meat. We feel that – in the light of these development – the time has come to go down new avenues. This summer, the City of Rotterdam will present a new action program, which is the follow-up to the existing one, called Taking Part or Falling Behind. However, drawing up the new program has been no easy matter. Today, I’d like to share with you the difficult choices and ethical dilemmas we’re facing in dealing with extremism. Dilemma No. 1: If we use catch-all criteria to catch all possible extremists, we will come up empty-handed and make things worse The first dilemma we’ve run into involves to criteria we’re using to identify individuals most at risk of going down the extremist route. Recent years have seen much research into which factors drive people into the arms of extremism. Among the major risk factors are these: 1) not having strong ties with family or friends; 2) feeling a sense of alienation and frustration; and 3) believing that you have no say in the political process. All of that helps to create fertile ground for extremism. I must say that these criteria are excellent for identifying people at the bottom of the heap who require government help in transforming their lives and moving forward again. And that’s what we’ve been doing in Rotterdam in recent years. However, these criteria are of no help in tracking down existing or potential militants. To use a fishing analogy, we’d be casting such a wide net that most of our haul would consist of perfectly innocent people. So we’d be wasting precious counter-radicalization resources on people with no militant tendencies. For example, does everyone who is not doing well at school and perhaps feel slighted by society suddenly warrant special attention from anti-terrorism officials? Of course not. Equally important, this broad-brush approach would stigmatize large sections of society as at-risk groups. That would create real anger among the people affected. This backlash would be precisely the opposite of what we’re trying to achieve. So please, no more use of very general, catch-all criteria. It’s too blunt an instrument. To use medical terms, we need precision instruments to perform a delicate operation. Dilemma No. 2: If we target whole groups on the basis of political beliefs, religion or ethnicity, this will be just as ineffective In Rotterdam, we just don’t believe in singling out whole groups of people for special treatment and classifying their members as people posing a risk to society. The problems caused by this quick-fix approach are exactly the same as the ones just mentioned in connection with the catch-all criteria. First of all, it’s not helpful in identifying the people

you’re looking for. And secondly, you run the risk of antagonizing large groups of people and thereby shooting yourself in the foot. I am making this remark as a general point of principle, but also have a particular group in mind, namely the Salafist movement. A new policy document from various Dutch ministries takes aim at excesses within the group of Salafists in the Netherlands. This report is partly based on information provided by the Dutch domestic security service. The internal security service writes and I quote, “A small group of ultraorthodox members of the Salafist movement is making intolerant-isolationist and anti-democratic noises.” What we are seeing is “a possibly polarizing influence and the adoption of anti-integrationist thinking.” End of quote. In addition to this, the ministerial report is also very critical of those Salafists who reject the equal treatment of women. I have often expressed my view that any special treatment reserved for Salafists is flawed. First of all, there are the practical drawbacks attached to using such a group-based approach. I will repeat them. One, you’re not catching militants, for you will not be able to see the trees for the wood. Secondly, by declaring the whole Salafist movement to be a group with possible “anti-integrationist ideology,” you are tarring all Salafists with the same brush and are likely to alienate many innocent members. Finally, this religion-focused approach would divert our attention away from the real problem: namely the cultural and socio-economic isolation of parts of the immigrant community. But in addition to these practical drawbacks, there are also ethical dimensions to consider. For starters, I find it problematic when government turns a religious group into one of its focal point of policy, as now seems to be happening with the Salafists. After all, it’s imperative that government should maintain a neutral stance on any religious belief and not trample on the separation of church and state. Another ethical argument that can be made is that of equality before the law. If a government takes aim at a group of people who fail to integrate into wider society and give women full rights, that’s fine with me, although you need to go about this in carefully considered manner. But you must then also apply the very same principle to other groups who are showing the same tendency. I am thinking of certain ultra-orthodox Christian and ultraorthodox Jewish groups who are well outside the mainstream of society and do not fully accept the equal treatment of women, either. So why don’t they attract the same level of scrutiny? What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, isn’t it? And there’s third ethical point I’d like to make. In my view, a government should not turn against groups or individuals simply because it does like their personal convictions. There’s such a thing as freedom of thought. I am not in favor of a thought police, as once found behind the Iron Curtain. Instead, our main focus ought to be on people’s behavior. As local government, we are well within our rights to call citizens to order and sanction them, if their concrete actions endanger public order and security. And we will do exactly that. There’s also a practical legal and PR advantage to this: thoughts are difficult to pin down, but actions are not or much less so.

So, what ought to be the centerpiece of our policies is not so much the ideology embraced by radicalized people, but their conduct – particularly if their actions contravene the law. We can give much better shape to our counter-radicalization policy, by more precisely defining the type of conduct we find objectionable and by showing great consistency in tackling this type of behavior – irrespective of these individuals’ backgrounds Let me give a few examples of the type of behavior that is unacceptable and warrants government action. For example, we find it objectionable when voters are being encouraged to stay away from the ballot box, as happened in the local election in 2006. We equally disapprove of men who won’t allow their wives to leave their homes, on the basis of their religious beliefs. We also deplore the intimidation directed against those involved in carrying out our asylum seekers’ policy. Let me summarize our points of view. We in Rotterdam reject the use of catch-all criteria for finding at-risk people. Likewise, we reject any group-based approach. Why? Both methods are not helpful in identifying our targets and also antagonize the very people we wish to bring into the fold. On top of that, for ethical and practical reasons, we will hold people to account primarily on the basis of their actions and not so much on the basis of their thoughts. Well, that’s all fine and dandy, but that still leaves us with the question of how best to identify the people we’re so concerned about. We were facing this question in the past and are still facing it today. Fortunately, in the year 2010 we can at least draw on a wealth of experience gained in recent years. And at present, we believe that the very best approach is a policy targeting individuals and doing so by using very precise criteria. So an individual approach and the use of precision instruments will yield much better results. That’s our considered opinion. At the same time, we will keep a sharp eye on the bigger picture and general patterns, obviously. And once we have identified the at-risk citizens, how do we best engage with them, so as to reduce or prevent any militant tendencies? And how do we keep close tabs on them to ensure that they stay on the straight and narrow? That much will be revealed this summer, when we will present the follow-up to our current counter-radicalization program, called Taking Part or Falling Behind program The existing program has guided us through the past five years. But the new program will incorporate fresh insights and ought to produce even better results. I thank you for you attention.

Annex VI: List of participants

1. Monica den Boer VU University Amsterdam / INEX (WP3) 2. Isabelle Ioannides VU University Amsterdam / INEX (WP3) 3. Matteo Tondini VU University Amsterdam / INEX (WP3) 4. Michelle Zonneveld VU University Amsterdam / INEX (WP3) 5. Gijs de Vries Court of Auditors/former EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 6. Wil van Gemert Dutch Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) 7. Bob Hoogenboom VU University Amsterdam 8. Sophie in 't Veld MEP D66 9. Karin Lasthuizen VU University Amsterdam 10. Willem Trommel VU University Amsterdam 11. Hans Boutellier VU University Amsterdam 12. Jean Paul Pierini IT Navy 13. Mient Jan Faber VU University Amsterdam 14. Koos van der Bruggen Delft University of Technology 15. Ronald van Steden VU University Amsterdam

16. Annemijn Poot D66/Atos Consulting

17. Sarah Wolff Clingendael

18. Linda Schouten IPOL/KLPD

19. Alexandra de Moor Ghent University

20. Sjaak Khonrad Avans Hogeschool

21. Auke van Dijk Police Amsterdam-Amstelland

22. Michael Kowalski National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb)

23. Ruben Boers Avans Hogeschool

24. Beatrice de Graaf Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism

25. George Dimitriu Ministry of Defence

26. Marianne van Leeuwen University of Amsterdam

27. Nathalie Vriezelaar Ministry of Internal Affairs

28. Sean Martell Chief Inspector - Channel Project -Counter-Terrorism Command 29. Wolfgang Wagner VU University Amsterdam

30. Theo Bot National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) 31. Erella Grassiani VU University Amsterdam

32. Michael van de Velde PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory

33. Wim Wensink PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory 34. Ivo Veenkamp National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb)

35. Remco Spithoven VU University Amsterdam (student) 36. James Spencer Inspector - Channel Project -Counter-Terrorism Command

37. Anke van Gorp Hogeschool Utrecht

38. Vlad Niculescu Zuyd University

39. Hans Hovens Nederlandse Defensie Academie

40. Jos Delnoij Ministry of Defence

41. Liliana de Waard

42. Nisette Groot Antink VU University Amsterdam 43. Jelle van Buuren VU University Amsterdam

44. Gloria Lake VU University Amsterdam (student)

45. Anouk Feld VU University Amsterdam (student)

46. Annemarie van de Vijsel University of Amsterdam (student)

47. Bregje Dekkers VU University Amsterdam (student) 48. Robin Christiaan van

Halderen VU University Amsterdam

49. Santino Lo Bianco Haagse Hogeschool 50. Laura Beck VU University Amsterdam

51. Elise van Leest VU University Amsterdam (student)

52. Andrea Baldi Delft University of Technology

53. Jonathan Vrijma VU University Amsterdam (student)

54. Peter Keller European Commission

55. Folkert van der Meer VU University Amsterdam (student)

56. Janne Kuijpers VU University Amsterdam (student)

57. Rianne Gerrits VU University Amsterdam (student)

58. Jasmijn Wijn VU University Amsterdam (student)

59. Vivianne Smit VU University Amsterdam (student)

60. Folmer Dinkla VU University Amsterdam (student) 61. Anneke Twijnstra VU University Amsterdam 62. Annemarije Hagen VU University Amsterdam 63. Deborah Rice VU University Amsterdam 64. Kim Steenbergen VU University Amsterdam 65. Marieke Ossendrijver VU University Amsterdam

66. Bert Jan Kreulen Police Amsterdam-Amstelland

67. Inge Zwagers Police Flevoland 68. Cathelijne van der

Bruggen VU University Amsterdam (student) 69. Ernst Schutte VU University Amsterdam (student) 70. Jaap Timmer VU University Amsterdam