consti 2 case digest fayda black
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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO HIU -vs-
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, VICTOR ALABANZA
G.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967
FACTS:
The petitioners, Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 which was put into action by the City Mayor of Manila who was sued in his capacity. The purpose of such ordinance is to reduce the incidents of hurting public morals or immorality like prostitution and thrill seeking. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its 18 members, “operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities.” Thus, it was also then alleged during that time the ordinance was enacted.
The said ordinance was asserted of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process; that it would require that the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of the hotel, motel or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to the public view at all times and in his presence; that such establishments would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, Chief of Police or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds; that the classification of motels into two classes is also violative of due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive; that persons below 18 years old are not allowed to be accepted in such establishments unless accompanied by parents or unlawful guardian is also oppressive.
In an answer filed, the ordinance being challenged bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of police power.
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ISSUE:
Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels is valid exercise of police power and/or constitutional.
HELD:
A Manila Ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does “to all the great public needs.”
LAO H. ICHONG- vs-
Amfccariaga, LLB-1
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JAIME HERNANDEZ and MARCELINO SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957
FACTS:
There was the happening of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1180 otherwisely known as "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." This act nationalizes the retail trade business. The petitioner and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, filed an action to obtain a judicial declaration of its unconstitutionality. The said action also wanted to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing the provisions expressly mandated by the said act.
Ichong then denied the presumption that there is the evident presence of alien predominance and the aliens can have the control in the retail trade. On the other hand, there is an allegedly well-grounded fear which was unfounded and presence of threat. Furthermore, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not in the enactment of R.A 1080 is a valid exercise of the police power of the government.
2. Whether or not the statute denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Further the Constitution does not define
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the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. The law in question in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien control and dominance. The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
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limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification. The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real, and reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of the Court to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limits of equal protection established by the Constitution.
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES -vs-
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SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, MARIA DEL CARMEN ROXAS DE ELIZALDE, CONCEPCION CABARRUS VDA. DE
SANTOS, MILAGROS AND INOCENTES DE LA RAMA, ALFREDO GUERRERO
G.R. No. 137569 June 23, 2000
FACTS:
Milagros and Inocentes de la Rama and Alfredo Guerrero entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on, December 14, 1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. De la Ramas and Guerrero had a conflict. They both claim that they are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of the 920 square meters.
The De la Ramas claim that they should receive the amount of just compensation because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on February 17, 1983. On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero argued that the title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the De la Ramas are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the lad in question.
HELD:
It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract's validity, which paved the way for the
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subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. The contention that the Deed of Absolute Sale excluded the portion expropriated by the government is untenable. The Deed of Absolute Sale does not say that the expropriated portion of the lot was excluded from the sale. Rather, it states that the entire property, consisting of 4,075 square meters, was being sold free from all liens and encumbrances except the lien in favor of the government over the portion being expropriated by it. Stated in another way, Guerrero was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the government. Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. This contract was registered in the Register of Deeds and, accordingly, a new transfer certificate of title was issued to Guerrero. Pursuant thereto, and by virtue of subrogation, the latter became the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation from the Republic.
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ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES INC. - vs- SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343 July 14, 1989
FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order 228 on July 17, 1987, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of Presidential Decree 27 providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131, instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. After a debate, the result was the enactment of republic Act 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
GR No.79777
A nine-hectare riceland worked by four tenants was owned by Nicolas Manaay and his wife while Augustin Hermano owned a five-hecater Riceland and was worked by four tenants. Thereby, the tenants of the said lands were declared as ful owners under PD 27. The original owners contended the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.
GR No. 79310
The landowners and sugar planters in the Victoria’s Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental; and the planter-members of Planter’s Committee Inc. filed a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming that the power to provide for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. They even contended that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of EO 229. On the other hand, on the same statute, Section 6 provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines “shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner’s declaration of current fair market value
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as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.” The said compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. A coconut planter named Prudencio Serrano, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of EO 229. He even raised the reason why EO 229 is unconstitutional such as: (1) only public lands should be included in the CARP; (2) EO 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on 2 July 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
GR No.79744
Inocentes Pabico alleged that the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to Salvador Talento, Jaime Abogado, Conrado Avanceña, and Roberto Taay, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. Pabico protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the Talento, et. al. He even claimed that his petition was denied without hearing.
GR No.78742
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., and its members invoke in their petition the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. The said lands are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They asked the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the rules on the ground that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the DAR has not issued the implementing rules required under PD 316 and PD 27.
ISSUE:
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Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money.
HELD:
The framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are “negotiable at any time.” The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs- COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002
FACTS:
The subject matter of the present case is the 76, 589 square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondent, which form part of the 544, 980 square meters of land expropriated by the Republic for the utilization of the Philippine Information Agency. More than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan issued an order of condemnation. Petitioner failed to pay the respondents the compensation pursuant to the trial court’s decision.
Five years after the 1979 judgment had become final, the respondents instituted proceedings for payment against the petitioner. The Bulacan RTC issued a writ of execution for the implementation of the February 26, 1979 decision. Despite the trial court’s decision, respondents were remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case. Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to permit deposit in court the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The respondents then opposed the said motion. Somme areas of the expropriated land were expropriated again to expansion of the facilities of Bulacan State University and area exclusively for the propagation of caraboas. Respondents then questioned the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, printing out that its present use differs fro the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Santos’ heirs are entitled to the return of the expropriated property.
HELD:
The constitutional limits of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
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described to be the price fixed by the seller in an open market in the usual and ordinary cause of legal action and competition or the fair market value of the property as between one who receives to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if the property is taken for the public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
Thus, the private respondents are not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, however, they deserved to be paid promptly on the award of just compensation.
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PHILEX MINING CORPORATION –vs- COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF APPEALS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998
FACTS:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amounting P 123, 821, 982.52. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit or refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P 119, 977, 037.02 plus interests. The BIR found no merit in Philex’s position. No legal compensation can take place since these pending claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty. The BIR reiterated its demand that Philex settle the amount plus interest within 30 days from the receipt of the letter. BIR denied the offsetting of Philex’s clam for VAT input credit or refund against its excise tax obligation, Philex rasied the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed is justified.
HELD:
Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex’s position, it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified Phiilex posits the thery that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all , it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/ refund BIR. The justices fail to see the logic of Philex’s claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex’s whimsical reason would render ineffective the tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence.
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SECRETARY OF JUSTICE - vs-
HON. RALPH C. LATION and MARK B. JIMENEZ
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
FACTS:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country,” on January 13, 1977. On 13 November 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.” The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 on June 18, 1999 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of the law such as: (1) Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; (2) Attempt to evade or defeat tax; (3) Fraud by wire, radio, or television; (4) False statement or entries; and (5) Election contributions in name of another. On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Jimenez requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government upon the pending evaluation of the extradition documents, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given enough time to comment on the request. But the Secretary denied on the said request. He then filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus; certiorari; and prohibition, with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
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of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.
HELD:
Presidential Decree 1069 provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained the same idea. Jimenez is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process’ evaluation stage. Moreover, an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances “must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness and he is not deprived of due process.
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PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION –vs- HONORABLE PETE PRADO
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS:
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judge will be prejudiced by the measure set. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
The petitioners contended that the submitted and enacted RA 7354 violates the Constitution which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. In that case they have submitted Section 35 of RA 7354. They even contended that the said statute is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice President; Senators and members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former President of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of the complaints against public office or offices.
The respondents, in defense, counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with equal protection clause. The franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also of the office of Adult Education; Institute of National Language; Telecommunications
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Office; Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; National Historical Commission; AFP; AFP Ladies Steering Committee City and provincial Prosecutors; Tanodbayan; Kabataan Barangay; Commission on the Filipino Language; Provincial and City Assessors; and National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7354 observed the requirements of equal protection clause.
HELD:
Section 35 of RA 7354 is violative of equal protection clause.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The repealing clause of RA 7354 is discriminatory that it denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the then franking privilege.
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DAVID –vs- MACAPAGAL –ARROYO (PD 1017)
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
FACTS:
There are seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5. The petitioners contended that the respondent officials therein were actually tramping upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Thus, they alleged that such issuance were void and unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 171396
Petitioners David and Llamas alleged that on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power 1.
G.R. No. 171409
At around 12;20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives “raided and ransacked without warrant” the office of the petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune. They confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures and mock-ups. The basis was PD 1017.
G.R. No. 171483
On February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang
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Mayo Uno(KMU). The police showed a warrant of arrest dater 1985. The alleged members were also arrested and detained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests made on the petitioners and search and seizure in the things are valid.
HELD:
The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures, and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
The warrantless search of the Daily Tribune’s Offices are illegal. The said offices were searched without warrant; the police operatives seized materials for publication; the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily tribune except the security guard of the building. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure which such rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
In G.R. No. 171396, the arrest was not valid for it did not comply with the rules prescribed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the arrests without warrant.
In G.R. No. 171483, the arrest was not also valid. In order that arrest would be valid the warrant must have the date it was issued and it must be recent order of the court.
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SOLIVEN –vs- JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN –vs- JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
FACTS:The petitioners, who were publisher and columnist of the
“Philippine Star,” were complained by the President for committing acts of libel based from the statements made by Beltran in his column dated October 12, 1987 attacking the Aquino administration. The President filed a petition against the petitioners. But Beltran moved for dismissing the complaint against them. The fiscal denied their motion. Subsequently, the petitioners filed motion for reconsideration, however, the court denied the same motion. Thereby, Judge Ramon P. Makasiar issued a warrant of arrest for Beltran and other petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Makasiar committed grave abuse of discretion on issuing warrant of arrest.
HELD:
Judge Ramon P. Makasiar did not commit grave abuse of discretion on issuing warrant of arrest.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
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probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of the probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before the courts. The Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
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MAYOR BAI UNGGI D. ABDULA & ODIN ABDULA –vs- HONORABLE JAPAL M. GUIANI
G.R. No. 118821 February 18, 2000
FACTS:
A complaint for murder was filed against herein petitioners and six other persons in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen. Salick U. Panda dismissed the charges of murder. Prosecutor Panda recommended the filing of an information for murder against certain Kasan Mama, thus, an information was then filed.
In an order, the Respondent Judge ordered that the case be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. The order also noted that although there were 8 respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court “charged only one of the 8 respondents without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. After evaluation of the evidence, Dimaraw recommended the filing of charges against herein petitioners. Prosecutor Panda added a notation stated that he was inhibiting the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose the case without his approval. The judge then issued a warrant of arrest for the petitioners.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the judge complied with rules regarding the issuance of warrant of arrest.
HELD:
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer. The judge did not comply the rules in the issuance of warrant of arrest. Thus, the respondent judge clearly admitted that he issued the said warrant and he had no doubt on the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing the warrant of arrest. Thus, the warrant of arrest was declared null and void.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs- NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ “BOBONG” & GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
“BOBOY”
G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3 Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see if there was really the said marijuana pusher. His informer pointed to a motorcycle driver, Mula, as the pusher. As to the other accused Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. The names and addresses of the accused came to his knowledge.
On August 8, 1996, 7:30in the morning, SPO1 received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at the NHA Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Acting on that information, he called for assistance which the precinct where he was assigned dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon (his brother) and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. On the same day, while the team was waiting, a “trisikad” carrying the alleged pusher passed by. The police officers ordered the “trisikad” to stop at that point, Mual who was holding a black bag handed it to Molina. Consequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police
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officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina resisted but SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Afterwhich, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
Through the counsels of the accused-appellants filed a Demurrer to evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence having been obtained in violation f their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of Mula and Molina is valid.
HELD:
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situation. Under the first exception, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before search can be made - the process cannot be reversed; as a rule, an arrest is considered if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Thus, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Evidently, SPO! Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officer themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants’ identity, and were, from all indications merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court, thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of the accused-appellants.
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DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO & Roberto L. MENDOZA –vs- HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO & PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado & Roberto l. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. They have been accused of heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrest without bail by the respondent judge. They were alleged to be the brains behind the said kidnapping and slaying of one Eugene Alexander Van Twest, a German National by Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary through an extrajudicial confession.
Umbal claimed that he and his companion met Allado and Mendoza at Silahis Hotel and for the consideration for P 2.5 M, that he undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Van Twest was then abducted by Umbal, ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino They blocked his car, forced him into their car and brought him to a “safe house” just behind the New Bilibid Prison. The three together with the petitioners and SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest and then made him sign certain documents
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The next day, Gamatero shot Van Twest, afterwhich Antonino stabbed him repeatedly. A day after the incident, Umbal executed his extejudicial confession, the operatives of PACC, armed with a search warrant raided the two dwellings of Santiago. The raiders recovered the car of Van Twest and assorted firearms and ammunition and arrested Santiago, Antonino and Bato. The accused were charged for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority, after evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives. Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to petitioners informing them that a complaint was filed against them, directing them to appear before the Department of Justice and submit their counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counter-affidavit, and moved for the admission of his counter-affidavit confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza.
On February 3, 1994, with the new panel failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an information had already been filed in the court. The petitioners secured a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them and 15-page undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC signed by the panel of prosecutors and at the same time, the information was filed before the RTC of Makati. Hence, the petitioners issued an opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest against the petitioners is valid.
HELD:
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he
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merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of the petitioners. In this regard, from the gathering of evidence until the termination of preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal’s sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities.
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR. -vs-
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE
G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
FACTS:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on May 11, 1992, Resolution 2323 was issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban." This law promulgates rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
Mr. Serapio P. Taccad wrote petitioner requesting the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. In the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty meters away from its entrance. Few minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the
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checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the COMELEC denied it.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is valid
2. Whether or not the non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process
HELD:
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which the Court declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
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search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case.
In the case at bench, the Supreme Court finds that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
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Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor. Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
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JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC. –vs- THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PR ESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.
No. L-64261 December 26, 1884
FACTS:
The offices of the publication of two newspapers namely the “Metropolitan Mail” and the “We Forum” were being searched. Such action was in the compliance of the two warrants being issued by the regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper were seized. The aforementioned items were allegedly used in the commission of the crime subversion.
The petitioners filed a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction issuing for the return of the seized articles and that the respondents herein should be enjoined from using the articles being seized as evidence against the petitioners. The respondents were then required to answer the petition. Thereafter, the plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the issuance of search warrant against the petitioner have a probable cause to make such action be valid.
HELD:
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive material, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. The broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publication and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as a basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
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RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (ULAP) –vs- GEN. RENATO
DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
FACTS:
On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the development of National Capital Region. As one of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/ or temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They contend that because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
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the vehicles which are subjected to regular searches and seizures are of without the benefit of search warrant or court order. The residents therein, were feared due to the death of Benjamin Parpon, who was gunned down by the members of NCRDC manning the checkpoint. They contended that such searches and seizures made by the NCRDC are made without the search warrant or court order which is in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure is violated.
2. Whether or not the checkpoints serve as blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search and seizure and are in violation of the Constitution.
HELD:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more stating the details of the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. Checkpoints during abnormal times, if conducted within reasonable limits, are constitutional.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ADREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN AND ADRIAAN VAN DEL
ELSHOUT –vs- HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION
No. L-82544 June 28, 1988
FACTS: The petitioners were apprehended from their respective
residences by the agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation by virtue of mission order issued by Miriam Defensor Santiago. Among the twenty-two suspected alien pedophiles, only the herein petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
During the apprehension of the petitioners, rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act, posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were seized. On the “Operation Report,” Harvey was stated there to be found together with two young boys while Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. Thereby deportation proceedings were instituted against the petitioners for being undesirable aliens under the Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of arrest were issued by Santiago against the petitioners for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners then filed an Urgent Petition for Release under Bond alleging that their health was not that good but the respondent denied their motion. The petitioners questioned the validity of their detention.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause to issue a valid warrant of arrest is existent.
HELD:
Probable cause has been defined as referring to “such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.”
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and are therefore admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs-
IDEL AMINNUDIN
G.R. L-74860 July 6, 1988FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, Farida Ali y Hassen was also arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. They were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. A motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a “thorough investigation” was filed by the prosecutor. The motion was granted. Thus, trial proceeded only against Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest and search done against to Aminnudin is valid.
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HELD:
It is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of its arrival was certain. From the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that “search warrant was not necessary.” The accused-appellant was not proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the ground that the marijuana which is illegally seized cannot be used as evidence against him.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs- CUIZONG. R. No. 109287 April 18, 1996
FACTS:At the Manila Peninsula Hotel, Pua and Lee were apprehended by
the NBI agents for having in their possession a quantity of “shabu”. On the other hand, while resting in his home, Cuizon was also arrested and then brought to the NBI Headqaurters for inquest. The seized “shabu” was proven to be of such prohibited drugs and was used as an admissible evidence against him. The accused then hereby proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. But Cuizon contended the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure.
ISSUE:Whether or not the warrantless arrest and searches and seizure
conducted by the NBI Constitutional.
HELD:
Basic is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land ordains. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, the
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right against warrantless search and seizure is not absolute. The exception of such id found is found under Section 5, of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. The law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belonging.
In the case at bar, the first thing which was undertaken was the search. After such search, an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the search. Thus, NBI violated the Constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs- RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN AND JAIME P. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 76005 April 23, 1993
FACTS:At a police checkpoint in Cavite City, on November 2, 1982 at
8:15 in the evening, the jeep driven by Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearm and other prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a black leather bag and he asked what it contained. ody Nobody answered. Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened because of his suspicion. Pfc. Galang found marijuana so the three were brought to the police station that same night. The bag was verified to contain marijuana so the three were charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A 6425 as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, Bocalan sought exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. He even contended that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained through warrantless search. On the other hand, Exala also denied that he did not own that marijuana and asserted that it was either Bocalan or Fernandez who owned the bag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the three accused was lawful.
HELD:
The search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in the proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is
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bound to admit the evidence. But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant’s contention deserves scant consideration.
The arrest of the three was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This one of the situations envisioned by Section 5 paragraph a, of Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal Procedure when a warrantless arrest may be made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana in violation of RA 6425.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs-
ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991FACTS:
Andre Marti went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. The accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined but he refused. Afterwards, when the packages were to be delivered to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress, Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. From that inspection and owing to his curiosity of the packages contents, he took several grams of the contents thereof. He then brought the samples extracted from the package to the NBI. It turned out that the contents were marijuana flowering tops.
An information was filed against the appellant for violation of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC convicted the accused appellant. The appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III). Appellant also contended that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence obtained is a violation of the constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.
HELD:
The Supreme Court holds in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
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First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an i l legal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain s ight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a pr ivate establ ishment for i ts own and pr ivate purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of pr ivate individual , not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protect ion against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
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HORTENCIA SALAZAR –vs- HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO AND FERDIE MARQUEZ
G.R No. 81510 March 14, 1990
FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, a sworn statement made and filed by one Rosalie Tesoro with the POEA charged Hortencia Salazar for the violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent a telegram to Salazar which contained that she should appear before the POEA. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, Administrator Achacoso issued his Closure and Seizure Order no. 1205. POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation issued an office order designating three lawyers to be members of a team being tasked to implement the said Closure and Seizure Order. Then and there, the team performed their task and found that the petitioner then was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. The counsel for Salazar flied their answer declaring that the properties seized should be immediately returned on the ground the seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of warrants of search and seizure can be made by POEA.
HELD:
Under the 1987 Constitution, Article III Section 2, it is only the judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Section 38 paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential No. 1693, in the exercise of legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. The justices reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, the justices declare that such Article of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Thus, POEA cannot issue warrants of search and seizure.
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HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS AND KARL BECK –vs- HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA AND MANUEL VILLARUEL JR. AND ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG AND JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ
No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Upon application of the offices of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan, Judge Roman Cansino, Judhe Hermogenes Caluag and Judge Damian Jimenez issued on different dates, 42 search warrants against the petitioners Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks. John Brooks and Karl Beck, and / or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the some personal properties. These properties include: Books of Accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, journals, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents, papers showing all business transactions. These items were regarded as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense which is described om applications adverted as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue and Revised Penal Code.
The petitioners filed with the Supreme Court an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction on the ground that they are alleging that the search warrants issued against them are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court,.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places.
HELD:
No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in the law’ and the
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warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned in the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. Al. may not validly object to the use in evidence against them, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES –vs-
NOEL TUDTUD
G.R.144037 September 26, 2003FACTS:
The Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier sometime between July to August, 1999 about a certain Noel Tudtud. According to Solier, his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. They gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs particularly selling marijuana. Few days after, Solier again gave a tip to the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana and even described Tudtud. Acting on the tip, the policemen who were assigned to this case approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. Thereby, they asked the man who resembled Tudtud’s description if the content of the box he was carrying was marijuana but he denied that he was carrying any drugs. One of the policeman, asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” He then opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box contained pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages then the police identified that it was drugs. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Both of them pleaded not guilty. They questioned the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Thus, denying all the charges filed against them.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not Tudtud’s implied compliance with the request of the police officers to open the box he was carrying be considered a waiver.
HELD:
Article III Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the right of a person against unreasonable search and seizure. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.
The knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as “personal,” having learned the same only from their informant Solier is useless. Solier testified that the information he relayed to the police officers are mere hearsay. Acting on such information, police officers conducted a “surveillance,” which it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere conduct of invalid search and seizure. There is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and opened the box himself.
Tudtud’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained. Further, they cannot be charged of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
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BLAS F. OPLE -vs-
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Oder No. 308 on December 12, 1996, entitled, "ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Its purpose is to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the A.O 308 issued by President Ramos is a violation of the Bill of Rights, specifically, the right to privacy. Thus, it is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
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contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
In no uncertain terms, the Supreme Court also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and compelling interests justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. The Court reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
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BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, FR. JOSE DIZON, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
FROYEL YANEZA AND FAHIMA TAJAR –vs- EDUARDO ERMITA, MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, GEN. ARTURO LUMIBAO, NCRPO Chief
Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL AND WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT CHIEF GEN. PEDRO BULAONG
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 169838, petitioners Bayan et al., allege that they are taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines and their rights as organizations and individual s were violated when the rally they participated was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P) No. 880.
In G.R. No. 169848, petitioners Jess del Prado, et al, allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. Furthermore, when they joined a rally to protest issuances of the Palace, was also dispersed violently and they even suffered injuries and were arrested.
In G.R. No. 169881, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al, allege that when they conducted a rally their rights as organizations and of those individual members as citizens are affected by B.P 880.
The three consolidated cases, the petitioners contended the validity of BP 880. They all argue that it is clearly violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. Further, they also contended that it is a curtailment of their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression on the ground that it set limits on once right of peaceable assembly.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not BP 880 curtails the right to peaceable assembly, thus it is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceable assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the others rights would meaningless and unprotected. While the right to freedom of speech, and to peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries, it is likewise a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. B.P. 88 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. Under it, the permit for a public assembly in a public place can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or health.
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ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION –vs- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 133486 January 28, 2000
FACTS:
From a reliable source, ABS-CBN has prepared a project with PR groups to conduct a radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the said election regarding the votes for national officials particularly for the two highest position, the President and Vice President. Acting on the said information, the COMELEC issued a Resolution on the ground that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the NAMFREL. Further, ABS-CBN is not authorized to undertake the exit survey. The petitioner, herein, prayed for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order which directed the COMELEC to cease and desist the implementation of the assailed Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution issued by the COMELEC is a curtailment of freedom of expression.
HELD:
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government – it is “preferred” right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. Admittedly,
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no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot be justified for in exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for it is not compulsory, but voluntarily. Indeed, tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the COMELEC so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
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SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED AND KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA
STANDARD –vs- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 147571 May 5, 2001
FACTS:
COMELEC enforced 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act) which provides “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven days before an election.” The petitioner then prayed for the prohibition to enjoin COMELEC on enforcing such law.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of elections both the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey. Further, Petitioner Kamahalan Pubishing Corporation intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections. The petitioners argue that the restriction being enforced by the COMELEC is a restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech. COMELC justified the restriction, thus, this aims to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is a restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
HELD:
Section 5.4 of RA 9006 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, ad the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of 15 days immediately preceding a national elections and 7 days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the
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constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the pres, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN –vs- COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO
G.R. No. 1126466 January 14, 1999
FACTS:
The petitioners are among the incorporators of the Philippine Star. Borjal was its President and Soliven was the Publisher and the Chairman of the Editorial Board. Borjal runs the column Jaywalker. A series of articles were written by Borjal and published in different dates in his column jaywalker. The said articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an “organizer of a conference” without naming or identifying the private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison. Wenceslao then reacted on the said articles and sent a letter to the Philippine Star insisting that he was the “organizer” whom the petitioner is referring to. Wenceslao then filed a complaint with the National Press Club against Borjal for unethical conduct and a complaint for libel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the article written by Borjal are matters which are covered by privileged communication.
HELD:
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. Privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion, which closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-expression which makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular, and political culture. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
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privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong “private communications” and “fair and true report without any comments or remarks.”
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are not within the exceptions of article 354 of the Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under article 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press, and this constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
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RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO AND ATTY. RICARDO ROMULA –vs- JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
FACTS:
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter dated on March 13, 2001 to the Court requesting to allow media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order “to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history.” The request was seconded by Cesar Sarino in his letter to Chief Justice and by Senator Renato Cayetano and Atty Ricardo Romulo. Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez filed an instant petition which mentions that the foregoing criminal cases involve a matter of public concern and interest which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the request for live radio-TV coverage of the trial of the President Joseph Estrada should be allowed by the Court.
HELD:
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The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of the court t control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. An accused has a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that is rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it not only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a court-room should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. Thus, the request for media coverage is hereby denied.
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BLO UMPAR ADIONG –vs- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the Resolution being implemented by COMELEC in so far as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. Such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11 (a) of Republic Act No. 6646. The petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. He even contended that he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed “Comelec Poster Areas.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for is null and void on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of free speech.
HELD:
The resolution prohibits the position of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is
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a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Art III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Thus, such prohibition is in itself null and void.
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA AND DULCE Q. SAGUISAG –vs- CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW
KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
FACTS:
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also named respondents.
A permit to exhibit the film “Kapit sa Patalim” under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted by the sub-committee of respondent Board. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. The Respondent Board released its decision affirming in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. The Court required respondent to answer. As a defense, it was alleged that the petition is moot as "respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution, replacing it with one immediately granting petitioner company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any deletion or cut [thus an] adjudication of the questions presented above would be academic on the case." Further: "The modified resolution of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as for-adults-only, but the petition does not raise any issue as to the validity of this classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part
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of the Board's action are the deletions ordered in the film. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.
An amended petition was then filed containing the main objection which was the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." For petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification. In an answer to the amended petition, it was asserted that the issue presented as to the previous deletions ordered by the Board as well as the statutory provisions for review of films and as to the requirement to submit the master negative have been all rendered moot. It was also submitted that the standard of the law for classifying films afford a practical and determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the limitation set on the film “Kapit sa Patalim,” is a violation of the right to freedom of expression of the petitioners.
HELD:
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression.
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is that
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where the movies, theatrical productions radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability.
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
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IN RE: EMILIANO P. JURADO EX. REL.: PLDT PER ITS FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, MR. VICENTE R.
SAMSON
A.M. No. 93-2-037, April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado is a journalist and a columnist in the Manila Standard. He had been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary. As a preventive step, the Chief Justice issued Administrative Order No. 11-93 creating an ad hoc committee to investigate reports of corruption in the Judiciary. Jurado was asked by the Ad Hoc Committee to make statements. Jurado apologized and explained that he had not “snubbed” the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee and avers that what he had written are based on information given to him by a highly reliable sources and he could not elaborate without endangering his sources. Jurado sought clarification as to the capacity in which he is being cited in the administrative and why he is being singled out, from among those who had also written about wrongdoings in the Judiciary. The Court informed Jurado that he is addressed as a journalist who coincidentally happens to be a member of the bar and granted 15 days from notice to qualify his comment and/or assert his rights and privileges in an appropriate manifestation.
Jurado moved for the termination of the proceeding on the ground that the court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of and that present administrative matter is not a citation for either direct contempt or indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not Jurado should be liable for published statements demonstrably false or misleading and derogatory of the courts and individuals.
HELD:
Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has places himself beyond the circle of Reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
Freedom of expression is among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The constitutional right or freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, this would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may be used to insult others; destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute, this would not be “to act with justice” or “give everyone his due.”
In the present proceeding, there is also involved the right to private reputation. Judges are voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from a private person. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth.
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JOSE B. L. REYES vs. RAMON BAGATSINGNo. L-65366 November 9, 1983
FACTS:
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, on behalf of Anti-bases coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and a rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the U.S Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held. The petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Mayor Ramon Bagatsing because the petitioners alleged that they had not yet been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally which it turned out that the permit they requested was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly denial was justified by clear and present danger.
HELD:
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
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application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modifications that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. In the case at bar, there was a denial of free exercise of right to free speech and peaceable assembly of the petitioner due on the notice which was never received by the petitioner.
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CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, AND JUNE LEE –vs- THE HONORABLE
ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, The GREGORION ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, CESAR MIJARES, GONZALO DEL
ROSARIO, TOMAS B. MESINA, ATTY. LEONARDO PADILLA, ATTY. FABLITA AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE AND EUGENIA TAYAO
No. L-62270 May 21, 1984
FACTS:
The petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the respondent University. They sought for a permit to conduct a meeting and it was granted. They held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court, which was the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as stated but at the second floor lobby. During the said gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched toward the Life Science Building and continued the rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance which severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. As a result, they disturbed the classes being held and the non-academic employees stopped their work because of the noise created. Thereby, the University authorities issued a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of the illegal assembly. The petitioners then questioned the validity of such memorandum and filed a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents.The private respondent Ramento found the petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph 146 © of the manual for Private Schools more particularly their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit being granted to the. They were punished for suspension of one academic year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of suspension of one academic year a severe penalty.
HELD:
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The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible correction through the ways of the law. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Authority of school officials over the conduct of their students cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free speech and assembly. A one-year suspension is too severe penalty on student rallyists even if the rally was held beyond the time permitted and went on to other portions of the University Compound thus disrupting some classes. Censure or reprimanded or one-weel suspension is reasonable.
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EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
FACTS:
The petitioners herein are students, who are Jehova’s witness, were expelled from their school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the National Anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by the Republic Act No. 1265 and Department order No. 8. Thus, the Division Memorandum No. 108 was issued by the division School Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug in accordance of the aforementioned statutes. The said memorandum is directing all district Supervisors, High School Principals, and Heads of Private educational Institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule. The members of the Jehova’s witnesses find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief. Thus the students and their parents filed for a special civil actions for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, alleging that respondents violates their Constitutional right to free public education and right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act 1265, Department Order No. 8 and Division No. 108 are violative of the petitioners’ right to freedom to public education, speech, religion and worship.
HELD:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The present Court believes that the idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one’s job, or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship.
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Jehovah’s witnesses are accorded exemption to the observance of flag ceremony in deference to their religious belief but said right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
The Supreme Court ruled that the division Memorandum No. 108 violates the rights of the respondents as Filipino citizens, under the 1987 constitution, to receive free public education, for it is the duty of the State to “protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Section 1, Article XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercise. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the National Anthem and recite the Patriotic Pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disrupt the peace, or pose “a grave and present danger” of serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
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RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA, TIRSO SANTILLAN, Jr., MA. LUISA ANDAL, NIEVE MALINIS, RICARDO LAVINA, CESAR CORTES, DANILO REYES, JOSE REYES, JOSEFINA MATE,
LOURDES CALMA ET AL. –vs- GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN AND MAJOR ISABELO LARIOSA
No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
FACTS:
The petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees, converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the t. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacanang grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along their way, they were barred by the respondent Lariosa upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan from proceeding any further on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacanang Security Area. The petitioners kept on insisting to allow them to get inside the church, but the respondents prevented them so they decided to leave. According to the petitioners, their purpose in converging was to pray and hear mass at the church but the respondents restricted them on the ground that they believe that the petitioner’s true purpose is to conduct anti-government demonstrations at the place near the Malacanang.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ right to freedom of religious worship and of locomotion denied by the respondents.
HELD:
The exercise of right to religious freedom must be done in good faith without any ulterior motive. The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners involving the constitutional guarantee of freedom religious worship and of locomotion. Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the mass action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious
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worship. Reasonable restrictions in use of thoroughfares near the Malacanang Palace are valid as threats to lives of heads of states are constant and real. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.
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IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION AND HONORABLE
HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ
G.R. NO. 119673, JULY 26, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner, Iglesia ni Cristo, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The said program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. They submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. Respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that the Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the board interferes with the petitioner’s right to free speech and religion.
HELD:
Any act that restrains exercise of right to free speech and religion is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
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to free exercise of religion. “Attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
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GREGORIO AGLIPAY –vs- JUAN RUIZG.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
FACTS:
The Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance and selling postage stamps violate the constitutional mandate.
HELD:
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
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that church. We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
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MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. –VS- COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127930, DECEMBER 15,2000
FACTS :
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction due to the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee. Instead of complying with the requirements imposed by the Discipline Committee of Miriam College the defendants contended that they have no jurisdiction to the case rather the DECS has the jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Miriam College Foundation Discipline Committee has jurisdiction to handle the case against the acts done by the editorial board.
HELD:
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Thus, the Disciplinary Committee has jurisdiction to handle the case against the acts done by the Editorial board of the School paper.
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ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL –vs- JUSTO LUKBAN, et al.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to travel of the 170 women is violated.
HELD:
These one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
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forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
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FERDINAND MARCOS -vs-
HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 8211 September 1989
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
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within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES -vs- THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA and MANUEL OPULENCIA
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
FACTS:
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.
An Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty and he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
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Fourteen (14) days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent was deprived of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
A person who was charged for violating a City Ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again for the same offense under the Revised Penal Code. The second sentence of Article III, Section 20 of the Constitution embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an Ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
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provided that both offenses charged but where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of the acts.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of the case against Opulencia amounted to an acquittal, he can no longer be charged with an offense under a different law which constituted the same act.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC95 SCRA 392
FACTS:
Igot and Salapantan Jr. , who are co-petitioners of Gov. Dumalao, assailed the validity of the following provisions of B.P. 52:
“Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to reversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any offices covered by this act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such act.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of B.P 52 are constitutional.
HELD:
The provision of the Election Code that the filing of charges for the commission of crimes before a civil or military court shall be prima facie evidence of the commission of an act of disloyalty to the State is void as it condemns a person before he is finally heard. Explicit is the constitutional provisions that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutionals presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for a public office on the ground
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alone that charge has been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It ultimate effect, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. And although the filing of charges is considered as prima facie evidence, and therefore may be rebutted, yet there is clear and present danger that because of the proximity of the elections, time constrains will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
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LOURDES T. MARQUEZ –vs- HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman and the other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relatives to the accounts in question. The lower court denied petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account violates the constitutional right to privacy.
HELD:
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
Amfccariaga, LLB-1
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An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R.A. No.1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing; 2. Impeachment case; 3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials; 4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R.A. No.3019, in cases of unexplained wealth
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that" Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another.
Thus, such in camera inspection is a violation of the constitutional right to privacy.
Amfccariaga, LLB-1