CXC Quarterly ReviewCXC Quarterly Review23 April 201423 April 2014

Gordon Garmire (Principal Investigator)Presented by Peter Ford

ACISACISRelocation of Flight Hardware Relocation of Flight Hardware

SimulatorSimulator

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 2

Overview

What is to be moved?• Flight hardware simulator• Peripheral equipment• Spare hardware• People and documentation

Who is moving it?• ACIS personnel• Outside contractor

When is it to be moved?• Current schedule• Fall-back schedule

What are the associated risks?• Likelihood/impact

assessment

Additional material• Engineering unit

components

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 3

What is to be moved?

Flight Hardware Simulator

• Detector electronics assembly (DEA: 10 video processors + 2 interface cards)

• Digital processor assembly (DPA: 6 front-end- and 2 back-end-processors)

• Power supply and mechanism control (PSMC)

Peripheral Equipment

• L-RCTU interface between computer and DPA• Image loader: frame buffer to simulate DEA output into DPA• Pixel switch to switch DPA input between DEA and image loader• PSMC push-button control unit

Spare Hardware

• Replacement hardware and cabling for all of the above• Spare focal-plane assembly

People and Documentation

• The MIT ACIS engineering team: 6 full-time employees• Document archive including ITAR/EAR-restricted items• Software configuration system and library of previous regression

tests

Flight Simulator Hardware

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 4

Digital Power Processor Supply & Assembly MechanismDetector (DPA) ControllerElectronics (PSMC)Assembly(DEA) PSMC controls

Power Supply& Mechanism PSMCController controls(PSMC) Pixel Detector SwitchDigital ElectronicsProcessor AssemblyAssembly (DEA)(DPA)

The View from Outside the Tent

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 5

The View from Overhead

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 6

The Outdoors part of the Move

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 7

Who is performing the move?

Management• Brian Surette, MKI Facilities/Safety

Manager• Sudy Nally, Project Manager, MIT

FacilitiesCore Hardware and Documentation

• Jim O’Connor, ACIS Project Technician• Bob Goeke, Senior Research Engineer• Demitrios Athens, Research Staff

Peripherals, Testing• Demitrios Athens, Research Staff• Royce Buehler, Research Staff• Peter Ford, Principal Research

ScientistMKI IT Network

• Demitrios Athens, Research Staff• MKI Network Staff

Office Contents• Contractor: Fox RPM Corp.

Telephones, MIT WiFi Network• MIT Network Services

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 8

The Master Plan

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 9

157 Items to be moved to

NE83

34 Items to be moved

elsewhere or left in place

The Building Plan

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 10

5th Floor — Offices and Meeting Rooms

4th Floor — Laboratories and Flight Assembly

FreightElevator

Elevators

Flight Assembly

ACIS

2014 ScheduleJanuary - March

• Complete demolitions• Complete framing of new walls• Rough-in and inspect electrical and

plumbingApril – Mid-June

• Complete walls, electrical and plumbing• Install and test MKI network• Install telephone and WiFi network

June 14-15 (weekend)• Move heavy equipment (with rigs and

hoists)June 19-20 (after 6 pm)

• Move offices, IT servers and light equipment

• Move ACIS documents and drawingsJune 21-22 (weekend)

• Continue moving light equipment• Move ACIS engineering unit and

peripheralsJune 28-29 (weekend)

• Continue moving heavy equipment (if necessary)

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 11

Detailed ACIS Schedule

Early June• Move duplicate ACIS peripherals to NE83• Install duplicate clean tent• Test ACIS peripherals and internet

interface• Move and test duplicate ACIS web server

Late June• Move ACIS engineering unit• Connect to duplicate peripherals and test• Estimated “down time” less than 24 hours• Move remaining peripherals, clean tent,

and web server• Move ACIS document vault

July, August• Should the schedule slip, the above steps

can be delayed until as late as mid-August, subject to the following:– MKI staff will be increasingly busy delivering a

flight instrument– ACIS engineering unit will be needed to certify

A016 SI modesMKI:PGF 23 April 2014 12

Risk AssessmentsEngineering Unit Risk Assessment

• MIT 36–02407 Revision A, September 25, 2011, submitted to SAO 9/27/11

Conclusions• Existing physical security in NE80 is adequate• Some ACIS hardware items lacked sufficient replacements• As a result, the following mitigations have been applied:

– Additional DEA flight-spare video board built and tested– Replacement 28V power supplies ordered– Replacement 24V, 15V and 5V power supplies acquired– All parts required for replacement DEA and DPA backplanes kitted

Updated Risk Assessment during and after the move• MIT 36–02407 Revision B is in preparation• Damage to the EU or peripherals during the move is judged

unlikely and is mitigated by the availability of replacement parts for all units, cables, etc.

• Current hardware re-test plans are adequate• Our objective is to match the level of physical security achieved in

NE80; implementation plans are not yet complete• Should the EU be irreparably damaged, it may be hard to develop

flight software patches or investigate flight hardware anomalies, but software has been developed to validate uplink loads for science and calibration runs

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 13

Original Risk Assessment

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 14

High

Imp

act

6

3 1 1

Low

5 2 6

Low Likelihood

High

Risk Item

Lik

elih

oo

d Im

pact

1 Misuse of legitimate access 5 12 Internal social engineering 5 13 Unintentional download of malware 5 14 Theft of hardware, data, or documents 2 15 Network access through unnecessary

interface1 1

6 System software not maintained at benchmark

1 1

7 Damage through unintentional user error

5 1

8 Damage/corruption through internal hacking

1 5

9 Systems not segregated from network 5 110 Unrecognized system vulnerability 5 111 External social engineering 2 112 Damage due to hacked authentication 1 113 Introduction of malware 1 114 Physical access with intent of theft 1 815 External theft of data or hardware 1 816 Interception of sensitive

communications1 1

17 Air conditioning malfunction 1 518 Hardware failure in EU or peripheral 5 519 Water damage due to sprinkler/HVAC

failure2 5

20 Fire damage 1 821 Water damage due to weather 1 822 Damage to facility or communications 1 823 Damage from snow/ice leading to roof

collapse1 8

24 Facility closed due to unsafe environment

1 5

Conclusion: only item 18 required further analysis and mitigation

Risk Mitigations

MKI:PGF 23 April 2014 15

Unit Flight EU Minimum Risk

Analog board 10 10 2 No

Interface board 2 2+2 1 No

DEA backplane 1 1+1 1 Yes†

Front end processor 6 6+6 2 No

Back end processor 2 2+1 1 No

DPA backplane 1 1+1 1 Yes†

Focal plane assembly 1 1 0 No

Power supply 1 1 1 Yes†

Image loader 0 3 1 No

Pixel switch 0 1 1 No

Telemetry control unit 0 3 1 No

Computer interface 0 3 1 No

† Mitigations: • Replacement DEA and DPA backplanes and connectors assembled• Power supplies acquired and cables made up to replace PSMC