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Cyber War Crimes Gresham College March 30, 2021 Tarah Wheeler University of Oxford Harvard University New America

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Page 1: Cyber War Crimes - Amazon S3

Cyber War Crimes

Gresham CollegeMarch 30, 2021

Tarah Wheeler

University of OxfordHarvard University

New America

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$whoami

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“Cybersecurity is one of the only IT roles where there are people actively trying

to ruin your day, 24/7.”

~ Chris Schueler

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“Are cyber war crimes real?”

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The domains of war

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The domains of war

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The domains of war

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The domains of war

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The domains of war

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The domains of war

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What’s (legally) cyberwar?

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Cyberwar may be hard to define…

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But cyber war crimes are not.

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But cyber war crimes are not.

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Crimes against Humanity

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War Crimes

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Why don’t we just take all this stuff offline

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“How is this affecting me?”

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What these weapons do

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Cyberweapons

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Cyberweapons

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Cyberweapons

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“What can I do about it?”

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0%Amount of security that is perfect.

Or will ever be perfect.

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26%Companies that were vulnerable to WannaCry in

2017

That still are.

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100%Companies with current vulnerabilities and

ongoing incidents

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“What can I do about it?”

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“No one really wants backups…What they want is restore.”

~Elizabeth Zwicky

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Data Retention

TRAITS

● Never shrinks

● Only grows

● Metadata counts

● Sensible data retention is governed not by technological limits, but by compliance and regulation

IMPLICATIONS

● No option to delete fully

● Metadata can effectively replicate the use of most data in communications even without the data itself

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Data Backup

TRAITS

● Offsite

● Not constant and continuous integration with production systems

● Not necessarily production data; can be forensically stored HDDs or other data that must be physically walked

IMPLICATIONS

● Not physically accessible by knowledge workers processing GDPR/Chinese/USG requests for warrants or deletion

● Only available through an interface

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Data Restore

TRAITS

● Multiple physical DCs and generally at least one onsite storage replicating to offsite

● constant and continuous integration with production systems

● Often provided by third party software or through API

● Often in a proprietary format (duplicity) or in OSS format but difficult to work with (rsync)

IMPLICATIONS

● Metadata generated and often stored on access to data for China/GDPR/USG requests for info or deletion

● Often available onsite for internal requests

● Often owned by multiple teams and contributed to by multiple teams

● Often owned by IT or office of the CIO, and often not audited by CISO’s office

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“What can I do about it?”

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The multitude of choices in dataarchitecture to provide for security aresometimes in direct conflict with privacy.

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The overwhelming conflict can cause ahands-in-the-air approach to developingdata structures with both privacy forregulation and security for ethics.

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Are doctors responsible for keeping patientdata safe? If not doctors, who? If you askyour doctor what happens to my data, howwould they answer?

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All personal data will eventually either bedeleted or will be fully public and in thehands of a foreign power.

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Data, Tomorrow (what do I not know that I

don’t know)

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The World’s First AI-powered Cyberattack

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Automated Spearphishing at Scale

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Trends in Automated Warfare

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This Won’t End… Ever.

So make it something that gets better over time.

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Thank You

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