cuba telecommunications negative - northwestern 2013 6weekseniors

8/11/2019 Cuba Telecommunications Negative - Northwestern 2013 6Weekseniors

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NotesIntegrate EU CP stuff from the juniors if you want to go for it these cards

are just a supplement You can and should read Castro good from the Castro cred DA on case.


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**CASE ANSWERS**


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Democracy


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1NC Democracy

Censorship means they dont solve Miami Herald 11 this article is an editorial from the Miami Herald. (Cuba is no Egypt, February 14, 2011,http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/newsroom?ContentRecord_id=DE4CA7CB-1CDD-44FF-983E-A5BCD4C9DD63)

Cuba is a different place. In Cuba, none of the trappings of democracy have existed for half a century. It isnot part of the Castro playbook to permit any activity that would nurture the popular aspiration forliberty. Access to the Internet for everyone are you kidding? There is no opposition press , real or make- believe, no opposition parties , foreign reporters are closely monitored and the average citizen haspractically no access to independent sources of information . Egypts business class is reported to be inanguish over the turmoil because its hurting the economy. In Cuba,there is no business class the military runs theeconomy. Nor is there any civil society to speak of. In Cuba, moreover, the military is an uncondtional appendage of the Castroregime. In Egypt, the armed forces are an institution apart. Officers must support the regime, but the institutions ultimate loyalty istied t o the state and to the militarys own traditions and customs, not to the political fortunes of one individual. In Cuba,its allabout loyalty to Fidel and Raul. Officers are closely scrutinized for signs of disloyalty (and publicly disgraced, even executed,if they fall under a cloud of suspicion). Fidel Castro has no use for the trappings of democracy because he has nointerest in democracy. His is a zipped-up, no-nonsense totalitarian regime, designed to perpetuate one-man rule, brooking no opposition and making no concessions to foreign or domestic critics. In the place ofnormal civic organizations, there are the notorious Committees for the Defense of the Revolution neighbors spying on neighbors. Principled and outspoken critics of the regime are thrown in prison andleft to rot. Dissidents honored by foreign human rights groups are rarely allowed to go abroad to accepttheir honors . Fidel and Raul Castro have had 50 years to hone the apparatus of Cubas paranoid tyranny.Crushing dissenthas been their principal preoccupation . If the streets of Havana do not burst forth with protest, it isnot because Cubas people are any less thirsty for liberty than the people in Cairo. But, unlike Hosni Mubarak and Sadat and Nasser before that the Castro brothers have foreclosed every avenue of rebellion and taken everyconceivable step to stifle the longing for freedom. Like the Sun King, Louis XIV, Fidel Castro has been able toproudly proclaim that he is the state.

Internet democracy promotion fails worsens relations and furthers thedigital divideFirchow 12 (Pamina, Assistant Professor of the Practice at the Kroc Institute for International PeaceStudies, A Cuban Spring? The use of the Internet as a tool of democracy promotion by USAID in Cuba,

5/23/12, http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2012/files/22913.pdf) One of the problems with using Internet for democracy promotion is that several studies have found thatInternet-based collective action makes it more difficult to achieve long-term political goals (Gladwell, 2010;Johnson, 2005; Schmitt 2003). Gladwell (2010), in particular, argues that the Internet is far more likely to create weakties than the strong ties that social movement theorists argue are the bedrock of costly political action. Finally, Faris and Etling (2008) argue that collective action on the Internet could lead to the displacement of anauthoritarian regime, but are structurally incapable of replacing it. This clearly would be detrimental tothe relationship between the democracy promotion and development aid arms of USAID, since acooperative authoritarian government is better for development concerns than a thin and fragiledemocracy with a weak infrastructure. Another concern with using Internet promulgation as a tool fordemocracy promotion is the limited group of recipient civil society actors. Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani (2009)find that democracy promotion in Georgia failed to connect with all but an elite group of civil society actors before the rose revolution in 2003.This led to a weak and uneven transition to democracy, where external actors were ill- prepared to address the many problems that arose in the sphere of democratic development.Susan Stewart (2009) concludes from various studies conducted of democracy promotion before and after the color revolutions that de mocracy promotion approaches are relatively standard: first, democracy promotion agencies waituntil a leader emerges in the opposition, then they support him or her and the corresponding movementmore or less unconditionally. Stewart argues that this has the negative effects for democracy promoters to beunprepared for environments where these individuals do not emerge and also to fail to take into accountthat these individuals come from the same structural environments as the leaders in power and are likelyto exhibit similar or the same problematic leadership traits. She deduces that the traditional approach of externaldemocracy promotion actors in authoritarian contexts, which is to rely heavily on support for civil society, has had only limitedsuccess in the case of Belarus. In addition, Clay Shirky (2011) makes the argument that policy that is designed to support
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/newsroom?ContentRecord_id=DE4CA7CB-1CDD-44FF-983E-A5BCD4C9DD63http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2012/files/22913.pdfhttp://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2012/files/22913.pdfhttp://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/newsroom?ContentRecord_id=DE4CA7CB-1CDD-44FF-983E-A5BCD4C9DD63


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dissidents on the Internet can backfire because the authoritarian regimes will seek to block the Internetand dissidents and thus furthering the digital divide and undermining the possibility for any online civilsociety to emerge. Although this does not seem to currently be the case in Cuba, it does demonstrate the precarious situationand that any kind of democracy promotion involving the Internet can lead to unintended consequences.Online dissidents in Cuba are always on the edge of losing connectivity, either by phone or Internet, andany kind of illegal activity is likely going to exacerbate this action whether it is directly targeted towardthem or the dissident community as a whole.

Squo solves reformsBilbao 13 Tomas Bilbao is the Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, DC. (What Cuba's Reforms TellUs About the Country's Leadership, January 14, 2013, http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/) I. Cuban Leadership Seeks Legitimacy by Responding to Popular Demands Cubas reforms indicate thatthecurrent Cuban leadership understands it must deliver results to gain legitimacy. Fidel legitimated his rule by virtue of being father of the revolution. Unlike his brother, Raul cannot simply blame Cuban workers forthe countrys poor economic performance and impel the Cuban people to make endless sacrifices in thename of the revolution . Instead, he seeks to legitimize his government by addressing some of the long-held grievances thatCubans dared not vocalize during his brothers rule.In 2011, the VI Party Congress approved the Guidelines of theEconomic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution, ushering in a series of reforms . According to theCuban government, the Guide lines are an expression of the will of the people influenced by more than781,000 public suggestions received from average citizens in 163,000 meetings held throughout thecountry between December 2010 and February 2011 . The final version of the Guidelines even contains a side-by-sidecomparison of original reform proposals and the final outcomes, accompanied by an explanation of any modifications. Cubanleaders have gone to great lengths to legitimize the reforms with an unprecedented solicitation of publicinput. These efforts to respond to public demands harken back to a December 2007 speech by Raul, delivered following Fidelsillness, in which he set a starkly different tone than his brother: those occupying a leadership post must know how to listen and howto create an opportune environment for the rest to express themselves with absolute freedom. II. Cuban Leadership is NotMonolithic While the Cuban government has boasted about public debate surrounding the reform process, little has been said ab outthe ongoing debate among the countrys leaders.It would be a mistake to assume that Cubas leadership ismonolithic by virtue of its authoritarianism . At closer look, the reform process reveals differences of opinion within theleadership with Raul setting high expectations for reforms and some within his regime responding with attempts to delay and waterdown changes. Pervasive throughout the reform process is a tension between those in the government who understand the urgentneed for reform and those fighting to preserve the status quo. For instance, in the first Guideline, the introduction of market reformsis promptly followed by a commitment to continued central planning. Likewise, while the Guidelines highlight the importance ofprivate enterprise growth, they concurrently establish fiscal policies aimed at preventing both the individual accumulation of wealth

and social inequity. These inherent contradictions may reveal divergence within the regime.

Squo solves information accessCampos 6/6 (Pedro, Havana Times staff writer, Cuba: Internet Access for the Nouveaux Riche andDissidents, 6/6/13, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94248)

HAVANA TIMES With a great song and dance, the Cuban government haughtily announced the broadening ofInternet access on the island by opening 118 cybercafs across the country and lowering web navigationrates to 4.50 CUC (or US $ 5.20) an hour. It has also, clearly declared that there are no plans of taking Internet services to Cubanhomes for the time being. Since the matter has already been addressed by a number of analysts and journalists, I will limit myself tocommenting on some elements that seem to me of considerable importance. The measure does, undeniably, expand theInternet services hitherto available in Cuba and lowers navigation rates. It is also true, as a friend of mine says that you have to start somewhere. It is another small, very small step taken by Cubas current administration, which hasgradually, and unhurriedly, b een eliminating the absurd regulations and restrictions that had been imposedon the Cuban people in the name of socialism and the struggle against imperialism. We have to acknowledge thatRaulCastro has worked to dismantle, partially or totally, some of the absurd regulations set up when his brother was at the helm , at a time when he was second-in-command.

The transition failsSuchlicki 12 Jaime Suchlicki is the founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami andDirector of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. He is also the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor ofHistory. (Getting Ready for Life after Castro, May 11, 2012,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=0,0)
http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94248http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94248http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/


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In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems , particularlyconcerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cubannationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years ofthe revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation . (Property Rights in the Post-CastroCuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Propertiesin Post-Castro Cuba, Mtias F. Traviesco-Diz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity toexercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate thecomplexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-SocialistTransformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, Jnos Kornai). Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in majorneed of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry.Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitateshave deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population . In addition,environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention .(Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.) Economic and legal problems are not, however, the onlychallenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of themilitary . (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, themilitary will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in whichCubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the politicalprocess. An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible . Apowerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as anunacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectorsunder the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its rolestrictly to external security . Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorblarge numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.The role of the military will also be shaped by social conflicts that may emerge in a post-Castro period. For the first half of thetwentieth century, political violence was seen by many as a legitimate method to effect political change, andthis could well have an effect on societal expectations in the future. Communist rule has engenderedprofound hatred and resentment. Political vendettas will be rampant; differences over how torestructure society will be profound; factionalism in society and in the political process

will be common . It will be difficult to create mass political parties as numerous leaders and groups vie for power and developcompeting ideas about the organization of society, economic policy, the nature of the political system, and unraveling the legacy ofdecades of communist dictatorship. A newly free and restless labor movement will complicate matters for anyfuture government. During the Castro era, the labor movement remained docile under continuous government control; onlyone unified labor movement was allowed. In a democratic Cuba, labor will not be a passive instrument of anygovernment. Rival labor organizations will develop programs to protect the rights of workers, and todemand better salaries and welfare for their members . A militant and vociferous labor movement will surely characterize post-Castro Cuba. Similarly, the apparent harmonious race relations of the Castro eramay also experience severe strains. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population overthe past several decades due to greater intermarriage and out-migration of a million mostly white Cubans.This has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. At the same time, blacks feel that theyhave been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro powerstructure . The dollarization of the economy and the recent relaxation in the amount of remittancesallowed to flow from the U.S. to Cuba has accentuated these differences. Since most Cuban-Americans are white, black Cubans receive fewer dollars from abroad. Significant racial tension could well result as these feelings and frustrations areaired in a politically open environment. (Race Relations in Cuba, Juan Antonio Alvarado - in Spanish). Perhaps the most difficultproblem that a post-Castro leadership will have to face is acceptance of the rule of law. (Establishing the Rule of Law in Cuba, LauraPatallo Snchez.) Every day, Cubans violate communist laws: they steal from state enterprises, participate inthe black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption .They do this to survive. Getting rid of those necessary vices will not be easy, especially since many of thempre-date the Castro era. Unwillingness to obey laws will be matched by the unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of thecommunist leadership to work hard and sacrifice for the sake of society. The youth are alienated from the politicalprocess, and are eager for a better life. Many want to immigrate to the United States . If the present rate of visa requests at the U.S. consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans wantto move permanently to the U nited States. Under the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cubans will be free to visit the United States. Many will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants; others will be claimed aslegal immigrants by relatives who are already naturalized citizens. A significant out-migration is certain, posing an


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added major problem for U.S. policymakers at a time of increasing anti -immigration sentiment. While many Cubans want to leaveCuba, few Cuban-Americans will be inclined to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the island, especially if Cubaexperiences a slow and painful transition period. Although those exiles who are allowed to return will be welcomed initially as business partners and investors, they are also likely to be resented, especially if they become involved in domestic politics.Readjusting the views and values of the exile population to those of the island will be a difficult andlengthy process. (The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban Transition, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez). The future of Cuba is therefore clouded with problems and uncertainties. More than five decades of communism have lef tprofound scars on Cuban society. As in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, reconstruction may be slow, painful, and tortuous. Unlikethese countries, Cuba has at least three unique advantages: a long history of close relations with the United States; excellentpreconditions for tourism; and a large and wealthy exile population. These factors could converge to transform the country's livingstandards, but only if the future Cuban leadership creates the necessary conditions for an open, legally fair economy and an open,tolerant, and responsible political system. Unfortunately, life in Cuba is likely to remain difficult for a while longer.

No Middle East impactCook 7 CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations fromthe Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University ofPennsylvania(Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265)Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the KurdistanRegional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff in deed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkeyand the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iranand Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of I raq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians,Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern

leaders , like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation . Committing forces to Iraq i s an inherently risky proposition, which, if theconflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection ratherthan projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Ir aq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenarioin which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihadagainst the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who i s coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, theSaudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with mili tants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally,

there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directlyinvolved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries otherthan Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committedforces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war inLebanon was regarded as someone else's fight . Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the currentsituation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and Americanfight . As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests thr ough proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiitemilitias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will r emain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of I raq. TheMiddle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars . But given its experience with ambiguousconflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and preventlocal conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.


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2NC Censorship

Plan fails Cuba will monopolize the technologySchmidt and Cohen 10 (Eric, Member of the President's Council of Advisers on Science andTechnology and Chair of the New America Foundation, and Jared, Adjunct Fellow at the Council on

Foreign Relations, The Digital Disruption Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power, November/December2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66781/eric-schmidt-and-jared-cohen/the-digital-disruption#)

A second and equally large group of developing countries are the "connecting nations" -- places where technologicaldevelopment is still nascent and where both governments and citizens are testing out tools and theirpotential impact. In these states, connection technologies are not yet sufficiently prevalent to presentmajor opportunities or challenges . Although these states will invariably rise into the ranks of the partially connected, it is too early to determine what this will mean for the relationship among citizens, their governments, and neighboring nations. Some of these states, such as Cuba ,Myanmar (also called Burma), and Yemen, have tried to wall off access to certain technologies entirely . For example, they haveconfined access to cell phones to the elite ; this, however, has led to a communications black market, which is most often used for dailycommunication but harbors the capacity to foment opposition. Activists in these states and in their diasporas -- such as those working along Myanmar's border with Thailand -- try daily to break the information blockade. In the short term, the regimes that govern these nations will dotheir best to maintain monopolies on the tools of communication.

No possibility of dissent Amnesty International 10 Amnesty International is an international humanitarian organization.(RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOMOF EXPRESSION IN CUBA, 2010, http://www.amnistia-internacional.pt/dmdocuments/Cuba_FreedomExpression.pdf)In recent years the Cuban government has taken some limited steps to address long-standing suppression offreedom of expression in the country. While welcome, these changes have had only a limited effect . The legal, bureaucratic and administrative infrastructure built up over the years to silence government opponentsand maintain the one party system remains largely intact. Those who voice views beyond those permitted by the authorities continue to be intimidated and harassed, arbitrarily detained2 or imprisoned afterunfair, often summary, trials . The principle that no one should be imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their opinions isone of the most widely accepted norms of international human rights law. Yet over the years, hundreds of prisoners ofconscience have been imprisoned in Cuba for the peaceful expression of their views . Some were imprisonedfollowing large-scale crackdowns on political dissent; others were individually targeted. At the time of writing, 54 prisoners ofconscience continued to be held by the Cuban authorities for peacefully exercising their right to freedomof expression . Harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and criminal prosecutions, all continue to beused to restrict the expression of views critical of the government . Those targeted are dissidents and critics, in manycases independent journalists and political and human rights activists. Cubans use the possibilities offered by theinternet and new communications technologies to bypass state censorship in order to express ideas andopinions and to seek, receive and impart information . Independent reporting by individuals or small groups, includingindependent press agencies, continues to defy government control. However, the virtual state monopoly on the broadcastmedia and the press remains intact; private ownership of mass media is prohibited under theConstitution. Similar restrictions apply to the internet, despite some relaxation of state control over thepast year. As a result, most Cubans are denied ready access to information that is independent ofgovernment sources or to opinions that differ from state ideology. The current legal framework and the way in which it is enforced by the authorities seriously limits freedom of expression. A range of laws are used tocurb the legitimate expression of opinion and dissent. People continue to face unfounded criminal prosecution, as

well as harassment and intimidation by state security and police officials, for expressing and distributinginformation or opinions critical of the government. Unlawful restrictions on freedom of expression areunderpinned by other restrictions on human rights, such as the rights to freedom of association, ofpeaceful assembly and of movement. Arbitrary detention, interrogations and warnings at police stations,and other forms of temporary arrests are frequently used by the authorities to intimidate individualscritical of the prevailing state system . The cumulative effect of such practices has been to create a climateof fear in Cuban society and inhibit the development of freedom of expression. The judiciary is neitherindependent nor impartial and allows criminal proceedings to be brought against those critical of the government as a mechanism toprevent, deter or punish them for expressing dissenting views. The complicity of the state judicial system inprosecuting government critics, often in summary trials that fail to meet international fair trial


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standards,3 has a profound chilling effect on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly .Political dissidents and other critics of the government were in many cases harassed and intimidated by organized groups ofgovernment supporters; these may include local members of the communist party and members of pro-government massorganizations, in particular Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and Rapid Response Brigades. There are reports ofcombined activities between government supporters, state officials and law enforcement agencies toharass dissidents. Although the government has taken some small steps towards enhancing respect for human rights, such assigning up to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), restrictions to freedom of expression

remain largely intact . The Cuban government has sought to justify failings in the protection of human rights by pointing to theundoubted negative effects of the US embargo. No matter how detrimental its impact, the US embargo is a lame excuse for violatingthe rights of citizens, as it can in no way diminish the obligation on the Cuban government to protect, respect and fulfil the humanrights of all Cubans. As Cuba embarks on the long and challenging process of legal and political reform, it will need to cons ider thedepth and complexity of the inte rrelationship between the various aspects of social structures that will need to be modified.4However, the respect, protection and fulfilment of all human rights civil, political, economic, social and cultural must be aprimary and urgent objective of that process.


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between reassurances that the economic changes were compatible with socialism, and a brutal assessment of the mistakes thecountry had made. Fidel Castro was not present for the speech. Raul Castro said the monthly ration book of basic foods,perhaps the most cherished of subsidies, represented an "unbearable burden ... and a disincentive for work ." He said the changes he is proposing will come "without hurry, but without pause." Still, he added that"there will never be room for shock therapy" in Cuba. Of term limits, Castro said he and his brother had made various attempts topromote young leaders, but that they had not worked out well perhaps a reference to the 2009 firing of Cuba's photogenic foreignminister and vice president, who were later accused of lusting too obviously for power. "Today we face the consequences of no t

having a reserve of substitutes ready," Castro said. Like the proposals on economic changes, the term-limit idea does not yetcarry the force of law since the party gathering lacks the powers of parliament. But it's all but certain to be acted on quickly by the National Assembly. The Communist Party is the only political organization recognized on the island, and mostpoliticians are members. Cubans vote for municipal and national assemblies, which in turn elect senior leaders including thepresident. Currently there is no set limit on their terms. Since taking office, Raul Castro has leased tens of thousands ofhectares of fallow government land to small farmers, and enacted reforms that allow Cubans to go into business for themselves, rent out homes and hire employees. Cubans are watching to see whether other changesemerge from the Congress such as the end of a near-total ban on buying and selling private property, or details on promises toextend bank credits. Raul Castro has also pledged to end Cuba's unusual two-tiered currency system, where wages are paid in pesos, while many imported goods are available only in a dollar-linked economy beyondmost people's reach . The president, however, has said little about how or when he will accomplish that.


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2NC Squo Solves Telecom

Access growing nowReuters 13 (Cuba to increase unrestricted Internet access at new outlets, May 29, 2013,http://www.stabroeknews.com/2013/news/regional/05/29/cuba-to-increase-unrestricted-internet-access-at-new-outlets/)

HAVANA, (Reuters) Cuba will begin offering broader Internet access next month through 118 outlets aroundthe country , according to a decree in the governments Official Gazette on Tuesday, in a step long awaited by many Cubans. It saidInternet would be made available starting June 4 at offices of ETECSA, the state telecommunicationsmonopoly, and elsewhere in what a government blogger said was a first step toward home service. Maybe it will take a while but the next step is to connect Cubans from their houses. This is the advance party , said blogger Yohandry Fontana, who often is first to report official information and viewpoints, commenting on Twitter. The decree madeclear that the new Internet access would be closely monitored, warning users it could not be used to endanger or prejudice publicsecurity, or the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Currently,unrestricted access to Internet in Cuba is availableonly to select institutions and professionals and to luxury hotels catering to tourists . The communist-led islandsays that 2.6 million Cubans, out of a population of 11.2 million, have access to the Internet, but until nowmost have only been able to explore a limited, state- controlled intranet basket of approved websites.

Cuban government has expanded internet accessBBC 13 British Broadcasting Corporation. (Cuba 'to offer' limited public internet access, May 31, 2013,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22696637)The government of Cuba has said it will soon expand public access to the internet , although it will maintainrestrictions for access at home. It said that 118 internet points would be set up on the Caribbean island from 4June, to allow web surfing for $4.5 (3) an hour. Cuba's average salary is $20 a month, and it has one of the lowest levels ofinternet access in the world. Most Cubans can connect only at work, at school, or in luxury hotels. Traffic will be monitored Theeasing of restrictions was published in the official paper , Gaceta Oficial. It said that member of the public will be able to access international websites for $4.5 (3) an hour - down from $6 - or $0.6 (0.4) an hour for national sites.The cost for checking emails will remain unchanged at $1.50 (1). The government also reaffirmed that it would continuemonitoring internet traffic closely. Cuba's telecommunications company, Etecsa, will "immediately" stop access to users if theycommit "any violation of the norms of ethical behaviour promoted by the Cuban state", the Ministry of Communications said in itsgovernment decree. Only some professionals, like journalists and doctors, are allowed to surf the internet athome. Most Cubans, however, can get online only in their places of work or study, or check their email atpost offices. They can also use internet points in hotels which mostly cater to international tourists . Slowconnection Up until recently, Cuba relied upon slow and expensive satellite links for internet connections. But in January, Etecsa

announced it would start using an under-sea fibre-optic cable from Venezuela that would provide high-speed internet connection. The Communist-led government has blamed limi ted bandwidth for restricting web access, sayingit is forced to prioritise it for universities, companies and research centres.


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2NC Middle East D

Middle East war would be short and small-scaleFERGUSON 2006 (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, andSenior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon

produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich,

the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Suchlanguage can for now, at least safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison withthose of June 1967 or October 1973 . In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt andSyria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syriaand Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a positionto risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction . Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any greatpower support for Israel's neighbors . During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict . Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, firstheard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev . The stakes were high indeed. At one pointduring the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (sixdays in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption beingmade in Washington.

No escalation

A) Arab states wont escalate COOK et al 2007 (Steven A., fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations) Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,International Herald TribuneFinally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directlyinvolved . The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never madeit. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, nevercommitted forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in

Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight . Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, theyhave long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence overpowerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnicstruggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone andaccustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developedan intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire MiddleEast .

B) No economic damage and no great power interventionKELLEY 2002 (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7) During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war . Inthose days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflictcould spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initi ative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. I sraeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. TheSoviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times inhistory have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over.Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror.Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has , after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer goodreason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread . Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the Arab oil embargo. But the oil "weapon" has lost much of its bang . We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then, but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabsmore than the loss of their oil would harm us .


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Econ


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1NC Cuban Economy

The aff doesnt overcome structural problems with the Cuban economySweig and Bustamente 13 JULIA E. SWEIG is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin AmericaStudies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know. MICHAEL J. BUSTAMANTE is

a Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. (Cuba After Communism, July/August 2013, Foreign Affairs,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139458/julia-e-sweig-and-michael-j-bustamante/cuba-after-communism?page=show) Nevertheless, Cuba faces serious obstacles in its quest for greater economic vitality. Unlike China and Vietnamat the start of their reform efforts, Cuba is an underdeveloped country with developed-world problems. Not onlyis the population aging (18 percent of the population is over 60), but the countrys economy is heavily tilted towardthe services sector . When Vietnam began its doi moi (renovation) economic reforms in 1986, services accounted for about 33percent of GDP, whereas the productive base represented nearly 67 percent. By contrast, services in Cuba make up close to75 percent of the islands GDP -- the result of 20-plus years of severe industrial decay and low rates of savings andinvestment. Service exports (mainly of health-care professionals), combined with tourism and remittances,constitute the countrys primary defense against a sustained balance-of-payments deficit . Cuban officials andeconomists recognize this structural weakness and have emphasized the need to boost exports and foster a more dynamic domesticmarket. Yet so far, the state has not been able to remedy the imbalance. In the sugar industry , once a mainstay,production continues to flounder despite a recent uptick in global prices and new Brazilian investment. Meanwhile, a corruption scandal and declining world prices have weakened the nickel industry, leading to

the closing of one of the islands three processing facilities. More broadly, Cuban productivity remainsanemic, and the country has been unable to capitalize on its highly educated work force . Although important,the expansion of the small-business sector cannot resolve these core issues . There are now 181legal categories for self-employment, but they are concentrated almost exclusively in the services sector, including proprietors ofindependent restaurants, food stands, and bed-and-breakfasts. Start-up funds are scarce, fees for required licenses arehigh, and some of the legal categories are senselessly specific . It also remains unclear whether the chance to earn alegitimate profit will lure black-market enterprises out into the open. No surprise, then, that the expansion of self-employment hasnot yet enabled the state to meet its targets for slimming down i ts bloated payrolls. In late 2010, Castro pledged to eliminate500,000 state jobs in the first six months of 2011, with an eye to incorporating over 1.8 million workers (out of a total estimated work force of 5.3 million) into the private sector by 2015. But the government managed to eliminate only 137,000 positions that first year. Still, the reforms are making a serious impact . Small businesses currently employ some 400,000 citizens, an increaseof 154 percent since the liberalization of self-employment began in October 2010. To spur further growth, moreover, authoritiesrecently launched a wholesale company that will allow emerging enterprises to purchase supplies on the same terms as state-runcompanies, thus addressing a major complaint of business owners. To supplement these gains, Cuba needs to continuerebuilding its productive capacities in core areas such as agriculture. Before Ral Castro came to power,

approximately 20 percent of the cultivable land in the country lay fallow and Cuba imported half its domestic food supply -- asignificant part of which came from the United States, under a 2000 exception to the trade embargo. To increase domesticproduction, the state has handed over more than 3.7 million acres of land to private farmers, whose cropsnow account for 57 percent of the total food production in the country despite their occupying just under25 percent of the arable land. Yet aggregate food-production levels in most basic categories still hover ator slightly below 2002 levels.

Tons of barriers to foreign investment that the aff doesnt overcome Sweig and Bustamente 13 JULIA E. SWEIG is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin AmericaStudies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know. MICHAEL J. BUSTAMANTE isa Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. (Cuba After Communism, July/August 2013, Foreign Affairs,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139458/julia-e-sweig-and-michael-j-bustamante/cuba-after-communism?page=show) The port project underscores some of the broader dilemmas constraining foreign investment in Cuba and the countrys overallgrowth prospects. Havana designated Mariel as a special economic development zone -- an area whereforeign companies are given special incentives and prerogatives -- in an effort to attract badly neededinvestment dollars . Cuban officials also aim to take advantage of the countrys well-educated population and establishinvestment zones geared toward high-tech innovation and other high-value-added activities, such as biotechnology. Yet withoutlinks to local industries, such investment zones could become economic islands, providing employment tolocals and income to the Cuban government but reduced multiplier effects. The islands dual-currencysystem makes the challenge all the more difficult . A byproduct of the circulation of U.S. dollars in the 1990s -- first in the black market, then legally -- the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) today functions as the currency of the touristsector and is required for the purchase of many consumer items. For common Cuban citizens, the value ofthe CUC is pegged to the dollar, with one CUC equal to 25 Cuban pesos (CUP), the currency in which moststate workers are paid. Consequently, citizens who receive hard currency from abroad or who earn money in
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CUC, such as workers who collect tips from foreign tourists, enjoy much higher incomes than workers who rely solely on salaries paid in CUP. Even worse, the values of the CUC and the CUP are considered equal within and between state enterprises. This bizarre accounting practice helped insulate CUP prices frominflation during the depths of the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, but today itmakes it difficult for analysts and investors to estimate the real costs of doing business on the island or the value of state companies . Economists agree that the least disruptive way to move toward a single currency would be togradually merge the two exchange rates in tandem with a steady rise in GDP and salaries overall. But in the meantime, theartificial one-to- one ratio within the state sector has the effect of overvaluing the CUPs internationalexchange rate and thus decreasing the competiveness of domestic goods. Paradoxically, the dual-currencyregime protects imports at the expense of domestic production.

Remittances solveChavez 13 Juan is a writer for the Miami Herald. (REMITTANCES FROM CUBANS ABROAD DRIVE THE ISLANDSECONOMY, the latest mention of anything in the article was about the entire 2012 year; figured it was from 2013,http://www.cubanalisis.com/SECTION%20IN%20ENGLISH/REMITTANCES%20FROM%20CUBANS%20ABROAD....htm) Cash remittances to Cuba in 2012 surpassed all revenue coming from the main components ofthe Cuban economy while becoming the largest element of support to the retail market , according to astudy by a Miami- based analysis group. The study, titled Remittances to Cuba: the Most Powerful Engine of the Cuban Economy, was done by The Havana Consulting Group. It concludes that in 2012, remittances reached $2.605 billion . The numberrepresents an increase of more than 13 percent compared to the previous year of nearly $2.3 billion. Today remittances to the

island reach 62 percent of Cuban homes, support close to 90 percent of the retail market and allowemployment of tens of thousands of people ,the study says. The remarkable upward trend has also been a commondenominator in goods (electrical appliances, clothes and consumer items, among others) that Cubans abroad ship to relatives

or friends in Cuba. This category amounted to $2.5 billion in 2012, according to the study. Both categories (money andgoods) together surpassed $5.105 billion. The remittances have left behind the powerful sugar industry ($391million) which by 1993 had entered its biggest crisis and it is still in decline they surpass tourism ($2.613 billion) in volume and performance, provide more revenue than nickel exports ($1.413 billion) and the pharmaceuticalsproduced by the Cuban biotechnological industry ($5 00 million), the study says. Andthis without subtractingcosts in each category, which would make the difference significantly larger .The injection of remittanceshas been a powerful pillar for the countrys economy , which has been practically stagnant and with high levelsof unemployment. But its role has now been strengthened because of the deteriorating economy , according toexperts familiar with the issue. In October 2010, the Cuban crisis forced Ral Castros government to launch market reforms andother emergency initiatives. The reforms , which a large part of the opposition calls insufficient and cosmetic,include alarger participation of foreign investment, self-employment and services in dozens of labor categories. Thestudy emphasized th at the Obama administrations policies contributed to the increase of remittances. During his first term, Obamalifted most of the restrictions of travel and remittances while easing up religious, cultural and educational exchanges. Without anydoubts, the arrival of President Barack Obama at the White House has directly influenced the increment of remittances in the lastfour years, an increment that has almost reached $1 billion in such a short time, says The Havana Consulting Groups study.Thestudy highlights that cash remittances in 2012 surpassed, at a ratio of 3 to 1, the salaries the government pays to the approximately 4million workers who work for the public sector. Officially, the average salary in Cuba is 455 pesos a month, equivalent to $19. If tothis value we add remittances arriving in the form of goods, the ratio would then be 5.5 to 1, a monumental difference, thestudysays. Another point that has favored the increase of remittances is closely linked to the migration flow ofCubans abroad, the study adds. The flow has been kept at 47,000 people annually, almost a half-million inthe last decade.

Reforms solveShank 11 Michael Shank is the US Vice President of the Institute for Economics and Peace. (Cuba's Economic ReformsHerald New Resolve by Castro; Time for US to Reform Relationship, 11/14/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/us-cuba-policy_b_1091316.html)

Things are changing quickly in Cuba. Last week, on November 10, the Cuban government , under President RaulCastro's leadership, launched its most progressive economic reform initiative yet by legalizing the sale andpurchase of private property . For Cuba watchers and Castro critics, this was noteworthy given that Cubans have not been allowed to trade real estate since the 1959 revolution. Having traveled myself to Cuba last year, as part of aCongressional staff delegation, this comes as little surprise; the winds of economic change were already blowing. But for those in theUS Congress critical of Cuba's economic policies -- e.g. US Senator Bob Menendez and US Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen --this may confound. Why the about-face and will it last? It turns out, as illuminated in a 98-page report published this month by theCenter for Democracy in the Americas, Cuba's recent economic reforms are indicative of a new resolve . Bolsteringthis claim, the authors found that "Cuba's reform process is here to stay and the changes are most likelyirreversible ." The report, titled "Cuba's New Resolve: Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy," shows that theeconomic policy trends in Cuba parallel the very conversations in Congress and throughout US state
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legislatures, whether it's reducing the numbers of employees on the state payroll, reducing governmentspending for social safety nets, or supporting small businesses. In fact, President Castro is spurring newprivate sector enterprise, enabling Cubans to open small businesses, hire workers, and create farming andmanufacturing cooperatives that will function as small businesses . Tea Party types in the US, and proponents ofsmaller government, should like what Castro is doing. He's cutting one million workers on the state payroll, reducing ration cardallocations, and ending some state subsidies entirely. Castro is also decentralizing government by handing over stateresponsibilities to provincial and municipal leaderships with the aim to build capacity and implementdecisions locally . All of this should make Washington happy. Yet while US President Barack Obama is on board the US-Cubarelationship transformation train, doing more to improve US-Cuba relations than recent predecessors, there are still ampleroadblocks in Congress keeping our two countries from increased economic cooperation. Don't forget that Cuba, until recently, wasthe United States' largest rice export market and the fifth largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm exports. Furthermore,Cuba holds the potential for $20 billion in trade with America over a three-year term. Our economy could clearly benefit from betterrelations. The longer we wait the more ground we lose. Brazil's former President Lula da Silva capitalized on Cuba'sappetite for growth, proposed investments in industrial, agriculture and infrastructure projects, includingports and hotels, and an agreement with Brazil's oil company. Venezuela and China are already investingin Cuba's oil industry, and Spain is weighing in with millions in microcredit to boost Cuba's small business industry.

No impact to bioterrorDove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, Whos Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist? Jan 24 2012,http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, were left with a list ofinfectious bacteria and viruses . With a singleexception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it . There have been at least three well-documented military- style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent thats not on the list. Im focusing entirely onthe modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying toinoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but its not clear those attacks were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so theresno telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with theirenemies. Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal . The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthraxincident , which killed an estimated 100 people . In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on bad meat, but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from agovernment-run lab : the 2001 Amerithrax attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the governments main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died. That gives us a grand total of around105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs . Remember that. Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice , and thesecases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculatedrestaurant salad bars with Salmonella bac teria (an agent thats not on the select list).751 people got sick, but nobodydied. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak , identified thesources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a d eliberate attack if a member of the cult hadnt come forward afterward with aconfession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack . The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993 . Members of the AumShinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from theroof of a building in downtown Tokyo . The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educatedmembers, so this release over the worlds largest city reallyrepresented a worst-case scenario . Nobody got sick or died. From the cults perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by p roducing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one ofthe top select agents is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups.Its a really crappy bioterrorist weapon . Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our

biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.


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2NC Alt Causes

Structural problems like the currency and the service sectorOptenhoegel and Pronold 12 Uwe Optenhoegel is a political consultant and is currently the Director ofFriedrich Ebert Stiftungs office for Cuba. Florian Pronold is Vice-Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, state

party lea der of the SPD in Bavaria and speaker of the circle of friends of Cuba in the Bundestag. (Cuba In Search of an OrderlyTransition, Social Europe Journal, 9/26/12, http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/09/cuba-in-search-of-an-orderly-transition/)The state of the economy as reform of the economic model gets under way is extremely poor . Half a centuryafter the Revolution Cuba has not been able to get its planned economy off the ground. Within the framework of the division oflabour of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) the country was committed to deliver sugar or other foodstuffsand raw materials. When the Eastern European economic community and thus the Soviet subsidies ceasedCuba had to completely rebuild its economy . Fidel Castro passed this task on to his brother and then Defence MinisterRaul and his Forcas Armadas Revolutionarias (FAR). The successful completion of this mission marked the entryof the Cuban military into the economy, at least in its more modern sectors . Since then they have extendedtheir influence and today are the pragmatic driving force behind the reforms . Although in this way collapse wasavoided the economic sectors built up since then tourism, nickel exporting and, to a certain extent, healthservices and biotechnology have not developed enough to cover the countrys need for foreign currency .For years Cuba has lived with a structural foreign trade deficit, with high foreign debts and, as a result, ashortage of liquidity. When Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela at the end of the 1990s Fidel Castro found a new sourceof subsidies. Although they kept alive the ailing planned economy, at the same time they stymied the promising reform efforts, aserious wrong decision that cost Cuba a lost decade with regard to economic policy. Meanwhile, the island has an economicstructure in which the productive sectors account for only around a quarter of value added, with theservice sector accounting for the rest. Cuban economists talk of a dysfunctional tertiarisation thatthreatens the healthy development of the economy . Since the beginning of the 1990s the Cuban economy has not been in a position to ensure the necessary recapitalisation, the basis of its very existence. Gross fixed-assetinvestments fell by 47 per cent between 1989 and 2007. In 2006 they accounted for only 13.5 per cent ofGDP and remain at this level today. This is half the level of 1989 and around half of what is regarded as necessary forsustainable growth. Thus Cuba lies below the Latin American average of around 20 per cent. The country is de-industrialisedand there are almost no intact value chains, to say nothing of the dilapidation of the infrastructure. Thedual currency that followed dollarisation at the start of the 1990s continues to have grave consequencesfor Cubas wage earners. It became the main catalyst of social differentiation. Wages were paid in the Cuban peso, which has little purchasing power. Most basic necessities are traded in the convertible CUC, however . Forthis reason Cubans who have access to foreign currency are much better off than their fellow countrymen

who do not. People acquire hard currency either through remittances from Cubans living abroad, throughtourism or through foreign trade . Generally speaking, additional incomes from remittances and from the blackmarket or private economic activities significantly exceed regular incomes. Thus paid work is becomingincreasingly unimportant. This system creates entirely the wrong incentives. The fact that a waitress, a taxi driver or thecleaners at a tourist place earn four times as much as a doctor or a teacher is leading to the inversion of Cubas social pyramid.Consequently, many young people are asking themselves whether its worth getting a good education. Andmore and more highly qualified professionals are emigrating to places where they can earn good moneyeven without qualifications.

DeficitsPujol 11 Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy's Secretary 1990-1997, Member of the Board of Directors 2002-2004, 2004- 2006. (MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO TTO SOLVE THEM, ASCE, 2011, http://www.ascecu ba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/pujol.pdf)Large Fiscal Deficits The global financial crisis, compounded by the damage inflicted by three hurricanes in2008, forced Cuban authorities to run a fiscal deficit of 6.7% of GDP in that year, stop payment of creditsreceived from Spain, China and other creditors, and cut back in many investment projects . Significantlimitations regarding the availability of foreign exchange to pay for imports and finance investmentprojects contributed to a sharp deceleration in economic activity . In order to reduce the fiscal deficit thegovernment adopted a very sharp readjustment in its expenditure plans and implemented a 6% across the board cut in government expenditures in 2009 . Expenditure cut backs were further intensified during 2010. Housingconstruction and maintenance have particularly suffered from the lack of funding, but most othergovernment activities have also been affecte d. Meanwhile, since 2008 there has been growing monetaryinjections to cover the domestic fiscal deficit and therefore money in the hands of the public (liquidity)


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has been increasing, reaching over 40% of GDP; since there has not been a concomitant increase indomestic output, this has contributed to the rise in domestic prices and a decline in real wages . LargeBalance of Payments Deficit Large and persistent deficits in the balance of payments since 2008 have generatedsubstantial foreign exchange shortages. As a consequence of the combination of an increase in imports, a deceleration ofexports, greater obligations to service a growing external debt, and lower availability of external financing, the demand forforeign exchange could not be met. Increases in international market prices, particularly of foodstuffs andfuel, increased the balance of payments imbalance and were one of the factors that triggered the need fora reform of the Cuban governments economic policies. Given Cubas fixed exchange rate,the above-mentionedexternal pressures ended up affecting the banking system, and the lack of foreign exchange led tosubstantial delays in making payments abroad for imports and other obligations . Many foreign exporters beganto curtail their supplies to the island or demanded payment in advance. In view of the credit crunch, foreign banks cut backtheir exposure on the island by over 16% in the first half of last year , according to the latest statistics published bythe Bank for International Settlements (BIS).2 The total external debt of Cuba to the members of the Paris Club asof December 31, 2010, totaled US$30,471 million, according to a publication of that organization . Outsidethe Paris Club, Cubas largest long-standing creditor is Argentina, with an estimated $1.8bn owed.3 China is rapidly becomingHavanas lender of last resort, as it recently racked up large loans to Cuba, perhaps as much as US$4 billion, according to someCuban sources. In response to the deterioration of the balance of payments, the authorities took steps to reduce monetary outf lows by lowering travel expenses, suspending imports, postponing investments that required outflows, and limiting the ability of foreignenterprises operating in the island and individuals to withdraw hard currency from their bank accounts. In 2009, Cuba slashedspending on food importing food and other basics by 34% percent, to $9.6 billion, from $12.7 billion the previous year. Further cuts were implemented in 2010. But so far, the moves have not been enough to rein in the deficit . The freeze of the

bank accounts of foreign firms operating in Cuba affected not only the image of the country abroad butalso resulted in a cut back of short term credits, thus contributing to the fall in imports and the increase incash payments abroad. The structure and composition of Cuban exports is extremely narrow and there isan excessive dependence of exports of services (such as medical, educational and military services) that have little ifany backward linkages . The agricultural and industrial sectors are totally unrelated to the expansion ofexport of these services, so there is no multiplier effect on the domestic economy . The sugar industry andtourism stopped playing such a role years back, as the sugar industry has practically disappeared andtourism had stagnated in recent times . The global economic crisis also hit tourism. Last year, the number of foreign visitorsrose by 3% but the tourism sectors earnings fell by 10%. Travelers from Canada, the U.S., Argentina and Russia increased, but thoseoriginating from the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany, France and Mexico declined. Travelers from Canada comprise thelargest number of visitors from abroad; they reached 945,248 in 2010. The second largest group is Cubans residing in the UnitedStates, whose numbers have grown exponentially in the last three years. According to estimates of tourism operators, some 300,000Cubans living abroad visited the island in 2009 and more than 370,000 in 2010. While tourist receipts were higher in 2010 than in2009, at US $2,395 million, they are still below the level in 2005.

The currency systemPujol 11 Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy's Secretary 1990-1997, Member of the Board of Directors 2002-2004, 2004- 2006. (MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO TRYTO SOLVE THEM, ASCE, 2011, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/pujol.pdf) Overvalued Exchange Rate and Complex Multiple Currency System Cuba has two forms of domestic currency . Stateemployees are paid in pesos moneda nacional (CUP), which can be used to pay for subsidized rations, busfare, additional food items at agro markets, and many forms of entertainment. Foreign currency , such asdollars and euros, are most often exchanged for convertible pesos (CUC), which can beused at largergovernment supermarkets, for individual (as opposed to collective) taxis , and at most clothing and appliancestores . Each convertible peso (CUC) is worth 24 pesos in moneda nacional (CUP) at government exchange houses. Eliminating thedual currency system has been one of the main talking points in the reform debates, but so far little has been done in this regard. Theexistence of this dual currency system is perceived as a source of discrimination between those that receive payments in onecurrency versus the other. In particular, while most states employees are paid in moneda nacional, they have topay in convertible pesos for many items that they buy in the official stores . In a sense the dual system acts asa hidden tax on workers who receive payment in moneda nacional. The maintenance of an exchange ratethat is not representative of market conditions has contributed to the problems faced by the bankingsystem and the difficulties in obtaining financing from abroad. In addition, the prevalence of an overvaluedexchange rate and a complex multiple currency system makes it nearly impossible to determine the realprofitability of various economic activities and results in all kinds of hidden cross subsidies and othereconomic distortions . Cuban economist Pavel Vidal Alejandro has pointed out that the official exchange rate of onepeso cubano in moneda nacional (CUP) equal to one peso cubano en moneda convertible (CUC) distortsalmost any economic measurement and the excessive value given tothe peso cubano en monedaconvertible makes a group of enterprises appear artificially profitable while making another group of


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enterprises appear unprofitable, without there being a true relationship between profitability andefficiency.


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2NC Remittances Solve

Largest sector of the economyMorales and Scarpaci 13 Emilio and Joseph are from the Havana Consulting Group. (Remittances Drive theCuban Economy, last updated June 11, 2013,

http://thehavanaconsultinggroups.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=345%3Aremittances-drive-the-cuban-economy&catid=48%3Aremittances&lang=en)It was a devastating ideological blow at the beginning of the so- called Special Period in a Time of Peace because it revealed thattheCuban exile community had become a lifeline for the island . Suddenly, U.S. dollars started inundating theisland and would never leave. Both the Cuban society and the exile community were startled by this boldmove . The former Cuban leader probably never imagined that the forced opening up to dollars was going to become the mostefficient driver in the economy over the last 20 years. Not a single Cuban economist foresaw that outcome. Today, remittancesreach 62% of Cuban households, sustain about 90% of the retail market, and provide tens of thousands of jobs. Money sent from overseas far exceeds the value of the once powerful sugar industry which, in 1993, began a huge decline from which it has not recovered . Remittances in 2013 surpass net profits fromtourism, nickel, and medical products manufactured by the Cuban biotech industry. The table above shows thatremittances ($5.1 billion) outstrip the leading four sectors of the Cuban economy combined ($4.9 billion). Moreover, the figures foritems 4 through 7 do not take into account expenses incurred in generating those gross revenues (i.e., costs of processing sugar,manufacturing drugs, food imports, etc.). Sending remittances does not cost the Cuban government money, but itcirculates throughout he economy and supports most Cubans in some way . White House Policies Trigger Growthin Remittances Barack Obamas arrival in the White House has directly influenced the increase in money beingsent to Cuba . In the past four years, $1 billion USD of remittances have infused the Cuban economy. Cash remittances in 2012reached a record $2.61 billion USD; a 13.5% increase over 2011. In other words, cash remittances outweigh government salaries by 3to 1. The current monthly mean salary according to ONEI (the official government statistics agency) is 445 Cuban pesos, or theequivalent of just under $19 USD. Today, the economically active work force is 5.01 million workers, of which about 80% (4.08million) draw state paychecks, whereas the balance is self-employed, agricultural, or cooperative workers. If we use the officialexchange rates that one Cuban convertible peso (CUC) equals 24 pesos (CUP) or one US dollar, the annual payout for state workers is three times less than the volume of money that Cuban migrs send to family back home. Include in-kind remittance contributions (gifts, appliances, clothing, etc., brought to Cuba during visits), and the ratio leaps to 5.5 to1. Behind this growth in sending money to Cuba is the opening up of travel to Cuba as well as eliminating restrictions on sendingmoney there. In 2012, just over a half a million Cubans residing abroad visited Cuba , making them the second largesttourist group in the islands market; only Canadians (1.1 million visits) surpass them. Out-migration from Cuba about47,000 annually on average over the past decade or nearly a half million migrs is also a contributing factor becausethose who have most recently left the island are the ones most inclined to send money back home. That was

not the pattern with the original exile community in the 1960s; sending dollars to the island was forbidden back then. We also needto acknowledge that several reforms introduced by the Cuban government in the past three years haveencouraged remittances. This cash infusion helps to start home restaurants (paladares), B&Bs, car rentals,and more recently the buying and selling of private cars and real-estate. These businesses are aided by the1.6 million cell phones in use today available to the general public only since 2007 of which 70% arepaid for by Cubans living off the island.

SQ remittances solve economic development and political reforms Goldstein 11 (Josh, Principal Director for Economic Citizenship & Disability Inclusion at the Centerfor Financial Inclusion, 2/1/11, Cuba & Remittances: Can the Money in the Mail Drive Reform?http://cfi-blog.org/2011/02/01/remittances-a-key-driver-of-economic-reform-in-cuba/)

With up to one million state workers moving off the government payroll in the next year, President Ral Castro and the Cubanleadership seem committed to strengthening the microenterprise and small business sector with self-employment now the certain future of so many Cuban workers. Could remittances from the United States play a key role inproviding finance to these new start-up enterprises, in the absence of private or public banks in a position to lend? On January 19th,the Center for Financial Inclusion, in conjunction with the Cuba Study Group sponsored the Cuba Small Business Summit, which was hosted by the Council of the Americas, at its headquarters in New York. The summit focused on the outlook for profound changein the employment picture in Cuba in the wake of a new commitment to economic reform announced in September 2010 by theCuban government. One question was on everyones mind. Were the newly enacted economic reforms beginning to make adifference in the lives of ordinary Cubans? The answer from the panel of experts, many of whom had recently visited Cuba, was aconfident, if anecdotal, yes. Most compelling was the consensus finding that the government was doing everything itcould to expedite the issuing of business licenses to the growing number of people wanting to establishmicro-businesses up to 75,000 since October. Whatever the number, more and more entrepreneurs are seen hawking their


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wares and services in the streets, and unlike in the past, the state media is no longer excoriating them for being ingrates andpilferers, but speaking of them with respect, if not reverence. This represents a sea change in the official view and the sixthCommunist Party Congress in April will focus on the need for economic change and may go even further in endorsing the growth ofprivate enterprise. (Already, the government has lowered remittance transaction costs.) Fortuitously, on the eve of the summit,President Barack Obama used his executive authority to open the way for a vast expansion of remittances tothe island even now approaching more than $2 billion a year in hard currency and another $2 billion inmerchandise remittances . Residents of the United States will for the first time be permitted to remit to nonrelatives up to

$500 per quarter, per recipient with no limit on the number of possible recipients. At least in theory, remitted money couldserve as a source of working capital for legions of new micro- and small businesses. Remittances couldanswer in the short term one of the greatest challenges of creating a microenterprise and small business sectorfrom scratch in Cuba the lack of financial capital. Merchandise remittances might also provide access to some keygoods at near wholesale prices the lack of wholesale markets being identified as a huge obstacle to business creation on the island. And remittances will certainly increase in importance for the newly self-employed by cushion ing the transition fromcradle-to-grave social welfare (however meager) provided by the Cuban state, to a scary new world where the safety net is fullof holes.


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2NC Reforms Solve

Theyre accelerating and solve the economyThe Economist 13 Obvi. (Money starts to talk, July 20, 2013,http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21581990-and-eventually-perhaps-one-currency-tempo-reform-accelerates-money-

starts) AT 9.01am one morning earlier this month, Marino Murillo, a member of Cubas ruling Politburo, strode on to the stage at theInternational Press Centre in Havana, gave a concise account of the governments economic plans, and took questions for 45minutes. What would have been routine elsewhere was remarkable in communist Cuba, for three reasons. Gone is theinterminable waiting around for the late-night rants of Fidel Castro : punctuality is one of the hallmarks of thegovernment led since 2006 by his younger brother, Ral. And after internecine political battles over liberalisingeconomic reforms, the government is confident enough of its message to have invited a small group offoreign journalists to hear it the first such initiative in many years. Third was the message itself. Mr Murillo , a burly former army colonel who is in charge of implementing economic reforms (officially dubbed updating), stressed that the coreof the system remained social property. But he alsotalked of wealth creation and the need for price signals andmarket factors. Life has shown that the state cant do everything, he said. Success will lie in how to maintainmacro balance while giving space to the market and wealth creation. Under 313 guidelines approved by a Communist PartyCongress in 2011, Ral Castro is trying to revive the islands moribund economy by transferring a chunk of itfrom state to private hands and by streamlining a cumbersome central-planning system . So far the changeshave centred on farming and small business. The government has handed over, on ten-year renewable leases, nearly 1.5mhectares (3.7m acres) of land to private farmers or co-operatives, who now occupy 70% of farmland. Farmers can sell almosthalf their output to the highest bidder, rather than handing all of it over to the state as in the past. About400,000 Cubans work in the budding private sector of small business and self-employment, up from150,000 three years ago. Cubans can now buy and sell houses and cars freely and travel abroad . From lastmonth, they can surf the internet at what will soon be a network of 118 telecoms centres , though the price of$4.50 an hour is about a quarter of the average monthly wage for a state worker. The tempo of reform isaccelerating . Over the next 18 months, Mr Murillo said, the government will loosen two of the economys mostcrippling shackles . Starting next year, state enterprises will be allowed to keep half their post-tax profits , toreinvest or distribute to their workers. Their managers will be given much more autonomy. Companies that postpersistent losses will, in theory, be liquidated. Mr Mu rillo is also preparing to unify Cubas twincurrencies , the source of convoluted distortions and hidden subsidies. Most wages and prices are set in Cuban pesos (CUPs), 25 of which buy a dollar. The tourist economy operates with convertible pesos (or CUCs), set at par to the dollar. In fact, CUCs are notfreely convertible, because state companies are allowed to pretend that each of their CUPs is worth one CUC. The upshot is thatordinary Cubans are paid a pittance (the average monthly wage of 466 CUPs is worth just $19). Income inequality is rising sharply asmore Cubans obtain CUCs, either as remittances from relatives abroad or because they work in tourism or the growing privatesector. And since scarce foreign exchange is assigned by government fiat, companies have had no incentive to export or substituteimports. The logical step would be to unify the two currencies by devaluing the CUC and revaluing the CUP, though this wouldtrigger inflation and boost demand for imports. Instead, officials say that within the next few weeks several industries starting withsugar, biotechnology and shellfish will be allowed to start experimenting with different exchange rates. Pavel Vidal, a formerofficial at Cubas Central Bank now teaching at the Javeriana University in Cali, Colombia, thinks that these companies will get 12pesos to the dollar for exports, will pay for imports at seven and book oil imports from Venezuela, Cubas main benefactor, at four tothe dollar. This experimental devaluation should generate opportunities as well as costs. Since companies need managementautonomy to take advantage of them, Mr Vidal thinks it is positive that currency and enterprise reform arehappening together. But he points out that multiple exchange rates tend to generate corruption and hidden subsidies vicesthat officials have pledged to fight. If they succeed in their aim of boosting productivity, these reforms are likely to lead to job losses.Ral Castro originally said that the state would lay off 1.1m workers by 2014. He was forced to backtrack, because many feared losingthe little they have (and the opportunity for pilfering that state jobs offer). Instead, the government is quietly easing workers off t

cuba telecommunications negative - northwestern 2013 6weekseniors

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