consti feb 10 digest

8/13/2019 Consti Feb 10 Digest

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Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend

loans to various individuals. Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. Mangali thereafter extended

loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale.

The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had

been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an

entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted

Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition.

Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that their was conspiracy between her and the borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment

operation was illegal due to some irregularities which attended her arrest.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the irregularities of the entrapment operation may nullify Eugenios conviction

2. Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of conspiracy

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

On the alleged irregularities attending Eugenios arrest and custodial investigation

Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment operation was illegal because it was conducted by a division of the NBI which does not deal with estafa

or fraud and without the participation of the police. Petitioner also alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither i nformed of her constitutional right to counsel nor

afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBIs entrapment operation, rendering the same without any probative value in

determining whether or not a criminal act has been committed.

Respondent does not contest petitioners claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming they did take place, do

not work to nullify petitioners conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the

arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure

to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Indeed,

not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary.

As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person under

investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted

confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused.

The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy to render petitioner liable as principal to Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following modes:

(1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

(3) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;(4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(5) Altering true dates;

(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

(7) Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement

contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

(8) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused. However, this does not dispense with the

requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy

suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as

accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused.

Taking into account admitted facts and unrebutted claims, her participation in the events leading to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt as

to her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and lending businesses

and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner.

As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions. This also explains why she was present in

all the occasions Mangali met Saquitan and Tyshe was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to receive

commission from Mangali.

On petitioners disclosure to Mangali that TCT No. 171602 is registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register

of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office. The prosecution did not rebut this.

In sum, we hold that the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed,when, as here, the circumstances

surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her

innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.

G.R. No. 169431 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007People of the Philippines, appellee


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vs Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, appellantPonente: Tinga

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirmingthe consolidated judgment of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was

found guilty of 2 counts of murder sentenced to the penalty of

reclusion perpetua for each count, plus indemnity for the heirs of the

2 victims.

In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged

with the murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.

Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion,

Palawan the accused conspired, confiderating together and mutually

helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of

superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladedweapons the victims.

Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded

not guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy.

Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was affirmed.

Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and

reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the

officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team

saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and

Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death washypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab

wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon

information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes.

The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the

latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make

confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to

the police station and later brought to the house of the only

available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes

is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station

was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house

of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of cULION, 2 SB

officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge).

Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized.

Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was files against Regino

who was likewise arrested. MTC of Culion conducted preliminary

investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was

ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding

of the TC by including Regino in the information, but then the latter

had left Culion already.

Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he

has nothing to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar,illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters


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away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the

killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked

by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a

banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall.

Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the

police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did notbelieve him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain document for his

release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb,

dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to

the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he

was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later

brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther,

which he refused for fear of being shot.

On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found

him guilty.

Issues: (1) Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and(2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premediation was

likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:(1) There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the

alleged confession and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of

the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold

that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be

discarded.

Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicialconfession, to be admissible, must conform to the following

requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession

must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent

counsel, preferably of the confessants choice;3) the confession must

be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but

was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was

detained from 11 oclock in the morning of22 October 1995 up to the

morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was

allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed

of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect,

contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory

constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started

to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of

Atty. Reyes.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when

the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved

crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.

According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter

already insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in

the killing.


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In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should

likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his

rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and

meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the

degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the

education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances ofthe person undergoing investigation.In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation

appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact

should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he

understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the

contents of his alleged confession.The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the

person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of

his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an

interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established.

Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain

whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making thealleged confession.

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad

would have been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the

translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand what was

going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellants

claim that he had never met Abad.

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when

accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even

if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there isno showing that the rights of a person under investigation were

effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The

interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights

were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant.

(2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed.

Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit

admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect,

the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he

waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant

did not make any such waiver.Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be

grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellants

counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation.

(3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the

contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the

contrary. The trial court found that appellants bare denials failed

to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to

hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce

to its admissibility.First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have

been supplied by the investigators themselves.Second, the prosecutionfailed to establish the actual date of the killings. The actual date


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of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the

credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of

the alleged confession.

(4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they aresubsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. There must be such

corroboration so that when considered in connection with the

confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable

doubt.As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom

the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the

time the confession was made or by any other evidence. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well

as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellants statement

could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of

Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial

investigation. However, they were not presented in court.

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a

doubt which must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession

should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we are left with the

unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of

authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective

testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we

find the same insufficient bases to hold appellants extrajudicial

confession admissible against him.