crim pro 1st case list

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1st Sem 2015- Criminal Procedure Full text Cases

G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pla inti ff-appel lee, vs .

CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING

ABANO, defendants -appel lants . R E S O L U T I O N

AQUINO, J.:

Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, a l ternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No.

3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, i s charge d with i l lega l possess ion of fi rearms and ammunitions .

As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy i f he were to be confined in the Vigan municipa l ja i l during the tria l

because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo fami ly in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been

murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death whi le hearing mass at the Vigan cathedra l .

Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that

he was trying to escape. Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fisca l of I locos Sur

s ignified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bi l ibid Prisons .

Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution express ly empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or place of tria l to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what i s involved is not merely a

miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo tria l in a

place where his l i fe would be imperi l led. Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a

justi fication for transfer of venue (See State vs . Siers , 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but a lso the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another

court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon Ci ty. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the Ci ty Court of Quezon

Ci ty and the holding of the tria l at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.

WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the Ci ty Court of Quezo n Ci ty

where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to

Camp Crame on the occas ion of the hearing. SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti tioner,

vs . MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO

(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,

OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,

ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed

DOES respondents .

FERNANDO, C.J.: The power of this Tribunal, constitutional ly mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as wel l as the

procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to ba i l 2 are

involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiri tu, 3 no doubt under

the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certa in

fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the respons ibi l i ty for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a

change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessi tated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the peti tion, the Court

required the comment of the Sol ici tor Genera l as wel l as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in s ix pending criminal cases before the Court of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidenta l .

On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor Genera l Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this prel iminary s tatement:

"The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos . 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola , et a l ., pending tria l

before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidenta l . Rightly, any peti tion before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Phi l ippines can, under the law, be insti tuted onl y by the Sol ici tor

General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervis ion of the Fisca l ' wi l l not, therefore, improve their lega l

s tanding." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipa l Court of Kabankalan,

pres ided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the peti tion for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a

miscarriage of justice. 7 The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting

on the evidence presented by the Phi l ippine Co nstabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidenta l , the Court of Fi rs t

Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of ti le deceased bodies of seven persons bel ieved in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacie nda at Sta . Isabel ,

Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola . Diggings made in a

canefield yielded two common graves conta ining the b odies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Ol impos , Al fredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Ca llet and Bienvenido Emperado. On

September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate compla ints fo r murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose

Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.

4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due prel iminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipa l court

found probable cause against the accused. It thus i ssued an order for their a . rest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of gui l t of the accused is

s trong, the court granted them the right to post ba i l for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola , Francisco Garcia , and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have s ince

been released from detention. In a para l lel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that i f the tria l i s held at the Court of Fi rs t Instance branch in

Himamaylan which is but 10 ki lometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officia ls with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on

bai l. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the

fami lies of the witnesses." 8 The facts a lleged argue s trongly for the

remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancel lation of the ba i l bonds .

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the

Sol icitor General on the urgent peti tion for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court

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of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting ba i l

to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos . 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, a ll enti tled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of tria l of

the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of

the Court of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidenta l at Bacol od Ci ty, pres ided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that Dis trict Judge Osterva ldo Emi l ia of the Court of Fi rs t Instance, Negros

Occidenta l , Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mi ld attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V i s

the nearest court s tation to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the peti tion to cancel ba i l , without prejudice to the publ ic officia ls concerned takin g the necessary

measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the i ssue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by

respondent Florendo Bal iscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on

March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the ba il bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decis ion.

The sole remaining issue of the cancel lation of the ba i l bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement

that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancel led and the case

remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Al fonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.

1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of tria l , in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod Ci ty. The Constitution is quite expl ici t. The Supreme Court

could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Consti tutional Convention of 1971 wisely

incorporated the rul ing in the landmark decis ion of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorous ly and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us , to compel

the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where i ts witnesses wi l l not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicia l process , and to betray the very purpose for which

courts have been establ ished." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor Genera l . Thus : "The exercise by this Honorable Court of i ts above

constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their l ives . They are afra id they would be ki l led on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days o f

tria l . Because of qqqts fear, they may ei ther refuse to testi fy or testimony falsely to save their l ives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao

was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the ba i l bonds .

Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terri fying,

but the question must a lways be the effect i t has on the witnesses who wi ll testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Consti tution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in

favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a peti tion of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however,

there i s justification for the procedure fol lowed in view of the fa ct that a long with the change of venue, the cancel lation of the ba i l bonds was a lso sought.

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified.

Ba i l was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipa l Court without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by

Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented

before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedura l due proces s . The answer i s in the affi rmative. We are of the

cons idered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capita l offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be

given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, a l l the

evidence that it may des i re to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an

opportunity, there would be a violation of procedura l due process , and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on

that ground." 17

These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, i s sedulous in mainta ining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence

of an opportunity to defend. Privi leges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable,

however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser a lso. The concept of fa i rness must not be s tra ined ti l l i t i s narrowed to a

fi lament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which i s of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that

there i s strong evidence of gui l t. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before ba i l

was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infi rmity of a jurisdictional character. 19

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting ba i l to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court

of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sa la the cases had been transferred by vi rtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, i s directed forthwith to hear the peti tions for ba i l of private

respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt aga inst the respondents i s s trong. This decis ion i s immediately executory. No costs .

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur. Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti tioner,

vs .

HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN

PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO,

CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and

EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents .

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor

General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.

Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano. Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.

Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.

Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor. REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Peti tion for wri ts of certiorari and mandamus, with prel iminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor Genera l and State Prosecutors , to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court

of Fi rs t Instance of I locos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos . 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs.

Pi lotin, et al.," to the Circui t Criminal Court of the Second Judicia l Dis trict; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesa id in the Court of Fi rs t

Instance of I locos Sur, s i tting in Vigan, capita l of the province.

In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of I locos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of

the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipa l i ty and

province, several residential houses were l ikewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death

of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincia l fi sca l , with severa l s tate prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10

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June 1970 fi led in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two

informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidenti fied persons , "confederating,

conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned

several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, I locos Sur (Petition, Annexes

B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bai l, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not gui l ty. Tria l was

then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970. It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice

i ssued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circui t Criminal Court of the Second Judicia l Dis trict, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a specia l term in

I locos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further i ssued Administrative Order No. 226,

authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative

Order Nos . 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a

transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and ca lling attention to the ci rcumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses

seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio Ci ty, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavi ts . The accused vigorous ly opposed such

transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge decl ined the transfer sought, on the ground that Adminis trative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where

the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded;

that i f the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obta in a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the

very inception of these cases . In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases

to the Circui t Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for wri ts of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set as ide the order of denia l of the transfer and to

compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at ei ther San

Fernando, La Union, or Baguio Ci ty.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command i t, to transfer the

cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and l ikewise denied that the ci rcumstances justi fied any such transfer. At peti tioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge

Gutierrez from proceeding with the tria l of the ca ses unti l further orders .

We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of adminis trative

regulation of executive affa i rs , trenches upon the time -honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not di rectly depriving the courts of their independence, i t would endanger the

rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily tra nsformed into a means of predetermining the outcome

of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republ ic Act No. 5179 of the Circui t Criminal Courts for the purpose of a l leviating the

burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the

disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual

cases to the ci rcuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly s ince Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of i ts Part

V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in

Section 3 of Part I I I thereof, provides that the transfer to Ci rcui t Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of Fi rs t Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify

any executive arbi tration of what particular cases should be apportioned to ei ther tribuna l . The very terms of Adminis trative

Order No. 226, i s sued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not di recting, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of Fi rs t

Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos . 44-V and 47-V (People vs . Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the

impropriety of imperatively di recting transfer of speci fied cases . Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Adminis trative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the

l imits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.

It i s unfortunate, however, that in refusing to cons ider Department Adminis trative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as

mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez fa i led to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circui t Criminal

Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they fel t thei r

l ives would be endangered. This cla im was buttressed by the affidavi ts of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses , reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and

48-V and expressing their willingness to testify i f the cases are heard outs ide of I locos Sur, where they can be free from tens ion and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be

cons idered fanciful and unfounded when account i s taken of the ci rcumstances that the informations fi led in the Court of Fi rs t Instance of I locos Sur show that of the one hundred armed

participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipa l i ty of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are s ti l l

unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influentia l fami ly in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first dis trict of

I locos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases , and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to s ilence them; that

i t i s not shown that the Executive branch is able or wi l l ing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even i f armed security escorts were to be provided,

the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 Jan uary

and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21 were solved;

and, finally, that the promotion and confi rmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of Fi rs t Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch II I , was actively

supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to peti tioner's supplemental memorandum).

This just refusal to testify in I locos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occas ion freely given evidence

before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outs ide of I locos Sur, i f the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the

interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fai r chance to present i ts s ide of the case.

The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the tria l s i te can not be made, because i t i s a long s tanding rule of criminal

procedure in these Is lands that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phi l .

376, andPeople vs. Mercado, 65 Phi l . 665, that the jurisdiction of a

Court of Fi rs t Instance in the Philippines i s l imited to certa in wel l -defined terri tory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons

charged with one offense committed outside of that l imited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in a ll criminal prosecutions the action shal l be

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ins ti tuted and tried in the court of the municipa l i ty or province

wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essentia l ingredient thereof took place."

It i s well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phi l . 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused

respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in

looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the pros ecution, as in the case at bar, i t i s but logica l that the court

should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the tria l according to the exigencies of truth and impartia l ju stice.

In the particular case before Us , to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at l iberty

to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicia l process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been

established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fa i r and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted

that the exigencies of justice demand that the genera l rule rel ied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of

the law would become the highest injustice "summum jus, summa in juria."

The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the tria l to a s i te where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equiva lent to ra i l roading them into a

conviction. Because regardless of the place where i ts evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the gui l t of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly

lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay i ts case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of

evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither chal lenge nor appeal .

We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us , are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicia l

Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicia l power connotes certain incidenta l and inherent attributes reasonably

necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do a l l things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective

institution of government" (Borromeo vs . Mariano, 41 Phi l . 322). One of these incidenta l and inherent powers of courts i s that of

transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fa i r and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands .

This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court,208 Mass . 162, 21 Ann.

Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, sa id that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back as i t can be traced."

And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was ful ly discussed, and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:

There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors , ... that where i t

appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartia l tria l in the proper county, then this

court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is ca lled, and to bring i t into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to

change the venue ... has been exercised by this

court from a very early period. We have reported cases , where the doctrine i s la id down in

emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The genera l

jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to

change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt.

This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of

authori ty, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, i t was held that the power to transfer the place of holding tria ls

became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the independence of this

country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of

very many i f not a ll of our s tates, ei ther by force of express statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same.

That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Phi l ippine

courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Phi l ippine Commiss ion, then

composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with the insti tutions and traditions of the common law.

In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phi l . 300, 333, this Court s tated: And i t i s safe to say that in every volume of the Phi l ippine Reports, numbers of cases might be

ci ted wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the

legis lation enacted i n and for the Phi l ippine Is lands s ince they passed under American sovereignty.

Among the earliest measures of the Phi l ippine Commiss ion, after the establ ishment of Civi l

Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in

the Phi lippine Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of Fi rs t Instance, and

substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out in genera l terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the

new courts and their judges. The majori ty of the members of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers . The spiri t with which i t i s

informed, and indeed i ts very la nguage and terminology would be unintelligible without some

knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United States . Its mani fest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with

i ts incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in a l l i ts essential characteristics upon the judicial systems

of the United States . It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential principles and

settled doctrines on which the new system rests , must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system.

Whi le not express ly conferred by Act 136, We find i t di fficul t to bel ieve that the framers ' intent was to deny, by s i lence, to the

Phi l ippine Courts , and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts

under their common law heri tage to transfer the place of tria l of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fa i r and impa rtia l inquiry and adjudication.

Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or genera l authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the

exercise of their judicia l functions , upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even i f not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when

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so demanded by the interest of justice i s equal ly essentia l and

possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua case just ci ted:

The grounds of public pol icy and the reasoning

upon which the doctrine i s based are not less forceful and imperative in these Is lands than in

the countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons ass igned ... leaves no room for doubt that a

fa i lure to recognize i t as an incident to the new judicia l system would materia l ly impair i ts usefulness and tend very s trongly to defeat the

ends for which it was establ ished. (21 Phi l . 333-334)

Not only has there been s ince then no proof of any speci fic pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the

law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in i ts Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of its existence:

SEC. 4. The Circui t Criminal Courts may hold sess ions anywhere within their respective

dis tricts:Provided, however, that cases shal l be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense was committed. And

provided further, that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring

province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)

Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by

the fi ling of the criminal case in question with the Court of Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; s ince the hol ding of the

tria l in a particular place i s more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; s ince the interests of truth and justice can not be

subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to tria l in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because i ts witnesses , for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent

court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by i t under the Constitution and

the s tatutes, should decree that the tria l of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circui t Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio

Ci ty, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, i f ci rcumstances so demanded.

Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquitta l , would remove any

doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the tria l Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo fami ly.

The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phi l . 523, where We sa id:

... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the

powers of the court within the limitations s et by natura l justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the

powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not

to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in

righteous action. It may be said in pass ing that the most sa l ient

objection which can be urged against procedure

today i s that i t so restricts the exercise of th e court's power by technica l i ties that part of i ts

authority effective for justice between the parties i s many times in incons iderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart

justice. Its proper a im is to faci l i tate the

appl ication of justice to the riva l cla ims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to faci l i tate and promote the

administration of justice. It does not consti tute the thing i tself which courts are a lways striving to

secure to l itigants. It i s des igned as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, i t i s a means to an end. It i s the means by which

the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration

of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave cri ticism. (Mani la Ra i lroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phi l. 523, 529

[1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing suppl ied.)

In resume, this Court holds , and so rules :

(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer

thereto speci fied and individual cases ; (2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicia l Power

vested by the Consti tution upon i t and other s tatutory Courts , possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and dispos i tion of a case pending in a Court of Fi rs t Instance be

transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a tria l by the court that

originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fai r and impartia l tria l and lead to a miscarriage o f justice.

(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos . 47-V and 48-V of the Court of Fi rs t Instance of I locos Sur to the Circui t Criminal

Court of the Second Judicia l Dis trict, in the interest of truth and justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the wri ts of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent Court of

Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, i s susta ined in so far as i t holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department

of Justice i s not mandatory, but only di rectory; nevertheless , sa id order i s declared in grave abuse of discretion and set as ide in so far as i t

decl ines to transfer the trial of i ts cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and sa id respondent Court i s accordingly directed and

ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesa id to the Circui t Criminal Court of the

Second Judicia l Dis trict for hearing of the evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest ava i lable

date, and such other proceedings as the Circui t Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice.

The accused are required to fi le ba i l bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for

the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as their present ba i l bonds , which wi l l be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fi fteen (15) days from

fina l i ty of this decis ion. No specia l pronouncement as to costs .

(separate opinions were not included here)

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G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Peti tioners ,

vs .

VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent. D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assai l ing the 18 December 2002 Decis ion 1 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and i ts 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Recons ideration. The dispos i tive

portion of the assa i led decis ion reads as fol lows: WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to

have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in i ssuing the assa i led Orders , the instant peti tion for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition i s hereby GRANTED

and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and i t i s hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismiss ing

the two (2) Informations for Murder, a l l i s sued by publ ic respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos . 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the

Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Pres iding Judge Wi l fredo Tumal iuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos . 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases

of Branch 36 of the Regional Tria l Court of Santiago Ci ty, Isabela ; and

3. Publ ic respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the

apprehens ion of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos .

36-3523 and 36-3524. 2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as fol lows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identi fied as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and El izer Tuliao, son of private respondent

Virgi lio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional

Tria l Court (RTC) of Santiago Ci ty. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 Apri l 1999, the RTC

of Mani la convicted a ll of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arra igned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this

Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Madera l was arrested. On 27 Apri l 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio,

a certa in Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and El i zer Tul iao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal compla int for murder against peti tioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the

sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding

Judge Wi l fredo Tumal iuan issued warrants of arrest aga inst peti tioners and SPO2 Madera l .

On 29 June 2001, petitioners fi led an urgent motion to complete

prel iminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumal iuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying

sa id urgent motion on the ground that, s ince the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons , the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed

the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad

took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against peti tioner Miranda. He l ikewise

applied this Order to peti tioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the sa id Joint

Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October

2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari , mandamus and prohibi tion with this Court, with p rayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from

further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nul l i fy the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restra ining order against Judge

Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against

peti tioners . On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15

November 2001, and issued the temporary restra ining orde r whi le referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the meri ts .

Respondent Tul iao fi led with this Court a Motion to Ci te Publ ic Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "del iberately

and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismiss ing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred sa id

motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiora ri , prohibi tion and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assa i led decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the

criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago Ci ty, as well as the i ssuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decis ion, but the same was

denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Hence, this peti tion.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the fol lowing ass ignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in revers ing and setting as ide the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,

2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating

the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Pres iding Judge Wi l fredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction

of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in di recting the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-

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3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the

Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Phi lippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest aga inst herein peti tioners .

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a revers ible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.

36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Phi lippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest aga inst

herein petitioners , the order of dismissa l i s sued therein having become fina l and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires nei ther jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

The fi rst assignment of error brought forth by the peti tioner deals

with the Court of Appeals rul ing that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief i f he does not submit his

person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired ei ther through compulsory process , such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such

as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It i s only when the court has a lready acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs .

Al fonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus , an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may va l idly act on his peti tion for judicia l rel iefs .3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that peti tioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicia l

rel ief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their l iberty at the time they fi led their "Urgent Motion to complete

prel iminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to reca l l an d/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Peti tioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that

such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was a l ready acquired by the court by

their fi l ing of the above Urgent Motion. In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the

adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Reti red Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it i s not necessary for the court to fi rs t acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the

case or grant other relief. The outright dismissa l of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Al lado vs . Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cau se

without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs . Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the i ssuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the

Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs . Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissa l of

the case for lack of probable cause.6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was a l ready acquired by their fi l ing of the above Urgent Motion, peti tioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.

Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court

acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accompl ished ei ther by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover,

appearing for arraignment, entering tria l ) or by fi l ing ba i l . On the

matter of bail, since the same is intended to obta in the provis ional l iberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authori ties

ei ther by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody

of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but i s not required for the adjudication of other rel iefs sou ght by the

defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accompl ished ei ther by arrest or

voluntary surrender,9 whi le jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appe arance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the

jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by vi rtue of a warrant files a motion before arra ignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the

jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his tria l

has commenced. 11

Being in the custody of the law signifies restra int on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own wi l l and l iberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of

the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes , but i s not l imited to, detention.

The s tatement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 ci ted by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in

the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads :

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his l iberty. A person who has not submitted himsel f to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to

invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have di l igently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he

indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before cons idering the appl ication for ba i l . 13

Whi le we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as i t concerns bail, we clarify that, as a genera l rule, on e who seeks an affi rmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of

the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affi rmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings , consti tutes voluntary appearance.

Pico deals with an application for ba i l , where there i s the specia l requirement of the appl icant being in the custody of the law. In

Fel iciano v. Pas icolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of ba i l i s to secure ones release and i t would be incongruous to grant bail to one

who is free. Thus, ba i l i s the securi ty required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that i t discourages and prevents

resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and

compl iance with the requirements therefor. 17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that fi l ing pleadings

seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer i s precisely for the

avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissa l are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; an d (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the

defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third i s a

consequence of the fact that i t is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that i s the very

i ssue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases , jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the

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accused when he files any pleading seeking an affi rmative rel ief,

except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving specia l appe arances , an accused can invoke the

processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, i f a person invoking the

special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must fi rs t submit himsel f to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the genera l rule applies, i .e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affi rmative rel ief.

Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best i l lustrate this point, where we granted various rel iefs to accused who were not in the

custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information

due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Al lado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a

temporary restra ining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us .

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants

of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and

to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests aga inst the accused. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a peti tion for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part

of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the i ssuance of

the warrants of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the

law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of ba i l to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can

afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense i f ever he is proven gui l ty. On the other hand, i f we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to

persons not in the custody of the law, i t would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This i s because i t is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who

wi l l decide whether or not he fol lowed the Consti tution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion

to quash i f he rea l ly did find probable cause after personal ly examining the records of the case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regulari ty of officia l functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the

day and night.22

Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, s ince fl ight i s indicative of gui l t.

In fine, as much as i t is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it i s l ikewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom

before asserting i t. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights ,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and

not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently fi led peti tion for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the pol i tica l cl imate consti tutes grave abuse of

discretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions

of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a l i ttle too eager of dismiss ing the criminal cases against the peti tioners . Fi rs t, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest i s sued by his predecessor

because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice,

and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the ci ty. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affi rmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases

on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with di fferent accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to i ssue a

temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of peti tioners , peti tioner Miranda appealed the assis tant prosecutors resolution

before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the bas is of sa id appeal . According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and

because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings i s but proper."24 Quashal on this basis i s grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and obl ivious to

comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the ass is tant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even i f the

peti tion for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review

of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25

we held that the peti tioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they s till have the right to appeal the adverse

resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Simi larly, the i ssuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order i f true: violation of the Consti tution.

Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the

above-quoted constitutional proscription, which i s Sec. 2, Article II I Bi l l of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and

to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or i ssue, after a deep perusal of the arguments ra ised, this Court, through [its] regular Pres iding Judge, finds meri t in the contention of herein accused -

movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26

Judge Anghad is referring to the fol lowin g provis ion of the

Consti tution as having been violated by Judge Tumal iuan: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses ,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shal l be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall i ssue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely

abused his discretion. According to peti tioners :

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order i tself, which

clearly s tated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certi fication, under oath, of the fi sca l and not on a separate determination personal ly made by the Judge. No presumption of

regulari ty could be drawn from the order s ince i t express ly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fi sca l s certi fication.28

Peti tioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order conta ins no such indication that he rel ied solely on the prosecutors

certi fication. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the

Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personal ly eva luating the records x x x.[29]

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The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was

accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Fel ix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the fol lowing:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S.

Reyes ; 2. Affidavi t dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; 3. Affidavi t dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; 5. Affidavi t dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 Apri l 1999 of the Regional Tria l Court of Mani la , Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355; 7. Sworn s tatement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Madera l ;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001; 9. Affidavi t-compla int of Vi rgi l io Tul iao; and 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tul iao

and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumal iuan of Article II I , Section 2, of the Consti tution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive

part of said section, i .e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after

a lmost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) i t was given by someone who rendered himsel f untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years ; (3) i t was given in

exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) i t was given during the election period amidst a "pol i tica l ly charged scenario where "Santiago Ci ty voters were pi tted agai nst

each other a long the lines of the Miranda camp on one s ide and former Ci ty Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and a l legedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no

reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan. It i s important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibili ty of a witness i s not within the province of the determination of probable

cause. As we held in Webb33

: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing

that more l ikely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of gui l t, nei ther on evidence

establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and defini tely, not on evidence establ ishing absolute certa inty of gui l t. As wel l put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than

"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the

suspect to s tand tria l . It i s not a pronouncement of gui l t. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be

determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of tria l x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decis ion of this Court in another case with di fferent accused consti tutes grave abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things , that there was a peti tion for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.

However, after the Secretary of Justice affi rmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the bas is of the fol lowing explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs . Wilfredo Leano,

et a l ., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn s tatements , he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators , the October 9,

2001 Decis ion of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of

murder, certa inly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of fa lsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting sa id

officers "who were likewise falsely l inked by said Rodel Maderal in his Apri l 27, 2001 s tatements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore

the same is without probable va lue." This Court agrees with the

defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals s tatements wh en the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Madera l i s

supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decis ion adverted to, the probative va lue of hi s

s tatements i s practica l ly ni l . x x x x

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissa l of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme

Court in People of the Philippines vs . Wilfredo Leao, et a l ., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect dis regarding a l l the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly,

the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twis t our decis ion and interpret i t to the discredit of SPO2

Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decis ion, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the bas is of the

dismissal of criminal case against di fferent accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We

never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to th e gui l t of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case rel ied on ci rcumstantia l

evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the peti tioners in the case at bar as there i s here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had

no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It i s preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of

reasonable doubt in Leao, "i t i s now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured s tatements and therefore the same is without probable va lue."35 On the contrary, i f

we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probabi l i ty of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probabi l i ty of gui l t

certa inly meets the cri teria of probable cause. We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissa l of the

informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibi ting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was fi led the day after the

informations were dismissed. While the dismissa l of the case was able to beat the effectivi ty date of the temporary restra ining order,

such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to i ssue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nul l i fi cation of a proceeding necessari ly carries with i t the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nul l i fied proceeding.

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumal iuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to i ssue

apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the peti tioners , i t was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the

warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be

a l lowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other di rection. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25

June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37

which issued the warrants of

arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals l ikewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certa inly, the

declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with i t the reinstatement of the orders set as ide by the nul l i fied proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest

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had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth

deemed unquashed. Even i f, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the i ssuance of

new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, i t would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records

of the preliminary investigation had been avai lable to the Court of Appeals, and are a lso available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the

case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Al lado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals , the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective

cri teria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the deci s ion of a

judge reversing a finding of probable cause, a lso on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arra ignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement

of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, a l leging that the order of dismissal i ssued therein had become fina l and executory.

According to peti tioners : It i s also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of

Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tul iaos Peti tion for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent

before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the fi rst page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders i ssued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obvious ly, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND

36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the va lidity or nul l i ty of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38

Peti tioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of

Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001

Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in

fi l ing with this Court a Motion to Ci te Public Respondent in Contempt, a l leging that Judge Anghad "del iberately and wi l l ful ly committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order

dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred sa i d motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referra l of respondent Tul iaos

peti tion for certiorari , prohibi tion and mandamus. Our referra l to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Ci te Publ ic

Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the i ssues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals . In cla iming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in i ssuing the

14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave a buse of discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating i t so as to avoid the

effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In sa id 12 November

2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal

cases upon the respondent Tuliaos fi l ing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tul iao had fi led the bond on 15 November 2005.

Whi le we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt,

seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to

ci te public respondent in contempt and for other rel iefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer

for the nul l i fi cation of sa id 14 November 2001 Order. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arra ignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy

cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and i t was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the origina l peti tion for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqual i fy Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that

the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to fol low the case of People v. SPO1

Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the Ci ty of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII , Section 4,

of the Consti tution. WHEREFORE, the peti tion i s DENIED. The Decis ion dated 18

December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in

the Regional Trial Court of the Ci ty of Mani la . In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decis ion be furnished the Executive

Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Santiago, Isabela , who is di rected to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Santiago, Isabela , i s l ikewise di rected to report to this Court

compl iance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases ;

3) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Manila shal l pro ceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the

transfer; 4) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Mani la i s l ikewise

di rected to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from sa id compl iance; and

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled i s di rected to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

6) Fina lly, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is di rected to i ssue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehens ion of

peti tioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restra

crim pro 1st case list

Documents

transfer of criminal

transfer of venue

camp crame

court of quezon ci

vincent crisologo

defendant crisologo

place of trial

place of hearing